

# Dealing with Rogue States

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**I**t is yet unclear whether globalization has effected an increase in the number of so-called rogue states; however, their ability to threaten U.S. interests is increasing. The spread of information, access to communications technology, mobility of people and assets, emergence of markets in scientific expertise and weapons materials, maturation of dual-use technologies, and commercial pressure for market access—all characteristics of globalization—facilitate the work of rogue states and organizations.

The effect of rogues is compounded because globalization also seems to be impeding states' abilities to sustain their traditional realms of national power. Globalization is reducing the ability of states to maintain monopolies of information and the use of force, regulate the permeability of borders, and amass treasuries beyond the magnitude of nonstate actors. Thus, globalization seems to be increasing the prospects of rogues while diminishing U.S. capabilities to counter them.

Current U.S. policies intended to manage rogue states emphasize three elements: economic and political isolation; international regimes<sup>1</sup> to prevent the spread of technology and weapons; and punitive military actions. The first two of these elements are particularly vulnerable to diminished effectiveness as a result of globalization. The limits of U.S. knowledge about states newly able to threaten U.S. interests will complicate efforts to use military force for limited political purposes. A new strategy is needed to protect and advance U.S. interests as globalization reshapes the international environment.

The United States needs to develop new strategies that capitalize on globalization's effects, rather than seeking to forestall them. Some strategies with particular promise are ending states' political and economic isolation, increasing reliance on narrow sanctions, and making greater use of media and financial interventions. As a prudent hedging strategy, the United States should also improve its national defenses. This approach would increase the vulnerability of rogue and other potentially dangerous states to the most powerful U.S. assets—globalization's economic benefits and the attractiveness of the American way of life—while increasing U.S. protection against attacks and intimidation.

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## Will Globalization Produce More Rogues?

For at least the last 6 years, U.S. foreign policy has operated on the assumption that there exists a particular category of states that neither accept the norms of international behavior nor respond to usual means of suasion. In 1994, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake noted that U.S. foreign policy “must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also to assault its basic values,” and for which the United States has “a special responsibility for developing a strategy to *neutralize, contain,* and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually *transform* these backlash states into constructive members of the international community.”<sup>2</sup> These states—namely, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran—eventually became commonly known as “rogues.” Although officially known as “states of concern” today, U.S. policy toward these states remained largely unchanged.<sup>3</sup>

What makes a state a rogue? The U.S. Government definition has had neither satisfactory explanatory power in categorizing the constituent states about which the United States is concerned nor sufficient persuasiveness to sustain international consensus. Nonetheless, the states categorized as rogues have several common features: they are all authoritarian regimes that govern without the consent of their populations; they tend to define their interests in hostile opposition to the United States; they are all on the U.S. State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism; and, finally, as Ellen Laipson has argued, they are characterized by their isolation from international political norms and trends.<sup>4</sup>

The sum of these shared attributes has tended to make the United States particularly wary of the so-called rogue states. There is greater uncertainty about the behavior of rogues because their respective societies are less transparent and less familiar, and they have leaders who are less restrained by institutions and public opinion. That rogue states support terrorism as a means of foreign policy engagement furthers suspicion that they will not engage politically or militarily in expected or predictable ways.

Rogues, however, also have many important differences that make a uniform approach to them a less than optimal U.S. policy. Some, like North Korea and Cuba, seem to have chosen international isolation to strengthen the hold of the regime. Others, such as Iraq and Sudan, would welcome engagement by the international community but are isolated against their will by multilateral concerns and effective U.S. action. So-called rogues also differ in their degree of hostility to U.S. interests and their means of contesting U.S. policies and international norms. North Korea, whose weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional capabilities could severely damage U.S. interests, is a much greater security concern than Cuba, whose military power pales in comparison. Some rogue regimes rule forcibly, while others may be accurate reflections of society. Such differences suggest that a uniform approach may be ill conceived.

The number of rogue states has remained surprisingly stable. None of them has been consistently isolated, let alone reformed, by U.S. policies. Cuba enjoys political and economic relations with the rest of the world, including the closest U.S. allies, while President Fidel Castro restricts basic political freedoms. Muammar Gaddafi remains in power and continues to make diplomatic progress with the West even

though Libya continues to seek ballistic missiles capable of reaching Europe and beyond.<sup>5</sup> With Washington's blessing, its European allies and South Korea are cultivating their relationships with North Korea despite the regime's threatening posture toward the United States and its Asian allies.<sup>6,7</sup> Even the United States has begun normalizing relations with some of the rogues: Washington has encouraged state-to-state relations with Iran following President Mohammad Khatami's 1996 election and recently completed an exchange of high-level officials with North Korea for the first time ever.

Isolation has succeeded best against Iraq. Sanctions initiated in 1991 and subsequent bombing raids have seemingly curbed its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. However, Saddam Hussein remains in power and implacably hostile to U.S. interests, and the policy imposes substantial material and political costs on the United States and its Persian Gulf partners. Moreover, this quarantine is eroding, as France teams up with Russia at the United Nations (UN) in efforts to lift the sanctions against Iraq and humanitarian organizations become increasingly concerned about the disastrous effects of broad sanctions on the Iraqi people.

The concept of rogue states has never been fully accepted outside the United States, in part because the Clinton administration never developed a standard that could be neutrally applied to replicate their results—rogues seem to be any state hostile to the United States. Even the list of state sponsors of terrorism<sup>8</sup> is politicized: Washington has considered removing North Korea from the list to facilitate talks with Pyongyang; Syria was a candidate for removal in order to advance the Middle East peace process, even though it supports Hezbollah; and Pakistan is not included in the face of its support of terrorists in Kashmir.<sup>9,10</sup>

Even if it were possible to clearly delineate rogue states in ways that would build international support, such a categorization is not beneficial in dealing effectively with those states and may ultimately be counterproductive. Stigmatizing states—even those hostile to U.S. interests such as Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and Iraq—reduces Washington's ability to engage them when it is conducive to U.S. interests to do so and undercuts international support for U.S. efforts to confront these states.

This is especially the case since other states in the family have begun to assault its basic values. In 1998, India and Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold and engaged in a rising spiral of threats over Kashmir. Both Russia and China continue serial proliferation of their WMD arsenals and expertise, as the former conducts a brutal military campaign in Chechnya, allegedly in response to apartment bombings in Moscow during the fall of 1999. U.S. and European attempts to influence Russia's policy both during and after the Chechnya conflict have proven futile. To intimidate Taiwanese voters in advance of the 2000 elections, China has increased its ballistic missile holdings adjacent to Taiwan and threatened to attack the island if it moves toward independence, although it has been virtually independent for nearly 50 years. All of these behaviors assault basic U.S. values, yet it would hardly be productive for the United States to term any of these states rogues. With a doubtful factual basis for judging certain states as rogues, the capacity to isolate them decreasing internationally, and Washington engaging in normal foreign policy trade-

offs with so-called rogues, the United States should revisit its scarlet letter policy and delineate behaviors that threaten U.S. interests.

States that are hostile to the United States *and* either possess WMD programs or engage in international terrorism are likely to pose the greatest danger and be least amenable to more engagement: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan (table 1). States that are not hostile to the United States but that possess WMD programs or engage in international terrorism are not necessarily a threat to the United States, but they nonetheless have the means to negatively affect U.S. interests.

The number of states and organizations hostile to U.S. interests may grow in the short run as globalization exacerbates the gap between rich and poor, and states unable to cope with globalization lash out at the United States as its dominant symbol. As Director for Central Intelligence George Tenet has stated, “That we are arguably the world’s most powerful nation . . . may make us a larger target for those who don’t share our interests, values, or beliefs.”<sup>11</sup> The world’s authoritarian regimes are busier than ever fighting the tide of Western ideas, values, practices, and products. Hermit states such as North Korea, Afghanistan, and Sudan will likely continue to use opposition to the United States to justify their hostile actions because they cannot find ways to balance their values with the press of globalization.

According to Ellen Laipson, rogue states are unable to take advantage of globalization’s benefits because their “centers” are too controlling (North Korea, Cuba) or too collapsed (Sudan). In either case, the benefits of globalization are passing these states by because they are unable to establish helpful national policies or effectively bargain with their underdeveloped or corrupt private sectors. Even so, controlling states will find it impossible to shut out globalization’s effects indefinitely, as unregulated media challenge their monopoly on information and trade. Eventually, states that try to take advantage of some globalization benefits—for example, freer flows of capital—will find it exceedingly difficult to suppress other aspects—such as an even freer exchange of ideas.

In the longer run, the centripetal effects of globalization are likely to reduce the number of states that either can or want to prevent the effects of globalization. In the shorter run, the United States cannot prevent the emergence of hostile states or coalitions among disaffected states reeling from the effects of globalization. There is much the United States can do to minimize their negative impact in the interim, however.

## **Harnessing Globalization to Effect Positive Change?**

As noted earlier, U.S. policy relies on three main elements: economic and political isolation; international regimes to prevent the spread of technology and weapons; and punitive military actions. Globalization is affecting all three.

**Table 1. The Strategic Consequences of WMD Proliferation**

State	Hostile	WMD Programs	Terrorism Sponsor
<i>Countries posing national security threat to the United States</i>			
Afghanistan	Yes	No	Yes
Iran	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iraq	Yes	Yes	Yes
Libya	Yes	Yes	Yes
North Korea	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sudan	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Countries for which security threat to the United States is unclear</i>			
Algeria	No	Yes	Yes
China	?	Yes	No
Cuba	Yes	No <sup>1</sup>	No <sup>2</sup>
Russia	?	Yes	No
Serbia	?	Yes	No
Syria	No	Yes	Yes
<i>Countries posing no national security threat to the United States</i>			
Egypt	No	Yes	No
India	No	Yes	No
Israel	No	Yes	No
Pakistan	No	Yes	Yes
Saudi Arabia	No	Yes	No
South Korea	No	Yes	No
<p><sup>1</sup>In June 1999, the Department of State said it had no evidence that Cuba is stockpiling or has mass-produced any biological warfare agents.</p> <p><sup>2</sup>The State Department explains Cuba's presence on its list of state sponsors of international terrorism with the following assertion: "Cuba continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists and U.S. fugitives in 1999. A number of Basque ETA [Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, "Basque Homeland and Liberty," separatist group in Spain] terrorists who gained sanctuary in Cuba some years ago continued to live on the island, as did several U.S. terrorist fugitives. Havana also maintained ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and Latin American insurgents. Colombia's two largest terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN) [Ejército de Liberación Nacional], both maintained a permanent presence on the island. In late 1999, Cuba hosted a series of meetings between Colombian government officials and ELN leaders." While this explanation may technically justify its presence on the list, the authors do not judge it adequate.</p>			

### *Economic and Political Isolation*

Clearly, the ability of the United States to maintain international sanctions against rogue regimes is eroding. The State Department estimates that 100,000 barrels of oil are smuggled out of Iraq each day, much of it going to Turkey with tacit U.S. approval.<sup>12</sup> With government encouragement, the French oil firm Total is engaged in Iranian oil exploration. The political isolation of Iran and Libya is ending as the European Union's "critical dialogue" makes sporadic, but undeniable, inroads. U.S. allies reject the legitimacy of extraterritorial acts, like the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the Helms-Burton Act, that sanction foreign firms whose investments undermine U.S. policy.

Whatever the fate of individual efforts, the trend is away from effective international sanctions because other states are decreasingly likely to comply. Sanctions remain a popular tool in the United States because they create a public symbol of U.S. disapproval and the American body politic tends to support principled international actions.<sup>13</sup> However, the United States cannot sustain broad sanctions alone.

Even if broad sanctions could be sustained, it is not clear that their effect is wholly positive. Morally, it is unpalatable to harm societies in authoritarian states for the choices of their leaders. It punishes the already punished without—in most cases—affecting the lives of ruling elites.<sup>14</sup> Practically, it reinforces the leaders' control (as the distributors of scarce resources) and gives them the ability to externalize responsibility for societal suffering (by virtue of their control of information). Also, broad sanctions provide others the economic advantage of not having to compete with American companies in sanctioned markets. In this vein, the U.S. decision to lift its 50-year trade embargo against North Korea, while leaving in place trade rules barring any export of American technology or equipment that could have military applications, is a step in the right direction. The Congressional decision to grant permanent normalized trade relations to China—although not widely considered a rogue—is also encouraging.

Narrow sanctions punishing individuals and companies involved in criminal or reprehensible activities fare much better and are on the rise in U.S. policy, as Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) has persuasively argued.<sup>15</sup> Recently, Congress passed legislation sanctioning a Russian firm known to have aided Iranian nuclear programs and prohibited the Clinton administration from spending \$500 million for cooperative work on the space station because of a suspected diversion of funds.<sup>16</sup> This approach would end the economic isolation of rogue states, opening them up to the pressures of globalization, while continuing to target individuals and firms involved in activities that increase danger to U.S. interests.

### *Nonproliferation Regimes*

According to the White House's 1999 National Security Strategy, "weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security."<sup>17</sup> The United States has constructed and relied upon nonproliferation regimes to slow the spread of weapons and technologies most threatening to U.S. interests. However, globalization is also eroding these regimes by facilitating a transnational market in

WMD, cloaking the participants, and facilitating the clandestine movement of people and resources across borders.

International monitoring and control regimes have not worked to the degree expected (table 2).<sup>18</sup> China continues to sell missile technology to Iran and Pakistan, despite a promise to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrictions.<sup>19</sup> Russia (or at least Russian firms) continue to sell WMD technology and expertise to Iran and other states.<sup>20</sup> Tehran has biological and chemical weapons programs and may already have nuclear weapons, despite membership in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC).<sup>21</sup> The extent of Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological programs discovered after the 1991 Persian Gulf War shattered confidence that the regime of international treaties and monitoring can be effective.

Unfortunately, official, documented arms control violations only begin to capture the magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem. Many states' proliferation activities are not widely known, or are not publicized, because of secrecy, indifference within the international community, or the limited membership of particular treaties. For example, although the International Atomic Energy Association holds that Iran is NPT-compliant, the Central Intelligence Agency has testified that "Iran is actively pursuing the acquisition of fissile material and the expertise and technology necessary to form the material into nuclear weapons."<sup>22</sup> These efforts may place Tehran in violation of the NPT, which does not permit non-nuclear members to "seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."<sup>23</sup> This trend is not limited to international institutions and rogue states: for years the United States refused to acknowledge the fact that India and Pakistan were *de facto* nuclear weapons states, as it continues to ignore Israel's nuclear weapons status in order to avoid challenging the legitimacy of the NPT and other nonproliferation efforts.

Moreover, the international norm condemning possession of weapons of mass destruction that nonproliferation regimes were intended to create no longer dominates state calculations, as Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests demonstrate. Possession of weapons of mass destruction may even be a more powerful status symbol and a potential equalizer to weak states than to states of greater political, economic, and military power. The norm against WMD possession will likely be further eroded by tepid international reaction to the Indian and Pakistani tests. The lesson for potential proliferators is that the strongest states in the system may even accord greater status to new nuclear states. President Clinton's visit to India and Pakistan in the spring of 2000 sends an unfortunate signal in this regard.

**Table 2. Arms Control Treaty Violations**

<i>State</i>	<i>Non-proliferation Treaty</i>	<i>Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention</i>	<i>Chemical Weapons Convention</i>	<i>Missile Technology Control Regime</i>	<i>Other</i> <sup>1</sup>
Afghanistan					
Algeria	In violation		In violation		
Argentina		In violation	?		
Brazil		In violation	?		
China	In violation	In violation	In violation	In violation <sup>2</sup>	In violation <sup>3</sup>
Cuba					
Egypt		In violation			
Ethiopia			In violation		
India		?	In violation		
Iran	In violation	In violation	In violation		
Iraq	In violation	In violation			In violation <sup>4</sup>
Israel			In violation <sup>5</sup>		
Libya	In violation	In violation			
North Korea	In violation				In violation <sup>6</sup>
Pakistan		In violation	In violation		
Russia	?	In violation	In violation	In violation	In violation <sup>7</sup>
Saudi Arabia			In violation		
Serbia	?				
South Korea					?
South Africa				?	?
Sudan					
Syria	In violation	In violation <sup>5</sup>			
Taiwan					

<sup>1</sup>Includes formal and informal arms control agreements related to weapons of mass destruction.

<sup>2</sup>On October 4, 1994, the United States and China issued a joint statement on China's adherence to the MTCR. In exchange, the United States promised to waive sanctions imposed on August 23, 1993, allowing the export of high technology satellites to China.

<sup>3</sup>On May 11, 1996, Beijing agreed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities after the U.S. State Department announced sanctions would not be levied against China for violating the NPT by supplying 5,000 ring magnets (used exclusively for uranium enrichment) to an unsafeguarded Pakistani nuclear facility.

<sup>4</sup>UN Security Council Resolution 687, which Baghdad formally agreed to after the Gulf War, requires Iraq to abandon its nuclear, biological, and chemical programs and all programs and capabilities related to ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km.

<sup>5</sup>State is signatory of treaty.

<sup>6</sup>Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze the construction and operation of its existing nuclear reactors and related facilities, to eventually dismantle this equipment, and to comply with the NPT. In exchange, the United States pledged to help North Korea acquire two light-water nuclear reactors and to arrange for deliveries of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the first reactor was completed. The reactors and fuel are to be used for electricity generation and heating only.

<sup>7</sup>In 1995, President Boris Yeltsin agreed to order Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy to drop plans to provide equipment and advice to Iran's effort to mine uranium ore and process it to use as reactor fuel.

States hostile to the United States that have significant WMD programs include North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. North Korea is the closest to developing ballistic missiles capable of threatening the United States, having tested the Taepo Dong-1 and demonstrated work on an even longer range Taepo Dong-2.<sup>24</sup> Pyongyang, which has advanced biological and chemical weapons programs, is thought to have enough plutonium for at least one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.<sup>25</sup> Although North Korea formally agreed to halt its nuclear weapons programs in a 1994 deal, the United States is unable to certify its compliance with that agreement or subsequent commitments to freeze its long-range ballistic missile program while talks with the United States continue.<sup>26</sup>

Iran has achieved the capability to deploy the Shahab-3, a 1,300-kilometer range missile that can reach targets in Europe, and is believed to have two even longer range missiles under development.<sup>27</sup> Tehran has used chemical weapons in the past and is thought to have advanced biological and nuclear programs as well; in December 1999, the Central Intelligence Agency warned President Clinton that it could not rule out the possibility that Iran already has nuclear weapons.<sup>28</sup> The regime also engages in the planning and execution of terrorist acts, including assassinations outside Iran.<sup>29</sup>

With UN inspections no longer in place and economic sanctions in question, Iraq could be well along the road to reconstituting its WMD programs despite a formal post-Persian Gulf War agreement to eliminate them. Targeted bombing by the United States and United Kingdom has failed to destroy most of the facilities where Iraq is storing its nuclear equipment, and there is evidence to suggest that it has stepped up efforts to produce the weapons-grade plutonium and uranium necessary for an atomic bomb.<sup>30</sup> Iraq, which loaded biological and chemical weapons into ballistic missiles before the Persian Gulf War, maintains the skills and industrial capabilities needed to reconstitute its long-range ballistic missile program.<sup>31</sup> Intelligence reports say that Iraq could test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapon by 2015—sooner with foreign assistance.<sup>32</sup>

Libya continues to obtain foreign assistance for its WMD program. In September 2000, shortly after UN sanctions were lifted against Libya, Gaddafi took delivery of a consignment of North Korean No Dong ballistic missiles capable of reaching not only Israel but also several NATO states in southern Europe with either conventional or NBC warheads.<sup>33</sup> Gaddafi commands chemical weapons—which Libya has used against Chadian troops—and maintains a biological weapons program despite membership in the BTWC. Even though Libya finally cooperated with the United Kingdom on the 1988 Lockerbie bombing case and has not been implicated in any similar act for several years, it continues to support international terrorism publicly and privately.<sup>34</sup>

Sudan, the least technologically advanced of the five hostile states, is a member of the CWC but is developing the capability to produce chemical weapons with help from Iraq.<sup>35</sup> In 1999, the United States conducted military strikes against a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum it suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons and associating with terrorists. Sudan is a major sponsor of international terrorism, acting as a meeting place, safe haven, and training hub for international terrorist groups, among them, Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network, which is probably targeting the United States.<sup>36</sup>

Preventing proliferation of nuclear expertise and materials has been a U.S. priority since the advent of the Nuclear Age. While the effort has succeeded in many instances, international controls and international norms are insufficient to prevent a determined proliferator such as Iraq or North Korea from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery means, even when these states are successfully isolated, politically and economically.

### ***Military Responses***

The third element of U.S. policy toward rogues has been the threat of military action. In an effort to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies, the United States does not rule out the use of any means in responding to WMD attacks. Recent military actions suggest a trend away from general punishments of societies; instead, the United States has targeted individual terrorists and military facilities within states in response to attacks on the United States. U.S. cruise missile strikes against Osama bin Laden and purported WMD facilities in Sudan in 1998, while widely criticized, demonstrate the personalization of foreign policy as organizations and individuals begin to possess the means of damaging U.S. interests.

As states such as North Korea, Iraq, Serbia, and Sudan challenge U.S. interests, the United States will need a world-class intelligence community to understand the leaders and social mores of these rogue states. Otherwise, military action may increase a leader's standing or fail to inflict expected harm. If the United States lacks understanding of the political calculus of states and organizations, then careful calibration of military force for political purposes (as currently practiced in Serbia, Bosnia, Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan) and against terrorist groups may not suffice to defend U.S. interests.

The audit of U.S. intelligence capabilities conducted by retired Admiral David Jeremiah to determine why the United States failed to predict India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests concluded that the United States is far from having that sophisticated understanding. The report placed special emphasis on the intelligence community's "mindset" problem—the challenge of viewing other states through Western interpretation.<sup>37</sup> In classified testimony to Congress, Jeremiah is reported to have described an intelligence community plagued by ineffective central management, overstretched analytical resources, limited human intelligence capabilities, and "poorly suited" satellite collection techniques that are "vulnerable to simple detection."<sup>38</sup> To date, it is yet to be seen what, if any, measures the U.S. intelligence community has taken to improve this state of affairs.

The spread of NBC weapons and missile technology could drastically alter U.S. foreign policy and overall strategy. A number of potential adversaries, reluctant to engage the U.S. military on its terms, have turned to asymmetrical warfighting strategies, one of which involves the deployment of long-range ballistic missiles with NBC warheads. By deploying even a modest WMD arsenal, a conventionally inferior state might believe it could threaten U.S. territory and overseas forces in a crisis, thereby narrowing Washington's range of options to an unpalatable few or deterring it from taking any action altogether. Such weapons could also be used in terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland aimed at sapping political support for its overseas commitments.

This argues for a substantial increase in U.S. defenses. The United States will not have the luxury of relying solely on efforts to prevent proliferation or likely have sufficient confidence in the U.S. intelligence community's ability to accurately interpret the intentions and actions of hostile states.

## **Crafting More Effective Policies to Counter Enemies?**

Policies intended to isolate states and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction are built on foundations that are being eroded by globalization. Given that the current course is one of diminishing effectiveness, the United States needs to decide whether to redouble efforts to shore up the current approach, resign itself to a world of more and better armed rogues, or try to find ways to achieve the objective of a world with fewer states hostile to, and able to threaten, the United States and its fundamental interests.

Strengthening the current approach would entail committing greater resources to the tasks of isolating rogues and strengthening nonproliferation regimes. Isolating rogues would require constructing a much stronger international consensus on both the threat that these states pose to the international community (as opposed to just the United States) and on isolation as the appropriate tactic to contain the threat. The United States is unlikely to achieve consensus by persuasion. Other states—not least Washington's closest allies—simply do not believe that their interests are served by shunning regimes hostile to the United States. Creating an international regime aimed at containing rogues would require enormous political attention; in fact, it would likely displace all other issues on the foreign and defense policy agendas. It would probably require resurrection of a system such as that associated with the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls and more legislation with extraterritorial reach and stronger enforcement against violators of current legislation, an unpleasant prospect given the determined resistance, both foreign and domestic, to the Helms-Burton and Iran-Libya Sanctions Acts. It would also probably require denial of American markets to violators and political acquiescence to popular arms control treaties (which may not be in American best interest) in order to entice international cooperation.

This approach would likely result in European allies reciprocating with extraterritorial legislation, companies choosing not to do business in the United States to avoid the prospect of sanctions, and opposition from nongovernmental organizations and human rights organizations concerned about the effects of broad sanctions on publics in rogue states. In short, it would cement the stereotype of the United States as a bully that must be constrained by the rest of the international community. Even if the United States could muster sufficient political and economic resources to make the current approach successful in the long run, this approach would be self-defeating. The price that the United States would have to pay in order to make rogues the defining issue on the international security agenda and pull the international community into a common approach would be prohibitively high.

A second possible course of action would be to forego trying to hold back the tide of globalization that is eroding current policies and accept the fact that the world is becoming a more uncertain and dangerous place for U.S. interests. This strategy

would seek to continue current policies even as their effectiveness declines but would not risk alienating allies or require heroic measures to create international regimes to isolate hostile states. It would seek to lower the political and economic costs of current policies and would introduce new approaches intended to better protect the United States from hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction. These new approaches would include a strengthened national missile defense, theater missile defenses, and cruise missile defenses; more active intelligence collection within and outside the United States; more active border controls; and NBC response teams operating in the United States and training civilian populations in urban areas.

This approach would gradually open rogue societies to the positive economic effects of globalization as current practices become less effective. However, the withering of current policies could embolden hostile states to believe that the United States would no longer uphold its commitments, creating challenges to U.S. interests. This course would require shifts in resources to dramatically improve border controls and might even include military policing of American borders. It would be likely to raise public concern in the United States about the protection of civil liberties and increase isolationism to the extent that U.S. engagements overseas are seen as “creating” the threat of WMD attack. This pessimistic and resigned approach appears unsuited to American political culture.

The third and most promising alternative strategy would end economic isolation while increasing U.S. defenses and targeting the interests of hostile individuals or groups. It would entail ending broad economic sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. It could retain targeted sanctions intended to undermine hostile individuals and regimes without affecting the general public, including travel restrictions, international criminal indictments, cyberoperations to erase bank holdings and identity markers, and prohibitions on regime-owned companies doing business in the United States and allied markets. Since the effects of globalization differ from state to state, a proper mix of such measures should be developed to maximize their impact on the regime in question.<sup>39</sup> It might be especially beneficial to introduce the prospective policy changes as part of a deal with U.S. allies to end broad sanctions in return for commitments to create and enforce a regime of targeted sanctions, intelligence sharing, and revitalized export restrictions on key technologies. This approach would also include improving U.S. defenses as a hedge against globalization producing more states and organizations that are both hostile and dangerous to the United States. While not going as far as the previous option, this strategy would still necessitate a strong national missile defense, theater ballistic missile defenses, and cruise missile defenses, plus some additional domestic preparation for responding to WMD attacks.

This approach would capitalize on the effects of globalization to create opportunities for change in rogue societies. The attractive power of the American way of life and the prosperity inherent in globalization constitute the best hope for reducing the risk of states hostile to the United States and its interests. These attributes should be used to the advantage of U.S. policies. Ending economic isolation would open rogue societies—particularly their emergent middle classes—to the benefits of economic advancement and weave their regimes into the international system, where other states could assist the United States in shaping their behavior. This approach would

better protect the United States from the damaging effects of WMD attacks without requiring major adjustments in the openness of American society. It would end restrictions that disadvantage American businesses in the international marketplace. It would emphasize the separation between rogue regimes and the people unfortunate enough to be living under their control. It could perhaps build a broader coalition of support for action against rogue individuals and regimes by the international community. Finally, it would reduce friction between the United States and its allies.

The main drawback to this approach is the political difficulty and ethical dissatisfaction of ending sanctions. Whatever their effectiveness, sanctions send a signal of American disapproval that is important to Congress and valuable in building the public basis for other action against these states. Unquestionably, it would be politically costly for any U.S. administration to convince Congress to repeal sanctions legislation. However, globalization is driving up the costs to the United States and diminishing the benefits of the current U.S. strategy. The question is not whether to sustain the current approach or move to a different strategy. The current approach will not be sustainable because of globalization effects beyond U.S. control. A comprehensive package of initiatives to end broad sanctions, increase sanctions targeted at individuals or regimes, improve U.S. defenses, and rebuild international support for a narrow set of export controls and monitoring would best defend and advance U.S. interests as globalization progresses. Moreover, instead of working against globalization, as the current U.S. policy does, this course would harness the driving forces of globalization to propel a more successful policy. 🌐

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> As used here, *regime* refers to a set of treaties, laws, codes of conduct, members, and enforcement mechanisms for regulating some aspect of international behavior.

<sup>2</sup> Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* 2 (1994), 45–46.

<sup>3</sup> Steven Mufson, "What's in a Name? U.S. Drops Term 'Rogue State,'" *The Washington Post*, June 20, 2000, A16.

<sup>4</sup> The authors thank Ellen Laipson for her insights on the key phenomena of globalization and rogues.

<sup>5</sup> Peter Ford, "EU's Outreach to 'Pariah' States," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 12, 2000, 6.

<sup>6</sup> "Britain, Germany to Recognize N. Korea," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 2000, A34.

<sup>7</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula, September 12, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are the seven governments that the U.S. Secretary of State has designated as state sponsors of international terrorism in *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999*.

<sup>9</sup> James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, February 10, 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Philip Shenon, "U.S. Warns Pakistan It May be Branded a Sponsor of Terrorism," *The New York Times*, January 28, 2000, A8.

<sup>11</sup> George Tenet, quoted in Justin Brown, "More Furtive Enemies Threaten US in New Century," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, 2000, USA 2.

<sup>12</sup> Robin Wright, "Iran Opens Key Isle to Iraqi Oil Smugglers, U.S. Says," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 3, 2000, 1.; Robert Suro and John Lancaster, "Navy Detains Russian Oil Tanker," *The Washington*

*Post*, February 4, 2000, A25; James Risen, "Iraq Is Smuggling Oil to the Turks under Gaze of U.S.," *The New York Times*, June 19, 1998, A1.

<sup>13</sup> Stephen Kull and I.M. Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

<sup>14</sup> Richard N. Haass, ed., *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998).

<sup>15</sup> Jesse Helms, "What Sanctions Epidemic?" *Foreign Affairs* 1 (1999), 3.

<sup>16</sup> Audrey Hudson, "Unanimous House Backs Sanctions on Russia Due to Arms Deal with Iran," *The Washington Times*, March 2, 2000.

<sup>17</sup> The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999), 2.

<sup>18</sup> Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1–December 31, 1999 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August); Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997; U.S. State Department, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 1998.

<sup>19</sup> Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress, 9.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>21</sup> James Risen and Judith Miller, "C.I.A. Tells Clinton an Iranian A-Bomb Can't Be Ruled Out," *The New York Times*, January 17, 2000, A1.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Senate, Statement by Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center A. Norman Schindler on Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, September 21, 2000.

<sup>23</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article II.

<sup>24</sup> U.S. National Intelligence Council, *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1999), 9.

<sup>25</sup> Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1–June 30, 1999 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2, 2000), 4.

<sup>26</sup> "North Korea Continues To Develop Missiles," *The Washington Times*, October 28, 1999.

<sup>27</sup> Steve Rodan, "Iran Now Able to Deploy Shahab-3," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, March 22, 2000.

<sup>28</sup> Risen and Miller, "C.I.A. Tells Clinton an Iranian A-Bomb Can't Be Ruled Out."

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism*, available at <[www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/sponsor.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/sponsor.html)>.

<sup>30</sup> Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Saddam May Soon Have the Bomb," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 1999, A22.

<sup>31</sup> R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. Says Iraqis Prepared Germ Weapons in Gulf War; Baghdad Balked, Fearing U.S. Nuclear Retaliation," *The Washington Post*, August 26, 1995, A1; U.S. Congress, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 15, 1998), 14.

<sup>32</sup> U.S. National Intelligence Council, *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat*, 10.

<sup>33</sup> Con Coughlin, "Missiles Deal Puts Israel in Gaddafi Sights," *London Sunday Telegraph*, September 24, 2000, 27.

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Department of State, Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism.

<sup>35</sup> Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress, 5.

<sup>36</sup> U.S. Department of State, Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism.

<sup>37</sup> Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, CIA Press Release: Jeremiah News Conference, June 2, 1998.

<sup>38</sup> Walter Pincus, "Spy Agencies Faulted for Missing Indian Tests; Wide Range of Failures Cited by Review Panel, But No Firings Recommended," *The Washington Post*, June 3, 1998, A18.