

Peace Operations: Political-Military Coordination

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Peace operations are linked to globalization because this paradoxical process generates both winners and losers. The great promise is that it can bring democracy, prosperity, and peace to regions previously lacking these qualities. Although this positive dynamic is occurring in many places, the losers in the globalization sweepstakes are the “failed states” that have become a leading source of instability in the contemporary era.

Globalization and the Failed State Phenomenon

As globalization has accelerated, peace operations aimed at dealing with troubled and dysfunctional states have correspondingly increased in frequency, difficulty, and duration. The effect has been to involve the United States and other participating countries in a host of areas that would have been dismissed as peripheral only a decade ago. Owing to this association with the enduring phenomenon of globalization, the demand for peace operations is likely to persist. Accordingly, the United States and its allies must become proficient at the demanding art of peace operations. This requires the ability to harmonize and integrate the actions of military forces with those of their civilian counterparts.

Under the influence of globalization, economic survival has become increasingly dependent on a vibrant trading relationship. This can place immense strains on authoritarian regimes that refuse to open their economies to outside competition or on aspiring democracies that mismanage the transition to market economics.

Globalization will likely contribute to the failure of autocratic rulers who reject free trade because they will find their capacity to meet the needs of their citizens inexorably declining. To retain power, rulers in such regimes typically opt to suppress making demands, which translates into heavy reliance on state security forces (military, paramilitary, intelligence, and police). One alternative source of revenue to sustain such repressive regimes in the short run may be the raw material resources of the state (for example, oil, diamonds, gold). This option has been prevalent in Africa,

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reducing politics to rapacious rivalry between competing warlords (such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola). An alternative source of funds to prop up such non-competitive political economies is smuggling and other forms of transnational criminal activity (for example, the Balkans, North Korea). In either case, a downward spiral is often set in motion that ultimately concludes with the masses being driven by economic privation to a bare subsistence level or by internal conflict into camps where they become wards of the international community. External actors may unintentionally abet this process by imposing economic sanctions aimed at pressuring repressive regimes to reform. As in Haiti, victims of this process will flee to neighboring states if they have the means to do so. If they do not, mass starvation may occur, as in North Korea, unless the regime collapses or is overthrown.

A governability crisis can also be generated when erstwhile dictatorships attempt to open their markets to global competition. Former communist states and other nascent democracies have been particularly vulnerable when they confront the challenges of simultaneously privatizing their economies and pluralizing their political systems. Without the institutional safeguards and rule of law to manage the turbulent forces that are inevitably unleashed, the result has sometimes been perverse. If the privatization process is unduly influenced by political rather than economic desiderata, the outcome can be a bonanza for shady, underworld elements that insinuate themselves into emerging corporate and political power structures (for example, Russia and the remnants of Yugoslavia). This is another path by which globalization can contribute to the collapse of the state.

Globalization also renders it more difficult for statesmen to ignore the consequences of state failure. This process draws the world together in an ever-tightening web of instant awareness and interdependence. During this decade, Europe has discovered that it cannot treat the Balkans as an isolated backwater because events there have profound consequences for its own process of peaceful unification. Europe now finds itself entangled there, seeking to create stability by integrating that restive region into a protective cocoon of political, economic, and security structures. If recent events are an indicator, prosperous countries of Asia are reaching a similar conclusion about poor and unstable neighbors in Southeast Asia. Although Africa has not reached a comparable level of strategic importance, it cannot be neglected either, and not only for humanitarian reasons. If major parts of the continent slide into chaotic violence, the economic and political interests of certain big powers will be harmed, and the inevitable effects will unsettle the regional order. For these reasons, the plight of troubled and failing states has become a matter of growing concern for the democratic community and the entire international system.

International Trends

Weak States Have Become a Chronic Source of Global Instability

Troubled and potentially anarchic states are distinguished by their chronic incapacity to meet the basic needs of their people and, beyond this, often by the savage repression of major segments of societies. In such situations, government

institutions are apt to be tested to the fullest, regardless of whether they are being used to respond to the demands of the populace or to suppress them.¹ In either case, grave doubt will be cast on the legitimacy of the governments. Recent examples include total collapse of the state (Somalia), economic bankruptcy coupled with brutal repression (Haiti), and genocidal assault by the state on an element of its own citizenry (Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo).

As the process of state disintegration unfolds, humanitarian catastrophes inevitably ensue, disrupting the internal social or political balance of surrounding states (for example, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo). The failure of institutions of law and order, moreover, can convert the failed state into an incubator of transnational threats, such as organized crime, terrorism, arms trafficking, and even proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Troubled states are strategically significant, therefore, because they lie at the core of many contemporary security challenges. In an era of permeable borders, free trade, and an omnipresent media, a state in chaos anywhere is apt to send reverberations across the globe.

Transnational security threats are a major factor in the institutional deterioration that produces dysfunctional states. The relationship cuts the other way as well because the failure of a state creates an institutional void that may be exploited by transnational actors of various sorts. Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, for example, has exploited turbulent conditions in Afghanistan to establish a base of operations there. The absence of law enforcement in Albania, moreover, was used to project his operation throughout Western Europe and to support operations against American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Drug traffickers have also exploited anarchy in the Balkans, expanding their smuggling networks across Europe to Scandinavia. In point of fact, half of the heroin traffickers presently in Swedish jails and 80 percent in Norwegian jails originated in Kosovo and Albania.² In an era in which continued prosperity depends on the international exchange of products, money, and information, sealing American borders against these threats is not a realistic option. Although globalization is a boon for consumers, its corollary will be domestic insecurity unless transnational threats emanating from troubled states can be contained.

Demands Posed by Anarchic States Exceed the Capacity to Respond

Peacekeeping, a United Nations (UN) innovation during the Cold War, was intended to help keep interstate conflict from spiraling out of control and sparking a superpower conflagration. During its first four decades, the United Nations was called on to conduct 18 peacekeeping missions (an average of one new mission every other year), almost all of which resulted from conflict between states.³ Between 1990 and 1999, the United Nations conducted 31 peace operations, or an average of 3 per year. Almost all have responded to "internal" conflicts in troubled states. However, the United Nations has been unable to deal adequately with this surge of new missions. Factors contributing to this failure include the high cost in terms of financial assessments to member states, an inability to recruit sufficient numbers of qualified peacekeeping troops and police, a lack of perceived national interests, a limited understanding of how to rehabilitate a failed state, and political

embarrassment in Somalia and Bosnia. One consequence is that some failing states have been neglected, with dire consequences. Rwanda and Zaire are examples.

Another serious limiting factor is the incapacity of the United Nations to conduct the type of large-scale military operations that have often been required.⁴ The United Nations is well suited for particular peacekeeping activities, such as monitoring and verification, which are premised on strategic consent among the disputants about the role of the intervening force. These conditions characterized the traditional peacekeeping of inter-state disputes during the Cold War. When consent was lost, UN forces withdrew, as occurred prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

Troubled states have been the focus of post-Cold War peace operations, and consent has been more conditional and fragile. In successful cases such as El Salvador and Mozambique, the conflict had been stimulated in part by superpower rivalry. Once this rivalry ceased to be a factor, local consent became obtainable. The United Nations has foundered when consent has been marginal and the need to wield force credibly has been high. The United Nations lacks a standing military capability, a viable command-and-control system, and consensus among UN Security Council members regarding use of coercive force in internal conflicts. As a result, it cannot manage the robust enforcement operations often required, at least initially, to deal with troubled and failing states.

These serious deficiencies are unlikely to be remedied any time soon. Many countries, including the United States, oppose an autonomous military capability for the United Nations. Even administrative initiatives, such as a rapidly deployable mission headquarters, have been resisted. Measures to enhance the capabilities of the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) may have reached their high-water mark. The establishment of a 24-hour command post was an essential improvement, as was the development of a mechanism for mobilizing standby military forces from member states. Another crucial practice, the use of “gratis” military officers from willing member states, has been abolished within the DPKO, however, at the behest of developing nations who insist that all positions be filled by paid UN personnel. Thus, the DPKO capacity to conduct even its current missions has been diminishing.

The United Nations has recognized its limitations in dealing with troubled states since the setbacks in Somalia and Bosnia. The Security Council has been willing to approve peace enforcement operations conducted by “coalitions of the willing” (such as the Multinational Force in Haiti, the Australian-led force in East Timor) rather than the United Nations, and by competent regional security organizations (for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] in Bosnia and Kosovo). As a practical matter, this practice has meant that only troubled states of high importance to the members of the Security Council can be managed. There has been little enthusiasm for large, expensive operations in regions of marginal strategic consequence, such as sub-Saharan Africa. United States arrears from previous peacekeeping activities and a tendency to use the United Nations as a scapegoat for failed peacekeeping activities have served as further disincentives to undertake new operations, though this situation has improved somewhat.⁵ Even when the United States is willing to support new missions financially, other countries may be reluctant to participate unless the United States also takes the lead militarily.⁶

Moreover, even when a troubled state affects U.S. strategic interests, other Security Council members may be reluctant to provide an unambiguous mandate for intervention. This is especially true where a brutal despot is suppressing his people (for example, Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovars) because some Security Council members find it vital to respect sovereign prerogatives in this regard. Thus, there are regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, in which the Security Council has been unwilling to act. There are also circumstances, such as ethnic barbarism, where the Security Council may be paralyzed. The greatest constraint, however, stems from the incapacity of the United Nations to manage the use of force credibly. Hence, future UN-led peace missions will be inclined to rather benign circumstances where the consent of the disputants is reasonably assured and international will is reasonably strong.

Despite these limitations, the United Nations performs several essential functions in managing troubled states. No other international body possesses the same degree of legitimacy to issue a mandate for intervening in a sovereign, but dysfunctional, state. Various UN representatives, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, make vital contributions to mitigating the consequences of state failure, especially in the early stages. The United Nations has also developed extensive expertise in election monitoring and civilian policing, and it has an established mechanism to fund peacekeeping activities through assessments on member states. Owing to these competencies, the United Nations is well suited for the later phases of a peace operation, when the emphasis is on long-term institution building (as in Haiti).⁷ The United Nations also has the potential to prevent the regionalization of internal conflicts by mounting preventive deployments in areas bordering a troubled state (such as the UN Preventive Deployment [UNPREDEP] Force in Macedonia).

The greatest deficiency, therefore, arises during the initial phases of an intervention, when a credible coercive capability may be essential for peacemaking or peace enforcement. The United Nations cannot be relied upon for this mission. Thus, this is a key area where demand exceeds capacity, at least until other mechanisms are adapted for this purpose. During the later stages, the United Nations can be more effective, but only if it can sustain the large numbers of skilled military personnel that often must remain deployed for long periods.

Intervention Is Occurring Before There Is a Peace to Keep

The international community continues to search for the proper set of tools to manage troubled and anarchic states, but the task has simultaneously become more demanding because the threshold for intervention has been lowered. Until recently, there was a sense that a peace mission should occur only after a dispute had become "ripe" for resolution. That is, the parties should have first exhausted themselves, moderated their war aims, and demonstrated a willingness to adhere to a peace accord. By following this prescription, the international community can avoid prolonged entanglements in violent conflicts; however, it also means that instances of genocide would be allowed to unfold, and surrounding regions might be destabilized before effective action is taken. By the time such situations become ripe for intervention on the ground, the cost in terms of lives and resources can burgeon. Having

learned the price of delay in Bosnia and Rwanda, the United States and its European allies sought to avoid a repetition in Kosovo. Consequently, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) fielded the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission in late 1998 with merely the promise of a final agreement between the government of Yugoslavia and representatives of the Kosovar community. When this effort failed, NATO became enmeshed in a war with Serbia to stanch its assault on the ethnic Albanian population.

Two factors contribute to this trend toward early intervention. First, the vast majority of wars are now internal to the state, and it is these conflicts that have increasingly become the focus of international interventions. Second, many of these internal conflicts involve wanton use of force by armed elements against civilian masses. As in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, humanitarian catastrophes are a likely result. Indicative of this trend, civilians today suffer the preponderance of casualties from armed conflict, whereas a century ago most casualties were military combatants.⁸

When a humanitarian calamity looms, immense pressure often is brought to bear from the media and concerned interest groups to “do something.” Aware of this, secessionist forces such as the Kosovo Liberation Army are more likely to pursue a media “war of attention” than they are to conduct a guerrilla war of attrition. Because norms of international conduct are evolving, sovereignty no longer confers an absolute right on autocratic rulers to wield unbridled violence against their own people. By the action that has been taken on behalf of the Kurds in Iraq and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the international community has begun to establish a tenuous, countervailing legal right to intervene to prevent wholesale slaughter and displacement of civilian populations. By thus lowering the threshold for intervention, it has become easier to get involved but more difficult to get out and riskier to remain. The policy dilemmas associated with managing this aspect of the troubled state will not simply disappear. Indeed, the NATO intervention in Kosovo may be a watershed event. The uncertainty of engaging in similar actions in the future will be heavily influenced by the degree of success ultimately obtained there.

Strategic Implications for Force Operations

The strategic implications of these trends, in the United States and other countries participating in peace operations, are manifold.

The Impact on Military Readiness

In earlier years, peace operations often required only modest forces. For example, a neutral zone between two armies could be patrolled by a few hundred peacekeepers. Modern peace operations aimed at saving failed states are far more demanding. In the early stages, forcible intervention can require thousands of heavily armed troops of division or even corps size (60,000 troops or more). Later stages can also require large forces, for although combat missions are no longer necessary, other missions must be performed, and they can demand large troop deployments. For example, a peace support force composed of a few combat battalions, military police,

intelligence and communications units, construction engineers, medical units, maintenance units, civil affairs units, training and educational units, other logistics support, and other special skills can require 20,000 to 60,000 troops. Moreover, these peacekeeping units might have to remain on station for years. Deployed troops must be rotated home after a tour of duty, and replacements trained in advance. This process requires a large replacement pool that can be two to three times larger than the actual deployment.

The post-Cold War “peace dividend” has now been collected, and the U.S. defense establishment is scarcely two-thirds the size it was at the end of the 1980s. Operational deployments, however, have tripled. Not all this increase is attributable to the exigencies of troubled states: natural disasters and more conventional security challenges, such as Iraq and North Korea, account for much of this trend. Nevertheless, there are legitimate concerns as to whether the Armed Forces can retain their fighting edge while engaged in continuous operations aimed at managing troubled states.

Peace support operations, considered in isolation, do not necessarily result in a degradation of military readiness. The experiences of the 25th Infantry Division in Haiti (as part of the Multinational Force) and the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia (as part of the Implementation Force [IFOR]) provide invaluable insights. In both cases, a minor but temporary degradation of some perishable combat skills (for example, gunnery) occurred. However, these skills were quickly restored and within a couple of months were at predeployment levels. The impact on leadership skills and organizational proficiency in complex warfighting tasks, in contrast, was significant and enduring. Daily patrolling in the challenging and unpredictable environments of Haiti and Bosnia placed a premium on decentralized decisionmaking and small-unit leadership. Such maturation could not have been achieved in artificial training environments. These are capabilities that will be central, moreover, to the decentralized and digitized battlefields envisioned for the future. By virtue of this refreshing of perishable skill sets, therefore, both units were deemed to be more combat-capable after the peace operation than before.

To achieve this outcome, certain essential steps had to be taken. Unit integrity was maintained,⁹ and commanders conducted an active training program throughout the deployment. Finally, they went in with overwhelming force so as to be prepared for a worst-case scenario. Under the more benign circumstances actually encountered, it was possible to satisfy requirements of both the peace mission and an active training program.¹⁰

Thus, while the direct impact of peace missions on readiness is not necessarily negative, the cumulative impact, along with numerous other smaller scale contingencies and continuing exercise commitments, has produced an unacceptably high tempo of operations and an adverse impact on quality of life and personnel retention. This tempo cannot be sustained with the present force posture, for it is having a major impact on specialized career fields such as military police and civil affairs, which have uniquely valuable skills for managing troubled states. Beyond this, the United States today has only 10 active Army and 3 active Marine divisions. All are needed to meet combat needs in the event of major regional wars. The same applies to Air Force and Navy units. When forces are deployed for peace missions, they are not readily con-

vertible for war fighting. Small deployments might not be highly damaging, but big deployments could have this effect.

The allegedly deleterious impact on the readiness of U.S. forces for combat operations is often decried. An equally potent example is the trend now taking place in Europe. The European Union is now setting out to create a full corps that can be employed for peace support missions. This corps is designed to include 60,000 full-time, active-duty troops. Beyond this, the Europeans are deciding to earmark fully 140,000 troops to provide this corps with individual replacements and staying power for deployments of many months. A strategic case can be made that the Europeans require a robust peace support force of this size. But there is a serious risk that these troops will come at the expense of manning the existing NATO Rapid Reaction Corps, which is tailored to heavy combat missions, as well as NATO efforts to create additional heavy corps for this purpose. The key point is that participating in peace operations may be a strategic necessity, but it is not a free lunch, and it can impose opportunity costs on other forms of preparedness for both U.S. and allied forces.

Civil-Military Interdependence

Peace operations bear little resemblance to the high-intensity battlefields that our forces are so well prepared to dominate. This use of the military differs from traditional combat operations because mission accomplishment is as dependent on the skill of civilians and effective civil-military integration as it is on military prowess. Deficiencies in this civil-military dimension impede the emergence of a durable peace and increase the burdens and risks borne by military units. Owing to the interdependence between civilian and military participants in complex contingencies, unity of effort is a key determinant of success. Whereas the Goldwater-Nichols Act successfully institutionalized “jointness” among the military services, the need today is for similar structural adaptation “beyond jointness” in civil-military collaboration.

The military contingent typically receives a mandate to establish a safe and secure environment. A stable peace can be put in place, however, only by working in concert with civilian counterparts, who have the expertise to help repair a broken state and mend a fractured society. Unity of effort is vital, therefore, because it enables the burdens to be shared more broadly, the tasks to be divided more competently, and the transition to a durable peace to be accomplished more expeditiously. Among the major activities requiring an effective civil-military partnership are:

- *Humanitarian relief.* In anarchic situations, humanitarian relief workers may be unable to provide life-sustaining assistance without protection from an international military force. While such forces have substantial capabilities that can be converted to humanitarian purposes, they are not specialized in the delivery of relief services. Thus, the military must nurture a symbiotic relationship with organizations established for this purpose.
- *Ending of hostilities and demobilizing of former warring factions.* Obtaining agreement to terminate a conflict often requires the international community to exercise a combination of force and diplomacy. Implementing the accord, more-

over, requires the presence of international human rights observers to monitor and investigate politically motivated violence. This effort often must be supported by a military contingent to monitor and verify compliance with activities such as a separation of forces, the cantonment of combatants and weapons, disarmament, and the demobilization of ex-combatants.

- *Public security and administration of justice.* At the inception of a peace mission, there tends to be a void in public security that the military contingent must fill, by default, until an international civilian police (CIVPOL) force can be deployed. As the CIVPOL element becomes operational, responsibility for maintaining public order will normally be transferred to it in a phased manner. Until police and judicial assistance programs can develop an indigenous public security establishment that serves the community rather than preying on it, the departure of military peacekeepers can be destabilizing.

- *War crimes and human rights.* An international tribunal may have a mandate to gather evidence about war crimes. The military contingent may be called upon to provide security for investigation of atrocity sites and to assist in the apprehension of indicted war criminals. The broader human rights community will also require a secure context for the development of local human rights organizations, independent media, and public attitudes that will serve as safeguards against government abuse of power once the peace operation ends.

- *Governance.* The incapacity of the state to respond to the elementary needs of its citizens is almost always an immediate concern of any peace operation. There is invariably a lag between the arrival of the military peace force and the period when international assistance begins to have an impact on the delivery of government services. United States Army civil affairs specialists in public administration, education, and health often perform a vital role, therefore, during the early phases of an operation. If a durable peace is to be constructed, ballots rather than bullets must determine who should govern. Civilian specialists play a central role by promoting grass-roots political development and by organizing electoral systems. The military contingent must provide a secure context for the conduct of campaigning and voting.

It is beyond tinkering and turning the screw even at the tactical level. It is more of a problem than just tuning up the CMOG, or making sure that the military and the NGOs just hold hands and sing 'Kumbya' at the end of the hour. . . . I would say that you are talking about a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the whole interagency process. Not just for the military. If we want to go 'beyond jointness,' we need to restructure radically. Maybe we need to look at the way we are internally structured and change.

— Anthony C. Zinni

- *Economic reconstruction.* Military combat engineers and civil affairs personnel will typically provide a capability to repair portions of the infrastructure that are vital for execution of the military mission. Examples are water, electricity, sewage, telecommunications, roads, railways, and bridges. Civilian reconstruction programs must not only restore basic services, but they also must stimulate the local economy and generate jobs, in particular for ex-combatants, if peace is to be self-sustaining.

Recommendations

Peace operations are inherently political, highly complex, and not susceptible to ready military solutions. Military force normally plays a key role, but it must be employed with specific political ends in mind and in concert with nonmilitary instruments. There is no substitute for wise strategic decisionmaking about when, where, and how they should be embarked upon. In general, they should be approached with restraint and resolve—restraint about mounting them at all, and resolve in carrying them out when mounted. Even when wise decisions are made to pursue them, the manner in which they are implemented matters a great deal in determining their ultimate success or failure.

The following practical measures could improve the efficiency of peace operations, perhaps in significant ways. They emphasize steps to better integrate the use of military forces with civilian assets in difficult settings where both must be employed adroitly in the service of common goals and policies. Just as the Goldwater-Nichols reforms institutionalized jointness in U.S. forces for combat operations, these measures could help bring greater coherence to peace operations that extend “beyond jointness.” In future peace support operations, prospects for success will hinge on the effective blending of military and civilian endeavors. This task will never be easy, especially when U.S. assets must work with those of other nations. But it could become easier, and more effective, if the following measures are pursued.

Improve Instruments for Managing Anarchic States

Although the United States cannot be the world’s policeman, this proposition provides little insight into who else should deal with the instability generated by troubled states. No amount of reform at the United Nations is likely to address this source of global instability fully. Two alternatives remain: regional security organizations and ad hoc coalitions of the willing.

Regional security organizations have made limited contributions to managing troubled states in Africa and Latin America. The most significant operations in Africa have been carried out under the aegis of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS). Dominated by Nigeria, which has supplied the bulk of the troops and material support, ECOWAS has been involved in bringing an end to the civil war in Liberia and is presently a protagonist in the civil war in Sierra Leone. The Organization of American States has also contributed to resolving regional security concerns in Nicaragua and Haiti.

In general, however, few regional security organizations have much potential to address the more demanding tasks of peacemaking and peace enforcement. Since they operate on consensus, they will often be paralyzed when faced with situations that might require using coercive force. Unlike the United Nations, where only five states wield a veto, any member can thwart action. Even if a mandate is forthcoming, member states are likely to have competing national interests in the troubled state that will militate against a coherent and constructive response. Thus, most regional organizations suffer from the same defects as the United Nations in dealing with the use of force. In more benign situations where the disputants provide their consent for

an external intervention, the United Nations would normally be the preferred option, on the basis of its greater legitimacy, extensive experience, and established procedures for cost sharing.

NATO is qualitatively different—in large part because of U.S. leadership and the alliance's demonstrated capacity to conduct multilateral operations. NATO allies also share a set of values and interests that can be put at risk by a troubled state on their periphery, such as the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, a non-Article 5 mission provoked the alliance's first operational use in Bosnia and first use of force in Kosovo. Dealing with such challenges is also a major component of the alliance's new strategic concept. In addition, NATO continues to incorporate partner states into its operations in the Balkans and to develop civil affairs capabilities in many allied military establishments to facilitate collaboration with international and nongovernmental organizations.

Despite NATO's considerable advantages, its freedom to act will continue to be constrained by concerns about a mandate. In spite of the precedent set by bombing Kosovo without an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council, many allies will be reluctant to undertake an intervention in the absence of a specific UN mandate. It remains possible for a regional body, such as OSCE, to provide an alternative mechanism for legitimizing collective action. But as of today, this option is a theoretical hope, not a practical reality.

Another potential response would be for European states to develop the capacity to act alone when the United States opts to remain on the sidelines. Although the experience of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia was unfavorable, the inefficacy of that mission had much to do with the unworkable dual-key command-and-control arrangement with the United Nations. One way to develop an all-European capability is the European Security and Defense Policy, which essentially would involve European and NATO capabilities without active U.S. participation.

As a regional organization, NATO cannot address troubled states everywhere. Nevertheless, it has given itself a measure of flexibility because it has refrained from defining its out-of-area interests in narrow geographical terms. This flexibility would theoretically allow the alliance to mount operations anywhere, were there a consensus that its security interests were sufficiently threatened. Realistically, however, such operations are likely to be confined to Europe's periphery. The long-term consequences of intervention in Kosovo are likely to leave the alliance without surplus capacity or appetite for similar ventures for a considerable period. NATO is also limited in its ability to address the nonmilitary aspects of rehabilitating a dysfunctional state. Although the United Nations remains the leading potential partner for this effort, OSCE was called upon to conduct the Kosovo Verification Mission, and it is a major participant in Kosovo, performing such activities as organizing elections and building institutions.

To cope with troubled states beyond the NATO security umbrella, "coalitions of the willing" may be the only other alternative. For situations with a potential for high-intensity combat, or at least forcible entry, the United States will undoubtedly be indispensable, as it was for the Multinational Force in Haiti. If the scenario is more permissive, such as the lawless conditions encountered after a nationwide fi-

nancial scam in Albania, an operation might be built around another lead nation, as Italy demonstrated in that case. Use of ad hoc coalitions will be contingent on the availability of capable coalition partners and a mandate from the United Nations or an appropriate regional security organization.

Because Africa has the greatest concentration of fragile states, the United States (via the African Crisis Response Initiative), France, and the United Kingdom have all undertaken programs to train and equip chosen African military forces to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities. The operational use of this capability, however, can be risky unless confined to considerable benign peacekeeping activities, as events in Sierra Leone have demonstrated.

Asia is the other major region with a potential for serious instability from future troubled states. Until the mission in East Timor, the only other post-Cold War peace operation in Asia had been in Cambodia. Asian nations had been involved primarily as troop contributors for missions in other regions. Future developments in Indonesia or the deterioration of such fragile regimes as those in North Korea or Malaysia could provide an incentive to develop a collective regional capacity to respond to failing states in Asia.

Expand Nonlethal Capabilities

Normally, an international mandate directs a peace mission to establish a safe and secure internal environment. During the initial phase of an intervention, the military contingent will often be the only source of order. It is apt to be tested by civil disturbances, violent clashes between antagonistic local factions, and theft of its own resources. The military can be a blunt instrument, however, and if even a single incident is mishandled through the use of excessive force, the entire mission can suffer because local consent may be squandered. Inaction, on the other hand, can risk the loss of credibility (for example, the disorders that accompanied transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs under the IFOR). The media spotlight will be unavoidable, and the consequences for success of the peace mission can be enduring.

To limit loss of life and destruction of property in the anarchic circumstances often encountered at the outset of a peace mission, nonlethal capabilities should be included in the initial force. Constabulary or armed police organizations with training and expertise in crowd control, nonlethal force options, and general policing could be deployed simultaneously with the military contingent. Until a CIVPOL contingent became operational, the constabulary could also begin organizing an interim local security cadre and monitoring their performance.¹¹ In this manner, a constabulary presence could help accelerate the process of reconstituting the local police force.

In addition to reestablishing order, a multilateral peace operation must also shape the political context in a manner favorable to the peace process. Unless this step is done successfully and peace becomes self-sustaining, other reconstruction and peacebuilding activities will be stillborn.¹² Because disgruntled political elites or “spoilers” may attempt to disrupt the peace process, military peacekeepers may be required to respond to various forms of violent resistance, including civil disturbances.

Military forces are reluctant to engage in confrontations with civilians because they are generally not trained in the measured use of force, riot control, negotiating

techniques, or de-escalation of conflict. Neither are unarmed CIVPOL personnel capable of handling such violent challenges. Constabulary forces can counter this vulnerability to stage-managed civil unrest, as demonstrated by the deployment of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) as a part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia in mid-1998.¹³ Composed initially of Italian carabinieri and Argentine gendarmes, the MSU has given SFOR the information-gathering capability to detect incipient unrest and to deter it by concentrating MSU patrols in restive areas. The MSU also has successfully defused potentially violent confrontations through negotiation. Only very rarely has the MSU actually had to use force, suggesting that by eliminating this gap in SFOR capabilities, the likelihood that the peace force will be challenged in this manner has been greatly diminished.¹⁴

Build a Capacity for Long-Term Management

For peace to be sustainable, core institutions of government such as the courts, prisons, and police require more than training and restructuring. Their fundamental mode of operation must be transformed. Indigenous institutions must be coaxed into functioning in rough accordance with internationally acceptable standards. This effort will usually entail a radical transformation of the culture of law enforcement. The local public security apparatus will often have operated as an instrument of state repression. It must begin to serve the public interest and function in a manner that respects the political and human rights of members of all groups, regardless of whether their members wield political power. Success requires time and patient effort.

Training a new police force and building the capacity of the judiciary and corrections systems are a multiyear project. Subsequently, the conduct of police, judges, and jailers must be effectively monitored and supervised. Without such oversight, the training and assistance that the international community provides could merely result in making these forces more competent at repressing their own people. Reconciliation will never occur under such conditions.

Innovative approaches to this challenge have been attempted in Bosnia by the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The concept developed there, termed "collocation," entails placing seasoned IPTF police officers alongside local police chiefs and senior Interior Ministry officials. In Kosovo, international judges and prosecutors have been introduced into district and supreme courts to assist their local colleagues in resisting the extrajudicial influences that abound there. Similar programs would also be warranted for penal systems. One of the primary constraints on implementing such a transitional phase is the lack of adequate international mechanisms to mobilize and field such highly qualified personnel.

Integrate Civil and Military Contributions

Troubled and anarchic states are distinguished by their failure to perform such essential functions as sustaining life, resolving political conflict, maintaining public order, and generating employment.¹⁵ Mounting an effective response to such abysmal political, social, and economic conditions requires the integration of a wide array of military and civilian specialties.¹⁶ The key lies in recognizing the interdependent rela-

tionship of military and civil components of contemporary peace missions and constructing effective regimes for their collaboration.

Integration of international efforts will always be imperfect because, inevitably, the states, organizations, and NGOs involved will all have their own interests in any given situation. American leadership is often essential to mount an international response. This leadership can be used to ensure the establishment of mechanisms that produce an integrated effort. Among these mechanisms would be steps to designate a single political manager (for example, a Special Representative of the Secretary General for a UN-led operation) to oversee implementation of the peace process and a common operations center for key international agencies involved. Fully exploiting the integrative potential of information technology (such as geographical information systems) could greatly facilitate information sharing, which is the first step toward task sharing and coordinated planning. Additionally, civil affairs personnel (known as Civil-Military Cooperation in NATO) perform an invaluable integrative function during interventions of this sort, and proper account needs to be made for this function in designing the force. Improvement is also needed in the capacity to mobilize CIVPOL personnel, to address the judicial reform issue, and to disperse funds for reconstruction activities in the early stages of an intervention.

Military commanders have historically been ill prepared to deal with the ambiguities of civil-military operations or to integrate their efforts effectively with the diverse array of multinational and civilian partners involved. Most military officers are unfamiliar with the capabilities and operational culture of the array of civilian actors—humanitarian relief workers, human rights monitors, election supervisors, police trainers, public administrators, and politicians—with whom they must collaborate. Most of the learning has been on the job. Even though these deficiencies have been repeatedly identified as “lessons to be learned” in after-action reviews over the past decade, the same shortcomings repeat themselves with monotonous regularity. These shortcomings will need to be overcome if future operations are to be successful.

Civil-military unity of effort is as vital to mission accomplishment as jointness is for combat operations. Yet this goal is even more difficult to attain because of the lack of formal authority to foster collaboration. The record of IFOR in Bosnia demonstrates the futility of seeking to divorce military and civilian implementation from each other. Absorption of this fundamental lesson—that an acceptable military end-state is unattainable without parallel progress in the civilian dimension—is crucial to unity of effort, as is mutual awareness of capabilities, responsibilities, and motivations. Success also depends on effective mechanisms for coordination and cooperation, the C-2 of civil-military operations (as opposed to command and control, the C-2 of military operations).

Civilian policy guidance or a strategic political-military plan is the starting point for effective civil-military collaboration. If the U.S. Government has not clarified what role its own civil and military agencies ought to play and what its expectations are for their international counterparts, the tendency will be to produce fragmented, uncoordinated, wasteful, and ultimately unsatisfactory operations. The second challenge is to link this planning effort with those individuals who must execute operations in the field. There are two dimensions to this challenge. The challenge for the

United States is to assemble the required experts—in civil and military affairs—in order to oversee the process of implementation. In the field, further complications arise because the primary responsibility for execution will commonly not lie with U.S. agencies but rather with various international groups and nongovernmental organizations. Effective remedies, therefore, will require structural adaptation at the strategic and operational levels.

The capacity of interagency officials to conduct strategic planning, as described in Presidential Decision Directive 56, needs to be enhanced. This will require institutionalizing a cadre of specialists with the expertise necessary to conduct training in the art of political-military planning and to provide a surge capability for developing such plans in crisis situations. This cadre of political-military planners should be drawn from across the cabinet agencies involved. The recently established Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group, if adequately supported and permanently institutionalized, could address the essential issues.

Interagency training activities should be conducted in concert with the regional commanders in chief (CINCs), addressing likely complex contingencies. The focus should be global and regional and should respond to the areas of responsibility of the commanders in chief. In this fashion, participants would not only gain general proficiency in developing political-military plans but would also help produce such plans.¹⁷ Simulations should incorporate participation by those NGOs and international organizations most likely to be involved as *de facto* partners in peace operations. During an actual peace operation or humanitarian crisis, the members of the CINC political-military team could assist the Joint Task Force Commander or senior U.S. diplomatic representative in operational-level planning, deployment in theater, and execution of the political-military plan.

Education and Training

The U.S. military services have enhanced their capacity to function jointly by having their personnel learn about the unique capabilities and cultures of the other services, study together in advanced schools, train and conduct exercises together, and plan together. The same approach would be warranted for peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and civil-military operations. However, military schools have not adequately kept pace with what has been happening in the field, leaving the bulk of the learning to on-the-job experimentation.

After-action reports and lessons-learned reviews conducted with veterans of these operations indicate that military task forces often arrive uncertain about how to coordinate and integrate their efforts with NGOs and international organizations already on the scene. This initial response period, when confusion is greatest, is frequently critical to determining the outcome of an operation. The community of NGOs and international organizations also needs to learn more about military thought processes, *modus operandi*, capabilities, and limitations, as well as how to work effectively together. Prior education for both communities could significantly reduce this period of confusion and perhaps even lead to advanced planning, integrated execution, and ultimately enhanced mission accomplishment.

To institutionalize learning about operations that require integrated efforts, the dedicated, strategic-level cadre suggested earlier should also:

- Identify areas in which civilian and military professionals lack understanding of these operations, and develop educational resources to address them.
- Develop short courses for senior civil and military officials designed to foster expertise in managing complex contingencies.
- Assist in developing relevant scenarios for military training exercises and in obtaining experienced civilian practitioners to serve as role players.

Resources

Regional CINCs require specialized personnel to plan and execute complex peace operations successfully. Civil affairs and psychological operations personnel are among the primary resources for addressing the civil-military complexities of these operations and thus have been in particular demand. Owing to the nature of these contingencies, personnel may need to be mobilized rapidly, and substantial numbers may need to be sustained in the field for a period of years. Almost all civil affairs assets are in the Reserve component, however, where the basic commitment is to serve 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks in the summer, except in national emergencies. Even with a seldom-used Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up, the availability of civil affairs personnel is seriously constrained in numbers and in the frequency and length of deployment. Thus, the Reserve force is being called upon to address a national security challenge for which it was not designed and is not suitably configured. This contributes to retention problems and chronic personnel shortages because there are increasing difficulties in finding sufficient volunteers to satisfy all requirements for demanding missions like those in Haiti, Bosnia, and now Kosovo. To have fully capable civil affairs elements available for duty on short notice requires an investment in highly trained and deployable civil affairs units well in advance of operational requirements.

The regional CINCs need to have adequate expertise in political-military planning and implementation at their disposal.¹⁸ At a minimum, there should be at least one senior, experienced civil-military affairs advisor in each regional CINC headquarters working closely with, or for, the political advisor, aided by the J-5 and senior civil affairs officer. Other desirable structural adaptations include:

- Expediting the increase of the civil affairs structure by 1,100 Reservists.
- Considering the formation of a second active-duty civil affairs brigade.
- Reviewing promotions and career incentives for civil affairs personnel.
- Determining which functional specialties have been in greatest demand.
- Filling shortages with civilian specialists on contract, including retired civil affairs personnel.
- Cataloging other potential sources of relevant civilian expertise in government agencies, the private sector, international organizations, and NGOs for rapid contact during the planning phase of operations.

Avert the Collapse of Troubled States

The fundamental challenge associated with averting the demands for future peace support operations to rescue troubled states is not early warning. It is a matter of early response in cases where preventive action can make a difference and where the United States has an interest to try. Potential cases would include either democratic regimes under extreme duress (for example, Colombia) or countries aspiring to a democratic transition that falter, in part, because of external or transnational sources of instability (such as Macedonia or Indonesia).

Preventive action normally begins with a traditional package of diplomatic, military, and economic assistance programs. If one source of instability is the spillover of conflict from a neighboring state, then the international community could mount a preventive peace operation similar to UNPREDEP in Macedonia. If these efforts fail and a general climate of lawlessness develops, there will not be time to await the results of typical training and assistance programs. Reversing this downward spiral requires prompt reinforcement of the performance and legitimacy of state institutions, especially those dedicated to providing law, order, and justice.

The option of using an unarmed international CIVPOL organization would probably be inappropriate in such circumstances because it would be incapable of self-defense. An international constabulary or armed police organization, however, could be mobilized to monitor, train, and operationally assist local police and judicial authorities. The guiding principle would be to inculcate in the local public security establishment principles of democratic policing and equality before the law. In extreme cases, a constabulary force might also require reinforcement by an international military contingent. Mounting an effective border patrol could also be extremely important in such situations. Over the long term, public security assistance offered by international organizations, individual governments, and NGOs would play a valuable role in the evolution of stable governance.

Mitigate the Humanitarian Consequences of State Anarchy

Relief workers have traditionally depended on an unarmed, nonthreatening posture and neutrality as their primary means of defense. These principles lose their protective value, however, when the relief community is seeking to assist a population that has itself become a primary target in the domestic conflict (for example, the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo). The risks will be compounded if refugee camps become safe havens for rebel forces. Under such circumstances, humanitarian workers may be targeted for kidnapping or assassination. The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, has suffered deadly consequences in recent years in Rwanda and the Chechen Republic. Rival armed groups may commandeer relief supplies, and order at warehouses and distribution centers may also be precarious owing to food riots and the activities of armed gangs. Unless security can be provided, relief activities may need to be suspended, or they may even be too perilous to mount in the first place.

Protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance could entail a range of tasks, including:

- Security for convoys, warehouses, and quarters of humanitarian workers.
- Protection of refugees and safe areas.
- Demilitarization and disarmament of combatants.
- Public security within refugee camps.

Each of these tasks may require a different combination of capabilities, since none of the protection options is without significant liabilities.

Standard military combat units are not well suited for the task of protecting humanitarian assistance. Lacking nonlethal force options, the danger of excessive use of force can be high, as befell the elite Canadian airborne brigade during the Unified Interim Task Force in Somalia. Military forces can perform a crucial function, however, by ensuring that legitimate law enforcement agencies are able to establish their writ over throngs of refugees.

One way to address the security void in refugee camps might be to deploy units of constabulary or armed police to work with the international relief community. Operating in concert with local security forces to the maximum extent possible, they could keep armed elements (gangs or guerrillas) away from refugee camps and help to maintain order at food distribution points. The mere presence of a capable international security force of this sort would tend to encourage local civilian and military security forces to perform their duties more responsibly. A constabulary force might help local authorities curtail the activities of armed gangs inside refugee camps by using investigative techniques, expertise at community policing, and, when confronted, nonlethal control measures. This would improve the security climate within the camps and increase the likelihood that humanitarian assistance would reach the hands of the neediest rather than the most heavily armed.

Civilian police units typically comprise individual volunteers from various countries. Thus, they do not have an organized capability to conduct operations, such as demilitarizing refugee camps. Moreover, they traditionally are unarmed. Once a secure environment has been established, however, they can remove abusive personnel from existing police forces, recruit trainees, establish training programs, and monitor the performance of the entire public security apparatus. Bilateral assistance programs, coordinated with or managed by CIVPOL, provide the bulk of financial and technical support for retraining of domestic police forces.

One common alternative, especially for humanitarian organizations dealing with internally displaced persons, has been to hire local security guards. This can be risky, however, since these personnel may be aligned with one of the warring factions, which could invite retaliation from their rivals. Private international security firms are another alternative. They may be cheaper than an intervention force, but quality control and adherence to human rights could end up being compromised.

Governments hosting refugees have the greatest obligation to provide for their security. In reality, however, they often lack the capability to do so. One attractive option, therefore, is to provide international assistance, through CIVPOL and bilateral assistance programs, to local security forces so they can perform this mission more competently. Local governments will be more likely to cooperate with the relief effort,

moreover, if they receive something in the bargain. Monitoring would also be required to prevent further victimization of refugees by a police force alien to them.

Another promising option would be to train cadres from the refugee community itself to maintain law and order inside the camps. Known as “encadrement,” this would provide employment for military-age males who might otherwise cause problems and also create a security force familiar with the refugees’ distinctive legal traditions. This option would require international training assistance and monitoring and would normally work best if implemented in concert with local police, judicial, and penal systems.

In general, humanitarian protection missions that are the least reliant on military resources are the most likely to receive an international mandate. Nevertheless, there remains a need to develop concepts and coordination mechanisms for integrating military quick reaction forces effectively with constabulary units, international civilian police monitors, and local authorities. One way to promote this sort of collaborative effort would be to establish a protection coordinator for every situation requiring protection of humanitarian relief.

Conclusion

The national security of the United States is most effectively buttressed by the consolidation of democratic regimes and by expansion of the realm of prosperous market economies. United States policy seeks, therefore, to encourage the democratization of autocratic regimes and to strengthen emerging democracies. The forces of globalization will bring increasing pressure to open up closed political and economic systems. Despots, however, sensing that power is slipping from their grasp, will be far more likely to go down with a bang than with a whimper. As Slobodan Milosevic has demonstrated in Kosovo, the internal humanitarian consequences of these ruthless attempts to cling to power can be abhorrent, and the destabilizing impact on surrounding states can directly imperil prominent U.S. interests. Democratic regimes, moreover, are at their weakest in their infancy, and it will be during the transition to democracy that many regimes will be prone to failure.

One effective antidote is the international peace operation. Civil-military collaboration will be essential to reinforcing the capacity of the international community to mount these operations in a timely manner and to conclude them successfully. This may be the most troublesome challenge for soldiers and statesmen in the future. Rather than the divide between East and West or North and South, it may be the gulf between governments that function and those that do not that concerns us most. 🌐

Notes

¹ These manifestations of a seriously challenged state have in common the failure of institutions to resolve disputes in a peaceful manner, maintain public order, generate employment or income, and allocate the scarce resources of society in a way that avoids massive suffering and mortality. Thus, the conflicts that arise are internal to the state and driven by the failure of political or economic institutions, as opposed to natural disasters. Until such elemental activities have been regenerated, the affected state and society will be unlikely to sustain peace autonomously. Consequently, the surrounding region will be at continued risk of destabilization.

² Swedish Foreign Minister Jan Eliasson pointed this out in a conversation with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley and the author on March 6, 1998, in Stockholm.

³ The Congo operation was the major exception.

⁴ John Hillen, *The Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1998).

⁵ The United States is presently responsible for funding 30.7 percent of each peace operation, and the costs associated with intervening in an internal conflict vastly exceed those involved in a simple monitoring mission between two rival states.

⁶ For example, none of the 19 states that had designated standby forces was willing to make them available to the UN when a mission was proposed for Rwanda.

⁷ The Haiti mission transitioned from a coalition of the willing, the Multinational Force, to the UN Mission in Haiti.

⁸ Dan Smith, *The State of War and Peace Atlas* (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1997), 14.

⁹ If units had been formed from individuals drawn from across the Army, the impact on readiness would have been decidedly negative.

¹⁰ The First Armored Division in Bosnia had an advantage in this regard because ranges were available in theater for periodic use by their units.

¹¹ The rules of engagement would be identical to those for the military force, most likely authorizing use of force to prevent loss of life or serious injury to members of the international community and, if indigenous authorities are unresponsive, innocent local civilians.

¹² If the peace process falters, refugees will be extremely reluctant to return to their homes; private investors assuredly will calculate that the risk to their venture capital outweighs any potential gain; the outcome of future elections could easily be determined more by bullets than by ballots; and resources spent on relief and reconstruction could merely result in a prolongation of the conflict. Transnational criminal organizations, moreover, are prone to seize upon such openings to intimidate or suborn even senior officials and insinuate themselves into positions of influence.

¹³ This does not negate the overarching objective of placing the burden of policing on local authorities. Until the dominant sources of political resistance have been quashed, however, it would be unwise to rely totally on a politically motivated police establishment to maintain order.

¹⁴ The controversial decision regarding the status of Brcko was announced in March 1999, and in spite of Serb verbal protests about the outcome, there was no orchestrated campaign of public disturbances.

¹⁵ *Essential functions* are defined as clusters of related activities (political, social, or economic) that must be performed at least at some minimal level to preclude a return to conditions that originally provoked the international intervention.

¹⁶ Where a peace operation is undertaken, the extent to which these essential functions are regenerated will vary. Some may not be addressed at all (with likely implications for achieving a stable outcome). However, all peace operations will address at least some of the areas.

¹⁷ This is consistent with current efforts to develop Annex V of the Standard Operations Plan.

¹⁸ Several have already taken steps to answer this need—for example, the PACOM Center for Excellence and the SOUTHCOM Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.