

# Formative and Operative Engagement

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Although the definition of globalization is still evolving, this volume accurately portrays it as a powerful process of integration that is rapidly becoming a major consideration in U.S. foreign policy. Concurrently, engagement is undergoing its own evolutionary process. To senior naval strategists, the word *engagement* may first evoke the image of blue-water battle as in the campaigns of the Pacific during World War II. To a newly promoted lieutenant junior grade, engagement may connote hors d'oeuvres on the flight deck with the ambassador and his guests. These are two extremes that exist today. They bracket a spectrum of thought and activity that defies limitations and consumes military resources. The engagement mission has grown beyond earlier boundaries and now needs greater definition. This new definition should be based on a fundamental understanding of the global condition and the unique capacity of a strong and credible naval force to positively influence that condition. Achieving the necessary balance and focus in an environment of globalization is the imperative of engagement.

All engagement by U.S. military forces during peacetime should reflect a commitment to a more secure, stable, and less risky international environment, lest the force serve merely as a strategic tripwire. What has become clear in studying engagement is that the commitment exists, but the concept itself and the global environment in which it is applied have both undergone a dramatic, bifurcated development since the end of the Cold War and its containment strategy. The armed services face an engagement conundrum in which the proper application of preventive and corrective approaches to unstable conditions presents an ever-widening dilemma. Further, global development in this technological age is separating the world into the political, economic, and military haves and have-nots. A conceptual framework for engagement is needed—one that leverages the unprecedented power and precious resources of U.S. naval forces.

U.S. naval forces protect U.S. national interests. The threats to those interests have come to demand a reliable and continuous global naval force presence at high readiness levels. The Navy and the Marine Corps have successfully met many chal-

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lenges both unilaterally and in joint operations over the past decades. Occasionally, augmentation by standby forces has been necessary to reinforce the deployed units. These occasions have included primarily operations of limited duration—usually no more than a year. Residual tasking from these contingency response actions has employed some specialized naval capabilities over longer periods. However, the Navy and Marine Corps have always managed to minimize the impact of these operations on the continuum of global naval force presence. The emphasis has been on the capability to respond on short notice; the hot spots of the world have seldom been without a naval force on at least 96-hour alert. Even through a decade of declining resources, the expeditionary rhythm of the force has been preserved.

Through peak Cold War tensions and well past the end of the containment mission, regional commanders in chief (CINCs) have placed a premium on naval force presence, the highest priority being the availability of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. Their requirements did not decrease with the demise of the Soviet Union. Instead, they increased with the emergence of new threats and the growing uncertainty in an increasingly interdependent world. A shift in naval strategy placed new emphasis on projecting power from the sea into the contested littoral and heartland regions. Inspired by new and innovative over-the-horizon warfighting concepts, naval forces have become more relevant to combat in these regions.

Nevertheless, few innovations or inspirational concepts have emerged to guide the forward-deployed naval forces in deliberate engagement planning and execution. Basic accounting procedures have been established in the new theater engagement planning process. Yet there is no method for ongoing examination of the impact of engagement, nor is there a valid process for establishing priorities. Strategy documents, in their quest to be globally inclusive, forgo the detail and clarity necessary to foster a more discriminate and deliberate approach. Declining resources fall victim to a high-level penchant for ephemeral issues rather than enduring priorities. Naval force employment remains conceptually wedged between Cold War containment constraints and the boundless possibilities of post-Cold War globalization. Recent fleet efforts to proactively assert the naval force role in engagement attest to the profound change in the course of political, economic, and military affairs. These efforts are the beginning of a peacetime naval force contribution unmatched in U.S. history.

The engagement role of the U.S. naval forces in the rapidly changing global environment can be defined from three perspectives: the scope of the National Security Strategy and its “imperative of engagement,” examined within a new construct of “formative and operative engagement”; key trends in globalization that impact the way naval forces influence the international environment; and U.S. naval force engagement during a similar period in U.S. history.

It is a primary assumption that naval forces can be more effective in the engagement role without increasing operational tempo, decreasing quality of life, or affecting readiness. Another is that U.S. naval forces can better serve national security interests by providing critical support to other elements of national power. Hopefully, the observations and recommendations of this paper will inspire movement toward realizing the full potential of a naval force that will be forward and present in the new millennium.

## Engagement: An Imperative

*To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.*  
— Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

Perhaps the most vivid realization of Sun Tzu's philosophy was the demise of the Soviet Union after almost a half-century of Western political, economic, and military maneuvers. During this time, the sustained commitment to containing communist expansion was not only a singular rallying point for U.S. interests, but it also brought together an international community to serve common interests and reinforce the commitments of nations. When the Soviet Union dissolved, so did the monolithic threat, and thus the singular rallying point. The aftermath of that dissolution was dominated by two conspicuous trends: a destabilizing reemergence of historical national and ethnic tensions that had been suppressed by the Soviet Union or managed within the Cold War's bipolar alignment; and an increase in global interdependence, and with it the growing certainty that U.S. prosperity, indeed the very expectations of the American people, depended on a stable international environment. The uncertainty as to the scope and volatility of these trends prompted the maintenance of Cold War-like U.S. naval force deployment patterns and readiness postures.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated that the President develop an annual security strategy addressing at a minimum: vital global interests and objectives, proposed short- and long-term use of all elements of the national power to achieve U.S. objectives, and the commitments and defense capabilities required to deter aggression and implement the strategy while achieving a balance among all elements of power.<sup>1</sup> Over the past 14 years, this National Security Strategy has elevated engagement from a footnote to a strategic pillar. Bush administration documents turned the corner from containment to engagement with the deliberate focus on "collective engagement."<sup>2</sup> The Clinton administration followed by adding "enlargement" to the strategy. Expansion of U.S. influence through growing involvement in international affairs was the end, and it appeared that the U.S. military would be a primary means to that end.

To engender momentum toward a more stable world and to maintain influence and play a leadership role, the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy of the 1990s consistently embraced the importance of engagement. One can develop an appreciation for the scope and complexity of strategic tasking by reviewing the phraseology typical of the national strategy documents of that decade:

- National Security Strategy phraseology
  - Engage actively *abroad*
  - Enhance *global* security
  - Bolster prosperity around the *world*
  - Construct *global* institutions
  - Harness *global* forces of integration
  - Leadership for *international* response
  - Dynamism of the *global* economy
  - The United States must lead *abroad*

- Advance U.S. leadership around the *world*
- National Military Strategy phraseology
  - Armed forces engaged *worldwide*
  - Global* competition
  - Global* responsibilities require global capabilities
  - Global* command and control
  - Worldwide* security interests
  - Continue *global* engagement
  - Prosper in the *global* economy
  - Actively engaged in the *world*

The language commits the U.S. military to a growing worldwide engagement effort. American political and economic health increasingly relies on the foundation of a secure and stable international environment, one that can accommodate an agenda of integration. In this pursuit, limited resources are at work in regions where Cold War barricades, together with imposed order, have been removed. The U.S. military is now exposed to a much broader array of unstable situations that have effectively blurred the distinction between the front, the rear, and the flanks. They engage to buttress flagging security conditions and reassure fledgling democracies in areas where national interests mingle with the interests of an increasing number of legitimate transnational benefactors as well as malefactors. This requires extraordinary coordination and synchronization of effort, as it is an extraordinary environment in which to engage.

Certain successes can be attributed to the strategy of remaining forward, present, and engaged in the world—for example, new democracies, burgeoning free markets, a growing observance of international law. These successes, however, have not lessened the engagement workload for the military. Even more is required now that many countries of the developing world are at critical junctures. Those that desire and have the potential to transition to modern societies with connected economies often are in bad neighborhoods and under extreme political pressures. U.S. support has, in many cases, been the defining factor in always tough political decisions to break with old ways and regimes, and to pursue independence and statehood. For many of these vulnerable countries, reassurance comes only through sustained U.S. engagement.

This increased workload has also brought more scrutiny to the allocation of resources. Resources for military engagement are limited, and the competition for those resources was in part responsible for institution by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of a formalized accounting process. The theater engagement-planning process was designed to track all military engagement activity by area of responsibility. CINCs were charged with the responsibility of developing theater engagement plans (TEPs) that linked activities and resources to prioritized regional objectives. The plans include annexes that detail activities over 5-year periods. Recognizing the scope of activity that this process now encompasses is important. It accounts for all engagement with the developing countries mentioned earlier—and other underdeveloped countries with less strategic value—but more importantly with the reliable and militarily sophisticated allies of the United States. Along with combined exercises and a host of foreign military interactions, the TEP is required to report as engagement those rou-

tine and continuous operational activities to which U.S. forces are committed for the long term, whether they began as a scheduled activity or are the result of ongoing operations.<sup>3</sup> The TEP attempts to track the complete range of global military activity short of the initial crisis response actions and the war fighting itself. Initial versions of the TEP submitted by CINCs were in most cases 500-page documents.<sup>4</sup>

## Engagement: A Military Conundrum

For the U.S. naval force, indeed the entire military, the meaning of the word *engagement* is not well understood. It is as vague today as the term *security* has been through the ages. Perhaps no other word had quite its capacity to infiltrate post-Cold War military lexicon. The *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual* (CJCSM 31130.10) published February 1, 1998, defines *engagement* as “all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the international environment in peacetime.” Here a vague phrase is used to define a vague concept. Ideally, engagement would shape (nurture) the international environment with the values of democracy, prosperity, and security. On the one hand, it seems that injecting these three ingredients into underdeveloped regions that exist beyond the margins of globalization would require a certain concept of engagement. On the other hand, sustaining these three ingredients in the mature, wealthy democracies of the developed world would require a fundamentally different concept of engagement. Yet strategy documents and vision statements to date reflect no conceptual distinctions regarding engagement.

The mind of the military strategist, while laboring to embrace the geostrategic breadth of the engagement mission, is further challenged as it plumbs the professional depth of its role in engagement. In the U.S. naval force, engagement has traditionally been viewed in a warfighting or response context (closing with the enemy in battle at sea). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, naval strategy added a landward focus, deepening the response context of engagement. New tactics like precision engagement and overland engagement are now set within this response context.

Furthermore, successive iterations of the National Security Strategy have increasingly emphasized the imperative of engagement in the peacetime or shaping context. Engagement, with its many modifiers, has fully penetrated the professional lexicon in both the shape and respond contexts. In one high-level document, the phrase *cooperative engagement* refers to coordinating efforts to shoot and kill the enemy and, in the next chapter, to the coordinated but benign activities designed to build relations and stabilize the international environment. Little discipline has been exercised in the development of the language of this strategic imperative.

It is useful to examine how the shape and respond aspects reveal themselves in the current strategy documents. Table 1 lists the term *engagement* and its modifiers as used in recent strategy and vision documents and posture statements from the Department of Defense (DOD) and its subordinate organizations. In the 263 instances in which the word was used, the context was either one of peaceful interaction (shaping) or war fighting (responding). In a few cases, the word served in both contexts. This theme runs completely through DOD organizations.

Other agencies and departments with significant international responsibilities and activities—the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Justice, and Transportation—do not use the word *engagement* in their key documents. Despite its status as an imperative in National Security Strategy, with the exception of the U.S. Coast Guard, none of the non-DOD organizations examined make reference to engagement in their strategic plans or vision statements. In over 1,000 pages of high-level documents, the word is absent. This is not to say that the imperative of engagement has been overlooked in these organizations; they are involved in international activities. It does, however, reveal inconsistency at the highest levels.

When it became clear that the word *engagement* was not used in high-level Department of State documents, examination of lower level documents was undertaken. The motivation for a deeper look at these guiding documents came from the realization that the State Department's field organizations (embassies and consulates) had the charter to oversee and regulate U.S. military interaction with their host countries. Furthermore, an ambassador, the direct representative of the President of the United States, would presumably place emphasis on any imperative set by his or her superior. The current Mission Performance Plans of the U.S. embassies in the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Tunisia were selected. Review of the Chief of Mission Statements encompassing embassy goals, interests, strategies, objectives, and assumptions in these three important and diverse countries revealed the word *engagement* used once.

Another element of inadequacy stems from the failure of the official definition of engagement to include that portion of engagement that is not focused on shaping the international environment. This is a matter of emphasis. Naval engagement with England, Germany, and Japan is not meant primarily to shape, but rather to reassure allies of U.S. commitment and to maintain the military access and interoperability that allows a strategy of engagement and enlargement to exist. These countries are, for the most part, shaped. They have democracy, prosperity, and security—in some instances, above U.S. levels. The emphasis here is on response-oriented engagement, engagement that focuses on complex war fighting and does not necessarily require

**Table 1. Use of the Term *Engagement* by the Department of Defense**

Shaping Context	Response Context	Both
Theater engagement	Multiple engagement	Engagement
Proactive engagement	Maritime engagement	Global engagement
Peacetime engagement	Overland engagement	Regional engagement
Military engagement	Precision engagement	Cooperative engagement
Environment engagement	First-round engagement	
International engagement	Long-range engagement	
Commercial engagement		
Sustained engagement		
Collective engagement		
Selective engagement		
Committed engagement		
Subregional engagement		

coordination with other political or economic engagement. It is perhaps disingenuous to consider naval engagement with France for the purpose of shaping the country or its international affairs. This must be considered less important than engagement for the purpose of enabling combined response to crisis or interoperability in war fighting. Hereafter, this type of engagement—that is, engagement with an operational focus—will be referred to as *operative engagement*.

On the other hand, military engagement with new and developing nations like Romania, Tunisia, or Algeria focuses on nurturing the internal and regional security environment and encourages rational defensive ambitions and capabilities. Naval engagement with new and developing nations will have an important but limited military agenda and in almost all cases will benefit from close coordination and balance with the political and economic elements of U.S. national power. This type of engagement targets fundamental security issues in unstable regions and hereafter will be referred to as *formative engagement*.

Engagement in this manner is a necessity brought on by the way that the United States routinely pursues its security objectives. The end of the Cold War did not bring the spoils or the subjugation of peoples that would normally accrue from victory. Instead, the United States has sought to embrace, not to occupy, and to influence, not to control. The emphasis has been on incorporating countries into a growing group of friends and allies committed to democracy, and on a law-bound international order. As Henry Kissinger points out, this approach has resulted in a “triumph of faith over experience.”<sup>5</sup> U.S. engagement strategy has as its underlying objective international order through enlargement of the group of responsible international actors, and that strategy is in all particulars noncoercive.

Thus, the U.S. naval force enters the 21st century exposed to a much wider spectrum of engagement. Figure 1 illustrates this in one dimension. Consider the military activities, competencies, and force postures that ensured a successful strategy of containment and place them on a spectrum that begins with the tense peace of the Cold War and ends in a major theater war. The strategic shift from containment to engagement mandated new activities, competencies, and force postures to supplement the old, most of which remain relevant and in place. The engagement spectrum extends beyond that tense peace of the Cold War, which today is merely a strategic placeholder with a particularly stubborn and perhaps permanent structural component of crisis. The spectrum now extends to an undefined point that could be characterized as an optimum combination of prosperity, democracy, and security. For the lack of any adequate military terminology, this point will be called *Har*, short for *harmony*—in a practical sense, the union of distinctly different parts to make a more stable and secure environment for change. Unfortunately, going to *Har* is not like going to *War*. Where *War* has primarily a military end state, *Har* has primarily a socioeconomic one. Where *War* requires that the United States maintain a unilateral capability, *Har* demands a multilateral approach. Where *War* focuses on the order of battle, *Har* focuses on international order. And finally, where *War* increasingly relies on over-the-horizon sanctuaries, *Har* depends on closing with the willing at the margins of stability. Such is the broad and contrary nature of the *Har*-to-*War* engagement spectrum.

**Figure 1. Peacetime Engagement Spectrum**

The challenge of understanding the impact of a wider role in engagement is great. The combined strategy goals of enhancing security, bolstering prosperity, and promoting democracy do not attain the same clarity for the strategists as does the objective of winning the Nation's wars. Further, engagement for the purpose of shaping the international environment is not an objective that easily translates into action by way of traditional, formalized military planning tools or intelligence methods. Simply put, engagement by the military in peacetime has traditionally focused on preparing the force so as to reduce the risk *in the fight* (Peace  $\Rightarrow$  War). Since the end of World War II, the military has become more directly involved in reducing the risk of *having to fight* (Har  $\Leftarrow$  Peace), and it should be developing core competencies in this new dimension as economy of force measures.

In a more practical sense, engagement activity to the right of Peace should be operative in focus, with priority on enhancing war fighting and crisis response with the reliable, ready, and modern militaries of allies and friends. This should be a more exclusive group of developed countries, given the short list of reliable, ready, and modern naval forces, as well as the level of national commitment necessary to build and maintain a naval force. Engagement activity to the left of Peace should be formative in focus, with priority on those developing countries whose potential to positively impact regional stability is high. This, too, should be a more exclusive group, given the minimum level of physical and organizational infrastructure necessary to realize a benefit from naval engagement and the rare political potential for gathering regional support for peaceful conflict resolution. The other important aspect of formative engagement is incorporating a host of nontraditional actors from across key sectors of society. This should be an interdisciplinary effort that would often cast the U.S. naval force in the supporting role.

Formative and operative engagement act together in lessening the need for, and increasing the effectiveness of, actions like the gunboat diplomacy that occurred between the United States and China in the Taiwan Straits in 1996. There, Navy carrier presence helped calm the tensions and stay the geopolitical brinkmanship between China and Taiwan. Increasingly, this type of unilateral, geopolitical engagement exists along the Har-to-War spectrum in the gray area of crisis. In the future, its success will depend on the effectiveness of the formative and operative engagement that precedes it.

From Har-to-War, the U.S. naval force is now exposed to a broader set of missions that stress its resources and professional culture. The force has adjusted well to

extensions of its mission, including nontraditional national security threats (for example, environment and health).<sup>6</sup> Yet without a coherent conceptual framework for engagement, one that taps its potential but also sets limits, the U.S. military may not control its destiny.

## Engagement: The Global Dimension

When thinking about the imperative of engagement across the Har-to-War spectrum, one is compelled to consider the following examples of the new dynamic of globalization—that is, the vast changes in the traditional linkages of power and influence:

- A retired Army Colonel, John Kronkitis, and a retired Air Force Colonel, Rom Kilikauskas, serve as the Minister of Defense and the Deputy Chief of Defense, respectively, for Lithuania.
- Greenpeace, whose followers have attempted to block Navy ship visits in various ports around the world, now has “prominent industrialists, including BP Amoco, Enron and Unilever”<sup>7</sup> appearing at their conferences, and the eco-organization is listed in the Mission Performance Plan of the U.S. embassy in Tunisia as the nongovernmental organization (NGO) for consultation on fisheries issues.
- In 1998, Daimler-Benz of Germany acquired U.S. carmaker Chrysler in, at that time, the largest ever takeover of an American company by a foreign company. In World War II, the armaments produced by these two flagship industrial groups closed in battle.
- On May 3, 2000, the merger between the London Stock Exchange and the Deutsche Börse was announced, ending 200 years of London Stock Exchange independence. The new body immediately signaled an alliance with the National Association of Securities Dealers and Quotations (NASDAQ).

Traditional linkages of power and influence are changing. National borders now seem to be more pliable and, in some cases, to have disappeared altogether. Traditional linkages are being broken down, and new linkages are forming. At a recent high-level meeting of a globalization study group, an official from a major American media corporation repeatedly emphasized that it was not “American,” but rather an international entity. He added that efforts were made to ensure that it was not seen as an American corporation—linkages breaking down. At the same time, the phenomenon of dollarization, by which a country’s monetary policy independence is sacrificed for the stability of direct ties to the U.S. dollar, has placed sovereign states under the policy arm of the U.S. Federal Reserve—new linkages forming.

The 21st century began amid a growing global transition of power and influence. That transition affects all sectors of society, and it appears to the developed world to be changing the entire earth. Worth noting, however, is the fact that the transition is not yet all-encompassing. Three-quarters of all business and social transactions still take place on paper, and only five percent of companies have made the transition to

modern technologies. Almost half the world's workers remain in the agricultural sector, and half the world's people have yet to place a telephone call.<sup>8</sup>

The year 2000 National Security Strategy states that globalization is "the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political integration." Achieving National Security Strategy objectives will increasingly depend on the degree to which states, regions, and superpowers can reconcile their growing integration. The forces of integration or globalization are powerful. They have been with us before, but never in such an accelerated or pervasive fashion. Understanding the impact of this process is a necessary albeit complex task, akin to capturing the societal and cultural impacts of the Agricultural Revolution and the Industrial Revolution occurring simultaneously and in double-time.

Some experts see globalization as growing interdependency across national boundaries with an attendant slow deterioration of the nation-state. One economist emphasizes a more routine yet pronounced cyclical rise and fall of pivotal commodities.<sup>9</sup> John Gray, another economist, and former advisor to Margaret Thatcher, calls the emerging global free market (the proximate cause of globalization) "a product of artifice, design, and political coercion that is short lived in any democracy."<sup>10</sup> Contrarily, in his book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, the popular journalist Thomas Friedman refers to globalization as an enduring and dynamic process involving the "inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before."<sup>11</sup> International financier George Soros warns of global crisis when he writes that globalization under the current capitalist system is fundamentally unstable, as there is no global society to temper to the global economy.<sup>12</sup> Leading professionals from all disciplines are thinking in terms of a new global dynamic.

James N. Rosenau, a professor of international affairs, sees our epoch as a time of contrary trends and episodic patterns, a period of commonplace anomalies. He highlights an underlying erosion yet a still vigorous assertion of state sovereignty, loss of government influence while government resources grow, and soaring corporate profits in a time of stagnant wages. Rosenau asserts that tradition and history are being redefined amid these contradictions, but points out that we are ill equipped to deal with the changes because the vocabulary does not exist. Professional military strategists would agree with this statement, as it would appear that recently DOD has become a clearinghouse for the difficult act of dealing with the downsides of these contrary trends: organized crime, contagious disease, environmental degradation, and a host of other transnational dangers and semi-dangers.

## Engagement: The Themes

It can be argued that, as far as U.S. naval forces are concerned, there are three central and cross-cutting realities, or themes, of globalization: transnationalism, privatization, and decline in hierarchical authority. It is changes of these kinds that, in fact, will necessitate a reexamination of the way U.S. naval forces can influence the international environment.

### *Transnationalism*

Globalists have their many unique perspectives. A reasonable one is that of transgovernmentalism. First observed by political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s, transgovernmentalism has become widespread. More recently, it has been paralleled in NGOs that no longer feel constrained by national boundaries—for example, labor unions, professional associations, special interest groups, and lobbyists. The broadening of Government or nongovernment activities and associations with foreign interests continues.

Significant nongovernment aspects expand transgovernmentalism to the more complex and pervasive notion of transnationalism. More than a vision of the future, transnationalism is happening now and is having fundamental impact on the “New World Order.” Transnationalism brings about a state’s disaggregation or fragmentation into separate, functionally distinct parts. Courts, regulatory agencies, executives, legislatures, labor unions, and even military and paramilitary organizations are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new transnational order. Today’s expanding national security challenges—for example, terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation, money laundering, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), bank failure, securities fraud, contagious diseases—create and sustain these relations.<sup>13</sup>

Transnationalism in the private sector can be adequately illustrated by further examining the Daimler Benz-Chrysler merger mentioned earlier. Roughly a year after the merger, in October 1999, a formal agreement established the European Aeronautics, Defense and Space (EADS) Company. EADS was the result of the merger between DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (DASA) and the French firm Aerospatiale Matra. The merger was called a political milestone in that it marked the restoration of the traditional privileged relationship between France and Germany. It was characterized as the “first truly cross-border, fully integrated aerospace and defense company in Europe”—the world’s third largest aerospace company and the leader in the helicopter and commercial space launcher sectors. The ownership structure formally acknowledges DaimlerChrysler as the single largest shareholder. However, the French state maintains prerogatives that effectively give it the right to veto future strategic decisions. Additionally, immediately following the creation of EADS, a merger between Aerospatiale Matra, Matra, the British firm BAe, and the Italian firm Finmeccanica brought together the main European missile producers under a new Matra BAe Dynamics entity. This entity controls 30 percent of LKA, a German missile company, which is controlled by DASA.<sup>14</sup>

Consolidation of the European defense industry is ongoing and complex. Yet the impact of transnational defense industrial integration on the major European powers and the United States is up for debate. Some would focus on the loss of a U.S. flagship company like Chrysler to European control or, in other instances, the potential for unauthorized direct or third-party transfer of sensitive military technology. Others can see an enhanced North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through greater system interoperability or greater burden sharing in system development and production. A recent study by the Defense Science Board examined the potential risks of

cross-border defense linkages and found them neither new nor compelling in view of the potential benefits.<sup>15</sup>

Examination of this phenomenon at the working level, in fact, discloses benefits. Soon, instead of a team of technical experts flying from Norfolk, Virginia, to Sigonella, Italy, and then out to a Navy ship to troubleshoot a critical weapons system, a team of French and German technical experts could embark from Marseilles, France, and be back home the same day.

Capital-intensive commercial industries have been impacted by transnationalism throughout the 1990s. Changes have been market driven and have substantially affected company control and ownership. Firms with international supplier, product, and investment bases are responsible for more than half the world's industrial output, and the advanced technology sector depends on a worldwide supplier network and labor pool. In this commercial metamorphosis, the characteristics of an American company do not remain self-evident. Further, the Cold War U.S. defense industrial base is no longer dedicated to domestic defense production, but is increasingly international in character. All this means that in the future, the U.S. military-technological advantage will derive increasingly from externally controlled sources.<sup>16</sup>

Following the lead of big business, organized labor is increasing its interaction across national boundaries. A recent poll of AFL-CIO unions found that two-thirds were engaged in international activity as a necessary extension of their normal organizing and bargaining, and 87 percent indicated that they need to do even more on the global scene.<sup>17</sup> In the 1997 United Parcel Service (UPS) strike, 185,000 teamsters forced a settlement on terms favorable to the union. The union strategy included broad international support. A year before the strike, empowered by the Internet, the teamsters formed a World Council of UPS Unions with assistance from the International Transportation Workers Federation. The group identified enough common ground to organize a World Action Day in the spring of 1997, coinciding with the final stages of negotiations. On that day, UPS was hit with more than 150 job actions or demonstrations worldwide, including work stoppages in Italy and Spain. With the trend toward privatization of military logistics, these stoppages will impact shipments of materiel to and through naval transshipment hubs like Rota, Spain, and Naples, Italy.

The halls of the U.S. judiciary do not escape this trend. In October 1995, 25 Supreme Court Justices and their designees met in Washington to inaugurate the Organization of the Supreme Courts of the Americas (OCSA [from the Spanish *Organización de Cortes Supremas de las Americas*]). The OCSA is dedicated to the principles of "promote[ing] and strengthen[ing] judicial independence and the rule of law among the members." Its charter envisages a permanent secretariat. Increasingly, judges around the world are referring to decisions made in courts outside their states. Clearly this is the case when courts from nations of the European Union refer cases up to the supranational tribunal, the European Court of Justice, in order to obtain opinions that consider the impact of European law on national law.<sup>18</sup>

Transnational forces do not require traditional power sources. At one extreme, the existence of "super-empowered individuals"<sup>19</sup> is all that is necessary to snare the policy objectives of great nations. This can be viewed as the slow erosion of American influence. Those who hold this view would not agree with international law ex-

pert Anne Slaughter, who has stated that the process of a nation-state's disaggregation harnesses the power to find, integrate, and implement solutions to global problems. For those who are concerned with national security, judging the good and bad of transnationalism is less important than understanding that the underlying process is real and ongoing, and will ultimately change the manner in which a forward, present, and engaged naval force goes about proactively shaping the international environment and responding to crisis.

This should not be a surprise to the U.S. military. For decades, it has been in the middle of transnationalism, doing more to promote its furtherance than perhaps any other organization, including the United Nations (UN). Recent successful yet painstaking efforts to include all 19 NATO member nations in the targeting processes for strikes in Kosovo and Yugoslavia are a prime example of how transnationalism works its way down to the tactical level. Evolutionary processes at the strategic level are evident in the role played by the Group of Eight (G-8) during the Kosovo crisis. NATO, in its statement on Kosovo, set forth conditions under which combat operations would cease. This in itself demonstrated new and powerful transnational cohesion. However, the prompt endorsement of the G-8 added a more significant piece, in that it meant that Russia supported the conditions.<sup>20</sup>

The G-8 is worth discussing in this light. A transnational organization of the world's most significant economic powers, the G-8 was established to improve cooperation in economic and financial policy. Yet it has entered into the areas of international security, crisis resolution, WMD proliferation, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, ballistic missile defense, and environmental issues. A new G-8 offshoot organization, the Group of 20 (G-20), as highlighted in the National Security Strategy (December 1999), is intended to "promote cooperation to achieve stable and sustained world economic growth."<sup>21</sup> It takes the G-8 transnational character even further by incorporating 12 more nations and enabling a broader consensus for G-8 ideas. Considering the potential economic power, political influence, and physical reach of the G-20, it is not difficult to imagine a changing UN role.

### ***Privatization***

The G-8 combined economic power and influence on global security and stability lifts transnationalism to new levels. The organization rides on the increasing primacy of economics and economical solutions to problems, which is reminiscent of past utilitarian practices. Utilitarians of the mid-18th century championed more economic efficiency through privatization, particularly when dealing with national security. John Rushkin, a vocal utilitarian, stated:

If our present doctrines of political economy be just, let us trust them to the utmost . . . let us take the war business out of the governments hands and test therein the principles of supply and demand. Let our future sieges of Sebastopol be by contract—no capture no pay. Let us sell the commands of our respective battles to the lowest bidder so that we may have cheap victories.<sup>22</sup>

Rushkin was promoting the broader use of all the elements of British national power to achieve the most cost-effective and capable security structure for the grow-

ing and global interests of the Empire. This was reasonable during the 19th century, when expanding colonial and commercial interests spurred numerous conflicts with limited objectives. He was merely expanding government practices that had for some time required private companies to provide for their own protection. In the early 19th century, the East India Company not only deployed an army in the field but also ran a navy of 122 ships. Had Clausewitz fully recognized the extent to which private, commercial interests would both provide and apply the means of war in the 19th century, indeed into the 21st century, he might have placed commerce alongside war as extensions of policy by other means.

Utilitarian principles are again alive and well in England, where in 1983 the Adam Smith Institute called for the “civilianization” of the armed forces and the government began to privatize not only the logistics support but also front-line warfighting functions.<sup>23</sup> The same trend is present in the United States, primarily with regard to logistics functions.

The Chinese armed forces achieve self-sufficiency from as many as 20,000<sup>24</sup> People’s Liberation Army businesses engaged in commercial activities, even overseas. Additionally, there are nearly 10,000 private security firms that offer services where states used to be the sole source. In South Africa, private security guards now outnumber the police. The security operations of large corporations dominate in some parts of the developing world, and the future may see these functions transcend the traditional nation-state. They provide vital security functions and pose credible asymmetrical threats. Presently, demand for their services remains “robust and fertile”.<sup>25</sup>

. . . at present there is no legislative prohibition or regulation which deals with private military companies [PMCs] and they are therefore . . . entitled to carry on their business within the law.<sup>26</sup>

Demonstrated cost-effectiveness of PMCs may prompt an expansion of services to the maritime sector. A future PMC—call it “Littoral Solutions”—subsidized through a combination of public funds and private funds from corporations exploiting off-shore resources, might very well provide security and safety services within a nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or, perhaps more cost-effective, across the EEZs of multiple nations. This could be an effective way to address the growing problems of piracy and illegal exploitation of maritime resources. A transnational security organization like Littoral Solutions should have the characteristics of a responsible, multinational organization. It should observe international law and possess functional capacities that provide desired levels of interoperability. Shaping the reasonable and rational role of this growing industry can be accomplished only through an understanding of its private and transnational character.

### ***Decline of Hierarchical Authority***

Globalization brings a “decline of hierarchical authority,”<sup>27</sup> says Michael Mazaar. Reaction against statism in the developing world and the dissatisfaction with one-party rule are indicators of broader challenges and changes based on the rising authority of

knowledge. Marshall McLuhan put it this way: “Delegated authority is lineal, visual, hierarchical. The authority of Knowledge is nonlineal, nonvisual and inclusive.”<sup>28</sup>

Information and knowledge are putting power in the hands of more people. Small horizontally organized work groups are vesting authority and empowering their workers through direct ownership. With little to no hierarchical structure, they can have great impact. Larger, more vertically organized groups like great multinational companies may maintain hierarchical structures, but their transnational investment patterns drive authority and power downward. Now, direct foreign investment in factories, utilities, and other long-term projects bypasses the more traditional and controlled method of investment in state stocks and bonds. From 1981 to 1985, annual foreign direct investment averaged \$98 billion; in 1997, the figure had risen to \$440 billion.<sup>29</sup>

The more unseemly side of this declining trend can be seen in what John Gray calls the “Anarcho-Capitalism” of post-communist Russia. Criminal elements within the Soviet Union fused themselves to the political elite and the bosses of a clandestine economy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation remains criminal, but perhaps less clandestine. Under a growing plurality of corruption and controlled by a less hierarchical structure, the criminal organizations now reflect the diverse ethnic tapestry of Russia and they do not normally act in concert.<sup>30</sup>

Strict hierarchical social control has been for centuries a foundation of many Asian cultures, but this, too, is changing. Extensive research in more than a dozen Asian countries recently found that governance is a central issue everywhere in Asia. Traditional hierarchical structures hold increasingly tenuous power, while individual empowerment is on the rise. China, with the most hierarchical of governments, is experiencing declining respect for central authority among the youth and within local governments.<sup>31</sup>

These global trends—transnationalism, privatization, and the decline of hierarchical authorities—are sustained by the democratization of technology, finance, and information.<sup>32</sup> They are rooted in economics, nurtured with science, and blossom through knowledge. As stated earlier, it must be recognized that not all countries are equal participants in globalization. The countries in the stable, concentrated zones of prosperous, well-developed economies are in a race for markets in the countries that comprise the broad, unstable, and contentious zones of underdeveloped economies—zones with most of the world’s population. These zones constitute that part of the globe that has yet to be fully embraced by globalization. The forces that drive a near-postmodern, developed world into interaction with the not-yet-modern or not-yet-developed world are the same forces that are driving the changes in the structure of power and influence across all sectors of a growing global economy and society.

## **Engagement: A Heritage**

As a flexible element of national power for two and a half centuries, U.S. naval forces have made use of all possible ways of procuring, organizing, deploying, and employing ships. In the mid-19th century, they were almost entirely in support of small-scale contingencies and missions other than war.<sup>33</sup>

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels commented on the era in the *Communist Manifesto*, published in 1848. They had observed the Western sensation of profit and *laissez faire* that provide the conditions for economic expansion. Growth had demands. Internally, women were streaming from their homes to take up work in more than 100 trades. A rigid domestic system from the Colonial Age began to crumble. Relief from labor shortages was found through immigration, which provided the additional workers for New England factories and the farmers for the western territory. Externally, political, economic, and military developments had, despite two recent wars over independence, prompted England to offer cooperation with the United States. Of this cooperation, 80-year-old Thomas Jefferson commented in 1823 that it was “the most momentous which has ever been offered . . . we should sedulously cherish a cordial friendship.”<sup>34</sup> With these conditions, engagement began to expand. Congress was emboldened by the rapprochement of the United States and the United Kingdom, and encouraged by memorials from men interested in trade, particularly with China.

In 1815, there were only two independent nations in the New World, the United States and Haiti. By 1822, continental America had largely thrown off colonial domination. From the Great Lakes to Cape Horn, only Belize, Bolivia, and the Guianas remained under European control. The Monroe Doctrine sought to consolidate gains by declaring any further attempts to extend European political systems in the Western Hemisphere as dangerous to America’s peace and safety. The doctrine went on to exempt Europe’s existing colonies or dependencies, saying that, “in matters relating to themselves [European powers] we have not interfered and shall not interfere.”

Key U.S. political, economic, and social trends from the mid-19th century are clearly present today. The desire to lead and consolidate democratic gains ran alongside the accelerated economic and social integration now termed globalization, albeit at a slower pace. This phenomenon is now, as it was in the 1830s and 1840s, just beginning. Pressures comparable to underdeveloped markets and labor shortages were then, and are now, relieved by influencing external factors like immigration and trade.

Of note is the fact that as the U.S. naval forces forged outward from the continent, it was empowered to act. Internal to the Navy, overseas squadrons reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy, who was a cabinet-rank political appointee; externally, the independent Department of the Navy was co-equal in status, enjoying autonomy with the Departments of War and State and other departments. In the inter-agency process of the time, it had equal access to the President.<sup>35</sup>

Not long after the War of 1812, the Navy assumed a global posture. By 1835, there were six squadrons: the Mediterranean, West India, Brazilian, Pacific, East India, and Asiatic. Often relieved on station, these squadrons and their global reach remained largely unchanged for the remainder of the century. In the 1830s, even with the administration’s emphasis on continental defenses, these squadrons remained forward. The 21 ships in the Navy’s registry were fully employed as the country endured the pressures and stresses that have been mentioned. However, and notwithstanding the brief but serious economic depression beginning in 1837, work continued on a special naval project, the Naval Exploring Expedition, in the planning stages for almost 2 years. Samuel Eliot Morison called the project, launched on Au-

gust 18, 1838, “the most important overseas project this era.”<sup>36</sup> The following instructions were issued by the Secretary of the Navy, James K. Paulding, to 40-year-old Lieutenant Charles Wilkes on August 11, 1838:

Sir—The Congress of the United States, having in view the important interests of our commerce embarked in the whale-fisheries and other adventures in the great Southern Ocean, by an act of the 18th of May 1836, authorized an Expedition to be fitted out for the purpose of exploring and surveying that sea, as well to determine the existence of all doubtful islands and shoals . . . to ascertain resources and facilities for trade to teach the natives the modes of cultivation . . . to ascertain whether there is any safe route which will shorten the passage of our vessels to and from China . . . to extend the empire of commerce and science . . . to diminish the hazards of the ocean...<sup>37</sup>

A squadron of six ships had been assembled and fitted for what would be a four-year voyage of shaping, responding, and discovering. Lieutenant Wilkes had been designated a Minister Plenipotentiary, assuming ambassadorial status for the expedition. Civilian scholars and scientists from many disciplines competed for assignment to the expedition and had formed a cadre that would “extend the bounds of science, and promote the acquisition of knowledge.”<sup>38</sup>

Wilkes worked closely with the State Department representatives permanently stationed in the most remote places, as well as the missionaries (the early NGOs) who were often the prime sources of information. He projected the prestige and power of the United States from the sea, seeking out the centers of power in the many tribal island environments and more powerful nations of the Pacific and around the world. This formative engagement effort established cooperative relations through various agreements and, given the unprecedented access, gathered important information. Wilkes had his contingencies and had the capabilities to respond to crisis with force when it became the only alternative. He served the operative side of the engagement spectrum with his surveys and assessments of suitable coaling stations to support the Navy’s pending transition from sail to steam. Additionally, his charts of the Southern Pacific were used extensively in the naval campaigns of World War II. The expedition carried many of the most important inventions of the day, as well as a unique library of scientific and academic books that would both assist the embarked scholars and scientists and astonish the people they engaged.

During preparations for the 1838 Exploring Expedition, The House of Giesse & Horckhaufs, a Philadelphia purveyor of finery, sent a letter to President Andrew Jackson asking him to consider purchasing items for the expedition. In the letter was an offer to provide the means to secure the cooperation of the natives encountered.

The good will and friendship of rude savages are most effectively secured by gaudy presents.<sup>39</sup>

The ability to influence the leadership of the tribal peoples was enhanced by showy beads and trinkets that were almost worthless to the expedition. Highly valued by the natives, on occasion the gifts would even be considered by the recipients to possess certain powers and spirits. There may be a modern equivalent of these trinkets, but the spread of information has produced a broader, better sense of value. For

example, in the Kayapo Indian village in a remote corner of the Amazon rain forest, the tribesmen monitor the business channel on a single satellite television set. They track the international rate for gold and then determine what to charge the gold miners who work on the tribal land.<sup>40</sup>

The records of the Exploring Expedition are replete with evidence of a professional acumen among its officers and men. A strong ethos of engagement and an interdisciplinary approach enabled them to set specific objectives and empower the executors. Cited as primary objectives of the expedition were the “Great Interests of commerce and navigation”—that is, increased international influence and science.<sup>41</sup>

## Observations

Engagement appears to be an enduring imperative of the National Security Strategy. However, for the U.S. naval forces, the engagement mission is underdeveloped. Largely transfixed by the Cold War containment strategy, the capacity of naval forces to shape the international environment has yet to fully mature. Part of the U.S. naval legacy is a capacity for special utility to national interests during (relatively peaceful) periods of economic expansion and profound international change. An inspirational approach to the national imperative of engagement, one aimed at seizing opportunities and mitigating the destabilizing effects of globalization, could reaffirm this utility. If deliberate, innovative, and focused in its engagement effort, the Navy could more effectively contribute to the global goals and aspirations of the Nation while preserving its precious resources. As was the case for its warfighting doctrine, the Navy must also turn its attention from the sea in its engagement effort. In doing so it will tap into its legacy and reinvigorate the unique geostrategic perspective of the naval service (a national treasure); limit its exposure to primarily ad hoc or issues-based employment; and empower the naval force to act as a catalyst for enhanced security among a diverse set of actors and interests.

In 1993, Ambassador Linton Brooks wrote the following:

The Navy’s failure to focus on peacetime presence arises in part because the profession lacks any consensus on how such presence relates to budget and force structure decisions. A second factor is the difficulty of understanding, at more than a rudimentary level, how peacetime presence advances national goals.<sup>42</sup>

In 2000, budget allocation and force structure issues remain. They join with the illusive goal of transformation to consume the intellectual capital of naval force visionaries. In this time of global change, proactive and innovative strategists should implement a modest shift in mindset to a more holistic approach. This approach will send a stronger message of naval force utility in an environment of globalization, and it will better prepare the naval service for the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review process. Important for the naval force strategy, this message will foster a solid understanding of the ends of forward presence and a full examination of the means to those ends—taking into account the entire potential of naval engagement from Har to War.

Any increase in future naval budgets and force structures will be a hollow victory without this preparation. If Congress were suddenly to allocate \$100 billion more per year to the procurement budget (the current high-end budget shortfall estimate), it would be insufficient in the presence of an underdeveloped vision for employment of a larger force in a peacetime environment. Ambassador Brooks' remarks highlight the added hurdle of a rudimentary understanding of how presence works. The U.S. naval force is beginning to overcome this hurdle through experimentation and innovation at lower levels, where more than rudimentary understanding already exists.

### ***Formative Engagement***

The process of making engagement a naval presence multiplier has begun. In the mid-1990s, ship deployment patterns began to change. For example, in 1994, 97 percent of all port visits in the European area of responsibility (AOR) occurred in NATO countries (plus France and Israel). By 1997, that total had fallen to 87 percent. The shift was toward the contentious zone of the developing countries mentioned earlier, and it has continued, aiming for an informal target of 25 percent of all port visits occurring in this contentious zone. Port visits are a good indicator of operating patterns and are representative of a much wider array of engagement in a global context. Moreover, alone they represent close to 1.5 million person-days a year spent in ports of the European AOR.<sup>43</sup> In 1997, at the Component Commander level, there was a conscious decision to continue the modest shift toward the more unstable areas in the Black Sea region, the Maghreb, and Africa, and to begin the process of developing formative engagement—tapping the unique capabilities of naval forces and having impact at the margins of stability. What was given up in terms of decreased operative engagement with the reliable and ready navies of NATO was insignificant. The intent was to strike that symbiotic balance between operative and formative engagement. Initial priorities were determined by combining a basic understanding of instability and the forces of globalization and a fairly clear understanding of vital U.S. interests. The result was a modest shift, one that benefited both the shape and respond tenets of national strategy and that began to develop economy of force measures conducive to a greater indigenous capacity for coping with complex security conditions and contingencies.

Two developments, among others, have served to reinforce the emerging engagement balance. First was the immense contributions of those nations near the theater of conflict during Operation *Allied Force*, particularly “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and others.” The CJCS Allied Force after-action report stated that these contributions “were in large part a dividend of sustained U.S. and NATO engagement over the last few years.” The report emphasized that this engagement “helped to stabilize institutions in these nations so they were better able to withstand the tremendous burden inflicted by the humanitarian crisis and the operation itself.”<sup>44</sup> In those few years (1994–1997), formative engagement by naval forces (again measured in port visit days per year) increased 600 percent in Bulgaria and 400 percent in Romania. This was indeed a concerted effort in light of the Montreaux Convention restrictions placed on non-Black Sea naval powers using the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Increasing the

quantity of port visit days does not by itself bring about the favorable conditions mentioned, however.

The second event was the sensitive evolutionary process of beginning engagement with Algeria. In 1997, when it was recognized that the internal stability of Algeria was improving, there was an effort on the part of the State Department and U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, to determine what initial steps could be taken to enhance security and signal support for reform through engagement. At the time, security conditions at the U.S. Embassy in Algiers were such that no one could leave the compound without an armed guard. However, the Algerian military was gaining against extremist factions, and the government was taking steps toward elections, political plurality, and reassurance of the outside world of its commitment to reform. It was considered by all involved that engagement by naval forces would be the least problematic. Through Algeria's long period of internal strife, its naval force remained detached from abuses and alleged abuses that occurred, and as such presented a more suitable path to strengthening relations—a recurring theme in developing countries with problematic pasts. Ultimately, engagement at multiple levels succeeded in opening doors. The initiating event, a ship port visit, included the first Algerian military exercise with a foreign military since Algeria's independence decades before. Recently, Algeria has accepted an invitation to join NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, a significant advance toward cooperative relations across the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

These are two examples—there are more—of formative engagement as it impacts near the center left of the Har-to-War spectrum (see figure 1). More to the right on the spectrum is a promising approach being explored by naval forces in the European AOR. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), is seeking to strengthen formative engagement through interdisciplinary and cross-sector partnerships with nonmilitary actors and transnational organizations. A recent seminar in London entitled *Managing Instability: A Pre-Crisis Approach* brought together senior policymakers from government, NGOs, international business, academia, finance, and the naval services to determine whether a formative engagement approach was plausible and supportable. The consensus was that ongoing engagement by a wide array of national and international players does have intersecting objectives. Further, creative partnering could effectively accomplish both military and development objectives while limiting counterproductive activities. The group was against establishing any hierarchical or formalized coordinating structures and suggested that a virtual working group could begin to transform the concept into reality. The process is ongoing, with initiatives in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and with the biennial West African Training Cruise.<sup>45</sup>

Efforts are being made at the unit level to enhance the quality of formative engagement. They make use of mostly organic assets to support the security-related objectives of a U.S. embassy and its country teams. A large portion of the resident expertise in a U.S. naval force unit is exportable and relevant to these country teams. Conceptually, the exportable knowledge and skills available to formative engagement are almost entirely organic to the force and incorporated in, and certified by, the basic or unit-level phase of pre-deployment training. For the many willing nations, skill sets like afloat sanitation, energy-efficient engineering plant operations, hazardous

materiel control, oil spill response, shore patrol procedures, and search and rescue operations, to name a few, are relevant and desired. Other skills not traditionally organic to naval units are becoming available at higher levels. A new training program in the Navy Chaplain Corps will focus on equipping the chaplains to advise commanders on cultural and religious aspects of military decisions and to interface with local religious communities.

Military or civilian, afloat or ashore, many of the developing institutions in these countries benefit from U.S. naval force engagement that addresses functional needs, builds institutional capacity, promotes international legal norms, and highlights moral obligations. A knowledge- and skills-based approach to formative engagement has the potential to influence at levels comparable to the beads and trinkets of Lieutenant Wilkes' Exploring Expedition. A realistic agenda for this kind of engagement can be fine-tuned using the priorities and objectives articulated in the U.S. embassy Mission Performance Plans for the countries involved.

### *Operative Engagement*

The domain of operative engagement is a prosperous developed zone of countries lashed together by alliances and interdependencies. The domain can be further reduced to the countries whose naval forces are the most reliable, ready, and capable—that is, capable of coming together with U.S. naval forces in a complex battle space, under a significant multidimensional threat, and sustaining the execution of a range of missions from surgically precise direct action to the projection of blunt force and shock from the sea. This small group should be carefully cultivated. Its combined blue-water (sea control), littoral (land attack), and space (theater ballistic missile defense) capabilities will give it unprecedented power and reach and at the same time place employment burdens on the force. Operative engagement must focus on burden sharing. Smaller yet capable partners should be encouraged to adopt (to the degree their budgets allow) critical niche competencies with plug-in interoperability. Exportable knowledge and skills available to operative engagement are almost entirely organic to a deploying naval force as subsets of the intermediate and advanced phases of pre-deployment training.

This group should be committed to a more robust and combined deployment scheme, one that occasionally slips the bonds of the now commonplace operating locations and patterns. This would require that U.S. naval forces modify the expeditionary rhythm and packaging of their presence, drawing the committed partners into a more dynamic and relevant scheme of operation. This scheme should fully recognize the realities of the new global dimension and more accurately reflect the expanding interests of the group. Conceptually, perhaps a new, syncopated rhythm could replace the standard 4/4 or 2/4 quartered rhythms that drive the Global Naval Force Presence Policy. An off-beat rhythm would demand a broader and more flexible strategic intellect, could reinforce a coalition of the committed and the ready, and would employ what Ambassador Brooks calls “constructive ambiguity,” a characteristic uniquely exploited by naval forces.

Changes of this sort should be undertaken slowly but deliberately and with extensive coordination. They should involve consideration of ongoing initiatives like the

European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). This identity will live with new command structures, institutional mechanisms like the Combined Joint Task Force, and non-Article 5 demands. The U.S. naval force should seek to integrate its processes of transformation and experimentation with the ESDI naval forces. This will be exceedingly complex with a small group of navies that are not only involved in their own naval force transformation process but also are dealing with overarching issues such as national sovereignty and institutional identity. Nevertheless, this is an essential element of operative engagement. NATO Operation *Allied Force* (Kosovo) after-action report highlighted this point by emphasizing the need for improvements: "Our experience demonstrated the urgent need to pursue the Defense Capabilities Initiative." The report went on to specify command-and-control systems, information systems, secure communications, precision strike capability, air operations support, and mobility systems as the most important deficiencies. Consolidation of European defense will happen, but its combined combat capability and readiness must improve. Operative engagement should be focused on assisting such improvement in ways that lead to a more coherent application of combined naval forces.

Operative engagement should be seeking the equivalent of Wilkes' coaling stations. Where are the coaling stations that will support future naval operations? Are they sea-based or in space, real or virtual, at home or abroad? Do they exist as a function of combined naval exercises, or are they embedded in agreements for interoperability and transfer of sensitive military technologies? Perhaps they will be formed within contractual language of international megaconglomerate mergers. Chances are there will be a mix of all these things, the complexity of which will require added organizational focus and intellectual capital.

The stresses and uncertainties of globalization are surely affecting the role of naval forces along the Har-to-War spectrum. As has been stated elsewhere in this volume (see chapter 22), to meet the challenge and adapt to new realities, it may be necessary to change the institutions, organizations, and indeed the legal basis for operating the Armed Forces of the United States. Fundamental change of this type will entail reinvigorating the unique peacetime competencies of the naval service. A from-the-sea shaping focus on the formative side of the Har-to-War spectrum has the potential to enhance the international security environment, just as does a from-the-sea response focus on the operative side of the spectrum. Achieving a symbiotic balance between formative and operative engagement amid the dynamic effects of globalization should be a national priority. This complex effort would certainly be a part of the knowledge superiority pillar of a new naval strategy.

## Recommendations

After almost 10 years with a relatively consistent National Security Strategy, declining resources, increasing employment, and the impact of globalization, the time has come to fully examine the naval role in a new era. In a recent *Defense News* article, the Secretary of the Navy was quoted as saying, "There is an era for naval power in this century that is more dramatic in its reach and its capability for effecting things

than we've ever seen before."<sup>46</sup> Noted naval analyst Wayne Hughes suggests that the 21st century can become a "maritime century" of peace and prosperity.<sup>47</sup>

The U.S. naval force will surely be a key factor in nurturing the kind of security conditions necessary to establish and maintain stability in the presence of profound global change. To begin the process, three actions are necessary:

- Issue an overarching U.S. naval force (Navy and Marine Corps) engagement policy that advances the operative and formative engagement construct and supports its development.
- Boost support for engagement planning and assessment from the Component Commander level (dedicated billets) to the unit level (collateral duty billets).
- Further explore and support the CINCUSNAVEUR initiative on formative engagement and adopt successful methods and approaches where appropriate.

For the future, effective engagement cannot merely rely on stronger forms of past preventive and corrective approaches. It must be deft and proactive, and it must embody the very best that the United States has to offer. It must match the goals of prosperity, security, and democracy with the enablers of leading, listening, and learning. It must combine the attributes of sense of purpose, consistency, and unity of effort with the qualities of credibility, humility, and strength. No single U.S. entity can attend to all these elements. However, the U.S. naval force can be uniquely postured in this environment of globalization, and it can serve as it has in the past as a primary catalyst for positive change and innovation. 🌐

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Section 108 [50USC 404a] (a) (1), National Security Act of 1947 as amended by Public Law 99-433, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1, 1986, section 104(b) (3 and 4).

<sup>2</sup> George Bush, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1993), 3.

<sup>3</sup> Joint Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning*, CJCSM 3113.01 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1998), A12, 13-14.

<sup>4</sup> Leenhouts interview, *OSD Strategy and Requirements*, November 16, 1999. Taken from Dirk Deverill, Brian Tarbert, Terry O'Brien, and Rick Steinke, *Global Engagement—The Shape of Things to Come* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, May 6, 1999), 7.

<sup>5</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 18.

<sup>6</sup> The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999), 3.

<sup>7</sup> Vanessa Houlder, "Ecowarriors Make Peace," *The Financial Times*, April 13, 1999, 14.

<sup>8</sup> Michael J. Mazaar, *Global Trends 2005: An Owners Manual for the Next Decade* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 4.

<sup>9</sup> George Gilder, *Over the Paradigm Cliff* (New York: Forbes ASAP, February 1997), 29.

<sup>10</sup> John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusion of Global Capitalism* (London: Granta Books, 1999), 17.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, April 1999), 7.

<sup>12</sup> George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism* (London: Little Brown and Co., 1998), xxix.

<sup>13</sup> Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997), 183–184.

<sup>14</sup> Nicole Beauclair and Matthieu Quiret, *Military Technology* (November 1999), 73–76.

<sup>15</sup> Hicks and Associates, *Final Report of the Task Force on Globalization and Security* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 1999), v.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 6, i.

<sup>17</sup> Jay Mazur, "Labor's New Internationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000), 86–89. Jay Mazur is the President of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees, and Chair of the AFL–CIO International Affairs Committee.

<sup>18</sup> Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," 186.

<sup>19</sup> Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 12.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report* (January 2000), 8.

<sup>21</sup> The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 22.

<sup>22</sup> Christopher Coker, "Outsourcing War," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Autumn/Winter 1999), 100.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Eric Fredland and Adrian Kendry, "The Privatisation of Military Force: Economic Virtues, Vices and Government Responsibility," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Autumn/Winter 1999), 149.

<sup>25</sup> David Shearer, "Private Military Force and Challenges for the Future," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Autumn/Winter 1999), 81, 85.

<sup>26</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee: Sierra Leone, second report, HC116, 1998–1999 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999).

<sup>27</sup> Mazaar, *Global Trends 2005*, 199.

<sup>28</sup> Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 272.

<sup>29</sup> Mazaar, *Global Trends 2005*, 161.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 155.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>32</sup> Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 39–58.

<sup>33</sup> Peter Swartz and E.D. McGrady, *A Deep Legacy: Smaller-Scale Contingencies and the Forces that Shape the Navy* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, August 1998), 3.

<sup>34</sup> Samuel E. Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People* (New York: Oxford Press, 1965), 413.

<sup>35</sup> Swartz and McGrady, *A Deep Legacy*, 24.

<sup>36</sup> Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People*, 443.

<sup>37</sup> Charles Wilkes, *Voyage Round the World: Embracing the Principal Events of the Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition* (Philadelphia: George W. Gorton, 1849), v–viii.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, viii.

<sup>39</sup> National Archives, records of the 1838 Naval Exploring Expedition, microfiche: M–75 057–4 (reel 1).

<sup>40</sup> Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 31.

<sup>41</sup> In a letter from Secretary of the Navy, James K. Paulding, the objective of the Exploring Expedition was the “promotion of great interests of commerce and navigation.” The advancement of science was to be “an object of great but comparatively secondary importance.” National Archives, records of the 1838 Naval Exploring Expedition, microfiche: M-75 057-4 (reel 1).

<sup>42</sup> Linton F. Brooks, *Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, October 1993), 2.

<sup>43</sup> Gregory M. Swider, *Liberty Incident Analysis* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, May 1999), 2.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf>>, 5.

<sup>45</sup> Bradd C. Hayes and Theophilos C. Gemelas, *Managing Instability: A Pre-Crisis Approach*, DSD Report 00-4 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, September 1999).

<sup>46</sup> Robert Holzer, “Danzig Speeds Implementation of Strategic Shifts,” *Defense News*, March 13, 2000, 4.

<sup>47</sup> Wayne Hughes, *United States Maritime Strategy and Naval Power in East Asia in the 21st Century*, paper delivered at the Sixth International Sea Power Symposium, Seoul, Korea, August 5, 1999, 1.