

Chapter 24

The Navy and Globalization: Convergence of the Twain?

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*And as the smart ship grew
In stature, grace and hue,
In shadowy silent distance grew the Iceberg too*

*Alien they seemed to be:
No mortal eye could see
The intimate welding of their later history*

— Thomas Hardy
The Convergence of the Twain

Two forces stand in strong and anxious contrast at the beginning of the new millennium. This chapter is an enquiry into their likely interaction.

In retrospect, it seems that once sociologists and students of international politics were liberated from the cruel and unusual confines of the mentality created by the Cold War, one issue above others seized their imagination. A remarkable literature devoted to exploration of the dimensions of a phenomenon called “globalization” emerged in the 1990s. The quotation marks are necessary because neither the nature of the phenomenon nor its effects are easily or generally agreed.

For the purposes of this discussion, however, it can be asserted that the term *globalization* is unequivocally grounded at three points. The nature of world economic activity at the beginning of the new century, particularly the international payments system, is remarkably interactive: there are major winners and losers. Secondly, I assert that, in consequence, the relative competencies of state and nonstate actors in global politics are importantly changed. Thirdly, and in consequence again, the technological, social, and psychological empowerment of individuals and commensurate curtailment of the competencies of state power, can engender a revision of the late 18th century social contract between citizen and state (but all circumstances

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do not necessarily have this effect). These latter insights propel that awareness of the inadequacies of both libertarian and socialist descriptions and prescriptions, and have given rise to the so-called Third Way project.

The literature on globalization is large, vigorous, often depressingly unfocused, and tends toward no single definition. But while there may not yet be a consensus on the precise shape of what is looming, there is a general sense that something lurks, which might be dangerous as much as it might be positive. In what follows, the case will be made that these empowerments and disempowerments do, indeed, force revisions of the essence of citizenship, and that whether these revisions will ultimately be supportive or destructive of global security will depend on American choices and actions. The United States is a lonely hyperpower. In particular, it will be suggested that prior and positive engagement with and fostering of a global self-consciousness, which currently is only fitfully present (in the emerging regime of human rights, for example), will be key.

The other force may be conveniently viewed by scanning its literature: the past volumes of the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. Here, if anywhere, one finds the Navy talking publicly to itself. The conversations are as vigorous as those among the globalization theorists and indeed in recent years have included excursions into aspects of operations other than war and diplomatic and military operations. But if one takes *Proceedings* in the round, these excursions are clearly that: the main focus has been and continues to be upon three other things, the first of which is astonishing improvements in the technological performance of the Navy in each of its departments. Secondly, associated with this is a continuing prime concern with maintaining readiness to engage peer competitors (Title 10 of the U.S. Code, mandating preparation for war fighting). Thirdly, linked to both is a wish to achieve these missions as automatically as possible, with the fewest personnel. A good practical indicator of this is the strengthening emphasis upon cruise missiles, both in the submarine force and as the claws of the arsenal ship.

The Ship and the Iceberg

To read these two literatures is to recollect Thomas Hardy's ominous poem about the *Titanic* and the iceberg. The great ship, in all its brilliance and warmth and technological prowess, is built and launched and celebrated, and sets out from Liverpool. Meanwhile, in the frozen Arctic wastes, the iceberg also grows, is calved, and it, too, sets out. Twins in a preordained sense, the one gaily sparkling with light and speed, the other silently gray and lurking, they come together with fatal effect in Hardy's poem.

The *Titanic* disaster is often portrayed as a morality play. The hubris of high Edwardian society ends with nemesis, and Hardy was quick with that theme. ("In the solitude of the sea; deep from human vanity, and the Pride of Life that planned her, stilly couches she.") But "The Convergence of the Twain" can also be read as a precursor to the tone in Hardy's war poems: a premonition of the calamities that war soon brought. This is a resonance that it is useful to hear again for the purposes of this chapter.

An overview of the two literatures does suggest a vivid, structural dissonance between them: the forces of globalization and the Navy may pass each other by, but, equally, they may collide. Globalization—in the form of the shadowy but vast bulk of the iceberg—faces the United States with a structurally different global reality to that which its Armed Forces were designed, or are currently configured, to face. The question that this chapter wishes to raise is what the likelihood of collision may be—what favors it—and, if it can be avoided, what the implications of a change of course might be for the Navy as it sails into the 21st century.

What, more specifically, may be seen to be newly globalized at the end of the millennium, *which bears directly upon the nature and the potential future roles of the Navy*? Three things, which together give rise to a fourth.

Accordingly, the first section suggests a view of the Navy, seen from outside (but after 20 years of interested observation). The second proposes first some general and critical observations about globalization and then suggests three generally applicable aspects of globalization that bear specifically upon the Navy's interests and responsibilities. The third section asks about the dangers of collision. What might happen under three different responses to globalization by the Navy? The conclusion reached is unexpected. Since the chapter is not merely descriptive but also openly prescriptive, the fourth section details missions: it outlines some of the suggested requirements for a course that will avoid collision. The conclusion notes that all this means that there are hard choices ahead.

What Is the United States Navy?

What is the United States Navy? The question may seem simple-minded to the point of ridicule, but that would be a mistake. The Navy is unlike other navies, even its closest and oldest partner, the Royal Navy. Therefore, four defining characteristics must be established.

The first characteristic is its shape. U.S. naval forces are not contained within a single navy. The Navy at maximal extent is, in fact, five navies: a surface navy; a sea-borne air force; a submarine navy; the Marines Corps; and the Coast Guard (the latter two less tightly associated than the first three, but associated nonetheless). Each of these is in itself larger than are the complete military assets of many other industrial countries. The Navy alone deploys more aircraft than most other national air forces. The surface fleet of gray ships is several times the size of the next largest navies: the 19th century Royal Navy principle of the "two-power standard" applies even within these subdivisions and hugely more so when the totality is added together. The U.S. Coast Guard is a force that in itself is the size of a powerful independent navy. The submarine force is *sui generis*: it is without any close analogy in scale, since the collapse of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet now rotting at its moorings in Murmansk. (Announcing Russian ratification of the latest START agreement, President Vladimir Putin stated that the Russian navy currently has 23 operational submarines.) Therefore, it is the branch of the U.S. military that, in this respect, most clearly parallels the Air Force, which is also so much in a league of its own that it, too, may confidently expect not to be challenged on its own terms. Fi-

nally, the Marine Corps possesses within their own identity an inventory of ships, helicopters, airplanes, armored fighting vehicles, and marines that is, in rough approximation, of the same scale as are the entire British armed forces.

A recital of this extraordinary array of force is instructive not only by underscoring the unique nature of the U.S. maritime capability, but also in explaining why, within it, each “union” has developed such strong identity (expressed in friendly rivalry in the letters, pages, and cartoons of *Proceedings*). More importantly, one sees distinct and coherent views of the best ways to defend the U.S. national interest: views made believable by the plain fact that each of the five component navies possesses credible means to propose its own solutions. This, as will become plain in the following discussion, may be a source of strength and advantage in the face of globalization.

Secondly, the Navy as a whole is distinguished by its shared philosophy, across all unions and derived from its historical self-image. The Navy, like the country to which it belongs, inhabits the “new world,” but is, in fact, much older than its birth. For the Navy is arguably the perfect expression of that view that relates together the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty-free areas of the high seas that has been in development since Hugo Grotius gave voice to the world view of the Dutch Republic in its golden age. It was no accident that Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who described the Royal Navy’s role in the promotion and preservation of British maritime empire, was an American; the continuing influence of his concept of sea power is to be seen to this day.

The Mahanian concept of sea power calls for different forms of maritime action in different parts of the globe: a blanking-off of areas that might be sources of threat to the independence of the sea power state, as much as it is promotion of the opposite, namely, control by exclusion of others from sea areas important for the preservation of freedom of navigation and trade. This common item of self-identity in all the advanced Northern European navies was the premise with which the Navy entered the Cold War. The nuclearization of national security in general, and naval thinking in particular, after the creation of Polaris, has served, if anything, to reinforce the historical self-image of the Navy as prime defender of the State.

That this self-image crystallized so firmly in the middle of the 20th century, at a time of U.S. ascendancy from great power status to superpower status to hyperpower status since the collapse of communism (in Hubert Védrine’s useful coinage), has enabled U.S. maritime thinking to escape, so far at least, the harsh lesson that Britain’s economic decline forced upon the view that naval supremacy led, rather than followed, economic strength. As Paul Kennedy famously observed in his study, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, it is a serious mistake to invert cause and effect. The purpose of this observation is not to argue that there is much evidence that the Navy is about to learn the Royal Navy’s lesson in that old harsh way: rather, it is to note that lack of such challenge has permitted the distinct shape and self-confidence of U.S. maritime strategic thought, a view to which particular reference was given just before the end of the Cold War in the publication of the quasi-official report “Discriminate Deterrence.”

The third defining facet of the Navy is its growing technological uniqueness. The pages of *Proceedings* provide eloquent witness to this, as each of the unions acquires its distinctive teeth and its common access to the neural network of sensors and data processing. The latter, more perhaps than the teeth arms, set the Navy apart from any other navy, including the navies of its closest allies. In order to operate on an equal footing in other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) navies in the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), for example, U.S. ships must routinely switch off data links and sensors, which are U.S.-only national assets. There is a school of thought that argues in a worried fashion that such technological prowess means that, whether it wishes it or not, the United States will be forced into the loneliness of a hyperpower, unable to operate effectively in coalition contexts.

The size, the distinct philosophy, and the massive investment that have produced the technological edge of the Navy are all products of the fourth defining characteristic: the Navy is an expression of the U.S. approach to the management of foreign affairs. From the time that President George Washington advised his countrymen to avoid the dangers of entanglement in foreign alliances, the United States has been a country wary of foreign wars. Indeed, in the history of the Republic, with the exception of the War of 1812 (which was just beating up on the British, and so a sort of family affair), the Cold War has been the only war that the United States has willingly chosen to enter. Indeed, for those attracted to geopolitical determinism, just as much might have been predicted from a reading of Professor Halford Mackinder's 1903 paper on the geographical pivot of history. At some point, the dominant sea power would have to square up to the dominant continental land power, which (after the defeat of the Third Reich) was clearly Russia. And it won, admittedly through the deployment of McDonald's, Coca-Cola, and Hollywood, rather than the 101st Airborne or the Marine Corps—except as means to outspend the Soviets on defense preparedness.

The U.S. approach to warfare is informed by the very nature of the civil settlement within the Republic at independence, when it was decided emphatically that the United States would be a civilian society. It may seem an incongruous description of the world's most awesome military superpower in all of history, the society of West Point and Annapolis; nonetheless, it is true. The Second Amendment, complete with the preamble clause that the National Rifle Association prefers to forget, gave the right to bear arms that militias might be raised so that, in turn, the dangers of standing armies might be avoided. Couple this to the high value attached to the individual in U.S. political culture and one sees without difficulty the sources of the U.S. way of war.

Two sentiments combine. War is indeed hell. General William Tecumseh Sherman meant both physical hell and moral hell (which fired his articulation of the case for massive use of force). Secondly, the lives of U.S. citizens are precious and not to be spent except in face of a clear and present danger to the Republic. Therefore, by all means engagement should be avoided, if possible. The provision and presence of the five-fold unions of the U.S. naval forces can serve powerfully to that end, and hence justify the investment. But when engagement becomes necessary, then in the interests of minimizing casualties, all the ingenuity of American know-how needs to be marshaled to the service of the most massive and the swiftest blow, the most decisively to end the circumstance of threat. Under the shadow of inter-war

economic depression, U.S. engagement in foreign affairs was isolationist and introspective. But, in the context of economic well-being and the absence of any peer rival, the same views express themselves as unilateral, rather than isolationist, actions.

In this respect, the United States is a modern state that expresses the essence of its social contract with its citizens on its coinage: *e pluribus unum*. Yes, the melting pot, but yes also the continuing strength of convergent loyalty to a sharp conception of statehood. The Constitution of the United States is cosmopolitan, meaning that the rights it enshrines are not claimed for U.S. citizens alone, but for all humanity. Nonetheless, the practicality of the state after 1776 has been to become the most successful and now the oldest extant example of the French revolutionary social contract, where the moral identity of the citizen was fused with that of the state in a benign compact.

As Robert Cooper noted in his seminal essay on the postmodern state and the new world order in 1996, these characteristics are distinctive and no longer general among socially and technologically advanced nations. Particularly in Western Europe and particularly as a product of the catastrophic fratricidal wars that tore at the continent's entrails for the first half of the 20th century, a much looser form of social contract is emerging, one more easily adaptable to a world where there are multiple sources of power—a world of globalizing forces. *Prima facie*, it might seem that neither the United States nor the Navy, in its shape, philosophy, technology, and self-image, is easily a participant in these new conversations.

What, Usefully, Is Globalization?

What conversations? In what do these conversations really consist? The essay opened with a statement of the three anchors of globalization, as the term is employed here, that must now be elaborated, in order then to derive the precise aspects of the phenomena that govern the interactions of globalization with the Navy. There are three general senses of globalization in common currency.

The first sense is the most colloquial. Ours is now a world where the flows of trade, of capital, and of finance are beyond the regulation of any single state or group of states. With the sole exception of the speed of communication, however, I see nothing in modern circumstances described under the rubric of globalization that is new. The case can well be made that the best system of automatic trade and finance that was beyond sovereign control was that of the gold standard (given the important proviso that Britain exercised a self-denying ordinance of nonintervention—as it did until war broke the system apart, causing the gold to flood across the Atlantic until the United States was sheltering more gold than any country had ever had, thus destroying the system in the countries whence the gold came as well as the system in the country to which it went). The simple point at issue is that the constraints on sovereign action have probably always been rather greater than is popularly imagined. So I suggest that this convenient generalization is, paradoxically, the least revealing.

The second general sense in which modern globalization may be interpreted has a stronger claim to uniqueness. Globalization makes big winners and big losers. It has divided the human family more stringently, and more generally, into rich and poor than has ever before been the case. Roughly one-third rich and two-thirds poor. So,

if, following Geoffrey Barraclough, we take the defining characteristic of contemporary affairs to be the massive and comprehensive increase in scale, then a case is more easily made for division, rather than unification, as the distinctive feature of modern globalization. Admittedly, the division in possession of wealth and access to wealth is not unprecedented as a phenomenon; in particular, the stark differences in access to *information* have been seen before. When the first undersea telegraph cable, laid by Brunel's *Great Eastern*, linked Europe to the United States in 1865 so that communication across the Atlantic became a matter of seconds rather than days or weeks, and was followed by a spurt of cable laying from 1865–1872 to India and Japan, a letter to unwired places still took 6 months to be delivered. So there is an important sense in which the one-third minority of the human family that controls the levers of the globalized world should be seen, in Anthony Giddens's memorably admonitory phrase, to be "riding the juggernaut." This world-dividing interpretation of globalization has a particular challenge within it when in the next section we consider what the Navy's responses might be.

There is, however, a third general interpretation of "globalization." This is homogenizing rather than dividing, and it is homogenizing in a particular direction. Writing recently of the groveling and divided mess of post-intervention Kosovo, Timothy Garton-Ash ended his acid observations with the pregnant thought that after a day of mutual recrimination between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs, both parties retreated to the privacy of their homes to share in a common ambition to enjoy the fruits of American consumer materialism. In the third sense of "globalization," the world has turned American. At root, I would suggest that it is a feature to be seen less in the specifics of the marketplace (to each his Coca-Cola according to his needs), but rather in America's possession of the key determinants of revolution: possession of a common vision, a language in which to express the vision, and provision of at least some tangible evidence of what that vision might be in practice.

Therefore, in summary of these general points, it can be seen that the colloquial interpretation of globalization is inadequate and insofar as it is true that it is not particularly novel; that what is new is the scale of the material divide between the rich and poor, and that superimposed upon this deeply riven human community there is a homogenizing vision projected through the new means of information technology that is specifically and unusually American in its nature. While the second point seems to affirm the possibility that the rich may need to repel the poor (the "discriminate deterrence" thesis), and therefore to indicate maritime military roles in that direction, the third runs counter, suggesting that the model of voluntary Americanization, which was so impressively powerful during the 1989 revolutions, may be more likely the norm than the exception.

So might one conclude that the ship and the iceberg will not converge? That their courses are widely different? Three further, general aspects of globalization engage the nature, ideas, and roles of the Navy concretely.

The first of these is the growing realization that the planet and its passengers face systemic stresses arising from global environmental change. This is not a chapter to do more than signal the phenomenon, and certainly not to enter the debate about anthropogenic *versus* natural causation. Rather, I would rest the observation upon the

single most authoritative accumulation of analysis, produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Sir John Houghton, Chairman of Working Group 1, which focused on the science of the climate, has observed of the second review report that evidence of global climate change is now moving “out of the statistical noise.” Subsequent evidence of ice thinning, sea warming, and the slowing of ocean currents in the Arctic, deriving from the transpolar research projects made possible by the ending of the Cold War, have tended to underscore that point. To what extent it is possible to ascribe recent episodes of hurricanes and other major storms to these general trends is not yet clear. But as a globalized phenomenon, the last 20 years of research on global climate change is certainly a candidate for uncontroversial status, even if we cannot yet ascribe with certainty specific events to general trends.

The second general characteristic of globalization that has specific relevance to the world of the Navy touches directly a central element of its self-image. In the 17th century, Hugo Grotius championed the notion of *mare liberum*, the sovereignty-free high seas, re-stated in Articles 87–90 of Part VIII, Section 1, of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Seas to give it its most precise modern reference. The sovereignty-free high seas are predicated upon the existence of exclusive littoral rights in coastal waters, and thus the contrast between the realm of the high-seas fleet and the coast guard—its literal, littoral, and legal identity is in its name—is made quite precise. But the arrival of global environmental stress and the potential for global climate change mean that the transferred notions of exclusive property that give substance to the concept of the exclusive rights of sovereignty are coming under challenge in the maritime environment almost before anywhere else.

This is, perhaps, fortunate because the maritime environment is one in which issues of property and sovereignty have been, and continue to be, most intensively explored. It has been within the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas of 1982, Part IX, Section 2, Articles 136, 137.1, and 137.2, that the most revolutionary challenge to the sovereignty/property equation underpinning the international, inter-state balance of power is to be seen. “The Area (the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction) and its resources are the Common Heritage of mankind,” declares the Convention. “No state shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any state or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole.” The concept of common heritage expresses another aspect of the enlargement of scale in Professor Barraclough’s terms: a globalized world is a world that cannot allow spaces to be blanked off. As Halford Mackinder observed in 1903, the opportunity to seek power and resources through horizontal expansion into imperial spaces or wilderness is now foreclosed. New power can be obtained only violently, at the expense of another, or consensually, through the construction of self-conscious common interest. This, very precisely, focuses one of the aim-points for security in a global age, and it is lineally connected to the third specific global trend that has arisen and that couples directly to the challenges and opportunities before the Navy.

On April 22, 1999, Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered an unusual speech in Chicago. In it, he sought to explain why it was in the British national interest to relieve the sufferings of the Kosovar Albanians. As has become subsequently public, in the testimony of the Chief of the Defence Staff to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence in April 2000, Blair was prepared to commit most of the military effort of his country to that end, had it become necessary. The Chicago speech was not an isolated and unusual geyser. Rather, it was the moment when a 50-year subterranean stream surfaced.

Most attention to Blair's Chicago speech has been paid to his elaboration of the criteria that must be met before the international community can feel warranted in breaching the sovereignty of a state, even in defense of human rights. Such tests are important and necessary, of course, but what was really striking was the manner in which Blair explained how the national interest was invoked. The suffering of these people, he said, demanded the attention of the rest of the world. In that justification, he simultaneously gave contemporary grounding to the principles established at the end of World War II in the Nuremberg Tribunal and surfaced the stream that went underground in the late 18th century.

For both reasons, it was appropriate that the speech should have been given in Chicago because the United States is the country that was central both at the 50-year and at the 200-year marks in the emergence of this trend in globalization. As has been already observed, the United States is uniquely endowed with a pre-French revolutionary Constitution, which enshrines cosmopolitan rights. That tradition, expressed in the way that American individualism values the individual, puts the United States logically, as well as militarily and politically, to the fore in driving both of the dynamics that emerged from the ruins of World War II: on the one hand, creation of the United Nations, the culminating expression of the age of the balance of power, and on the other, the Nuremberg principles, the most forceful modern expression of the late 18th century cosmopolitan imperatives. Blair's speech in Chicago took both to the center of the contemporary political stage, and this is regardless of the efficiency with which the mandate may or may not have been executed. The third general aspect of globalization that touches the world of the Navy directly is, therefore, that which once again interprets national interest as a responsibility to sustain global civil society.

To be sure, particularly after the disaster of Mogadishu, there has been much greater reticence in the United States to accept the implication of this role, and, insofar as it has been accepted, strenuous efforts have been made to fulfill its mission by means that minimize the exposure of U.S. military personnel to risk (even if that may increase the risks to other parties). But the debate about public willingness to accept risk really is a diversion from the essential point, namely, that the strengthening imperative to conduct humanitarian intervention in defense of human rights is plainly a defining characteristic of globalization as well.

Therefore, in summary, the three areas of globalization that bear specifically upon the concerns and potentialities of the Navy are, in the first two cases, natural (global climate change) and social (global commons) phenomena, respectively, which have in common the fact that the maritime provides the best first lines of ap-

proach. The third case (human rights) invites vigorous development of maritime and amphibious approaches, given the demonstrated difficulties in strategies giving primacy to land or air roles.

What Could Happen?

One possibility is that, in face of the globalization challenges identified and listed in the previous section, the Navy could remain close to a narrow self-interpretation: an *introspective unilateralism*. Certainly, three of the four characteristics of the contemporary Navy mentioned in the first section of this chapter would tend toward the view that a narrow construction is to be expected. Mahanian maritime doctrine, shot through with nuclear deterrence doctrine from the Cold War, combined with a unilateral (certainly) and isolationist (possibly) interpretation of U.S. interests, would support that view. It would be in conformity with the underlying tendencies of the American way of war, and, as Edward Luttwak has recently and arrestingly observed, most Armed Forces are designed and procured precisely not in the expectation of use, but rather as contributions to so overwhelming a deterrent threat that, in that manner, the Republic is to be kept safe. However, whereas the very long design, procurement, and service cycles of naval equipment mean that it is difficult to change the basic composition of the fleet easily or swiftly, the other characteristic of naval power tends in a different direction.

Arguably, the key asset that naval power possesses, distinct from any other military form of power, is its ability to provide presence without the declaration of any explicit intention of action. Furthermore, presence combines with the well demonstrated flexibility of most forms of naval unit, with the exception of the most highly role-specialized. In action, it is the rule rather than the exception that ships find themselves undertaking types of operations for which they are not primarily designed. That, parenthetically, is a powerful argument against the trend to intense and precise role specialization that is a consequence both of technological drive and of the Cold War constraints on strategic imagination. An Aegis cruiser that is incapable of dealing with pirates or smugglers may, in the future, find that its lack of general purpose capability is more of a drawback than seemed apparent at the time that it was conceived. At present, the trend is clearly to engage the military challenges of the post-Cold War world, insofar as possible, with high precision, remotely delivered systems such as the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM). That was plainly to be seen in the Balkan operations and, as such, subordinates maritime to air power theory. For the purposes of the new era, this may not be prudent.

The second way in which the Navy could respond to the new circumstances of globalization would be more internationally engaged than is the introspective unilateral national model. The Navy could play its role *multilaterally*, in a traditional interpretation of alliance, principally through NATO. Such a course of action has the advantage of retaining a higher degree of international political and military engagement (if such engagement is deemed to be an advantage); the disadvantage that dogs an alliance or coalition context is that historically it is a context within which it is hard to conduct innovative thinking.

A natural tendency of alliances (and NATO is no exception) is to seek the common denominator and to find language that can be as temporizing and as inclusive as possible. In the case of the U.S. principal modern alliance, which is NATO, one consequence of its recent, fraught, physical enlargement is to exacerbate the risk aversion that is already a function of such an institution. This is a paradox. For most of the last 50 years, the political rule of thumb in the United States has been for those favoring external engagement to support U.S. participation in alliances, notably in NATO, and for those favoring isolationist or unilateral priorities to oppose engagement in international organizations, especially the United Nations.

The challenge posed by globalization calls for deep and comprehensive rethinking about where comparative risks and advantages lie. The implication of the foregoing is to suggest that the context traditionally favored by liberal engagement may not be as effective as the one traditionally associated with introspection.

The third possibility for the Navy in the face of globalization is, therefore, a different sort of unilateral action: unilateral action in support of a broad interpretation of U.S. national security interests that sees national and global security interests fused in the manner that Blair described in his Chicago speech: *extrovert unilateralism*. Unilateralism of any sort, even extrovert unilateralism, is by its nature systemically different from any form of multilateral engagement, of course, because whereas the latter depends upon acceptance of a constrained role, in certain circumstances, and an accepted part in a general international political culture, the former does not.¹ Historical analogy for the Navy taking this type of leading role is with the Royal Navy and the antislavery patrols of the 19th century. At a time when a power can take unilateral action and has the means to do so, as the Royal Navy did then, there is an opportunity to produce a far more decisive leverage upon the general direction of events than in any other way.

It is here that the five-fold nature of the Navy can become so effective an asset. Whereas many complain, in a more or less good-humored manner, of the autonomy of the different unions, in fact, the ability of certain of them to develop their own systematic approaches to maritime problems may render them especially well prepared to assume the tasks required to give the Navy its lead role in the protection of global (hence national) security. Three specific facets of globalization have been isolated as having both importance and special maritime salience. How may they be attacked by the Navy? What missions are entailed?

Avoiding the Iceberg

Mission One

The first facet identified was global environmental stress. "Soon after his accession to the throne," wrote the Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty of King George III, "having happily closed the destructive operations of war, he turned his thoughts to enterprises more humane but not less brilliant, adapted to the season of returning peace. . . . His ships, after bringing back victory and conquest from every quarter of the known world, were now employed in opening friendly communications with

hitherto unexplored recesses.” Thus introducing accounts of the voyages of discovery to the Pacific Ocean undertaken by Captains Cook, Clerke, and Gore in His Majesty’s ships, the *Resolution* and the *Discovery*, the text is given for a similar orientation of naval efforts to other purposes in the years following the end of the Cold War.

The role of the Navy submarine force through the Science Ice Expeditions (SCICEX) program in permitting the exploration of the Arctic Ocean has been decisive. The platform of a nuclear submarine is agreed to be the best possible way in which to map and investigate the underside of the ice sheet. Therefore, it is a matter both of anxiety and regret that, with the decommissioning of the last of the Sturgeon class attack submarines in 2001, this capability may be lost. Environmental monitoring roles have been performed by other branches. Notably, the use of satellite assets in a more transparent environment has been essential to improvements in global mapping of vegetation, both natural and cultivated, of soil loss, and of meteorological and oceanographic data and the like.

Mission Two

The second precise facet of globalization is the challenge of policing the global commons. It is generally agreed that stress in fisheries is one of the most important and sensitive indicators of the general health of the oceans. Because all five of the main pelagic fisheries are now under stress, with worldwide fishery take peaking at around 100 million tons per year, there is a danger of precipitating fishery collapse. This trend increases the importance of fishery protection. Far from being a hum-drum and insignificant role, it comes rapidly to the fore. One has only to recollect the Battle of the Grand Banks to see why. Fishing boats of one NATO ally (Spain) broke all the regulations on net size and take, while warships of another NATO ally (Canada) technically committed piracy on the high seas when arresting the offending miscreant, to general applause at home. The case shows how fishery disputes provide, in not insignificant microcosm, a model of the type of global conflict over environmental resources that we may face, if we are not careful. Traditionally, it has been the role of the coast guard to protect assets within the exclusive economic zone of the country. The Grand Banks debacle was only the first of a series of deep-sea fisheries disputes that are likely to increase. In 1999, the Royal New Zealand Navy sailed to defend the fragile population of the Orange Roughy at the sea mount south of New Zealand, to protect them from predatory fishing “down the chain” by Japanese fishermen. So one sees that fishery protection is already providing a context within which the fundamental ethical and legal debates about the common heritage are being fought. Looking toward new technology applications relevant to execution both to this mission and the previous one, the rapid development in long-range, remotely guided miniature submarines, originally conceived with oil installation patrol and other fixed seabed assets in mind, offers creative possibilities.

Another, but related aspect of the global commons mission connects to an existing priority task, namely, the policing of international straits and the combating of piracy. Admiral Jacky Fisher, creator of the modern Royal Navy, once observed that a handful of “choke points” locked up the globe. Control these, he said (and at that time Britain largely did), and one controls the world oceans. The Dover Straits, the

Straits of Gibraltar, and the passage around the Cape of Good Hope are relatively well policed at present. Such is certainly not the case for the Straits of Molucca or indeed for other coastal waters in Southeast Asia, such as the South China Sea. During the Persian Gulf War, in the Strait of Hormuz, the USS *Vincennes* was harassed by small vessels that it was ill equipped to repel. Investigation of the subsequent shooting down of an Iranian Airbus suggested that tensions in the ship resulting from the prior episode may have contributed to the error in its designed task. For the purposes of this chapter, the conclusion to be drawn is simply one of the utility of general purpose frigates, combined with a willingness to explore the modalities within which best to deploy such constabulary power. A good model is the “building-block” approach to Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) followed by the nations of Southeast Asia and expressed in the Honiara Pact. This arrangement has permitted the largest and most advanced regional maritime power, Australia, to operate in a supportive and consensual context with the much smaller forces of neighboring states in a range of antipiracy, antismuggling, and maritime asset protection roles. The Battle of the Grand Banks and the accumulating evidence of global fish stock stress tell us that we have a need for systematized presence on the high seas beyond Mahan’s methods, which, if it is to be effective and legal, calls for much innovative prior effort by the Naval Judge Advocate’s department. It may be that the well established practices for international straits and pirates offer a point of departure.

Mission Three

The third mission is humanitarian intervention: the one of these three missions that has been most vividly in the public eye since the end of the Cold War. While I was visiting the Adriatic city of Dubrovnik several years after it was bombarded by Serbian gunboats in 1991, a resident observed to me how in the days before the war, ships of the 6th Fleet had sometimes paid courtesy calls. “What a pity,” she said, looking at me closely all the time, “that one of those ships couldn’t have found the time to call on us in 1991 when we really needed it.” It is easy to be wise with hindsight. But in the case of the Bosnian war, the matter is precise and was entirely clear at the time. On November 6, 1991, the assembled European foreign ministers issued a solemn declaration in which they demanded that the Slobodan Milosevic regime cease forthwith its bombardment of Dubrovnik, else unspecified consequences would follow. The bombardment did not cease, and no consequences followed. Milosevic made his judgment of the will of the West, and many tens of thousands of people lost their lives before, chastened by the horror of the massacre at Srebrenica in the summer of 1995, the international community overrode the UN effort and, acting through NATO, took decisive and expensive military action.

The Dubrovnik case is useful not simply because it is true, but also because the military task of removing the Serbian and Montenegrin mountain battery that was bombarding the city would have been so easy for carrier aircraft close to the scene to do, had they been allowed to do it. Maritime strategists never tire of observing that most of humanity lives not far from a coastline. But even so, the chastening experiences of the death of Yugoslavia, combined with the rising salience of the global concern for the observance of human rights, mean that if these tasks are to

be successfully embraced, it will require a much more systematic and early deployment of amphibious capability designed for diplomatic/military operations (DMOs) than heretofore.

Since Bosnia, there have been both a greater number and a wider range of cases calling for preventative or humanitarian DMO deployments of maritime force. The regional intervention under UN auspices in East Timor (UNIFET) was an example of the former; the disorganized relief effort for Mozambique after the epic floods, of the latter. In both cases—as indeed in most others that one can envisage—the capacity of the Navy to provide sealift logistics; communications and intelligence; a spectrum of organic maritime air power, especially helicopters; and, if necessary, amphibious assault, stands in a league of its own. In this realm, too, the United States has the unique capability to take a lead, just as in the monitoring, protection, and constabulary roles discussed earlier. Looking at new technology developments relevant to these missions, the near-term prospect of FastShip hull design that will make freighters capable of an economical, sustained transatlantic 45 knots, or a 50-knots-plus light carrier or amphibious assault ship using such a hull, serves only to heighten the relevance of a maritime approach to DMOs.

Conclusion

The previous section has linked U.S. capability to specific missions that combat potential threats with global reach, arising from facts of globalization. Of the three choices before the Navy, traditional alliance internationalism seems, on the evidence, to be too soft to take the necessarily firm imprint of new directions; the choice of introspective unilateralism might exacerbate, rather than relieve, the divisive aspect of globalization. However, extrovert unilateralism—the modernized version of the 19th century antislavery patrols—will demand important changes, not only in mission but also in the self-image and relative status ascribed to functions within the Navy.

The central commitment to maintaining the submarine leg of the strategic nuclear triad is mercifully diminished. No peer competitor now exists or is likely to emerge in the near future. The only role of the nuclear weapon is entirely passive politically. It is the *existential deterrence*, so aptly coined by the late McGeorge Bundy, where already cautious powers are made more cautious. The Navy might therefore wish to adopt another of the planning devices of the Royal Navy at its zenith, namely, the 30-year rule—that this would be the warning time for emergence of a peer competitor. If it is felt to be valid (which it could well be) a precious window of opportunity opens within which it is both safe and necessary to raise the priority of other roles that help avoid collision with the facts or consequences of globalization.

The monitoring, protection, and constabulary roles manifestly require a new form of legal entity for the new century and the global maritime stresses that it brings. The principles for policing the high seas demand the domestication of the high seas. Grotius' *mare liberum* must be replaced in legal terms by *mare nostrum*. But this cannot be done by the unilateral extension of national rights of sovereignty. Therefore, the appropriate response to globalization is the creation for the high seas of an analogue to the coast guard. Littoral states require coast guards; global security de-

mands an ocean guard. (The legal and practical details of an ocean guard can be found in the *2000 Ocean Yearbook*, edited by Professor Mann-Borghese.) Much of the necessary thinking that would permit the extension of the coast guard concept has already been done by coast guard lawyers. What is needed now is a full political recognition of the priority that should be given to the operationalization of this task. The Navy alone is able to exert the right leverage in the right places for this to occur.

The same requirement applies to the other key emphasis that the threat of the iceberg brings. Within the vision for extrovert unilateralism by the United States, the Marine Corps could encounter arguably the most challenging and rewarding period in its history. As observed earlier, the size of the Corps gives it a structural advantage when it comes to developing both a doctrine of maritime maneuver adapted to DMOs and requests for support that it requires from other branches.

But the hard requirements are not military, and are not to be dodged. If ever substance is to be given to militarily efficient protection of human rights worldwide, then the Marine Corps, supported by the other branches, must have a pre-eminent role in the delivery of that capability to the United Nations in a larger scale and more focused version of the CSBM building-block formula devised by Professor Ball and his colleagues, which has proved to be so effective in Southeast Asia.

There are no two things about it. Such combined and joint operations can only, in a limited fashion, be conducted through NATO. In the same way that the requirements of globalization for monitoring, resource protection, and constabulary roles demand an ocean guard, so the new demands for effective worldwide protection of human rights require commensurate restructuring in response. That means, above all, finding viable ways to achieve collective political-military direction of operations that are acceptable to the United States. Of course, there are countries, notably France and the United Kingdom, that can and will happily buttress such a move. Indeed, the British have moved closer to the principle of an Article 32 allocation of force to the United Nations than ever before. But whilst they may suggest and in limited theatres may act independently, at the time of its unconstrained global influence, the United States alone has the means and the opportunity to take the lead.

While this may jar the minds of one segment of contemporary U.S. politics, the hand need not long be stayed, for, as the world faces the challenges of globalization, it is fortunate that the country best able to lead the reorientation in the political and military response is the one whose revolutionary birth, reflected in its Constitution, speaks most directly to the central values of cosmopolitan democracy. 🌐

Notes

¹ The issue is debated fully in the contributions to Gwin Prins, ed., *Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations* (RIIA, June 2000), notably in the essays by C.W. Maynes and J. Bolton.