

# The Coast Guard: Past Catalyst, Future Tool

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**T**he Coast Guard has been a helpful catalyst of globalization in the past, and it can provide a uniquely valuable tool for U.S. policy in the future. Nonetheless, with nontraditional threats to maritime security on the rise, the Coast Guard will need to be modernized and otherwise updated so that it will be capable of performing its future missions. Only then can it be an equal partner with the Navy in what has come to be called the “National Fleet.”

## Historical Background

The United States has always wanted to use the seas safely, securely, fully, and wisely—to preserve its marine resources, to ensure safe transit and passage of cargoes and people on its waters, to protect its maritime borders from intrusion, to uphold its maritime sovereignty, to rescue the distressed who ply the oceans in ships, and to prevent misuse of the oceans. In essence, the most fundamental role of the Coast Guard is to protect the freedom of Americans and promote their opportunities to compete economically by providing maritime security. But the seas have always been considered part of the global commons, belonging to all nations to freely use, except the near-shore coastal waters. Thus, any effort of the United States to protect its citizens and interests, and the interests of its friends, regarding the use of the seas, must have an impact on other nations and groups, sometimes at great distances from U.S. shores. Even before globalization became fashionable, the military, multimission, maritime U.S. Coast Guard was a key element in global issues, trends, and dynamics.

The Coast Guard and its predecessor organizations—principally the Lighthouse Service (1789), Revenue Cutter Service (1790), Steamboat Inspection Service (1838), and Lifesaving Service (1847)—have relied on a combination of regulation, enforcement activity, cooperation with other public organizations, and partnerships with private enterprise to accomplish the objectives of a safe and efficient marine operating

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environment for the common benefit of individuals and the security of the country. Because the Coast Guard has never enjoyed ample budgetary support, it has had to seek a “holistic” approach to accomplish the desired outcomes of its numerous and varied legislative mandates. As such, the Coast Guard has reached out around the world to create effective regimes that improve safety at sea and the operational efficiency of Coast Guard activities. Enforcement burdens have been shared when possible. Vessel carriage requirements have been standardized among maritime fleets. Merchant vessel watch-keeping and training-certification standards have been made universal by international agreement. This effort has been ongoing for more than a century.

Today’s Coast Guard is dedicated to protecting the public, the environment, and U.S. economic and national security interests in the Nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as required by U.S. national security.<sup>1</sup> Every day, the Coast Guard saves lives and property at sea; provides essential elements for a safe, efficient maritime transportation system; protects the marine environment; enforces laws and treaties in the maritime regions; and defends the national security interests and maritime borders of the United States. In sum, the Coast Guard exercises the sovereignty of the United States in maritime regions of vital interest, thereby establishing maritime security for the people and enterprises conducting legitimate activity.

The Coast Guard’s role in providing for the national and maritime security has its origins in the first administration of this country under President George Washington. The Revenue Cutter Service was established in 1790 to provide a means to enforce the custom duties, then the young republic’s primary means of paying off its \$70-million debt and ensuring the solvency of the United States.<sup>2,3</sup> The Revenue Cutter Service was the only military, armed maritime service of the young United States at that time and the only force capable of demonstrating the sovereign power of the United States at sea. The custom duties also were structured to favor the utilization of U.S. flag shipping in coastwise trade to encourage a recovery of that industry from the losses of the Revolutionary War.<sup>4</sup> Thus, from its beginning, the Coast Guard protected this country’s maritime sovereignty by excluding undesirable activity and promoting the development of strong economic activity.

Additionally, the ninth act of the First U.S. Congress established the public policy of assisting in promoting safety at sea by the establishment of Federally funded lighthouses and aids to navigation as a means of assisting the economic development of trade and reducing the risk to human life at sea. This was the first public works act of the United States.<sup>5</sup> The Lighthouse Service that grew out of this act was incorporated into the modern-day Coast Guard in July 1939.<sup>6</sup> This expanded the service’s responsibilities on the eve of World War II, when the safe, efficient, and effective movement of cargo to support and sustain military operations would be a critical responsibility in support of U.S. national security around the world.

The December 1999 National Security Strategy outlines three core objectives: enhance U.S. security, bolster U.S. economic prosperity, and promote democracy and human rights abroad.<sup>7</sup> As can be seen from the first acts of the First Congress just discussed, these basic objectives have existed for more than 200 years. The predecessors of the current Coast Guard promoted and protected these objectives from the

very beginning. As the United States enters a new century, the fundamental objectives of its national security will not change. As the Nation seeks to expand the acceptance of its core values worldwide, the Coast Guard, actively involved in promoting and defending those values in the beginning, must remain involved as a multimission service with an expanded role in the future.

To enhance its ability to execute its multiple responsibilities efficiently and effectively, the Coast Guard has been a catalyst for globalization. Sumner I. Kimball, head of the Lifesaving Service (merged with the Coast Guard in 1915), was a key U.S. representative to the 1899 International Maritime Conference held in Washington, DC, with the goal of promoting safety at sea. This conference standardized the “rules of the road” for sea-going traffic that are now used throughout the world.<sup>8</sup> By establishing an international set of rules to be followed by all mariners, conferees ensured that the safety of individual citizens would be enhanced and economic prosperity advanced by lessening the risk of collision at sea, with the attendant loss of life, property, cargo, and fouling of the environment.

In another action that further recognized the evolving international concern for safety of lives and property at sea (that is, the advancement of international concern for human rights), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, signed in London in January 1914, established the International Ice Service of Observation and Ice Patrol, directed by the United States. Convened as a direct result of the loss of the *Titanic* in 1912,<sup>9</sup> 14 leading maritime nations attended, and the person then serving as Captain Commandant of the Revenue Cutter Service was a member of the U.S. delegation. He became an active member of the resulting committee on safety of navigation.

Immediately after the *Titanic* tragedy, the Navy dispatched two vessels to the area south of Greenland to report on ice conditions. The following year the Navy declined to resume the patrol because it did not fall under its primary duty to be prepared to promptly defend the United States and win the Nation’s wars. The Revenue Cutter Service assumed that responsibility in 1913, and the Coast Guard continues that function today. The French Ambassador to the United States in 1914 recognized the patrols as “fully effective as expected and are such as to call for the sincere gratefulness of the mariners of countries.”<sup>10</sup>

The Coast Guard has continued to globalize the concern for safety at sea. Through the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)—now the Intergovernmental Maritime Organization (IMO)—established by the United Nations (UN) in 1958, and the 1960 Conference on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the safety of merchant ships and shipping company practices were improved and standardized. The IMCO originally had 21 member nations; in 2000, the IMO has 158 members.<sup>11</sup> Coast Guard-led efforts revised the standards for watertight subdivisions on vessels, set ballasting and stability standards, refined lifesaving requirements for boats and rafts to be carried on vessels, set navigation standards, and established load guidelines.<sup>12</sup> All of these efforts improved the seaworthiness of vessels, making them safer to operate and more likely to survive the perils of the sea. At the same time, establishing international standards that were observed by all merchant vessels and maritime shipping companies helped level the competition among international shipping companies. This kept the

U.S. merchant marine, which already had higher operating costs because of domestic laws requiring many of these safety features, in business.

The Coast Guard did not use the IMCO just to protect American economic interests. After disastrous fires on the Panamanian flag cruise ship *Yarmouth Castle* and the Norwegian cruise ship *Viking Princess*, Coast Guard efforts led the IMCO to set standards making passenger vessels "fire-safe" in 1966.<sup>13</sup> Several initiatives concerned standards for fire protection, including insulation and intumescent-coating barriers intended to stop the spread of shipboard fires. The Coast Guard is implementing the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers. This is the latest effort in a campaign started in the 1930s to improve the qualifications of mariners who operate vessels, reflected at that time in the Convention Concerning the Minimum Requirements of Professional Capacity for Masters and Officers on Board Merchant Ships.<sup>14</sup> The use of international conventions and standards has proved more effective in improving maritime safety than have efforts by individual countries acting unilaterally and without coordination.<sup>15</sup>

In 1870, after the departure of the Russians from Alaska, the U.S. Government attempted to prevent the wanton slaughter of seals for their skins in the Pribilof Island rookeries of the Bering Sea. The Revenue Cutter Service patrolled this region, clearing poachers from the territorial seas to protect the seals from the foreign vessels hovering in international waters.<sup>16</sup> The seals were easy prey when venturing outside the territorial seas. To improve the operational effectiveness of the Revenue Cutter Bering Sea Patrol in protecting the seals and to diminish the numbers of potential foreign flag sealing vessels, the United States tried for 20 years to gain the cooperation of other nations in preserving the seal population from extinction. In what was a remarkable change from the past American tradition of wasteful exploitation of natural resources, the United States successfully commenced an experiment in international cooperation by creating the Sealing Convention Treaty of 1911 between Russia, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. This treaty prohibited pelagic sealing in the waters of the North Pacific Ocean.<sup>17</sup> Most unusual for that period of time was the ceding of sovereign flag state responsibility by the parties to the Revenue Cutter Service to police the agreement on all vessels of the parties to the Convention. The Revenue Cutter Service became the *de facto* international maritime police force for the four parties involved.<sup>18</sup>

## Recent Missions

The Coast Guard has continued to use international conventions and treaties to expand the protection to marine resources that have been overexploited. In the 1950s, the extensive Japanese high-seas fishing fleets were taking a significant amount of American and Canadian salmon that spawned in fresh water and then traveled the oceans for three years before returning to their places of birth to start the cycle of life over again. The significant Japanese catch was rapidly reducing the number of salmon returning to generate offspring. In 1955, American and Canadian fishing interests negotiated an agreement with Japan to attempt to control the amount of fish harvested and conduct research on the migratory patterns of the salmon. Enforcement

of catch quotas and authorized fishing zones was difficult. A new treaty between Japan, Canada, Russia, and the United States went into force in 1993 that banned targeting salmon fishing north of 33° north latitude in the Pacific Ocean outside the exclusive economic zones of the contracting parties.<sup>19</sup> Enforcement provisions were in keeping with the emerging requirements of basic responsibilities that had evolved as part of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, particularly enforcement by one party to the treaty on vessels belonging to other parties to the treaty.<sup>20</sup>

Recognition of coastal state jurisdiction over marine resources that originate in coastal and internal waters, as reflected in the creation of an exclusive economic zone, was codified in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Subsequently, work has focused on defining the general obligations regarding conservation and management of fisheries by coastal states and fishing nations. This led to the development of the 1995 UN Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, the 1995 UN Food and Agriculture Organization Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries, and the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. These important agreements set the specific rules that the international community will need to follow to move toward sustainable marine fisheries. The tightening of enforcement regimes by all of these agreements, particularly with regard to nonmember fishing nations, represents an important step forward in enabling the international community to conserve marine life.<sup>21</sup>

In addition to the interests of human rights, as reflected in safety concerns for mariners and passengers at sea and concern for marine life that have been advanced by the Coast Guard through global organizations, marine environmental pollution has increasingly posed regional and global challenges. Pollution of the maritime commons was becoming such a problem by the early 1970s that the Coast Guard-led U.S. delegation to the IMCO successfully gained a consensus to change the practices of tanker crews and oil shipping companies in 1973. The new international standards created were enforceable by both coastal states and flag states. The coastal states' authority was extended under certain circumstances to 50 miles off-shore, well beyond the 12-mile limit of the territorial seas.<sup>22</sup> The growth in the coastal states' authority was in recognition of the potential harm that could be caused to these states by the activity of tankers and hazardous material-carrying merchant vessels. Coastal states could take such measures on the high seas as may be considered necessary to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastlines.<sup>23</sup> Many of these merchant vessels traveled under the authority of weak flag states, but called regularly on major ports throughout the industrial world. The weak flag states were unable to enforce regulations on vessels that seldom entered their ports or came within reach of their inspection authorities. A global approach and the relinquishing of some national sovereignty evolved as the best solution to an environmental problem that was threatening common interests.

The Coast Guard has used international agreements to advance the operational effectiveness of drug law enforcement efforts in the 1980s and 1990s. Basing its actions on Article 108 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the Coast Guard has moved to take safe havens away from those who transport drugs by sea from source

countries to consumption countries. Article 17 of the 1988 Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances outlined in principle operational concepts for greater cooperation among maritime states. Through bilateral negotiations and operational engagement with training teams, cutter visits, and combined exercises and operations between the United States and member countries throughout the Caribbean, these principles are slowly becoming operational realities. The objective has been to strengthen coastal states' ability to police their own waters either independently or, when operational time lines do not allow for coastal state forces to react, to allow nearby Coast Guard forces to assist on the behalf of coastal states.

The Coast Guard and partnering nations' maritime forces have developed common operational procedures that have allowed for a more effective effort in countering drug and other smuggling activities. Excess defense articles and Coast Guard equipment have been shared with selected nations to ensure such a capability. Continuous engagement with Caribbean nations is required to reinforce training and operational procedures. This is done under ambassadorial or Commander in Chief (CINC) South sponsorship, as the circumstances require. Fifteen agreements have been concluded with maritime partners, putting into practice the cooperation called for under Article 17 of the 1988 Vienna Convention.<sup>24</sup> This is a real measure of the success of engagement as a tool to shape the environment, to improve friendly relations with selected countries, to improve operational effectiveness of forces for the benefit of the recipient countries and the United States, and to gain acceptance of U.S. norms in the conduct of other national law enforcement procedures.

One of the most difficult challenges facing the U.S. military today is disengaging from intervention operations, such as establishing and restoring legitimate governments in fragile nations, and engaging in peace enforcement or stabilization operations in disintegrating nations. Successful disengagement requires the establishment of legitimate local institutions that can take over the responsibilities of providing security for the population and the rule of law so that legal activity can resume for the benefit of the citizens. This is most critical where the previous governing apparatus was focused on maintaining the leadership in power over the general welfare of the population and the elements of government have no acceptably established traditions to help guide their development. When these fragile nations are coastal states, they need to develop Coast Guard-like services to provide for their maritime sovereignty, just as the United States has done. The Coast Guard is the correct service to serve as a mentor to these smaller navies.

After the overthrow of Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1991, the Coast Guard provided training teams, excess equipment, and organizational expertise to create the Panamanian National Maritime Service (SMN in its Spanish initials). This effort involved the deployment of patrol boats to help exert Panamanian sovereignty in adjacent waters while the SMN was being formed. Training team visits and the assignment of advisors in Panama lasted for 8 years. Coast Guard ship visits have been scheduled repeatedly to exercise with the SMN to develop at-sea patrol capabilities. Five Panamanian students have graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy to provide long-term professional maritime leadership to the SMN and Panama. Two Coast Guard pa-

trol boats were transferred to the SMN in 1999 to enhance its capabilities. The Coast Guard role has shifted over the last few years from providing basic skill training to providing technical operational advice and developing long-term self-support strategies for the SMN.<sup>25</sup> Ongoing efforts ensure that the SMN can control the activity that goes on adjacent to Panama's coastline, deterring illegal activity such as drug transshipments and smuggling of aliens through Central America and the poaching of Panamanian fishery stocks.

After the international coalition restored President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti in 1994, the daunting task of establishing legitimate Haitian organizations to rule over the poorest population in the Western Hemisphere remained. All Haitian civil functions had ceased to operate. Initially, U.S. Coast Guard forces provided vessel traffic control services to the capital's harbor and security patrols throughout the adjacent waters. The U.S. Coast Guard, in partnership with the Canadian Coast Guard, created from virtually nothing the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG). Starting with just 7 Haitian police personnel and no boats, the HCG has grown to 90 trained personnel, 8 operational boats, and 2 newly constructed bases. This required the long-term investment of instructors and mentors in Haiti, training team visits, ship visits, and the donation of refurbished equipment. Upon the withdrawal of U.S. in-country assistance to Haiti in the fall of 1999, the HCG, small as it might be, was one of the successful institution-building efforts. Four full-time Coast Guard trainers remain to assist the HCG.<sup>26</sup> For the first time, Haiti has the capability to patrol its own territorial waters outside its capital's harbor. The HCG is the only effective counterdrug trafficking unit in Haiti, having participated in 11 maritime narcotics seizures during which it captured 6 narcotics smuggling vessels through 1999.<sup>27</sup>

While both the Panamanian and Haitian operations were done as part of a team effort to establish a functioning country with greater respect for human rights and the rule of law, the U.S. Coast Guard benefited operationally from the existence of functioning maritime services that could help disrupt the flow of contraband in the Caribbean. The Department of State and the regional CINC supported Coast Guard efforts. Both provided funding to support these operations. Coast Guard efforts were constrained by the competing demands of other operational requirements for its limited assets.

The Coast Guard has been part of the Navy task unit conducting the CINC Atlantic's UNITAS deployments since 1959. Coast Guard participation provided a more relevant role model to the many smaller navies encountered. All have the daunting task of controlling their coastal waters from undesired activity, mostly of a nonmilitary nature (for example, fisheries encroachment, smuggling, pollution, persons and property in distress).

In 1992, the U.S. Coast Guard dispatched a vessel to the Baltic Sea to participate in exercises and professional exchanges with former Warsaw Pact members following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This activity has continued under the sponsorship of the CINC Europe and has been extended to the Black and Mediterranean Seas. The Coast Guard organizational model represents a cost-effective way for many nations to exert the necessary maritime sovereignty within their region of interest. The Coast Guard has built an international reputation for bringing a multitude of interests together

to promote the respect for law and a humanitarian concern for maritime operations. The CINC Europe stated that “the number of operations and engagement missions . . . is growing while the number of ships available is declining. . . . The Coast Guard’s rich maritime heritage, unique skills, and proven expertise in crucial mission areas make it the ideal maritime operational and engagement tool for this theater.”<sup>28</sup> The continued deployment of Coast Guard ships to the CINC Europe is needed as the size of the vessels and the day-to-day missions of the Coast Guard closely match the size and missions of host navies.<sup>29</sup>

## **Toward the Future**

The President’s Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions for the 21st Century in 1999 concluded that, “as a multi-mission law enforcement, humanitarian, and regulatory agency, as well as a military service, the Coast Guard is well suited to perform maritime engagement roles.”<sup>30</sup> It is likewise well suited as a “model maritime service” for emerging democratic nations. Participation in geographical CINC engagement strategies can improve mission effectiveness and efficiency.<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately, the demand for Coast Guard ship participation has been such that the Coast Guard has had to limit participation so as not to affect its ability to perform its other responsibilities. The CINC Central Command and the CINC Pacific have been sharing limited Coast Guard ship time because assets are just not available without having an impact on other Coast Guard missions. When U.S. vital interests are at stake, Coast Guard mission priorities shift to those most important to national security. When humanitarian and other lesser national interests are at stake in overseas regions, the chronic underfunding of the Coast Guard and the limited capital resources provided make for difficult choices. The expertise and skills of the Coast Guard may be the more appropriate response to support overseas engagement efforts with emerging democracies and military interventions, but the capacity is not available. In some of these cases, Department of Defense assets, which are more expensive and less suited for the mission, are sent; in others, the opportunities are lost.

The Office of Naval Intelligence has outlined the future threats and challenges to maritime security. They include an increased volume of illegal trade, the continuing emergence of nonstate actors who challenge sovereignty of the nation-state, organized crime (that is, smuggling goods and people), exploitation of marine and nonmarine resources, and the adoption of asymmetrical threats.<sup>32</sup> These are a direct result of globalization of economies, information services, and cultural clashes. Most of these threats do not lend themselves to traditional military responses. As the Coast Guard and other forces conduct operations to counter these threats, the CINC needs greater access to Coast Guard assets. Each CINC is well aware of this. Correspondence from each of the geographical CINCs to the Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions has indicated an increasing opportunity to deploy Coast Guard assets and encouraged increased availability in the future.<sup>33</sup> The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stated that the Coast Guard is an important international engagement resource that may be called upon more frequently in the future.<sup>34</sup> The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction echoed the Chairman’s input.<sup>35</sup> Unfortunately, the Task Force did

not endorse the input received from these experts. The Task Force concluded that the current level of Coast Guard effort overseas should remain the same.

The term *national security* encompasses a rich and complex tapestry of economic, social, environmental, political, diplomatic, cultural, and military dimensions. Accordingly, the President's National Security Strategy has articulated a more expansive construct. The Coast Guard has broad responsibilities for ensuring maritime security—the service's singular contribution to U.S. national security posture. These capabilities help ensure homeland security, protect critical infrastructures, and safeguard U.S. maritime sovereignty.

To be sovereign at sea, the United States must control what takes place in the waters under its jurisdiction and exercise influence in the waters that it deems of high interest. Absent an organized military threat, the responsibility for upholding U.S. maritime sovereignty rests more and more upon the Coast Guard. Traditional military threats to U.S. maritime interests are now much less serious than they once were, while nontraditional criminal, operational, commercial, and environmental threats are much greater. Because of *posse comitatus* constraints and the U.S. constitutional canon, Department of Defense military services cannot and should not address these threats. Consequently, the need for the Coast Guard to ensure maritime security is a reality that makes the Coast Guard in many ways more relevant. Many of the threats and challenges to the maritime security of the United States and that of U.S. friends and allies—piracy, drug trafficking, illegal migration, Law of the Sea disputes, environmental degradation and ecoterrorism, resource wars, and the need to ensure the economic security of commercial sea-borne traffic—are the forte of the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard may be described as the world's seventh largest navy; it is also the world's 39th oldest in terms of average platform age. The service's high- and medium-endurance cutters, patrol aircraft, and communications systems are generally old and are becoming obsolete, if they are not so already. The life cycle support challenges of severely aging cutters and aircraft also affect their effectiveness for patrols, especially for deep-water duties far from shore, as well as their ability to operate "seamlessly" with the other armed services.

Such developments bode ill for U.S. maritime security, as the Nation's economy is critically dependent on the use of the high seas and its own coastal and internal waterways. Everywhere there is an increase in pressure on marine resources and, as a result, on those charged with their protection. The pressures range from enormous increases—probably a tripling—in the volume of legitimate maritime trade by 2020 (95 percent of U.S. exports and imports still move by sea); to a boom in illegal migration; to an increase in maritime drug smuggling (at least 70 percent of the total drug flow into the United States travels part of the way by sea); to greater demands on ocean resources, such as fisheries and mineral deposits; and, finally, to a growing list of maritime security concerns.

## Modernizing the Coast Guard

To hedge against tomorrow's uncertainties, the Coast Guard should be rebuilt to make it adaptable to future realities. Today's threats must be kept in mind, but tomor-

row's U.S. maritime security requirements will never be precisely known. The Coast Guard of the future must have the flexibility to adapt to a wide range of maritime challenges—a fact that must be reflected in today's planning for tomorrow's forces and operations.

The recapitalization of the deep-water capability is a near-term national priority. The Coast Guard must modernize its deep-water cutter, aircraft, and command-and-control assets if it is to sustain and improve upon its current performance. This was endorsed by the findings of the Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions.<sup>36</sup>

As the Coast Guard moves forward to resize, recapitalize, and modernize itself for the next 20-plus years, each geographical CINC should have the availability of a Coast Guard cutter full-time in his or her area of responsibility, in addition to the staff talent to maximize the benefits from this asset. Coast Guard assets conducting engagement activities deal with many nonmilitary organizations in addition to the host nation's naval forces. They provide more contact than Navy warships visiting the same nation. The Coast Guard's tradition of routinely participating in multi-agency solutions to policing, marine resource management, marine environmental protection, and marine accident prevention and mitigation operations allows it to open dialogues with a variety of host nation organizations and to build bridges among these organizations. The humanitarian nature of most Coast Guard operations makes the service acceptable in some countries where the Navy would not initially be permitted. The Chairman recognized this role in his memorandum to the Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions.<sup>37</sup> A Coast Guard ship in each CINC theater would also be immediately available to participate in operations involving resolution of small-scale contingencies, provision of humanitarian aid, or foreign assistance where Coast Guard capabilities fit the situation.

The United States needs to take advantage of all the tools that it has available to enhance its national security. The Coast Guard provides a unique form of maritime security. It is "forward deployed" in the Caribbean and the Pacific to counter the threat of drug trafficking and illegal migration. It also operates in remote parts of the Bering Sea and the Central Pacific to protect marine resources from illegal activity. Upon request, it has operated in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia.

It was for these and other compelling reasons that in September 1998 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, and Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral James Loy, signed the National Fleet Policy Statement to ensure that, as the Navy and the Coast Guard moved to recapitalize their forces in the 21st century, they synchronized planning, training, and procurement in order to provide the highest level of maritime capability for the Nation's investment.<sup>38</sup> These operational needs will shape current and future designs and operational concepts for multimission naval surface warships and small, general-purpose, shallow draft cutters; these vessels can mutually support the roles, missions, functions, and tasks that will be required of both the Coast Guard and the Navy. As Admiral Loy noted in a letter to Admiral Johnson on July 31, 1998, "I envision a National Fleet . . . of surface combatants and major cutters that would be affordable, interoperable, complementary, and balanced with minimum overlaps in their capabilities."

Such a fleet would comprise highly capable multimission Navy surface combatants optimized for the full spectrum of naval operations. The Coast Guard's maritime security cutter—one element of the ongoing Deepwater Project—would be optimized for peacetime and crisis-response Coast Guard missions. But this cutter must also be able to complement its Navy counterparts in its assigned contingency and warfare tasks, filling the requirement for a small, general-purpose warship. Although not the primary purpose of the program, this cutter could provide an attractive alternative for foreign military sales, thus helping the U.S. shipbuilding base while potentially assisting future interoperability efforts with allies and friends.

The Navy and Coast Guard continue to examine closely the shared purpose and common effort focused on tailored operational integration of the two services' multimission surface platforms, with the goal of meeting the entire spectrum of U.S. maritime requirements for the 21st century. Such a partnership mandates that the Navy and Coast Guard work together to maximize their operational effectiveness across all naval and maritime missions. Furthermore, the Navy and Coast Guard should coordinate surface warship/cutter planning, information systems integration, research and development, acquisition, and life-cycle support. In addition, this cooperation could embrace joint concepts of operations, training, exercises, and deployments.

Clearly, such a joint endeavor will have broad implications for both the Navy and the Coast Guard. The likely benefits to such a coordinated and integrated approach could include the more efficient and economical meeting of operational support and upgrade requirements, coordinated acquisition strategies, standardized training and cross-training in service-specific operational specialties, improved operational planning, integrated doctrinal and tactical development, and much enhanced force and unit interoperability. The improvements in these areas will allow the United States to stretch its budget dollars to maximize the operational effectiveness of these two services. The Navy and Coast Guard have always worked well together, and the National Fleet turns tradition into policy, greatly strengthening the relationship.

## Conclusion

A key element in the renaissance in the Nation's sea services will be the revolution in thinking about the shared purpose, operational integration, and common effort between the Navy and the Coast Guard that the National Fleet concept entails. The Navy-Coast Guard collective task is to build fully interoperable, multimission, naval and maritime forces for tomorrow's challenges at the best price for the U.S. citizen. To do that, the Navy and Coast Guard must work even more closely together.

Through globalization efforts, the Coast Guard has expanded its operational effectiveness by developing regional cooperation with adjacent countries' maritime forces and using international forums to standardize the approach to many common problems found in the maritime environment. The safety of life at sea has been improved. Arising awareness and concern for the health of living marine resources has led to the curtailment of harmful fishing practices. The standards to which commercial vessels are built and operated have grown safer as the nation of flag registry and the coastal states that the vessels call on have joined forces to ensure safety. The amount of petroleum and other hazardous

products that have entered the maritime environment has been reduced through partnerships with private organizations and international public bodies. It has taken many years to develop the awareness, understanding, consensus building, and urgency for action to accomplish these objectives. 🌐

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Coast Guard 2020 Ready Today . . . Preparing for Tomorrow* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1998), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen H. Evans, *The United States Coast Guard 1790–1915: A Definitive History* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1949), 3–5.

<sup>3</sup> Bruce Stubbs and Scott C. Truver, *America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, January 2000).

<sup>4</sup> Evans, *The United States Coast Guard 1790–1915*, 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Robert E. Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard 1915 to Present* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 162.

<sup>7</sup> The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999), iii.

<sup>8</sup> Evans, *The United States Coast Guard 1790–1915*, 149.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 197.

<sup>10</sup> Jean Jules Jusserand, letter to Secretary of State William J. Bryan, June 27, 1914.

<sup>11</sup> Press release, March 20, 2000, <<http://www.imo.org>>.

<sup>12</sup> Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea*, 310.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 339–340.

<sup>14</sup> *Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), chapter 1.

<sup>15</sup> Introduction, <<http://www.imo.org>>.

<sup>16</sup> Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea*, 112.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean*, Article I.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Articles VI and IX.

<sup>21</sup> Mary Beth West, *State Department Official on Fisheries Management*, <[www.usia.gov](http://www.usia.gov)>.

<sup>22</sup> Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea*, 347–348.

<sup>23</sup> Marine pollution legislation, <<http://www.amsa.gov.au>>.

<sup>24</sup> *U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Manual*, Enclosure 4.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, *U.S. Coast Guard Involvement with Panama*, Fact Sheet, June 2000.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, *U.S. Coast Guard Involvement with Haiti*, Fact Sheet, June 2000.

<sup>27</sup> U.S. Coast Guard Brief, “Haitian Coast Guard Development Plan.”

<sup>28</sup> Wesley K. Clark, letter to Deputy Secretary of Transportation, June 24, 1999. See also *Report of the Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999), Appendix D.

<sup>29</sup> Wesley K. Clark, letter to Commandant, USCG, July 6, 1999. See also *Report of the Interagency Task Force*.

<sup>30</sup> *Report of the Interagency Task Force*, 2–33.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Office of Naval Intelligence, *Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020*, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1999).

<sup>33</sup> *Report of the Interagency Task Force*.

<sup>34</sup> Henry H. Shelton, memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Chairman of Interagency Task Force, July 26, 1999. See also *Report of the Interagency Task Force*.

<sup>35</sup> Andrew Hoehn, letter to Executive Director of Roles and Missions Task Force, August 12, 1999. See also *Report of the Interagency Task Force*.

<sup>36</sup> *Report of the Interagency Task Force*, 44.

<sup>37</sup> Henry H. Shelton, memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Transportation, enclosure.

<sup>38</sup> *NATIONAL FLEET—A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement*, September 21, 1998. See also Thomas Fargo and Ernest Riutta, “A ‘National Fleet’ for America,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (April 1999), 48–51.