Chapter 31

Religion and Culture: Human Dimensions of Globalization

Douglas M. Johnston

. . . And if the things most finely French
Are better done in France—
Might not Americanisation
Be best applied to its own nation?
Ere every shop shall be a store
And every trade a trust . . .
Lo, many men in many lands
Know when their cause is just.
There will be quite a large attendance
When we Declare our Independence.
— G. K. Chesterton
"Americanisation"

Communal conflict, although not totally attributable to globalization itself, is becoming a hallmark of globalization. Regardless of the cause, the United States is unprepared to deal with it, either diplomatically or militarily.

One of globalization's major side effects has been the accelerated revival of religious and cultural identities that, as a result of the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and the technological advances of the 20th century, were once thought to be in decline. In his insightful article "Jihad vs. McWorld," Benjamin Barber describes the dynamics of the contemporary world as a clash between tribalism and globalism—between "a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality," on the one hand, and "one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce," on the other. "The planet," Barber writes, "is falling precipitantly apart and coming reluctantly together at the very same moment."[1]

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Definitions

Boston College sociologist Peter Berger has observed that "Those who neglect religion in their analyses of contemporary affairs do so at great peril." For the purposes of this discussion, culture is defined as the comprehensive worldview through which one perceives and interacts with the outside world. Religion, by contrast, is a personal or institutionalized set of attitudes, beliefs, and practices relating to or manifesting faithful devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity.

Key Phenomena and Trends

Clash of Civilizations . . . or Not?

A cursory glance at recent ethnoreligious hostilities—those in Kosovo, Indonesia, Nigeria, Chechnya, Sudan, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka, to name only a few—suggests that Samuel Huntington's predictions about fault line conflicts may indeed be coming to pass.[2] The fundamental assumption underlying these predictions is that rapid technological and social change driven by economic globalization is creating a crisis of identity in certain parts of the world and a corresponding longing for traditional values, often embedded in religion.

There are at least two grounds for challenging Huntington's basic thesis that conflicts between civilizations will dominate the future of world politics. First, considerations of power politics more often than not overwhelm cultural affinities. A recent example of this was the attack by the Christian West on the Christian East to aid the Muslim populations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Second, a reasonably persuasive case can be made that modernity and interdependence will ameliorate cultural differences as future generations communicate directly with their peers in other countries, relatively unencumbered by the ethnic and religious overhangs of the past.

These challenges notwithstanding, Huntington identifies religion as the most important defining element of any civilization (as contrasted with race, language, or way of life). As such, it is also portrayed as a defining element in future conflicts. Whether the root cause of a particular conflict or merely a vehicle for the mobilization of nationalist or ethnic passions, religion is certainly central to much of the strife currently taking place around the globe. Equally sobering is the fact that the level of discontent is likely to grow worse over time as an increasing fraction of the world's population is left behind by rapid technological change; the economic gap continues to widen between the *haves* and the *have-nots*; secular governments in hard-pressed areas fail to meet the legitimate expectations of their populations. Adding to the problem, and amply illustrated by the conflicts mentioned earlier, is the fact that religious institutions have on more than a few occasions strayed from their original purpose and become an integral part of the problem, exacerbating human suffering rather than alleviating it.

With people increasingly turning to religion in such situations, Western governments are ill equipped to deal with the consequences. As evidenced by its missteps during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the later intervention in Lebanon, and the

breakup of Yugoslavia and beyond, the neglect by traditional diplomacy of religion has rendered the West ineffective both in dealing with religious differences and in combating demagogues who adeptly manipulate religious adherents.

U.S. diplomats are a product of the nation-state model of international relations, with its attendant emphasis on the maximization of power and an all-but-total neglect of religion and its dynamics. A rather glaring example of Western indifference to religious imperatives was the recent decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to bomb Serbia on Orthodox Easter. Arguably unnecessary from a military point of view—NATO could have bombed more intensely the day before or the day after—it was the kind of decision that will never be forgotten. As the Serbs were quick to point out, the only others to have bombed them on this holy day were the Germans in World War II.

The reasons that religion and culture have become such important factors in understanding and dealing with today's international environment extend well beyond the reaction to globalization. A better understanding of these reasons will be important in the development of an effective approach for the challenges that lie ahead.

Religion in the Cold War

Having successfully vanquished the Axis powers in World War II and thereby averted, in Winston Churchill's words, "a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science,"[3] the victors turned against one another. Religion's role in the daily conduct of the resulting confrontation was minor at most. In certain sectors of society (for example, the religious conservatives who provided much of Ronald Reagan's electoral support), the Cold War took on the quality of a crusade against the godless "evil empire." For the most part, though, it was a battle between the world's two most formidable modern (and essentially secular) ideologies: liberal democratic capitalism, grounded in a strong commitment to the separation of church and state (if not the expunging of religious expression from the public sphere altogether[4]), and Marxism-Leninism, built on the complete suppression or elimination of religion as "the opium of the people."[5]

In such an environment, religion was given only passing mention, if any at all. When dealing with an atheistic foe, the only religious factor to enter the policymaker's calculus was the possible cause-and-effect relationship between disbelief in an afterlife and nonsuicidal behavior (thus enhancing the rationale for nuclear deterrence as a curb to aggressive tendencies). As Soviet communism was beginning to fall of its own weight, Alexander Solzhenitsyn sounded a prescient warning in his commencement address to the Harvard Class of 1978. He chastised communism and capitalism alike for their failure to address the essential spiritual needs that lie at the center of human existence and identity:

> On the way from the Renaissance to our days we have enriched our experience, but we have lost the concept of a Supreme Complete Entity which used to restrain our passions and our irresponsibility. We have placed too much hope in political and social reforms, only to find out that we were being deprived of our most precious possession: our spiritual life. In the East, it is destroyed by the dealings and machinations of the ruling party. In the

> West, commercial interests tend to suffocate it. This is the real crisis. The split in the world is less terrible than the similarity of the disease plaguing its main sections.[6]

The end of the Cold War brought with it a sense of elation in the West. The major ideological competitor of democratic capitalism had collapsed, leading Francis Fukuyama to speculate that "liberal democracy may constitute the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form of human government,' and as such . . . 'the end of history.'"[7] Fukuyama's argument was that "while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such . . . internal contradictions. . . . [T]he ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved upon."[8]

The hubris was short-lived. As made clear by the events of the 1990s in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Sudan, and Indonesia, Western modernity would not rule the world by default any time soon. A number of ideologies and belief systems, many religious in nature, were more than eager to compete.

Religion's Long-Standing Appeal

Although effectively suppressed by the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War, the fact is that religion and culture have never lost their appeal; the West has just been in a state of denial for the last two centuries. Berger points out that the current surge of academic interest in religion (for example, the funding by the MacArthur Foundation of the multimillion-dollar Fundamentalism Project) is based on "an upside-down perception of the world":

> The notion here was that so-called fundamentalism (which, when all is said and done, usually refers to any sort of passionate religious movement) is a rare, hard-to-explain thing. But in fact it is not rare at all, neither if one looks at history, nor if one looks around the contemporary world. On the contrary, what is rare is people who think otherwise. Put simply: The difficult-to-understand phenomenon is not Iranian mullahs but American university professors.[9]

The decline of religion's importance in the policymaker's calculus thus has more to do with the eye of the beholder than with any objective appraisal of reality. The antitraditionalist and rationalist assumptions of the Enlightenment have blinded the West to an important part of the picture. As Mark Juergensmeyer points out, many of the West's difficulties in dealing with non-Western states stem from its ignorance of the growing confrontation between secular nationalism and "parochial political identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances."[10] Through the West's neglect of the religious and historical factors underlying this confrontation, its ability to rightly diagnose and respond to these developments has become crippled.

Perhaps the best example of this neglect was U.S. inattention to the religious dynamics underlying the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In the years leading up to the revolution, the only recorded suggestion within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that it might be a good idea to monitor the complex and volatile religious situation in Iran was scornfully rejected as "sociology"[11]—"a term," Edward Luttwak writes, "used in intel-

ligence circles to mean the time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant."[12] Furthermore, when the brewing crisis was finally detected by the U.S. Government, it was misdiagnosed as a political, economic, and social problem, in which religion played only a superficial role, if any at all. As Luttwak notes, "It must be admitted that the situation probably allowed no successful policy, but false diagnosis was inevitably followed by false prescriptions," making recovery even more doubtful.[13]

Impact on International Politics and Trends

In assessing the relationship between religion and culture, on the one hand, and economic globalization, on the other, it is necessary to address five related issues: (1) the development of the international order, (2) cultural expressions of religion, (3) the problem of objective sources, (4) the Information Revolution, and (5) religion as a positive force.

Development of the International Order

It is impossible to understand adequately the development of and changes within the current international system without a proper understanding of the way that the international order has been shaped by the worldviews (that is, identity, norms, and preferences) of its major players. Specifically, Daniel Philpott argues that the formation of the Westphalian international system, characterized by sovereign nation-states, was inextricably linked to the religious debates raging during the Reformation. In his words:

> The Reformation's indispensability emerges most saliently through the following correlation: those polities that experienced a Reformation crisis were the same ones that adopted an interest in Westphalia; those that saw no such crisis did not. In plumbing the causal logic behind this correlation, I argue that the intrinsic content of Protestantism itself points to sovereignty.[14]

More fundamentally, as University of Virginia religion scholar John Milbank points out, the notion of a secular sphere free of religious influence is itself a theological construct grounded in the metaphysical debates of medieval academia. As he argues, "Theology enters into the very construction of the new realities 'property' and 'sovereignty,' helping to create a new space for human maneuver."[15] If how the world is perceived—even by nonreligious people—is therefore integrally connected to a particular theological perspective, then the question of how religion and culture shape globalization answers itself: they undergird the very concept of globalization. More practically, and closely related to an argument frequently made by Muslim intellectuals, since the concept of an autonomous secular realm is itself theological, the imposition of this secular construct by the West on the non-Western world is an explicitly religious action as narrowly sectarian as anything attempted by its nonsecular opponents.[16]

Cultural Expressions of Religion

As infamously illustrated by many 19th century Christian missionaries in the non-Western world, quite often what passes for religion in the eyes of particular believers is their own culturally specific expression of their religious beliefs. As missionaries have taken a harder look at both anthropological insights and the New Testament's account of the shift within the early church from predominantly Jewish to predominantly Gentile, they have—with few exceptions—acknowledged the bias in their interpretations and sought ways to winnow out what in their beliefs is culturally specific from what is theologically essential. University of Edinburgh church historian Andrew Walls makes this point;[17] he argues that Christianity has been—and should be—contextualized for specific cultural settings, but that, in doing so, one should not lose sight of the essential core that unites all Christians: "There is nothing wrong with having local forms of Christianity—provided that we remember that they are local."[18]

Such an understanding of theology "as prisoner and liberator of culture"[19] has profound implications. A similar debate within Islam as to what constitutes "true Islam" in light of its different manifestations around the world suggests that the concept of contextualization crosses religious boundaries.[20] If one can legitimately argue that the rigidity of Middle Eastern Islam (speaking very generally) is culturally contingent rather than theologically essential, then perhaps a more tolerant stance, such as that in Southeast Asia, is not just theologically possible but theologically necessary. One does not convince religiously committed people to be more tolerant because their beliefs do not matter enough to go against the cultural grain, but rather because they matter so much that they are worth getting right. Such an approach opens questionable practices justified on religious grounds to the charge that they are rooted more in cultural particularity or vested interest than in essential religious tenets. It also enables the West to compete for the religious high ground rather than conceding it ipso facto to the militants.

The Problem of Objective Sources

Portrayals of the clash between the Enlightenment belief systems dominant in the West and the non-Enlightenment belief systems dominant elsewhere are not without their own biases. To properly understand this claim, it is necessary to examine the beginnings of the Western Enlightenment. The Enlightenment's driving motive was nicely summarized by Immanuel Kant:

> Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage . . . [whose] cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. *Sapere aude!* "Have courage to use your own reason!"—that is the motto of enlightenment.[21]

The goal of this process was to create a modern society of autonomous individuals unfettered by ties of blood, community, or religion and dominated by the overarching structures of the state and the market. (For the purposes of this chapter, both the forces driving the process and its end goal will be referred to as modernity.[22])

What the forces of modernization sought to oppose—that which was "premodern" and, in its reaction to modernity, "antimodern"—was defined largely in terms of being opposed by modernity: the bonds of community—be they religious, social, ethnic, or familial; the realm of particularity rather than abstraction, where the "unenlightened" carry out their normal life cycle processes; "public goods" not fully supported by market forces; in short, anything standing in the way of the free, "unfettered" reign of modernity.[23]

The champions of modernity have polarized the debate by portraying themselves as Promethean figures, "stealing fire from the gods" and empowering humankind to exist and flourish independently (as opposed to the unenlightened, sinister, and "medieval" defenders of premodernity). They tend to regard premodernity's resurgence, at best, as an obstacle to "progress" and, at worst, in terms reminiscent of Norse mythology's "twilight of the gods," in which the dull, brutish giants overcome the noble gods and consign the world to an endless Ice Age—or worse. To quote one such portrayal:

> The irrational precinct of the mind which needs invisible spirits can be dangerous, and has brought untold misery. Thinking people must strive constantly to hold it in check. . . . The evidence seems clear: To find living conditions that are safe, decent, orderly, and 'civilized,' avoid places with intense religion.[24]

In trying to make sense of the modernity-premodernity dichotomy, it is helpful to realize that the proponents of each side are adversaries, not dispassionate observers. Advocates of the shift from premodernity to modernity claim, with Max Weber, that it is a natural part of human development. Similarly, critics of modernity tend to lay the lion's share of the blame for contemporary societal problems at its feet. Rather than viewing the premodernity-modernity dichotomy as either an intermediate phase in human evolution or the disruption of an idyllic past by a regimented present, one should keep in mind that this dichotomy is nothing new; it has existed at least since the Renaissance and likely even before that. Furthermore, the dawn of the Information Age has forced the modern world to adopt many of the characteristics of premodernity in order to adapt to new technological realities, thus increasing the likelihood that the relationship between premodernity and modernity will be "mostly one of harmony, not conflict."[25]

In this light, each side's demonization of the other should not be taken at face value. The perception among many in the West, for example, that premodernity's "exaltation of communitarian values over individual ones" is fundamentally and irreconcilably inconsistent with Western visions of international human rights is little more than a self-fulfilling prophecy.[26] When grounded in the primacy of the individual, the effort to enforce basic human rights around the world is resisted as cultural imperialism by those from cultural or religious backgrounds that emphasize community over individualism.[27] Many of these seeming opponents of the human rights agenda are actually quite sympathetic to its underlying themes of justice and human dignity and could likely be turned into allies if the agenda were articulated in a way that is consistent with their religious and cultural norms.[28]

To summarize, the hostility of modern individualists toward antimodern communitarians stems in large part from the fact that the Enlightenment's assertion of atomistic individualism is predicated on a polemic against the twin terrors of tradition and authority. Thus, individualists will assert that they are the only legitimate defenders of justice and human dignity despite communitarians' equal (if not greater) claims to that role, not so much because there are fundamental differences in their respective outlooks, but because ascribing legitimacy to communitarianism undermines the polemic of the individualists and thus the basis for their religion-free public sphere.

The Information Revolution

Without proper safeguards, information technology can dramatically increase the inequalities and tensions between the developed world and the developing world. The meteoric rise of affordable information and communications technologies has been heralded as the vanguard of a kinder, gentler, more well-connected world order. While such technology does indeed improve the capacity for genuine dialogue and understanding between people with diverse national, ethnic, and religious identities, it is much more likely that the new ease of information access will sacrifice depth and insightfulness for shallow, half-baked approaches to intercultural communication. While the advent of satellite broadcast television news *has* made it easier for people to keep track of events around the globe, it has also forced news providers to condense to a 20-second sound bite the kind of in-depth historical and cultural background that is required for a true understanding of any issue (as contrasted with the more thorough treatment characteristic of newspaper journalism). Careless television coverage actually accentuates differences and tensions rather than ameliorating them. Communications have become faster, but understanding continues to take time.

Beyond any compromise in content, the existing inequalities in access to information technology act to limit its benefits to those above a certain socioeconomic threshold. Below that threshold, much of the impact of this technology is negative to the extent that it exacerbates inequalities and leads to the automation of tasks previously requiring paid labor. Since these disenfranchised populations tend to be the most insular (and, as the least educated, the most open to religious demagoguery), the much hailed global culture will pass them by. As Henry Kissinger speculates:

> The world could evolve into a two-tiered system in which globalized elites are linked by shared values and technologies while the populations at large, feeling excluded, seek refuge in nationalism and ethnicity and in attempts to become free of what they perceive as American hegemony.[29]

Such a system could create a dangerous alliance between those opposed to the global elite because of resource and power inequalities and those opposed because of the elite's perceived disrespect for their value systems. The battle lines would be drawn between rich and poor, "new class morality" and "traditional morality,"[30] urban and rural, center and periphery. As governments in the developing world continue to slip behind in the globalizing economy, the religiocultural differences between Westernized elites and the more traditional non-Western masses will be fertile ground for a demagogue hoping to base his or her rise to power on a global ver-

sion of the American "culture wars."[31] The stability of such a system would depend on whether the global elites could successfully divide and conquer their "silent, sullen peoples"[32] and, perhaps more important, whether its implementation would be just. If the system is just, then, with proper precautions, it could prove to be stable; if it is unjust, it would come crashing down in short order.

A Silver Lining? Although advances in technology have done little to improve ties *between* divergent religious and ethnic groups, they have been extremely influential in improving the cohesiveness *within* these groups. As instant communication becomes the rule rather than the exception, a civil war is no longer waged solely within a country's borders; rather, it is waged on the rhetorical level by its diaspora.[33] In addition, email has greatly improved the ability of Western Christians to monitor the status of their "persecuted brethren" abroad and to raise public awareness of existing abuses. This informal network exerted a great deal of influence in making the case for the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

Electronic globalization also tends to strengthen the position of ethnoreligious minorities vis-à-vis the nation-state, as demonstrated by the recent successful Internet-based public relations campaign run by human rights activists on behalf of the Zapatista Indians of Chiapas, Mexico. Whereas the state's control of conventional information resources used to be more than adequate to enable it to crush rebellious indigenous movements without fear of international condemnation, the ease and speed of Internet-based communications has rendered such an action much more difficult.

Similarly, during the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo, interested people around the world kept in constant touch with the human face of the Serbian people. Through well-written, emotionally intense emails and graphic color photos of collateral casualties and damage, the sterile black-and-white official footage of smart bombs neatly sliding into ventilation shafts gave way to a more squalid perspective. The myth of a clean war engendered by the successes in the Persian Gulf War did not survive the Kosovo conflict.

A notable indication of what may lie ahead occurred when a NATO plane accidentally released one of its bombs over Hungary, demolishing the roof of a house, but causing no injuries. While such accidents are an unavoidable consequence of any war (in World War II, they were too common to be reportable), the details were flashed around the world to Web-accessible populations. This tendency to turn minor incidents into major public relations embarrassments (for example, "NATO bombs Hungary without provocation") suggests that warfare will become an increasingly difficult option; an absence of casualties and a quick exit strategy make for good rhetoric, but little else.

The successful reversal of modernity's depersonalizing effects is further enhanced by the technological advances driving globalization. As University of Colorado sociologist Otomar Bartos argues, "Since postmodern society will be shaped by free communication, it will emphasize the values that are inherent in such communication, especially . . . the value of similarity, friendship, and free interaction. . . . [It] will have many of the features that classical sociologists have linked with preindustrial societies."[34] In such an environment, the depersonalized bureaucratic structures that worked so well in emerging industrial societies are no longer the most effective.

Instead, Bartos argues, the most rational organization is one "that is small, decentralized, informal, utilizes complex roles, and favors workers who are creative and possess interpersonal skills."[35] As illustrated by the proliferation of ethics courses in programs for a master's degree in business administration and by the increasing salience of management concepts such as servant leadership,[36] formerly impersonal aspects of society are incorporating characteristics thought to have been abandoned with the rise of industrialization. The public sphere has been reclothed after its extended experiment with impersonal objectivity.

The Other Side of the Coin. On the other hand, transnational affinities can sometimes prove problematic. As Huntington points out, conflicts between states of different civilizations have the potential to escalate as they draw in other countries with similar cultural and religious affinities ("civilizational rallying"). The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a case in point. Germany and much of Europe rallied to Catholic Croatia's side, while Russian and "Greater Slav" nationalists actively supported their Serbian Orthodox brethren. During the peak of the war, in the mid-1990s, one could find Orthodox clergy manning tables on heavily traveled Moscow sidewalks to collect donations for their "Serbian brethren." By the same token, Bosnian Muslims were reinforced by Islamist *mujahideen* from throughout the world who came to the aid of their Muslim brethren in their struggle against the Christian infidels. More recently, the war in Chechnya has also galvanized the Islamist world, prompting both moral and financial support. For example, the Web site Jihad in Chechnya (www.qoqaz.net) has posted emails from all over the world supporting the Chechen guerrillas and advising those who are interested in joining the struggle.

Religion as a Positive Force

Religion is not merely a divisive force in the affairs of humankind. In some situations, it can unite people across ethnic, racial, and political lines through a common allegiance to their Creator. To the extent that religious ties can, in fact, provide common ground between opposing nationalities or ethnic groups (and a complementary, if not common, worldview and morality), they should be harnessed accordingly. For example, in 1978, Chile and Argentina were about to go to war over their mutual claims to the Beagle Islands. An invasion order had been given, and the warships of the two countries were just hours apart. A call went to Rome, and the Pope sent an envoy. Once the Vatican envoy appeared on the scene, passions subsided. It took the envoy 6 years to work out a solution, but his presence provided a face-saving way for these two Catholic countries to avoid war.

To explore this aspect of religion in peacemaking, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies undertook a study to examine the positive role that religious or spiritual factors can play in actually preventing or resolving conflict while advancing social change based on justice and reconciliation.[37] Among the major findings to evolve from the study, two in particular stand out: religious contributions to peacemaking have been underappreciated, if not totally ignored, by most foreign policy practitioners, and there are substantial underutilized assets within religious communities that, if properly employed, could be applied to peacemaking. In today's environment of increasing disorder, the world can no longer afford to overlook the significant

contributions that religious and spiritual factors can make to the resolution of conflict. Not only do the theologies of the major world religions share some version of the Golden Rule, but they also incorporate specific moral warrants for peacemaking. The need to apply religious principles and instruments based on these warrants to the practical work of conflict resolution is becoming increasingly urgent.

A Model for the Future. Religion as a positive force for change is clearly evident in the successful collaboration between the lay Catholic Community of St. Egidio and official diplomats in resolving the brutal civil war in Mozambique that ended in 1994. The final breakthrough to peace evolved from the Community's recognition that, if the humanitarian assistance that it was providing was to have any useful effect, the conflict would have to be resolved. Accordingly, members of the Community set out to win the trust of both sides, taking initiatives that governments would never consider, such as escorting guerrilla fighters to their first dental appointments and buying them their first spectacles. In short, by winning trust on a personal level and rehumanizing the situation, they were able to persuade the two sides to come together to negotiate their differences.

It took 10 rounds of talks before an agreement was reached to end the war. Early in the process, it became apparent to these religious peacemakers that the overt backing of the international community would be required in order to monitor a cease-fire agreement and guarantee fair, multiparty elections. Accordingly, in the ninth round of talks, they invited diplomats from Italy, the United States, Portugal, France, and the United Nations (UN) to attend as official observers. In the 10th round, they passed the baton to these diplomats who, in turn, brought the resources of their respective nation-states and the United Nations to bear in overseeing the signing of the peace agreement, the monitoring of the cease-fire, and the holding of fair elections. Today, there is peace in Mozambique under a democratically elected government, and its economy is on the rebound—at least prior to the recent floods—all because official diplomacy was able to build on the trust developed by a religious third party. However, it is crucial to understand that the work of religious peacemakers is not something for governments to own (the state's political agenda will undermine the credibility of the process), but rather for them to reinforce and use as a foundation.

A Need for New Tools. As research conducted in the 1980s made clear,[38] there is a pressing need to carry out four operational functions on a coordinated and systematic basis:

- To facilitate greater understanding and collaboration between diplomats and religious leaders in addressing confrontations where the normal tools of diplomacy are inadequate
- To recruit and deploy multiskilled, inter-religious action teams to trouble spots where conflict threatens or has already erupted
- To recruit and train religious clergy and laity in the tasks of peacemaking
- To provide feedback to theologians and clergy on interpretations of their teachings that are contributing to strife and misunderstanding

Religious peacemakers, properly trained and supported, can add a critically important dimension to the work of diplomats and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in addressing ethnic conflict and other problems of communal identity that prove beyond the reach of traditional diplomacy. In some situations, this added capability can make the difference between success and failure by providing a transcendent environment for dealing with secular obstacles, as well as deep-seated religious issues. This is the premise upon which the new International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) was established in July 1999.

Implications for U.S. Interests

In a globalizing world, it is no longer expedient—or even possible—for the United States to retreat behind its two-ocean moat and insist that the world can be explained without reference to the religious and cultural views of others. In both its diagnosis and treatment of foreign (and, increasingly, internal) policy problems, it is imperative that the United States take these views into account. Furthermore, in the wars of identity that are likely to plague the 21st century—whether ethnic, religious, or cultural in nature—doctrines of nuclear or even conventional deterrence may be rendered moot, as may conventional diplomacy. With this as a distinct possibility, how can the United States promote political stability, and what role can the military play? It is time to begin thinking outside the box.

Rather than reacting to conflict after it has erupted, the United States needs to think in new and creative ways about prevention. Here a problem arises. Moving from a culture of conflict management to one of conflict prevention is not easy. Among the challenges are:

- The need to think beyond the "crisis of the immediate" in thoughtful and discerning ways
- The difficulty of demonstrating the effectiveness of certain initiatives (How does one prove that something that did *not* happen was a result of the preventive measure in question, such as nuclear deterrence?)
- The overriding need to muster the political will to take action.

A recent case in point regarding the last item: for several years, the United States lamented the likelihood that the tinderbox of Kosovo would ignite at any time, yet did next to nothing to prevent it. Of course, the Nation was absorbed in Bosnia at the time, which points to another, related problem—the difficulty of addressing more than one crisis at a time.

Another case in point involved Admiral William Owens. When he was 6th Fleet Commander, he received a message from the then President of Yugoslavia requesting more port visits by U.S. naval vessels—to show the flag and help keep the country calm. The State Department recommended against it, and the request was denied. The reason given was to avoid involving the United States in what was seen to be a European problem. Whether such visits could have made a difference is something that will never be known. But when contrasting the cost of doing that versus the price the

United States is now paying in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is natural to wonder what might have been.

The problem runs even deeper, however, as evidenced by the substantial cuts in the foreign affairs budget in recent years. These cuts have been occurring at a time when the demands of interdependence require that the United States become more engaged diplomatically. Even before the cuts, political will was a problem.

Preventive diplomacy or even preventive defense does not come naturally in a democracy where crisis is the normal prerequisite for intervention. This suggests a special role for the commanders in chief (CINCs). Their relative freedom of action in their respective regions puts them in a better position than most to take such considerations into account and to act on them.

Recommendations

Despite the obstacles, there are several straightforward initiatives that would go far to enhance U.S. capabilities for preventive action. With respect to diplomacy, for example, consideration should be given to posting a religion attaché to diplomatic missions in those countries where religion has particular salience (for example, Israel, Nigeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia). This posting would greatly enhance the mission's ability to monitor religious movements and to deal more effectively with complex religious issues. As missions are currently configured, religious developments are forced to compete for attention with a myriad of other, seemingly more pressing concerns on the part of the cultural attachés or the political or consular officers. In some locations, the stakes are simply too high to continue on this basis. They are also too high to dismiss such a suggestion out-of-hand because of resource constraints.

In the meanwhile, help may be forthcoming from another quarter. Early in 2001, the ICRD will be conducting training for all Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard chaplains in "the complex and profound role of religion in statecraft as it shapes both cultural and political attitudes toward war and peace across the international geopolitical spectrum" (quoting from the governing directive). The intent is to provide the sea service commands with a new and valuable asset for pursuing the preventive aspects of their missions. Although their training is not currently planned, Army and Air Force chaplains should receive such training as well.

With an expanded mission statement and proper training, chaplains can serve an invaluable early warning function for their commands, based on their personal interactions with local (overseas) religious communities and with religion-based nongovernmental organizations. Not only will the chaplains be able to develop a grass-roots understanding of the religious and cultural nuances at play, but also they will be able to pass on the concerns of indigenous religious leaders about incipient threats to stability posed by ethnoreligious demagogues. At times, they may also be in positions where they can provide a reconciling influence in addressing misunderstandings or differences with these communities. Finally, they can advise their commanders on the cultural aspects of decisions that are being taken (or that should be taken). In other words, in addition to their normal function of addressing the human casualties after

conflict has erupted, military chaplains can become an important tool in preventing its eruption in the first instance.

It is also recommended that sensitivity training be provided for U.S. military personnel serving in countries where religious customs differ markedly from those in the United States. Consistent with their evolving charter, the chaplains themselves could provide such training.

As embassies and military commands tune in more closely to religious concerns and to one another in dealing with these concerns, they will need to walk a fine line between accurate reporting and undue entanglement in religious affairs. In this regard, although it was intended for domestic application—specifically relating to the constitutionality of state-sponsored salary increases for teachers in nonpublic schools—the tripartite test set forth by the Supreme Court in *Lemon et al.* v. *Kurtzman* in 1971 provides useful guidance for religious monitoring overseas:

- A policy or action must have a secular purpose as its primary motivation.
- "Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
- It must not "foster 'an excessive . . . entanglement with religion'" on the part of the U.S. Government.[39]

In cases where meeting such a test looks questionable, consideration should be given to handling the situation through the influential NGO sector rather than the traditional "track one" channels. In recent years, various departments of government have become quite adept at working in tandem with nongovernmental organizations. As the influence of nonstate actors continues to rise, it seems likely that the U.S. Government will increasingly find itself dividing responsibilities into those that it must do by itself and those that it can share.

Conclusions

Neither the tribalism and fractionating influences of Barber's jihad nor the universalizing tendencies of his "McWorld" have an exclusive claim on reality. Just as Barber's (and Huntington's) treatment of religious antagonisms overlooks the positive role that religious and spiritual factors can play in preventing conflict and in advancing social change based on justice and rule of law, so too do advocates of economic globalization neglect the religious and cultural imperatives through which many people find life's deeper meaning.

In today's world of ethnic strife and high-technology weaponry, old concepts of security based on a competition of armaments will no longer suffice. Increasingly, security will be a function of the strength and durability of national, supernational, and most particularly, subnational relationships. This suggests a need to move toward new mechanisms for international relations that reach beyond the normal methods and channels of diplomacy to uncover and deal with the deeper sources of conflict, to rebuild relationships, and to make the necessary concessionary adjustments wherever possible. With wisdom and discernment, the reconciling dimension of religious faith

could prove to be one of the more effective mechanisms for dealing with the growing challenges of an interdependent world.

Notes

[1] Benjamin Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," *The Atlantic Monthly* 26, no. 3 (March 1992), 53. See also Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1997).

[3] Winston Churchill, speech to the House of Commons, June 18, 1940, <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/finestc.htm>.

[4] One particularly compelling examination of this issue is Richard J. Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984).

[5] Karl Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's* Philosophy of Law, <http://csf.colorado.edu/mirrors/marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1840/df-jahr/law.htm>.

[6] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *A World Split Apart* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

[7] Francis Fukuyama, "By Way of an Introduction," in *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), xi.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Peter L. Berger, "Secularism in Retreat," *The National Interest*, no. 46 (Winter 1996/97), 3.

[10] Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 2.

[11] James E. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 417.

[12] Edward Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension," in *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, eds. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Daniel Philpott, "The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations," *World Politics* 52, no. 2 (2000), 206.

[15] John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), 15.

[16] A similar argument was made by Murad Hoffmann in a panel presentation on "Islamic Vision for the 21st Century" at the conference *America, Islam, and the New Millennium*, co-sponsored by the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding and the United Association for Studies and Research, April 26, 2000.

[17] Andrew Walls, *The Missionary Movement in Christian History* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993). To quote Mark Noll, McManis Professor of Christian Thought at Wheaton College, "If a more important book on the general meaning of Christian history is published this year—or even this decade—it will be a surprise." Mark A. Noll, "Translating Christianity," *Books and Culture* 2, no. 6 (November/December 1996), 6.

[18] Noll, "Translating Christianity," 6.

[19] Chapter heading in Walls, *The Missionary Movement in Christian History*.

[20] For one example, see Adeline Masquelier, "Identity, Alterity and Ambiguity in a Nigerian Community: Competing Definitions of 'True' Islam," in *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*, eds. Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1996). For an evaluation of this question in a Buddhist context, see Melford E. Spiro, *Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

[21] Immanuel Kant, "What Is Enlightenment?" ("*Was Ist Aufklärung?*"), *Modern History Source-Book*, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/kant-whatis.html>.

[22] This nomenclature was first popularized by Ferdinand Tonnies, *Community and Society* (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) (1887; reprint, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988).

[23] For the sake of readability and at the risk of oversimplification, the categories of premodernity and modernity have been used to encompass much more complex categories. In the interests of avoiding excessive anachronism, "anti-modern" is used to describe premodernity's current manifestations, since arguably "premodernity's" critique of modernity only became coherent (or even necessary) after the onset of modernity. It is better perhaps to refer to "premodernity" as Community (*Gemeinschaft*) and modernity as Society (*Gesellschaft*). This nomenclature was popularized by Tonnies, *Community and Society* (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). The distinction between Community and Society has also been described by Emile Durkheim as the difference between organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity and by Jurgen Habermas as the difference between the lifeworld and the system. For more information, see Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in a Free Society* (1893; reprint, New York: Free Press, 1964) and Jurgen Habermas, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, vol. 1 of *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Boston: Bacon, 1988). In addition, one of the clearer descriptions of this distinction can be found in Guido Dierickx, "Christian Democracy and Its Ideological Rivals: An Empirical Comparison in the Low Countries," in *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. David Hanley (London: Pinter Publishes, 1994), 15–30.

[24] James Haught, *Holy Hatred: Religious Conflicts of the '90s* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1995), 232.

[25] Otomar J. Bartos, "Postmodernism, Postindustrialism, and the Future," *The Sociological Quarterly* 37 (Spring 1996), 307–326.

[26] Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?* 196.

[27] On a related note, Harvard Law School professor Mary Ann Glendon makes the argument from a Catholic standpoint that liberal democratic political discourse focuses unhealthily on individual rights at the expense of collective responsibility. Mary Ann Glendon, *Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

[28] A good example of such an articulation in an Islamic context is Abdulaziz Sachedina, *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

[29] Henry A. Kissinger, "Making a Go of Globalization," *The Washington Post*, December 20, 1999, A33.

[30] For a particularly illuminating discussion of the "new class," see Peter Berger, "Different Gospels: The Social Sources of Apostasy," in *American Apostasy: The Triumph of "Other" Gospels*, ed. Richard John Neuhaus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989). Also see James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

[31] Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. Hunter describes recent American politics in terms of a "culture war" between traditional/orthodox/conservative forces and a rising nontraditional/progressive/"liberal" New Class. Interestingly, this division cuts across racial and religious boundaries, so that progressive Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims unite in squaring off against their more culturally conservative co-religionists.

[32] Rudyard Kipling, *The White Man's Burden*, <http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs30b.htm>.

[33] To use the example of the Sudanese conflict, a constellation of Web sites has been created by the different factions as well as other interested groups to provide news (of various stripes) and debate the issues; for a good starting point, see <www.sudan.net>.

[34] Bartos, "Postmodernism, Postindustrialism, and the Future."

[35] Ibid.

[36] Servant leadership first gained a prominent place in management theory through Robert Greenleaf's book *Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness*

(n.c.: Paulist Press, 1977), in which Greenleaf argues that the nature of leadership—and authority in general—is beginning to change. A fresh critical look is being taken at the issues of power and authority, and people are beginning to learn, however haltingly, to relate to one another in less coercive and more creatively supporting ways. A new moral principle is emerging which holds that the only authority deserving one's allegiance is that which is freely and knowingly granted by the led to the leader in response to, and in proportion to, the clearly evident servant stature of the leader (9–10). It has reached a wide degree among certain parts of the business community. For example, Max DePree, Chairman of the Herman Miller Company and author of *Leadership is an Art* (Doubleday, 1989) and *Leadership Jazz* (Dell Publishing, 1992), has said that "the servanthood of leadership needs to be felt, understood, believed, and practiced." And Peter Senge, author of *The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (Doubleday, 1990), reportedly tells people "not to bother reading any other book until you read Robert Greenleaf's book, *Servant-Leadership*. I believe it is the most singular and useful statement on leadership I've come across."

[37] Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[38] Ibid.

[39] *Lemon et al. v. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Pennsylvania*, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Accessed online through FindLaw, <http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=403&invol=602>.