

# Ideas Matter: A Diversity of Foreign Policies

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Now that globalization is bringing the world closer together, the future will be shaped by how countries act and interact on the world stage. Events taking place in one country or region will be influenced importantly by events in others. Domestic developments will play a larger role in foreign affairs as the distinction between “foreign” and “domestic” policy becomes increasingly blurred. The number of countries capable of playing influential roles in politics, diplomacy, economics, and security affairs will grow. What values, belief systems, perceptions, and calculations will they employ to shape their goals, actions, and dealings abroad?

This chapter’s thesis is a simple one: ideas matter. They matter in shaping the foreign policies of virtually all countries in a globalizing world. In the coming era, foreign policy ideas will come in two distinct forms: values and beliefs, and ideologies. Often foreign policies will reflect values and beliefs alone. These are intellectual constructs of a normative and empirical nature that, in being both calculating and transient, instruct a government on how to interpret contemporary affairs. But there also will be countries whose foreign policy is deeply impassioned by the ideologies of the citizenry. Ideologies are ideas formed by a collective identification with the past and a common vision for the future. They have a teleology and a political theology. By contrast, values and beliefs are less deeply planted and more susceptible to outside influences. Both types of ideas have already manifested themselves in the foreign policies of countries around the world and will continue to strongly influence them in the future (table 1).

This chapter rebuts the notion that globalization will produce a homogeneous world where only one idea—the rational pursuit of prosperity—will shape foreign policy. More basically, it rejects the notion that countries will be so driven by impersonal forces that ideas do not matter. People continue to shape their own destinies, and they are powered by their ideas. Moreover, the reality of today’s world is diversity, both in culture and in thinking. The challenge will be to master this complicated geostrategic scene not only globally but also in key regions, which differ greatly from one another. The opportunity lies in working with these realities to produce steady

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progress. The danger is that despite the best efforts of the United States and its allies, these realities will conspire to produce a changed world that is as troubled as today's, or even more so.

**Table 1. Forms of Ideas That Shape Foreign Policies**

<i>Ideas</i>	<i>Values and Beliefs</i>	<i>Ideologies</i>
Democracy		X
National interests	X	
Geopolitical assertiveness	X	
Nationalism		X
Outlaw aggressiveness	X	
Strategic preservatism		
Authoritarianism		X
Traditionalism		X
Religion		X
State survival	X	

## The Role of Political Ideology

Beliefs and values are important factors in the development of a country's foreign policy, but they are not the only factors, and they are not intrinsic in the collective psychology of a people, which also can play a big role in influencing foreign policy. Aristotle believed that humans are political animals by nature. They band together to form societies based on a need, a collective instinct created by a sense of a common past and future. The resulting political ideology is the product of how humans think, feel, hope, and scheme in reaction to themselves and the world around them. It is relative, not absolute. The historical record of ideologies illuminates the remarkable extent to which people can see and judge things in very different ways. To one degree or another, this likely will remain true in the coming years, and maybe for the entire century ahead. In the final analysis, the human race is heterogeneous because nature made it that way.

Political ideology is best understood by placing it in a historical perspective. Ideology was not used as a term until the late 18th century.<sup>1</sup> Before then, the preoccupation with intellectually legitimizing the need for core political motivations was only beginning. For example, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) dealt with matters connected with ideological phenomena. He linked religions to power and domination, anticipating a recurrent theme of the concept of ideology, namely, the social function/relevance of religion. Machiavelli discussed the legitimization and attainment of power, an ideology, without ever using the term *ideology*. The Roman Catholic Church, a strong political force of the time, used its own ideology, one that stemmed directly from theology. After the nation-state system was born following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, political ideology became secular and started growing to full flower.

The word *ideology* was coined in 1796 by the French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy, who described it as a science, the study of human consciousness in all aspects. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels furthered the science of ideology by theorizing that all human thought was economic in basis. To them, society was a function of human interactions, built on economic need and development. Marx builds his theory of ideology on one main principle of society:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.<sup>2</sup>

Within this context, Marx said, ideology is formed from social realities (for example, class warfare) and historical experiences (for example, the inevitable victory of the proletariat). Marx goes on to say that practice follows theory: that the ideas and feelings associated with ideology are only a reality once the ideology becomes a course of action. One such course of action is the use of ideologies as a way to legitimize power.

Ideologies, political ideologies appeared in our century—even more so than in the past—as a powerful instrument in the integration and manipulation of groups, collectives, in the motivation of individuals as well as groups and crowds, moreover in setting the direction of social actions, in setting goals and in determining the processes of development.<sup>3</sup>

Over the course of the past two centuries, many other political philosophers have likewise emphasized the importance of ideology in politics. Political ideology remains important today because it shapes the perceived national interest of a country and creates its sense of place in the world—past, present, and future. From this sense of things, policymakers—namely, the state—create foreign policy. In other words, defining the nation's interest and essence on the world stage, through the filter of ideology, defines the state's foreign policy. Ideology defines the nation; it is a motivation of national interest and a precursor to foreign policy. Therefore, ideologies will remain a component in the formation of a nation-state's foreign policy as long there are nation-states that act on such ideas.

The idea that political ideology can still exert a defining influence today may seem overdrawn to those who believe foreign policy has been reduced to making purely technical decisions within the framework of globalization's dictates. Yet many countries need an ideology to help guide them, and consciously or not, many countries have one. Before technicalities can be addressed, strategic motives must be decided on, and these are still determined by governments, not by impersonal forces. Even in an era of globalization, countries retain wide discretionary latitude in their foreign policies. For many, ideology helps define their main strategic motives, purposes, and ambitions. In addition, ideology performs two other important functions. By proclaiming a few simple but appealing concepts, it can unite large groups of people—an ethnic group, a country, or a larger body—behind it. Indeed, it can mobilize them to act in powerful ways, sometimes at the expense of those who do not share it.

## **Democratic Enlargement and Economic Markets**

The collapse of European communism opened the door for democracy to flourish as never before. The result has been today's burgeoning ideology of democracy, market capitalism, and multilateral cooperation—a combination that has recently swept over much of the world. At the core of this ideology lies the basic belief that democracy is the proper form of government for humans to experience life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Added to this belief system is the view that market capitalism is the best way to make people wealthy. Market capitalism is not seen as guaranteeing any single person's good fortune, but rather as the best way for society as a whole to prosper. The third general belief of liberal democratic countries is that democratic countries can best advance their safety and wealth by cooperating, not only in security affairs but also in economics and other fields as well. These three powerful beliefs combine to form the ideology of today's democratic community, which now totals nearly 90 countries and, depending on one's assessment, at least one-third of the world's population.

The United States and its core democratic partners in Europe and Asia share this strategic stance. In the past decade, they have pursued policies that draw them closer together. Their ideology has proven attractive in many quarters. Despite extensive social problems, Latin America has become mostly democratic and capitalist, and several governments there are now attempting to strengthen regional organizations to promote trade, investment, and other forms of cooperation. In one way or another, countries in other regions are trying to follow suit. For the most part, globalization operates in ways that help promote this democratic community's internal ties and growing bonding. While globalization creates problems in some areas, and the threat of fissures if events are not handled well, the democratic community seemingly has the capacity to handle them.

How was this democratic community built? The question is important because it has a bearing on the future. The answer is that this community's strong inner core mostly was built from the bottom up, not imposed from the top down. When the Cold War began in the late 1940s, an alliance and community of democracies did not exist. Those present at the creation launched the process of joining together, but they did not have a clear destination in mind or a blueprint for action. Gradually, the democracies began building a community by creating ever-stronger ties in security and economics. What appeared in Europe was very different from developments in Asia: collective defense in the former, and a series of bilateral ties with the United States in the latter. Both approaches worked because they responded to the unique situations at hand. The Europeans were prepared to think in collective terms, but the Asians, not yet. Both efforts benefited from strong assets: effective national governments, cohesive societies, talented work forces, and access to natural resources—plus the added incentive of burying old hatchets in order to defend themselves against communism. What ultimately emerged as the "inner core" was impressive, but it was not accomplished overnight. While it was no accident, neither was it predestined.

Outside the inner core today, by contrast, efforts to build a wider, full-fledged democratic community, with all the trappings of success, are apparently proceeding

from the top down. That is, an appealing idea has been identified on the basis of the model of the inner core, rather than on the natural predilections of candidate countries. True believers are now trying to orchestrate the internal arrangements and foreign policies of their countries and regions to match this model. To a degree, they are trying to fit square pegs into round holes by making the holes square. Whether success will be achieved remains to be seen. Much will depend on whether the underlying ingredients for success are present or can be created. What can be said is that a great deal of changing lies ahead. Like any ideology, the democratic version provides a clear concept, but its ability to take hold and achieve lasting success depends on its suitability to the situation, the daily labors of its believers, and the reactions of many other people.

Some observers believe that the democratic model will sweep over the entire world, if not soon, then eventually. Their principal argument is that this model is not only appealing but also necessary and irresistible. Presumably countries have no choice but to adopt this model if they know what is good for them. Otherwise, they allegedly cannot be free, safe, and wealthy. Maybe so, but much will depend not only on the theoretical validity of this argument, but also on whether governments and their people accept it.

As of now, much of the world outside the democratic community neither shares this ideology nor embraces any other single ideology. Instead, it is littered with different ideas, with radically dissimilar views on how foreign policy should be conducted. Seemingly, they came to life when the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, forcing many countries to search for new identities in their domestic affairs and foreign policy. A number of countries, in fact, are pursuing foreign policies that seem animated by a mixture of ideas, not just one of them. But most of them have a dominant value, belief, or ideology at the core of their foreign policies, and supplement it with ideas borrowed from others. Now that 10 years have passed, these different ideas have established themselves in the minds of the world's people and are showing a stubborn capacity to resist efforts to dislodge them. To the extent that these multiple values, beliefs, and ideologies continue to exist, they will inhibit globalization's capacity to transform the world into a uniform place.

## **The National Interest and Geopolitical Assertiveness**

Outside the democratic community, the idea of anchoring foreign policy in the "national interest" has become the most popular motivation of foreign policy for the past decade. This idea is not an ideology, but instead an expression of values and beliefs. At first glance, pursuing the national interest seems commonplace. Indeed, members of the democratic community are pursuing their own interests. But something more specific and consequential is at work here. In today's world, a country publicly pursuing a foreign policy of national interest is sending a signal of its individuality and separateness. It is telling the world that it will make up its own mind, on its own terms, about how it will judge its role in strategic affairs. Moreover, it is saying that it means business in this regard. Friendly or otherwise, such a foreign policy is focused solely on what is good for the country, not the larger community. This

stance has no millennial or universal pretensions. It does not claim to speak for the good of humanity. It is prepared to cooperate with other countries, or not cooperate, depending on which course produces the biggest strategic payoffs. In this regard, it is entirely instrumentalist in its outlook. What matters is what works—for the good of the country, not the region or the world.

Obviously the term *national interest* leaves a good deal of latitude for determining the goals and methods of foreign policy. Interests are not etched in stone, but instead must be defined by countries, which are capable of changing their minds as time passes. Interests seen as bedrock by one country may be viewed as peripheral by another, and vice versa. Some themes seem common, however, among countries proclaiming this idea today. Virtually all of these countries are demanding to be respected as individuals, with their own history and identities, not herded like cattle or treated as merely one part of somebody's collectivist scheme. They also are asserting that their national interests are legitimate and have a right to be treated as such by other countries and multilateral organizations. Further, these countries are saying that they intend to protect and advance their interests with the means at their disposal.

Many of these countries merely want to be left alone in order to bask in the sun on their own terms and to be selective about the international efforts that they are willing to join. Some are more assertive and are willing to squeeze their neighbors in order to advance their interests. This conduct raises questions about whose interests are legitimate and whose are illegitimate—the stuff of diplomacy and regional security affairs. But the good news is that even countries with controversial interpretations of this ideology seemingly have limited aims in mind. Typically, they are sending a message that they are not embarked on imperial crusades, especially of the global variety. They are merely behaving, they say, in the understandable manner of strong but responsible countries over the centuries.

Of the countries embracing the national interest rather than joining the democratic community, medium and small powers tend to behave unpretentiously on the world stage. Motives aside, they lack the strength to do otherwise. In Eurasia, a good example is Ukraine, a medium-sized country that is trying to establish its sovereign independence from Russia. In Asia, a good example is Thailand, which has long sought to retain its separateness from countries and movements trying to control Southeast Asia. In North Africa, there is Morocco, which is friendly to the United States and Europe, yet wants to be left alone and to have its separate identity respected. These and other similar countries differ greatly in their specific foreign policies, but they have a common stance toward globalization. Typically, they want to join in its benefits, yet fear for their own health and independence. Above all, they do not want to be swallowed up in the relentlessness of globalization and thereby turned into clones or clogs of a machine. This stance leaves them open to globalization and the democratic model in some ways, but decidedly wary in others—hardly a surprising stance for countries that see their interests as key to their identities and self-respect.

If medium and small powers are compelled to behave modestly, big powers possess the resources to think more ambitiously, in geopolitically assertive terms capable of posing a strategic challenge to the U.S.-led democratic community. The idea that geopolitical aims still influence the foreign policies of big powers is nothing new.

Indeed, the desire to be militarily secure and to wield influence over neighboring territory is a common part of big-power foreign policies anchored in national interests. But when a big power starts building strength and using it to recast the entire neighboring security system in its image and likeness, a new and distinctly different foreign policy emerges. A restrained sense of national interest gives way to more ambitious and controlling behavior. Typically, countries of this sort employ diplomacy to attain their goals and go to war only as a last resort. But during peacetime, they are willing to throw their weight around and bully their neighbors. They often take the form of overt challengers to the strategic status quo, seeking major changes to it. This type of geopolitical conduct was standard fare in the 19th and 20th centuries, when virtually all major European powers engaged in it in varying ways. Today's geopolitical conduct, as yet, is more muted, but it exists all the same, and it has the potential to grow if not harnessed.

In theory, globalization puts an end to any need for geopolitical conduct because countries presumably can attain their economic goals through the marketplace and their security goals through multilateral cooperation. But what exists in theory does not always exist in practice. Today's big powers seemingly want to participate in the world economy in order to profit from it. But they want to employ their enhanced strength in order to put their own imprint on security affairs, rather than become quiescent members of the U.S.-led democratic security community. Thus, they may favor the idea of a flourishing world economy anchored in competitive capitalism. But their stance on the security system that underlies it is often different from the concepts being pursued in Washington and allied capitals.

A good example of modern big-power geopolitics is Russia, which has been losing strength of late but still possesses the resources to imprint its designs on local politics, security, and economics. Russia's declared foreign policy is the pursuit of its national interests. When Russia emerged as an old but newly minted country in the wake of the Soviet Union's downfall, its foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, initially announced a foreign policy of Atlanticism and warm partnership with the United States. By mid-1993, however, Russia was starting to talk in different terms. In the following years, statements that espoused Atlanticism and partnership were replaced by proclamations that while Russia would be a responsible country, it also would be a strong country guided by its own national interests. In effect, the Russian government was serving notice that it would pursue a pragmatic but standoffish attitude toward the United States and unifying Europe.

Since then, Russian foreign policy has unfolded accordingly. Russia has been mostly preoccupied with its internal situation, but outside its borders, it has thrown its weight around in the former Soviet Union, while complaining loudly about the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and sometimes siding with opponents of the United States in more distant areas. This is not a foreign policy of imperialism, but neither is it a policy of subsumption within the U.S.-led democratic community. Russia seemingly wants to become a democracy with a market economy. But it wants to achieve this goal in its own way and to be taken seriously as a strong power at least regionally, not seen as a client doing the bidding of the United States and its close allies. Its policy amounts to moderate geopolitics,

aimed at challenging the status quo in limited ways that do not yet greatly ruffle the feathers of other big powers.

Chinese foreign policy seems to be anchored in national interests, but it is difficult to characterize in simple terms because it is motivated by a mixture of ideas. Moreover, it is in the process of changing as China's strategic power grows. China is a communist country, but communist ideology seemingly plays only a limited role in motivating its foreign policy. China clearly is not on a crusade to export communism outside its borders. If anything, its rulers seem deeply worried about the ability of the Communist Party to cling to power as globalizing dynamics affect its economy and society. More fundamentally, China has long been an Asian mainland country worried about foreign imperialists dominating it or even occupying it as the Japanese did in World War II. During the latter stages of the Cold War, it adopted a standoffish attitude toward the Soviet Union, kept a tight leash on North Korea, and sought stability in Southeast Asia—all signs of a country more concerned about protecting its territorial integrity than asserting domination outside its borders.

Recently, however, China has been coming out of its strategic shell and looking outward a good deal more. A key motivation has been to gain greater access to world markets—through exports, imports, and foreign investment within its borders—in order to lift itself out of poverty. But China's new foreign policy is not limited to economics. Increasingly, it has been showing signs of geopolitical conduct in recent years. Its effort to subjugate Taiwan is an example. Beyond this, Chinese foreign policy apparently is being influenced by the long-term goal of expanding its influence across Asia and the Western Pacific, reducing the U.S. presence and role, and preventing Japan from re-emerging as a regional power. The big issue is whether China's pursuit of such classic geopolitical goals will intensify as its economic strength and military power grow. The future is uncertain, but if China emerges as an assertive geopolitical power with the strength to back up this agenda, the consequences could be trouble for Asia's tranquility and for U.S. interests there.

India is a democracy. But whether it has a foreign policy that resembles most of today's democracies is another matter. It, too, has been acting mostly as a headstrong geopolitical player lately. Despite its nuclear capabilities, India remains a regional power player. Its primary concern is not to take over a major portion of the world, but to retain Kashmir and remain a serious player on the world stage. Nuclear power combined with nationalist fervor and ancient hatreds, however, make India's regional concerns global. If India or Pakistan were to launch a nuclear attack to exert its influence over its neighbor, retaliation would be a certainty. The result would be massive devastation in one of the most populous regions in the world, followed by nuclear fallout that could destabilize surrounding quarters of the globe. Especially disconcerting in South Asia was the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan. This step has the potential to further destabilize the region. India is uncertain about the motivations of the new military government, and there is a high level of anxiety in the region. In today's globalized, interdependent world, no state's actions affect only itself. The United States must concern itself with any regional struggle that threatens to become global. The rift between India and Pakistan does not directly affect the United States, but globalization makes this regional conflict important to all countries.

Looking ahead, the future will be determined by how such strategic challengers as Russia, China, and India react to a globalizing world in which the United States and its democratic partners endeavor to use their power to influence events in many places. To the extent that these countries place profit-seeking in international markets above other goals, the task of maintaining productive relations with them will be easier and more hopeful. To the extent that they choose instead to put a big geopolitical imprint in ways that menace U.S. and allied interests, the task will be harder. History suggests that in such situations, peace will depend largely on such traditional mechanisms as diplomacy, a balance of power, and a balance of interests, rather than economics and markets.

## Nationalism Today

Nationalism can be defined as a theory of political legitimacy holding that the political unit, represented by the state, and the national unit should be congruent.<sup>4</sup> The term *nationalism* implies a sense of consciousness exalting the nation and its culture with the goal of preserving the nation within the state. To a degree, most countries show nationalist instincts merely by taking healthy pride in their own identity and achievements. They pursue a policy of domestic pride, but their foreign policy reflects an understanding of the global community and international relations based on human rights. But there are those countries, most small and isolated, that translate this benign and normal sentiment into an ideology for shaping their foreign policies in aggressive and bullying ways. Those that do so today are harkening back to an era when nationalism commonly ruled in ways that often had lamentable consequences. Sometimes, nationalism became a rationale for truculent policies that exceeded any traditional interpretation of valid interests, and at its worst, it produced aggression against neighboring cultures for the sheer pleasure of crushing them or for perceived grievances based on history.

At the time the Cold War ended, some observers worried that strong-armed nationalism would spring back to life in many places. This has happened in a few countries, but not yet in widespread or virulent ways. The most noteworthy purveyors of angry nationalism today tend to be small powers, like Serbia, acting in settings of ethnic stews, like the Balkans. The big powers are not showing major signs of such conduct. Thus far, nationalism mostly acts as a backdrop for adding emotional vigor to foreign policies primarily driven by different ideologies. On the surface, globalization would seem to dampen nationalism because it encourages countries to blend into the world around them. Paradoxically, it may have the opposite effect in places. By creating external pressures for homogenized cultures, it gives resentful countries a strong motive to rediscover what is uniquely valuable about themselves. As a result, nationalism's future is uncertain; its various forms seem unlikely to disappear anytime soon, however, and it retains the potential to spring back to life in big ways that can produce tough-minded foreign policies.

### *Essence and Origins of Nationalism*

Nationalism presumes a collective national identity. It provides for the preservation of the state, which protects the nation as the only source of legitimate power and authority. As Anthony Smith said, “nationalism expresses and draws attention to certain forces at work in the actions and beliefs of a large number of people in all parts of the world, and prescribes in roughest outline a program of action for their satisfaction.”<sup>5</sup> If the legitimacy of the state is put into question, either by outside forces (other states or state actors) or internal strife, nationalism turns its ugly eyes on that which threatens its natural existence. One theory of nationalism explaining this negative reaction to outside forces (namely, globalization) is based on a sociological interpretation of human nature according to which the development of a national identity reflects the deep-seated need to belong.

The elements that constitute national identity often are almost randomly chosen. That is to say, national identity is perceived and developed. The effect of globalization on national identities can be to create resentment and hostility toward those who are benefiting among those who are not (winners and losers). This nationalism is associated with a term coined by German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche: *ressentiment*, the psychological state used by the powerless to justify their plight or weakness.<sup>6</sup> The theory of *ressentiment* is that the weak consider themselves the noble good, persecuted by the powerful evil. In actuality, the real difference is power versus weakness, not necessarily evil versus good. Nietzsche defines the essence of *ressentiment* as the need to look outward. In order to exist, the subject first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction. History, religion, ethnic culture, and land are the stimuli leading to *ressentiment* and the formation of the national identity. Globalization can be the stimulus that intensifies the negative connotation of national identity, for it exacerbates the feeling of alienation by certain states or minority groups within states vis-à-vis others, making the population easier to mobilize for active hostilities. It can also accentuate differences and perceived differences between socioeconomic haves and have-nots, increasing *ressentiment* and political actions (or worse) against the target of anger, justified or not.

The essence of nationalism is a personal identification with a nation or nation-state, a selected community. Globalization, the identification with a global community, goes against this need to personally identify with a group. A state formed with no national identity, but with a population that requires identification with some sort of community, is in jeopardy of societal splintering—identification with clans, family units, regional villages, territory, or culture. A natural outcome of globalization as a theory, which is a Kantian notion of universal humanity, is identification with these latter units.

The lasting effects of *ressentiment* on a nation—a less-than-stable state structure and the ability to place the blame outside oneself—are the elements of nationalism. It does not follow that all nationalism has negative consequence, but the failure to predict the backlash of this emotion-based ideology, or how it can be used, can lead to conflict.

### ***Balkan Nationalism***

The Balkans are the prime example of this nationalism—but not for the first time. Globalization is creating a universal identification through economics and technology and, at the same time, has left many people, groups, and states feeling bypassed by these growing trends. Some countries are, therefore, motivated by a nationalist ideal through which they can either compete with others or make themselves singular and remain a part of the international community. The most interesting aspect of this theory of nationalism is that it can have two different effects in the Balkans: one negative and the other positive. Greece, a homogeneous country with a nationalist history, does not follow an actively nationalistic foreign policy. On the other hand, Serbia, the most negative nationalist of the Balkan countries, is pursuing a destructive foreign policy and is basing its nationalism on perceptions of injustices through 500 years of history. Why is Serbia interpreting its national identity in this way?

The answer is that historical anti-Muslim sentiment and perceptions of injustices against Orthodox Christians in the Balkans have intensified feelings of resentment in the Serbs. The period of Ottoman domination in the Balkans, as well as subsequent Muslim influence, could easily be the greatest factor in the formation of Serbian national identity. In Serbia, an important piece of the national identity is found in the hatred, fear, and anger toward Muslims. The emotional reaction to the Ottoman Muslim influence in Serbia's history, religion, and land are the stimuli that lead to *ressentiment* and formation of the national identity.

Behind the ballads, rhetoric, and Enlightenment theories lay the Serbian perceptions of noble suffering. The Ottoman Empire's presence in the Balkans was an essential part of Serbian history. The Turks shared 400 years of history and culture with Serbia.<sup>7</sup> The two groups have a certain quasi-brotherly relationship. The perception, on the other hand, is one of contradiction based on the psychological theory of *ressentiment*. As Orthodox Christians, Serbs were below Muslims in the hierarchical Ottoman system. Since the Turks were Muslim, by definition of higher status, and their conquerors, they were defined by the Orthodox people as evil. Those who were opposite, the Orthodox Christians, were deemed good. The experience of the Ottoman Empire became a mythology of suffering that was carried through the folk songs, literature, and traditions of the Serbs.

The negative perceptions of Muslims intensified during the Balkan Wars. Proof of the anti-Muslim sentiment can be seen in the violence against the Turks by Serbs during the Wars. The identity of the Orthodox groups was, essentially, that of not-Turks/Muslims. With this definition in place, all dealings with Turkey or the Muslims of Yugoslavia only intensified the feelings of resentment. All acts deemed offensive against Serbs were followed by quick and bloody retaliation.

According to Serbian mythology, the history of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire begins on a battlefield in what was once the center of medieval Serbia, Kosovo. The Battle of Kosovo Polje is where the Turks delivered the final defeat to the Serbs on June 28, 1389. It was the symbolic end of the independent Serbian medieval state, which made it of great significance to the Serbian people. It was in this battle that Muslim influence in the region was first established. Furthermore, the battle of Kos-

ovo signified the end of an independent Serbian state. Kosovo offered the Serbs the identity of the wronged people, those who suffer evil, but rise above it to survive as a people. The Muslim defeat of the Serbs was the structural cause of the *ressentiment* against the Muslim conquerors, while at the same time forming the Serb national identity, which holds true to the present day. The symbolism of the loss of Kosovo continues through Serbian history.

With the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913, ending the Second Balkan War, Serbia recovered most of its historical lands in the southern Balkans, especially Kosovo. Between the battle of Kosovo Polje and the Treaty of Bucharest, Kosovo was not a part of Serbia. The bitterness of 500 years was finally redeemed when Kosovo returned to the Serbs. In addition, as Michael Boro Petrovich said, "Serbia's victories in the Balkan Wars were of great historical moment. No more Serbs were left under Turkish rule. Kosovo had finally been avenged."<sup>8</sup> That was the first step by the Serbs to avenge Kosovo. As witnessed in 1989, Kosovo has remained a source of resentment for the Serbs.

Serbia's goal was a state based on the acquisition of lands that had historical associations or that had at one time been under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Before the Balkan Wars (1912, 1913), the nationalist vision for Serbs was that of a Greater Serbia, United Yugoslavia, and a Balkan Peninsula that belonged to the Balkan people.<sup>9</sup> With the end of the Balkan Wars, and the alliance of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, the idea of Balkan unity was dead, but not that of a united Yugoslavia. Serbs were driven by economic, geopolitical, and military considerations, as well as by a historical myth of resurrecting the old empire of Stephen Dusan, the greatest of Serbia's medieval rulers. The fact that the old empire would create an ethnically mixed population in which Serbs would be a mere majority, or even less, did not dismay the champions of Greater Serbia.

After World War I, the peace conferences in Paris and Berlin did not result in a treaty that divided the Balkan people along purely national lines. Despite the emphasis on self-determination, the peace treaties in the end were based more on the historical and strategic claims of the victors than on the national principle.<sup>10</sup> Outside forces again played a part in the formation of the state without taking into consideration the effect on pre-existing national identities.

The Axis attack on Yugoslavia led again to the partition of Yugoslavia. The Germans created the independent State of Croatia, a third of whose population was Serbs, and installed the extremist Croat nationalist Ante Pavelic as head of its government. Pavelic organized the Ustasa (insurrection) movement in 1929 with the help of Mussolini. The goal of the Ustasa was Croatian independence, if necessary by means of revolution and violence. This situation became worse when the new Croatian leadership embarked on a policy of annihilation of the Serbian third of the population. Muslims joined with Croats against the Serbs, who were often faced with the alternatives of extermination, expulsion, or conversion to Catholicism. An estimated 350,000 Serbs were killed at that time.<sup>11</sup> Again, as during the Ottoman occupation, the myth of noble sacrifice strengthened the national identity of Serbs.

During World War II, the Chetniks and the Partisans rose as resistance movements against the Ustasa. They attempted to work together, a collaboration strongly urged of

all occupied countries by the West and the Soviet Union. Soon after the establishment of the two resistance forces, and after a brief period of cooperation, their diametrically opposed goals and strategies led to conflict. In the initial years of the war, both forces drew their support overwhelmingly from the Serbs of Yugoslavia.<sup>12</sup> The Chetniks, however, were never able to attract widespread support from Yugoslavia's other nations. This became a major disadvantage for them in their struggle with the Partisans. Non-Serbs increasingly saw the Chetniks as a Serb nationalist organization committed to a pre-war political order that, in their eyes, had been discredited. Serbs viewed the Partisans as Muslim sympathizers, along the same lines as the Ustasa. The new Yugoslav communist authorities, led by former Partisans, remained a constant reminder of Serbian suffering until Slobodan Milosevic turned it all around.

In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic became head of the Communist Party of Serbia. Milosevic's dramatization of the Kosovo question opened the way for Serbs to ventilate many other grievances, including the fact that one-third of the Serbs had been forced, under Tito's disbursement of Serbs, to live outside Serbia and Montenegro. Milosevic had recognized the appeal of nationalism when he stood up for the rights of the Serbs in Kosovo. The ethnic breakdown of Kosovo is 90 percent Albanian and 10 percent Serbian.<sup>13</sup> The Serbs in Kosovo found it a bitter pill to be a minority in the "most Serbian of lands." To make matters worse, they were being subordinated to Muslims, since Albanians are, for the most part, believers in Islam. These factors added to the rise in *ressentiment* for the Serbs. As Robert Kaplan said, "While 1989 will be remembered by other peoples as the year when the Cold War ended and the communist system collapsed, for 8.55 million Serbs, 1989 signified something altogether different: the six hundredth anniversary of their defeat."<sup>14</sup>

Modern nationalism, in some cases, is extending beyond state borders. For example, the Albanian Diaspora has moved into Western Europe, bringing with it organized crime. It is being aided by an Albanian national identity, which extends far beyond the borders of the Albanian state. The connection of an Albanian nation is inherited from a close cultural allegiance to a patriarchal family and clan. Illegitimate taxation of Albanians outside any state structure, by organized crime groups as well as pseudo-military organizations, has been common practice. The issue of a greater Albanian state, proposed by some as the motivation for the rebel actions in Kosovo, is missing the mark. Albanians are not drawn to return to "the motherland" of Albania; in fact, they are generally resentful of, and want little if nothing to do with, the state of Albania. However, the tie of an Albanian nation, a people who are spread across Europe, bonds and motivates these people into a ring of organized crime and other illegal activities. The fear of Albanians in Europe is not a fear of the Albanian state, but of the Albanian nation, which is seen as a criminal people that infiltrates other countries, bringing with it crime, corruption, and chaos.

Albania is small and the poorest country in Europe. Yet, Albanian organized crime is one of the largest, most influential international threats facing Europe and the U.S. policy in Europe. Criminal corruption has spread through the Albanian people who migrated into Western Europe, the Albanian nation in Kosovo, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Kosovo Liberation Army was funded by illegal arm sales, drug trafficking, and unlawful taxation of Albanian nationals

throughout Europe. Albanian migration into Western Europe has been accompanied by higher crime rates in countries such as Italy, Greece, Germany, and Britain. The Albanian Mafia is regarded as the fastest growing in Europe. Serious organized crime is becoming more international, faster moving, and more sophisticated, and its effects are increasingly felt in local communities throughout Europe. Albanian émigré populations abroad, held together by a national concept, have coordinated Mafia-type organizations based on Albanian traditions of loyalty to the extended family and clans. Fund-raising is carried out through activities such as drugs and arms trafficking, the smuggling of contraband cigarettes, and unofficial “taxation” of the Albanian community abroad.

With the collapse of communism in Albania and the ensuing transition to a free market economy, deregulation and privatization of former state assets were exploited by those who came to power under the Berisha government in March 1992. An increasingly corrupt elite began appropriating the country’s land and other assets, as well as gaining control of key posts in the ministries, the police, and the secret police, whose principal objective was to neutralize the political opposition.

While a minority amassed personal fortunes, the general population of Albania remained by far the poorest in Europe; the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 1996 was around \$600 per year per person employed, but unemployment was equal to around 30 percent of the work force. Conditions of chronic poverty and contempt for a political elite perceived as self-serving and corrupt favored the growth of entrepreneurial crime as a means of survival.

A nation without purpose and without a clearly established national boundary within which its people live—for example, the Albanians in Europe; the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Armenia—creates international concern over state security. Dealing with armed, motivated, and frustrated groups of people fighting for their perceived identities is like dealing with a gaggle of 3-year-olds wanting their way. There is no easy way to analyze their thoughts or justify their actions, therefore no way to adequately prepare militarily for small or medium-sized crises. Policy regarding ethnic conflict often has been motivated by a “moral” requirement to take sides. But there are not always clearly defined “good guys” in ethnic conflict based on nationalism. The policy in Kosovo is a prime example; the Serbs were bad, and the Albanians are bad. Understanding that not all states, nations, or nation-states will act according to what is considered reasonable (the creation of a national identity, after all, is by all accounts not very reasonable), and that globalization is creating a more aggressive need for national identification, will help make policy assessment and military planning better.

In summary, the future of the Balkans will depend heavily on whether efforts to promote greater regional stability and progress can tame not only Serbia’s ultranationalism but also the nationalist predilections of other countries. Truculent nationalism is not currently a driving imperative in many other places. But the seeds for its reappearance doubtless still lie deeply buried in the ground, and they could be fertilized by globalization’s less attractive features. For this reason, nationalism will remain an ideology to be watched carefully, not taken for granted or treated as an outmoded historical relic.

## Outlaw Aggressiveness

Outlaw countries tend to pursue classic geopolitical goals—for example, acquisition of territory, control of natural resources, or subjugation of their neighbors. What distinguishes their values and beliefs from normal geopolitical conduct is that they rely more openly on the threat or actual use of military force or other forms of violence. Geopolitical actors typically try to attain their goals by peaceful means and to display a measure of respect for international law and acceptable standards of conduct. By contrast, outlaws are scornful of norms and are openly willing to invade their neighbors if the opportunity presents itself or to inflict terrorism on them and their allies. Their foreign policies dwell heavily in offensive military power, actual aggression, and violence. Whereas geopolitical actors can be approached through diplomacy and bargaining, aggressive outlaws typically are restrained only by the direct application of military deterrent power.

Today, the most obvious outlaw aggressors are Iraq and North Korea, both medium-sized powers with large military establishments. Iraq invaded Kuwait in the early 1990s and is now allegedly trying to build weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and delivery vehicles in order to underwrite its still menacing agenda in the Persian Gulf. North Korea has held a military gun to the head of South Korea for the past 50 years and is itself allegedly trying to acquire WMD systems and long-range missiles capable of striking not only Japan, but the United States as well. Some believe that Iran either falls into this category or will do so once it acquires WMD systems. Such countries as Syria and Libya also arguably qualify because of their long-standing use of terrorism. Thus far, these countries seem immune to globalization's pacifying allures. Joining the democratic community is not their intent. Subjugating members, friends, and partners of this community is what they have in mind, and they may be willing to go to war to accomplish it.

North Korea is an ideal example of an aggressor nation. Widely suspected of seeking a nuclear arsenal, it spends much of its resources on military preparation, even as its citizens starve. In 1994, North Korea signed the "Agreed Framework" with the United States that promised an end to that country's nuclear development efforts in return for a number of benefits, including free heavy fuel oil and two light-water nuclear reactors.<sup>15</sup> This Agreed Framework allegedly has been broken by North Korea, one of the most notable occasions being in August 1998. Under the guise of launching a satellite, on August 31, 1998, North Korea successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile over Japan. This firing sent shock waves throughout the world, especially Japan and the United States. This action, coupled with the U.S. intelligence community's assertion that North Korea was operating an underground complex to revive its nuclear programs, made the Agreed Framework seem shaky. The United States is struggling to maintain the agreement, despite these alleged breaches. North Korea's disruptive actions remain a most critical threat to peace in East Asia,<sup>16</sup> albeit the recent North-South diplomacy in Korea raises hopes for a gradual reconciliation.

Iraq is another outlaw aggressor that threatens the globalized society. Its WMD program has been documented since the Persian Gulf War. Former Commander in

Chief of the U.S. Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf, issued a statement of objectives during the war that included the destruction of Iraq's ballistic missile nuclear, biological, and chemical capability.<sup>17</sup> Since 1991, the United States has been consistently flying air missions to protect the no-fly zones in the area. Despite this aim and attempts by United Nations (UN) inspectors to investigate the weapons facilities, there is no proof that Saddam Hussein's weapons capabilities have been eliminated. This potential WMD capability, coupled with a hatred of the United States and the West, makes Iraq dangerous and impossible to predict.

In the post-Soviet, globalized world of the early 21st century, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a major concern. No longer are all the globe's nuclear weapons situated within two camps. The Russian-Ukrainian brain drain of the post-Soviet era has opened the doors for countries like Iraq and North Korea, which are willing to pay to gain some measure of nuclear capabilities. With the increase in low-level nuclear programs comes a dissipation of the theory of mutually assured destruction that carried the world through tenuous times in the Cold War. Today, nuclear countries can attack each other and cause devastating damage, but not destroy the entire world. Deterrence is more difficult in this context. As Robert Chandler said, "unless intrinsic U.S. interests are present in the region, American nuclear threats may not be credible."<sup>18</sup> Despite the fact that any outlaw aggressor that uses nuclear weapons will cause an enormous ripple effect in both the security and economic realms, it is not likely that an attack somewhere that does not affect U.S. national interests will result in a strike by the United States. Thus, there is less of a deterrent today than there was during the Cold War. Outlaw aggressors will likely continue to develop WMD capabilities because of this fact. Regardless, they will continue being a major threat to prospects of peace in a globalizing world.

What the future will produce in this connection is uncertain. By their nature, outlaws stand outside the democratic community and its prosperous markets. This situation seemingly carries with it the seeds of their destruction because they perpetually will lack the wherewithal to make economic progress in the ways needed to amass imposing strategic strength. Yet the past decade shows that they are not withering away as fast as once was hoped. In the best case, today's outlaws will eventually wither away. A more pessimistic scenario is that they might cling to life and be joined by others. The worst case is that future outlaws obtain from big powers the political and economic support needed to cause even bigger trouble than they do now. Importantly, the future lies in the balance of these contending scenarios.

## **Strategic Preservatism**

Strategic preservatism consists of a set of ideologies aimed at keeping domestic political arrangements as they already exist. It calls for a foreign policy aimed at warding off external pressures for internal change, including the damaging effects of globalization. Three types of countries pursue such an ideology. First, there are authoritarian regimes, normally led by a dictator backed by a single political party. Second, there are traditional regimes, normally ruled by monarchies and their political supporters. Third, there are religious countries, governed by theocracies, clergy, and

rigid religious customs. All three types of countries typically have weak economies, and their populations are often poverty-stricken. They all have an incentive to participate in the world economy in order to become wealthier. But they also fear that market capitalism within their borders will lead to political pluralism and, ultimately, to democracy. Their stances on regional security affairs vary greatly: some are peaceful and others are menacing to their neighbors. What makes them similar to each other is their wary-eyed view of globalization and the Westernizing values of the democratic community.

Authoritarian regimes, unlike totalitarian regimes, have ambiguous definitions. Authority may or may not rest on wide popular support, but is not put to the test of free elections. There are many types of authoritarian regimes: civilian (China), military (Pakistan), secular (Iraq), religious (Afghanistan), capitalist (Indonesia), and socialist (Serbia). The ostensible goal of an authoritarian regime is to protect society from harmful influences. The government can claim to be building a new society, but shows a bias toward statism and usually allows a dominant political role for the military. These countries are isolated and want no outside influence corrupting their societies.

Although Chinese foreign policy is mostly driven by geopolitical interests, it is partly influenced by preservatist instincts as well. China is an authoritarian, communist government, threatened by the growing phenomenon of globalization, in particular the ability of modern communications to transcend ideological and nationalist rhetoric, which threatens the government's influence on the people. The more control-oriented sect of the Chinese government in Beijing is terrified by the Internet's potential, while others see it as a big step toward freedom. It is calculated that China will have the second largest population of Web surfers in the world, after the United States, by 2005. Beijing officials fear that the Internet will weaken their power over the masses. The government wants the economic benefits of the Internet without the freedom that it gives. Beyond money, the Internet is also spurring a sense of nationalism among those who think the Internet can help them draw level with the West.<sup>19</sup>

From the beginning, Chinese bureaucrats sought ways to manage the contradiction between maintaining authority and spreading information. In 1997, they set up an Intranet with China-only access, which was abandoned. In January 2000, the Chinese government implemented strict regulations on Internet content and encryption technology, following the Singapore example of more selective restriction and greater reliance on the threat posed by the possibility of monitoring. In China, the technique for this is more blunt: subscribers to the Internet must register with local security bureaus, enabling officials to ascertain who is visiting which Web site. This requirement has been combined with legislation, open to interpretation, outlawing "interference in domestic politics" (aimed at the international press) or content that "brings the Government into hatred or contempt" (aimed at the Internet).<sup>20</sup>

Additionally, Internet cafes have opened in Tehran, Iran, and in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In Iran, users—monitored by some providers—must promise, among other things, that they "will not contact stations against Islamic regulations," a reference to sites with sexual content. In Saudi Arabia, all Internet connections in the country have been routed through a hub outside Riyadh, where high-speed government computers block access to thousands of sites catalogued on an expanding blacklist. Those

trying to access these sites receive the warning “Forbidden!!!” and all access attempts are logged—thus inducing a form of self-censorship motivated by fear.

The Internet is a tool of globalization that provides an outlet from, or inlet into, authoritarian regimes. Naturally, those who wish to retain control over a population will try to make Internet access as difficult as possible. Attempting to control access to the Internet, however, will likely prove to be a futile endeavor on the part of the government, for technology is moving faster than state censors. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes have a weapon that the West greatly underestimates and that globalization cannot redress swiftly: fear. The fear of being discovered using the Internet in ways that are not acceptable to the government is inherent in those who have lived under authoritarian rule. Eventually, globalization and access to the world at large will diminish that fear, but it may take the process decades.

Often, globalization is thought of as Westernization. Promoting religions that are out of the Western Judeo-Christian mainstream is often a way for a nonglobalized state to distinguish itself from the West. In addition, religion can create a basis for a national identity and in turn promote nationalism. Islamic fundamentalist extremists and nations illustrate this type of non-Western religious identity. Nations that promote extreme Islamic fundamentalism are often either isolated but benign or aggressive militants (that is, supporters of terrorism). Globalization has either created states that are more hostile to world involvement or created an arena in which states that are isolated can emerge and become more open to democracy and integration. The Taliban government in Afghanistan and the new reform government in Iran, respectively, exemplify these trends.

The Taliban are exemplary of extreme Islamic fundamentalism that runs counter to the globalization trends in much of the world. The leaders have taken an extreme interpretation of the Koran and have created laws to enforce this interpretation. As a result, a state where prior to the takeover by the Taliban in 1998 women had many liberties and were often highly educated white-collar workers has emerged as a place where women cannot leave the house without a male relative. The oppressive nature of this government is contrary to the human rights stipulations that the globalized world takes for granted. In addition, Afghanistan has been a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and other anti-American terrorists. The religious identification that allows the government of Afghanistan to hide this “religious brother” also helps destabilize the world with continued threats from terrorists like bin Laden. The antiglobalization stance and resulting isolation of some fundamentalists are of great concern to U.S. planners. These are the truly unpredictable countries that are not politically or economically tied to the United States and that have to be carefully monitored.

Globalization, however, has also had positive effects on religion-based states. In early 2000, the Iranian people voted in supporters of reformist Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, who advocates the removal of Islamic restrictions within the state. This election marks the desire of the Iranian people to continue President Khatami’s policies of increased individual freedoms, press freedom, and the reduction of religious interference in the government structure. This is the result of the interconnectivity of the world. Although the Iranians are still religious believers, they have seen or experienced the opportunities that a democratic, globalized society has to offer.

The end result may be an Iran that uses diplomacy rather than muscle to attain its goals. In early 2000, in response to the elections, the Clinton administration relaxed certain trade embargoes on Iran. This step was meant to encourage continued progress toward democratization and, in turn, peace. Although Iran is certainly not an ally, the United States would like to foster its democratic movement. Perhaps further steps toward democratization will cause Iran to abandon its push to become a regional hegemonist. Currently, however, the democratic trends have been primarily domestic and internal and have not emerged into the realm of foreign policy.

Despite the common ground of a strong and almost universal faith in Islam, Afghanistan and Iran have taken very different paths as a result of globalization. These two states are emblematic of the divisions that globalization is creating. An absolute hatred of Westerners that exists within Afghanistan and other states, guided by Islamic extremism, creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and danger. Threats of terrorism and of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and other states exude from these countries. They may create troubles for a good many years to come.

The bottom line is that in today's world, several regions are pockmarked by countries more motivated by strategic preservatism in its various guises than by joining globalization and its robust international markets. Perhaps many of these countries will become motivated to join the world economy and democratic community, but the reality is that such changes would compel them to pursue big internal changes that are difficult at best and unwanted at worst. As a result, this ideology of warding off external pressures for internal change likely will remain an imposing roadblock to globalization for the foreseeable future, but its exact power is hard to predict. In itself, strategic preservatism is not inimical to peace. It tends to produce countries that want to withdraw from world affairs in order to shield themselves, rather than to exert power aimed at altering the external status quo. Such is the case today, for example, in many Middle Eastern countries. The real danger can arise if preservatist instincts are accompanied by assertive geopolitical agendas in ways producing countries intent on both maintaining their domestic orders and controlling the regions around them. The danger can grow further if this dual agenda of defensive and offensive goals becomes animated by ultranationalism and is pursued by big countries with the strength to assert their wills on their neighbors. Such an outcome is by no means inevitable; it will remain a worrisome risk, for it could make the world a more troubled place than now—even in the face of globalization.

## State Survival

For some countries threatened by internal failure and collapse, survival itself is the dominant construct of values and beliefs. These countries are saddled with weak governments, unstable societies, growing populations, poverty-stricken economies, and widespread local violence. Their foreign policies are geared mainly to warding off additional threats to internal order, while seeking assistance from countries and multinational institutions willing to help them. Such countries abound in sub-Saharan Africa—for example, Somalia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe—but also exist in the Caucasus

and elsewhere. Typically, they lie so far outside the globalizing world that its dynamics neither help nor harm them.

Somalia and Rwanda stand out as examples of humanitarian crises, reactions to them, and lessons that should be learned. Both countries suffered humanitarian disasters prompting or prompted by domestic political struggles. The predominant goal driving Somalian and Rwandan foreign policy was survival.

The territory of Somalia was two colonies until 1960, one ruled by Italy and the other ruled by Britain, when they were merged to become Somalia on July 1, 1960. The Italian South and the British North were basically two separate entities with different ruling tribal factions. They had two separate systems based on the rule of Italy and the rule of Britain. In 1960, the United Nations created a task force called the Consultative Commission for Integration to assist in their merger into one state. In October 1969, following the assassination of the President, the army staged a coup d'état in conjunction with the police forces, and army commander Major General Mohamed Siad Barre took leadership of the new government, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). The SRC arrested the members of the democratic government and detained them in the presidential palace. The new regime vowed to end tribalism, nepotism, corruption, misrule, and national liberation movements.

The SRC formulated a government system based loosely on the Koran and Marxism. A uniform civil code, produced in 1973, eliminated laws restricting the Sharia courts. The death penalty was enacted. Tribalism under the new regime was considered a disease and was punishable by imprisonment and fines. Community rather than lineage was stressed, and "orientation centers" to reeducate Somalis were developed. Political party affiliation was also prohibited. Siad Barre declared Somalia a one-party state of scientific socialism. The SRC changed its name in June 1976, becoming the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, which was in theory to end military rule.

Barre's affiliations with Marxist states eventually began to wane after the Ogaden war with Ethiopia, which depleted Somalia's resources and forced it to accept assistance from other countries, such as the United States. By 1982, resistance within the country had grown stronger. In July, Somali dissidents (with assistance from Ethiopian air support) captured two border towns, and Siad Barre appealed to the United States for assistance. The United States in turn sent light arms so that the Somalis could defend themselves against the Ethiopians; however, the arms were used instead against domestic opponents of Siad Barre.

Internal resistance continued to grow within Somalia, and Somalis living in Ethiopia and Ogaden were dealt with brutally. In 1986, Amnesty International charged that the Somali regime was violating human rights. Its documentation, along with that of Africa Watch, influenced the United States to deeply cut its aid to Somalia. Barre's reign of terror on the people somehow solidified his hold on the government. But, in May 1986, a car accident that incapacitated him for a month prompted an internal struggle for power between a constitutional faction and a clan faction. Once again, a reign of terror was effected by his elite force, the Red Berets, ensuring his control.

In 1988, a bloody rebellion commenced, culminating in the fall of the regime in January 1991. The civil war took more than 50,000 civilian lives and destroyed

Mogadishu. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled Somalia. The war in the South also triggered a famine, as farmers fled into the bush. Clan tensions flared up, and by June the dominant northern faction, the Somali National Movement, declared the former British territory separate from the South, calling it the independent Republic of Somaliland. The United Nations ceased its relief efforts in 1992 because of the fighting and thievery. United States President George Bush then sent in 25,000 troops to assist in delivering UN food, medicine, and other supplies.

The first U.S. deployment, UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), formed in response to a UN Security Council recommendation, was limited and incapable of completing the daunting task of trying to prevent 4.5 million Somalis from starving. The grim situation was further intensified by clan warfare. International media coverage of the crisis helped create conditions in December 1992 conducive to U.S. escalation of its involvement. That escalation, UNOSOM II, involving operations of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force, resulted in the October 3, 1993, attack in Mogadishu and tragic deaths of 18 Rangers. The involvement of the United States and the United Nations in Somalia ended in March 1995.

The clans obviously rule in Somalia. There is no working central government, with the exception of the recent beginnings of stabilization in the Republic of Somaliland, and the warlords are still warring. Survival of the state depends on a system akin to that of the Greek city-states. Although not centralized, there is control through the clan system. The most prominent effect is on foreign policy, which basically involves a constant need for foreign assistance. Humanitarian relief operations are under the control of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body.

On July 1, 1962, Rwanda gained its technical independence from Belgium. Prior to that, there was a Rwandan monarchy led by the Tutsi minority. In 1950, the Hutu majority overthrew the monarchy and many Tutsis were exiled. The children of the exiled Tutsis formed a group called the Rwandan Patriotic Force and started a civil war with the Hutus in 1990. This culminated in ethnic genocide in April 1994, when 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed. However, in July 1994, the Tutsis defeated the Hutu rulers and ended the genocide. Fearing reprisal, over 2 million Hutu refugees fled Rwanda and surged into surrounding countries, including Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, and Tanzania. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as of 1996, 1.3 million of the refugees have returned to Rwanda. Currently there is relative peace, although remaining tensions have slowed agricultural growth and reconciliation. Today, members of the former Hutu regime are attempting to destabilize the northwest region of Rwanda through a low-intensity insurgency.

The UN Tribunal on War Crimes is currently dealing with the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. However, disagreements between the United Nations and the still ruling Tutsis on the release of the Hutu criminals have increased regional tensions. As of today, the Rwandan government has stopped cooperating with the tribunal because of differences of opinion on the trial.

In Zimbabwe, the state is following a policy of preserving national and state control over economic development. President Robert Mugabe is turning foreign investors away from the country. The fear is that outsiders will enter and interfere in the internal workings of the state's economy. In the words of the President, "At the end

of the day, black people must be able to say, the resources are ours—our people own the mines, our people own the industry.”<sup>21</sup> The country’s severe economic problems, according to Mugabe, can be solved only internally, if the integrity of the state and the nation is to be preserved.

Looking ahead, the risk is that the phenomenon of troubled and failing states may grow in the coming years. Globalization’s allure of prosperous economic markets seemingly lessens this risk. But the problem is that many countries falling into this category are not benefiting from globalization, and some are being further damaged by it. Moreover, many face the added problems of soaring population growth and severe internal weaknesses in their governments, societies, and economies. An increase in the number of countries in this category will not directly threaten peace on a global scale, but it may produce local violence and turmoil. Moreover, it will elevate the number of countries desperately needing outside help and thereby will enhance the pressures on the wealthy democratic community to help them.

## **Implications for Regional Affairs and U.S. Foreign Policy**

In today’s setting, the democratic community and its ideology cover nearly one-half of the world, but other countries are motivated by a wide spectrum of different values, beliefs, and ideologies in their foreign policy. Most countries are pursuing their national interests in moderate ways. A few big powers are acting in an assertive geopolitical manner. Some countries are driven by nationalism in angry and exclusionary ways. A few countries are genuine outlaws and aggressors, threatening aggression, war, and WMD proliferation. A number of countries have a mentality of preservatism. Some are merely struggling to survive. Because of these diverse ideologies, the world remains a complicated place. Indeed, globalization is washing over these countries and creating pressures to conform to the model of democracy and markets. But it is not yet an all-powerful force, and its pressures for conformity are meeting the resistance posed by many countries whose individualist foreign policies resist uniformity. Their resistance likely will exert a major influence on how fast globalization unfolds, the course it takes, and its ultimate outcome.

Equally important, the interaction of these ideas plays a major role in producing today’s world of great differences among the key regions. Each region has its own distinct set of beliefs and values at work in ways that yield unique political-economic contours and trends. Eurasia is dominated by Russia, which is playing an assertive geopolitical role and interacting with newly independent countries seeking to protect their sovereignty and interests. The troubled Balkans is littered with angry nationalists. Asia is marked by a motley combination of countries: those already members of the democratic community or trying to join it, neutrals trying to maintain their independence, outlaw states, preservatism-minded countries, and troubled states. South Asia is the scene of mounting geopolitical competition and WMD proliferation as India squares off against Pakistan. The Greater Middle East houses a diverse combination of preservatist countries, medium-sized geopolitical actors, criminal and terrorist states, and aggressive outlaws in a setting of Persian Gulf oil and accelerating WMD proliferation. Huge Africa has a few democracies, some stable neutrals, and

many countries struggling to survive. Latin America is now mostly democratic, but it faces social and economic troubles, and a few of its governments look more criminal with each passing day.

What does this diverse world, with its many different foreign policies and fluid interactions, say for U.S. policy? Two points are worth mentioning. First, the United States and its democratic partners need to be self-aware. Perhaps their admirable values of democratization and globalized economics are riding the irresistible tide of history. But even so, their values amount to an ideology—a new and potent one, but an ideology all the same. They clearly are perceived this way by the rest of the world, and some countries do not like what they see, for they perceive not only allegedly universal values at work, but also interests, control, and even arrogant nationalism. A little humility and acceptance of alternative perspectives might go a long way toward making U.S. and allied policies more acceptable and effective.

Second, those carrying out U.S. foreign policy need to be acutely aware of the many different types of foreign policies at work today, and of the ways that these policies have combined to produce the significant regional disparities in evidence. The Balkans is one thing; Asia, something entirely different. Yes, the United States needs a coherent strategic stance. But no single model of strategic conduct is likely to work with equal effectiveness everywhere. This judgment applies not only to globalization but also to traditional models of superpower leadership. Because the world remains complicated, U.S. policy needs to be multifaceted and finely tuned. The United States will have to treat every country and region on its own merits.

In each region, the United States will face the challenge of shepherding a diverse set of values, beliefs, and ideologies toward stability and progress. This challenge will require full use of all tools and instruments at the disposal of U.S. policy, including diplomacy, aid, security assistance, and economic cooperation. United States military forces also will have to play contributing roles in this attempt at peacetime “strategic shaping,” often in difficult circumstances. Using these forces effectively, while not lessening their readiness for still important warfighting missions, will have a major impact on the success of future U.S. foreign policy in many places.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

In the coming years, the United States will make regular use of its military forces in trying to influence the foreign policies of many nations in nearly all major regions. Military-to-military education and engagement are key instruments in the pursuit of U.S. strategic interests. Educating foreign officers in the United States encourages increased understanding among military personnel and contributes to the strengthening of positive influence on foreign militaries. An appropriate example is the expanded International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which focuses on military justice, including human rights, democracy, and civil-military relations. Improving human rights awareness is akin to prevention.

Although the Armed Forces must be prepared to fight big wars, they also must be able to deal with a regular influx of military operations other than war (MOOTW) that may or may not involve the use of deadly force. The international community

and the U.S. military are faced with complex MOOTW, such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and national disasters, and forms of internal, ethnic, or civil wars. These operations often require the establishment of new military coalitions rather than the exploitation of existing military alliances. Familiarity with operational doctrine, command-and-control procedures, and logistical organization aids is essential in creating effective ad hoc military coalitions. As one observer noted:

In the existing post-Cold War environment, the IMET program can and does provide a foundation for mutual understanding and enhanced interoperability in a wide range of activities, including supply of medicines and foodstuffs to refugee communities, rescue of embassy and United Nations personnel, and enforcement actions exemplified by Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.<sup>22</sup>

The Navy and Marine Corps are leading participants in many of the MOOTW that occur and will occur in the future. Currently, overseas bases are placed strategically for waging old Cold War conflicts. With rising regional powers, threats of smaller scale contingencies, and MOOTW, the United States must be prepared to act almost anywhere in the world. The Navy provides floating bases from which an operation can begin quickly; it is not dependent on a traditional land base nearby. Since change is the nature of this era of globalization, the Navy must be trained and ready to fight the nontraditional fights and perform the new peacetime missions that arise from the multitude of beliefs and ideologies around the world.

The Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) MOOTW Symposium at Quantico trains and educates U.S. and international officers in peace operations, humanitarian operations, insurgency, and counterinsurgency. The education offers case studies, lessons learned, and training directly applicable to current world situations. Since U.S. involvement in MOOTW will continue, schools and symposia such as that of the AWS are essential to the strengthening of U.S. force preparedness for 21st century missions.

An important goal is to influence foreign militaries so as to promote political objectives, including democracy. Military-to-military education and coalition building strengthen support for healthy ideologies. In the words of General Anthony Zinni, the former Commander in Chief, Central Command:

Engagement is the first leg of our strategic vision. Its goal is developing professional and responsible militaries in democratic states and states that are undergoing democratization—military organizations that are capable and well-led. We work to create potential collation partners.<sup>23</sup>

Political advisors offer another avenue for influencing political objectives. They provide military commanders with regional, ethnic, and cultural perspectives that promote personal relationships between U.S. military leaders and international political figures. Regional commanders develop personal relationships with both political and military leaders in their areas of responsibility. As General Zinni has said, “The other thing we like to do is make sure that we function in a way to support diplomatic and policy efforts in the region . . . by establishing personal relationships.”<sup>24</sup> Political military officers and political advisors provide commanders the appropriate perspec-

tive for establishing these personal relationships. Within the Navy structure, however, there are no political advisors below the commander in chief (CINC) levels. Fleet commanders could also benefit greatly from this kind of guidance on port calls and other diplomatic calls.

While military-to-military outreach programs can help U.S. forces carry out their shaping agendas in many regions, the larger reality is that shaping will be performed by a host of other U.S. military activities as well. The peacetime presence of large U.S. forces in key regions—coupled with their ability to perform major operational missions in peace, crisis, and war—is itself a major instrument for strategic shaping. Their shaping activities take the form of exercises with allies, visits to reassure vulnerable countries, actions aimed at dampening crises and competition, and daily efforts to deter aggression. Regions in which governments are driven by many different foreign policy ideas and goals are making these activities complex and demanding. As a result, any single type of action by U.S. forces may please some countries, but offend others. Indeed, some countries welcome the presence of U.S. forces, but others resent it.

This diversity carries with it a major implication: U.S. military shaping activities will have to be carried out with careful planning and great skill in the coming years. The task continuously will be one of acting in ways that balance multiple objectives and trade-offs—a difficult act, even in the best of times.

In sum, the end of the Cold War has fostered not only globalization, but also a plethora of new foreign policy ideas aimed at defining how countries should act in an increasingly interdependent world. Partly as a consequence of this trend, the threat of global war has greatly diminished, but the frequency of regional wars and smaller conflicts seems on the rise. While the common hope is that this trend toward mounting turmoil will decrease as globalization gains momentum, the risk is that it will remain the same or even increase. Being prepared to dampen this trend is likely to be one of the principal challenges facing U.S. foreign policy and the military forces that underpin it. 🌐

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Jorge Larraín, *The Concept of Ideology* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), 17.
- <sup>2</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. and trans. S. Ryazaskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964).
- <sup>3</sup> Feliks Gross, *Ideologies, Goals, and Values* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), xxxiii.
- <sup>4</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- <sup>5</sup> Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1983), 21.
- <sup>6</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967).
- <sup>7</sup> Four hundred years is not an occupation, which is what Serbia considers the Ottoman Empire. It is a shared history.
- <sup>8</sup> Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918*, 2 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 603.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 605.

<sup>10</sup> Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*, 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 134.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 264.

<sup>12</sup> Peter Radan, *The Serbs and Their Leaders in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter Radan and Alexander Pavkovic (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1997), 12.

<sup>13</sup> *World's Almanac, 1994*.

<sup>14</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: Random House, 1993), 35.

<sup>15</sup> Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Dangerous Korea," *National Review*, December 31, 1998, 35.

<sup>16</sup> The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999), 35.

<sup>17</sup> Robert W. Chandler, *Tomorrow's War, Today's Decision* (McLean, VA: AMCODA Press, 1996), 11.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, xxi.

<sup>19</sup> Terry McCarthy, "China's Internet Gold Rush," *Time*, February 28, 2000, 50–51.

<sup>20</sup> Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1998).

<sup>21</sup> "Opposition's Challenge," BBC News/World Service, June 15, 2000.

<sup>22</sup> John A. Cope, *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment*, McNair Paper 44 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 2.

<sup>23</sup> General Anthony C. Zinni, "Challenges in the Central Region: An Interview," *Joint Force Quarterly* 24 (Spring 2000), 27.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*