

The Persian Gulf: Security, Politics, and Order

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Globalization is a term that describes the acceleration of modernization and the increasing interdependence of the world economically, culturally, and politically. This process has been intensified and led by technology, which speeds communications, travel, and transactions, and makes information, mobility, and adaptability the prime requisites for economic competitiveness. Globalization has many dimensions, not excluding defense, whether in planning forces, procurement, or industries. We are here concerned with how globalization affects order and security in the Persian Gulf and implications for U.S. defense planning.

This chapter begins by looking at globalization as a general phenomenon, noting the problems it may cause or accentuate for developing states. It then looks more specifically at the impact of globalization on the Persian Gulf, noting the existence of both traditional security problems (such as interstate conflicts) and the rise of new security issues, such as transnational threats posed by the drug trade. Third, the chapter briefly examines the reactions and perceptions of these states to globalization. It concludes with an assessment of the implications of these issues for U.S. security policy and, to the extent feasible, the military forces in particular.

The paper is not exhaustive. It focuses on Iran particularly for two reasons. First, Iran is the largest country in the region and has the potential to play the most important role there, for either good or ill. Second, Iran is in a state of transition and is very much preoccupied with the issues raised by globalization. These issues, in some ways, cut across Iran's original priorities of self-reliance and self-assertion. Shifts in the strategic environment caused indirectly by globalization are clearly possible and are noted in this chapter; however, the translation of the problems of one region into implications for specific features of U.S. security policy is not easy or necessarily useful. The depiction of the forces and trends described can, however, assist in better understanding the environment in which that policy and, in the case of the Gulf, U.S. forces will be operating.

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Key Phenomena and Argument

This chapter makes a number of points worth outlining at the outset. The Persian Gulf States, like most Middle Eastern states, are not democratic. Lacking popular legitimacy, they are vulnerable to change. Traditional security issues persist in the region. This, combined with the fact that most are new states subjected to some form of imperialism or colonialism, leads rulers of states to take very seriously the “old agenda” of arms, territory, resources, and the defense of sovereignty. At the same time, the pressures unleashed by globalization, competition and communications, and cultural attraction make it harder to define security in traditional terms. The rulers of states are experiencing increased pressures for democratization, transparency, and accountability. Economic inefficiency and resource needs demand adaptation, politically and economically (for example, privatization, the rule of law), which threatens regime control; at the same time, few regimes are flexible enough to adapt. The risks of reconciling reform and control are palpable, where the institutions and practices of civil society are still deficient. The cultural dimension of globalization is especially difficult in the Islamic world, whether pro-Western (Saudi Arabia) or not (Iran). Attempts to rally support against “cultural threats” have and will be made, but this is a losing battle.

On a different level, globalization will make sanctions and policies of technology denial less effective. The U.S. role as paramount power and premier economic and cultural power has unintended consequences. As an intervening power (or external power balancer in different regions), the United States will inspire states to seek measures to deter it. Interventions and activism to prevent proliferation will thus feed arguments and incentives for proliferation. However, as a soft power holder/exerciser, the United States will gain many supporters, imitators, and friends.

Ironically, globalization will make U.S. allies in the Gulf more unstable and will underscore the gap between them and the United States in terms of political values. On the other hand, if Iran can adapt, its values will become closer to those of the United States. This will not necessarily lead to closer relations on security issues. Globalization will not end state desires to play their own roles and have their own autonomy in their immediate regions.

Globalization and Security: Trends

However defined, globalization is a disorienting phenomenon—one that puts strains on states to adapt or be left behind. It is seen by its critics—the weak, conservative, and skeptical—as a formula for continued domination by the strong, a continuation of the structural violence attributed to the unjust political order in earlier years. It has implications on several levels, among them, political, economic, legal, and cultural.

Globalization challenges the state and weakens sovereignty. Humanitarian issues and massive human rights violations have led to the concept of the right (or) duty to intervene and the notion of qualified or conditional sovereignty. Human rather than state security has been extolled as the operative new criterion. As Secretary General

Kofi Annan put it, "State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation, while individual sovereignty has been enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the right of the individual to control his or her destiny."¹

The challenge to the state's uncontested right to act domestically is seen by many states as a deliberate policy intended to undermine them, rather than as the product of an evolution toward greater planetary consciousness. Put succinctly, "The globalization agenda is a neoliberal political programme that primarily promotes the interests of the world's most powerful players."²

Decolonization coincided with the globalization of the state system. The rules of the Eurocentric state system, however, were created by the European states. A disproportionate role and status were given to the states of the Euro-Atlantic area.³ Globalization now threatens to change those rules, again to the disadvantage of the weak and marginalized. There were, therefore, few takers when the United Nations (UN) Secretary General announced his support for a new doctrine that, in the view of the weaker states, threatens, or claims, to become a new orthodoxy.

State sovereignty depends on mutual recognition and has been the foundation of the state system, which, in a rudimentary form, has maintained order and held anarchy at bay. Well before the latest phase of globalization, Hedley Bull noted:

Among the Third World countries the idea that we must all now bend our efforts to get "beyond the state" is so alien to recent experience as to be unintelligible. Because they did not have states that were strong enough to withstand European or Western aggression, the African, Asian, and Oceanic peoples, as they see it, were subject to domination, exploitation, and humiliation. It is by gaining control of states that they have been able to take charge of their own destiny. It is by the use of state power, by claiming the rights due to them as states, that they have been able to resist foreign military interference, to protect their economic interests by excluding or controlling multinational corporations, expropriating foreign assets, planning the development of their economies and bargaining to improve their terms of trade. It is by insisting upon the privilege of sovereignty that they are able to defend their newly won independence against the foreign tutelage implicit in such phrases as "basic human needs," "the international protection of human rights" or (more sinister still) "humanitarian intervention."⁴

Globalization challenges the control of the state and its authority and autonomy. Through interdependence, it reduces its scope for independent activity. The dominance of the market and weight of foreign direct investment push for a more open, transparent, and rules-based system in countries. It may offer rewards, but it risks increasing differences among and within states.⁵ For all but the most flexible, adaptable, and hence least conservative, globalization appears as much a threat as an opportunity.⁶ (For Middle Eastern states short on legitimacy and highly conservative, the threat dimension is paramount.) As one observer noted, the two fears associated with globalization are that cultures will be homogenized (see below) and that "nations will be left out of an increasingly competitive and unequal international system."⁷ As worrisome is that globalization will unleash political and social instability.

What Jeffrey Garten has called a “tumultuous transition” for the more advanced states lacking adequate regulatory structures and impartial institutions will be worse for the less advanced states. As William Pfaff notes, “The internationalization of any non-Western economy automatically undermines social practices and religious and cultural norms. It is a literally subversive force.”^{8,9}

Although globalization suggests an integrative process by reference to interdependence, mobility, speed, ease, and numbers of contacts, it is in fact more contradictory, as Falk observes, “both generating a kind of homogenised world civilisation that ignores civilisational particularities and revitalising traditional ethnic and religious identities that give renewed potency to civilisational categories.”¹⁰ As David Apter has observed, globalization and marketization tend to uniformize situations and accentuate cleavages in economics, culture, and identity, thereby opening up rifts between winners and losers.¹¹ Culturally, the pressures and attractions of globalization already have created a political backlash among some of the developed states that are seeking to protect their heritage. Among the less advanced states, the problem is more severe, not least because they often find the implied values (materialism and hedonism) offensive or threatening and fear above all the loss of identity implied by the process. Loss of control, identity, and values is a serious concern for new or less advanced states. The equation of the process with Americanization and with a conspiracy to ensure their continued marginalization is thus easily made.

Whereas advanced states talk of the challenge as one that “accentuates the benefits of good policies and the costs of bad ones” or see it as reflecting a benign entanglement (“Instead of fighting wars they [modern states] assert sovereignty by arguing over the rules of the global game”¹²), other states see it differently. The very process of entanglement implies loss of control, autonomy, sovereignty, and power.

To summarize, for developing states that inherited a Eurocentric system that slighted their importance, globalization constitutes a threat to the very basis of the system to which they have been adapting—slicing at their sovereignty, weakening the role of the state, threatening their independence and social cohesion, and laying siege to their identity, culture, and values. Most states in the Middle East are at least skeptical of it as an opportunity to redress the power imbalance or as a chance to attain real equality in the international system. Thus, they do not see globalization as likely to bring about a change in the distribution of power or in the *nature* of power. For a state that is preoccupied with traditional security threats, the view that power has become more dependent on other bases, economic or “soft,” or on other components would appear fanciful. However, while globalization may appear unwelcome and threatening, there is no sign that there is an alternative to it or that globalization is avoidable. Adapting to it is thus a reluctant process and one characterized by ambivalence about its mixed blessings.

Globalization and the Persian Gulf

By any standard, the economic performance of the Middle East as a whole has been lackluster. Even the oil-producing states have performed economically less well over the past decade than have other parts of the developing world. This can be at-

tributed in part to the volatility of oil prices and their general decline in real terms over the past decade and a half. Equally important are government policies of state interference and control, subsidies, elaborate welfare systems, and the culture of the *rentier* state, which is inimical to competition and work.

To meet security threats, states have invested in costly arms imports, and military establishments are large without being effective. Servicing and maintaining this equipment and making the military effective are still distant prospects. For the foreseeable future, the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states will continue to rely on the United States and its allies for security against major threats. Wars and the legacy of wars and the failure to create genuine trust or build regional institutions will necessitate a continued requirement for the United States as a key security partner for GCC states in the region. At the very least, the U.S. role in maintaining a regional balance of power in favor of its GCC allies, in the absence of a cooperative and moderate Iraq and Iran, will persist, as will the U.S. role as arms supplier and advisor. The traditional security threats of interstate wars and territorial claims, however, are not the only threats faced by the regimes of the area. As Gary Sick argues, the new security threats are at least as serious.¹³

Included in this category of threat are those arising from the challenges posed and accentuated by globalization. Thus, the rapid population growth (averaging 2.5 to 3 percent), giving rise to disproportionately young populations (some 50 to 60 percent under 25 years of age) who require education and employment, puts considerable pressure on the state. The problem is compounded by the fact that this youthful citizenry demands a greater say in politics at a time when the state is less able to provide subsidies or otherwise sidetrack demands for reforms. Moreover, the state has not inculcated the tradition of work, innovation, and competition necessary for an effective workforce. The upshot is that the Gulf regimes are challenged by globalization and demands for greater economic performance and political reform.

Oil, which has postponed the need for adjustment, can no longer be relied on to act as a buffer. At best, revenues will be volatile, with a better-than-even chance that they will decline in real terms from their current \$30 a barrel, itself historically low. Second, oil revenues per capita have been halved as populations have soared, giving the government less leeway. As subsidies are cut and the welfare system reviewed, the state's compact with its populace will have ended. The system of providing money in exchange for political passivity will have come to an end.

Adapting to realities means improving economic performance and considering political reforms. Economic results might curb demands for political reforms, but not for long. In any case, economic performance will not be possible without political reforms. Transparency, a rules-based order, and representative government are necessary. As Khalaf has written, "If they want the private sector to lead development, it will require more accountable government."¹⁴ Accountable government and transparency are not indigenous concepts in the Middle East. They suggest an end to cronyism, corruption, and centralization. Yet political reforms and democratization introducing uncertainty and open-endedness are not without their own risks for regional order. States such as Saudi Arabia have applied to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). They have not found it easy. On the one hand, they remain

exposed to criticisms from Amnesty International for their human rights policies. On the other hand, they attribute delays in joining the World Trade Organization (so far it has taken 5 years) to their unique status as guardians of the holy places, for which they demand special provisions that are not easily granted them. (They also wish, according to Robin Allen, to have the right to ban alcohol and pork, among other things.¹⁵) Other states, such as Kuwait and Qatar, are experimenting with political reform. The new security issues and heightened demands make continuing old policies dangerous while ensuring that reforms will have their own dynamic and uncertainties. In either case, the loss of control by governments seems likely.

Globalization acts as a solvent to weaken and loosen traditional relationships. Whether it is a process forced on the weak by the strong, it is often seen that way. Less contentious is the proposition that it affects the roles of both the state and the citizen: "Globalisation has in effect made the citizen disappear, and has reduced the state into being a mere instrument of global capitalism."¹⁶

As Thomas Friedman has noted in reference to Egypt, globalization means changing the relationship between the individual and the state and community in a way that citizens feel "puts their society at risk of disintegration."¹⁷ Globalization thus challenges the state on a variety of levels, raising questions about the state's role, its policies, and its relationship with other institutions and with individuals. This is especially, though not uniquely, felt in the *rentier* state. Rapid change and disorientation stoke the ambivalence felt about globalization. Questions of identity and culture are in the forefront of the concerns of traditional societies, which value the extended family. These are at risk in the market economy and capitalism, which introduce differentiation and division. Globalization acts to accelerate the disorientation already present in modernization.

The reaction of states and individuals has been ambivalent. Globalization can neither be fought and resisted nor totally embraced. "Retraditionalization" and the growth of religious fundamentalism are defensive responses to this assault of modernity. Looking to the past for reassurance and guideposts is one answer to the cultural onslaught. As culture and identity are under threat, the danger of revived and aggressive nationalism may become apparent. Nationalism at any rate will be a key and possibly growing component of regional politics.

A more difficult approach is to attempt to modernize religion through interpretation and to make it more adapted to current needs. Iran's efforts at reconciling Islam and democracy and injecting accountable government into a clerically led regime are notable. An important question is whether globalization will widen the technological gap between the West and the Muslim world, with the latter ending up producers of raw materials or suppliers of cheap labor.¹⁸

Another concern is whether as the forces of globalization make for homogenization of cultures and threaten identities, the backlash taking the form of civilizational loyalties and affiliations will not displace the role of states and act as the new axis of international politics. Although Samuel Huntington's thesis is plausible in abstract, it does not have much support empirically; the two wars in the Persian Gulf were *intra*-civilizational, and the animating forces were state or local nationalism. State nationalism is replacing Islam as the motivating factor in Iran and in the other Gulf States.

Security in the traditional definition will be the preoccupation of the Persian Gulf States for the foreseeable future. Two unresolved conflicts, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and military imbalances, make the region insecure. Overcoming this insecurity will require armed forces, deterrence, alliances, arms control, and guarantees. In this sense, the region is, in Robert Cooper's terms, in the "modern era," where the prevalence of interstate war and the role of territory and resources, nationalism, and the like are still predominant.¹⁹ At the same time, the region is under stress from accelerated modernization and its concomitant demands. States need to meet the challenges of the new security issues if they are to survive. These challenges are accentuated by globalization, which makes adaptation both more necessary and more difficult by undermining the state, disorienting the individual, dissolving traditional relationships, and demanding transparency, laws, and accountability in short order.

Regional Perceptions of Globalization

Since the end of the Cold War, it has become customary to talk about the rise of new issues, the regionalization of international politics, the reemergence of nationalism or ethnic conflicts, and the prevalence of civil wars, and other points that reflect the tendency to see the world through the lens of the great and rich powers. The fact is that regional dynamics, such as the Islamic revolution in Iran and its repercussions, have dominated the politics of regions more comprehensively and longer than the Cold War ever did. Similarly, nationalism has been an important ingredient in states' policies. Regional forces and dynamics will continue to shape and dominate the concerns of local states.

At the same time, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR, more states look to the United States for attention and support. More is expected of the United States, and more attributed to U.S. power. The end of the Cold War meant the triumph of democratic values and the market system. Neither is without potential problems for Middle East states. The United States has taken to attaching conditions to foreign assistance, including making aid conditional on an acceptable human rights record, good governance, and the like. Selectively applied, these criteria still reflect American values and domestic consensus. U.S. allies in the region are not reassured by the possibility that globalization might mean the extension of American or Western norms to their own conduct.²⁰ On the other hand, U.S. adversaries note the selective nature of American concerns for human rights and the tendency to use this as a club when convenient. Both sets of states consider the whole notion of global norms another way of describing an instrument for American pressure.

The United States is also considered the principal agent of globalization and thereby a cause of destabilization or worse. Indeed, the rise of the unipolar system is itself coincident with the era of globalization. U.S. power comes not only from its military but also from its domination of the media, from its culture, and from its "soft" power. The threat to traditional and Islamic values is of concern to all states that have young populations increasingly connected globally. The threat posed by the

United States in its new incarnation is given voice by the Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei, but is not uniquely Iranian in its analysis:

Audio and visual waves, which are worse than warships and warplanes, are being used to disseminate a rogue culture aimed at reasserting the domination of the enemies of Islam, paving the way for the imposition of unethical values and Westernized ideas to captivate and humiliate Muslims.²¹

In a subsequent speech, Khamenei was more specific in referring to a “dual threat” facing all states not on the same level as the advanced European states and the United States. These he identified as the direct influence of the U.S. superpower and “the wave of globalization”: “They want,” he asserted, “to set up a share-holding company in which they should hold 95 percent of its share while the rest of the world countries should have 5 percent. They want to have authority. They want to make decisions. That is what globalization means.”²²

Iran, like other states, is torn between acceding to the demands of youth for access to the Internet and reluctance to do so for the loss of control that that entails.²³

Globalization and the Internet threaten cultural values and the control exercised by states. In this view, it has not happened as a result of an ineluctable process but as part of the deliberate policy of the hyperpower, the United States. Again, Iran’s leaders argue that they are not alone in alluding to this, noting that other states are similarly alarmed:

You young people must recognize the aims of the enemy. Today, the aim of the American arrogant power is domination of the world. This is not a hidden objective. Even the European countries complain about the American cultural onslaught. They complain about America’s interference and the influence of its currency. The problem here is domination and interference. There are some countries which cannot resist (America), but the Iranian nation can.²⁴

Iran fears globalization and what it may unleash but also fears economic marginalization; it holds the United States in awe for its energy, dynamism, power, and wealth, and in contempt for its hedonism, materialism, and alleged insensitivity to social justice. Iran’s attitude toward U.S. power is similarly ambivalent. This power is portrayed as at once unmatched and puny and excessive and practically useless. Some images of U.S. power have been depicted by François Heisbourg: “omnipotent and powerless,” trigger-happy sheriff (and self-appointed sheriff), paper tiger, and rogue state. The latter designation has been amplified by Samuel Huntington, who has noted that many, possibly most, states believe that U.S. unilateralism and behavior merit this title.²⁵

The key point is that globalization and unmatched U.S. power create pressures on states that they find difficult to resist or control. The United States has used the new international order when it can and has ignored it when it must. It has often acted as sheriff, judge, and executioner without compunction and has chosen to interpret, or develop, international law when required.²⁶ Inconsistency and double standards are seen to prevail when the America launches cruise missiles against alleged terrorists while condemning and seeking to prevent their acquisition by states with legitimate

security needs. The United States is seen as “the agent of the more disruptive manifestations of globalization” and as actively undermining the Westphalian state system to which the Middle Eastern states, as latecomers, subscribe.

Globalization is a challenge and a threat. In the short term, its impact on stability will be negative. Depending on how states manage the multifold political and economic challenge, it may or may not eventually enhance regional security. Failure to meet the challenge could mean that “lowered self-esteem, resentment, and feelings of victimisation could grow against a globalisation process which would be seen as essentially benefiting the U.S.”²⁷

The GCC states are thus torn between a dependence on the United States for their traditional security concerns, arms supplies, and guarantees, and the fact that the new security threats may in fact be aggravated by a close connection to the United States. This is especially the case because globalization is seen as a threat to values and because it stimulates a reaction based on religion, ethnicity, or nationalism. At the same time, pressures for political reform and adherence to human rights may intensify the problems of transition and complicate relations with the United States, especially as Congress or nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International become more demanding in this respect. For the United States, there is a complication already represented by Iran; an unfriendly state may prove to be more democratic than favored regional allies. For local states, domestic and international pressures to emulate Iran’s democracy could create further instability.²⁸

Iraq is a special case in the Gulf, and its future is opaque; nevertheless, certain continuities can be noted. Iraq aspires to a regional or Arab leadership role and has the population, geographical position, and resources to make a case for this. It cannot be marginalized or ignored for long. As a multiethnic society, Iraq has long been the site of a struggle for power between a strong state and pressures for decentralization. Current sanctions and the impoverishment of the country are likely to bring these strains more acutely to the surface. The quest for identity in specific communities and the competing desire for identification with a strong state will persist.²⁹ The possibility of Islamic radicalism, especially in the Shi’i areas, is surely growing. Dissatisfaction with the border settlement with Kuwait is widespread. Violence against regional states or the international community, seen as responsible for the current conditions of the country, appears possible. The requirement for the payment of reparations or compensation for its past aggression condemns the country to penury in the future.

A perverse effect of the sanctions aimed at pressuring Iraq into compliance with monitoring intended to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction has been the deterioration of its large arsenal of conventional arms. Ironically, this increases Iraq’s incentives to guard its WMD capabilities. Continuation of the current attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction or retain parts of them seem likely, whatever the nature of transition after Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi case defies an easy translation of the effects of globalization on security. However repulsive the current regime, its belief that the United States practices a double standard and pursues its principles selectively is scarcely contested. Without integration into the region, a broader say in regional politics, and a stake in the current order, Iraq will have little reason, in light of recent experience, to change its attitude or temper its policies. Here the logic of

deterrence and containment and that of engagement and entanglement will have to be reconciled in terms both of criteria to be met and timing.

Since 1991, the United States has assumed responsibility for the security of the Persian Gulf. In so doing, it has formalized the GCC dependence on the West for security and drawn a line of containment around two principal Gulf powers, Iraq and Iran. Sanctions, embargoes, and supplier regimes intended to limit transfers of sensitive technologies to these states have been put into place. Both states, to different degrees, reflect the problems associated with the new security agenda: notably, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Iran is the more interesting of the two because its situation is more ambiguous and it is in the midst of change, partly because of the very forces identified earlier and associated with globalization.

Iran: Independence and Security

There is an assumption about globalization that increased interdependence and contacts will generate openness and create harmony, or at least temper differences. This is explicit in U.S. policy toward China.³⁰ There is, however, little evidence that a more democratic or liberal Iran would be less nationalistic or find U.S. policies easier to accept.³¹ Globalization does not entail a harmony of interests, or even agreement on how to resolve differences. (This is especially the case where the levels of institutionalization are low.)

From the outset of the revolution in Iran in 1979, there has been a consensus on a number of key propositions: the need for *independence* (economic, political, and technological) and the right to follow its own path; the quest for *recognition*; and the necessity of *equality*. These principles have animated the regime in various domains, including the diplomatic and military. They make Iran a state that seeks increased status and acknowledgment by the great powers, while insisting that it stands for the principle of equality and the right to decide issues for itself. To realize independence, Iran cultivates self-reliance militarily. These principles are neither revolutionary nor likely to be ejected as Iran changes. Iran will, for the foreseeable future (over the next 5 years), pursue a foreign policy that reflects, in President Khatami's words, its "cultural and historical identity" and will pursue "religious and spiritual values and particularly the realization of justice."³²

What does this mean? Globalization so far has put pressures on Iran, but it has also reinforced its belief that the U.S. unchecked power is potentially dangerous. There is no sign that political evolution will mean convergence of values or interests or necessarily make differences more manageable. Iran's attitude toward key security issues reflects these differences. Most of the issues summarized in the following paragraphs involve an aspect of the values or principles noted earlier.

Discrimination in Arms Control: The Nonproliferation Treaty

Iran, although a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), is ambiguous about its ultimate intentions. It tends to allude to the major nuclear weapons states' obligations to undertake disarmament (Article 6) and to the unequal way in which the

United States in particular seeks to tighten the treaty while applying it only selectively. Iran's complaint is that a nonmember such as Israel is exempt from pressures³³ while members (formerly) in good standing, such as Iran, are the object of sanctions and propaganda. In this view, the U.S. selectivity and adherence to a double standard stand out and are unacceptable. Underlying Iran's resentment, however, is a simple fact: NPT is a discriminatory treaty, with two classes of states. Unlike other multilateral arms control conventions such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, where all states are prohibited a category of weapons, in NPT, states are given different rights and privileges. NPT is an unequal treaty³⁴ that also is selectively enforced and adhered to. Iran, as a revolutionary state, would not have adhered to the treaty if it had not inherited membership. A nationalist Iran will find the inequality of the treaty and double standards it implies no less chafing.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Technology Control

Will a more open, democratic Iran eschew development of weapons of mass destruction? This will depend upon its security environment (Iraq) and on its alternatives—access to other forms of deterrence and retaliation. It is these security factors, rather than ideology, that have determined Iran's arms programs. Iran has sought missiles when denied aircraft spare parts and persisted when it found them easier to manage and develop domestically, hence increasing, in its view, its self-reliance. Similarly, the development of chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) capabilities can be traced to Iran's experience with Iraq and the need for a deterrent.³⁵

The United States has depicted Iranian interest in missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical materials and technology as a threat to international security. It has also sought to block Iran's access to them, bilaterally and through various regimes and supplier clubs. Iran has argued that such policies amount to attempt to displace existing conventions deny relevant technology to states to keep them backward and dependent.³⁶ This is an old issue. How will globalization affect it?

The United States has had difficulty controlling the flow of technology, much of which is dual-use technology and not easily categorized. Most allies, often commercial competitors, do not always share the U.S. view of the threat posed by particular states or of the way to deal with it. Increasingly, defense technology will be drawn from the commercial sector and from a global base. "The U.S. denial of that technology to all potential enemies will be impossible."³⁷ Access to technology will become easier with globalization, and commercial incentives will make it more available than before. Countries such as Iran can use the new suppliers of technology, disguise sources of supply and identify purchasers, muddy the intended uses of technology, and exploit commercial competition among suppliers to acquire virtually everything they need. Globalization may have created gaps between states more transparent and less tolerable and made technology flows harder to control.

What of the charge that Iranian WMD programs constitute a threat to the region and broader international security? Iran's CW and BW programs constitute options intended as hedges against an Iraqi breakout. Missiles are a substitute for aircraft and now have a domestic constituency of their own. They epitomize self-reliance, are relatively cheap and effective in terms of penetration and mobility (survivability),

and are depicted domestically as evidence of Iran's technological progress. The U.S. charge that these programs are interrelated and intended for aggressive or threatened use (that is, for intimidation) against Iran's neighbors is not fully plausible. (It is, for example, difficult to invent a plausible scenario wherein Iranian threats do not push the GCC states closer to the United States.) Iran's rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the GCC states has increased confidence on both sides; defense ministers have exchanged visits, and agreements have been reached on combating terrorism.

The continued sale of sophisticated aircraft to the GCC states, the latest example being the ultramodern 80 F-16s to Abu Dhabi³⁸ (a state that will have difficulty finding qualified pilots) does little to strengthen the case for regional restraint. The U.S. offer of a theater missile defense system for the GCC, while welcomed, will also be seen skeptically by states that may wonder in whose interest it is.

U.S. concerns about WMD proliferation in the Gulf appear to be focused less on their potential use between Iraq and Iran (the most likely scenario) and more on their impact on U.S. freedom of action in the region. As Iran evolves politically and its relations with the United States improve, the United States will find that its assessment of Iranian intentions will change; however, absent a major change in the threat from Iraq, Iran is unlikely to change its policies on hedging on weapons of mass destruction.

UN Special Commission and the U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf

The presence of some 30,000 U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf since 1991 has altered the balance of power in the region. Iran's attitude toward the U.S. presence reflects an ambivalence stemming from the discrete functions these forces play. One function of the U.S. presence is to ensure that Iraq complies with UN resolutions, especially those pertaining to disarmament in the WMD area. This function as the basis for the inspection regime—the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and its successor, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)—is emphatically in Iran's national interest. Given Tehran's concerns about Iraqi WMD intentions, the U.S. role is a stabilizing one.

A second function, to contain Iran, is less welcome. The U.S. military presence in the Gulf dilutes Iran's diplomatic influence and reduces its leverage with its neighbors. Iran thus opposes U.S. presence as destabilizing. Related to this is Iran's attitude toward periodic attempts to punish Iraq for noncompliance, terrorism, or some other infraction. However much Iran welcomes the weakening of Saddam's Iraq, it cannot but be concerned by the implicit subtext of attacks on a neighbor; these act as warnings to Tehran that its turn to be punished may be next and that the United States has the means and latitude to punish recalcitrant states at will. Iran is thus a prominent critic of attacks on Iraq, seeing in them not enforcement of UN resolutions directly in its national interest but rather evidence of the self-appointed, trigger-happy sheriff of the new era of U.S. primacy.

Iran has sought to reassure its neighbors by engaging in diplomatic exchanges and confidence building. It hopes in time to encourage the GCC to engage in regional cooperation, thus rendering the U.S. presence unnecessary. The thinking is that joint military operations and exercises, "to restore peace and stability" to the region, will

act as a prelude to the conclusion of “defence accords,” which, in turn, will make the presence of foreign forces unnecessary.³⁹

Iran’s opposition to U.S. presence is not ideological; no aspirant regional power would welcome the forces of an external power as a permanent presence in its vicinity.⁴⁰ Nationalism also plays a role. Depending on the evolution of Iran-U.S. relations and on the U.S. proclivity to use force in the region, one rationale for developing a nuclear capability in Iran could become the ability to deter attacks from the United States, whether labeled punitive, preventive, or part of a war on something or other.⁴¹

This opposition is likely to persist, whatever the nature of the relationship with the United States. In an era of globalization, regional powers may come to question the efficacy of reliance on external military powers for the provision of security:

Because of the unstable global security situation, regionalism is one of the United States’ main national security policies. Time, environmental necessities, and regional conditions force us to pursue a policy based on the concept of regionalism. The United States has pursued a policy of undermining relations between Iran and regional countries. Today, it is clear that it has failed. In fact a system of confidence building has dominated our relations with regional countries.⁴²

More concretely, it is unlikely that Iran will reduce its current programs that seek to deny sea control to outside powers by the acquisition of land-based antiship missiles, mines, and submarines.⁴³ The United States will have to accept the fact that globalization has made the diffusion of some types of arms easier and either live with it or offset it.⁴⁴

Implications for U.S. Interests

At the broadest level, globalization accentuates rapid change, with attendant consequences for order. It risks destabilizing states by creating new and greater pressures and demands on them. It weakens the state (or intermediate institutions, in Guehenno’s phrase) or creates new competitors for it and new demands on it. Although globalization threatens to homogenize values (good with respect to human rights concerns, bad if it means a dumbing down), it creates its own antithesis. Nationalist and fundamentalist backlashes and the conscious cultivation of identities and cultures may be a response. Globalization may accentuate inequalities (winners and losers) or, equally bad, *perceptions* of inequalities. Globalization reflects and accentuates a phenomenon implicit in its title—the widening of interests and interdependence, not between regions but on a broader level, of planet Earth.

The equation of globalization with Americanization and the attribution to the United States of a broader conspiracy to weaken or infect others with cultural threats and viruses reflect a broader consideration: concern about the U.S. undoubted power. Because the United States is viewed as a hyperpower, its unilateralism elicits concern, even from allies. It may in time see the emergence of an antihegemonic coalition to offset unconstrained and unrivaled U.S. power or, more likely, bring disappointment to its possessor for its limited returns. The Nation will have to live with an ungrateful world, surrounded by sullen spoilers, free riders, and carping friends.

At this level, U.S. policy must balance leadership with the need for consultation and consensus and mix engagement with deterrence and selective involvement with self-restraint (or abstention). The current international system is complicated, and complexity is not the strongest American suit. Whether seen as a three-dimensional chessboard or simply as a multileveled game, diplomacy will need to mix the old and the new, “cruise missiles and the Internet.”⁴⁵ Nuance and subtlety may be antithetical to the public mood or culture of American institutions, but most issues today require multilateral consensus if solutions are to be found, even if all consulted are not equally endowed or responsible.

How will globalization affect the Persian Gulf States specifically? The initial effect will be destabilization. The control and authority of the state will be under challenge. Expectations, demands, and loads on government will increase. Pressures for more open, accountable systems will increase. Economic performance will rise in salience and be a more acute factor in regime legitimacy (performance legitimacy). Iran’s move toward democracy may create a “demonstration effect” that increases pressures on other states.⁴⁶ The question of the role of Islam in politics, as in culture and identity, will continue to fester and may be aggravated by the perception of globalization’s assault on values. States may choose to step aside and seek autonomy, a phrase without meaning in an interdependent world (risking marginalization) or accept globalization, entanglement, and the consequent loss of autonomy.⁴⁷

In the Persian Gulf, we see side by side the existence of traditional military security threats from unresolved conflicts; differences over territory, resources, and the newer security threats associated with globalization; demographic and political pressures for reform; and transparency. If Iraq represents the continuance of the old agenda, Iran reflects the mix with the newer issues, a case of reluctant globalization, as demonstrated by the attempt at transition to more representative government to meet the new pressures. Democracy may be the best answer we have, but the democratization process is uneven and its outcome not foreordained. It will destabilize the region, including key allies such as Saudi Arabia. A democratic Iran may find the United States no more congenial than does an Islamic Iran. Regional dynamics will remain the driving force behind international politics. This is not meant, however, to suggest irrelevance. Regional decisions will be made in light of regional perceptions of likely U.S. roles, postures, and policies—that is, in the shadow of potential intervention.⁴⁸ American influence, direct and indirect, will thus be considerable; however, the risks of miscalculation on the part of regional states is ever present, as we have seen. There is no reason to expect either spontaneous democratization in the region or the flowering of a security community in the short run. The Persian Gulf will continue to see the use and threat of force and the balance of power as necessary ingredients of security.

Conclusions and Key Recommendations

Globalization comes at a time of unmatched U.S. military power. There is no reason to believe that this primacy will be threatened or that others will harness technology to create a system of systems. Doubts remain, however, as to whether this

military power is translatable into political results and whether the United States has the political will to make commitments that can be sustained over time. Widening disparities in military capabilities and the “revolution in military affairs” will not be alleviated, and may even be aggravated, by globalization. This may encourage states to adopt asymmetrical strategies, in which they seek to use simple but effective technologies against U.S. vulnerabilities.⁴⁹ They may do this by exploiting the range of ballistic missiles and threatening the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. allies in-theater or beyond, or by targeting friendly forces or vulnerable fixed bases. In all cases, the aims would be the same: to decouple the region from outside forces, to limit U.S. options, and to insulate their local area.⁵⁰

States *may* resort to indirect strategies, acting against the interests of the United States and its allies through terrorism, which could not incontrovertibly be proved to be their responsibility. Rapid *faits accomplis*, clandestine maneuvers, threats—all would be aimed at making their homeland a sanctuary and offsetting U.S. military power. (None of this has worked so far, and raising the stakes may not be the optimum strategy, even for Iraq.) Such strategies would seek effective technologies as de facto equalizers and constrain the unlimited ability of the Nation to visit destruction on them from a distance. In the case of Iran, while missiles are seen as necessary in themselves, weapons of mass destruction are seen as a necessary evil vis-à-vis other weapons (in the hands of Iraq). Misestimation of relative military power or overreliance on military power on the part of Iran seems unlikely. Unlike Iraq, Iran is territorially a status quo power. In the case of Iraq, with the deterioration of its conventional capabilities, the options other than surrender and the clandestine cultivation (retention) of weapons of mass destruction are not very clear. Short of direct threats to regime or homeland, I do not see these states as inclined to use weapons of mass destruction or as reckless undeterrables.

U.S. success in operationalizing *compellence*, admittedly always difficult, has so far been less than impressive. One could argue that the use of latent force by the United States in East Asia, China, and Korea has been more effective than its actual use in Kosovo and Iraq. Forces in being and force withheld, combined with other measures, have proven effective.

By weakening borders, blurring domestic and foreign distinctions, speeding unrestricted information access, and spreading production, globalization makes the diffusion of technology, including militarily relevant technology, much harder to control. The lesson of sanctions and embargoes and even of the most intrusive arms control system ever devised (UNSCOM) is that the determined evaders can get away with a lot. The use of force and threats has proved almost powerless to reverse the situation. Moreover, the use of force convinces states that they are better off with the means to deter outside powers, or at least complicate their interventions. Furthermore, with virtual capabilities, destroying the knowledge base becomes harder. A different approach, one dealing with incentives, is needed.

Proliferation is a phenomenon limited to a handful of states that live in a zone of recent interstate wars and in the shadow of further rounds of war. For these states, there are perceived concrete benefits in seeking weapons of mass destruction. Denial and punishment strategies do not deal with the motives of these states. A policy based

more on the North Korean model of mixing inducements with deterrence might lead to better technology transfer controls. Specifically, a policy that calibrated the level of technology offered with the degree of transparency the target state accepted may be more productive. Thus, the United States should consider offering Iran appropriate nuclear technology in exchange for increased transparency—for example, acceptance of the new enhanced safeguards system (93+2) or equivalent safeguards. Policies mixing deterrence and inducements might be more effective (and easier for the regional state to sell domestically). Above all, as the example from the nuclear domain illustrates, states reverse their programs as a result of two major factors: a change in domestic regime, which no longer values these weapons (for example, Argentina and Brazil); and a change in the regional environment (such as South Africa). One assumes a regime change in Iran or Iraq or a change in the regional environment could set the stage for regression in these states' programs.

As Andreani persuasively argues, the United States must integrate its nonproliferation and *regional* policies.⁵¹ If the major issue concerning the use of weapons of mass destruction revolves around their likely use between Iran and Iraq, rather than between either and the GCC, policies that seek to stabilize the relations *between* these two states are important. "Dual containment" does not speak to this problem. Engaging Iran and devising a policy for post-Saddam Iraq will require some attention to regional structures for diplomacy and arms control. It requires addressing the need any Iraqi regime will have for access to the Gulf's waters and the reasonable requirement that Iraq not be singled out for prohibitions of particular classes of weapons systems. This means considering what types of guarantees might make it easier for Kuwait to consider leasing arrangements that Iraq might accept. The United States will have to consider what level of technology is safe in Iran, what safeguards provide adequate levels of reassurance, and what constitutes a weapons of mass destruction. Is it ballistic missiles alone? In exchange, it will have to reconsider its high-technology arms export policies. Will theater missile defenses encourage a local arms race or deter one? In brief, the United States will have to consider whether dual containment helps or hinders in building a viable regional arrangement and to examine its own expectations and policies more carefully.

The United States must consider whether regional arrangements and institutions⁵² will not benefit its interests as much as the current approach, as Guehenno argues. The United States has been reluctant to encourage a genuinely regional approach, relying on its bilateral influence with Saudi Arabia and GCC. This is a policy that puts all the eggs in one uncertain basket and requires the United States to act as the region's security manager, not of last but rather first resort. This is not sustainable and will aggravate the soft security issues emerging on the peninsula.

The use of soft power should not be underestimated. This Nation remains, for all the criticism leveled against it, important and admired. Even, perhaps especially, those countries most openly hostile to the United States look to it for recognition and acknowledgment and consider it as a great power. America could build on the fund of goodwill that it currently enjoys in the Persian Gulf by policies of engagement and cultural exchanges that flatter the nations in that region and better acquaint them with American society and values. 🌐

Notes

- ¹ Kofi Annan, speech to the UN General Assembly, September 1999.
- ² Cees Hamelink, "The Elusive Concept of Globalisation," *Global Dialogue* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1999), 5.
- ³ Richard A. Falk, "The Monolithic Religions in an Era of Globalisation," *Global Dialogue* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1999), 146.
- ⁴ Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," *Daedalus* 108, no. 4 (Fall 1979), 121.
- ⁵ Bulent Ecevit, "Disparities in the Distribution of Wealth within and among Societies Are Being Augmented to a Disturbing Degree," quoted in Sutherland Davos and Alan Friedman, "Global Elite Are Fretting on Response to Backlash," *International Herald Tribune*, January 29–30, 2000, 1, 13.
- ⁶ "National governments alone simply cannot cope with the challenges presented by a borderless economic system." Peter D. Sutherland, "Beyond the Market: A Different Kind of Equity," *International Herald Tribune*, February 29, 1997, 8.
- ⁷ Dominique Moisi, "The West's Obligations," *The Financial Times*, July 26, 1999, 10.
- ⁸ Jeffrey Garten, "The Challenges of an Emerging World," *The Financial Times*, May 21, 1997, 10.
- ⁹ William Pfaff, "If Globalization Means Westernizing, Then It Means Trouble," *International Herald Tribune*, January 2, 1997, 6. Some analysts, such as Dani Rodrik, see globalization as threatening social cohesion by widening the rift between people with the skills to flourish in the new environment and those without.
- ¹⁰ Falk, "The Monolithic Religions," 144.
- ¹¹ David Apter, "Violences de la Mondialisation," *Le Monde*, December 24, 1999, 16.
- ¹² Martin Wolf, "Far from Powerless," *The Financial Times*, May 13, 1999, 18, quoting the "World Economic Outlook of the IMF" (1997) and Philip Stephens, "The Broken Borders of the Nation-State," *The Financial Times*, December 3, 1999, 15.
- ¹³ See, for example, Gary Sick, "The Coming Crisis on the Persian Gulf," *Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 195–212.
- ¹⁴ Roula Khalaf, "Arab Rulers with a New Agenda," *The Financial Times*, February 3, 2000, 12.
- ¹⁵ Robin Allen, "Saudis Blame 'Unique Status' for Delays in Joining WTO," *The Financial Times*, June 14, 2000, 6.
- ¹⁶ Vandana Shiva, "Diversity and Democracy: Resisting the Global Economy," *Global Dialogue* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1999), 19.
- ¹⁷ Thomas L. Friedman, "Pushing Globalization in a Land of Prayer-Operated Elevators," *International Herald Tribune*, January 29–30, 2000, 6.
- ¹⁸ Anoushirvan Eteshami, "Globalisation and Political Islam," in *Dissociation and Appropriation Responses to Globalization in Asia and Africa: Study No. 10*, eds. Katja Fullberg-Stolberg, Petra Heidrich, and Ellinor Schone (Zentrum Moderner Orient: Verlag Das Arabische Bch., 1999), 107–121.
- ¹⁹ Robert Cooper, *The Post Modern State and World Order* (London: Demos, 1996). Cooper argues that the current differentiated international system is comprised of the "post-modern" states of the Euro-Atlantic area where wars, resources, nationalism, and the like are less relevant and where effectively a peace zone has been established. The third area, which is "pre-modern," largely corresponding to Africa, is preoccupied with state and nation building and creating the capabilities of a modern state, including developing a nationalism, armed forces, and the like.
- ²⁰ Seasoned commentators argue that U.S. strategy should be "built around an active U.S. support for representative democracy not only in Iraq and Iran, but also in the conservative Arab monarchies of the region." Jim Hoagland, "As Clinton Withdraws, Saddam Survives Unchallenged," *International Herald Tribune*, March 2, 2000, 6.

²¹ Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, address to a conference of parliamentarians from Muslim states, Islamic Republic of Iran (IRNA) news agency, Tehran, June 15, reported in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3562/MED/1, June 16, 1999.

²² Ali Khamenei, "Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran," Tehran, April 20, speech in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3822 MED/2, April 24, 2000.

²³ An Iranian student in recent elections was quoted as saying, "In my university, there is no Internet connection, there is no access to the world. In the last election, we voted for Husseini-Nejad, but this time we won't make the same mistake." Geneive Abdo, "Shifting Allegiances Muddle Iran Vote," *International Herald Tribune*, February 5–6, 2000, 2. For the Arab States' similar reactions, see the "Report of Human Rights Watch," which argues that the Arab States have tried and failed to battle against public access to the Internet. David Gardner, "Arab States Fail to Curb Internet," *The Financial Times*, July 8, 1999, 5. The full Human Rights Watch report is available online at <<http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/internet/mena/index.htm>>. See also Howard Schneider, "The Arab World Is Logging on Slowly and Ambivalently to the Internet," *International Herald Tribune*, July 27, 1999, 4. See also Guy Dinmore, "The Ayatollahs Go On-line As Technology Takes on Tradition," *The Financial Times*, June 26, 2000, 18.

²⁴ Ali Khamene'i, "Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran," speech in Tehran, November 3, 1999, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (SWB) ME/3685MED/3, November 6, 1999. As Jean Marie Guehenno has noted, globalization can be seen as Americanization, "a new ideology legitimising the supremacy of a particular power." "The Impact of Globalisation on Strategy," *Survival* 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998/99), 5–16.

²⁵ François Heisbourg, "American Hegemony? Perceptions of the U.S. Abroad," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999/2000), 5–20. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2, 35–49; and James Hoagland, "Military Security, Too, Is a Global Matter Now," *International Herald Tribune*, November 1, 1999, 8.

²⁶ For a critique along these lines, see Marc Weller, "The U.S., Iraq and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999/2000), 81–100.

²⁷ Heisbourg, "American Hegemony?" 12, 17.

²⁸ See *Al Ahrām's* call for Egypt to take Iran's polls as a model. March 2 in BBC SWB ME/3780 MED/11-12, March 4, 2000.

²⁹ Toby Dodge, "Iraq: Fragile Future," *The World Today*, January 2000, 7–9.

³⁰ See, for example, President Clinton's arguments for supporting China's membership of the WTO. David Sanger, "Clinton Sends His China Trade Bill to a Wary Congress," *International Herald Tribune*, March 10, 2000, 3.

³¹ For a recent reminder along these lines, see Philip Bowring, "Why Iranians Will Take Their Time," *International Herald Tribune*, March 10, 2000, 8.

³² Mohammad Khatami, "Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran," February 26 in BBC SWB ME/3775MED/10-11, February 28, 2000.

³³ In discussions about an extended U.S. (nuclear) security guarantee to Israel that might accompany a peace settlement, there has been no mention of Israel's adherence to the NPT. See Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel Warms to U.S.-Proposed Defense Pact," *Defense News* 15, no.8 (February 28, 2000), 1, 60.

³⁴ Reflecting the fact that not all values are commensurable or attainable simultaneously. In this case, the requirements of order and justice clearly conflict.

³⁵ This is discussed at greater length in my *Iran's National Security Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution for the Carnegie Endowment, 1994).

³⁶ There is considerable evidence for this. Most of the new technologies relevant for defense are key for *civilian* sectors of the economy. See Wolfgang Reinicke, "Cooperative Security and the Political Economy of Non-Proliferation," chap. 5, in *Global Engagement: Cooperative Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Janne Nolan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 175–234. For an Iranian re-

view and critique of U.S. denial policies, see Ali Asghar Keyvani Hosseini, "The U.S. and the Technological Ban on Iran," *Journal of Defence Policy* 17, no.1 (Winter 1998/99), 29–68 (in Persian).

³⁷ Ashton B. Carter, "Adapting Defence to Future Needs," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999/2000), 117.

³⁸ Jacques Isnard, "*Washington Vend 80 Avions F-16 Ultramodernes aux Emirats*," *Le Monde*, March 8, 2000, 6. The \$6-billion agreement involves aircraft that the U.S. Defense Secretary has called "the most sophisticated aircraft in existence." See "Lockheed to Sell F-16s to Emirates for \$6 Billion," *International Herald Tribune*, March 6, 2000, 11.

³⁹ For an example of this approach, see the comments of Iranian naval commander Abbas Mohtaj, February 24, in BBC SWB ME/3774MED/9-10, February 26, 2000 and March 4 in ME/3781MED/9, March 6, 2000.

⁴⁰ See Samuel P. Huntington, who sees a pattern in this globally as a response to U.S. policy; Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," 43–47.

⁴¹ François Heisbourg notes that "a perception of a militarily activist U.S. policy" (over-emphasizing the use of force) . . . "may have adverse strategic consequences by providing certain countries with a politically convenient and effective packaging for their attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Faced with overwhelming U.S. airpower, countries such as Iran may wish to avoid the Iraqi mistake of acting aggressively without having at their disposal a credible nuclear force to deter U.S. retaliation." Heisbourg, "American Hegemony?" 13.

⁴² Ali Shamkhani, interview, February 8, 2000, BBC ME3760MED/15-16, February 10, 2000.

⁴³ This was the message of Rear Admiral Danesh-Kar and Vice Admiral Manavi in the military journal *Saff* (November and December editions 1999) as reported in *Iran Report* (RFE) 3, no. 10 (March 6, 2000), 3–4.

⁴⁴ "Air defense and antiship systems are two categories of military systems where the capability that can be procured on the open market has increased dramatically in recent years because the United States and its partners have been unable to agree on restraints." Ashton B. Carter, "Adapting U.S. Defence to Future Needs," 114–115.

⁴⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, "On Key Foreign Policy Issues, the Differences Are Narrowing," *International Herald Tribune*, March 11–12, 2000, 8.

⁴⁶ Howard Schneider, "Will Iran Be a Model for Arab Reform?" *International Herald Tribune*, March 11–12, 2000, 1.

⁴⁷ This is vividly illustrated in the case of Mexico, which has found that it has to be responsive to external pressures regarding environmental concerns because of NAFTA and globalization. Julia Preston, "In Mexico, Nature Lovers Merit a Kiss from a Whale," *The New York Times*, March 5, 2000, 13.

⁴⁸ Lawrence Freedman, "The Changing Forms of Military Conflict," *Survival* 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998/99), 39–56.

⁴⁹ See the message of Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, "A paradox of the new strategic environment is that the American military superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically." William S. Cohen, *The Proliferation Threat* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997), 1.

⁵⁰ For a discussion with Asian examples, see Paul Bracken, "The Second Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.1 (January/February 2000), 146–157. For "limiting U.S. options," see Gilles Andreani, "The Disarray in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999/2000), 56.

⁵¹ Andreani, "The Disarray in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy," 55, 58.

⁵² Guehenno emphasizes the need for institutionalization as a response to globalization. See Guehenno, "The Impact of Globalisation on Strategy."