

Asia-Pacific Security Relations: Changes Ahead

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The United States has an enormous stake in Asian security as well as a large military presence in the region. Although the nations of Asia-Pacific are diverse in character and history, certain regionwide trends are apparent (such as democratization, market-oriented economic policies, and a split between traditionalist and modernist cultures). Four major issues dominate U.S. national security concerns in the area: the division of Korea; the Chinese threat to Taiwan; the rise of Chinese nationalism and anti-Americanism; and the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.

Globalization is a disturbing variable in this complex security environment, but it is only one of several transforming elements—an influence, not a controlling factor. It may be at the leading edge of economic dynamism, but it is still only marginal in strategic impact. But even though globalization may not be the principal motivator, the current Asian security system seems likely to change appreciably in the coming years. Guiding it to a stable outcome will be a key challenge confronting the United States and its allies and friends in the region.

Globalization Defined (and Bounded)

Globalization is a wondrous term, having many meanings and connotations. Using it can create analytical pitfalls, such as a reduction to a small subset of components that include factors not global in scope.¹ Globalization must also be differentiated from other important determinants of modern life, such as modernization, interdependence, and regionalization.² When these considerations are tallied, globalization becomes a category that can refer to almost any development over the last century and that can encompass almost any future possibility. Thus it is essential to be clear about the boundaries and specific contents of globalization.

Dividing a term into its parts and conducting inquiry along the several lines of analysis thus opened can be very useful.³ In the most general sense, globalization includes one or more of the following processes, taking place across the globe, often at widely separated locations:

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- *Acceleration* and, therefore, *constriction* of many long-extant trends, such as the pace of modernization, scientific discovery, and economic transactions.
- *Increased complexity*. The concatenation of processes, each of which is relatively simple, begets a much more complex whole. Examples include the assembly of new high-technology military systems and the use of many different kinds of complex testing equipment in biological research.
- *Boundary breakdown/penetration* geographically, politically, ethnically, and economically, as well as by discipline. Examples abound in all fields, such as the interpenetration of economics and politics, of sociology and anthropology, of political and ethnic boundaries, and the ease of crossing international boundaries (either in person or via various media).
- *Universalization* of cultural and religious norms and values. Examples include contemporary modes of musical expression among young people and the increasing global spread of Christianity and Islam.
- *Technology growth*, the import of ever-higher levels of technology into all aspects of life. Examples include the personal computer, the Internet, email, the cell telephone, and the global positioning satellite.
- *Enlargement* of economic, political, and military units. Examples are the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the emergence of the European Union, and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- *Infinitization*, the fracturing/transcending of long-set limits of time and space at both ends of these spectra. Examples are the emergence of nanotechnology and the reach to near the edge of the universe by new astronomical instruments (both the product of international scientific cooperation).

When combined, these processes appear to constitute the leading edge of change in the contemporary world. They do not, however, define modern life, since most of humanity's activity revolves around coping with the various constants of existence—nature, home and family, geography and climate, and division into communities—and with such slowly evolving processes as genetic change, consumer economic tastes, and the nature of the international state system. Indeed, the temptation must be avoided to presume that globalization dominates, or even significantly penetrates, most levels of current endeavor. It does not. At best, globalization operates at the margins of the whole. Further, other agents of change are more important than globalization: population size and location, the relative pace of economic development between nations, and the propensity to democratization and marketization, to name three. Globalization may influence these other agents of change, but chief attention must be paid first to them and only thereafter to globalization as a disturbing variable.

Two final cautions must be entered. First, the tendency must be resisted to extend the various processes under this rubric, important though they are, to the outer bounds of international relations as a whole. The thesis of much of the work in the field is that globalization is rapidly transforming the nation-state system; organized violence; trade, markets, and finance; material production; population; culture; and the environment.⁴ Globalization may become the driving force that changes interna-

tional relations beyond current comprehension, but not during the next decade or two. International and security relations, and the foreign and national security policies made as a consequence, will remain dominated by states, by the propensity to use force as the leitmotif of foreign policy, by domestic economic determinants of production, by the continued dominance of traditional culture, and by the environment.

Second, much of the thinking about globalization tends to be done by either economists or technologists, with the consequent reduction of the whole to processes in their fields. For example, they study the growth of international trade and its increasing control by large corporations, the changing international division of material production, the interdependence of international finance, the influence of the computer and the Internet, the spread of information via satellite and television, the ability to move about the globe with relative ease and speed, and the various changes in military capabilities summed by the term *command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I)*.⁵ All these are increasingly important for foreign and defense policies, in general and in Asia. But globalization is broader than these influences alone.

National Security Defined (and Bounded)

Like globalization, over the last several decades, the meaning of the term *national security* has been expanded to include practically any cross-boundary event or process.⁶ Politics is the reason—relating some matter or issue to the national security raises it to a higher level of discourse, gives it a kind of objectivity, and provides it with an aura that justifies the investment of national resources, whether monetary, material, informational, attitudinal, or technological. As such, anything can be placed in that category. Moreover, the phrase *in the national interest* can be attached. Since national interest⁷ also can place a mantle of objectivity over any matter, national security becomes doubly sacrosanct. It thus becomes of no policy utility, being all-inclusive.

It is thus appropriate to reduce national security to its original meaning: matters of a specific military nature (having to do with the threat or use of physical force) that concern the physical survival of a national entity (one possessing territory, population, economy, and government). Such matters include military forces and their armaments, military budgets, the military component of international relations, and defense policies and strategies, but they do not include, directly, the political, economic, diplomatic, or cultural motives or policy means that stand behind these matters or that are parts of the more inclusive foreign policy. National security also includes a comparative and relational element (for example, the interaction of the United States and China in Asia or the overall military equation in that region). Although many nonspecifically military matters contribute to national security, allowing their direct consideration reopens the floodgates and permits expansion to a completely unwieldy whole. Moreover, since *globalization* is also a general term, reduction of national security to military security makes it possible to assess their relationship in a meaningful and policy-relevant manner.

Asian International and Security Relations at the Millennium

Regionwide Characteristics

At the turn of the millennium, Asia evidences six regionwide characteristics. First, stretching from Pakistan to Korea and including the Russian Far East, Asia is a relatively autonomous arena of post-Cold War global patterns and processes. What happens within this enormous area is largely the product of structures and developments within each of its 24 nations, regions, or nation-like entities.⁸ It is true that external state actors (especially the United States), collections of states (for example, the European Union), some distant regional powers (such as the relevant oil-exporting nations of the Middle East), and some international organizations (for example, the United Nations [UN] and its specialized agencies, together with many international nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) exert influence over the region and its four subregions: Northeast Asia, China/East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. A total picture of Asia-based and Asia-related activities, however, reveals an enormous welter of astonishing dynamism within the region as a whole and within each of these subregions, with external influences being only a small portion of the total.⁹

Second, no widely accepted system of behavioral rules exists to regulate activities among Asia's constituent units. There is no balance-of-power system, no collective security system, no great power condominium, or any of the other traditional means of regulating cross-boundary behavior. The closest Asia approaches to any such arrangement is a kind of watery Pax Americana, based on the Cold War set of Washington-centered alliances and guarantees to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand, with presumed extension to some other Southeast Asian nations. This arrangement is shaky and subject to diverse interpretations, is frontally opposed by China, and surely does not extend to South Asia (where a crumbling left-over Cold War framework centered on India and Pakistan continues a shadowy existence).¹⁰ It is also subject to challenge by economic processes and institutions (replacement of military-related interstate competition with a combination of state-centered and market-based economic interstate competition). But that challenge has not proceeded far enough to replace the former, weak though it is.

Third, two of Asia's four subregions, South and Southeast Asia, are strategically isolated from Northeast and East Asia, and South Asia has relatively few contacts with the other subregions. There is little subregional organization: Northeast Asia has almost none; East Asia, none; Southeast Asia, only the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is increasingly weak; and South Asia, only the nascent South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The only regionwide security institution—if it can be termed that—is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); there is no such economic institution, although the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperative (APEC) forum provide partial substitutes. The region is therefore knit together, to some extent, only by the forward deployment military policy of the United States, the aforementioned Washington-centered treaties and guarantees, and the general wariness of China, in national security terms; and by cross-boundary trade, the activities of multinational corporations,

the central banks of the major powers, investment and brokerage houses, and stock markets, in economic terms.

Fourth, all Asian nations, except North Korea, concentrate most of their energies on domestic affairs, especially economic modernization and recovery from the economic crisis of 1997–1998 (or, in North Korea's case, physical and political survival). That effort leaves little room for foreign policy-related issues. Nonetheless, two of the three remaining communist-governed states, China and North Korea, often are considered current or likely threats to the military or economic security of their neighbors.¹¹ That has not, generally, led the others to seek direct protection from the United States—the only source—but it does provide Washington with additional policy latitude toward Asia as the protector of last resort.

Fifth, certain regionwide trends are apparent: democratization, marketization, rapid economic growth, interdependence, and bifurcation between traditionalist and modernist cultures.¹² Those nations farthest along in these processes are the most highly respected within and outside the region, and those that have moved least far are looked up to much less. Generally perceived as having succeeded in all these spheres of activity, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are at the top of most lists; North Korea and Burma are at the bottom; and the others are spread out between. There is a tendency in the region to move toward the upper levels—slowed, to be sure, by the 1997–1998 economic crisis in the case of several Southeast Asian states. All but North Korea and Burma aspire to higher status along all the nonculturally related dimensions. Modernization in all its aspects does, everywhere, produce a conflict between traditionalist and modernist culture. The revival or persistence of traditionalist culture is expressed in different manners in the various states—for instance, Confucian paternalism, Islamic fervor, and Buddhist and Christian revival—and is sometimes linked with the rebirth of nationalist pride in pre-modern era accomplishments and status. This often produces an amalgam of traditionalism and modernism not previously seen in the region, sometimes with important policy consequences (as in North Korea, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan).

Finally, most Asian states and quasi-state entities (for example, Hong Kong and Taiwan) participate in, have agreed to abide by, or aspire to accede to most of the general international treaties and agreements regarding such issues as the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear test bans, environmental concerns, control of export of missile technology, and the actions of the WTO, the United Nations, and the UN specialized agencies. In many instances, these Asian nations are flooded with the activities and personnel of a large number of international nongovernmental organizations. The exceptions, once again, are North Korea and Burma.

National Security Issues

Although there are several others of lesser importance, as previously mentioned, there are four major issues that dominate national security: the division of Korea, the Chinese threat to Taiwan, the rise of Chinese nationalism and anti-Americanism, and the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.

Division of Korea. The North Korea military threat to South Korea remains the most persistent and most dangerous security issue on a day-to-day basis.¹³ Despite some marginal changes in Pyongyang's exceedingly aggressive military posture and policy in the post-Kim Il-Sung period, and despite the vast weakening of the economic and political status of the Northern regime, the military threat continues unabated. It could lead quickly to vast destruction; death and injury to millions of people; use by the Northern regime of chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons; possible escalation to nuclear weapons by the United States; a possible wider war between China and the United States; and spread of conflict to the Taiwan Straits. While all other concerned states agree, directly or tacitly, to place whatever limits seem possible on Pyongyang's potential to initiate war, and while the turn of the millennium has seen some hope for substantive improvement (as opposed to mere maneuvering) between the two Koreas, no major change has yet occurred in North Korea's military dispositions or its political/negotiating posture.

Chinese Military Threat to Taiwan. Extant from 1950, by the late 1990s the Chinese threat to Taiwan reached the level of acute danger of a major cross-Straits conflict that would involve the United States.¹⁴ This has raised the possibility of a direct U.S.-China war. Two "rehearsals" of such a conflict occurred in the mid-1990s, and Beijing's level of threat—both diplomatic and military—rose greatly late in the decade. With the coming to power in Taipei of the Democratic Progressive Party in early 2000, the two Chinese entities are poised on the brink of Mainland Chinese-initiated conflict. The United States is hastening its efforts to avoid conflict by carrying out diplomatic efforts in both Chinese capitals, by accelerating arms transfers and augmenting security guarantees to Taiwan, and by increasing its own readiness to participate in conflict. The potential for war, both regional and global, has thus increased, and only a combination of strong diplomatic initiatives and mutual military restraint will seemingly avert a conflict. Such a war could, if escalated to the nuclear level, kill many millions of people in both countries, spell the end of Chinese economic modernization attempts for decades, severely cripple the United States, and damage Asian and global international relations for many years.

Rise of Chinese Nationalism. The general rise in China's power status¹⁵ (the product of its rapid economic development since 1979), combined with the concomitant emergence of a virulent antiforeign (mostly anti-Japanese and anti-American) nationalism, threatens stability throughout the region. In Northeast Asia, for example, China has restored a close working relationship with Russia and has an all-but-announced alliance with it based on anti-American security cooperation and accelerated sale of advanced Russian military systems to China. It also plays a dual game on the Korean Peninsula, holding back Pyongyang and befriending Seoul on the one hand, but continuing to supply missile parts and technology to the North and attempting to pull the South away from its close security ties with the United States on the other. Beijing plays up its anti-Japanese stance at practically every turn, based on Tokyo's marginally upgraded security relations with Washington, Japan's unwillingness to issue a full apology to China—complete with reparations—for its World War II transgressions, and the suspicion—without substantive basis—that Japan will soon rearm and face China again militarily. This policy drives Tokyo away from attempt-

ing a full reconciliation with China; furthermore, when combined with Beijing's threats against Taiwan and its insistence on expanding its territorial waters to those around the contested Senkaku Islands, China's policy arouses Japanese resentment and causes Japanese leaders to work more closely with U.S. leaders.

In Southeast Asia, China not only claims all the South China Sea and all the Spratly Islands as its own but also progressively projects its naval and air power into the region. It refuses all ASEAN-based proposals to negotiate the matter or submit it to legal proceedings, and it turns away militarily all regional attempts at redress. It has also made Burma an economic satellite, severely constraining Rangoon's foreign policy options, and uses that country's territory for intelligence purposes.

In South Asia, China maintains its historically close anti-Indian ties with Pakistan, although it tries to stay away from the Kashmir dispute and has engaged in some minor border-related confidence-building measures with India. Beijing's policy is generally anti-Indian, which was a major factor in causing New Delhi to reveal, in 1998, its nuclear capability and accelerate development of a missile-based nuclear deterrence.

In its transpacific activities and in its policies toward other regions and issues, China has become anti-American. It criticizes Washington whenever the latter undertakes any kind of international initiative, whether that initiative relates to humanitarian needs, peacekeeping, economic decisions, or human rights. The stage is being set for a major security confrontation and, in all probability, a new Cold War. As such, all Asian and Asian-related matters in which both the United States and China are involved are rapidly being infused with bilateral competition for regional (and, later, global) power. Most Asian subregional policies of the United States and China are also being subordinated to this larger competition. The propensity to conflict will thus rise as previously bilateral U.S.-Chinese cooperation (as in the case of North Korea) drops away. New security issues will be addressed in that zero-sum context and therefore will tend to escalate, and such nonsecurity concerns as economic, environmental, and human rights issues will be subordinated to the new military competition.

Dispute over Kashmir. There is little prospect for settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The dispute could, at any time, broaden into major conflict between these two South Asian states.¹⁶ Such a conflict could involve nuclear attacks on their respective major cities, killing and injuring millions. A nuclear exchange would, of course, be disastrous for both and would represent the first use of such weapons since 1945. That, in turn, could open the door to their use elsewhere—not only by other countries in Asia, but also by countries in the Middle East and by Russia—and would destroy the global effort, over several decades, to rid the planet of weapons of mass destruction. If nuclear weapons were to be used in this conflict, the use of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction would be increasingly probable.

Other Security Issues. Of lesser severity in terms of immediacy and potential for destruction and escalation, there are three other classes of Asian security issues:

- Traditional issues¹⁷—the Russo-Japanese dispute over the Northern Islands, South China Sea controversies among the non-Chinese littoral states, the ques-

tion of the territorial viability of Indonesia, the character of the Burmese military regime and integrity of that country, and civil war in Sri Lanka.

- Nontraditional issues sometimes thought of in the context of globalization¹⁸—piracy, smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal migration, refugees, control of the spread of disease, environmental issues, and fisheries questions.
- Issues that concern the evolving shape of Asian security as a whole and changing relations among the major regional actors¹⁹—the continuing role of the United States as overall security guarantor for the region and the changes needed in the U.S. forward presence strategy in response to changing regional security relations, U.S. security policy elsewhere, and domestic determinants of U.S. policy; prospects for change in U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-South Korean relations; the reemergence of Russia as a full player in Asian security relations and Moscow's role meanwhile as China's ally and arms supplier; accommodation of India's more dynamic regional policy; whether ASEAN will recover enough internal unity to act together and thus become interested in transforming itself into a subregional security community, were external threats to warrant such.

A possible fourth class of issue arises from concern about whether Indonesia can remain a single political entity and, if not, the security consequences of the territorial breakup of that giant island entity.

When these six Asian regionwide security-related characteristics, the four major security issues, and the panoply of less severe security issues are summed, the result is a highly complex amalgam. It should immediately be apparent that globalization in the general sense, as defined earlier, is only one element in that mixture, probably of policy-transforming importance only in the long run (if at all), and likely to be overwhelmed by critical security challenges in the meanwhile. It follows that the globalization-related issues mentioned in the preceding discussion must occupy a relatively unimportant place in the lengthy list of lesser Asian security concerns. Thus, the initial decision to consider security issues per se unadulterated by globalization appears justifiable.

U.S. Policies toward Asia—Globalization Excluded

At the turn of the millennium, the Asia policy of the United States remains a loose collection of autonomous schemes, according to region, issue, government department, and private institution. This assortment sometimes is pasted together and reconciled at the White House level, but often is not. Moreover, the Congress has its own version of Asia policy, often at variance with, or opposed to, that of the executive branch. Private industry has a still different policy (or, rather, a set of different policies, as there is no full unity among Asia-oriented corporations), and the myriad of interest groups, think tanks, the media, and influential individuals pursue their own goals toward Asia, either directly or indirectly, by attempting to sway the Congress or the executive branch departments. The approaches, attitudes, and full-blown policies thus are broad, diverse, and often as contradictory as American society as a whole. Nonetheless, there is substantial agreement in some areas.

In the broadest (that is, diplomatic²⁰) terms, the United States pursues a policy of access to, and full participation in, the affairs of Asia, applying its own “national interests” to that region and taking care that it has the requisite means to carry out these goals. In the post-Cold War decade, this has meant a policy of *laissez faire*/status quo, as the United States enjoys its status as the region’s only superpower. Hence, the United States does not wish to move to another distribution of power (balance, great power condominium, or collective security)²¹ and instead strives to extend *Pax Americana* as long as possible. In turn, this prompts a strategy of delay in addressing the various issues noted previously. Because of the six regionwide Asian characteristics that have been described, Washington can carry out this strategy with relative ease: policy attention can be minimized, power resources efficiently applied, and in general, a relaxed and confident attitude adopted.

In military security terms,²² this strategy of delay entails:

- Continuation of alliances and security guarantees left over from the Cold War.
- A forward presence (meaning 100,000 personnel from all services in the Western Pacific, mostly in Japan and Korea, but also afloat and in Guam).
- Places not bases (reconciliation to the loss of bases in the Philippines, but their partial replacement with agreements for repair/recreation/joint operations in peacetime and possible use of bases in designated security threat situations).
- Work with all regional governments to settle or postpone disputes (preferably by the governments in question, secondarily by U.S. participation, and only lastly by threat or use of U.S. military force).
- A policy of engagement toward three of the four regional communist governments (excluding North Korea, toward which a combination of tripwire-plus-escalation military deterrence and offers to negotiate differences continues).
- Reconciliation (to the extent possible) with Russia.

There is no attempt to pursue a unified military policy toward all four Asian subregions, even though they all lie within the area of responsibility of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command. From mid-decade, a tendency has emerged to concentrate on the heightening Chinese threat to Taiwan and, concomitantly, on Beijing’s increasing military power and pugnacity toward Washington. While this focus could motivate the United States to shift to a quasi-containment strategy toward China and thus to try to weld together an Asia-wide anti-China coalition, the United States has resisted this departure from the engagement strategy in place since the early 1970s.

Economically,²³ the United States continues to pursue its historical policy of relatively free trade, extending the most-favored-nation principle as widely as possible (except, as in the case of North Korea, where military security considerations intervene). Because American corporations encounter various trade and financial barriers to doing business in many Asian countries—whether military allies, market economies, former communist enemies, or other relatively closed economies—resulting in a negative trade balance with many in the region, the U.S. Government uses a panoply of trade tools to press for freer markets. These include annual reviews of trade,

various unilateral trade sanctions and threats, reciprocal closings or constrictions of the American market for certain products, and quota arrangements.

In finance, aside from the standard use of the Import-Export Bank to encourage trade, the United States leaves currency and investment matters to a combination of private markets and the global investment/finance institutions, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Because private American financial institutions (the stock markets and investment banking houses) are so strong worldwide and in Asia, and because the World Bank and IMF are essentially under American control, Washington assumes that a policy of benign neglect toward Asian financial matters is best; when necessary, Washington can apply more direct pressure on governments thought to be recalcitrant in terms of American economic goals. For the same reasons as with military security, this combination has worked with efficiency and ease, at least until the Asian financial crisis that began in mid-1997. Thereafter, U.S. policy has changed to a more directly participatory and interventionist financial policy as concerns the states principally affected (Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia); those that could find themselves next in crisis, especially Japan; and reform of the World Bank and IMF.

Washington also has been constrained to ease up, if only slightly, on its emerging anti-China policy, since that country, paradoxically, is so important economically and beset with so many internal economic problems as to require careful treatment. U.S. economic policy toward the subcontinent, especially India, tends to be kept separate from that toward the other subregions, both because of comparative disinterest (India's relative unimportance in American eyes) and because of that country's slowly liberalizing international economic policy.

The human rights component of U.S. Asia policy has early roots.²⁴ In the post-Cold War decade, however, it has risen in importance to at least equality with security, if not economic, policy. The reasons are not only the commanding U.S. power position and the lack of serious and immediate security threats in the region (with the exception of North Korea), but also the transition to democracy in South Korea and Taiwan, its continuation in Japan, and its hoped-for spread to most other Asian nations—even those still under communist rule. Although the Congress has taken the lead, both Democratic and Republican administrations also have fully participated in focusing attention on this component of U.S. Asia policy, while a myriad of NGOs have taken it upon themselves to be the shock troops of the new moral offensive. Indeed, the human rights movement has deep roots throughout American society, and the new policy initiatives toward Asia are part of a newly activist approach to all regions.

A focus on human rights is poorly integrated with security and economics in policy terms, and it sometimes causes otherwise avoidable Asian criticism of the overall U.S. approach to the region. But the emphasis on human rights has risen to prominence nonetheless, fueled by untoward events in Asia itself—the shootings in Tiananmen Square, many other gross violations of human rights in China and East Timor in Indonesia, military suppression of democracy in Burma, deliberate starvation of the citizenry by the North Korean regime, and widespread factory labor abuses. The concern over human rights clearly will not recede to Cold War-like levels, but neither will it integrate easily into a new, more ordered U.S. Asian policy.

Although the United States does not yet possess a general policy toward globalization per se,²⁵ and certainly not one toward globalization in Asia, there is an emerging appreciation of the phenomenon. Also, there is a developing attitude, if not a full-blown national interest-based policy, toward globalization and its expression in Asia. Begun by scholars and analysts, taken up by pundits and the media, and made into an assumption of great significance by policymakers, suspicion has mounted that a new era has dawned and that globalization has become an operator on U.S. "national interests" as a whole, on various means of policy, and on specific policy issues. The argument also turns in opposing directions. Globalization is, on balance, good for the United States since it is the leader of the movement and, thus, could add globalization to its quiver of powerful policy instruments. Or, globalization is neutral in its effect on various countries and policy issues, and thus the United States has nothing to gain or to lose by it (although surely globalization's effect, positive and negative, will be great). Or, globalization will affect the United States greatly and negatively, given the "advanced" nature of the United States, and should thus be resisted. Whatever the outcome of that debate, it is increasingly assumed that globalization already has significantly altered the very basis of U.S. foreign and defense policies and that rethinking and reconfiguring of interests, power means, and policies are all required.

U.S. Policies toward Asia—Globalization Included

By the mid-1990s, globalization caused a few changes in the U.S. Asian policy. But the combination of the presumed effects of globalization elsewhere, together with the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and beyond, has focused attention on that policy.

Strategic Priorities

Diplomatically, Washington has begun to overlook what it heretofore has known to be the case—Asia's enormous diversity—and instead has begun to conduct its Asian policy consonant with its own evaluation of common trends associated with globalization. In particular, it tends to evaluate regional states and their policies according to four criteria: how fast they are moving along certain paths (such as modernization, democratization, marketization) assumed to be consistent with globalization; to what extent they are participating in the globalization-related revolutions of encomplexification, technologization, and infinitization; whether they are subject to aspects of universalization (for example, Islamization, interest in human rights, or the increasing penetration of American popular culture); and how easy it is to communicate with and travel to and within these Asian states. Perception of these changes cuts both ways. Some consider them reasons to continue, with even greater efficiency and ease, the policy of Pax Americana. Others feel that these influences present an opportunity for the United States to carry out a new diplomatic offensive in favor, as it were, of Americanization of the globe as a whole. Still others conclude that globalization should be approached much more cautiously; that the United States could be affected negatively, and quickly; and that a more conservative, if not reactionary, policy is warranted. In any case, a debate about globalization has ensued,

which has somewhat unsettled post-Cold War assumptions concerning the longevity of the U.S. position as the globe's only superpower and the arbiter of Asian affairs.

Militarily, globalization's effects on U.S. Asian policy are easier to perceive. The acceleration of the pace of change in military technology—the revolution in military affairs (RMA)—causes U.S. defense officials to increasingly emphasize research, development, and fielding of new high-technology military systems. This new emphasis has been ratified somewhat by their use elsewhere—against Islamic terrorist camps in Afghanistan and in Kosovo, for instance, as well as in the easy victory of the Persian Gulf War. New sea-borne and airborne systems have thus been deployed to Asia, particularly in relation to North Korea and in support of Taiwan's defense against possible mainland attack. Some conclude that the United States can feel increasingly confident about its military prowess because it possesses all the requisite factors for keeping ahead of possible opponents in the revolution in military affairs. Maintaining that lead will take a great deal of money, talent, and effort, of course, but this aspect of military globalization plays directly to U.S. strengths. Others are not so sure that the task of maintaining American superiority will be so easy. They note with increasing concern that China is accelerating its own military modernization, learning quickly from U.S. experience and doing its best to obtain U.S. technology. They also note that China is receiving much very modern technology and many weapon systems from the former Soviet Union. In either case, the consequence is near-fixation on the emerging China "threat" and on the closely related Taiwan question. Quasi-containment is thus growing in favor, and engagement is coming under fire. Such other security issues as the South China Sea question or the changing security equation in South Asia are placed further down the list, if not entirely ignored.

A related change, partially caused by greater appreciation of globalization, is a new emphasis on the North Korean military threat, now not so much to South Korea as to the United States itself. Thus, in 1994, Washington went to the edge of war in an ultimately successful campaign to quash, more or less, Pyongyang's attempt to produce nuclear weapons. With the emergence of widespread starvation in the North and the technological modernization of the military in the South, the North relaxed a bit in its quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction. This was short-lived, however, because of Pyongyang's successful 1998 test of the Taepo Dong missile. This test provided a stimulant to those pressing for a national missile defense (NMD) or for some version of a theater missile defense (TMD) in Asia that would extend to Taiwan and thus cancel some aspects of China's own modernizing ballistic missile threat. That, in turn, has weighed heavily on the budget of the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as on such extra-Asian issues as how to obtain Russian assent to building an NMD system, which clearly would be in violation of START II.

A third change stems from the Indian and Pakistani explosions of nuclear weapons in mid-1998. Nonproliferation being of global concern, the nonproliferation treaty having been signed by practically all nations, and the United States being the leader in that movement, the South Asian nuclear tests, together with Indian and Pakistani missile capabilities, spell a major defeat for stated U.S. policy. The door is now open somewhat wider to the more rapid spread of nuclear weapons, especially to rogue states, but eventually to such other Asian nations as Japan, South Korea, and

Taiwan. In all, although these three changes cannot be traced entirely to aspects of globalization, that phenomenon contributes increasingly to their emergence as security issues, especially into the new millennium.

It is in the economic arena that globalization seems to have the most effect. The catalyst has been the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and beyond. Although there was some warning of its imminence, if not its severity, government and private institutions in the United States were surprised at why it began, how fast and far it spread across Asia, how much effort and funding were required to counter it and begin repair, and how much blame the United States received for responding. The crisis has become an exemplar of several aspects of globalization: acceleration, encomplexification, boundary breakdown, technologization, and infinitization. Because the crisis has so severely weakened important Asian economies heretofore regarded as models of marketization and democratization and threatened to spread to Japan, China, and outside the region, the entire set of assumptions underpinning U.S. Asia policy has come under question. Indeed, if Korea and Japan, the principal regional allies of the United States, are put under such great economic pressure while China manages to avoid (at least temporarily) this plague, a tectonic shift in overall Asian power relations could occur away from the U.S.-centered past to an emerging China-centered future. Although the need to avoid such a deleterious change has not been the center of the U.S. reaction to the crisis and the severity and longevity of the crisis have not been as great as originally anticipated, one upshot has been to focus attention more sharply on China.

Aside from the new focus on China, however, the economic crisis has had a silver lining in two regards. First, needed reforms have been at least set in motion in the World Bank and IMF, despite gathering opposition from below to their operations at the Seattle meeting in late 1999 and in Washington in early 2000. Second, U.S. attention has shifted back, to some extent, to Southeast Asia (where the crisis began and where, in the cases of Thailand and Indonesia, it continues), which had been comparatively neglected until then. That has helped, if only a bit, to counter the U.S. tendency to consider Asian subregional isolation as a natural and perpetual state of affairs. At least in some eyes, the crisis has added reason for a more unitary and sophisticated U.S. approach.

The demand upon all people to respect and improve human rights, that self-appointed U.S. policy invention, especially as applied to nondemocratic entities, has become more closely associated with two aspects of globalization: boundary penetration and universalization. Although the United States continues in its leadership role, it no longer maintains a monopoly, but it finds that human rights are of growing interest and, thus, of policy relevance throughout Asia. In Hong Kong, a lively movement toward democratization took place in the years before reversion and continued after 1997. In Indonesia, human rights are at the heart of the East Timor movement, and they were one of the bases of the anti-Suharto movement that finally, and through a relatively peaceful electoral process, succeeded in changing the regime in Jakarta. In Malaysia, human rights have been a central factor in the standoff between Premier Mahathir and his erstwhile challenger, Anwar Sadat. In Singapore, the regime, so attractive in other regards, has come under pressure for its draconian legal

system, among other matters. In the Philippines, human rights and democratization continue the revolution begun with the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s. In Burma, the brutal suppression of democracy has made the Rangoon government into a pariah. The international reputation of the North Korean regime remains the worst in the world because of its wholesale violations. South Korea, in contrast, is a human rights and democratization success. China recently has experienced no fewer than five domestically generated attempts to broaden democracy and human rights. India, surprisingly, has maintained a democratic polity since 1948, although a myriad of human rights violations continued to occur throughout the society. Mongolia has switched directly from communism to democracy. And in Taiwan, the first full and peaceful transition to democracy in a Confucian society transformed politics there during the 1980s and the 1990s, and continues today. So while U.S. policy could claim success in this aspect of its Asian policy, most of the credit goes to people and movements in most every Asian state.

Human rights and democratization also present a dilemma to U.S. policymakers: how to integrate these goals and concerns with overall foreign and defense policies, and how to address the responses or initiatives that these concerns might demand in other policy arenas. Thus, China's very unenviable record from Tiananmen forward tilts U.S. policy away from what was thought in the 1972–1988 period to be a balanced and progressive orientation. Human rights concerns feed directly into the fear of a militarily threatening China and thus make replacement of engagement with containment more likely. The Burmese regime is kept at more than arm's length by all U.S. administrations, mostly for human rights reasons, thus ensuring that Rangoon will remain in Beijing's pocket. Human rights and democratization are at the center of U.S. support of Taiwan against mainland China, which makes Sino-American military conflict more likely. Similar analyses can be made in regard to policy toward many other Asian entities. Human rights and democratization, thus, emerge as a principal example of the influence of globalization on U.S. Asian policy.

Specific Issues

Several specific Asian instances of the eight global issues mentioned previously can be cited, all of which exert at least some influence on U.S. policy toward Asia.

Environmental Issues. Such increasingly critical changes as global warming, atmospheric and water pollution, drop in water tables, deforestation, desertification, methane gas emissions, and forest fires are all to be found in Asia. Most are of concern to Asian policy, as the United States fashions itself the global leader in environmental matters. These issues, therefore, invade the diplomatic, economic, and even the human rights components of Washington's Asian policy, if not, as yet, the military. That may come soon enough.

Washington is not yet ready to raise environmental issues nearer to the top of its ordered list of policy concerns, even though in the longer term they will materially affect the region as a whole and negatively influence the quality of life in the United States itself. Most U.S. efforts remain at the level of international conferences (the 1997 Kyoto Protocol being an Asian-based example), diplomatic representations to governments on specific issues, environmentally oriented programs in foreign assis-

tance, and (increasingly) inclusion of environmental components in the programs of international lending institutions. Environmental issues, for all their intrinsic importance, do not yet significantly alter the general U.S. approach to Asia, nor do they influence, except at the margins, policies toward specific issues or regional entities. But change is inevitable.

Drug Trafficking. Because the Golden Triangle (mostly in Burma but also in northern Thailand and Laos) is the principal global source of pernicious, habit-forming drugs, and because a large portion of the product is illegally imported into the United States with disastrous effects on American society, drug trafficking is an important issue in U.S. relations with Asia. It remains also of great concern to many Asian countries, and there is a natural propensity among these countries to cooperate in stemming the flow to the United States and encouraging producers to switch to other crops. Unfortunately, the Burmese government continues to be uncooperative, and the Thai and Laos governments do not have full control of the relevant growing areas. The burden thus shifts to interfering with the transit chain in Asia, across the Pacific, at American borders, and within the United States. Reduced thus to a police problem, cooperation with many states, including China, is relatively well advanced, and the relevant U.S. Government agencies have offices throughout Asia. Interception of shipments could increasingly involve U.S. military assets, but for the most part—partly because of the vast Pacific and other ocean distances—drug interception tends to take place at or near U.S. territorial waters and land boundaries. Judged in this manner, trafficking is more a domestic, North America-based problem. Like environmental issues, drugs are unlikely to move significantly up the ladder of policy concerns unless officials in major transit spots—such as Hong Kong—refuse to continue cooperation, which seems unlikely.

Boundary Penetration. Smuggling, illegal migration, refugees, and control of the spread of disease are increasingly important U.S. concerns. Given the ease of transportation and boundary penetration in a global era, all could peak in their effect on the United States. The means to address these problems are, for the most part, similar: intelligence and police cooperation, interdiction, office representation in relevant Asian entities, monetary and training assistance, and work through international agencies such as Interpol and the World Health Organization. The severity of three of the four matters is a function of the economic and societal health of the sending countries: smuggling, migration, and the spread of disease vary with the level and rate of economic development. Refugee flows are more a consequence of domestic political and military suppression. In all four cases, the U.S. interest is to support continued economic and societal health throughout Asia.

The China case once again is special because of the enormous population of that country and its rapid modernization. If the United States and China become embroiled over Taiwan, engage in sufficient additional controversy to lead to a break in relations, conduct military operations against each other, or restore Cold War-like confrontation or containment, the Chinese propensity to cooperate with the United States in these areas will cease, with potentially grave consequences. The same might be true were China to enter a political, economic, or societal tailspin. The overall U.S. interest vis-à-vis China would then have to be amended to allocate greater

weight to these factors. Given the already tenuous Washington-Beijing relationship, U.S. policy toward China could become even more complicated. Although massive refugee flows out of China would be a major disaster, they would not induce conflict.

Societal or political breakdown in North Korea, according to some scenarios, could precipitate a new Korean War. In several additional instances, handling of refugees could become an important element in U.S. military planning, training, equipment, and deployments: the Sri Lankan civil war, breakdown of military government in Burma, further human rights suppression in Indonesia, or renewed Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. At the turn of the millennium, the United States does not possess the requisite set of policies, plans, funds, or forces to deal with any of these and assumes instead that some kind of ad hoc UN arrangement will be made.

Piracy and Fisheries Questions. Often thought of as global issues because they involve the high seas and because they are to be found outside Asia as well, piracy and fisheries questions are not really global. Piracy does take place, unfortunately, in the South China Sea, but not—except as deliberate North Korean state actions—elsewhere in Asia. The existence of piracy is linked to the nature and rates of growth of the economies of the littoral states and to the limited police resources available to their navies. Fisheries disputes are both bilateral in character—for example, that between Japan and New Zealand—and multilateral—such as international treaties prohibiting catching fish with drift nets. But, like piracy, such problems do not fall under the definition of global issues. They do not pose a global threat and need not be dealt with on a global basis. The resources of the United States—diplomatic, military, and economic—are not habitually engaged in piracy suppression and only sporadically participate in policing Pacific Ocean fisheries agreements. Most efforts are left to the states in question, as is only proper, either individually or collectively, as in the case of the Malaysia-based antipiracy center combating Southeast Asian piracy.

Effect of Globalization

Summing up the influence of globalization, U.S. foreign and defense policies toward Asia vary. The principal changes are in the American economic and human rights approaches to Asia and not, relatively speaking, in the diplomatic or military arenas. In the latter, globalization engenders debate over its policy effects. But changes in the U.S. diplomatic or military approach to the region cannot, generally, be traced to globalization alone—at least not yet. It is the Asian economic crisis and the new, post-Cold War emphasis on human rights that initiates U.S. policy changes toward Asia and its subregions. That is not to say that economics and human rights challenge the traditional primacy of diplomacy and military policies toward Asia. These remain primary and relatively unchanged up to the new millennium. Economic and human rights issues are increasingly penetrating the other two, however, challenging Washington policymakers to seek a more integrated overall policy or at least to be forewarned that economic and human rights questions can cause diplomatic and military crises. The China question drives this need for revision: Sino-American diplomatic breakdown or even war could result from the human rights issue, while China's economic weight and its enormity could, if not treated with great care, propel the whole region and much of the world toward either a new globalized era of agreed-on order or disaster. As for specific issues,

only the potential problem of refugees threatens serious policy consequence (inducing war on the Korean Peninsula or overwhelming U.S. and regional resources in the case of Chinese domestic breakdown).

The most important point concerning the influence of globalization on U.S. post-Cold War Asian policy is that, compared with the driving forces in the region and basic U.S. foreign and defense policies toward the region, it has not yet caused any fundamental revisions. Change could take place in succeeding decades, but its net effect cannot be known until three further inputs are made. The first is likely change in Asia, taking all factors into account as best as can be forecast. The second is probable change in the United States and the altered foreign and defense policies that may stem from this change. The third is the evolution of globalization itself.

Post-Millennial Changes in Asia

Three successive approximations disclose how Asia may look in the first two decades of the 21st century: an examination of normal or general determinants, country-by-country and substantive arena-by-substantive arena surveys, and extrapolation.

Normal Determinants

Residue of the past. This includes the long-term historical legacy, as interpreted by relevant viewpoints. Examples are Japan's World War II transgressions; China's desire to overcome the legacy of self-perceived post-1842 colonialism; various "syndromes" informing U.S. policy ("no more land wars in Asia," "no more wars not winnable in a short time with few casualties"); and Korea's 4,000 years as a single culture, broken only in 1945.

Future persistence of present realities. These most likely will include North Korean military threats; residual effects of the economic crisis; China's foreign policy expansionism; and U.S. strategic dominance.

Dominance of domestic factors. The most important determinant, this includes continued Chinese modernization and likely change away from a communist regime in China and North Korea; a Burmese civil war; ethnic problems in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka; and possible further political disintegration in Russia.

Things we know will come, but not when or how. Candidates are resolution, by whatever means, of the Taiwan problem; Korean reunification; Japanese recovery from economic stagnation and emergence as a full security partner; withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan and Korea; and settlement of the Kashmir question.

Interpenetration of relations between the great spheres of domestic action (political, economic, military, cultural, and societal). It is no longer possible to analyze each in isolation from the others. New complex, multicausal syntheses that are not yet apparent will appear. Two Chinese examples are the relationship between military strategy/acquisitions/deployments and the Confucian nature of Chinese society, and the propensity of that society to hold together despite grave political troubles.

Relationship between global, regional, foreign policy, and domestic levels of action in geographical, policy, and institutional senses. Many trends within and

between these spheres are apparent, and U.S. policymakers are constantly challenged by the global consequences of domestic unrest in some countries and the implications of massive and reversible capital flows for defense procurement and thus regional security. Analyses pitched at one level—foreign office and defense military—will no longer suffice, and overarching syntheses must be sought.

Surprises. Sudden developments are the order of the day in Asia-Pacific history. Events such as regime collapse, popular uprising or repression, economic crisis, invasion, massive attacks against the Internet, and coup d'état will be repeated, but their timing is unknown.

Order and pace of events. The outcomes of the Taiwan and Korea questions are closely related, since the manner, speed, and specific outcomes of the first to be resolved will importantly configure the other. Similarly, slow Japanese economic reforms will centrally affect the pace of recovery from the Asian economic crisis. Accelerated Chinese threats against the Spratly Islands could unite ASEAN and the United States into an anti-Chinese security community and materially impede Chinese military conquest of Taiwan.

Given these major factors and the uncertainties innately associated with each, the Asia-Pacific future will be very difficult, if not impossible, to forecast. It follows that globalization, a disturbing variable, cannot by itself configure that future, unless—as is exceedingly unlikely—it comes to dominate all activities at all levels of life and policy. Instead, it must take its place, among these other determining elements. This conclusion is even more evident when analysis by country and substantive arena is added, for relatively constant elements are becoming variables.

Countries and Arenas

China. Chinese modernization, based on a high rate of economic growth, cannot continue at the same rapid pace as in the past two-plus decades. There must be some downturn, the product of many emerging and well-known domestic economic difficulties. The ecological crisis will accelerate. Chinese society will at some point boil over, and a political crisis of the order of Tiananmen seems unavoidable. The pace of change will thus vary considerably, as will its direction. Therefore, China may not continue as a stable and growing nation, gradually learning the ropes of responsible international behavior. The ruling party, further losing legitimacy, may be driven to extremes: pulling back from ever more detailed and complex external involvement or striking out in frustration and anger against prospects of implosion by engaging in unacceptable behavior—against Taiwan, Mongolia, Korea, Japan, or the United States. The middle ground between these extremes seems increasingly shaky. In any case, China cannot continue as before, becoming a forecasting variable rather than a reasonably known quantity.

Japan. In the throes of its third post-1868 revolution, Japan is becoming fully modern in all senses. Once its modernization is accomplished, a new and more stable country will enter the society of nations as an accepted and attractive leader. But in that over-20-year process, Japan may become temporarily less democratic, responsible, and willing to solve its economic problems, and it may decrease its security dependence on the United States in reclaiming its place as an independent international actor.

Korea. Bifurcation of the Korean Peninsula cannot continue for another 20 years. How reunification occurs will obviously configure its domestic capabilities and international posture, although a united Korea probably will be a market democracy. Eventually, Korea will emerge as a powerful and independent international actor, taking fuller charge of its foreign and national security policies. After those changes, U.S. forces cannot remain in Korea for long. So the status quo on the peninsula, a central factor in the Asia-Pacific security equation for a half-century, will be replaced by a period of fluidity dangerous to all but holding the potential for a new and more stable configuration of forces in and around the cockpit of Asia.

Russia. It will be impossible for Russia to remain as it is. It could split into several parts, or a leftist bureaucratic authoritarian regime could return to power and re-establish draconian rule. A split Russia would be so weak as to play essentially no role in transpacific international relations except as an object of competition. A new leftist regime could go even further than the regime in power at the turn of the millennium in terms of anti-Westernism and could link up even more closely than at present with a similarly anti-U.S. China. That would produce a new Cold War, consuming the entire first 20 years of this century.

The United States. For mostly domestic reasons, the United States may not remain the stable, all-powerful center of global affairs. A new left-right political crisis may be brewing, the 1990s economic expansion cannot continue forever, the racial question remains essentially unsolved, the middle class is weakening, the populace possesses no consensus on foreign policy, and renewed neo-isolationism is not out of the question. These problems are nowhere near as severe as those of many Asian states. But because of the commanding moral, military, economic, cultural, ideological, and political position of the United States in global affairs, weakening in any or several of these areas would have disproportionate consequences around the world and, therefore, in U.S. Asia policy. A continuation of a high defense budget, the forward presence military strategy, the provision of a free ride to Japan, a willingness to fight a new Korean War, and the defense of Taiwan against concerted Chinese attack cannot all be assumed under such circumstances.

Other Regions. For more than a century, at least, what happens in one sector of the globe affects what occurs elsewhere. The difference today concerns the rapidity of that connection, in terms of information and policy change. Only a portion of today's developments can be traced to globalization (the Asian economic crisis being an example). In any case, conflicts or crises elsewhere (such as the Persian Gulf or Southeast Europe) will continue to reverberate in Asia. Nonetheless, it is not clear that global regions are more connected, all factors considered, than previously. That may be true in terms of economics, communications, and information, but not to the same degree in diplomatic and military matters. The principal reason appears to be that unlike in 1914 or 1941, the United States is the only nation with global reach and, therefore, with interests that can be globally operationalized. So the influence on Asia of events in other regions depends extraordinarily on what the United States—not Russia or China or even the European Community—does.

The Global Economy. Based heretofore mostly on national units and European-North American market dominance, the global economy will continue its major transition

to one centered as well on the transnational production unit, Asia, near-instantaneous capital transfer, very large semi-integrated geographical areas, and invention of new international economic institutions. National economic policymakers will have to include a heavy foreign component in making domestic decisions. But no one knows where the global economy is going: it could stabilize with reasonable, if no longer high, all-around growth rates; stagnate; or retreat into a long and severe global recession. If so, defensive economic nationalism, not further globalization, might result. So present directions cannot be taken for granted. Finally, since the relationship between economics and security is poorly understood—although recognized to be complex, profound, and direct—the global economy will affect Asian security and U.S. Asian policy, although in a confused and unclear manner.

Alternative Asian Security Arrangements. The turn-of-the-millennium regional security arrangement, based on a watery Pax Americana and dependence on economic development to enhance military security, cannot last. Some system (that is, an agreed-on set of rules of the game) must replace it. There are a multitude of alternatives: anarchy if and when the United States tires of its regional security burden or is forced to retreat from its present strategy; decline into balance of power and inevitable war; gradual building of security institutions through such approaches as ARF or APEC as an interim solution; gradual ascent to multilateralism through confidence-building measures, arms control agreements, and the like; a great power (the United States, China, Japan, possibly India) condominium; Chinese overlordship; or collective security. By 2020, Asian security will look quite different than it did in 2000, whether the new form arrives through evolution, revolution, reform, or reaction.

Extrapolation

Given the vast uncertainties—a combination of mixed-up, often mutually contradictory, and widely disparate developments—forecasting over a 20-year period is best avoided intellectually. But to develop policies and to understand how globalization may fit in, the effort must be undertaken. One way is to ignore variables, such as surprises and the order of events, as impossible to grapple with accurately and merely to extrapolate present trends. A low-probability event will result, to be sure, but by treating each component of the above two sets of determinants as if it were autonomous, it is possible to examine the likely trends visible in each.

Region-Wide Issues. The residue of the past will continue to push China toward risk-taking behavior, Japan toward further evasion of full participation in regional security affairs, Southeast Asian nations toward addressing domestic and regional (but not extraregional) problems, India toward further de facto hegemony in South Asia, and the United States toward unwillingness to accept further exclusive responsibility for stabilizing regional security.

Some present realities will persist. North Korea will continue to threaten a new war, as Pyongyang seeks nuclear, chemical/biological, and ballistic weapons capability and as its various domestic crises peak. Asia will eventually recover from the economic crisis and resume growth. The United States will persist in its belief that its status as Asia's, and the globe's, only superpower will ensure transpacific security, as well as its own. Japan will resist pressure to change its foreign and security policies.

ASEAN will continue in a weakened status, and Southeast Asian nations—except Burma—will keep believing either that external threats (for example, China) are far enough away to ignore or that, in a crisis, the United States will come to their aid. The Kashmir dispute will not be solved, and Pakistan will still try to vie with India, despite the latter's clear superiority and the unwillingness of outside powers (China, to say nothing of the United States) to side with Islamabad in a crisis.

Domestic factors will continue to dominate foreign and national security policies. China will experience a significant economic slowdown and will compensate for the resultant social tensions by heightened repression. Japan's third revolution will proceed slowly, allowing for desultory but continued revision of its external policies. North Korea could well witness the supplantation, and perhaps removal, of Kim Jung-Il by direct military rule. Russia may not disintegrate further, but a new leftist authoritarian or repressive government could come to power, repudiate remaining Russian debts, and cast its lot with the emerging anti-Western international coalition that China seeks to lead. Indonesia will persist in its quest to remain a unitary nation and recover economically, but at least a decade of near isolation from participation in regional affairs will have to take place before Jakarta can afford to look outward without trepidation. Most other ASEAN nations will be similarly consumed by their efforts to recover from the economic crisis. India will have to cope with its overwhelming domestic problems, drastically curtailing its ambition to become a full participant in Asian and global affairs, while Pakistan could descend into anarchy and civil war.

Some events will surely transpire. The Taiwan-mainland China standoff will flare up, with direct U.S. military participation increasingly likely through the revival of direct defense arrangements with Taipei. Korean reunification may not occur in the next 5 years, but the two sides may move ever closer to that end through conflict stemming from Northern breakdown or negotiations. Japanese economic recovery will proceed so slowly that the Chinese gross national product will approximate it (that presumes only a near-term Chinese economic slowdown and not a full domestic crisis, perhaps not realistic). As new incidents occur and as Japan initiates full-scale restructuring of its regional security posture, U.S. bases in Okinawa will become even more problematic.

Newly emerging forces will further revolutionize Asian international relations. The revolution in military affairs will proceed as China continues to avail itself of new classes of weapons and threatens to approach, if slowly, U.S. levels of sophistication and as the United States depends increasingly on such weapon systems and their scientific-technological base. Theater missile defense will be demonstrated to "work"; the United States will begin to make the necessary investment for Western Pacific-related deployment; and Washington will pressure Japan and South Korea to join a single anti-North Korea, anti-Chinese missile defense system. Taiwan will lobby successfully to be included or at least will persuade the United States to build a separate system for its defense, precipitating a full-scale Sino-American security crisis. Various environmental disasters will continue and even escalate. For example, Chinese-produced air pollution will affect crop production in Korea and Japan; Indonesian forest fires and Thai-Laotian-Burmese deforestation will further impede in-

creased food production in Southeast Asia; and water tables will sink so alarmingly in the North China and Indian plains as to bring into question the long-term capabilities of these nations to feed their populations at current levels.

Intradomestic economic/political/societal/military relations will be even more confusing. China may jettison Marxist/Maoist ideology, but Confucian nationalism will provide an even stronger justification for rapid military modernization, political repression, and anti-Americanism. Korean nationalism will also increase in strength, justifying Northern totalitarianism, Southern economic sacrifice, and the quest both for reunification and for security independence that could cause the ejection of U.S. forces from the South. Indonesia will be lucky to emerge as a single political entity on the other side of the communal and religious strife that will consume much of its energy. India will remain a confusing welter of class, caste, language, and religious differences. The American melting pot may come apart, and racial and class differences may combine with a constitutional crisis (pitting Presidential authority against Congressional insistence on micromanaging governmental affairs) to further accentuate confusion in U.S. foreign and national security policy.

Confusion will be heightened by interpenetration of forces at global, regional, foreign policy, and domestic levels. Human rights in China, North Korea, and Burma will motivate increasingly severe external evaluations of these states. Some progress will be made in reforming international and regional economic institutions, but lack of overall agreement among the great economic powers will slow progress to a point at which these institutions become increasingly ineffectual. Regionalization in Northeast Asia will not proceed until Korean reunification is accomplished, and in Southeast Asia, a weak ASEAN will continue to experience difficulties in fully integrating recently admitted states.

Individual Nations. China will move into semi-crisis, the product of lowered growth rates, declining foreign investment, intensification of the banking crisis, rising political opposition with heightened oppression, and vast and unsolvable social problems. One or two poor harvests could require China to purchase large quantities of grain, to aggravate world markets, and to devalue its currency, triggering another round of regional economic crises. China's military budget will nonetheless continue upward, funding further large-scale purchases from Russia. This semi-crisis should constrain Beijing from attacking Taiwan, but cross-Straits conflict prospects will increase as Taiwan's electoral process moves the island ever closer to independence. Beijing will restore its military backup commitment to North Korea in the event of a failed invasion of the South and subsequent Southern conquest to the neck of Korea. Chinese nationalism will guarantee even greater opposition to the U.S. security presence in Asia, while a full alliance restoration will return Moscow and Beijing to their early 1950s status of anti-American policy coordination and mutual security policies.

Japan will experience even further political crises as the Liberal Democratic Party continues to lose influence and the Diet takes on Italian Parliament-like characteristics. Electoral reform will proceed, if slowly, and a debate will take place over Tokyo's future foreign relations course and modification of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Hesitation in the face of the North Korean missile threat and rapid Chinese military modernization will prevent Japan from quickly modifying its external rela-

tions or reinterpreting Article 9 as a basis for a more independent policy. But Washington will be put on notice to expect significant eventual drawdown of U.S. forces in Japan and not to presume automatic approval of U.S. military activities in the Western Pacific without full and prior consultation. Economic reform will proceed to restore reasonable (approximately 3 percent) growth and further open Japan's markets to competition. But the damage to the overall Asian economy will largely have been done by 2020.

The two Koreas will continue to move in opposite directions. The South will continue its economic recovery, resuming reasonable growth and opening its markets further. A debate will ensue as to Seoul's place in the region and the globe, with most South Koreans favoring withdrawal of U.S. forces after reunification. Only the continuing Northern military threat will prevent the National Assembly from making such a demand of Washington. Seoul's problems will be how to protect itself from Pyongyang's severe military threat, despite all, and how to finance eventual reunification. The North will continue to sink, although a short-term economic mini-recovery could take place. The military will dictate internal and foreign policies, repression will spread even further, foreign economic influence will be minimized, and the population will continue to suffer grave privations. Another nuclear weapons crisis will bring Pyongyang and Washington close to war before negotiators reach a compromise. That will be the last straw for Washington, which will warn that further North Korean cheating on nuclear agreements will lead to airstrikes. The acquisition by Pyongyang of ballistic missile capability will greatly upset Japan, drawing Tokyo closer to Seoul and propelling the United States into a full Asian-oriented TMD and possibly an NMD. Korea will thus remain a powder keg until resolution and reunification are finally reached through war, Northern collapse and Southern takeover, or (unlikely) negotiation.

Russia, having restored a latter-day version of the status quo before Mikhail Gorbachev with a left nationalist government, will isolate itself increasingly from the West. Therefore, the country will decline to the point where not much may be left except a rump Moscow government and a dispirited population, thus setting the stage for final political disintegration. In foreign policy, Moscow will set itself firmly on an anti-Western course, establishing alliances with China and radically anti-Western states. The United States and other Western states will give up on Russia, absorbing the debt loss and girding for another Cold War. Russia will actively assist rogue states in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Economic reforms having been reversed in favor of high-technology military production, and environmental protection neglected, the final economic disaster will arrive. Russia will thus again become a factor to be taken into account, although its direct influence in Asia will be minimal and could decline to zero if political disintegration ensues.

The United States could find domestic and international difficulties cascading. Political fissures—the nature of the presidency; Congressional-presidential relations; campaign financing; the lack of strong, attractive political leaders; and racial and class splits—will open further. The economy may suffer debilitating recessions, with very little net growth in between. Although the United States eventually will work through its problems, the social, economic, and political costs will be high. Its global leadership

will come under question, especially when international crises demand strong responses. Neo-isolationism, which is growing in popularity, could obstruct the objective requirements of U.S. military actions, and justifications will fail to garner support for continued heavy military involvement around the globe. The country may thus drift through, muddle through, or be pushed around by distant events and crises. War could come out of deliberate calculation by unfriendly dictators, were the United States to respond to their transgressions only weakly, or out of popular and leadership frustration with their exploitation of growing anti-Americanism around the globe.

Excepting Latin America and non-Burmese Southeast Asia, all global regions could be engulfed in various conflicts: ethnic conflicts in Southeast Europe, South Asia, and Africa; terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southwest Asia; civil wars in various portions of Africa and South Asia; overthrow of long-established and generally pro-U.S. regimes; and the continued India-Pakistan nuclear threat. Unless the United States takes decisive military counteraction, rogue states will come to possess chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons and their means of delivery. So the type, range, and threats of conflict will increase.

Unless major, but unlikely, changes are deliberately made in U.S. and Chinese national security policies, the Asia-Pacific region is headed for a balance-of-power system featuring competing alliance systems headed by these two states. In the case of the United States, this system would include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, some Southeast Asian nations (the Philippines and possibly Vietnam, but probably not Thailand or Indonesia), Australia and New Zealand (Island Asia), with the possible peripheral adherence of India. The alliance system headed by China would include North Korea, Russia, possibly Pakistan, and Burma (Continental Asia). Mongolia would try without success to secure its borders by seeking to become a U.S. protectorate and would be forcibly reincorporated into China's alliance system. Thus would begin, if nothing were done to prevent it, a New Cold War. The resulting balance of power, as a system and as a policy, could keep the peace for a few years. But the opportunity would be lost to move to a higher order system or even to capitalize on current trends toward building all-around regional security institutions and multilateralism. The stage would then be set for direct military clashes between the two alliance structures.

Fitting Globalization into Post-Millennial Asia

Because globalization is only one of the transforming elements in the confusing swirl of major changes likely to take place in Asia during the first period of the 21st century, it is impossible to state how important it will turn out to be. Given the fact that many of the other factors noted are by themselves capable of revolutionizing the turn-of-the-millennium situation, it is highly unlikely that globalization by itself can fully redirect Asia's regional international and security architecture. Globalization may well continue to be an operator on 21st-century Asia (a subset of each development), a continuing, even a growing, influence. It may exacerbate, be neutral with regard to, or constrain the possible trends and developments described earlier. The jury must remain out, however, as to its net importance.

Globalization and Post-Millennial Asian Security by Country

North Korea. Acceleration causes Pyongyang to be left in the dust, as its neighbors modernize and partake of developments around the globe with ever-increasing speed. The regime risks total failure if it does not find some way to escape its self-imposed isolation. Its emphasis on military systems as salvation is, of course, a reaction to this contradiction. Paradoxically, therefore, acceleration may convert North Korea into an even greater security threat. Increased complexity also is unkind to the North, for the sorts of change imposed by this aspect of globalization require a broad range of international interactions not permitted by the regime. A nation organized by simple rote categories of social differentiation cannot easily participate in the kinds of activities demanded by encomplexification. As long as Pyongyang does not change its very nature, it is thus driven to obtain the results of work by other people through stealth or by trading what it has—mostly military systems—for the antisocial results of rogue state investments. Boundary breakdown/penetration is a direct threat to the continuation of the Kim family communist dynastic rule. The regime must resist, which in the end will kill it, although it could tinker with reunification as a short-term palliative. Universalization does not much affect the North, so it remains estranged from the rest of the world, religious and secular. That provides short-term strength and long-term brittleness. Technology growth is Pyongyang's enemy, lest it spread to the entire populace. The regime must limit technology to a small and isolated elite, thus guaranteeing rapidly increasing irrelevance, except in military mischief-making. Enlargement, except in terms of reunification on its own terms, is never considered in Pyongyang. Infitization, in all probability, is beyond the bounds of thought of most North Koreans, who are consigned to fight as best they can for mere physical survival. In sum, North Korea is at one extreme as concerns globalization. To the extent that globalization accelerates change in Asia, the North is progressively excluded. That makes North Korea both irrelevant and increasingly dangerous. In this instance, the very nature of the North and that of globalization combine to augment Pyongyang's security threat in the last years of its existence.

South Korea. In globalization terms—as well as in many other regards—South Korea is the polar opposite of North Korea. Its people and its government, so often divided within and against themselves, seem united to take full advantage of at least most aspects of globalization. Acceleration, increased complexity, technology growth, and infinitization all assist the South to beckon to the world for participation and protection, as well as to augment its innate power and defensibility against Northern predations. But globalization is not a panacea to the South. Seoul is of two minds about universalization, on the one hand seeking to insulate its traditional culture from external winds, but on the other hand not only remaining open to Christianity and all forms of Western musical and other cultural modes of expression but also being a principal exporter of latter-day forms of each. South Korea rivals Japan in both these regards, converting itself into a combination of attractive cultural museum and a factory for inventing and exporting new ideas. The South is also of two minds about boundary breakdown/penetration. Its leaders understand the interpenetrating nature of various fields of endeavor and seek to capitalize on its benefits. Their citizens travel widely, and the

country welcomes all others for a visit (as long as they do not try to impose their values). But the South must take care to ward off Northern attempts at subversion while simultaneously maximizing its own efforts to penetrate the North with its own values. The South is not interested in enlargement, except in the context of reunification, as that could well place Seoul at the mercies of Tokyo, Beijing, and Washington. If globalization has firmly taken hold in South Korea, it is mostly because its leaders see it as a device to gain respect, autonomy, riches, and above all, to steal a march on the North. Its view of globalization is thus quite parochial.

Japan. Except perhaps for those of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, Japan's approach to globalization may be the most advanced and confident of any Asian entity. It is much like that of South Korea, save that Japan, being in the business of modernization and Westernization far longer, feels qualified to undertake a leadership role in many of its aspects. These include acceleration, increased complexity, technology growth, and infinitization. There is worry, however, that Japan may be losing its competitive advantage in the globalization race, as its political and business leaders view it. Moreover, Japan tries to minimize the possibilities of boundary breakdown/penetration, except in science and technology; fears corruption by many of the cultural and religious values of the modern world and thus by universalization, and is surely not interested in any sort of political, economic, or military enlargement. Japan wants globalization only on its own terms and tries to hold off some of its putatively unpalatable content. Tokyo is, thus, of two minds about globalization: full acceptance of those aspects that can be controlled and taken advantage of, but avoidance of those that would too quickly and radically alter the nature of Japanese society. As in the case of foreign and defense policies, Japan wants the benefits of globalization but does not want to pay the price for them. Consequently, Japan may not be able to reclaim the position that it claimed to have achieved in the 1970s as the world's most advanced society. Instead, it may have to run faster to catch up or fall slowly behind.

China. Globalization makes China schizophrenic. Its communist leaders realize that the country must globalize, but they also know that their own longevity in office will thereby be drastically shortened. They know that globalization—which they sometimes reduce to the modernization component of acceleration—is the country's only hope for finally achieving the combination of wealth and power that will, in their eyes, make possible the restoration of Chinese greatness and influence. But they also understand that several of globalization's aspects—the scientific and economic aspects of acceleration, increased complexity in most of its meanings, boundary breakdown/penetration, universalization, and enlargement—carry such huge dangers to the polity, the economy, and society as to warrant continual resistance and erection of a series of moats and walls behind which to retreat. China, thus, is attracted to globalization and wants all the benefits it allegedly will bring but fears its transforming nature. Like both Koreas and Japan, there is a subterranean bias against giving in completely to globalization, based on nationalism and on the desire to preserve Confucian cultural values. On the other hand, China seems fully in favor of technology growth, which is seen as a clean way to attain full modernization without paying the

costs of interdependence and other aspects of foreign penetration. It will be a long time before China makes its peace with globalization.

Taiwan. In some globalization-related regards, Taiwan is to China as South Korea is to North Korea. With the exception of boundary breakdown/penetration, Taiwan appears to perceive globalization as its salvation. It certainly wishes to maintain barriers against mainland conquest and sees all other aspects of globalization as a means both to defend against that possibility and to finalize its own transition to a fully modern, Westernized, accepted national entity. Thus, acceleration, increased complexity, universalization, technology growth, infinitization, and even enlargement (in the sense of being included in a greater economic and, particularly, military security arena) are all favored. The more globalization, therefore, the better for Taiwan. If it turns out that the island must become a globalized colony of advanced European/North American states, that is a cost that—given the unpalatable alternative of acceding to mainland rule on the latter's terms—will have to be borne. Perhaps, as in Japan's case, traditional culture can also be preserved, if only in small, quaint corners of society.

Hong Kong. A world city, Hong Kong accurately views its salvation in globalist terms and does everything it can to encourage the rest of Asia, and the world, to take advantage of all aspects of globalization as rapidly as possible. Hong Kong is thus at the opposite extreme of globalization from North Korea. But its utility as a model or as a present illustration of what the future might bring is limited by lack of a foreign and defense policy on which globalization would operate.

Southeast Asia. There is a spectrum of influences of globalization on, and reactions to globalization by, the 10 ASEAN nations. At one extreme (as in other instances) is Burma. Rangoon is akin to Pyongyang in its attitude toward globalization. It seeks to avoid the effects of globalization to the extent possible through isolation. It has been successful in that, for the time being, Burma is falling behind the other regional states in most every regard. Partly as a consequence of its fear of globalization, Burma has become a foreign policy and security dependency of China.

At the other extreme are Malaysia and Singapore, which so far have managed to take advantage of most of the globalization components that they consider beneficial, but still avoid those (boundary breakdown/penetration and enlargement) that threaten to overthrow their respective internal orders. Malaysia is planning over the next 20 years to become the world leader in all other aspects of globalization—exceedingly ambitious, if unrealistic. Singapore is much closer to that presumed ideal. Its problem is its small size, which precludes it from occupying a position of international leadership acknowledged by its regional neighbors, much less by all.

Ranged between these two extremes are the other ASEAN members. Indonesia and Thailand are both examples of penetration, in this case, penetration of Asian economic crisis-related international institutions and nongovernmental organizations. Their autonomy has been much constrained by the external imposition of requirements for economic recovery and, in Indonesia's case, by the extraordinary influence of external nongovernmental organizations. Having gone too rapidly toward the modernization component of acceleration, both countries now must pay a penalty. Vietnam admits the need for, and inevitability of, globalization, but is still too suspi-

cious of the outer world to take full advantage of its offerings. Indeed, most of globalization's components, save perhaps technology growth, are regarded in Hanoi with suspicion, and it will take further political transformation unrelated to globalization before this viewpoint changes substantially. Cambodia and Laos are even further behind. The former continues to suffer from the massive societal destruction of the Khmer Rouge period and the exceedingly difficult political transition to something beyond a fully traditional society. Globalization's influences there, thus, remain relatively slight, as they do in Laos, essentially a Vietnamese colony. Perhaps Brunei can be looked on as a product of globalization, if only because of its oil production-derived wealth. But Brunei is a special case, being so small. Its ruler resists all aspects of globalization except economic modernization for a small percentage of the population and tries his best to insulate the country from all other components. Globalization operates on Southeast Asia, therefore, in differential manners, and there is no possibility of net assessment.

South Asia. In the 1990s, after decades of trying to modernize on its own with little comparative success, India essentially admitted its errors and attempted to open to the outside. The forces of globalization began to penetrate the country. But because of its size and the enormity of its traditional problems, globalization has not come quickly to India. As it already controls much of the life and foreign/security policies of other regional states (except Pakistan), India is not much interested in universalization, certainly not in enlargement in South Asia. But the other components of globalization are all to be found increasingly in India, in both the more developed urban areas and the still very traditional—and dominant—rural and regional sectors. The country's great diversity and the need to pay attention to feed, clothe, and at least minimally govern its people consume most of its energies. Globalization will be consigned for some additional years, if not decades, to nibbling around the edges of India.

Pakistan is further behind. Its deep ethnic and political divisions, let alone its fixation on Kashmir and India's presumed security threat, together with a highly ambivalent attitude toward acceleration, consign Pakistan to receding relevance in globalization terms. Pakistan continually opposes boundary breakdown/penetration and enlargement, and it embraces universalization only in a restricted sense (that is, the spread of Islamic values), seeking to oust or resist other cultural and religious norms and values. The other components of globalization have not yet made much headway in Pakistan. Sri Lanka is so devastated by its long civil war as to be unable to appreciate, to any large extent, the benefits of globalization. Bangladesh is, surprisingly, a brighter possibility. Despite domestic problems of even greater magnitude than those of India, Bangladesh is akin to Indonesia in terms of its willingness to subject itself to globalization's various component forces. Enlargement is not relevant, and certainly universalization is resisted by most components of a traditional society. Yet Bangladesh is changing rapidly under the modernization component of acceleration and is open to the influence of the other four aspects of globalization.

Globalization and Post-Millennial Asian Security by Issue

Korean Question. Certain components of globalization have exerted an obviously exacerbating, if hardly commanding, influence on the Korean question. The

already greatly different structures and directions of the two Korean societies, and thus their military dispositions and strategies toward each other, are driving this issue. Increased complexity, technology growth, and infinitization in military systems development and deployment drive up military budgets in both Koreas and push them further into the arms of their respective security guarantors, the United States and (to a lesser degree) China. Non-conflict-oriented solutions to the standoff thereby seem even further off. Indeed, as the North becomes ever less able to compete, its propensity to initiate a desperate, final conflict may rise. Moreover, as U.S.-Chinese security tensions rise, Korea may become an issue of increasing differences between the two outside powers, and correspondingly, the Sino-American cooperation concerning Korea that characterized the 1990s may drop away. The other components of globalization appear relatively neutral to the Korean question. On balance, therefore, globalization does not assist resolution of this issue and may moderately enflame it but is hardly controlling. The Korean question will continue to live a life of its own.

Chinese Military Threat to Taiwan. Much the same may be said of the Chinese military threat to Taiwan. Globalization influences both sides, but the exigencies of the military balance across the Straits require both to stress increased complexity, technology growth, and infinitization of military systems. Given the quantitative differences in force levels much in favor of the mainland, China's rapid acquisition of high-technology military systems from Russia, and the deployment of those systems in credible numbers against the island, Taiwan must try to move faster than ever to modernize and deploy new systems. This can, and already has, driven Taipei even further into becoming a U.S. dependency and, reciprocally, driven the United States into confrontation with China over the future of the island. The situation has become critical for reasons entirely separate from globalization, as noted previously. These aspects of globalization appear only to make peaceful settlement even less likely. So globalization is not good for the Taiwan question.

Rise in Chinese Military Power. China perceives acceleration, increased complexity, technology growth, and infinitization to be working in its military favor so long as it continues to modernize economically in a rapid manner and so long as these same components do not, on balance, unduly disrupt the domestic order. But they do not guarantee such continued growth, and they certainly do contribute to domestic instability. China thus must attempt the impossible: to build firewalls between unwanted globalization influences and those that enhance the country's military power. A recent example of this effort is the quest to shut off many links to the Internet available to ordinary citizens but to keep the channels open in the case of military research. Universalization, enlargement, and boundary breakdown/penetration (except as concerns Taiwan) are to be shunned to the extent possible.

The more general globalization-related problem for China is that its security policies toward the four surrounding Asian regions must be analyzed not merely in terms of its own military capabilities and strategies, but also in terms of how fast and how far the nations in these regions are themselves proceeding in upgrading their military capabilities. These capabilities are also subject to the forces of globalization. The outcome will remain uncertain for a considerable period because of the differential effects of globalization in these regions, as well as the more important Asia-wide

characteristics. But some nations in each region are at least as well off, in terms of their capabilities to address globalization-related military modernization, as China. Such nations include Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India. The question is whether they will reorient their military capabilities in an anti-Chinese direction, whether they will somehow see that their security is best protected by working together, and whether they will once again look to the United States for security guidance, leadership, and (ultimately) guarantorship. Globalization raises these issues for China and its Asian security environment. So, in the China case as well, globalization is an adjunct, at best, to the larger security issue.

Kashmir Dispute. The only globalization components of apparent influence in the Kashmir dispute are boundary breakdown/penetration (by Pakistan-based and supplied forces, who are able to enter Kashmir with increasing ease) and technology growth (the introduction of high-technology weaponry, such as nuclear missiles, on both sides). Even here, however, the issue is far more the product of causes in place and, for the most part, unchanged since 1948. The 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests merely made public what had been the reality for many years, while Pakistan-based penetration has been met by strong Indian countermeasures that have nothing to do with globalization. Certainly, none of the other components of globalization bear significantly on this issue, which like Korea unfortunately lives its own life. A test: if there were no globalization, would the Kashmir question be affected? Answer: no.

Northern Islands Question. This question appears almost entirely immune to the influence of globalization. The only change in the issue is the willingness of Russia to try for settlement on the merits, in the hope of achieving a final resolution of the Russia-Japan enmity at the end of World War II and the subsequent rekindling of Japanese interest in investment in Russia. Globalization is not involved unless it is thought that, because Russia has fallen so desperately far behind Europe, North America, and Northeast Asia, it must take extreme measures to reverse the course. One measure would be to sell out a part of its territory (however minuscule and however ill-gotten) in the name of revived economic growth. But that has not happened and is not likely.

The South China Sea Dispute. The influence of some of the components of globalization is apparent in the South China Sea dispute. Acceleration is evidenced by the quickened quest for oil in the region; boundary breakdown/penetration, by China's propensity to appropriate by whatever means and justification possible more Spratly atolls; technology growth, by the import of high-technology oil search devices; and increased complexity, by the assembly, mostly by China, of a full array of state-of-the-art military systems to project power into those waters. But the pace of the dispute has slowed in recent years, the outcome of processes and decisions unconnected to either the ASEAN threat to China to cease military activities lest it convert itself into an anti-Chinese security community and call in the United States, or China's own refocusing of its military attention on Taiwan. Globalization might make things happen marginally faster in the South China Sea, but the basic determinants are to be found elsewhere.

Globalization and Post-Millennial U.S. Security Policy

Each component of globalization may also be inspected as to whether, how, and in what direction it may influence U.S. security policy in Asia.

Acceleration. Clearly, acceleration influences several aspects of U.S. policy in Asia. It speeds up U.S. military policy toward the areas involved in the four major issues—Korea, Taiwan, China, and Kashmir—so that what may come anyway may arrive sooner or with an even more pronounced element of surprise. The nature and outcome of these four potential conflicts may not change, but acceleration shortens the time for preparation or avoidance. Overall military policy is likewise highlighted in the temporal sense. There is a greater need for a revised military strategy toward Asia, one that goes beyond the laissez-faire, Pax Americana-based assumptions of the forward defense policy and the alliances that flow from it to construction (if that is what Washington were to decide) of some kind of security system in Asia. The Security Treaty with Japan must therefore be modified (again, if that were to be requested by Tokyo or Washington) sooner rather than later. And the post-reunification question of the overall relationship with Korea, including the disposition of U.S. forces on Korean soil, and a revised security approach to ASEAN—in particular, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia—will both probably emerge sooner. In the economic component of security, the need will become more obvious: to integrate the large number of issues particular to Asian security—host nation support, pressure on Asian states to revise their domestic economic orders to prepare for possible conflict—with Washington's larger foreign economic policy. That is to say nothing of the need to revamp Asia-related international economic institutions—the World Bank, IMF, and ADB, among others—in the short-term rather than the medium-term future and perhaps to tolerate the creation of others by some of the countries in the region.

Greater Complexity. Managing an Asian security policy, to say nothing of that security itself, can only become much more complex. With so many emerging and continuing threats, intersecting trends—domestic and international—in so many fields—old and new—and so many forces newly arrived on the scene, the formulation and execution of an Asian security policy will require greater skill at recognizing their relevance and integration into a new, hopefully coherent, whole. Policy integration within and among relevant U.S. Government agencies will have to take place at lower levels, and stovepiping will have to be resisted or eliminated. Encomplexification will also beget more policy errors with greater frequency; provision must thus be made for addressing them more efficiently and more forthrightly than before.

Boundary Breakdown/Penetration. Asian security issues will tend to influence one another so that crises no longer will be so easily compartmentalized and will tend to cascade. The four regions of Asia will also be more liable to the spread of changes from one subregion to the others. The requirement for a new, cross-field (political-military-economic-cultural) Asian security policy synthesis will, therefore, become even more apparent. That need has already emerged, for a host of nonglobalization reasons adumbrated previously, but pressure from this boundary breakdown/penetration process of globalization will rise to merge what heretofore has been kept separate in geographical, bureaucratic, research, and institutional terms.

Universalization. The regionwide spread of cultural, religious, or other popular trends also carries implications for U.S. Asian security policy. Washington could find itself shut out of states that adopt a fundamentalist Islamicist policy, as has already happened with some Central Asian and Middle Eastern states. On the other hand, the apparently massive upsurge of Christianity in China could, when linked with similar trends in certain other Asian entities and in the United States, require an altered security policy toward that country. Contemporary forms of musical expression, while seemingly totally irrelevant to regional security policy, might make it easier for U.S. military forces to find support, were it necessary to station forces or intervene militarily in Asian states. Modern, secular, rationalist, science-oriented modes of thought characteristic of highly educated peoples everywhere will make it easier for the U.S. military to do business with their Asian military, or military-relevant civilian, counterparts.

Technology Growth. The implications for U.S. Asian policy of the revolution in military affairs and other technological aspects of globalization are obvious and manifold, and have, at least in the details of military systems research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E), long been a central aspect. Problems will continue to accompany the unfolding of technology growth in two regards. First, while the United States has a presumably long lead over prospective opponents, especially China and Russia, no law says that lead will continue indefinitely. Just as likely is the asymptotic approach in an ever-larger number of weapons-related areas of these countries, a phenomenon already evident in the Chinese case. Second, the United States appears to depend unduly on the magic efficacy of such systems, as demonstrated since the Persian Gulf. Conflicts are won or lost for many reasons, technological or otherwise, and the danger for the United States is complacency (overdependence on technologization and its presumed favoring of U.S. strategy and defense policy) in Asia as elsewhere. Needed is a revived appreciation of Clausewitz, Mahan, Liddell Hart, and Sun Tsu.

Enlargement. Given the vastness and complexity of the region and its subregions, enlargement does not appear destined to be of as much influence in U.S. Asian policy as in other arenas. It may well be that an objective argument can be (and already is being) made favoring enlargement of the U.S.-led security community in Asia from its post-Cold War leftover base to include, in a possible new Cold War with China, as many Asian states as possible. It would be a mistake to assume the success of such a quest despite its supposed utility. Nor is it likely that enlargement of Asia-based or -oriented economic communities will come about, either from U.S. leadership or from the expansion or consolidation of extant regional economic institutions. An Asian currency arrangement could emerge, but it is not clear that the United States would benefit therefrom. The prospect of consolidated political communities in Asia (such as ASEAN) or the formation of others in the region is near zero. Asia will continue to be divided against itself along traditional state boundary lines or, as appears more likely, into fellow travelers and opponents of China.

Infinetization. The arguments for and against the security implications, for the United States in Asia, of the rising influence of infinitization are very similar to those concerning technologization, if perhaps even more critical. Infinetization does not require huge resource inputs and can occur wherever enough critical mass exists in

terms of education, economic level, and leadership. That is why Malaysia thinks, rightly or wrongly, it can be the world's globalization leader and why Singapore and Hong Kong are moving so rapidly in that direction. Infitization, therefore, confers no innate security advantage on the U.S. security policy toward Asia.

A Bottom Line?

Viewing globalization from the several different angles set forth in this chapter, is a useful synthesis possible? Can its policy influence, in Asia and on U.S. foreign and security policies toward that region, be summarized by a small subset of statements? The answer appears, on balance, to be no. There are too many other constants, variables, and factors involved in Asia, its future, and U.S. policy. Globalization, understood here in terms of its components, is only one input among many and appears destined to remain that way. Nonetheless, some observations are useful:

- It is better to analyze globalization through its seven components than to treat it as a whole or concentrate on traditional approaches.
- The components of globalization are just one of many determinants of national security, in general, and of Asian security and U.S. foreign and security policies toward that region, in particular.
- Globalization, in terms of its components, may be on the leading edge of change, but only marginally. Other agents of change remain more influential.
- It is not clear that globalization is transforming, or even capable of transforming, international relations as a whole, much less Asian international and security relations.
- Globalization is not reducible to any one, or a smaller subset, of its seven components. This is especially true of economic and technological matters.
- The same is true of globalization and national security.
- In any consideration of the six Asia-wide security characteristics, the four major security issues, and the several other less critical regional and subregional security issues, globalization is only one element in a complex amalgam. Globalization is capable of transforming this whole only in the long run, if at all.
- Discussion of U.S. foreign and defense policies regarding Asia, first by excluding the impact of globalization and then by reintroducing it as a disturbing variable, confirms that conclusion.
- Globalization has had some obvious and important impacts on Asia:
 - It encourages policy smoothing, generalizing, and construction of broader categories.
 - It is influencing the kind of foreign and security policy that the United States ought to have in Asia.
 - Militarily, globalization encourages concentration on the revolution in military affairs, fixes attention on China and its emerging military threat, focuses on the North Korean missile question and thus on TMD, and brings to the fore the India-Pakistan nuclear issue and, thus, Kashmir.

- Economically, globalization causes attention to be devoted to the Asian economic crisis and what changes may be required for U.S. relations with Japan and Korea and for China's economic situation. The need is apparent for a more sophisticated, holistic approach.
- The role of human rights in U.S. Asian policy is rising quickly and will continue to exert major influence over other policy arenas. That will drive up costs significantly.
- Of the eight global issues analyzed, only the refugee question appears to be of increasing moment to U.S. security policy in Asia, mostly because of the potential for disruption from China and North Korea.
- Although globalization had some important impact in Asia and on U.S. policy toward the region by the turn of the millennium, it has not yet caused any fundamental revision in either regard.
- In the post-millennial era:
 - The eight normal determinants of the future will remain commanding. Globalization must, therefore, continue to be consigned to being a disturbing variable—only one of many.
 - A country-by-country and arena-by-arena analysis confirms this, a conclusion accentuated when current trends are extrapolated over the coming two decades.
- It is impossible to tell how important globalization may become in post-millennial Asia. Present evidence indicates that it will not become commanding and could even shrink in influence. Globalization is best viewed as an “operator” on the whole, exacerbating it, being neutral, or constraining it.
- When analysis is undertaken component by component:
 - By country and by security issue, the results are quite varied. No component appears to be overarching. Nonetheless, the analysis, in policy terms, becomes much richer thereby.
 - By component per se, the influence of globalization is more apparent and direct: each component then emerges as important on its own and perhaps increasingly so. Most of the direct policy implications can be found by this means.
- The bottom line: globalization is arriving, perhaps at an increasing pace. But so far it accentuates what is already known about Asian and U.S. Asian policy, is not at the center of any analysis, and seems destined to remain on the margin. Therefore, globalization must be taken into account, but not be considered as overwhelming. It is best utilized as another, but not the only, means to adjust, if not transform, policy.

Implications for the U.S. Military

Globalization, in its many variegated forms, is already an important factor in Asian security and bids fair to gain even greater policy importance. But when matched against the panoply of traditional security issues in that region, it shrinks to minor importance. The most important lesson for the U.S. military is not to over-worry about how globalization will affect military operations, basing, procurement, training, and other standard tasks. Rather, traditional security issues require that the

military stick to its path: sea control and projection of power onto land. Given the enormous size of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the relatively small size of existing naval and Marine forces, and the threats posed by the security issues noted throughout this chapter, the Department of Defense will have its hands full merely fulfilling the tasks assigned to it.

As a result, it will be necessary to concentrate on two classes of issues. The first is addressing the four security issues that could lead to war and, thus, to major military involvement: Korea, Taiwan, China, and Kashmir. Put another way, the most important question in this class for the Armed Forces is how to prepare to fight such conflicts; avoid them, if possible; and win them, if war comes. The second class of issues involves participating and presumably taking a lead in restructuring Asian security. In particular, a new U.S. security strategy vis-à-vis Asia must be worked out and set in place. Pax Americana cannot last much longer and will be succeeded by some other set of security arrangements. The forward deployment strategy, centered on Japan and Korea, cannot be assumed to continue, and the Navy must understand that bases in those two countries and perhaps places in Southeast Asia may not be available regularly. If sea control and power projection in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are to be continued successfully, new arrangements will be required. These arrangements will include finding alternative home ports in those waters; reaching more specific agreements with Japan and Korea about when and if the Navy and Marines can access their territories; addressing the probable need to acquire a significantly larger force structure to offset the very long transit times to and in Asian waters; producing and deploying new kinds of weapon systems and platforms capable of remaining on station for very long times; and changing the very nature of warfare to counteract the general lack—before the commencement of hostilities—of friendly terra firma in Asia.

It would help were at least some of the four severe security threats to be solved. That will be exceedingly difficult, to say the least. The three non-Kashmir issues are not only intractable on their respective merits but also are mutually intertwined. Any solution to, or exacerbation of, one or more of them will automatically involve the other two. Moreover, other security issues in other areas, not necessarily Asian, are sure to be involved, so that settlement of any one of the three will undoubtedly involve tradeoffs in such other considerations as TMD, NMD, proliferation of CBR weapons and their means of delivery, and power relations in non-Asian regions. Only when all issues are laid on the table and the negotiation process begun will it be possible to think of solving the Taiwan and the China problems, if not so directly the Korean question. Thus, the Department of the Navy must decide within its own walls what it wishes in terms of longer term U.S. security policy toward Asia and then be prepared to argue for those desires before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at the White House, and to the Congress.

Globalization takes on two functions for the Navy in the new era of movement, and rapid change has already begun. First, to maximize the probability of addressing the four security issues successfully, every aspect of globalization must be inspected in detail to determine how each can support the new U.S. policy and the Navy's severely altered requirements and how the Navy can minimize the influence of any as-

pects that hinder those goals. If the United States is to continue as this planet's acknowledged leader, it must seize the opportunity that globalization presents and press each of its advantages into the service of a much altered Asian security policy. That means deliberately subordinating globalization to the reformulation of national and, thus, Asian security-related goals (reversing the generally presumed arrow of causation). It also means deliberately opening the United States even further to globalization, even when some of its effects are deleterious domestically. Second, the Navy must understand that globalization, while continuing to be a disturbing variable, can be used for national policy purposes and thus can be placed in the service of particular military goals. If a critical element in overall U.S. security policy is to keep sufficiently ahead, in the military sense, of prospective opponents, all seven of the elements of globalization must be taken advantage of, not merely coped with.

Specific examples abound, but space permits only one or two for each element. Acceleration requires the Navy to place much more money at the disposal of military-oriented research and to field systems and platforms faster than before, with much less RDT&E lead time. Increased complexity drives the services to engage in enhanced coordination and systems compatibility and, conversely, to cut interservice rivalry to an absolute minimum. Boundary breakdown/penetration pressures the Navy significantly to enhance its intelligence facilities, cooperate more directly and rapidly with other government intelligence institutions, and bring online new intelligence systems, particularly in the high-technology area. Technology growth supplies the Navy with a major opportunity to emphasize all relevant aspects of the revolution in military affairs, while understanding that such a revolution will drive up costs, casualties, and equipment losses whenever a similarly armed opponent (like China, in the Asian context) is engaged. Enlargement propels the Navy to become a principal advocate of the construction of a new transpacific security system to replace the present U.S.-centered arrangement. Finally, infinitization means that the Navy will become involved in Asian security crises at a moment's notice, with almost no time for force buildup and deployment.

All these changes mean that the Navy must acquire more of practically everything, increase its budget quite significantly, deploy more ships and planes constantly close to potential war zones than at present, and greatly augment its degree of readiness. In sum, while the name of the game in Asia will remain security in the traditional sense, globalization will play an increasingly important role in the challenge that stands before the United States in the 21st century: to advance and defend its interests in a world so complex and rapidly changing that many of the regularities and assumptions of the past no longer hold.

It is highly unlikely that U.S.-Chinese relations will improve in the foreseeable future. Much more probable is ever-heightening tension, not only over Taiwan but also in the generalized sense that always accompanies the emergence of a new power. In the past, this appearance of a new power has led to war. The task of Armed Forces is to find the right combination of policies that will direct Chinese power into peaceful and internationally acceptable channels, but to be ready to engage in conflict, if necessary, with that country. A U.S.-Chinese war would be disastrous for both nations and would corrupt Asian and global security for at least a half-century. The

United States must nonetheless be ready for war with China. That means viewing China as the most probable enemy, with all the obvious security implications that implies. But it also means taking every opportunity and making every attempt to convince the Chinese People's Liberation Army that U.S. intentions are honorable. The United States does not seek to destroy, overly restrict, or contain China, but rather wishes to assist China in playing a responsible international role. That means encouraging China to cooperate with the United States and its Asian allies and friends in constructing a new security system capable of solving crises before war becomes the only option. All aspects of Navy operations must be used for that purpose: training and deployment, demonstrations of naval power, port calls, personal relations with Chinese personnel, cooperative ties with other Asian navies, and an emphasis on common globalization-related interests whenever possible. These challenges will centrally affect all aspects of the U.S. military during the next two decades. How it responds to them may well spell the difference between war and peace, not only with China but also throughout Asia. 🌐

Notes

¹ Thus, the official U.S. statement of foreign policy goals, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, includes globalization ("The process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural, and political integration") as one of the positive trends, along with democratic governance, free market economies, respect for human rights, economic dynamism, and the communications revolution. But negative trends include actions of rogue states, ethnic conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, international crisis, resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, spread of disease, corruption, refugees, and market collapse. With such a mammoth tussle between the forces of good and evil confronting the United States, globalization shrinks to a relatively minor element.

² For a useful comparison of globalization and interdependence, see Keohane and Nye, "Globalization: What's New? What's Not (and So What?)" On modernization, see Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations*. On regionalization, see Fawcett and Hurrell, *Regionalism in World Politics*.

³ In this work, *The Global Century*, only two chapters elect to proceed in this manner, the other being chapter 9 by David J. Rothkopf. The categories in both cases are similar if not identical. The present listing is shorter and simpler, but not thereby superior.

⁴ As for example Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*.

⁵ Yergin and Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights* is one of many examples. See the combined bibliography at the end of this volume for others.

⁶ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* is a good example, as are its Clinton-era predecessors. See also "The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region." Other titles relevant to globalization, in a very large literature, include Terriff, ed., *Security Studies Today*, Rostow, *Toward Managed Peace: The National Security Interests of the United States, 1759 to the Present*, Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Snow, *National Security*, and Carter and Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New National Security Strategy for America*. Also of relevance is the quarterly *International Security*, among other journals.

⁷ The best study of the nonobjective nature of the term remains Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny*, which traces 15 distinct meanings of the term in the 19th and early 20th centuries, varying according to the power of the country. That "national interest" is a dependent variable, changing according to the relative

power of the entity in question, is the basic notion behind the work of Hans J. Morgenthau, father of modern international relations studies. This simple but accurate notion is consistently missed by those who continue to assert the objective nature of the term.

⁸ The only rendition of post-1945 Asian international relations is Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 1945–1995*. There are many inquiries into post-Cold War international relations, including Simon, ed., *East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era*; Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security*; Robinson, *Asian Security Post-Cold War*; Harris and Mack, *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus*; the papers of the annual Asian Roundtable of the Malaysian Institute for Security and International Studies, and the papers of the annual National Defense University Pacific Symposium.

⁹ For Northeast Asia, recent literature includes Hayes, ed., *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia* and Green and Cronin, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*. Southeast Asia is covered in Ellings and Simon, eds., *Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium*, and Liefer, “The ASEAN Regional Forum.” For South Asia, see Hewitt, *The New International Politics of South Asia* and Harrison et al., *India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years*.

¹⁰ Ball, ed., *The Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region* and Roy, ed., *The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region* begin to approach the subject, as does Dibb, *Towards a New Balance of Power in Pacific Asia*. The most comprehensive analysis remains the present author’s *Asian Security Post-Cold War*. Most authors assume both that a security system exists in the Asia-Pacific region and that such a system can only be some variation of the balance of power. In the post-Cold War period, there has been no system, nor is the balance of power the only possible system.

¹¹ In a plethora of recent books on the Chinese military, see Wortzel, ed., *The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century*, Lilley and Shambaugh, eds., *China’s Military Faces the Future*, Wortzel, *China’s Military Potential*, Pillsbury, *China’s Assessment of the Future Security Environment*, and Stokes, *China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States*. The North Korean case is much more difficult. But see Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb*, Kim, ed., *North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Moltz and Mansourov, eds., *The North Korean Nuclear Program*, and “North Korea Promises to Be Formidable Foe,” *Aviation Week and Space Technology*.

¹² Some samples, relevant to globalization and to Asia, from a very large literature: democratization: Diamond et al., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia*; marketization and economic security (not including the Asian economic crisis, covered below): Brook and Luong, *Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia*, World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle*, Gapinski, *Economic Growth in the Asia Pacific Region*, Dana, *Entrepreneurship in Pacific Asia*, Kim, ed., *The Four Asian Tigers*, Ravich, *Marketization and Democracy: East Asian Experience*, Borthwick, *Pacific Century*, and Tipton, *The Rise of Asia*; interdependence: Alves, ed., *Change, Interdependence, and Security in the Pacific Rim*, Goodman and Segal, eds., *China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence*, Zhang, *Major Powers at a Crossroads: Economic Interdependence and an Asian Security Community*, Mueller, ed., *Peace, Prosperity, and Politics*, Blouqvist, *Economic Interdependence and Development in East Asia*, Jones, *Globalization and Interdependence in the International Political Economy*, and Blanchard, ed., *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security*; culture: Tu, ed., *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity*, Wallach, *Losing Asia: Modernization and the Culture of Development*, and Maidment and Mackerras, eds., *Culture and Society in the Asia-Pacific*.

¹³ The most comprehensive unclassified analysis is O’Hanlon, “Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier Than the Pentagon Thinks.” O’Hanlon is too optimistic. For another view, see “North Korea Promises to Be Formidable Foe” and “‘Second Front’ Concerns Allies,” *Aviation Week and Space Technology*.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” assumes, unrealistically, no American participation. A more likely set of conflict scenarios is in Saunders, *Project Strait Talk: Security and Stability in the Taiwan Strait*.

¹⁵ On China’s general rise in power, see Harris and Klintworth, eds., *China as a Great Power*, Goodman and Segal, eds., *China Rising*, Overholt, *The Rise of China*, Khalilzad et al., *The United States*

and China: Strategic and Military Implications, Shambaugh, ed., *Greater China: The Next Superpower?*, Nye, "China's Re-Emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific," Feigenbaum, "China's Military Posture and the New Economic Geopolitics," Bernstein, Munro, and Ross, "China I" and "China II," and Segal, "Does China Matter?" On China-North Korea ties, see Kim, "Strategic Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang."

¹⁶ See Wirsing, *India, Pakistan, and Kashmir Dispute*, Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, and National Foreign Affairs Training Center, *A Brief Overview of the Dispute Over Kashmir*.

¹⁷ On the Northern Islands question, see, inter alia, Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, Ivanov et al., eds., *Japan and Russia in Northeast Asia*, and Goodby et al., eds., *"Northern Territories" and Beyond*. The South China Sea issue is examined by many authors, including Gendreau, *Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands*, Valencia, *China and the South Sea China Dispute*, and Catley and Keliat, *Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea*. Indonesia is the subject of Taylor, *East Timor: The Price of Freedom*, Emmerson, ed., *Indonesia Beyond Suharto*, Manning, ed., *Indonesia in Transition: Social Dimensions of the Reformasi and the Economic Crisis*, and Hill, *The Indonesian Economy in Crisis*. Burma/Myanmar is poorly covered. But see J. Mohan Malik, "India-China: Myanmar's Role in Regional Security" and Donald Seekins' annual coverage in *Asian Survey*, 1998–2000. Sri Lankan developments are reviewed in Rotberg, ed., *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Conciliation* and Bartholomeasz and De Silva, eds., *Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka*.

¹⁸ Piracy: Gottschalk et al., *Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat of Modern Piracy*; Smuggling: Smith, ed., *Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America's Immigration Tradition* and Heyman, ed., *States and Illegal Practices*; Drug Trafficking: Chepesiuk, *Hard Target: The United States' War Against International Drug Trafficking, 1982–1997*; Illegal Migration and Refugees: Ager, ed., *Refugees: Perspectives on the Experience of Forced Migration*, Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis*, Hyndman, *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Displacement*, Cohen and Deng, *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis in International Displacement*, Van Hear, *New Diaspora: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal, and Regrouping of Migrant Communities*, and Nickolson and Twomey, eds., *Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes*; Disease: Garrett, *Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health*, Garrett, *The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance*, and Bright, "Invasive Species: Pathogens of Globalization"; Fisheries: Leonard, *International Regulation of Fisheries*; Environment: Winnefeld and Morris, *Where Environmental Concerns and Securities Studies Meet: Green Conflicts in Asia and the Middle East*, Hurrell and Kingsbury, *The International Politics of the Environment*, Porter and Brown, *Global Environmental Politics*, Hoagland and Conbere, *Environmental Stress and National Security, Reports of the Environmental Change and Security Project*, Case Studies: China, India and Indonesia of the Project on Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity, and Civil Violence, and Robinson, ed., *The Foreign Relations of China's Environmental Policy*.

¹⁹ After a long and strange post-Cold War silence, this question is finally receiving attention from nongovernmental writers, mostly international relations theorists. See Steinbrunner, *Principles of Global Security*, Kapstein and Mastanduno, eds., *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*, Hoffman, *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in a Post-Cold War Era*, Haass, "What to Do with American Primacy," Acharya, "A Concert of Asia?" Kupchen, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," and Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order." An early and comprehensive analysis is Robinson, "Asian Security Post-Cold War."

²⁰ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*.

²¹ See Robinson, *Asian Security Post-Cold War* for an elaboration and evaluation of these alternatives. A useful supplement is Carter and Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*.

²² Office of the Secretary of Defense, *The United States National Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*.

²³ See the relevant sections of the annual *Economic Report of the President*.

²⁴ Department of State annual *Country Report on Human Rights Practices*.

²⁵ This section follows Robinson, *The Pacific Rim in the 21st Century*.