

Africa: Troubled Continent in a Globalizing World

P. François Hugo

Much of what is being published about globalization and its various manifestations is American in origin and perspective, but a lively intellectual debate on the subject is fast developing in many other parts of the world, including Africa. The challenge lies in contributing something new. The ideas advanced in this chapter contribute to the debate on the impact of globalization, including its impact on Africa over the long term—not only on its politics and economics but also on national security and military forces. They do not necessarily reflect the official position of the South African government.

The Globalized World and the Nation-State

An appraisal of Africa can best begin by discussing globalization in general. In his book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman makes the point that the present era of globalization is not, in fact, the first that the world has seen. He explains that the period from the middle 1800s to the late 1920s was very similar to what we have been experiencing since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Great Britain was the superpower of the time and made huge investments in emerging markets. Similarly, the international flows of trade, capital, and labor, relative to gross national product and populations, were comparable to what we are seeing today. Friedman points out that there were no currency controls at the time and makes a further observation that has a very familiar ring to it: “. . . no sooner was the transatlantic cable connected in 1866 than banking and financial crises in New York were quickly being transmitted to London or Paris.”¹

The current process of globalization does, however, exhibit a number of important differences. One is the degree and intensity with which the world is being bound together into a single marketplace. Another is sheer numbers. Populations are much greater, and capital flow is now measured in trillions of dollars per day. The previous era of globalization resulted, inter alia, from falling transportation costs, whereas the rapid decline in communication costs is one of the primary driving forces of the cur-

Captain P. François Hugo, Republic of South African Navy, serves in the Policy and Plans Division at the South African Department of Defence. He is a surface warfare specialist who has twice held command at sea and has served in a range of other operational, training, and planning assignments.

rent process. This is the result of new technologies such as computerization, miniaturization, digitization, satellite communications, microchips, fiber optics, and the Internet. In Friedman's words, "these technologies are able to weave the world together even tighter."² The main premise of his book is that globalization represents a new international system with its own unique characteristics in the same way that the Cold War represented an international system with its own rules. But the globalization system is not static; it is a dynamic, ongoing process involving "the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before, (and) in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before."³ The driving idea behind globalization, according to Friedman, is free-market capitalism. He therefore attributes the following characteristics to the system:

- Globalization means the spread of free-market capitalism to almost every country in the world.
- It has its own set of economic rules; the more open and deregulated a particular economy is, the more efficient and flourishing it becomes.
- Globalization has its own dominant culture and therefore tends to have a homogenizing effect. This culture is predominantly American.
- It has its own defining technologies. These technologies serve to create the defining perspective of globalization, and that perspective is integration, powerfully symbolized by the World Wide Web that unites everyone.
- It has its own demographic pattern, one of rapid urbanization and lifestyles linked more closely to global fashion, food, markets, and entertainment trends.
- Globalization has its own complex structure of power.

Friedman warns also of a powerful backlash against the forces of globalization by those who are marginalized economically and by those who find their culture and their way of life threatened. Regarding the complex structure of power, he points out that the Cold War system "was built exclusively around nation-states" and "was balanced at the centre by two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union." The globalization system, however, is built around what he terms *three balances*. These balances and the relationships among them have to be clearly understood in order to make sense of the system.⁴

- The first is the traditional balance among nation-states, but given the new twist that the United States is now the dominant superpower and the reality that all other states are "subordinate to it to one degree or another."
- The second balance in the system is between nation-states and global markets. Friedman coins the terms *electronic herd*, denoting the millions of investors moving money around the world with the click of a mouse, and *supermarkets*, the key global financial centers such as Wall Street, Hong Kong, London, and Frankfurt, where they gather.

- The third balance is the (new) balance between individuals and nation-states. Globalization “gives more power to individuals to influence both markets and nation-states than at any time in history.” Friedman refers to individuals wielding such enormous power as “super-empowered individuals.”

He concludes that in order to understand the globalized system it has to be viewed as “a complex interaction between three actors”: nation-states against nation-states, states against supermarkets, and supermarkets and states against super-empowered individuals.⁵ This view is independently endorsed to a certain extent by Alexei Vassiliev: “The international space, earlier occupied almost exclusively by states, is filled more and more by new actors, especially transnational corporations (TNCs), which acquire qualitatively new characteristics, international financial conglomerations, nongovernmental agencies.”⁶

In another view, Benjamin Barber sees the dynamic of the globalizing world as made up of four imperatives. He postulates further that these imperatives, by shrinking the world and eroding national borders, “have in combination achieved a considerable victory over factionalism and particularism, and not least of all, over their most virulent form—nationalism.”⁷ He describes these imperatives as follows:

- A market imperative, referring to national economies, which “are now vulnerable to larger, transnational markets within which trade is free, currencies are convertible, access to banking is open, and contracts are enforceable under law.”
- A resource imperative, referring to the growing resource dependency of nations, where “even the wealthiest societies (are) ever more resource-dependent and many other nations in permanently desperate straits.”
- An information technology imperative, referring to universalizing technologies. The pursuit of these technologies compels societies to open up because scientific progress depends on open communication and easy exchange of information, and the technologies supporting this do not recognize geographical boundaries. Also, the software supporting these communication technologies—such as television shows, films, and lately, of course, the Internet—constitutes the element spreading the culture of the dominant supplier.
- An ecological imperative, referring to the global impact of pollution as a result of a particular type of activity in one or more countries. By this, he means the global impact of changes in climate and the growing problem of inequality, where modernized nations try to prevent developing nations from modernizing by saying, “The world cannot afford your modernization; ours has wrung it dry.”⁸

Paul Kennedy wrote in the same vein when he said, “Although very different in form, these various trends from global warming to twenty-four-hour-a-day trading are *trans-national* by nature, crossing borders all over the globe, affecting distant societies and reminding us that the earth, for all its divisions, is a single unit.”⁹

Globalization has considerable impact on the nation-state and the way that it conducts itself. The global world is characterized by relative anarchy and chaos in the sense that there is no central control, but this very fact means that it creates almost

unlimited opportunity for both individuals and states. Those that are the quickest and most agile get first go at these opportunities, but the secret lies in identifying them. In other words, those most capable of creating and designing their own future in this rapidly changing environment are those that succeed. Knowledge has therefore become absolutely essential. The state's intellectual capital and the abilities of its people are thus key assets in the global competition. But the mobility of capital, labor, and people has become a force in its own right, a force that can rapidly erode these vital assets, as follows:

- Rightly or wrongly, markets will punish irresponsible management and reward good custodians of their investments. Massive flights of capital or huge injections of foreign investment can be accomplished virtually instantaneously in the interconnected world. The mobility of capital is discussed at length in Friedman's book.
- Mobility of labor is the result of the cost of labor and developmental disparities—it is simply cheaper for companies to relocate their manufacturing operations to where skilled labor is cheap. Nations that price their labor out of the market are therefore at a severe disadvantage. A side effect of the mobility of labor is distributed processes of manufacture and a significant increase in the physical transportation of goods.¹⁰
- Mobility of individuals results from the huge demand for specialist knowledge and skills, specifically knowledge and skills related to those technologies driving the global system, or so-called new critical skills, and the attractions of a preferred lifestyle. The worldwide demand for software specialists, coupled to generally high levels of remuneration and the perceived lifestyle in the United States, has, for instance, resulted in a net outflow of these skills for the rest of the world and a positive inflow for that country. Moreover, those who establish global reputations for their particular talents literally become citizens of the world who pick and choose where they want to live.

The net result of these new dynamics is that the nation's intellectual capital and its wealth creators are now mobile. The nation-state is therefore at risk of being impoverished and of finding itself the custodian of those who have no mobility—those who do not possess the knowledge or skills that the state requires for its survival and prosperity. These are people without globally competitive skills, blue-collar workers, unskilled labor, and the unemployed, and in smaller numbers, those who are ideologically committed not to relocate or to become citizens of the world. Strategies to counter this outflow of key assets are limited, and nation-states have little choice but to do what Friedman refers to as the “golden straightjacket.”¹¹ They have to compete to provide stable and attractive investment opportunities; liberalize their economies and deregulate capital flow; offer quality of life and the freedom to pursue a preferred lifestyle, which implies also safety and security; and above all, invest in infrastructure and the education of their workforce.

The ability of the nation-state to resist the forces requiring it to open up to the global community is also being eroded by the ascendancy of TNCs, most of them

with market capitalization far exceeding the gross domestic product (GDP) of the majority of nations. The economic and political power of these corporations, and the mobility and complexity of their operations, often lead to enormous difficulties for both their home and their host states. Transnational corporations are not, however, a law entirely unto themselves; they are not interested in investing in their own army, navy, or law enforcement apparatus and the like. It suits them to leave this burden to the state and to the taxpayer. What they need is a stable environment within which to conduct business. It can therefore be argued that a natural symbiosis exists between the state and TNCs.

By sheer virtue of their size, however, TNCs powerfully influence the playing field where states compete for economic survival. Jerry Hultin, formerly Under Secretary of the Navy, endorses the need for stability when he says, "This (globalized) world calls out for stability, stability for development, for education, for growth, and for freedom."¹² This world requires, in other words, effective and orderly support systems and appropriate infrastructure, primarily in the fields of transportation and communication. What is different, however, is that governments no longer control these systems in the way that they once could. But it is vital that these systems not break down and interrupt the flows of commerce, knowledge, and information. In this sense, the protection and policing of support systems and infrastructure across international borders become the highest priority. Their increasing sophistication, however, tends to make them highly vulnerable.

In *The Wired Model*,¹³ Greg Mills, director of the South African Institute for International Affairs, identifies 10 global trends that will shape not only the economy, politics, security, and development of nations in the new millennium, but also the ways in which they practice diplomacy:

- The trend toward economic globalization, meaning the rapid acceleration of economic activity across national borders, which applies not only to goods, but also to services, information, capital, and labor. He lists a number of factors contributing to this trend, including some that have already been discussed:
 - The increasing mobility of capital.
 - A reduction in the flow of aid.
 - Increasing global trade (with reference to the decline in costs of both transportation and communication).
 - The emerging economic consensus (that earlier alternatives such as communism, socialism, and fascism cannot work).¹⁴
 - The expanding role of multinational or transnational corporations.
 - The changing role of stock markets globally.
 - The role of shadow or informal economies.
 - The emergence of English as a common business and media language.
 - The common consumer culture.
 - Global travel and tourism.
 - Increasing international migration.
 - The globalization of crime.
 - Growing consumer power and technological advancement.

- The impact of constantly improving global communication.
- Improving conditions for freedom of choice and expression, including growing international concern with human rights and humanitarian issues. As Mills puts it, “As repressed populations [have seen] how the rest of the world lives, they have moved to become part of that world.”¹⁵
- The trend toward national and regional interdependencies that is produced by, but also sustains, globalization. Instead of the collective security groupings of the Cold War world, “there has been a new stress on regional economic groupings.”¹⁶
- The growth of units rather than nation-states. These regional units do not necessarily resemble the traditional form of nations clustered into regional groupings. Mills quotes Kenichi Ohmae, who contends that such units, or so-called growth triangles or regional couplings, “can tap successfully into what he [Ohmae] terms the four *I*'s of the global economy: investment, industry, information technology, and individual customers.”¹⁷ Examples are the relationships or connections between China's Guangdong and Fujian Provinces and Taiwan, and those between Singapore, the state of Johore in Malaysia, and Batam in Indonesia. In Southern Africa, this is reflected “in the form of the business ties that exist between South Africa and Mozambique through the Maputo Development Corridor.”¹⁸
- The growing importance of multilateral political, economic, and security interaction in the field of international relations.
 - Mills points out that whereas “the multilateral environment once supplemented bilateral relations, many would argue that this role is today reversed [and that] international political unipolarism and lack of reform of multilateral institutions (particularly the United Nations) undermine this growing orthodoxy.”¹⁹
 - He also identifies the introduction of what he calls a “rules based global trading regime” that is reflected in “the application of strict conditionalities on domestic policy reform,” leading to a “convergence of domestic policy choices” where civil society, particularly nongovernmental organizations, plays an increasingly important role.²⁰
- Massive global population growth.
 - By 1900, world population stood at around 1.6 billion; by 1999, it had reached 6 billion, and at current growth rates it is projected to increase by another billion by 2010. Nearly half of all people are now under the age of 25.²¹
 - This type of population growth will inevitably exacerbate environmental stresses.²² On the positive side, the world has coped reasonably successfully with growth up to now. In addition, there is a definite correlation between increasing affluence and reduced birth rates, while, in Mills' view, “the empowerment of women and, paradoxically, a decline in infant mortality, reduce population increase.”²³
- The impact of aging populations.²⁴
- The increasing divergence in prosperity between the most advanced and most underdeveloped economies.²⁵
- Related to this growing divergence, a trend toward parallelism between greater international interdependency and the rise of nonstate actors on the one

hand, and a reduction and (in some areas) collapse of state functions on the other. This particularly holds true for a number of African countries.

- Under U.S. leadership and assisted by Western technology, a trend as regards military security in the post-Cold War world toward greater stability between states. Mills contends that today, “socio-economic prosperity in Western nations²⁶ has both reduced the likelihood of those wanting to fight and removed the reasons for engaging in inter-state war.”²⁷

Paul Kennedy made a number of astute observations on globalization, national security, and the nation-state when he observed (in 1994) that “in the interconnected new world, ‘national’ security becomes increasingly inseparable from ‘international’ security, and both assume a much broader definition; in place of the narrower military concept there is emerging a larger definition which can encompass a whole spectrum of challenges, old and new. Indeed, we may eventually come to agree that a threat to national security means anything on the globe which challenges a people’s health, economic well-being, social stability, and political peace.”²⁸ He goes on to question the usefulness of the nation-state itself in this global community by saying that it “appears not just to be losing its control and integrity, but to be the *wrong sort* [his emphasis] of unit to handle the newer circumstances.”²⁹ The main reason is that global threats require global solutions, hence the need for transnational agencies and commonly agreed policies.

Supranational regional organizations, within which national differences begin to disappear, are emerging in order to pursue common regional commercial aspirations. The European Union (EU) is a prime example; even within smaller EU regional economic zones, previously hamstrung by customs and tariff systems, such organizations are (re)emerging. Kennedy cautions that “this ‘relocation of authority’ carries with it the risk of national disintegration—at least in societies where ethnic rivalries and disputed boundaries fuel regional differences. [In] much of Africa, the European-style state-system is breaking down, borders are permeated, regional and ethnic rivalries are on the rise.”³⁰ This turn of events serves to illustrate the dilemma faced by many developing nations, particularly in Africa, where the state itself is weak in many cases. African states have to gear up to compete in the global system, but opening up to the system and suborning national authority to that of supranational bodies will undoubtedly further restrict and erode whatever degree of autonomy their governments may aspire to. These indicators notwithstanding, Kennedy concludes, “Even if the autonomy and functions of the state have been eroded by transnational trends, no adequate substitute has emerged to replace the state as the key unit in responding to global change.”³¹ He makes a further observation that is particularly apt when considering African prospects for successful integration into the global system: “How the political leadership of the nation prepares its people for the twenty-first century remains of vital importance even when the traditional instruments of state are weakening.”³²

Africa and Its Prospects for Globalization

In their essay, "Pax Africana in the Age of Extremes,"³³ Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg contend that a central aspect of understanding contemporary African politics is to see it primarily as a crisis of the state. The state

is not merely an instrument of public management, or consumer and distributor of goods; it is fundamentally also a manager of disputes and conflicts. Indeed, the state's primary function is to maintain order. The continuation of conflicts in Africa should therefore be seen as a sign of the weakness of the state. The inability of many African states to maintain effective order and resolve conflicts has been a primary motivation behind the militarisation of the state. It is therefore vital that the African state be strengthened as a means of resolving conflicts.³⁴

They conclude by stating that "the two forces identified as having crippled African states at birth—colonialism and the Cold War—have now receded into the past. But their legacies remain to haunt the present. If Africa is to have a future worth celebrating in the next millennium, fulfilling hopes for a renaissance, a new generation of Africans will have to muster the ingenuity and courage to make the dream of Pax Africana a living reality."³⁵

Views on when, whether, or how successfully Africa will integrate into the globalized world differ widely. In their very upbeat view of the future, *The Long Boom*, Peter Schwartz, Peter Leyden, and Joel Hyatt briefly refer to Africa: "the most poverty-stricken and least developed portion of the world, [as] a key long-term challenge."³⁶ Despite its many woes, they make a strong case for optimism about the (long-term) future of the continent, given the positive developments in the south and the fact that "Africa can ride some very fortuitous global technological trends" by leapfrogging stages in development and cashing in on newer, better, and cheaper technologies.³⁷ They cite the value of Africa's natural resources, particularly that of its (remaining) rain forests and their utility as future biological and biotechnology laboratories, as powerful incentives for the developed world to assist in its development. Moreover, they claim, should the Long Boom sustain global growth rates of 4 to 6 percent a year, the world's wealth would more than double by the year 2020. "That level of prosperity enjoyed in many places around the world would make the contrast with the poverty in Africa nothing short of obscene. At some point the world community would be forced to act—if not out of genuine compassion and generosity, then out of utter shame."³⁸

Allen Hammond refers to the fact that sub-Saharan Africa, "two and a half times the size of the United States [and] home to 600 million people, is largely undeveloped; the entire region has fewer telephones than does Manhattan, the central borough of New York City."³⁹ He lists a range of internal problems and external challenges, but also refers to the region's substantial assets in terms of arable land, water, and forests, of which it has more per capita than either China or India. He proposes three possible scenarios:

- In the first scenario, *Market World: Southern-led Growth*, South Africa's neighbors copy its successes, the Southern African common market emerges, and ultimately the region begins to boom. By 2050, "nearly all of sub-Saharan Africa was making progress, [with] South Africa itself an economic giant on a global scale."⁴⁰
- In *Fortress World: Collapse and Beyond*, the developed world adopts a fortress approach in order to protect itself against the woes of the [failed] developing world, and the region spirals into anarchy and collapse.
- In *Transformed World: The Big Lift*, the nations of the world succeed in dramatically reducing pollution and destruction of the ecology. Africa awakens. "A new generation of pragmatic leaders appear, bring[ing] their countries into the modern [transformed] world [by] making education and other basic social services their highest priority."⁴¹

Hammond concludes that any of these outcomes is possible, but he advances very powerful arguments for the more positive scenarios, despite the region's overwhelming problems. He stresses, however, that "the deep-seated nature of Africa's crisis means that there are no quick fixes."⁴²

In his well-known article, *The Coming Anarchy*,⁴³ Robert Kaplan, on the other hand, holds up the example of West Africa as "symbol of world-wide demographic, environmental and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger," and projects that "West Africa's future, eventually, will also be that of most of the rest of the world."⁴⁴ He paints a grim picture of "nature unchecked" and expresses the opinion that Africa's immediate future could be very bad. He then extrapolates this grim outcome to the Balkans, and "perhaps also the Middle East," based on "the coming upheaval in West Africa, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous disease-ridden coastal 'trading posts,' such as in modern day Sierra Leone." He concludes his particularly dark view of Africa's future by warning ominously that "Afrocentrists are right in one respect: we ignore this dying region at our own risk."⁴⁵

In his report *Africa: A Stepchild of Globalization*, the Russian academic Alexei Vassiliev stresses the gross inequalities among nations, exacerbated by the forces of globalization, and raises the question, "If (globalization) is an absolute good, why has the per capita GDP gone down in 80 countries within the recent decade, why are more than 50% of Africans living in the conditions of absolute poverty, [and] why has their average life duration returned to the level of the early 1960s?"⁴⁶ André Roux, Director of the Institute for Futures Research of the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, raises similar issues. He points out that almost a third of the world population lives on less than \$1 a day, with more than half a billion people suffering chronic malnourishment, but ascribes this phenomenon to a particular aspect of globalization. "The social institutions that ordered life 50 years ago," he believes, "are unable to contain the speed and levels of change characterising today's global society, with concomitant rending of the social fabric, rising crime, drug abuse and a growing sense of individual isolation and hopelessness."⁴⁷ But Roux acknowledges some very encouraging global

developments, which Vassiliev does not. He recognizes that less developed countries have lately been setting an economic growth pace three times that of the industrialized countries, and that the share of humanity living in abject poverty has significantly declined over the period 1960–1992, the share of those enjoying satisfactory human development levels having increased from 25 percent to 60 percent over the same period.⁴⁸ Vassiliev, however, does not condemn Africa to inevitable collapse. He acknowledges that “Yes, African states are weak, anaemic, often alienated from their own population, corrupt,” and then normatively prescribes that “nobody but the state authorities, provided they become more efficient, provided their connection with the population is revived and their responsibility to the society is strengthened, provided they are purged from corruption at least to an extent, can help the economic and social development, [solving] Africa’s confounded problems.” He concludes by saying that “first of all, Africa is the sphere of interest of Africans themselves,” but qualifies this by emphasizing that Africa cannot solve its problems without foreign aid. “That aid should be granted not on the basis of the imposition of naked predatorial behavior of free market under the banner of neoliberal orthodoxy, but with regard for the social, civilizational, historical, environmental, psychological and other features of African countries.”⁴⁹ This view ties in with that of Adebajo and Landsberg when they refer to a new generation of African leaders and what they would have to do to make Pax Africana a success. But what do other Africans have to say about the prospects of their continent in the globalized world?

Richard Cornwell, currently head of the Africa Early Warning Programme at the Institute of Security Studies in Pretoria, tends to liken Africa today to the “Africa of the Chartered Companies of the 1880s” because “globalization for Africa means opening up African markets to penetration, but not vice versa.”⁵⁰ He bases his pessimistic outlook on the inherent weakness of the state throughout Africa and on the fact that African nations often continue to exist in spite of the state, not because of it. He contends that in many African countries the state is not the guarantor of freedom, but a predator—and for the rulers, the security of the state means security for them and their cronies only. These states, furthermore, are states inherited from the former colonial powers, as Cornwell writes in *The Collapse of the African State*.⁵¹ They will continue to be torn apart by the forces of particularism, ethnicity, or tribalism. The scourge of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), he further foresees, is going to negate much or all of the progress that the continent, Southern Africa in particular, has made in recent years; hardest hit will be the armed forces. He recognizes that African people have shown a remarkable resilience in adapting to, and surviving in, the adverse conditions of life on the continent,⁵² and he believes that they will go on doing so, but not in a first-world paradigm. He strongly believes that the idea of a first-world development future for Africa is simply not viable and that, if anything, a successful Africa will of necessity develop its own paradigm of living with, but not necessarily in, the globalized world. This raises the question of whether an African version of Friedman’s “golden straightjacket” is at all possible. Two powerful factors would seem to militate against this:

- The absence of any sleight-of-hand quick fixes in the transparent, interconnected world. The principles guiding the regulatory frameworks are universal.
- The influence of expectations and accountability. One of the longer-term effects of constant mass communication is the direction of individual expectations toward some common denominator—that is, the predominant (American) culture and its values. Once African expectations become sufficiently modified by this exposure to what life could be like and to how governments in mature democracies maintain legitimacy—but more importantly, to how an informed electorate can and should hold government to account—the people will continue to move toward imposing and achieving those conditions for themselves and their governments.

Brazilian author Alfredo G. A. Valladão concludes that no alternative to globalization really exists in different terms:

In a rapidly integrating world, therefore, there is little sense in the preservation of cosily inward-looking identities. Inter-community wars in the Balkans, the Caucasus and parts of Africa are a clear enough illustration of the horrors that lie in wait for defenders of “purity,” be it ethnic, religious or cultural. Such actions in any case can only, at best, delay the inevitable: When the war is over, the economy will have to be restarted and the country eased back into the orbit of World-America (the globalized world). Witness the Islamic Republic of Iran, which since the early 1990s has been painfully negotiating its re-entry to the world trade system, resolutely ignoring the losses of sovereignty that will inevitably have to be digested sooner or later.⁵³

Nonetheless, Cornwell makes a very strong case for his prognosis that Africans will find their own ways of dealing with the dilemmas of their continent and that their solution will not necessarily approximate that of the developed world. He is supported in his view that Africa functions in a “different” paradigm by Chabal and Daloz. Their analysis concludes that “Africa’s present condition represents a form of singular modernization which needs to be explained,” which they then explain in terms of a new paradigm that they call “the political instrumentalization of disorder.”⁵⁴ They conclude, “[One] simply cannot know how Africa will evolve politically,” because “the prospects for political institutionalization [in accordance with the Western model]⁵⁵ are in [their] view, limited.”⁵⁶

Greg Mills, on the other hand, while fully cognizant of the continent’s current and foreseeable extremes of misery, is positive about the prospects of Africa and of, as he puts it, its continental superpower, South Africa, in the next century. He quotes *The Economist* as observing, “Thabo Mbeki . . . has a vision. He would like to lead an African Renaissance. A creative surge of political, economic, and cultural activity across the continent which will eventually make Africa prosperous, peaceful and powerful. Mbeki sees South Africa as a major catalyst in this process.”⁵⁷ Mills concedes that the continent is still giving out contradictory signals regarding its economic prospects but quotes a number of positive indicators from *Global Economic Prospects 2000*:

During 1999 a number of African states have managed impressive rates of economic growth. According to the World Bank, during the period 1996–98, 35 of 48 sub-Saharan countries registered positive GDP growth per capita. However, this slowed progressively from an average of 4.7% in sub-Saharan Africa in 1996 to less than 2.5% in 1998–99. In 1998 at least 29 countries registered positive GDP growth per capita. This slowdown was the result of a number of factors, including a reduced demand for oil and other commodities as a result of the Asian crisis, the rise of numerous conflicts, and poor weather. Growth for 1999 was set to be around 2.3% and was anticipated to recover to 3.3% in 2000–01.⁵⁸

Mills further concedes that it is “very difficult, if not impossible” to explain why some African countries have been able to perform during the 1990s and others have not, but he identifies two critical factors that separate these groups:⁵⁹

- Good governance, or governance “that can be measured in terms of the ability of developing countries to confront and manage what might be referred to as the four deficits: the current account, fiscal, efficiency, and social deficits. The first three are self-explanatory, and stress pragmatic, sound management alongside the need to encourage productive sectors of the economy and reduce the expense of doing business—what economists refer to as ‘transaction costs.’” But “foreign investment is crucial in this process,” and “national conciliation and the sublimation of divisive loyalties lie at the heart of responsible, yet pragmatic post-war governance and reconstruction.”⁶⁰
- An appropriate leadership ideology,⁶¹ which, as Mills explains, includes the following aspects:
 - Effective economic policies designed to encourage productive sectors while reducing state demands
 - The political skills required to maintain popular support while the long process of recovery is taking place
 - Efficient administration and, especially, the imposition of controls on the abuse of power, which frequently manifests itself in the economic domain in the form of corruption—the effects of which are hard to overstate.⁶²

In assessing African prospects for globalization and structural adjustment, Mills refers to the continent’s policy milieu, which experts indicate would have to change considerably. “Until now,” he observes, “the African continent has not encouraged efficient production and thus global competitiveness. High transport costs, potential difficulties with contract enforcement, the difficulty and expense of obtaining reliable information, and the poor quality of public institutions have all raised the so-called ‘transaction costs’”—and such costs “discourage transaction-intensive activities such as manufacturing.”⁶³ He concludes his assessment by stressing that “success does not demand solely emulation, but also adaptation.” He cautions that this will be a long process, “almost as long as the structural decay, in spite of the imposition of conditions of good governance and good policies.” The challenge, he believes, is to “inculcate into the social mindset and cultural identity of Africans the need to adhere to the

conditions and practices of the global economy—[for it] will remain a *global* [his emphasis] economy and environment, one in which we should be aware of the need to promote gradual, rather than radical, change.”⁶⁴

Opinions on the future of the continent thus vary widely. But already there are many encouraging signs⁶⁵ of a self-awakening desire from within the continent to integrate with the developed world—albeit perhaps in a uniquely African paradigm—and a number of compelling arguments could be made that Africa will not be left to spiral into chaos and misery. Schwartz and associates allude to one when they project that, should the developed world continue to boom in the way that they foresee, the moral imperative will overcome any unwillingness affluent nations may have in assisting and guiding Africa toward that desired future. Another argument is captured in Kennedy’s reference to the planet as a single unit and Kaplan’s warning that the world would ignore this region at its own risk. The global nature of potential health, environmental, and migration threats that would issue from a collapsed Africa would leave the developed world no choice but to intervene.

There are, of course, other, more positive reasons for intervention and involvement in the continent. One is the growing importance of its oil resources,⁶⁶ and another is the attraction of growing markets in those countries where some economic progress is slowly being made. The extent to which such intervention and involvement would be meaningful in promoting a “developed world future” for Africa remains to be seen. The desire of millions of Africans to be part of the globalized world, but on more equitable terms, and the potential threat that catastrophic failure would hold for all people, seem to echo in Thabo Mbeki’s statement to the recent Africa-EU summit in Cairo. He refers to the substantial benefits “Fortress Europe” stood to gain should it succeed in pulling Africa out of poverty. Such a feat would result in “a radical expansion of the world market for capital, goods and services.” But, he cautions, “we watch, troubled by the possible danger of the development of the concept and practice of a ‘Fortress Europe,’” and he insists on a more equitable dispensation by saying, “We [African leaders] have every reason to believe that we share a common resolve to ensure Africa’s integration in the world economy, [but] in the ways we have indicated.”⁶⁷

National Security in Africa

The preceding overview of the globalizing world, and Africa’s future in this world, makes clear that African states face formidable challenges in the new century. These challenges include the need not only to open up and become full-fledged competitive partners in the global economy but also to democratize, and yet keep the state together as a functioning entity, while at the same time providing burgeoning populations with the basic necessities of life. National security in this context goes far beyond mere military security, and a regional approach to security is essential in Africa. It is also clear that, in order to succeed, Africans themselves must take control of their own destiny and the pace at which they are going to pursue this better future. But doing all of this in a world that is daily moving faster and becoming more and

more unforgiving is simply not possible without substantial assistance and aid from the developed world.

The dilemma is where to start. Aid for the sake of aid has proved more fatal than no aid at all. The Cold War luxury of appealing to two opposing superpowers who were only too willing to buy influence on the continent, it can be argued today, has probably set Africa back many years. The most immediate need is perhaps massive investment in communications infrastructure and education so that the people will come to demand good governance. But of higher priority is the need to stabilize the continent and rid it of endemic violence in order to normalize business and effect good governance. This means large-scale, decisive, and effective peace support intervention. African nations themselves clearly do not have the capacity to embark on such ventures alone, although they can and should most definitely participate. Substantial outside assistance, on terms acceptable to Africans, is vital. But even more urgent is the need to provide food, potable water, shelter, and medical care to millions of displaced people.

Considering these critical needs, when are issues such as HIV/AIDS,⁶⁸ care for the elderly, due democratic process, and the rule of law going to be dealt with? This paper does not provide a conclusive answer to these seemingly insurmountable problems. Two conclusions can be drawn, however. First, the distinctions between national and regional security are rapidly blurring, for regional solutions are required. Second, solutions will more likely evolve over time as a result of constant incremental steps taken by African leaders themselves, facilitated by consistent and sustained, but nonthreatening, outside assistance and support, rather than through precipitate spurts of damage control or quick in-and-out interventions triggered by short-lived humanitarian concerns.

The Role of the Military in Africa

In traditional terms, defense forces owe their existence primarily to the need of the state to protect its territorial integrity and to protect its people against the ravages of invaders and its resources against plundering. The question then arises: Does this still hold true in the globalizing world? One answer, regarding the potential shift from national to regional or international security, is provided by John Bayliss and Steve Smith. They argue that “it remains much too soon to conclude that a paradigmatic shift is taking place in international politics in the aftermath of the Cold War, or that such a permanent shift is possible.”⁶⁹ They recognize, however, that in the 1990s:

ideas of cooperative or common security [in which states take account of the security interests of their neighbours] are beginning to have a significant impact on security policies in Europe and in other parts of the world. This can be seen in the developments that have taken place in the European Union, the [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], as well as the relations between Nordic countries and between [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] states in South East Asia. These developments [involve] something of a shift from the tra-

ditional preoccupation with national security to a growing recognition of the importance of international and global security considerations.⁷⁰

The developed world, where the focus would seem to be expanding to long-term collective survival issues rather than more immediate national security concerns, is also grappling with what the role of the military should be in this apparently changing environment. If it is accepted, then, that Africa eventually will become part of the globalized world and that it too needs to adopt a regional approach to security, the same question applies. Furthermore, given the wide range and the urgency of the security dilemmas confronting African states and the fact that no alternative exists to grasping the challenges of globalization, it is important not only to address the role of the military but also to ask how it can contribute to this process.

The answer should clearly relate to internal and regional stability, as well as to the facilitation of this long-overdue transition to equal partnership in the global community. What contribution can armed forces and, more particularly, naval forces make to assist governments in this transition? Some answers seem self-evident. Once a country has progressed to the point where its “army” does not merely constitute an extended presidential guard, with the sole aim of keeping a kleptocratic dictator in power, its armed forces should provide some measure of conventional defense or core defense capabilities. These should be appropriate to the nation’s defense needs—that is, related to the potential for interstate conflict in its immediate region and commensurate with the capacity of its economy to sustain those forces. Equally important, the armed forces should be capable of dealing with internal threats to the constitutional order by upholding law and order where police services are unable to do this on their own. But other than these requirements, these forces should focus on promoting internal stability and prospects for growth by assisting the relevant authorities in the following:

- Maintenance of law and order. This entails assisting police services with the combating of crime, particularly where crime takes on a paramilitary character.
- Defense against terrorism.
- Border control (land, air, and sea), with the purpose of curtailing flows of drugs, illegal weapons, and other contraband, and apprehending bandits and criminals intent on gaining illegal entry.⁷¹
- Policing sea lines of communication and approaches to major ports.
- Protection of natural resources against plunder and pollution, particularly those resources contained in and under the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and in maritime zones beyond the EEZ.
- Preservation of life, health, or property, and maintenance of essential services, especially in cases where the capacity of appropriate agencies is exceeded due to unusual circumstances, such as natural or industrial disasters.
- Humanitarian aid, including the management and care of refugees on national territory.

Once these internal needs have been satisfied, the next priority should be the promotion of regional peace and stability. This would entail a sustainable capability to project force in order to participate in the collective regional peacekeeping initiatives required to back up diplomatic efforts in this respect, with or without assistance from outside the continent. However, no African country, including South Africa, currently has sufficient sustainable force projection capacity to make a decisive difference in terms of peacekeeping in Africa without substantial, sustained outside assistance.⁷² The ability to project force as a means of providing regional stability should, however, constitute but one arrow in a quiver that contains a range of other options. The full spectrum of activities aimed at promoting regional security cooperation should be included. Professional armed forces enable governments to engage in military-to-military cooperation, assistance operations, and a variety of confidence- and security-building measures. These could include the exchange of attachés, observers, training teams, students and staff, or other courses of assistance. One condition remains paramount, however: Given the need for African governments to invest massively in infrastructure and education, basic services, and health care, it is imperative that the defense burden not amount to more than is absolutely necessary in terms of fiscal resources. This is a particularly difficult issue to deal with when considering the functions, size, and shape of inherently expensive naval forces.

The Role of Naval Forces

In his incisive assessment, *Maritime-Naval Trends in the 21st Century*,⁷³ Rear Admiral Thomas Kemf of the German Navy observes that in the future, nations will not fight to conquer, “but to retain the status quo and allow for stability to grow.” He lists various (new) risks resulting from poverty, religious fundamentalism, and conflict over natural resources, notably access to energy sources and fresh water. These risks share a number of features: they are “transnational and asymmetric in nature, not susceptible to traditional security solutions, [they] feed on instability and are thus in direct conflict with states whose prosperity is linked with a stable, global market.” Examples are terrorism, drugs and international crime, and weapons proliferation (including weapons of mass destruction and highly sophisticated conventional weapons). These new challenges do not mean that traditional naval tasks are becoming obsolete, “but even these will require new capabilities.” Kemf stresses the growing importance of the littoral. “At present, over two-thirds of the world’s population lives within 100 nautical miles (nm) from the nearest shore, [and] most human maritime activity; shipping, fishing, oil exploration . . . are conducted within that 200 nm coastal zone,” the EEZ. As a consequence, “a substantial proportion of the world’s economic and political activity is being conducted on a narrow strip of land and sea on average no wider than 300 miles.” A clear trend with respect to future development, therefore, is “the increasing importance of littoral capabilities.” Kemf also stresses the future importance of

- Partnership and cooperation;
- Combined/joint crisis management operations; and

- General defense—the retention of capabilities to build up sufficient forces should a major crisis occur.

In addition, he identifies a number of essential capabilities relating to the prominent role that navies have acquired in crisis management operations:

- Naval surface fire support⁷⁴ (the ability to affect targets on land from maritime platforms).
- Strategic sea lift.⁷⁵
- Ballistic missile defense.⁷⁶

Speaking in a global context, Kemf perceives the following broad trends:

- Cooperation (even with former adversaries) will be a key feature of future maritime tasks.
- The importance of naval contributions to enhance regional stability and security will increase.
- Traditional maritime skills will have to be augmented to deal with new challenges.
- Asymmetrical risks will dominate naval planning.
- The naval focus will be on combined and joint operations and littoral warfare capabilities.
- Defense budgets will continue to decline.

In view of this, he concludes that navies will remain valuable political and military instruments, but that they will have to retain traditional skills as well as adapt to new challenges. Moreover, navies are “indispensable” to coastal states. But, “it is debatable, whether all navies will be able to keep pace with the procurement requirements.”⁷⁷ These challenges undoubtedly hold true for future African navies, particularly with respect to crisis management. Certainly, the importance of naval contributions to enhance regional stability and security will increase. Cooperation and partnership, therefore, hold promise for African navies.

African Naval Forces

Given these new challenges to security, the importance of trade and, therefore, maritime trade routes in the global world, and the challenges presented with respect to national and regional security on the African continent, what is the state of African naval forces, and what contribution can they make? In his treatise *The Challenge of Effective Sub-Saharan Maritime Defense*,⁷⁸ Louis du Plessis, director of the Centre for Military Studies, points out that “the African naval hierarchy is unique among the Third World regions in its preponderance of ineffective navies. This holds true even when the northern Arab-African navies are included.”⁷⁹ African navies include only littoral navies, coastal navies, constabulary navies, token navies, and “no navies”—navies that have, for practical purposes, no maritime capability at all.⁸⁰

In analyzing the challenges faced by littoral African states, du Plessis highlights a number of issues. He refers to the emergence of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for

Regional Cooperation (IORARC) and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA). Both of these organizations are aimed at promoting trade and cooperation among member littoral nations, many African nations among them. He refers also to the region's need for protection against foreign exploitation of natural resources, such as fishing and minerals, in territorial waters and in the EEZ, and to the need for dealing with ecological threats such as pollution. The EEZ, he says, is "the most prominent example of the global trend toward more extensive national control of ocean zones," but this presents a huge dilemma to African countries. "The inshore and off-shore territorial defense capabilities of [African] navies are, at best, weak and often nonexistent, and even their EEZ surveillance potential is questionable."⁸¹ He refers to the need for Africa's developing economies to protect their sea routes, "particularly given their dependence on commodity exports," but points out that "none of the states, not even South Africa, which is blessed with both eastern and western coastlines, fully benefits from access to these oceans and to their potential wealth."⁸²

"The many small and weak sub-Saharan states," du Plessis says, "are vulnerable to a number of foreign influences. This vulnerability is associated with the vast length of coastline, with the fact that major shipping routes pass through each of the continent's ocean basins, and with the richness in natural resources of the continent and some of its offshore regions."⁸³ A former South African Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, has said, "The current theft of maritime resources is sub-Saharan Africa's greatest security threat. This will continue until fishing stocks have been totally plundered or until a regional naval presence calls a halt to what amounts to daylight robbery."⁸⁴ Viewed against the growing importance of the littoral worldwide, and it is no different in the African context, these facts bode no good for the future of the continent. Furthermore, "the maintenance of a navy, by its very nature, is a capital-intensive and technology-intensive undertaking." Du Plessis points out that "only those sub-Saharan countries experiencing some economic growth and relative political stability" would seem to be in possession of some maritime capability. In this regard, he mentions Nigeria, which has a coastal navy with a very low degree of operational readiness; Kenya, "one of the best trained and most professional navies in sub-Sahara, overshadowing that of Nigeria, and second only to South Africa"; and South Africa, "which has the leading sub-Saharan navy."⁸⁵ Moreover, "most sub-Saharan states find themselves in the predicament that the maritime infrastructure required to support and maintain naval systems and military air surveillance elements does not exist and is unlikely to be developed in the medium term."⁸⁶ Not only that, but also most sub-Saharan states have no shipbuilding industries: "They face a permanent problem of finding enough foreign currency to buy vessels and spare parts from overseas shipyards." In addition, it is a fact that maritime issues are accorded a very low priority within sub-Saharan security establishments. "No African state has allocated even a third of its national defense budget to the navy."⁸⁷

In maritime terms, stability and the unhindered flow of trade by sea are essential prerequisites for sub-Saharan prosperity. In recognition of this truth, the Organisation for African Unity Council of Ministers resolved, as early as February 1980, that "African nations should work in closer collaboration to provide maritime services, in order to increase their participation in the world's seaborne trade."⁸⁸ A fundamental

principle of maritime policy is to guarantee the security of coastal and territorial waters. But safety, or the lack thereof, also affects insurance. If an area is not secure, insurance premiums for calling vessels will be higher. Moreover, there is a legal imperative. With the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea having come into effect since the middle 1990s, “the need for naval policing capabilities is now greater than ever before.”⁸⁹ In order to comply with international requirements, an efficient maritime structure should comply with a range of navigational and safety requirements. These du Plessis considers to include:⁹⁰

- Harbors that are clear of obstacles, regularly dredged, and competently marked and buoyed.
- Adequate lighthouses and marked shipping lanes.
- Up-to-date mapping, aerial photography, and hydrographic services available on demand.
- Guaranteed availability of sea search-and-rescue facilities, including 24-hour radio watch and reliable weather forecasts.
- Regular coastal patrols by competent national agencies such as coast guards, aimed at combating piracy, terrorism, illegal immigration, and smuggling.

But activities aimed at water-space management represent another important area where emerging sub-Saharan navies can assist in promoting economic development. Du Plessis cites the following examples:⁹¹

- Assistance with protection of maritime resources, notably fishing and marine environment and the ecology; as well as pollution control, including protection against oil spills and the dumping of toxic waste at sea
- Disaster relief and the ensuring of safety of life at sea
- Hydrography and the support of scientific research

These policing activities aimed at compliance with international requirements represent a very attractive area for regional maritime cooperation to mutual benefit. “Neighboring countries could consider bilateral or multilateral agreements so that certain policing tasks, such as operations against smugglers and dealing with oil spills, could be shared.”⁹² Some useful work is being done to achieve this through structures such as the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, an organ of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and its maritime substructure, the Standing Maritime Committee. Other organizations attempting similar objectives are the Port Managers’ Association of Eastern and Southern Africa, and that of Western and Central Africa. But as du Plessis points out, “the regional focus is not yet on maritime affairs.”⁹³ These structures will go some way toward promoting regional maritime cooperation but need to be expanded and to give more positive guidance. The following are areas in which interstate maritime cooperation is urgently required:⁹⁴

- Policing EEZs

- Combating the invasion of regional waters by unlicensed fishing fleets
- Preventing, containing, and clearing up pollution, which threatens both marine life and tourism
- Sharing information on hydrographic surveys and oceanographic studies
- Exchanging intelligence on criminal activities, such as smuggling by sea
- Training regional peacekeeping forces
- Cooperating in a regional search and rescue system

The main point, however, is that the need is very real for regional maritime cooperation aimed at addressing a wide range of common issues in order to promote unhindered trade and maritime security. But how do African states, starting from such a low baseline, go about creating the necessary naval means? Du Plessis suggests that for sub-Saharan states, “the systematic creation of efficient, but inexpensive and unpretentious naval forces is a first prerequisite.” But “no African state has the financial or the technical wealth to maintain a navy as well as a separate coast guard. The thrust of any effort toward development and cooperation should thus be to establish naval capability where it does not exist, and to assist in its improvement where it does.”⁹⁵ Naval capabilities can be developed only incrementally, so it follows that African navies need to develop “effective offshore policing capabilities” before they can “move into blue water.”⁹⁶

The needs listed earlier are considered first-order needs. In generic terms, the means to satisfy offshore policing requirements are simple; large numbers of rather cheap patrol vessels with very good seakeeping ability, good endurance (specifically in terms of crew comfort), reasonable speed,⁹⁷ low operating cost, and basic armament appropriate to the task at hand will suffice. Should these vessels be capable of carrying helicopters, with or without hangar facilities, so much the better. Should some form of rudimentary maritime air patrol capability complement this surface capability, effectiveness would increase exponentially. In addition to the provision of these basic maritime services, littoral African nations should also provide for basic conventional maritime defense commensurate with the assessed threat, or what Kemf terms “general defense.”

Any expansion of forces to meet the classic requirements of seapower, such as effective sea denial and ultimately sea control—albeit in limited areas—or the protection of sea lines of communication beyond the EEZ, should be very carefully calibrated against other demands on the national budget. Some prudent form of conventional maritime capability is, however, essential. Its size and shape are determined largely by the individual state’s threat perception, which is governed in turn by the perceived stability of its immediate region, the political posture of its immediate neighbors, and that of potential aggressors beyond the region.

Attempting to ensure superiority of force across the widest possible spectrum as a means of dealing with this problem is simply unaffordable. In this regard, the solution adopted by the South African National Defence Force is of note. It is known as the core force approach⁹⁸ and implies, in theory at least, a minimum force that contains an expandable growth core for a range of capabilities—particularly those capabilities that cannot be created or reconstituted within a short space of time. In

addition, it is capable of dealing with foreseen short-term contingencies. But more important, it is affordable and not of such magnitude that it threatens neighboring states. Such an approach should ideally be complemented by confidence- and security-building measures aimed at establishing some form of common security regime where neighbors do not constitute potential threats but are partners for peace.

The third priority for defense investment should be the development of force projection capabilities to promote stability and participate in regional peace support operations. The design of the maritime component of peace support capabilities should be aimed at providing the following:⁹⁹ mobility, versatility, lift capability, sustained reach, poise (the demonstration of presence covertly or openly to provide political and military leadership with options without the political commitment involved in the deployment of forces ashore), and leverage (the ability to influence political events and shape military operations ashore through suitable positioning). Meeting these requirements, even with the most modest of forces, remains an expensive undertaking. It may prove useful, however, to explore some of the options for the development of suitable maritime defense open to African littoral states.

Options for Maritime Defense in Sub-Saharan Africa

African states face enormous challenges. The establishment, maintenance, and expansion of naval forces to meet the urgent demand for vital maritime and naval services appropriate to national security and developmental needs constitutes only one of them. The obvious solution is to start small and take incremental steps, but the urgent need for maritime services far exceeds the capacity such embryonic navies would be able to provide. Militaries constitute an enormous burden on the national treasury. Around the world, nations are striving to reduce this burden through outsourcing of noncore services, public-private enterprises, cooperation and alliances, and other efforts. Ideally, armed forces should migrate from being pure cost drivers in the national household to becoming integrated components of the economy. But such an undertaking requires a major paradigm shift and is not possible without some further sacrifice of sovereignty. The more important question, however, is how to work toward this solution in the African context. Cooperation and alliances would seem to provide one answer.

André Roux, in his analysis on the budgetary consequences of a military alliance for South Africa,¹⁰⁰ develops an interesting proposition. He argues the merits of defense cooperation in Southern Africa and proposes that South Africa, “as the leading producer and operator of conventional deterrence [and therefore public good] weapons in the sub-continent,” should shoulder the bulk of the conventional defense burden on behalf of member states.

Given the limited resources in the region, co-operation and some form of defence alliance would promote security and, by implication, stability, which in turn would serve the economic interest of all members. Moreover, by entering into an alliance with other countries in Southern Africa, South Africa could feasibly make a significant contribution to the overall welfare of those members of the alliance. By consuming security provided by the

rest of the alliance and, in particular, South Africa, the security effort demanded by the individual smaller country is smaller. Consequently, resources are released for the production and consumption of civilian goods and services. The country therefore has a higher level of security than before, as well as a greater volume of civilian goods.¹⁰¹

Roux predicts that South Africa would have to carry a “disproportionate deterrence-sharing burden” and that “the military and economically weaker members of such an alliance would tend to be free riders at the expense of South Africa in particular.” Nevertheless, he concludes, such an arrangement could in the long run “be to the benefit of all parties involved.” His calculations show that “if, in 1990, countries in Southern Africa (excluding South Africa) had lowered their combined defense burdens from 3.6 percent to 2.6 percent, \$300m would have been released for expenditure on, for instance, public education and health.” In the Southern African context, this is a substantial amount, particularly if it were to be repeated annually. By the same token, efforts by South Africa in 1990 “to substitute for the other countries’ loss in defense capability by simply spending an additional \$300m on defense and making this additional capacity available to the entire region” would have resulted in a 6.6 percent increase in defense expenditure. Provided then that the other members spend their savings on defense in a meaningful fashion—“for investment in physical and human infrastructure the longer term benefits for South Africa, as an exporter to the region, as an investor in the region and as supplier of security”—should outweigh the shorter term costs.¹⁰²

Many counterarguments must be raised, primarily regarding the practical execution of such an arrangement, but considering the potential dividends for the entire region, it would be more than worth the effort. Once again, an incremental approach would be prudent. Maritime services provide a nonthreatening opportunity for international and regional cooperation. Issues such as the sovereignty of individual states or the taking up of arms on behalf of other governments are not as acute as in conventional defense alliances. Cooperation could be initially extended, therefore, to the provision of maritime services—that is, policing of the regional EEZ only. If the South African Navy, which would probably carry the bulk of the burden because of its relative size, could be assisted in its efforts on behalf of the region in this regard by a Big Brother, such as the European Union or individual EU member states such as Britain, France,¹⁰³ or Germany, chances for success would be greatly improved. The navies of Kenya and Nigeria could play a prominent role in any such arrangement. The region also has the option of contracting out its maritime requirements to individual navies or coast guards in the developed world or groupings thereof. Payment need not necessarily be in coin. African states are not currently exploiting resources in the EEZ to anywhere near their full extent.¹⁰⁴ Other actors are doing it on their behalf without paying for the privilege. Naval forces from outside the continent participating in such a venture would provide their respective governments with the added advantage of sharing in the curbing of the international drug trade by limiting the flow of drugs around the African coast.

Cooperative exposure of this nature not only would give African naval forces time to develop but also would provide the opportunity to do so. Activities such as

training, hydrographic survey, search and rescue, and ship repair and maintenance should be included in any such arrangement. Southern African nations could then exploit this situation to work toward a complementary hierarchy of navies or naval forces appropriate to their own evolving common defense regime. The South African Navy is the only littoral navy in the region, and it does, in fact, also have some blue-water capability.¹⁰⁵ This capability will be greatly enhanced with its recently announced acquisition of German corvettes. Regional naval forces could therefore shape themselves, in turn, to provide coastal services across a spectrum of activities. This could eventually lead to a rationalized sharing of the maritime defense burden among member states and maybe even to some form of standing regional navy. To this end, the SADC and its defense structures could play a decisive role. Regional states could also consider foregoing the luxury of maintaining national naval forces and leaving the full responsibility to South Africa against some form of reimbursement. This rather radical arrangement would presuppose full acceptance of the consequences: the continued commitment of all members, and in the case of South Africa and its navy, a benevolent disposition. It is, however, not totally far-fetched. Other structures, such as IORARC and ZPCSA, also could render a similar constructive and supportive contribution to immediate maritime service exigencies. They could assist in building a regional maritime capacity that could ultimately lead to formalized maritime security among the littoral nations of sub-Saharan Africa. By way of kick-starting such a process, these structures could materially support and give some substance to the so-called Abidjan and Nairobi Conventions for the protection of marine resources.

A final proposal stems from the fact that a number of Southern African littoral states are members of the Commonwealth. Some form of cooperative venture among these states and their developed counterparts in the Commonwealth should therefore also be viable.¹⁰⁶ Whether the Commonwealth—considering its broad spectrum of members and their diverse national interests—could muster the political will to embark on such a venture remains debatable. Greg Mills, when prompted for his view on such an undertaking, expressed the opinion that it could not easily do so.¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

Globalization has broad implications for the individual nation-states of sub-Saharan Africa. Successful integration into the globalizing world will inevitably entail collaborative approaches to national security, particularly maritime security. Regional maritime defense alliances, with South Africa shouldering the bulk of the responsibility, have been proposed. Such alliances are seen not solely as advantageous from the security perspective, but also as beneficial to regional growth and stability. Options for the provision and development of appropriate naval forces are clearly a long-term issue; those forces will not materialize overnight. There is every reason, however, to start working on the provision of effective maritime services now. However, because African nations cannot presently meet the maritime security challenges facing them on their own, they also will need the assistance and cooperation of the developed nations.

Despite the seemingly insurmountable nature of Africa's problems, a number of factors mitigate for a better future and a true African Renaissance, although it may be a generation or two in coming. There are some positive signs: indications of growth, of greater willingness toward constructive engagement among the nations of the developed world, and of growing realism. There is the gradual disappearance of dictators who were in business only to line their own pockets. There is, in fact, ample evidence of a new attitude among a significant number of the continent's leaders—leaders who understand the challenges of the global world, who are committed to educating and empowering their people to compete on an equal footing, and who are prepared to make the hard choices needed in order for their nations to succeed. But above all, there are the people of Africa, people of tremendous resilience and resourcefulness who persevere in carving out an existence even in the face of some of the most extreme living conditions to which humankind can be subjected—a people who deserve a better future. 🌍

Notes

¹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), xiv.

² *Ibid.*, xv.

³ *Ibid.*, 7, 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶ Alexei Vassiliev, *Africa: A Stepchild of Globalization*, report delivered at the 8th Conference of Africanists held by the Africa Institute of Moscow University in Moscow, September 28–30, 1999.

⁷ Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs McWorld," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1992, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/barberf.htm>>.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 129.

¹⁰ Due to advances in technology, this increase in the movement of goods does not directly translate into an increase in the volume of goods transported, but certainly to an increase in value.

¹¹ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 86. The "golden straightjacket" entails, inter alia, making the private sector the primary engine of (your) country's economic growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the state bureaucracy, maintaining a balanced budget, removing restrictions on foreign investment, and deregulating capital markets.

¹² J.M. Hultin, "The Challenges of the 21st Century: Linking Naval Power, the Heartland and You," an address to the Toledo Navy League, Toledo, Ohio, February 7, 2000, <<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/undersec/speeches/n1000207.txt>>.

¹³ Greg Mills, *The Wired Model: South Africa, Globalisation and the Third Millennium* (Johannesburg, South Africa: The South African Institute of International Affairs, Jan Smuts House, and London: I.B. Taurus and Company, in press).

¹⁴ Friedman echoes this view when he writes, "There is only one thing to say about these alternatives: They didn't work. And the people who rendered that judgement were the people who lived under them." Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 85.

¹⁵ Mills, *The Wired Model*, 59.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 74.

²² Peter Schwartz, Peter Leyden, and Joel Hyatt, *The Long Boom. A Future History of the World 1980–2020* (London: Orion Business Books, 2000), 154. Reference is also made to Ehrlich's basic equation defining the environmental impact of humans: Environmental Impact=Population×Affluence×Technology.

²³ Mills, *The Wired Model*, 77.

²⁴ In contrast to those countries with high population growth rates, those with low, zero, or negative growth face the specter of rapidly aging societies, as is the case with the United States, Japan, and Europe. Some of the implications are that in these countries "public pensions and health costs could skyrocket against an increase in taxes and budget deficits, and a reduction both in the rate of economic growth and the amount of finance available for infrastructural and capital investment." As a consequence, "social welfare could increasingly become an issue of private rather than state provision." The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development predicts that the living standard of Japan may be cut by 23 percent by the middle of the 21st century, that of Europe by 18 percent, and that of the United States by 10 percent. Mills, *The Wired Model*, 78.

²⁵ Mills quotes from a UN Conference on Trade and Development study on globalization, which shows that "the differences in income per head between the seven richest and seven poorest countries world-wide have nearly doubled (in the period) between 1965 [and] 1995, from 20 to 39 times." Mills, *The Wired Model*, 81.

²⁶ One assumes that by Western nations, the author means developed nations with mature democracies.

²⁷ Mills, *The Wired Model*, 85.

²⁸ Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, 130.

²⁹ Ibid., 131.

³⁰ Ibid., 133.

³¹ Ibid., 134.

³² Ibid.

³³ Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, "Pax Africana in the Age of Extremes," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 7, no. 1 (Summer 2000).

³⁴ Ibid., 26.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Schwartz et al., *The Long Boom*.

³⁷ Ibid., 140.

³⁸ Ibid., 142.

³⁹ Allen Hammond, *Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century. Global Destinies, Regional Choices* (Washington, DC/Covelo, CA: Island Press/Shearwater Books, 1998), 187.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 194, 195.

⁴¹ Ibid., 197, 198.

⁴² Ibid., 200.

⁴³ This article by Kaplan first appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* of February 1994 but is taken here from Helen E. Purkitt, ed., *World Politics 99/00*, 20th ed. (Connecticut: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill).

⁴⁴ Purkitt, *World Politics 99/00*, 11.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 13, 14.

⁴⁶ Vassiliev, *Africa: A Stepchild of Globalization*, 2.

⁴⁷ André Roux, ed., *Business Futures 1999* (University of Stellenbosch, South Africa: Institute for Futures Research, October 1999), 2–49.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Vassiliev, *Africa: A Stepchild of Globalization*, 21.

⁵⁰ Richard Cornwell, interview conducted in Pretoria on March 29, 2000.

⁵¹ Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason, eds., *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies* (Pretoria: The Institute of Security Studies, 1999), 63.

⁵² This resilience is also referred to by Allen Hammond: “African extended families and the habit of sharing provide a resilience that helps the region to weather adverse conditions. The African people are mobile, and large-scale migrations to areas of opportunity, to seek jobs or better grazing for live-stock, are common.” Hammond, *Which World?* 190.

⁵³ Alfredo G.A. Valladão, *The Twenty-First Century Will Be American*, trans. John Howe (London: Verso, 1996), 192, 193.

⁵⁴ Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder As Political Instrument*, African Issues (Great Britain: Villiers Publications/The International African Institute, 1999), 143.

⁵⁵ Chabal and Daloz explain: “The dynamics of the political instrumentalisation of disorder are such as to limit the scope for reform in at least two ways. The first is that, where disorder has become a resource, there is no incentive to work for a more institutionalised ordering of society. The second is that in the absence of any other viable way of obtaining the means needed to sustain neo-patrimonialism, there is inevitably a tendency to link politics to increased realms of disorder, be it war or crime. There is therefore an inbuilt bias in favour of greater disorder and against the formation of the Western-style legal, administrative and institutional foundations required for development.” Change toward the establishment of the constitutional, legal, and bureaucratic political order, which is a requirement for fundamental reform, would have to be driven by popular will. “Only when ordinary African men and women have cause to reject the logic of personalised politics, seriously to question the legitimacy of the present political instrumentalisation of disorder and to struggle for new forms of political accountability, will meaningful change occur. Tempting as it is to think that political liberalisation, the so-called democratisation of Africa, will facilitate such change, there is in the foreseeable future little likelihood that it will.”

⁵⁶ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works* 162, 163.

⁵⁷ Mills, *The Wired Model*, 23. A counterview is expressed by Jeffrey Herbst in his contribution to Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy’s book *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*. Herbst takes the position that “(positive) spillovers from South Africa to the rest of the region will only develop slowly. At the same time, the region itself is already having a profound, and in many ways negative, impact on South Africa. South Africa is not strong enough to determine, in either a positive or negative way, the fate of its region.” Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., *The Pivotal States. A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 163–164.

⁵⁸ Mills, *The Wired Model*, 147.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 150.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 151, 153.

⁶¹ Ibid., 155.

⁶² Mills quotes James Wolfensohn, who identifies corruption and issues of equity as lying at the core of ending poverty, but very accurately points out that this works both ways: “Just as corruption has to be addressed through the inculcation of standards of transparency and probity in developing countries, there is also an onus on investor countries to ensure that bribes are not paid as a way of doing business.”

Mills, *The Wired Model*, 156, 157. A very encouraging breakthrough addressing an aspect related to appropriate leadership ideology and corruption is captured in the front page headlines of *The Star*, a Johannesburg daily of Wednesday, April 5, 2000, which reads, "Payback Time for Africa's Plunderers." Accompanying articles refer to the decision taken at the Africa-EU summit in Cairo, where EU countries have agreed in principle to take steps to ensure that money stolen by African leaders and officials and deposited in European banks is returned. The South African foreign minister is quoted as saying, "I think it is important that they return that money. It was difficult to sustain their position. You can't talk of fighting corruption [the Europeans have insisted on greater commitment by Africans to stamp out corruption if they want more investment], and then refuse to return money expatriated by corrupt people. This money comes mainly from poor countries; it was stolen from countries which badly need it for development. How can a rich country hold on to that?"

⁶³ Mills, *The Wired Model*, 158.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 170, 171.

⁶⁵ Paul Kennedy wrote in 1993, "[S]ome observers claim to have detected signs of a turnaround. With the exception of dyed-in-the-wool African socialists (many of whom have since disappeared off the political scene), many leaders are now attempting to institute reforms. [The World Bank] has identified past errors, many of them urged upon African governments and funded by that institution itself, and encouraged economic reforms. [This statement applies to donor and development institutions across the board; they have all learnt from past mistakes.] Democratic principles are also returning to the continent. Moreover, at the grass roots level, there are examples of economic self-improvement, cooperative ventures to halt erosion and improve yields, and village-based schemes of improvement." Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, 217.

⁶⁶ This view is endorsed by Jakkie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Security Studies, who captures all of these arguments, but also the growing importance of Africa's oil reserves, when he writes in *The Sunday Independent* of April 9, 2000: "Irrespective of the arc of crises that stretches from Eritrea to Namibia, Africa will not remain marginalised from the global economy, and therefore from the global polity, to the extent that doomsday pundits and Afro-pessimists predict. There are three reasons for this—Africa's increasing importance as an oil-producing region, the extent to which the continent is becoming a source of drugs—and the often associated linkages to organised crime, and the continued relevance of humanitarian considerations. Based on current trends Angola may eventually supply more than 20 percent of all US oil imports given the role of ExxonMobil and Chevron in that country. . . . The growing role of Africa as an oil-producing region implies a potentially important role in global economics and politics that may be lost in the focus on war, conflict and diamonds. Skewed as development driven by oil might be, greater transparency, a focus on good governance and an acceptance of the role of big business in Africa are important considerations in the future of Africa."

⁶⁷ Thabo Mbeki's address to the Africa-EU summit held in Cairo in April 2000, as quoted in *The Star*, April 5, 2000, 6. Mbeki's point of departure is that Africa is integrated in the world economy, but that this (ongoing) integration, in a way that up to now has benefited the developed world only, "has condemned our continent to poverty and underdevelopment."

⁶⁸ "As a result of AIDS, life expectancy in some African countries could dip as low as forty years, reducing overall population numbers but at the same time undermining economic growth prospects." Mills, *The Wired Model*, 75.

⁶⁹ John Bayliss and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 210.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁷¹ As a general rule, African police and border forces (if they exist) are ill equipped to deal with these contingencies. Moreover, their efforts tend to be concentrated in the major cities.

⁷² Two articles published in *Salut* (the official monthly magazine of the South African Department of Defence) are of note. First, in *South Africa and the United States, Natural Partners for Peace*, William S. Cohen, U. S. Secretary of Defense, is quoted as stating, "South Africa and the United States

share common goals and values. Both are democracies, both promote equal opportunity and stress human rights. Both South Africa and the United States want an Africa that is stable, peaceful and prosperous." *Salut*, April 2000, 16. Second, in *Talk Is Cheap*, Leopold Scholtz, Deputy Editor of *Die Burger* (a Cape Town daily newspaper), commenting on U.S. policy toward Africa, makes the following observations: "The American Africa policy is, as is the case in many democratic countries, a compromise—a result of the power struggle between different lobbies, each with its own agenda. In short, while some Americans in the business of policy formulation understand the need to stabilise Africa, and South Africa is regarded as a strategic partner, this is mainly to ensure that they do not have to do the stabilising themselves. And this does not only apply to Americans; the Europeans also view South Africa in the same light. In this way, the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon could tell black voters that America is taking the initiative with the solution of Africa's problems, while in actual fact the country is risking almost nothing, so as not to alienate the white voters. When South Africa, therefore, ponders its participation in peace operations proposed by the United States, it should know very clearly that it is being used as a pawn in the internal American political power struggle." *Salut*, April 2000, 17.

⁷³ Thomas Kempf, *Maritime-Naval Trends in the 21st Century*, paper presented at the South African Navy Conference 2000, Durban, April 14, 2000.

⁷⁴ Naval surface fire support with modern standoff weapons has led to a total change in command-and-control philosophy. Higher military or even political levels, Kempf contends, "will make the crucial decisions on the selection of land targets and the time of weapons release. Maritime commanders at sea will neither be able to control these missions nor to verify target data. They will only have to execute these attacks according to direct orders from superior decision levels." Kempf, *Maritime-Naval Trends in the 21st Century*, 4.

⁷⁵ Strategic sealift capabilities, or even amphibious capacities, capable of functioning under threat, are a scarce resource the world over. In order to deal with the demand for this capability resulting from naval participation in crisis management operations, "navies of all countries will have to provide a national contribution." Kempf, *Maritime-Naval Trends in the 21st Century*.

⁷⁶ Ballistic missile defense relates to the extended air defense capabilities that maritime forces should be able to provide in view of the threat arising from ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction aimed at home lands and troops deployed in theatre. Kempf, *Maritime-Naval Trends in the 21st Century*.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷⁸ L. du Plessis and M. Hough eds., *Protecting Sub-Saharan Africa: The Military Challenge* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council/CEMIS and ISSUP, 1999).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 147, 148.

⁸⁰ Among the 44 littoral sub-Saharan states, only 1 has a littoral navy, 2 have coastal navies, 7 have constabulary navies, and 18 have token navies. Plessis and Hough, *Protecting Sub-Saharan Africa*, 149.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 155.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 156.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 157. Kasrils also stated, "The more fish lost, the more hungry stomachs on land and the fewer jobs. Those thousands of kilometres of open sea and coastline beckon the gunrunners, the drug smugglers, the international mafia, the terrorists and the pirates of all nationalities, who are fast becoming the greatest security threat of all our time."

⁸⁵ Plessis and Hough, *Protecting Sub-Saharan Africa*, 158, 159.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 161.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 163.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 165.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 164.

⁹¹ Ibid., 165.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 168.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 169.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ A minimum of 20 knots sustainable speed.

⁹⁸ This approach is described in the *South African Defence Review*.

⁹⁹ *Peace Support Operations: A Working Draft Manual for African Military Practitioners*. A publication sponsored by the government of Norway through the Training for Peace project at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, February 2000, 76. The draft manual also describes a comprehensive range of maritime tasks specific to peace support operations.

¹⁰⁰ André Roux, *The Future of Defence in Southern Africa: In Defence of the Future (A Socio-Economic View)*, paper presented at the International Conference on Defence Economics and Security in Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Countries, organized by the *Centro de Estudos sobre Africa e do Desenvolvimento* and the Portuguese National Defense Institute, June 5–6, 1998, Lisbon.

¹⁰¹ Roux, *The Future of Defence in Southern Africa*, 13, 14.

¹⁰² Ibid., 14, 15.

¹⁰³ France already maintains a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean.

¹⁰⁴ “Africa contributed 1.3% of the total world fish trade in 1996 according to the *UN International Trade and Statistics Book*. Considering the fish stocks available in Africa’s EEZs, Africa has not taken investment in the fishing industry seriously.” A.A. Rafrouf, *An African View of Maritime Challenges*, a paper presented to the South African Navy Conference 2000, April 14, 2000, Durban, South Africa.

¹⁰⁵ Its global reach, albeit very limited in scale and sustainability, has been successfully demonstrated on a number of extended cruises, notably to Taiwan and Chile, in the past decade.

¹⁰⁶ The author is indebted to Richard Cornwell for this idea.

¹⁰⁷ Greg Mills, an interview conducted at Jan Smuts House on March 29, 2000.