

The Balkans: Failing States and Ethnic Wars

Laura Rozen

The breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing savage ethnic wars in Bosnia and Kosovo offer an illuminating example of how the new era can produce great turmoil. In the Balkans and elsewhere, the combination of failing states, ethnic hatred, and escalating local violence is challenging the ability of international institutions to respond. Dealing with such situations promises to be a key strategic task of the early 21st century.

In at least three areas, the lens of globalization can be helpful in understanding the breakup of Yugoslavia. Conspicuous in this regard is the impact of economics. Excessive international lending in the 1970s to Yugoslavia and other less developed countries followed by an international recession in the 1980s led to Yugoslavia accumulating an enormous international debt of \$20 billion. Belgrade attempted to restructure the country's decentralized economy to service the debt, inducing soaring unemployment and ultimately inflation. These developments exacerbated ethnic and political tensions, eroded the Yugoslav middle class, which had provided a base of political moderation, and fueled the secessionist aspirations of the more economically successful Yugoslav republics in the prewar period.

Also of some significance was the intervention in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts of key international security institutions—the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Most striking about the Bosnian intervention is the paradox of the disturbing failure of the institution regarded by most as the foundation for global cooperation, the United Nations, to be effective in a conflict typical of those that have captured the moral consciousness of the international community in the wake of the Cold War. This conflict leaves open to question whether the United Nations is inherently incapable of effective intervention in Bosnia-like conflicts, precisely because its requirement of consensus serves to neutralize the capacity to act on its political and moral judgments. As the case of Bosnia shows, sound political judgment and leadership are crucial to timely and energetic intervention and ultimately to stopping aggression and forging peace. In the United States, the debate focused on the question of the U.S. role in conflicts not considered of vital national security interest. Also evident in this connection is the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations and human

Laura Rozen is a freelance journalist who covers events in the Balkans. She previously worked as a political analyst on Yugoslavia for the International Crisis Group.

rights groups on the foreign policies of governments, particularly that of the United States, even in the matter of demands for military intervention.

The Kosovo war advanced the debate over the role of the U.S. military and international organizations in intervening to protect human rights. Of specific concern was the global precedent of the international community decision to intervene militarily to protect the Kosovar Albanians from mass abuse, killings, and expulsions by their own government rather than honoring the principle of sovereignty. Essentially, the international community chose human rights over the sacredness of borders.

Finally, the imprint of globalization also can be traced in the evolution of the international community response to crises in the former Yugoslavia. Of some interest is how the international community and its security institutions such as NATO have fitfully, but fundamentally, redefined their missions to adapt to conflicts—such as Bosnia and Kosovo—prominent in the wake of the Cold War. But the evolving institutional charters and declarations of groups such as NATO and OSCE also make plain that the international community remains in a period of drift and confusion, trying to reconcile itself to the challenges of conflict in the globalization era.

Globalization does not seem to provide the international community with a complete explanation for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflict in the region. Although globalization does not explain why Yugoslavia dissolved violently rather than peacefully, growing evidence indicates a trend in the globalization era toward conflicts fueled by state collapse—conflicts in which warlords, Mafia dons, and self-interested, violent criminal figures rise to power and exploit conflict to maintain their fiefdoms.¹ Globalization does not provide a sturdy framework through which to understand the evolution of the international community response to the types of ethnic conflicts represented by Bosnia and Kosovo, which, although not numerous, have become more visible in the post-Cold War world. And perhaps most troubling, globalization does not explain why Yugoslavs—who, of the Eastern Europeans, are among the most well-traveled, intermarried, and exposed to Western ideas, products, and technology—participated in, or at least were unable to halt, the most sadistic ethnic killing in Europe since the Holocaust.

The Early Coming of Globalization to Yugoslavia

Economic Crisis and Political Immoderation

International circumstances that ushered in the globalization era, particularly the debt crisis in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent diminished strategic importance of Yugoslavia to the Eastern and Western blocs, exacerbated an economic crisis in Yugoslavia that contributed to its dissolution.²

At the time of Josip Broz Tito's death in May 1980, Yugoslavia had a foreign debt of \$20 billion, the result of generous international loans forthcoming because of Yugoslavia's strategic nonaligned position relative to the Cold War superpowers. Contributions from American banks flooded with petrodollars from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the wake of the 1973 rise in oil prices also contributed to the Yugoslav debt.³

Although external forces—including heavy international lending, soaring oil prices starting in 1973, and the international debt crisis—contributed to an economic crisis in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, the country had chronic, internal economic problems partly of its own making. Particularly damaging was its failure to get a grip on inflation.⁴ However, heavy international lending to Yugoslavia, particularly in the 1970s, did nothing to encourage Belgrade to adopt the disciplined measures necessary to control inflation and reform its economy, which ultimately allowed it to sink into debilitating debt. Fred Singleton has characterized the situation as follows:

There was a mood of facile optimism which could be detected amongst decisionmakers at all levels concerning the prospects of recovery in the world economy. . . . There was an expectation that something would turn up at the eleventh hour to save the situation. To some extent this did happen, for the World Bank, the IMF [International Monetary Fund], and other western banks frequently came to the rescue with loans. . . . This international aid gave a temporary breathing space, but only stored up trouble for the future.⁵

The international recession of the 1980s hurt Yugoslavia in other ways. Facing rising unemployment, Western European countries sent tens of thousands of Yugoslav guest workers home. For years, Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* had been sending hard-currency remittances home to their families. Their dismissal and forced return to Yugoslavia exacerbated the economic crisis in Yugoslavia twofold: the influx of hard currency to Yugoslavia dried up, and the returning guest workers came back to a country experiencing soaring unemployment. Unemployment in Yugoslavia rose from 14 percent in 1979 to 17 percent by 1986, and to more than 20 percent in the republics of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶

Accustomed to imported foreign goods, Yugoslavs in the 1980s faced long lines and meager supplies on store shelves. Annual inflation rose by over 50 percent a year through the early 1980s, then jumped to over 100 percent in 1987, and to 1,200 percent in 1988. Growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) fell from more than 5 percent in 1979 to 0 percent in 1982 and to less than 15 percent between 1989 and 1991, when war broke out between Croatia and Serbia.⁷

The economic crisis that ensued in the 1980s pushed Belgrade to reverse a more than decade-long trend in the devolution of political and economic power from the federal to the republic level, and to adopt austerity measures, including import restrictions, oil rationing, power cuts, and a devaluation of the dinar.⁸

The result of this economic crisis in Yugoslavia was twofold: Yugoslavia's middle class began to erode rapidly, taking with it the base of political moderation that it supported. And the gap between rich and poor republics became more pronounced, straining the cohesion of the Yugoslav federation.

Economic Crisis and Nationalism

Belgrade's efforts to reform the national economy and adapt it to the changing international circumstances coincided with longstanding but growing gaps in the economic success of Yugoslav republics. Increasingly, those gaps stoked secessionist aspirations of the more developed and economically successful republics, Slovenia

and Croatia. These republics had more opportunities to integrate with Western European markets because of their geographic position in the country as well as their Adriatic coastline, which supported lucrative tourist industries. By 1983, the ratio of GDP between the poorest area, Kosovo, and the wealthiest, Slovenia, reached a staggering 1:7.5.⁹ The growing gap between rich and poor republics

would be serious enough in a country with a culturally homogeneous population, but it becomes explosive in a multinational society like Yugoslavia, whose leaders have always maintained that a truly socialist society cannot exist as long as these great economic inequalities survive. Unfortunately, despite their best endeavors, the gap has widened steadily, and as the process of decentralisation has developed, the resistance of the richer republics to the demands of their poorer neighbours has stiffened. On both sides of the dividing line between rich and poor this situation has fueled the fires of nationalism.¹⁰

Croatia and Slovenia maintained unemployment rates below 8 percent throughout the 1980s, but the unemployment rates of the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia hovered between 17 percent and 30 percent throughout the 1980s. And while the most populous republic, Serbia, had a steady unemployment rate of almost 20 percent throughout the 1980s, its southern, predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo had an unemployment rate that jumped from nearly 40 percent in 1979 to nearly 60 percent in 1985.¹¹

In the 1970s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had encouraged the decentralization of Yugoslavia's economy. However, during the international debt crisis of the 1980s, IMF advice reversed course and urged Yugoslavia to recentralize and reorient its economy toward the manufacture of exportable products that would generate hard currency and allow Yugoslavia to service its massive foreign debt. The Yugoslav federal government attempt to assert more control over the republics was resented and resisted by the wealthier republics, which increasingly felt that they had little to gain from the federal union. Indeed, IMF pressure to recentralize the Yugoslav economy fueled tensions between those Yugoslav political leaders who favored a strong federal government and those who preferred devolution of power to the republics. Increasingly, this rift led to deadlock in the Yugoslav parliament and to a growing sense of the dysfunctionality of the country as a cohesive unit.

Poverty and Its Ethnic Impact

The economic crisis had another pernicious effect on multiethnic, multireligious Yugoslavia. Ethnic suspicions and prejudices grew as the country's economic and employment pie steadily shrank. The middle class, which had grown since the 1950s and might have provided the sturdy base of political moderation needed to counteract this trend toward ethnic hostility, instead was polarized and diminished by growing poverty and a sense of insecurity.

One expert describes how the economic crisis of the 1980s destroyed the Yugoslav middle class and exacerbated ethnic tensions:

The consequence of greatest long-term political significance was the erosion of the substantial middle class, which had been growing since the late

1950s. This solid social middle . . . could provide the basis of a moderate political center. . . . Instead, they were being polarized economically and socially by the austere conditions. Sixteen percent were able to sustain or improve their standards; the remaining 84 percent felt their economic fortunes and sense of personal security begin to decline. Even those who could maintain their standard of living feared the future and the prospect of isolation from the global economy.¹²

In addition, the shrinking economic pie also fueled animosity between Yugoslavia's different ethnic groups:

Instead of encouraging market behavior as intended, the reforms . . . reinforced social divisions. . . . Pressures to employ relatives, finding scapegoats on the basis of social prejudice, antifeminist backlash, and right-wing nationalist incidents became more common. Resentment against those with political sinecures—or what were assumed to be party-based privileges—was informed by old stereotypes (for example, the belief that Serbs dominated political offices) . . . the employment requirement of proportionality and parity among national groups made ethnicity more salient. . . . Suspicion of ethnic bias was as powerful as its reality, and such resentments particularly threatened poor, ethnically mixed communities.¹³

1985–1989: Pivotal Years in Yugoslavia and Abroad

Internal forces were hardly the only factors in the incipient ethnic, religious, and political changes portending revolution in Yugoslavia:

Forces both inside and external to Yugoslavia combined to further erode confidence that Yugoslavia would hold together. In 1985, the preconditions of a revolutionary situation were apparent. One million people were officially registered as unemployed. . . . Inflation was at 50 percent a year and climbing. . . . Attempts to alleviate the pressures made inflation worse. . . . This economic polarization led to social polarization . . . scapegoating against minorities . . . bubb[ed] up. The outcome of these conditions was a growing political polarization. . . .¹⁴

Outside Yugoslavia the world was changing rapidly. On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the Soviet Union. His political reforms, fueled in part by the approaching bankruptcy of the Soviet economy, began to erode the Cold War competition between the two superpowers that had defined the global political landscape for the past half-century. That Cold War fault line was one on which Yugoslavia had found a precarious perch, and its erosion led Yugoslavia to lose its internal balance.

In 1985, Gorbachev agreed to strategic arms reductions with the United States and launched *glasnost*, the policy of openness that led to the liberalizing of the Soviet press and civil society.¹⁵ In 1987, Gorbachev ordered Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan. In the same year, the Serbian Communist Party boss, a 46-year-old former banker named Slobodan Milosevic, went to Serbia's predominantly Albanian southern province of Kosovo and told a crowd of frightened and angry Kosovo Serbs that "no one will dare beat you again." It was April 1987 and in 2 years Milosevic would revoke

the autonomy that the province's Albanian majority had enjoyed since 1974. The idea of multiethnic Yugoslavia was overcome by nationalism. In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia would declare independence, and Milosevic's Serb-dominated Yugoslavia went to war to carve out a Greater Serbia from the remains of Yugoslavia.

The Culmination: Dissolution in Hindsight

The nationalism that propelled Milosevic to power took hold in Yugoslavia as the system of brotherhood and unity eroded in the decade following Tito's death. It was fueled in part by exposure to the global economic crisis and its loss of balance in the face of the dramatically shifting global political landscape of the 1980s.

It is interesting to put the political biographies of Slobodan Milosevic and the other nationalist leaders who presided over the carve-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s into the context of the global economic and political conditions that enabled their rise to power. "The argument that such aggression in the Yugoslav case was the plan of one man, Slobodan Milosevic," writes Woodward, "ignores the condition that makes such leaders possible and popular and therefore ascribe so much power to the man that foreign governments came to rely on him to end the wars... Why did Yugoslav society take the turn it did at the end of the 1980s? Why did the economic and political reform of a socialist country bring nationalists to the fore?"¹⁶

As early as the decade preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, years before the time that has come to be known as the globalization era, there emerged some of the phenomena associated with globalization that ultimately contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The country's exposure to the international economic crisis in the 1980s and the failure of measures adopted to adapt to the circumstances can be seen to have contributed to rising hostilities between pro-federalist and antifederalist politicians and between ethnic groups fighting for a share of an ever-shrinking economic and employment pie. In hindsight, reforms urged by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, particularly recentralization of the Yugoslav economy, seem not only to have failed to help but also accelerated the forces leading to Yugoslavia's breakup.

Whether Yugoslavia's vulnerability to economic and political circumstances of the 1980s constitutes globalization is a fair argument. What seems relevant to a discussion of the influence of globalization on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, however, is that the internal instability that led to war was in part a result of its exposure to the economic crisis, the changing international environment, and rigid policies imposed by international institutions on the debt-strapped country during the prewar decade of the 1980s.

Globalization and the War in Bosnia

Why did the United Nations, the "global" institution that in theory seems ideally suited to deal with post-Cold War conflicts of the Bosnia type, prove so incompetent at just that? Why did it take the North Atlantic alliance, created to defend Western Europe from Soviet invasion, to halt the war that no NATO nation initially found so

compelling as to seriously resolve to halt earlier? And does the UN failure (and NATO success) in Bosnia yield any insights about globalization and international efforts to cope with conflicts like Bosnia's, which have come to preoccupy international attention in the post-Cold War world?¹⁷

Again and again in the 1990s, in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia, the United Nations has shown itself ineffective in preventing the slaughter and suffering of innocent people by war and warlords where its blue helmets have been deployed as peacekeepers. Why? The United Nations often is left to cope with crises in which the world's most powerful nations do not find sufficiently compelling vital national interests to muster the political will necessary to undertake a more active intervention. In other words, the United Nations is given the hardest jobs—where others lack the political will to intervene. In addition, UN peacekeepers are repeatedly sent into conflict zones such as Bosnia without sufficient means to protect themselves, or without sufficient force size, firepower, or mandate to take robust control of an unstable situation. A mismatch between stated ends and means is a chronic problem of UN peacekeeping operations, seen most recently in the kidnapping of 500 UN blue helmets by Sierra Leonean rebels.¹⁸

The UN determination to view the Bosnian conflict neutrally, apolitically, almost like a natural disaster, even in the face of early and compelling evidence that the Bosnian Serbs were committing most of the atrocities, led the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to avoid dealing with the chief source of the violence and suffering. This policy equated the aggressors with their victims, as one journalist wrote:

How can impartiality, which means making no distinction in one's practical dealings between someone who commits genocide—as the International War Crimes Tribunal has accused Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic of doing—and its victims, be consistent with international law in which genocide is a crime?¹⁹

The fact that UNPROFOR as an institution attempted to view the Bosnian conflict as a humanitarian crisis without political and moral judgments to clarify the landscape that they were operating in is largely a function of the political dynamic of the UN Security Council. The different, often conflicting national interests, sympathies, and historical ties of the five permanent member nations of the UN Security Council served to neutralize the body's judgments on the war. The politics of consensus led the UN Security Council to mandate that peacekeepers take only minimal actions to alleviate the suffering of the victims, which included 200,000 dead and 2 million displaced by the time UNPROFOR was replaced by the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in late 1995.²⁰

If [UN Secretary General Boutros] Boutros-Ghali wanted the votes of the French, the British, the Russians and the Americans, who disagreed so fiercely on Bosnia, there was nothing for him to do but adopt a minimalist approach to the problem and say as little as possible, since anything he could say was bound to offend one or another of the permanent five members of the Security Council.²¹

Too many conflicting national policies in the UN Security Council led to political deadlock, a muddle, and a proliferating number of resolutions designed more to appease horrified Western publics than save lives in Bosnia.²² In his new study of peacekeeping and war in the globalization era, William Shawcross writes:

The UN Security Council was not prepared to heed warnings. . . . Resolution 752 of May 15 [1992] . . . required UNPROFOR to provide armed escorts for humanitarian convoys in Bosnia and demanded that “all irregular forces . . . be disbanded and disarmed” and cooperate with the United Nations. This was totally unrealistic, and within a fortnight the fighting had got so fierce that Boutros-Ghali had to order the evacuation of most UN officials from Bosnia. . . . Resolution 752 was the first of more than 150 Security Council resolutions on Bosnia, as the demand for action dragged the United Nations further and further into the conflict without the means to limit, let alone stop it.²³

UN inability to cope with its ever-increasing responsibilities in Bosnia only became more pronounced as it became more clear there was no peace to keep. UNPROFOR peacekeepers were often the subject of abuse and even hostage taking by the Bosnian Serbs.²⁴ The organization yielded almost daily to shows of force by Bosnian Serb commanders, making it increasingly evident that it controlled nothing; it could scarcely take care of its own members, let alone the Bosnians.

In what became the cruelest joke of the war, UN Resolution 819, declaring six Bosnian towns UN safe areas,²⁵ was passed April 16, 1995. The United Nations deliberately chose a name for the project that would sound like the United Nations would be protecting people, when, in fact, it knew it could not live up to such a commitment:

What the term [safe area] meant was left vague. The term “safe haven” was studiously avoided . . . since this had a precise definition in international law and implied immunity from attack for all who sought refuge there. . . . But there was never any intention, in practical terms, to render [these towns] safe, since this would have involved the United Nations abandoning its position of neutrality. The term “safe area” (like “protection force”) quickly became a cruel misnomer. The safe areas were among the most profoundly unsafe places in the world.²⁶

Less than 3 months after declaring the eastern Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica a safe area, 370 surrounded, outnumbered,²⁷ and vastly outgunned Dutch troops assigned to protect it withdrew, allowing Bosnian Serb forces to overrun the town and massacre 7,414 unarmed Bosnian men and boys, beginning July 11, 1995.²⁸

The UN force commander for the former Yugoslavia, Bernard Janvier, who, according to the dual-key²⁹ system under which the approval of both NATO and the United Nations was required to launch airstrikes, held a veto, refused the Dutch pleas for NATO airstrikes to ward off the Serbs, saying that the enclave was indefensible and that airstrikes would risk the lives of the UN hostages.³⁰ The killing that followed went on for days:

The Serb triumph over Srebrenica was the ultimate in international humiliation, and not just because the world had stood by and watched the biggest single mass murder in Europe since the Second World War. There was a

second more revealing reason for international shame: hidden behind the public condemnation and outrage there lay a very real sense of relief; satisfaction that the messy, unresolved matter of the eastern enclaves, which cluttered up the peace-makers' maps, had at least been settled. Neater maps, on which a settlement could be based, could now be drawn. Once the enclave of Zepa was overrun a fortnight later, the division of territory was easier still . . . the forced movement of hundreds of thousands of people . . . was actively helping the peace process gain momentum. . . . A consensus had already taken shape that humanitarian aid had simply prolonged the war without much affecting its eventual outcome.³¹

The international effort to alleviate the pain of war delayed but did not meaningfully change the final outcome: the Bosnian Serbs, and to an extent the Bosnian Croats, carved out their ethnically pure swathes of territory through mass killing, expulsions, and deliberate terrorizing of civilians, and simply factored the UNPROFOR presence into their plans when it suited them. The map the warring parties created on the ground through aggression and retreat was largely reflected in the final Dayton peace agreement. As the aggressor's policies of population transfer and killing resulted in an increasingly ethnically partitioned map of Bosnia, the internationals started to see a zone of separation they could police, 3½ years and 200,000 lives after the war had begun.

NATO's Turn

After the Srebrenica massacre, European allies with troops on the ground with UNPROFOR were threatening to pull their troops out, a project that President Bill Clinton had committed U.S. troops to assist. Thus, Srebrenica was the watershed that forced Clinton to make a choice between committing U.S. troops to help withdraw Allied troops in Bosnia in utter shameful failure, or committing Americans as part of a NATO peace enforcement force that would police a final peace agreement.

The prospect of a UN withdrawal rang alarm bells in Washington. Clinton knew that he would be called on to fulfill his promise to send up to 25,000 U.S. troops to help extract the allies from Bosnia. That opened up the possibility that U.S. troops would lose their lives doing what no military leader ever seeks to do—reinforcing defeat. For Bill Clinton, to put American lives in danger for so inglorious an operation, and in the year when he would be seeking re-election to a second term in the White House, would have spelt electoral disaster. Clinton needed a new plan.³²

Clinton's decision that the United States would take the lead gave the UN mission new direction and crossed the Mogadishu line of peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The Bosnian Serbs were recognized as the main aggressor.

After Srebrenica, nothing would ever be the same. All reticence about stepping over . . . the Mogadishu line, which separated peace-keeping from peace-enforcement, was swept aside. The United Nations, led unambiguously by the United States, in effect went to war with the Bosnian Serbs, all pretense of impartiality now abandoned. Washington turned to Croatia to do

what it would not: fight against the Serbs. And the Europeans . . . followed the American lead.³³

European, American, and Russian foreign and defense ministers, gathered in late July 1995 in London, agreed to two important policy changes, according to U.S. lead Bosnia negotiator, Richard Holbrooke:

First, NATO would draw a “line in the sand”—the evocation of President Bush’s 1990–1991 language on Iraq was deliberate—around the enclave of Gorazde. Second, the decision as to whether or not to use airpower, and how much, at Gorazde, would be made by NATO only, thus removing from the UN from its dreadful “dual key” authority.³⁴

In early August, the Croatians launched a military offensive that retook the Serb-held Krajina region of Croatia, sending hundreds of thousands of Croatian Serbs fleeing as refugees to Serbia. Although many European and U.S. diplomats deplored the continued fighting, Holbrooke saw a practical value in this development: the fact that Milosevic let the Croatian Serbs fall, and that Serbs had tasted military defeat on the ground, would potentially make them more cooperative at the negotiating table.³⁵

Another high profile atrocity—this time the Serbs’ second mortar attack on a Sarajevo marketplace on August 28 that killed 37 people and wounded 90—added to the sense of outrage that was fueling U.S.-led efforts to punish the Serbs and finish the war. UN analysis decisively determined that the mortars launched into the Merkala market came from Bosnian Serb positions.

Two days later, on August 30, at 2 a.m., NATO launched Operation *Deliberate Force*, targeting Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo. Unlike earlier NATO pinprick bombing of the Bosnian Serb positions, this operation was fairly massive. “After 40 months of awkward hesitation, NATO today stepped squarely into the midst of the Bosnian war,” proclaimed Holbrooke in quoting *The New York Times* Sarajevo bureau chief Roger Cohen, in reaction to the bombing.³⁶

On September 14, the Serbs agreed to lift the siege of Sarajevo, and NATO ended the bombing. Three months later, the parties signed the Dayton peace accords, and soon thereafter 60,000 heavily armed, NATO-led IFOR troops oversaw the separation of the warring parties according to the map agreed upon at Dayton, and the establishment of a demilitarized zone separating the 51 percent of Bosnian territory awarded the Muslim-Croat Federation and the 49 percent of Bosnian territory awarded the Bosnian Serbs as Republika Srpska. The Bosnian Croats and Serbs remained nominally, reluctantly, part of a unitary Bosnia. As of May 2000, however, some 1 million displaced Bosnians have still not been able to return to their original prewar communities because of continued hostility toward ethnic minorities and related security concerns.

Ingredients of International Intervention in Bosnia

Why Did the United Nations Fail in Bosnia?

The United Nations failed in Bosnia partly because the situation was inherently difficult and partly because it lacked the strong political will and institutional means to intervene effectively. Shawcross contends that there are interventions in which the United Nations can be effective. He compares the relative success of the UN peace-keeping operation in Cambodia with its failure in Bosnia to try to yield insights into intervention in the globalized era.

In Cambodia the UN was deployed only after an exhaustive peace-making process. . . . There was a framework and if factions tried to break out or ignore it . . . that was self-evident. In Yugoslavia, by contrast, the UN was merely responding to cataclysmic events. There was no peace plan to which all signs had signed on. . . . In Cambodia the UN had the backing of a united Security Council. . . . In Yugoslavia . . . there was spectacular international disarray, which had prevented the development of any coherent policy. In Cambodia, UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] had supreme authority in one country. UNPROFOR, by contrast, had a much more limited mandate in several countries. . . . In Cambodia the UN had to deal with cease-fire violations; here the UN confronted war. In Cambodia, there was the overarching figure of Prince Sihanouk. . . . In Yugoslavia there was no such unifying figure—all leaders divided and spoiled. In Cambodia UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] was able to repatriate all the refugees living along the border. . . . In Bosnia the crisis grew all the time, as thousands and thousands more people were forced from their homes. This in turn encouraged more war.³⁷

In short, UN peacekeepers had shown that they could operate effectively where there was a peace to keep, when the United Nations had a broad mandate that gave it authority, and when it had the support and confidence of its Security Council backers, and by and large that of the local parties.

In Bosnia, there simply was no peace for the UNPROFOR to keep. Despite ample evidence of this, the UN Security Council refused to recognize the reality of the ground situation and the impossible situation into which it had inserted international peacekeepers. Shawcross writes further:

UNPROFOR's personality was split. At its starkest, the issue was bread versus bombs. There was a fundamental clash between UNPROFOR's two principal missions—support for humanitarian assistance and the safe area concept. To succeed in humanitarian operations, the UN had to be seen as impartial. This was made almost impossible by its parallel mandate to deter attacks against the safe areas. The safe areas resolutions were essentially anti-Serb.³⁸

The Bosnia conflict also shows the need for strong political leadership that was lacking in the UN Security Council, which was split along the lines of the conflicting national interests and sympathies of its five permanent members. This led to lack of clarity in the political objective for Yugoslavia, and as Shawcross writes, “escalated

the conflict rather than led to resolution.”³⁹ In addition, the political conflict in the Security Council led to a situation in which the United Nations chose to view the Bosnian factions as morally equal, a position wholly inconsistent with the facts on the ground, and led to the UN inaction and, in effect, collaboration in the atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs.

As Bosnia also shows, the chronic UN habit of deploying with insufficient means either to protect the well-being of its peacekeepers or to implement its mandated commitments can do more harm than not going in at all. Much of the failure in the Bosnia case was the fault of the member nations, who repeatedly came up short in compliance with requests from the Secretary General for more troops and funds. The consequences of the UN failure to recognize and point out that it could not perform its task were most egregiously revealed in the ultimately tragic decision to establish UN safe areas, which, in fact, the United Nations was unable to keep safe.

Putting UNPROFOR troops into Bosnia to help escort humanitarian aid convoys may have appeared “humanitarian” but seems to have in fact had the insidious effect of prolonging the conflict, both because it gave the international community the illusion of doing something when in fact it was doing too little and because the war did not end until the Bosnian Serbs and Croats had essentially carved out the ethnically pure swathes of territory that they had originally wanted. They got the territory; it just took longer than otherwise might have been the case.

The Muslim-led Bosnians, cruelly outgunned as the result of a UN arms embargo, which served in effect to give the Serbs and, to a lesser extent, the Croats vastly superior firepower, were largely defenseless and undefended. In the future, the cruelty of a seemingly well intended arms embargo and the disadvantage that it may in practice offer in a conflict where one side accumulates the arms of a state and the other is left on its own must be considered. To prevent people from defending themselves, and then fail to adequately protect them, seems a crime given the atrocities against civilians that occurred in Bosnia.

Why is this relevant to globalization? Because the war in Bosnia, in 1992 a multiethnic state that had only recently come into being as a result of the collapse of the state of Yugoslavia, is similar to other types of conflicts that seem to be more visible, if not more numerous, in the post-Cold War, globalized world. These types of conflicts raise questions about international borders, national minorities, the right of self-determination, the role of the international community in intervening to prevent genocide and protect people from massive human rights abuses, and the tools and means necessary for successful intervention, especially when the final outcome desired by international and local actors is not always clear.

Why Did NATO Succeed?

Many of the ingredients UNPROFOR lacked in Bosnia NATO had. The main reason NATO seems to have succeeded is that the warring parties, primarily the Serbs, had secured most of the territory that they thought they could. They had achieved many of their strategic war aims and were beginning to experience defeat, in 1995, at the hands of the Croatian military. In addition, there was ample evidence that since late 1994, economic sanctions against Belgrade had driven a wedge be-

tween the Bosnian Serbs' former patron Slobodan Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. This situation contributed to a situation favorable to a peace settlement. Another contributor to NATO success in Bosnia was the fact that the final framework for peace hammered out at Dayton and signed in Paris in December 1995 was genuinely agreed to, guaranteed by the parties, supported by the key international powers, and extremely detailed, particularly the demilitarization requirements and the features of the final map. Finally, NATO did go into Bosnia with overwhelming force and was able to easily counter occasional attempts by the parties to test its will.

Also important was the fact that the United States took a leadership role, both in the search for a peaceful settlement and in contributing thousands of troops and assuming the command of the NATO-led IFOR. Holbrooke gives great credence to the explanation that U.S. leadership and power were decisive in, indeed essential to, the success of the Dayton peace process. Furthermore, he argues, U.S. leadership, in particular, will be required to rescue future Bosnias:

There will be other Bosnias in our lives, different in every detail but similar in one overriding manner: they will originate in distant and ill-understood places, explode with little warning, and present the world with difficult choices—choices between risky involvement and potentially costly neglect. . . . There will be other Bosnias—areas where early outside involvement can be decisive, and American leadership will be required. The world's richest nation, one that presumes to great moral authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to conscience and call on others to carry the burden.⁴⁰

Was the Kosovo Intervention Another Bosnia?

Indeed, in June 1998, Holbrooke was again in the Balkans, this time meeting Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commanders in the western Kosovo town of Junik, bordering Albania, and visiting the rural villages that had been surrounded and shelled by Yugoslav army troops and Serbian police, who suspected the townspeople of harboring KLA rebels. In October 1998, Holbrooke negotiated a cease-fire with Milosevic for Kosovo that held just through the winter, long enough for both sides to regroup. When the Serb delegation rejected the peace plan on offer at the February 1999 Rambouillet peace talks, Holbrooke flew to Belgrade for last-minute crisis negotiations with Milosevic. But this time, Milosevic rejected the West's last-chance offer, and NATO conducted 11 weeks of airstrikes before Milosevic finally yielded to a peace plan that permitted NATO-led peacekeeping troops to protect the Kosovo Albanians inside the province, which all the internationals acknowledge is legally part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Was Kosovo another Bosnia? To many Kosovo represented another potential Bosnia, and Holbroke saw it as a chance to demonstrate that early and sustained U.S. leadership, combined with the credible threat of NATO airstrikes, could prevent another tragedy like Srebrenica. For Holbrooke, as well as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark, and others who had been frustrated by early U.S. inaction on Bosnia, Kosovo represented an opportunity to prevent another genocide in Europe by the same actors, the Serbs, through

U.S. leadership and NATO power. While intervention likely did ultimately save lives in Kosovo, the international community involvement in Kosovo has offered U.S. and other Western leaders new and confusing case studies on the complications of international intervention in communal conflict, as well as postwar peace building in a state within a hostile state.

Policy Adrift: A Continuing Search for Answers

International security institutions—NATO, the United Nations, OSCE—and the U.S. military have all struggled to develop coherent policies to address the kinds of post-Cold War conflicts that they find themselves confronting in Bosnia and Kosovo. Mostly formed at the end of World War II, and defined by the twin earthquakes of World War II and the Cold War, key security institutions now find themselves trying to adapt to and define their roles in trying to prevent or intervene in conflicts very different than the ones that they long prepared to face. Their evolving charters make clear that these institutions are still in a period of drift and confusion, trying to reconcile themselves to the challenges of the globalization era.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In the decade of the 1990s, significant change has occurred in the NATO interpretation of its appropriate role in response to aggression against a nonmember state. In this regard, the following sequence is instructive:⁴¹

- In 1992, at the outbreak of the Bosnian war, NATO was limited to policing a no-fly zone.
- In 1995, NATO chose to intervene with airstrikes to stop Bosnian Serb aggression against Bosnian civilians.
- Later in 1995, NATO-led troops enforced a peace agreement in Bosnia.
- In 1999, NATO decided to bomb a sovereign nation, Serbia, in order to coerce Belgrade to halt mass abuse of its own subjects, the Kosovar Albanians, and to accept NATO-led peacekeeping troops in Kosovo.

NATO responses to the crises that have accompanied Yugoslavia's breakup have slowly evolved—from conceding that such conflicts were outside its area of responsibility and core mission to adopting and implementing, case by case, a 1999 strategic doctrine that explicitly includes peacekeeping and crisis management tasks outside its borders.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSCE also adopted in November 1999 a new security doctrine that explicitly mentions the threat to regional security posed by wars within states and sets out to create new peacekeeping and rapid-response divisions to deal with the current security landscape. At the organization's Istanbul summit in November 1999, a year after it had dispatched a mission of 1,200 unarmed monitors to Kosovo to oversee a short-lived cease-fire there, and as it urged Moscow to accept an OSCE-headed fact-

finding or human rights commission for the conflict in Chechnya, OSCE revised its charter to reflect the types of challenges that it now finds itself facing:

We have put Europe's old divisions behind us, but new risks and challenges have emerged. . . . It has become more obvious that threats to security can stem from conflicts within States as well as from conflicts between States. We have experienced conflicts which have often resulted from flagrant violations of OSCE norms and principles. We have witnessed atrocities of a kind we had thought were relegated to the past. In this decade it has become clear that all such conflicts can represent a threat to the security of all OSCE participating States.⁴²

Recognizing its growing role and expanded field operations in communal conflict situations, the OSCE Istanbul summit charter nevertheless attempted to outline a strategy for developing tools to meet its new responsibilities:

We reject any policy of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsion. . . . In order to enhance the protection of civilians in times of conflict, we will seek ways of reinforcing the application of international humanitarian law. . . . We recognize that the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. We are committed to developing a capability . . . to offer experts quickly to OSCE participating states. . . . To facilitate this, we decide to set up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre with a small core staff.⁴³

With an eye to a trend toward devolution of responsibilities from the United Nations to the regional level, OSCE declares its

most effective contributions to regional security have been in the areas such as field operations, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratization and human rights and elections monitoring. We have decided to explore options for a potentially greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping.⁴⁴

The U.S. Military

"The biggest problem in the world today," President Clinton told U.S. troops at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, on November 23, 1999, "is the oldest problem of human society. People tend to be afraid of people who don't look like them. The number one problem is racial and ethnic and religious hatred." Clinton concluded by saying, "This is the most important issue in the world today."⁴⁵

Nowhere is there more confusion, self-doubt, and uncertainty about roles in today's world, particularly as regards such questions as intervention in Yugoslavia-type communal conflicts and peacekeeping operations, than within the U.S. Government, the military, and the American public. Clinton's speech to U.S. troops in Kosovo last November reflected a major evolution from his first-term position of non-U.S. military involvement in the Bosnian genocide.

Notwithstanding the decisive role of NATO in the Balkans and the heavy commitment of NATO-led peacekeepers—more than 20,000 are deployed in Bosnia and another 50,000 in Kosovo—there is still strong resistance, particularly from the U.S.

military and key members of Congress, to the expanded U.S. commitments in the region. This resistance is in part attributable to the improbability of an early departure of the peacekeepers and in part to the prospect of their involvement in further conflict in Montenegro or even Serbia proper.

Despite its successes in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the fact that U.S. troops have not lost lives there to hostile fire, as was initially feared, a culture of resentment and resistance to peacekeeping missions seems to predominate in both the U.S. military and parts of the U.S. political establishment. Such resistance is based on the conviction that the United States should reserve its troops and military power for conflicts that directly threaten the vital national interests of the United States. Some U.S. military commanders complain that the frequent peacekeeping deployments of U.S. troops away from their families are contributing to the departure of significant numbers of enlisted people from the military and to a lack of readiness that threatens the nation's ability to defend against potentially more compelling security threats.

The debate over the U.S. role in the world, particularly in communal conflicts and peacekeeping, has evolved but has not fundamentally changed over the decade since Yugoslavia dissolved.

The Growing Influence of Nonstate Actors on Foreign Policy

The influence of globalization also can be seen in the growing role of nongovernmental organizations, particularly in efforts to influence U.S. foreign and international policy toward the crises in Yugoslavia. Greater access to computers, the Internet, and information from the conflict zones (the CNN effect) have enhanced the access of nongovernment actors to conflict information, which they use to form opinions and lobby for action, including military intervention.

While not decisive, nongovernmental organizations, human rights groups, and journalists were a real factor in influencing the U.S. Government to change its foreign policy from one of inaction to one of leadership in negotiations to reach a peace agreement and in creating a climate in which the U.S. political elite perceived a sense of American public outrage over the atrocities in Bosnia that would lead to a demand for U.S. leadership in ending the killing.⁴⁶

As journalist Warren Strobel suggests in his analysis of the influence of the media on U.S. policy toward Bosnia, "Graphic images of the worst human rights abuses in Europe in forty years did not have the power to move governments in directions in which they were determined not to be moved."⁴⁷ However, Strobel concedes, the coverage of atrocities in Bosnia, and later in Kosovo,

accelerated and catalyzed a policy evolution that was already under way. In internal Clinton administration deliberations, they provided ammunition for those officials arguing for a more forceful American policy. . . . Perhaps more interestingly, in terms of officials' perceptions of what public opinion would permit them to do, the images provided a moment of increased public attention to Bosnia that could help justify the administration's policy response [of military intervention].⁴⁸

According to Strobel, CNN was one of several factors that contributed to the Clinton administration's decision to move into Bosnia. But it played a larger role than in earlier conflicts in influencing foreign policy because of genuine confusion within the administration and Western governments about what to do.

Globalization and the Prospect for Postwar Yugoslavia

The year 1999, when NATO found itself bombing a sovereign country, Yugoslavia, in order to stop its mass abuse of the Kosovo Albanians living within its national borders, also saw new international initiatives aimed at a macroscopic—that is, a regional, cross-border, integrationist—approach to the Balkans rather than an approach that treats each country's problems, economic development, and crises as discrete, isolated projects. This new approach reflects the positive side of globalization: growing security, democracy, and economic development in the region through regional integration and integration with Europe. The international community's earlier fear of a cross-border contagion of conflict in the Balkans drove it to policies emphasizing containment. UN forces were deployed to Macedonia in 1992 as a tripwire to slow any spread to that country of the conflict in Kosovo. Indeed, in 1999, massive refugee flows from Kosovo raised concerns about the potential for destabilization of Macedonia.

On July 30, 1999, world leaders gathered in Sarajevo to launch the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and declared that "regional co-operation will serve as a catalyst for the integration of countries in the region into broader structures." The Stability Pact, however, much like UNPROFOR before it, is a meaningless shell for what is needed to stabilize the Balkans:

In the wake of Yugoslavia's violent dissolution, southeastern Europe's economy has become dangerously fragmented. . . . The Balkans needs the leverage that can be achieved only by satisfying the region's single common aspiration: 'Europeanization.' In practice, Europeanization means extending the cross-border monetary, trade, and investment arrangements that already operate within the EU [European Union] across Europe's southeastern periphery. . . . By pursuing purely economic integration with the southeast, the EU would avoid having to impose political conditionality for participation, an approach that has proven dismally unsuccessful to date. . . . Early staged entry into liberal European economic regimes will encourage private sector development, reduce the state's economic role, underpin the rule of law, and increase the benefits of forswearing violent conflict over resources and national boundaries.⁴⁹

As suggested earlier, there is compelling evidence that the prolonged economic crisis of the 1980s contributed significantly to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and its descent into conflict. Yugoslavia's exposure to that crisis and the seismic shifts in the global political landscape had a negative influence on its own economy and social and political cohesion. It is reasonable to think that globalization—specifically, integration into Europe—could benefit the states that have emerged from the former Yugoslavia by offering them a share in a larger economic pie and reducing the emphasis on ethnic identities inside small, ethnically dominated mini-states. 🌐

Notes

¹ One remarkable feature of Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, and even Sierra Leone, Angola, and other conflicts not examined in this paper is the way that, in the globalization era, war and criminal activity seem to overlap to a high degree. Particularly in Serbia and Bosnia, many of the Bosnian Serbs indicted for war crimes were also in charge of organized crime syndicates and protection rackets and often generated as much fear among local Serb civilians as among their non-Serb victims. The recently arrested Bosnian Serb Momcilo Krajisnik and the recently assassinated Zeljko Raznatovic “Arkan” both ran paramilitary and political operations as well as illegal oil-smuggling concessions. The Revolutionary United Front leader in Sierra Leone and the Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi both command brutal rebel groups and diamond-smuggling operations. This phenomenon is explored in the recent works of Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy, Ends of the Earth*, and William Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

² This section of the paper on the international economic factors that contributed to Yugoslavia’s dissolution is indebted to the work of political economist Susan L. Woodward, in particular the chapter “The Politics of Economic Reform and Global Integration” in her excellent anatomy of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998).

³ “Lending by developed-country commercial banks to developing countries had changed dramatically, in both volume and kind, during the 1970s. . . . Changes in banking practices, fueled by the 1973 oil shock, changed all that. The massive shift of resources into OPEC hands—the cartel held a \$68 billion surplus in 1974—created, almost overnight, two serious problems. One was for U.S. banks, especially the dozen or so largest, in which OPEC promptly parked its new wealth, and which immediately had to find money-making uses for the vast sums. Another was for the non-oil-exporting, lesser-developed countries (LDCs), which suddenly had huge new energy bills to pay. The answer—‘petrodollar recycling,’ wherein western banks lent OPEC money to LDCs to buy oil—was obvious, and agreeable to all parties. It also changed the face of international lending. The new ‘sovereign’ or ‘balance-of-payment’ loans were to governments, not to businesses, and paybacks were predicated on the performance of whole economies rather than discrete ventures.” From David Kennedy, *What the Market Will Bear: The CIA and the International Debt Crisis*, written for the Intelligence and Policy Program at the Kennedy School of Government (Boston: Harvard University, 1991).

⁴ “One of the major unsolved problems of the early 1970s was the failure of the system to find a reliable method for controlling inflation. . . . By 1975 [inflation] had reached 30 per cent. . . . Causes of inflation were uncontrolled government expenditure, the issuing of an ever increasing volume of currency, the sanctioning of investment programmes which were not backed by adequate resources, and the tendency for enterprises to run up large deficits . . . an attitude of irresponsibility seemed to affect all levels of Yugoslav society. These causes were massively reinforced by world pressures, especially the rise in oil prices after 1973.” Fred Singleton, *A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 266–267.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 268. Singleton writes, “It was perhaps appropriate that in October 1979, the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank were held in Belgrade. The Yugoslavs took the opportunity to plead with some of their creditors for a renegotiation of up to \$600 million of the country’s foreign debts. At this time it was stated that Yugoslavia’s total indebtedness to western banks was between \$11 billion and \$13 billion, and debt servicing of these loans was estimated to be \$1.8 billion in 1979, rising to \$2.9 billion in 1981. Approximately 22 percent of all foreign-currency earnings was needed to cover the servicing these debts. In Belgrade in 1979 the bankers negotiated a rescheduling of Yugoslavia’s debts to ease the burden of repayments, as it was obvious that unless this was done the development of the Yugoslav economy would suffer a serious setback.” Shortly after Tito’s death in 1980, Singleton writes, “as the western economies continued to grapple with their own problems, there was a tendency to look with increasing disfavour on Yugoslavia’s persistent requests for help.”

⁶ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 51.

⁷ Ibid., 55.

⁸ “In 1982, an austerity programme was launched. . . . This involved foreign currency controls, import restrictions, petrol rationing, power cuts, acute shortages of some consumer goods, and a 20 per cent devaluation of the dinar. These measures achieved a limited success, but at the cost of a rise in unemployment to almost one million, or 18 per cent of the workforce. No progress was made toward the reduction of the regional gap.” Singleton, *A Short History*.

⁹ Ibid., 276.

¹⁰ Ibid., 270.

¹¹ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 53, citing unemployment statistics for the Yugoslav republics from Joze Mencinger, *Privredna Kretanja Jugoslavija*.

¹² Ibid., 56–57.

¹³ Ibid., 57.

¹⁴ Ibid., 73.

¹⁵ “Gorbachev impressed Reagan with his willingness to take concrete steps on such contentious issues as reducing strategic arms by 50 percent and working toward an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. . . . Gorbachev instituted a campaign of *glasnost*, or openness. . . . He held press conferences. He spoke openly of sensitive subjects. . . . In December 1986, he brought home from six years of internal exile the Nobel peace prize winner Andrei Sakharov.” From Kirsten Lundberg, “The CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of ‘Getting It Right,’” a case prepared for the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994.

¹⁶ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 15.

¹⁷ This paper does not attempt to go into great detail about the Bosnian war, which has been analyzed in several dozen recent books and thousands of articles, except to try to look at the features that are uniquely relevant to the issue of globalization and the issue of conflict in the post-Cold War world. For a particularly relevant book on conflict in the post-Cold War era, and international efforts to apprehend it, see Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil*.

¹⁸ Mark Doyle, report for BBC World News, May 7, 2000.

¹⁹ David Rieff, “The Institution That Saw No Evil,” *The New Republic* (February 12, 1996).

²⁰ A leaked confidential 1994 memo from UN peacekeeping official in New York Shashi Tharoor to his boss Kofi Annan, then head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, revealed doubts about the UN view of the Bosnian parties as equally guilty. “The arguments we have always used in favor of the continuation of UNPROFOR are, on the strategic level, that it alleviates the consequences of the conflict, limits the war from spilling beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, and helps create conditions that facilitate the work of the negotiators; and on the tactical level, that its deployment and method of work (through daily cooperation with the parties) gets humanitarian aid through, saves lives, prevents worse excesses, and is preferable to any alternative. The problem is that recent Serb actions have served to undermine that case.” Cited by Rieff, “The Institution That Saw No Evil.”

²¹ Ibid.

²² “And since UN officials were perfectly aware that so many of the fifty-odd resolutions and eighty-odd presidential statements passed by the Security Council were in fact designed by individual member states not to effect a better outcome in Bosnia but to assuage outraged public opinion back home—in other words, were ends in themselves rather than new initiatives designed to do something effective for Bosnia—it was hardly surprising that they felt they were bearing the brunt of criticism that should have been directed at the national governments concerned. . . . When the UN’s supporters argued, on Bosnia and on many other questions as well, that it was inappropriate to blame the UN because the institution could be no better than its members wanted it to be, the claim sounded reasonable. And yet to accept it is to accept the view that the United Nations is quite simply the only body devised by

human beings in the history of the world that can never be held accountable for its actions.” From Rieff, “The Institution That Saw No Evil.”

²³ Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil*, 68–69.

²⁴ “Later that morning [Bosnian Serb General Ratko] Mladic ordered his men to start seizing UN soldiers throughout Bosnia. Four unarmed military observers were handcuffed to a fence outside the Pale ammunition dump, and Mladic said they would be killed if another airstrike occurred. In all, three hundred UN soldiers were seized as hostages. In another telephone call, Mladic told [UN Commander Rupert] Smith it was all the fault of ‘preposterous’ bombing. . . . It was a crucial moment. Nothing showed the impotence of the United Nations so vividly as the plight of its soldiers chained to potential targets. And nothing showed so graphically the need to reduce the UN’s vulnerability.” *Ibid.*, 158.

²⁵ First Srebrenica, then later Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Zepa, and Gorazde.

²⁶ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 274.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 347.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 349.

²⁹ Richard Holbrooke describes the dual-key system: “This was a system that required both the United Nations and NATO to ‘turn the key’ to authorize NATO airstrikes. In practice, the ‘dual key’ was a ‘dual veto.’” Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 73.

³⁰ Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, 348.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 350.

³² *Ibid.*, 351.

³³ *Ibid.*, 353.

³⁴ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 71–72.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 73.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 102–103.

³⁷ Shawcross, *Deliver Us from Evil*, 148–149.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 149–150.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁴⁰ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 369.

⁴¹ NATO, “The Alliance’s Operational Role in Peacekeeping: The Process of Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia, Evolution of the Conflict,” *NATO Handbook*, 1998 edition, online at <www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v080.htm>.

⁴² OSCE, *Charter for European Security* (Istanbul: November 1999), online at <www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/istachart99e.htm>.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ “Clinton Calls on Kosovars to Seek Reconciliation and Quit Revenge Killings of Serbs,” *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, November 24, 1999.

⁴⁶ For a fascinating analysis of the *CNN effect* and U.S. foreign policy, see Warren P. Strobel, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, June 1997). Strobel contends that the so-called CNN effect—whereby, supposedly, CNN films a crisis or disaster and policymakers rush to change the foreign policy agenda in response—is a myth. “In Bosnia, for example, the mass media—including some reporters who hoped to influence US foreign policy—filmed and reported on the atrocities of the war for years with no response from either the public or the Bush administration. We’re perfectly capable of watching horrible things on our

TV screens [and doing nothing],” Strobel said. He quoted Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia: “It wouldn’t have mattered if television was going 24 hours around the clock with Serb atrocities. Bush wasn’t going to get in.” Strobel concluded that the media have had influence only in situations where there was a lack of leadership that left a vacuum in policy or communications. For example, the media seemed to have inordinate influence in the late 1980s and early 1990s only because there was a huge gap in our understanding of the world as the Soviet empire collapsed and of the ethnic conflicts that erupted in the aftermath, he said. “Indeed, most changes in the impact the media has had on international affairs do not stem from technological advances, but rather from a shift in the military’s focus from waging war to keeping the peace, Strobel argued.” From “The Media and Peacekeeping,” excerpts from a U.S. Institute for Peace event, online at <www.usip.org/pubs/PW/697/media.html>.

⁴⁷ Strobel, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, 153.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 155.

⁴⁹ Ben Steil and Susan Woodward, “A European New Deal for the Balkans,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999), 97–98.