

# The Canadian Role in Human Security

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If the epic struggle that was paramount in the mind of Thucydides was the Peloponnesian War, in current times it is the Cold War. Whatever contemporary historians make of the post-1945 superpower conflict, however, citizens and policymakers are challenged to respond to the world left in its wake. Of some interest in this connection is the case of Canada—specifically, how Canadians perceive their security role in the context of the overarching phenomenon shaping social and economic organization into the 21st century: globalization. Once the security threats of the post-Cold War globalizing world are clear, attention must focus on the Canadian armed forces in countering them.

## Security Revisited

In his insightful 1995 study of security in the context of the state, Stephan Del Rosso, Jr., points out that the term *security* stems from the Latin *securitas*, which is related to *securas*, meaning without care.<sup>1</sup> At the most basic level, security has traditionally been understood to mean without care for or freedom from risk, danger, doubt, anxiety, or fear. For most of the past 400 years—and Canadian perceptions were no exception in this regard—a more refined definition saw security closely associated with the state and regularly described as freedom from “organized violence caused by armed foreigners.” “Since ‘foreign’ [*sic*] implies a person who is ‘not like us’ and since territorially-based states (or nation-states) emerged in Europe after 1648 as the dominant organizing principle for separating ‘us from them,’ security’s identification with the state is not surprising.” Being free from the threat of violence from foreigners meant being protected from it. National armed forces were tasked with providing such protection. During the Cold War, the devotion of Canada’s military, first and foremost, to the protection of Canadian and Allied territory against armed aggression by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact rested upon this concept of security (or national security, to which the term often referred).

Because of the connection between the Canadian conception of security and the function of the armed forces, a change in the definition of security obviously could

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affect the military significantly. Indeed, if the predominant Canadian understanding of security expanded from meaning without care for foreign aggression to include freedom from one, two, or more alternative threats, the type of protection required to reach the desired secure state also is likely to shift. In the post-Cold War world, precisely this kind of reconceptualization has occurred.

Despite its predominance, the traditional notion of security was the subject of academic analyses as early as the 1960s and throughout the following decades. Again, Del Rosso offers a useful commentary in this regard.<sup>2</sup> Referring to the efforts of Rachel Carson, Richard Ullman, Gwyn Prins, and others, he observes how attempts were made to broaden the concept of security from the notion of a national citizenry's freedom from the threat of armed foreign aggression to include the idea of the freedom of individuals worldwide from the often nonmilitary threats to human well-being (such as ecological degradation and population growth). Nevertheless, an expanded concept of security did not begin to take root in official policy circles until the 1990s, when the Cold War came to an end. Prior to 1989, the East-West rivalry—with its attendant proxy wars, risk of a major European war, and, at worst, assured mutual nuclear annihilation—instilled in foreign and defense ministries the long-standing state-centric and military threat-based understanding of security. However, once governments were released from the intellectual strictures—some might also say certainties—of Cold War brinkmanship and were compelled by their publics to define the so-called New World Order, they were challenged to revisit the concept of security. In this context, the academic soundings of years past assumed new relevance, with much of their content finding its way into official policy.

Jean-François Rioux and Robin Hay rightly observe that one of the earliest formal documents articulating an expanded notion of security was the United Nations (UN) 1994 Human Development Report.<sup>3</sup> In part, the text read:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. . . . Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the Cold War receding, one can see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.<sup>4</sup>

Broadly speaking, and with admittedly important nuances depending on the government or organization, an expanded view of security appeared to have garnered acceptance among Western policymakers by the end of the 1990s. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared its commitment to a broad approach to security in 1999, having spoken of the need to be vigilant of armed foreign aggression against Allied territory, yet also of other threats or risks:

[The] Alliance must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the

flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance.<sup>5</sup>

Canadian policy, too, reflected a shift from the predominantly state-centric and military threat-oriented concept of security to one of security writ large.<sup>6</sup> The revised definition took into account military and, increasingly, nonmilitary threats not only to the Canadian state but also to individuals everywhere—in other words, threats to humanity at large. International crime and disease, global warming, and intrastate ethnic, cultural, and religious violence joined the traditional threat of foreign violence as some of the forces from which Canadians and their fellow human beings were said to have to be without care for in order to be secure. Reflecting the expanded Canadian view of security, the term *human security* is heard with increasing frequency.<sup>7</sup>

In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety and their lives. From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments.<sup>8</sup>

Why do Canadians wish to focus on the well-being of others more than ever before? Why are they concerned with others' freedom from harm as much as their own? The 1995 Foreign Affairs White Paper, *Canada in the World*,<sup>9</sup> offered some clues. The text reveals how Canadians see their economic livelihood to be linked in unprecedented terms to the stability of the world community as a whole:

... our economic security, is increasingly dependent on the security of others. More than ever, the forces of globalization, technological development and the scale of human activity reinforce our fundamental interdependence with the rest of the world. Our well-being and our national interest are inextricably linked to global developments.<sup>10</sup>

By the same token, Canadians avowedly appreciate, with a new sense of urgency, that when the values that they hold dear—respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the environment—are put at risk in other parts of the globe, they also are ultimately jeopardized at home. “Their [Canadian values] adoption internationally will also be essential to ensuring that they are viable in our own country. Canada is not an island able to resist a world community that devalued beliefs central to our identity.”

A broadened notion of security such as the one accepted by Canadians prompts the question, What type of protection is required to guard against the new security threats? Put more specifically, What is the role of armed forces in this new context? A more detailed examination of the security threats of the post-Cold War world is necessary to address this issue.

## The 21st Century World

In recent years, efforts to describe the overarching phenomenon shaping humanity's organization in the 21st century have frequently led to the discussion of globalization. For the purposes of this paper, the definition devised by Jan Aart Scholte is broadly accepted. In articulating the meaning of globalization, Scholte highlights a trend whereby social and economic relations are "less tied to territorial frameworks. From this perspective borders are not so much crossed or opened as *transcended*."<sup>11</sup> Although not asserting that "territorial space has become wholly irrelevant" to the ordering of human relations, Scholte speaks of growing "supraterritoriality" in six broad interrelated spheres: communications ("media such as air travel, telephony, computer networks, radio, and television allow persons anywhere on earth to have nearly immediate contact with one another"), organizations (the rise of transborder business and civic associations), trade (the transworld marketing of global products), finance (the electronic trade of financial instruments), ecology ("anthropogenic alterations to the environment that are not constrained by distance or circumstances [such as] stratospheric ozone depletion"), and consciousness (people conceiving of the world as a single place and affiliating themselves with transborder communities).

In many respects, the process of globalization may be seen in a positive light. Its potential for wealth creation, for example, is underscored by the fact that, at the turn of the century, more and more countries were "looking to global integration as an important vehicle for improving their economic performance."<sup>12</sup> Also noteworthy is the precedent value of innumerable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have taken advantage of unparalleled communication networks to build a transnational constituency and better humanity's lot—for example, Doctors Without Borders and Amnesty International. Some commentators have even gone so far as to suggest that supraterritorial capital interests may work to diminish the threat of interstate conflict.<sup>13</sup> Such thinking is perhaps most optimistically expressed as follows: ". . . globalization is the harbinger of a Nirvana. It will generate more wealth. It will lead to a sharing of more values. It will create a commonality of more interests. Ultimately it will produce a world of liker [*sic*] minds. Those who work together, play together."<sup>14</sup> By the same token, many see globalization as posing new dangers to world stability, as a representative from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs recently articulated:<sup>15</sup> "Globalization has brought many benefits, but it has also meant a rise in violent crime, drug trade, terrorism, disease and environmental deterioration." The implication is that in the future, certain aspects of globalization conceivably could incite or exacerbate challenges to the welfare of Canadians and their fellow human beings for whom they now avowedly so dearly care.

Despite the rise in the number of countries interested in global integration to bolster their wealth and prosperity, evidence indicates that in the economic domain, the effects of globalization both between and within states are increasingly uneven. As the 1998 World Health Report points out:

A recent review by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) suggests that since the early 1980s, the global economy has been experiencing rising inequality. Income gaps between countries

have continued to widen. In 1965, the average per capita income of the G-7 industrialized countries was 20 times that of the world's poorest seven countries. By 1995 it was about 50 times greater. . . . Polarization among countries has also been accompanied by increasing income inequality *within* countries. The income share of the richest 20 percent of the population has risen almost everywhere since the early 1980s. . . . If this situation continues, there is a real threat of a political backlash.<sup>16</sup>

The warnings and implications of a possible political backlash within and between states resulting from globalization are echoed in many additional commentaries. In addressing the interstate issue, Ralph Peters moves the discussion to include not simply economics but also culture, suggesting that the way in which transborder communication networks are spreading American (one might equally argue Western) culture throughout the globe "will excite hatreds without precedent.... Hollywood goes where Harvard never penetrated, and the foreigner, unable to touch the reality of America, is touched by America's irresponsible fantasies of itself; he sees a devilishly enchanting, bluntly sexual, terrifying world of wealth he can judge only in terms of his own poverty. . . . States will struggle for advantage or revenge as their societies boil."<sup>17</sup> And how will the anger and desperation of poor and culturally challenged polities be expressed? When the West proves beyond the reach of the marginalized state, its struggle for advantage and revenge is expected to translate into the perpetration of violent acts within its own neighborhood. (Concern over regional interstate conflict incited by Iraq and North Korea comes to mind in this regard.) To target the West more directly, according to Peters, states most commonly will turn to crime and acts of terrorism. (For instance, Sudan and Libya allegedly are involved in state-sponsored terrorism.) Still others have voiced worry about the use, by so-called rogue states, of ballistic missiles designed to deliver direct nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks against Allied territory—weapon systems that appear to be on the rise outside Europe and North America.<sup>18</sup>

Such speculation about conflict between haves (including Canada) and have-nots of the world is all the more sobering when demographic trends are considered. As Peter Petersen points out, while the West's populations are aging<sup>19</sup> and getting proportionately smaller,<sup>20</sup> "in many parts of the developing world, the total fertility rate remains high (7.3 in the Gaza Strip versus 2.7 in Israel), most people are young (49 percent under age 15 in Uganda), and the population is growing rapidly (doubling every 26 years in Iran). These areas also tend to be the poorest, most rapidly urbanizing, most institutionally unstable—and most likely to fall under the sway of rogue leadership."<sup>21</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the process of globalization also carries the danger of political upheaval within states. In this regard, both developed and developing states are affected. As Vincent Cable remarks:

We have already noted that globalization may be squeezing the wages and job prospects of the more unskilled workers in rich countries in particular. At the same time, for the educated and moneyed section of the population, the opportunities presented by globalization—travel, wider experience, promotion—are great. We have thus one, potentially large, disadvantaged, alienated, and powerless element in society and another which is flourishing

but has less of a stake in the success of any particular country. Such tendencies might lead to a loss of authority of those who govern in the name of the nation-state.<sup>22</sup>

In the context of the global information society, Steven Rosell similarly speaks of a “growing crisis in governance” within Canada as well as states elsewhere in the world.<sup>23</sup> For his part, Jean-Marie Guéhenno refers to *disintermediation* within the political sphere.<sup>24</sup> Cable, in particular, is careful to point out that as the marginalized segments of society loosen or reject old affiliations and allegiances, new ones regularly emerge based on perceived commonalities of ethnic background, religion and language. (These commonalities, one may add, often transcend national boundaries.) Although Canadians would be expected to show the wherewithal and ingenuity needed to peacefully respond to the new aspirations and frustrations emerging in the wake of globalization—the Changing Maps symposium emphasis on building social cohesion through shared learning clearly is a step in the right direction—they cannot expect every society to be so fortunate.<sup>25</sup> European states may prove successful in devising novel forms of government that create lasting and peaceful bonds among their peoples—the European Union—but other communities surely will buckle under internal pressures with their elites struggling to hang on, often through violent means, until the bitter end.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, many futures studies highlight the threat to international stability posed by the ethnic, religious, and cultural strife emerging in the place of so-called failed states. From human rights violations to trade disruptions to the mass displacement of people, the challenges to world order are posited as very real. Moreover, even if the breakdown of a community cannot be rooted in a globalizing world’s uneven distribution of wealth—the planet’s release from the stifling pressures of Cold War rivalry also is widely perceived as a factor behind the emergence of many a new nationalist or secessionist movement—the possibility of globalization increasing the potency of conflict when it occurs cannot be ignored. For example, the globalization of production and marketing of weapon systems has facilitated the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to the threat of new violence, alterations to the natural environment that are not constrained by distance or circumscribed by borders are a characteristic of globalization generating cause for concern. In this context, much attention focuses on global warming resulting from stratospheric ozone depletion partly caused by the release into the atmosphere of carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons, and nitrous oxide. Some analysts have even gone so far as to describe global warming as “the greatest threat to the long-term health of our planet, as the danger of nuclear war declines.”<sup>28</sup> Environment Canada has likewise been carefully monitoring the issue. Although noting that there is a “significant degree of uncertainty involved in predictions regarding the specific timing, magnitude and regional patterns of climate change,” it does draw attention to the conclusions of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC):

In 1995, IPCC concluded that if human activities contributing to the greenhouse effect and aerosol emissions are not checked, global mean temperatures during the next century will rise an average of between 0.1°C and 0.4°C per decade. This means that the likely rise in global temperature will

be 2°C before the end of the next century. . . . A climate shift of this size and rate has not been experienced since the last de-glaciation some 10,000 years ago. . . . Accelerated global warming could therefore have a significant impact on all of the Earth's ecosystems.

Although some benefits may accrue from such climate change—in more northern regions, the economic gain from lengthened shipping seasons due to longer ice-free periods at seaports, for example—negative impacts cannot be discounted. Among the potential natural (human- and trade-disrupting) disasters resulting from global warming, Environment Canada mentions increased fire risk as a result of the drying mid-latitude climate; water shortages because of alterations in precipitation patterns;<sup>29</sup> and, through rising sea levels, flood damage to low-lying areas (including, in Canada, the greater Vancouver region, Prince Edward Island, Halifax, and Saint John). Along with tropical diseases inching northward to locations whose populations may have no immunity, countries of the Northern Hemisphere may eventually face the challenge of growing numbers of migrants seeking to escape the potentially harsher environmental conditions of the southern regions of the globe. Particular attention also has been drawn to the potential detrimental effects of global warming on Canada's Arctic.<sup>30,31</sup> With the possibility of increased shipping due to a navigable Northwest Passage in as little as 10 to 15 years,<sup>32</sup> discussion regularly turns to the dangers of a rise in illicit crime, whether it be people-trafficking or drug-smuggling; the pollution of the fragile Arctic ecosystem; a human disaster at sea; and violations of Canadian sovereignty (Canada claims the Northwest Passage as territorial waters).

## The Role of Armed Forces

The Canadian post-Cold War security agenda will involve not only the threat of foreign violence against Canadian and Allied territory (conceivably from rogue states via ballistic missile attacks), but also international crime and terrorism, regional interstate conflict, intra-failed-state ethnic, cultural, and religious strife, and climate change—each with its own inherent potential for a human disaster, trade disruption, or human rights violations. With the perceived threats to the future peace and security of Canadians and their fellow human beings clearly in mind, it is possible to address the function of Canadian Forces in protecting against these threats.

The term *Canadian Forces* refers to the three unified services—army, air force, and navy—which were established by the National Defence Act and are headed by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Working with his civilian counterpart in the Department of National Defence, the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the Defence Staff supports the Minister of National Defence, an elected member of Parliament, in managing military resources. Such management is guided by two overarching principles fundamental to the place of the military in a parliamentary democracy: ministerial control over the military and Department of National Defence, and effective parliamentary oversight of the defense programs and activities of the government.<sup>33</sup>

The Canadian Forces have approximately 60,000 regular force members and 30,000 reservists. The army is by far the largest of the three services, consisting of three regular force brigade groups, an engineer support regiment, an air defense

regiment, and a divisional headquarters and signal regiment. Among its leading-edge battlefield systems are more than 200 Coyote surveillance vehicles, each fitted with battlefield surveillance radar, thermal imager, daylight camera, and laser rangefinder. The air force comprises three dozen flying squadrons. Included in its inventory are 60 operational CF-18 Hornets, some equipped with infrared sensors and laser designators for precision-guided munitions. The workhorses of the tactical airlift fleet are 32 aging CC-130 Hercules aircraft. The Canadian navy includes 4 destroyers, 12 multi-purpose frigates, and 2 operational support vessels organized into two task groups, one each on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.

Although sometimes criticized for downplaying the role of Canadian military resources in the delivery of human security,<sup>34</sup> the Canadian government has increasingly recognized the vital contribution to be made by the military. The Department of Foreign Affairs 1995 White Paper placed much emphasis on the tools of sustainable development and preventive diplomacy in support of the broadened Canadian security agenda.<sup>35</sup> However, the section headed "The Protection of Our Security Within a Stable Global Framework" stated, "Though today, direct threats to Canada's territory are diminished, the Government considers it necessary to maintain a military capability appropriate to this still uncertain and evolving international environment." The paper also mentions Canadian support for the strengthened UN rapid reaction capability needed to engage in future peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. This statement is consistent with the wording of Canada's 1994 Defence White Paper, which called for "multipurpose combat capable forces" able to fight "alongside the best, against the best."<sup>36</sup>

Since those statements were made, government words have more directly underscored the value of the military in offering protection against the array of threats that Canadians and their global kin will face in the decades to come. Much of this confidence stems from the precedent value of the growing number of missions that the Canadian Forces have undertaken in support of the broadened Canadian security agenda since the mid-1990s—for instance, Canadian Forces humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under Operation *Palladium*, Canada has provided a 1,350-member task force, encompassing a battle group and a command-and-support element, that provides assistance to the United Nations in deterring hostilities, establishing a secure environment for the local population, and monitoring the peace.

Until February 2000, Canada assigned staff officers at Bihac and Banja Luka to train local civilians in modern demining techniques in Operation *Noble*. Aside from operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Canadian Forces were central players in the forceful defense of human rights in Kosovo in 1999. Under Operation *Echo*, the air force contributed 18 CF-18 fighters at the height of the NATO-led air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 675 combat sorties that Canada undertook (over 360 precision-guided munitions were expended) accounted for nearly one-tenth of the battlefield air interdiction missions flown during the Kosovo campaign. During the campaign, the military also worked with the Red Cross and Citizenship and Immigration Canada in a humanitarian effort—Operation *Parasol*—to temporarily relocate 5,000 Kosovar refugees to Canada. When hostilities ended in the summer of 1999, the Canadian commitment to safeguarding the peace and human

rights in Kosovo was sustained. To provide a secure environment for all civilians, under Operation *Kinetic*, Canada deployed over 1,400 military personnel to Kosovo, including a national command-and-support element, an infantry battle group, a Coyote-equipped reconnaissance squadron, and a tactical helicopter unit.

Outside the European theater, the Canadian Forces have been similarly visible in upholding the expanded Canadian security agenda. To safeguard the peace and democratic will in East Timor, the Canada contributed over 600 personnel to the International Force in East Timor, including the support vessel Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Protecteur* and a reinforced infantry company with an initial tactical area of responsibility of more than 1,000 square kilometers. In the Arabian Gulf, too, the Canadian Forces have been active in safeguarding global security. During 1999, HMCS *Regina* integrated with the USS *Abraham Lincoln* carrier battle group to monitor and enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. During the deployment (Operation *Augmentation*), *Regina* conducted more than 95 hailings and 22 boardings.<sup>37</sup>

With the military increasingly called on to support the expanded Canadian security agenda, current government statements on security have heightened the profile of the armed forces. They have in fact moved beyond the observation of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan—"You can do a lot with diplomacy but, of course, you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up with firmness and force"<sup>38</sup>—to speak of the value of armed force actually employed:

Human security provides a template to assess policy and practice for their effects on the safety of people. From a foreign policy perspective, there are a number of key consequences. First, when conditions warrant, vigorous action in defence of human security objectives will be necessary. Ensuring human security can involve . . . military force, as in Bosnia and Kosovo.<sup>39</sup>

Similarly, as Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy recently stated:

Pursuing human security involves using a variety of tools. Some rely more on persuasion—as with the campaign to ban anti-personnel mines<sup>40</sup> . . . while others are more robust, such as sanctions and military intervention.<sup>41</sup>

Government documents have suggested that such interventions probably will be multilateral in nature and will require a high degree of coordination with nonmilitary organizations or nonstate actors, such as human rights monitors, humanitarian relief groups, and development nongovernmental organizations.<sup>42</sup>

Such statements recognizing the utility of armed forces in the pursuit of human security not only align with the Canadian tradition of being a provider as much as a consumer of security,<sup>43</sup> but they also mirror much contemporary thinking on armed forces in other nations. For example, in addressing the U.S. response to an expanded security agenda for the 21st century, Ian Lesser states, "The security agenda has expanded in functional terms. Formerly peripheral challenges such as migration . . . now compete with conventional military rivalries as affecting the use of force."<sup>44</sup> Similarly, with regard to failed states in the decades ahead, John Spellar, British Minister of State, recently remarked on the importance of armed—also likely combined and joint—interventions to alleviate human sufferings and to uphold human rights. Ottawa-endorsed statements by NATO, too, recently affirmed additional roles for

armed forces in the pursuit of the wider 21st-century security objectives shared by Canada and its allies. As well as affirming the traditional task of repelling armed attack (whether conventional or weapons of mass destruction) against member state territory, the new NATO Strategic Concept stated:

In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and as set out in fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations.<sup>45</sup> The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations support the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability. . . . [Allied Forces] must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations.<sup>46</sup>

In addition to the potential response of Allied armed forces, including the Canadian Forces, to failed states or regional interstate violence (joint and multilateral peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian relief operations), the Strategic Concept also offers some direction with respect to the threat of crime and terrorism: "Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty,<sup>47</sup> and where appropriate, coordination of their efforts, including responses to risks of this kind."

Since the new Strategic Concept was developed, the military has been prepared to fulfill its tenets. A dedicated force consisting of a naval task group, a wing of fighter aircraft, a squadron of tactical transport aircraft, a brigade group (or three separate battle groups), and an infantry battalion group is being maintained in readiness for an Article 5 contingency. Apart from the provision of training facilities to enhance the military effectiveness of the Alliance (Suffield, Alberta, for example, is home to the largest, most comprehensive training area in use by the British Army), the Canadian Forces have been active in non-Article 5 crisis response missions. During the Kosovo crisis, the Canadian commodore of the destroyer flagship HMCS *Athabaskan* commanded the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) deployment to the Adriatic Sea. Moreover, with respect to NATO efforts to combat international crime, in January and February 2000, the same Canadian ship led STANAVFORLANT in supporting Drug Enforcement Agency counternarcotics operations in the Gulf of Mexico.<sup>48</sup>

The Canadian Forces are likely to have a role in countering the threats associated with the environmental effects of globalization. The continuing requirement for surveillance of Canada's north notwithstanding, a contribution to disaster relief both at home and abroad would not be unprecedented; the military delivered essential support during the Manitoba floods of 1998, and HMCS *Preserver* provided supplies and reconstruction assistance to the Florida victims of Hurricane Andrew in the early 1990s. Since the middle of the last decade, Canada also has made available a rapidly deployable Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) focused on fulfilling four critical needs in emergency situations: primary medical care, the production of purified drinking water, a limited specialist engineer capability, and a command-and-control structure to facilitate

coordination between the host nation, in-theater NGOs, and military personnel. Following the August 1999 earthquake in Turkey, for example, a 200-member DART cared for over 5,000 victims of the disaster, produced and distributed over 2.7 million liters of clean drinking water, and constructed a tented camp for 2,000 displaced persons.<sup>49</sup> Although the latter action did not constitute a response to a negative consequence of global warming, DARTs might be similarly used to respond to a human disaster associated with that phenomenon. Such actions, moreover, clearly would fall within the responsibility and commitment of the Canadian military to “provide emergency humanitarian assistance.”<sup>50</sup>

No doubt should remain as to the ongoing utility of armed forces in the revised security environment of the post-Cold War globalizing world. Not only are the Canadian Forces focused on maintaining the effectiveness of existing resources, but also they are seeking to acquire new assets that will deliver capabilities particularly relevant to the emerging security environment. In this context, much attention is centered on combat capability, rapid reaction, global deployability, and interoperability with the Armed Forces of the United States. Although Canada recognizes that, ultimately, professional and highly trained men and women are key to delivering each capability,<sup>51</sup> efforts to acquire new technologies and hardware are under way. For example, the first of four ex-Royal Navy conventional submarines were delivered in the autumn of 2000, improving the combat capability of Canada’s naval forces. Plans are being made for a new fleet of maritime helicopters, with the aim of significantly upgrading the Canadian Forces antisubmarine warfare and surface surveillance capabilities.

The Army is in the process of acquiring in excess of 350 Light Armored Vehicle III state-of-the-art wheeled infantry troop carriers. In terms of rapid reaction and global deployability, options for enhancing strategic airlift as well as strategic air-to-air refueling are under investigation. The Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability project also seeks to provide the Canadian Forces with the capability to deploy and support land forces, including with tactical aviation from the sea. Regarding interoperability with the United States, Canadian participation in the American advanced extremely high-frequency military communications satellite program is but one example of concrete steps in that direction—a trend that no doubt will continue. As a report of the Chief of the Defence Staff recently declared, “NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command], the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and the Military Cooperation Committee all provide venues for ensuring interoperability between the two [American and Canadian] forces.”<sup>52</sup>

Consideration of the military capabilities required to counter the threats of the post-Cold War globalizing world, of course, is hardly sufficient. Equally as important is attention to the criteria governing their employment. Without carefully thought-out criteria, an expanded security agenda such as the one articulated by Canada would seem to leave the door open to limitless military interventions on behalf of individuals anywhere, anytime. A common refrain in Canadian policy circles is that the human security agenda, with its focus on the individual, has the potential to be one of the most interventionist foreign policies that Canada has ever seen.

In an effort to bring some semblance of order to the use of armed forces—particularly in situations that see the human rights of the individual at odds with the

tenet of state sovereignty—Canadian and international commentators have increasingly turned their attention to clarifying principles of intervention. In his recent book on the Kosovo campaign, for example, Michael Ignatieff speaks of strengthening the sanctioning authority of the Security Council through an enlargement of its membership and the replacement of the great power veto with majority voting.<sup>53</sup> Others advocate the introduction of a new principle of international law explicitly sanctioning interventions when the “most egregious violations of human rights, such as genocide and violent mass ethnic expulsions,” occur.<sup>54</sup> To achieve this, they suggest an international convention or UN General Assembly resolution capable of bypassing the Security Council veto. Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy also has entered the debate. In remarks in 2000 to the UN Security Council during a discussion on the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, he posited several principles to govern military interventions aimed at the protection of civilians. They encompassed several circumstances:

- Peaceful means to resolve the conflict have been exhausted.
- Regional and international stability is at risk.
- The severity of the crisis is fully corroborated.
- The use of force is multilateral and widely supported.
- The use of force is part of a long-term strategy to build and sustain peace.

Even if these standards were to find their way into international law or custom, serving to provide some new checks and balances for armed interventions, they still would hold the potential for multiple, simultaneous Canadian Forces deployments to far-off regions of the globe. Coupled with the sovereignty protection and disaster relief functions of the military, such a prospect is cause for concern for the 60,000 Canadian men and women in uniform. Many are keenly aware of how the political classes can inadvertently overcommit resources. For example, while pointing out that the Canadian Forces flew nearly one-tenth of the strike missions during the Kosovo campaign, David Bashow and colleagues describe how this was done with only 2 percent of the in-theater Allied aircraft. Accordingly, air crews and aircraft were severely tasked. In a similar vein, a report of the Chief of the Defence Staff stated:

For most of the year [1999], more than 4500 Canadian Forces personnel were deployed on 23 missions around the world. This commitment represented a higher ratio of the total force structure deployed on peace support operations than that of most other like-minded, Western nations. The tempo of operations stretched the Canadian Forces.<sup>55</sup>

Although the Federal Government’s recently announced defense spending increase will assist in improving the quality of life of military personnel and realizing some of the capital programs discussed earlier,<sup>56</sup> human and capital resources will remain limited. As the Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff bluntly stated, “Despite [the] additional resources, however, the pressures on the Department of National Defence] continue.”<sup>57</sup> Expecting the elected Executive (Cabinet) to independently recognize this fact and unilaterally provide new national guidelines that would set even tighter parameters for the employment of the military than those currently in

effect is unrealistic. Left alone, ever checking the pulse of public opinion and the headlines of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Cable News Network—now broadcasting 24 hours a day from virtually every corner of the globe—politicians will more often than not be governed by what is politically, rather than militarily, expedient. With the broadened security agenda of the 21st century now at hand, the personnel of the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence are responsible for clearly informing elected officials, the public, and even the Department of Foreign Affairs of the number, duration, and intensity of military missions that Canada can realistically mount under current and projected operating budget lines.

## Conclusion

In the globalizing post-Cold War world, the threats against which Canadians demand armed protection for themselves and for their global kin are widespread—challenges to Canadian and Allied sovereignty, possibly by rogue states; international crime and terrorism; interstate regional conflict; intra-failed-state ethnic, cultural, and religious strife; and even climate change. Such protection in turn requires diverse (often joint and combined) operations, whether they be antiterrorism, humanitarian efforts, and disaster relief activities; the defense of Canadian and Allied territory; or peace-keeping and peace enforcement missions. By the same token, a broadened requirement for diverse missions carries with it the risk of an overextension of the military, despite the best efforts being made to prepare for the various contingencies. Politicians may succeed in establishing new tenets of international law regulating armed interventions for the protection of civilians. However, the prospect remains that in addition to their sovereignty protection and disaster relief operations, the Canadian Forces will be committed by the government to multiple, simultaneous deployments in the name of human rights. Accordingly, the elected Executive and public must be made aware of what those who serve them with their lives can realistically achieve. To an unprecedented degree, this imperative devolves upon the armed services personnel and their civilian counterparts in the professional defense establishment. 🌐

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Stephan Del Rosso, Jr., “The Insecure State: Reflections on ‘the State’ and ‘Security’ in a Changing World,” *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 183.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 185–190.

<sup>3</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1994), 34, <[http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/94wpaper/white\\_paper\\_94.html](http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/94wpaper/white_paper_94.html)>.

<sup>4</sup> UN Development Programme (UNDP), *UN Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>5</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, Parts II and III (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1999), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>.

<sup>6</sup> Denis Stairs, “Canada and the Security Problem: Implications as the Millennium Turns,” *International Journal* 54, no. 3 (Summer 1999), 386–403.

<sup>7</sup> Norway also has declared a commitment to human security, effective since 1998, through the Canada-Norway *Lysøen Declaration* (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1998). Austria, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Thailand also have held discussions with Canada and Norway under the human security umbrella (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Perspective on Human Security: Chairman's Summary* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999), <<http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreignp.HumanSecurity/lysoen-e.htm>>.

<sup>9</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995), 10–11.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Jan Aart Scholte, "Global Capitalism and the State," *International Affairs* 73, no. 3 (1997), 430–432.

<sup>12</sup> World Health Organization, *The World Health Report 1998: Life in the 21st Century, A Vision for All* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1998), 115.

<sup>13</sup> Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sørensen, eds., *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 204.

<sup>14</sup> Stairs, 388. Denis Stairs describes, rather than advocates, this perspective.

<sup>15</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda*, notes for an address by Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Relations, Princeton University, Ottawa, 1999, <[www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/english/news/state-ments/99\\_state/99\\_028-e.htm](http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/english/news/state-ments/99_state/99_028-e.htm)>.

<sup>16</sup> World Health Organization, *The World Health Report 1998*, 115.

<sup>17</sup> Ralph Peters, "Constant Conflict," *Parameters* 27, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 4–14. In a similar vein, Zalmay Khalilzad, David Shlapak, and Ann Flanagan, in Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian Lesser, eds., *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 10–11, state: "Wander the streets of Paris, Tel Aviv, or Tokyo and note the number of Michael Jordan jerseys being worn by teenagers, the number of U.S. [United States] films being shown in cinemas, and the explosion of Pizza Huts and McDonald's. . . . These linkages are *not* trivial. . . . And this enmeshing . . . makes the United States a threat and a target for regimes and creeds that wish to resist [American] influence, either out of insular motives or a desire to supplant [the American] message with their own. Thus do security implications grow from seemingly frivolous cultural connections."

<sup>18</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment*, Report 99–2 (Kingston, Ontario: Army Directorate-Land Strategic Concepts, 1999), 12. See also, Thad Cochran, "Responding to an Escalating Threat," *Comparative Strategy* 18, no. 4 (October/December 1999), 293–294.

<sup>19</sup> By 2021, 19 percent of Canada's population will be composed of seniors. Peter Peterson, "Gray Dawn: The Global Aging Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 1 (January/February 1999), 45.

<sup>20</sup> "In 1950 7 of the 12 most populous nations were in the developed world: the United States, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The United Nations projects that by 2050, only the United States will remain on the list. Nigeria, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Congo, Mexico, and the Philippines will replace the rest." Peterson, 45.

<sup>21</sup> Peterson, 51.

<sup>22</sup> Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," *Dædalus* 124, no. 2, 43–45.

<sup>23</sup> Steven Rosell, "Changing Maps: Scenarios for Canada in an Information Age," *International Affairs* 72, no. 4 (October 1996), 677.

<sup>24</sup> Jean-Marie Guehenno, "The Impact of Globalization on Strategy," *Survival* 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998/99), 9.

<sup>25</sup> Rosell, "Changing Maps," 687–688.

<sup>26</sup> It is perhaps the fundamental paradox of globalization that while some segments of humankind may move to bind together successfully in new forms of governance, others may falter and fragment.

<sup>27</sup> National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*.

<sup>28</sup> Robert Lanza, ed., *One World: The Health and Survival of the Human Species in the 21st Century* (Santa Fe, NM: Health Press, 1996), 174.

<sup>29</sup> By 2025, 40 percent of the world's population is expected to live in countries with chronic water shortages (National Defence, 1999, 11), although man's aquifer mismanagement is likely to prove just as great a causal factor as global warming.

<sup>30</sup> A. Mitchell, "The Northwest Passage Thawed," *The Globe and the Mail*, February 5, 2000.

<sup>31</sup> C. Nickerson, "Girding for a Sea Change: With Ice Thinning, Canada Claims a Northwest Passage," *Boston Globe Online*, March 21, 2000, <[www.boston.com/dailyglobe2](http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2)>.

<sup>32</sup> Compared with the present route via the Panama Canal, a navigable Northwest Passage would cut the journey from Asia to Europe by 4,500 nautical miles (Mitchell, 2000).

<sup>33</sup> National Defence, *Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence*, 2d ed. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999), <[www.dnd.ca/Images/inside/inside/ins\\_orgacc\\_e.htm](http://www.dnd.ca/Images/inside/inside/ins_orgacc_e.htm)>.

<sup>34</sup> National Defence, *Strategic Overview 1999* (Ottawa: Policy Group, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, 1999), 36.

<sup>35</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada and the World* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995), 24–26.

<sup>36</sup> National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*, chapter 3.

<sup>37</sup> National Defence, *Building on a Stronger Foundation: Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff, 1999–2000* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000), A1–A3.

<sup>38</sup> Mansell, 6.

<sup>39</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999), <[www.dfaif-aeeci.gc.ca/foreignp/HumanSecurity/secure.htm](http://www.dfaif-aeeci.gc.ca/foreignp/HumanSecurity/secure.htm)>.

<sup>40</sup> The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, commonly known as the Ottawa Convention, entered into force on March 1, 1999.

<sup>41</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda*.

<sup>42</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*.

<sup>43</sup> Desmond Morton, "Providing and Consuming Security in Canada's Century," *The Canadian Historical Review* 81, no. 1 (2000), 2–28.

<sup>44</sup> Khalilzad and Lesser, eds., *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century*, 1.

<sup>45</sup> Article 5 is the collective defense provision of the Washington Treaty (1949).

<sup>46</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* (Brussels: 1999), <[www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm)>.

<sup>47</sup> Article 4 of the Washington Treaty (1949) states: "The Parties will consult whenever in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."

<sup>48</sup> National Defence, *Building on a Stronger Defence Staff 1999–2000* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> National Defence, *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999), 6.

<sup>51</sup> National Defence, *Building on a Stronger Defence Staff*, 25.

<sup>52</sup> National Defence, *Building on a Stronger Foundation: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 1999–2000*, 22.

<sup>53</sup> Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada, Ltd., 2000), 182.

<sup>54</sup> Charles B. Shotwell and Kimberley L. Thachuk, “Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Legitimacy,” *Strategic Forum* 166 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 1999), 4.

<sup>55</sup> National Defence, *Building on a Stronger Foundation*, 5.

<sup>56</sup> The 2000–2001 federal budget earmarked an additional C\$1.9 billion over 4 years to keep defense allocations in the range of C\$11 to C\$11.5 billion, or 1.1 percent of gross domestic product in coming years. In terms of defense spending, this commitment will position Canada in the middle of the group of the 19 NATO members, alongside the Netherlands and Spain (Department of National Defence, 2000, 1–2).

<sup>57</sup> *Defence Planning Guidance 2001*, ii.