

PART II.
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY: EMERGING PRIORITIES

A Global Agenda for Foreign and Defense Policy

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This paper explores in broad terms how continued globalization is likely to affect U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy over this new decade and beyond. It then examines some of the implications of this newly configured foreign policy for national defense and the requirements for maritime forces.

Foreign Policy

Three striking changes launched the period of fundamental alteration in the context for U.S. foreign policy that began in the 1990s. The Soviet empire collapsed, ending the Cold War; the United States emerged as the only superpower, with an unprecedented opportunity to influence the world; and America became more connected internationally as the process of globalization was fueled by technology. In addressing the impact that globalization is likely to have on U.S. foreign policy in this decade, it must first be acknowledged that there are many other trends, factors, and complexities that will shape the arena and global framework for which foreign policy is designed and implemented. Globalization is just one among many trends; and as others have observed, a “trend” is not necessarily a “destiny.”¹ Nonetheless, the “rapid, ongoing, and uneven expansion of cross-border flows of goods, services, money, technology, ideas, information, culture and people” is likely to have a profound influence on future U.S. foreign policy and national security requirements.²

The United States no longer has the option of avoiding entangling foreign relationships. Forces beyond the control of any one nation are shaping a world that will be increasingly linked and enmeshed. Whether an open democracy or an insular dictatorship, no nation will be able to shield its citizens entirely from the impact of globalization. George Washington’s hope “in extending” American “commercial relations” to have “as little political connection as possible” with “foreign nations” spoke to a profoundly different era of U.S. foreign policy.³ Whatever foreign policy choices we make today in pursuing goals that enhance our interests, we must envisage that we will be dealing with a more tightly connected and interdependent world.

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Global interdependence is not a new phenomenon. Policymakers have been talking about it with increasing intensity over the last 30 years. For example, President Richard Nixon's report to the Congress on *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s* observed, "Increasingly we see new issues that transcend geographic and ideological borders and confront the world community of nations. Many flow from the nature of modern technology. They reflect a shrinking globe and expanding interdependence."⁴ During the preceding three decades, movement toward closer integration has been steady and substantial. In the 1990s, the pace became unrelenting and unprecedented.

Globalization alone is not likely to create new foreign policy demands. Rather, the acceleration of existing trends will have consequences both for policy and for the way Americans respond to future challenges. Globalization is providing both obstacles and opportunities. It is, for example, shrinking the time frame in which we must act. To be effective, foreign policy will have to deal with more problems at an earlier stage.

Impacts of Globalization on Foreign Policy

Among the many components of globalization, a few stand out as having a significant effect on foreign policy requirements. These include finance and trade, information, education, porosity of borders, and shared dependence.

Finance and Trade. The growing linkage of world economies will clearly influence future foreign policy. In spite of the November 1999 protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle and against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, DC, in April 2000, there does not appear to be any insurmountable barrier to the further integration of global financial markets and world trade. The pace, however, may be halting at times, with an uneven development of market economies and a growing gap between "have" and "have-not" nations.⁵ Ability of governments to control the flow of money internationally has diminished as an estimated \$1 trillion exchanges hands daily. Free financial flow adds to volatility. Even the strongest and largest economy in the world is not isolated from fluctuations in other markets, as demonstrated in recent years by the effects of disruptions in Mexico, Latin America, and East Asia on the American market.

The exchange of goods and services is also accelerating as American companies become more invested in markets overseas and as more foreign companies become an integral part of the American economy. The United States is the world's largest importer and exporter, and by 2010 will be dependent on trade for an estimated one-third of its gross domestic product (GDP). McDonald's, Coca-Cola, Goodyear, Johnson & Johnson, Exxon-Mobil, Gillette, Xerox, Intel, and Citicorp have joined the growing list of American companies that depend on overseas markets for more than half their earnings. Many foreign companies, such as the Japanese carmakers, have built plants in the United States or own American companies. Whether in the entertainment, beverage, insurance, banking, communications, or a range of other industries, the links forged among global businesses are multiplying at unprecedented rates. The merger of Chrysler/Daimler and Ford/Volvo are recent examples of the globalization of companies along product lines and new transnational alliances that help penetrate markets. We are confronted daily with reports of global mergers and

acquisitions. Random House is now a German firm; a Denver company is buying a German cable television network. A British-Dutch conglomerate has acquired Ben & Jerry's Homemade Ice Cream, and a British company has bought New England Electric. An American group has purchased a major Japanese bank. A Spanish company is trying to buy Lycos.

E-commerce has introduced still another force that is promoting linkages. Although we will be increasingly connected electronically, the spread of an American presence in nations all over the world is also likely to accelerate. U.S. citizens will participate in all phases of economic life throughout the world. As a General Electric official has said, "Geographical and functional barriers must evaporate entirely. People must be as comfortable in New Delhi and Seoul as in Louisville or Schenectady."⁶ A down side of this activity will be more U.S. citizens who are exposed and vulnerable to the vicissitudes of unstable countries and groups. Overseas businesses have always been targets, but there are more of them today and likely to be even larger numbers tomorrow. For instance, even if run by local entrepreneurs, McDonald's restaurants have become popular symbols of American enterprise targeted by protesters overseas.

What does this closer economic linkage mean for U.S. foreign policy? Clearly, we have an interest in the stability of an increasing number of countries and segments of countries for economic as well as political and mutual security reasons. No longer can we sustain the growth of our economy through the internal trade of goods and services. Our economic expansion is increasingly dependent on markets abroad. Therefore, a shared prosperity and an equitable trading system will be even more in our interest in the future than it is today. This economic dimension also has political ramifications. Growing competition for global markets may generate political tensions. Economic interdependence may also facilitate the building of better relations. For example, China's free market and desire to trade with the rest of the world could eventually lead to greater internal political freedom. Iran may be moderating internally as it seeks to restore trading relations with the United States.

As economic globalization continues, the map of foreign policy interests and national security requirements is likely to change. Economic components of foreign policy may have heavier weight. New economic alliances, partnerships, and friendships may have greater influence in defining national security priorities.

Information. Even in the early stages of the Information Revolution, the implications for foreign policy are profound. We have only begun to exploit the potential of the Internet, email, satellite telephones, and global television networks. In the early 1980s, a keen observer of the Soviet Union told me that what the Kremlin feared most was the spread of computing networks. Soon it would no longer be possible to suppress the flow of information or control the spread of ideas within or from outside Soviet society. The Internet was only in its infancy at the time. Certainly, there are still areas of the world where populations are isolated and where efforts continue to censor and distort the flow of information. The Internet and other pervasive media sources alone will not produce complete transparency. Propaganda and manipulation are not yet endangered. Nevertheless, the degree of control that any government exerts on the flow of information or powerful ideas to its citizens is likely to diminish

over time. The opposition Malaysian political party Harakar's recent turn to the Internet is one example.

This free flow of information and ideas has many other implications. As the economic gap between the so-called developing and developed nations widens, it may exacerbate the discontent of the "have-nots," who begin to perceive that the conditions in which they live are not foreordained and that they need not be tolerated stoically. The flow of populations creates looming problems in certain countries as restive global nomads are drawn across borders in search of political freedom and respite from the ravages of ethnic cleansing or out of desperate need for economic opportunity or simply enough food and water. Such movements can lead to tensions, as the forceful return of Albanians by the Italians or the unrelenting struggle with illegal aliens on the southwestern U.S. border demonstrates. The majority of persons on the move across the world's borders are economic refugees. As the media connect more citizens with disturbing images, it becomes difficult in the "have" world to ignore the plight of peoples dying of starvation as a result of a natural disaster or an ethnic conflict. Pictures of the exodus of ethnic Albanians driven from Kosovo provided the evidence that ensured international support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing. This CNN effect can be powerful. Thus, information can both stimulate population flows and influence responses to them.

During a recent meeting in Jacksonville, Florida, with a small group from Punjab, India, calling cards and email addresses were exchanged. New connections had been established. Similar informal linkages occur daily and multiply exponentially. Over time, there will be millions of linkages among individual citizens and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These individual connections may link people with common global interests or causes (for example, preserving the environment or preventing the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus [HIV]) and either reduce government influence or convince governments to change policies. The 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, which recognized the grass-roots efforts of Jody Williams and associates to ban and clear antipersonnel land mines, is one example of this potential.

These new networks of formal and informal linkages also create vulnerabilities. Hackers are intruding into supposedly secure computers with regularity. Whether stealing identities or credit card numbers, breaking into confidential government networks or simply testing skills, cybercriminals present a continuing challenge. The arrest of young Israelis who broke into the Department of Defense (DOD) network is one recent example; another is the Scandinavian hacker who managed to tie up the 911 systems in Florida. The shutdown of global email by the "I Love You" virus is one in a series of incidents that illustrate the pervasiveness of these worldwide linkages and their vulnerability. As we become more dependent upon the Internet, our vulnerability to and the threat of cyberterrorism will grow.

What does this sharing of information and connectedness across global boundaries mean for U.S. foreign policy? A few implications are:

- Governments will have greater difficulty controlling commerce, movement of peoples, and the flow of information and ideas.

- The awareness of the plight of distant peoples will be much higher, and there will be pressures to use capabilities to assist where feasible.
- Tensions may rise as individuals become more aware of and discontented with the uneven distribution of wealth and move across state boundaries in search of a better life.
- Resentments may build as American culture proliferates around the globe.

We are only beginning to understand the likely influence on foreign affairs of this profound Information Revolution.

Education. Closely linked to information is the increasing globalization of higher education. The internationalization of education is illustrative of what is happening in practically every other profession. For example, it is routine in college libraries to search collections abroad for materials. The librarian of Davidson College recounts the story of a frantic email message from a student in Scandinavia who had become electronically locked in the North Carolina library and was pleading for a way to get out. The sharing of documents and information means that with the click of a mouse, under-resourced institutions can multiply the access that their students have to global sources of information.

Education is an essential underpinning of the preparation necessary to deal with the effects of globalization. Nonetheless, we are only at the beginning of the monumental effort needed to prepare U.S. citizens to operate effectively in this new world. As the new head of Claremont McKenna College observed, if we do not become more seriously engaged in the study and analysis of global issues, “America will gradually lose its relative economic, military, political weight in the world, while it also becomes more economically integrated and exposed to external environmental factors that will be increasingly more difficult to control.”⁷ In the United States, higher education is just starting to take innovative steps to respond to this future. Larger percentages of graduates have spent a semester abroad,⁸ courses are reflecting a broader approach to the world across curricula, and language requirements are making a comeback. Distance learning provides new ways of connecting classrooms, and there are growing examples of students in different countries jointly taking the same courses or earning degrees online in another nation.

Although there are encouraging initiatives to get more American college students overseas during their undergraduate years, many foreign countries are far ahead of the United States in this regard. There is an alarming trade imbalance in higher education. This is one area in which the United States has a four-to-one exchange surplus: it educates far more students from foreign countries than it sends abroad. As American institutions strive for more geographically diverse student bodies, foreign students gain a deeper understanding of the United States. The experience of American students also is broadened; however, rubbing elbows with foreign students who are spending time in the United States is no substitute for going overseas to study. Interestingly, eight of the top ten providers of students to the United States are Asian nations, but the majority of American students (64 percent) who go abroad to study still choose Europe.⁹

There is also a growing international partnership among educational institutions. The joint venture between Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the University of Cambridge that formed the \$135 million Cambridge-MIT Institute is a recent example.¹⁰ Foreign scholars are also joining American academic associations in significant numbers. For example, more than one-third of the membership of the American Mathematical Society is foreign.¹¹

In order for its foreign policy to be more effective, the United States will need not only informed diplomats, international economists, intelligence specialists, and military officers, but also citizens in every profession who speak foreign languages, understand foreign cultures, and know how to operate in the world. If the United States is going to sustain a leadership role in the decades to come, it must begin now to develop greater numbers of citizens with deeper understanding of the multiplicity of global cultures that approach life in starkly different ways.

Porosity of Borders. As the financial, information, and education flows demonstrate, national borders are eroding as barriers to international interaction. Growing connections across permeable borders have both positive and negative implications for nation-states. On the down side, it has eased access for global crime syndicates and drug cartels, exposed nations to terrorism, and contributed to the proliferation of arms around the world. The spread of weapons of mass destruction (that is, chemical, biological, and nuclear arms and their delivery systems) is facilitated by ease of access and global connections. At the same time, globalization offers tools for combating these menaces to civil societies. It is clear that nations must cooperate much more closely if they are going to combat such criminal activities. The rapid expansion of legitimate international connections provides a mechanism for doing so. However, this essential coordination among nations also contributes to the erosion of their individual sovereignty.

The internal breakdown of nation-states that occurs as a result of ethnic struggles—struggles that global media bring to our living rooms—has raised a major new foreign policy question: At what point is it appropriate for the world community to act within the sovereign boundaries of a country? Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and the Congo are recent examples of this dilemma.

Shared Dependence. International cooperation is also essential to ensure that resources meet the needs of a growing world population and to find solutions to the common challenges of a shared environment. It has long been recognized that the oceans, environment, energy, food supply, air, and weather affect the world—not just individual states—and that preservation of ecological systems requires global solutions. World water demands are “expected to double in the next 30 years,”¹² and global food requirements are estimated to double in the next 25 years. According to the Archer Daniels Midland Company, “Food security has become the single most important issue in international trade negotiation,” and the world’s food economy has become “truly global this past decade.”¹³ The world’s need for energy and delays in developing economically viable alternative sources underline the importance of ensuring that oil supplies and other important natural resources remain in the hands of nations friendly to the outside world. From mad cow disease to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), world health standards are also important to long-term

survival. Cooperation among nations is essential, since microbes carry no passports. Similarly, from fishing to forests, the impact of excesses and the failure to preserve biodiversity are mortgaging the health and quality of life of future generations.

Whether dealing with acid rain, biodiversity, or oil spills, there also is a deeper understanding that it is in the mutual interests of nations to find shared solutions to common environmental problems. Nations share the consequences of environmental degradation. In the future, we will live even more closely together. We have seen that the fallout from a Chernobyl can endanger agriculture thousands of miles away. Nations have conflicting interests, and finding practical and equitable solutions is seldom easy. A major task of foreign policy is to achieve international cooperation in addressing these common problems.

In examining the potential negative consequences of globalization in the future, the White House has reiterated that U.S. citizens “have a direct and increasing stake in the prosperity and stability of other nations, in their support for international norms and human rights, in their ability to combat international crime, in their open markets, and in their efforts to protect the environment.”¹⁴

Foreign Policy Objectives

Over the past decade, there has been little change in how American presidents have defined core national security objectives. The broad goals described by the White House in late 1999 in *A National Security for a New Century* are similar to those outlined by President George Bush at the beginning of the last decade. Essentially, these core goals have been to enhance security, to bolster economic prosperity, and to promote democracy abroad.¹⁵ It can be argued that we have worked successfully in the last decade to “advance the welfare of our people by contributing to an international environment of peace, freedom and progress within which our democracy—and other free nations—can flourish.”¹⁶

How we succeed in the new century in accomplishing these historic and enduring elements of national strategy will depend increasingly on how we deal with the challenges presented by a more closely linked and globalized world. The three core objectives are intertwined. Economic prosperity will increasingly be a shared global experience. The promotion of peace, prosperity, and representative government are complementary endeavors. The freer flow of ideas, stimulated by globalization, should facilitate the growth of democracy. A free economy provides incentives for peace and representative government.

Former National Security Advisor to the President Sandy Berger said, “The central phenomenon of our time, globalization, plays to America’s greatest strengths—to our creative and entrepreneurial spirit—and spreads our most cherished ideals of openness and freedom.”¹⁷ The somewhat simplistic notion that democracies seldom fight or jeopardize intertwined economies, often referred to as the “McDonald’s rule,”^{18,19} has become a modern axiom. However, some scholars have cautioned that in the “short run, democratic transitions often promote war and undermine economic reform.”²⁰ During the United Nations (UN) intervention in Somalia in 1993, it appeared to be the fear that more representative government would mean the loss of

power for warlord General Mohamed Farah Aidid that motivated him to oppose the United Nations so violently.

The core goals of security, prosperity, and democracy are more likely to be advanced in an atmosphere of relative global stability than in an atmosphere that is unstable. Promoting stability and peace in this increasingly networked and changing world will be central to future foreign policy and is likely to create new defense challenges and priorities.

To a considerable extent, the U.S. approach to this challenging world will be influenced by the strategy adopted by the administration elected in November 2000. Roughly, there are three variations in the way a new administration might approach its foreign policy and national security responsibilities while professing the same core agenda of past administrations. In broad terms, these approaches, and in a sense attitudes, can be described as protective, reactive, and proactive. Each approach will influence the strategies employed:

- *Protective.* A protective strategy would be characterized by minimizing exposure abroad, limiting participation and support of international organizations, adopting more protectionist measures with regard to the impact of trade on American workers, reducing treaty alliances and limiting new commitments, and very narrowly defining U.S. interests in terms of when U.S. forces should be committed.
- *Reactive.* A reactive strategy would involve allowing situations to evolve and responding to critical requirements as they presented themselves. With this ad hoc approach, we would develop and select in each instance the best possible option.
- *Proactive.* A proactive strategy would involve providing leadership in world organizations, developing long-term strategies, and moving aggressively and preemptively to solve problems. The United States would be a leader in working with other nations to try to anticipate and to resolve world problems.

What are the consequences of these strategies for U.S. national security policy in a globalizing world? A protective approach would put priority on such issues as the preservation of American jobs. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the WTO, the World Bank, the United Nations, and other global organizations and arrangements would be seen as threats to our sovereignty. An effort would be made to limit the “damage” of these manifestations of globalization. Such an approach would run counter to the strong and relentless current of inevitable change. What might appear to be “progress” in the short term would probably leave the United States farther behind in the long run. Resort to protection would amount to the world’s most powerful nation trying to duck an unwanted leadership position.

An ad hoc approach would take a more measured middle road between the other two strategies and might mitigate rancor generated by a perception of overweening U.S. activism. It would sacrifice, however, the concerted strategy that is probably necessary to influence the world in directions favorable to the United States. It would slowly abandon the opportunity for leadership provided by our economic, political, and military position in the world.

A proactive approach would require developing and conducting a well thought-out strategy. It would give the United States the largest role in shaping global outcomes. However, such a strategy would probably mean more U.S. involvement in controversial activities such as peacekeeping and in schemes designed to contain conflicts and bound problems without actually solving them. A proactive approach would raise resentments in some areas of the world and could be seen as threatening in others. Nonetheless, it appears to be the approach most consistent with operating successfully in a globalized world.

In implementing a proactive policy, the cross-cutting issues of globalization that sometimes have been relegated to the back burner would need to have greater priority. Terrorism, crime, drugs, pollution, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery can no longer be seen as problems of an individual country or even of a region. These problems are global in nature and require global solutions. It will take our most innovative and determined individuals to fashion solutions. It will not be enough that goals are reflected in high-sounding rhetoric; meeting these challenges must be the day-to-day passion of an administration.

Diplomacy

Even if the United States chooses a very protective foreign policy, the age of globalization is likely to call for a different approach to implementing it. We will need a much more dynamic diplomacy to help meet the prolific demands of a new age, and it will need to be backed by military power.

As linkages become tighter and news travels faster, we enter a world in which there is an increasing magnification and resonance of events. Ramifications ripple farther and faster, and responses need to be more rapid and effective. This calls for a new kind of diplomacy that has some of these features:

- More connection to governments and to other power centers in a given country.
- Rapid consultation, cooperation, and coordination with allies and friends.
- A better informed country team in the field, and an ability to react more quickly in Washington with informed decisionmaking.
- A tightly coordinated national security team that fully integrates political, military, and economic factors. This may call for reorganization, as international businesses are doing, along functional rather than regional lines. More power may need to be shifted to the functional bureaus of the Department of State, for example, from the traditionally dominant regional bureaus.
- A military that is better positioned and has the means to react quickly in both the prevention and crisis phases of potential conflicts.

Although the practice of diplomacy will need to change in response to a faster moving age, one historical axiom remains valid. To be effective, diplomacy designed to promote peace and defuse crises must be backed by military strength. This relationship is one of the enduring reasons for maintaining a responsive and respected military capability in a period such as the one ahead.

A central task for diplomacy and DOD will be building cooperative relations with friends and allies. In promoting stability around the world, a network of allies and friends will be essential. The very nature of globalization means that partnerships will need to be an important component of resolving critical concerns and problems. Worldwide crime organizations, for example, must be confronted by resolute global partners. In the same way, it will take nations working cooperatively to meet the vast needs of economic and political security and stability. Just as the purposeful investment in alliance building and containment was relevant to the Cold War, a strong network of partnerships for stability will be essential to this new world.

Defense

As the world becomes more interdependent, the need for the skillful exercise of a blend of diplomacy and power and the need for partnerships with other nations will not diminish. As discussed earlier, maintaining stability in various critical regions of the world will continue to be one of the dominant objectives of U.S. foreign policy. It is also likely that the list of geographical locations in which the United States has interests will be much longer and contain unfamiliar names. The forces of globalization may also lead to new functional priorities and changing alliance structures. Although some locations will have greater priority than others, as American goods, services, culture, and people spread to remote areas of the globe, U.S. citizens may become more tightly linked with new societies.

The continuing march of globalization is likely to generate a more diverse and less predictable set of requirements over a wider area of the world. As the scope of economic interests spreads farther and penetrates deeper, driven by new multilateral companies and the pervasive network of entrepreneurial dot-coms that know no boundaries or barriers, the United States will require a more active and better informed foreign and commercial policy backed by a more flexible and agile defense organization.

Decisionmaking. The forces of globalization are helping create a national security environment that calls for rapid and sound decisionmaking. The pressures alone to be “out front” of globalized media call for faster and more flexible responses. The combination of unpredictable situations and far-flung interests requires Washington to overcome its historical inability to concentrate on more than one foreign crisis at a time and to be able to manage multiple crises simultaneously across the globe. This imperative of timeliness, however, does not offer an excuse for poorly thought-out policies, knee-jerk reactions, and avoidance of the “And then what?” question. Rather, it calls for rising to a new level of performance.

A number of elements will be required to retool the national security machinery to meet the responsibilities of this changing world. They include a much deeper and wider intelligence base from which to inform decisionmaking, a well thought-out and well formulated policy framework from which to make crisis decisions, and tighter coordination based on a strong and responsive National Security Council (NSC) system. This will require closer policy integration across concerned departments—both

horizontally and vertically—and a team of talented, selfless individuals who are genuinely devoted to putting the national interest before bureaucratic self-interest.

Partnership between State and Defense starts with a close relationship between the secretaries of these departments. Other players will need to be integrated. For example, given the global economy, the Secretary of the Treasury must be more involved in national security decisionmaking.

There also will be no substitute for the personal involvement and leadership of the President. It is the one area in our system of checks and balances in which a President has clear-cut leadership and Constitutional responsibilities. Failure to prepare for and skillfully handle national security challenges could be the downfall of this Nation. On key issues, the President must be engaged in national security policy formulation from its inception. A framework of goals and objectives must be established in the quiet prevention phases of impending crises, long before they move to the media glare of the near-conflict stage. The national security advisor should be instrumental in seeing that this is the case. Focusing on the economy should not provide an excuse for turning inward; instead, in a global economy, it should underline the need to turn outward.

Requirements. The demands of defense in an age of complex globalization are imposing. What appears to be needed is a streamlining comparable to that which major companies have undertaken in order to remain competitive and to take commanding leadership in the global marketplace. With the commitment of the President and adequate resources, this is a task well within the competence of our entrepreneurial Armed Forces. As we contemplate the future impact of globalization, it is helpful to consider the changing imperatives of prevention, deterrence, commitment, crisis response, and success in conflict.

Prevention. In the future, it will not suffice for the armed services simply to provide a “911 force” for rescuing failed policies. Instead, DOD must be a full partner with State, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other members of an expanded national security organization in making a long-term investment in the knowledge, global relationships, and confidence building that will reduce the number of emergency calls. In a globalizing world, successful prevention will require a comprehensive strategy and a concerted effort across the entire cabinet—not just the traditional national security community. An effective strategy will also require working more closely with the private sector. Conflict prevention is one of the most difficult challenges ahead, but greater attention must be focused on the early phase of meeting selected global responsibilities. We will need to devote more assets to shaping the environment in which we must operate. Just as medicine has begun to learn that investment in prevention pays, the national security establishment will need to become involved earlier in trying to head off difficulties in the era ahead.

Historically, DOD has played an important role in prevention, but it will have to operate with greater anticipation and skill than in the past, when decisions on where to invest preventive attention could be made in the context of a more clearly defined Cold War framework. Overseas bases, for example, are still important to a responsive global defense structure, but new locations may be needed and others should be abandoned. Sites will have to be selected with the sensitivities of potential host na-

tions in mind. The Marine Corps barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1983 and the terrorist bombing of the Air Force Khobar Tower barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 are reminders of the challenges of placing forces statically in tense areas.

Prevention also requires a better understanding of the swirling cultural differences in this new world and a keener grasp of potential nation-state and nontraditional adversaries as well as friends. This job is not limited to intelligence agencies. It requires the pooling of relevant governmental, private, and public resources, especially in overseas missions. With Internet newspapers, global radio and television, and knowledgeable businesspersons operating all over the world, there are numerous sources of information, often untapped, that must be integrated into the equation. Pervasive globalization presents complex challenges to defense, but it also offers tools for becoming better informed and thus better prepared.

Deterrence. An important question related to prevention in this new period is, What constitutes effective deterrence? Closely linked to this question is the importance of *credibility*. The time-honored ingredients of credible deterrence may be harder to achieve, but appear to be just as relevant in a more globalized world as they were in former times. If challenges are to be kept to the minimum, the warnings of diplomats or peacemakers must be backed by a force that adversaries anticipate will be used with relative impunity and that will have an impact on the things they value most.

With this requirement in mind, there must be a closer partnership between diplomats and military commanders. Diplomacy must be undergirded by ready forces whose power and capability are unquestioned. There must also be a belief in the commitments made by the President of the United States. This requires a willingness to act boldly when it is in U.S. interests to do so. Such commitments must also be based on a determination to persevere when the going gets rough and on the readiness to provide sufficient means for the military to accomplish assigned missions.

American credibility has ebbed and flowed in recent years. The United States did not start to close the global credibility gap caused by its handling of the Vietnam War and by the failed Iran rescue attempt in 1980 until 1983, when the quick victory in Grenada demonstrated that the United States could and would still act decisively. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the *Desert Storm* response to the invasion of Kuwait raised U.S. military credibility in the early 1990s to an all-time high. Some of this capital was squandered when the United States decided in 1993 to pull its forces out of Somalia and shortly afterward appeared to be intimidated from acting in Haiti. One of the major reasons given for the recent intervention in Kosovo was the future credibility and survival of the NATO alliance. Whatever the legitimate criticisms of the Kosovo process, it has given new life to NATO and was an impressive demonstration of standoff power.

These latter crises had more to do with where we draw the boundary lines of national interests requiring sacrifice than with the capabilities of our forces. They bring home, however, the importance of careful consideration of which commitments are sufficiently in our interests to include a willingness to sacrifice lives to defend those interests. American military power will need to command respect from a vast range of potential adversaries—from individual terrorists such as Osama bin Laden to future peer competitors.

Commitment. In an era of globalization, the U.S. definition of national interests is likely to expand. In recent years, the President has committed to defending national interests and values. Values are even more wide open to interpretation than are traditional national security interests. There are many instruments besides military forces for defending interests and values. However, it is likely that future armed services, in addition to preparing for current priority contingencies in Asia and the Middle East and for the unanticipated crisis and hedging against a peer competitor, will be contributing to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian recovery, and a broad agenda of other global challenges. These may include ethnic cleansing, terrorism, the war on drugs, nonproliferation, and defending against asymmetrical warfare. While it might be ideal to concentrate on fewer, better defined missions, the realistic expectation is that the spectrum of mission requirements is likely to expand, rather than narrow, in this uncertain period.

Whether a major or a minor conflict, the consequences of the commitment of U.S. forces should be thought through before it is undertaken or before participation is expanded. However, the underlying need for perseverance and follow-through, once a commitment is made, will not change, nor will the global consequences to credibility from pulling out.

Related to participating in complex emergencies is the unrealistic expectation that American casualties will be minimal and that we can be successful without paying a cost in lives. While we must always strive to minimize casualties, the much lower than predicted losses in the Persian Gulf War and the surgical approach to Kosovo have fed misleading notions that U.S. power can be effective with little risk to our forces. The United States should strive aggressively for a technical edge that raises probabilities of rapidly achieving goals, but in deciding to commit forces, we must weigh the costs carefully in advance and accept that there are always consequences (sometimes unintended), dangers, and risks to using military force. Appropriate preparation of U.S. citizens for these eventualities is essential.

Crisis Response. Even with optimum intelligence and an active program of conflict prevention, globalization is unlikely to change the fact that there will be instances when national security surprises require rapid crisis response. In cases in which we enter with our eyes wide open because a laborious process of diplomacy and prevention has preceded intervention, we will undoubtedly be prepared to respond with the full measure of diplomatic and military capabilities. However, we are not likely again to have the luxury of the 6-month buildup period of *Desert Shield*. Our future will surely have its share of surprises and “come-as-you-are” emergencies requiring immediate action. Delaying, hedging, or postponing tough decisions should never be the only feasible option. The defense establishment must be rapid in its response, agile in its employment of appropriate instruments of power, and fully capable of bringing pressure to bear effectively. This will require having the right instruments and being able to use them in a timely manner. We also must have developed the peacetime diplomatic and military relationships that help convince allies and friends to provide their political and practical support in times of potential conflict.

Success in Conflict. As history demonstrates, the combination of skillful execution of diplomacy backed by available force is not always enough to deter conflict.

There will undoubtedly be a wide range of circumstances requiring a variety of responses such as coercive diplomacy, retaliation, or restoration of a pre-existing situation (as in *Desert Storm*). Forces will also still need the capability to respond to major theater contingencies. Whatever the shape of the conflict, forces must be able to persuade an adversary to capitulate quickly. They must be able to bend the will of an adversary and demonstrate convincingly that there is more to lose with each passing day of conflict. This requires forces that are clearly superior and able to target accurately, and with relative impunity, things of value to an adversary.^{21,22} We must be able not only to conclude military actions successfully but also to deal with post-conflict activities that ultimately may determine the long-term success or failure of a military operation.

Design of Forces. Designing forces to operate effectively in a globalizing world is a daunting task. Building a “force for all missions” would be challenging, even in an ideal world unencumbered by an outdated procurement system and the historical American inclination not to invest in future security when there is no overriding threat. Clearly, greater flexibility, versatility, responsiveness, speed, reach, and accuracy are dictated by likely responsibilities and contingencies in a globalizing world. The Army and Air Force are moving toward greater flexibility with air expeditionary forces and more rapidly deployable Army brigades that complement the traditional expeditionary capabilities offered by the Navy and Marine Corps; however, a much higher level of joint integration in warfare is needed. Innovative concepts such as “Rapid Dominance” that exploit the potential of advances in rapidity, information, control, and brilliance²³ need to compete with more conventional approaches to preparing for the future. We should take advantage of American entrepreneurial capacity to adapt to this new age. “Dot-com” ingenuity, boldness, and determination reflect some of the new spirit and energy needed.

The Maritime Mission. It is also clear that in the period immediately ahead, it will be necessary to orchestrate more skillfully the unique capabilities that each service brings to the battle. The seamless optimizing of joint forces is essential in a period in which diffuse and unanticipated requirements may be the norm and the size of the armed services has been cut significantly. All of the services, including the Coast Guard, will need to continue to contribute to traditional maritime missions; however, the Navy and Marine Corps will likely retain a primary role, especially in the prevention and crisis response roles that will be an important part of day-to-day maritime operations.

As the United States extends its economic and political reach into unfamiliar corners of the globe, naval and marine forces afloat provide a visible reminder that Americans on the ground are backed by a full coverage insurance policy. The peacetime missions of the 6th and 7th Fleets, and now the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, and regular cruises to other regions (for example, South America, West Africa, and the South Pacific) have been traditional solidifiers of good will, confidence, and stability. As some nations become more secure and independent, one can legitimately ask whether a reassuring presence is still relevant. Is this an anachronistic vestige of the Cold War struggle for the Third World or a return to “gunboat diplomacy” of the 19th century? In the less defined world ahead, there will be changing relationships

and needs. Some nations may become more secure; others will experience increased insecurity and possibly internal fragmentation. In this volatile period, the overseas presence mission, although difficult to sustain, will still be relevant.

The relationships established while exercising with friendly armed forces have long-term benefits. As a preventive tool, they demonstrate readiness to act together to defend mutual interests. They help pave the way for access to territorial waters and straits or hurried air transit or tanker overflight clearances in times of crisis. The groundwork is prepared for more effective coalition warfare in conflict. The foundation for long-standing relationships needs to be built in periods of peace, just as access to U.S. military schools and exchanges of people promote lasting friendships and provide the basis for better understanding complex societies. These traditional tools of prevention are just as relevant in an uncertain period of globalization as they were in the Cold War.

In crisis, there is still no substitute for a warship or carrier aircraft appearing offshore or beginning training with local forces during times of tension and impending crisis. Such symbols of capability, backed by the credibility of a government that means what it says, can translate into powerfully persuasive messages of peace and restraint. The numbers of crises that need to be defused in their early stages by the visible expression of commitment are not likely to diminish in this new restless decade.

The Navy and Marine Corps have traditionally been effective symbols of U.S. interests in areas in which the United States does not have a usable base structure for land-based assets. Depending upon the circumstances, they can sustain a presence or withdraw over the horizon. Even in well established relationships, there have been recent reminders that potential host nations are not always prepared to offer access to their facilities. Saudi reluctance to authorize use of bases for Operation *Desert Fox* is a vivid reminder that the United States needs to have a full array of flexible sea-borne weapons platforms. When crises erupt, the Navy and Marine Corps provide a valuable means for responding in remote areas and for teaming with other joint forces in bringing weapons to bear on an adversary.

Historical maritime requirements to protect the open ocean sea-lanes and ensure access through strategic chokepoints (such as the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, or the Strait of Malacca) are not likely to disappear. Most of the logistical flow to support ground-based forces continues to go by sea, and the industrial West, including Japan, still depends on the free flow of energy and other materials.

The Navy and Marine Corps also will need to provide their full range of warfighting capabilities to strike from the sea and influence events ashore in support of joint efforts to respond to regional contingencies and to hedge against the emergence of a peer competitor. For example, the Navy cannot assume that no submarine force will ever rise to challenge its free access of the open ocean as the Soviet Union once did.

How does the increase in globalization affect these historical missions? Will they be different in the future? Are new tools necessary, and are old ones anachronistic? Clearly, maritime forces will have to continue to change with the times. Better weapons should be developed as technology advances, and other services may become stronger contributors to the maritime mission.

Because of globalization and a variety of other influences, such as the collapse of the Soviet empire and the breakup of nation-states, in the next two decades the United States is likely to confront tough national security choices in a more complex and unstable world. As long as stability is a major foreign policy mission, maritime forces will be critical instruments for maintaining it.

Globalization, therefore, has two immediate effects on the national security requirements for maritime forces. First, the scope of coverage needed and the responsiveness required to protect U.S. interests are likely to increase. Second, the short-term effect of globalization may contribute to increasing instabilities in some areas while tightening the bonds between like-minded societies in others.

Conclusions

The period of accelerating globalization ahead will introduce forces for stability and instability. It will offer both opportunities and challenges for achieving foreign policy goals. The long-term influence of globalization may be to help create a more peaceful and stable world in which closely linked and interdependent global citizens have a growing stake in a shared prosperity and political freedom. However, over the next several decades, globalization will also be one of the factors that stimulate reverberating tensions and unleash forces of change.

In meeting the demands of national security during this uncharted period of transition, tension, and turbulence, the United States will need highly effective, mobile, and responsive forces capable of meeting a wide range of complex and challenging contingencies in both new and familiar trouble spots. It must also make a concerted investment in conflict prevention. In such an unsettled time, maritime forces can provide a number of answers. The Navy's "anytime, anywhere" approach to preparing for this period appears to be on target. It would be appropriate to add to that assertion, "We deliver." 🌐

Notes

¹ Jaime Lerner, quoted in the *1997 Annual Report* of The Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation, 13.

² This is the definition used throughout this book. The White House describes globalization as "the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political integration." The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999), 4.

³ George Washington, farewell address, *The Record of American Diplomacy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 87.

⁴ Richard M. Nixon, The White House, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Building for Peace* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 25, 1971), 5.

⁵ The share of global income possessed by the 85 percent of the world's population living in emerging nations is estimated to be only slightly above 20 percent. *The Babson Staff Letter*, Cambridge, MA, March 3, 2000.

⁶ Dennis D. Dammerman, "Educating People for the 21st Century," remarks to a conference of Jesuit Advancement Administrators, *Fairfield Now* (Spring 1997), 2.

⁷ Pamela Brooks Gann, inaugural address, Claremont McKenna College, October 23, 1999.

⁸ Only about 9 percent of U.S. college students currently study abroad, and fewer than one-third of these spend at least a semester in a foreign country. A. Lee Fritschler, as quoted in an article by Stephen Burd, *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 46, no. 35 (May 5, 2000).

⁹ Paul Desruisseaux, "15% Rise in American Students Abroad Shows Popularity of Non-European Destinations," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 46, no. 16 (December 16, 1999), A60.

¹⁰ Alina Tugend, "MIT and U. Cambridge Announce \$135-Million Joint Venture," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 46, no. 13 (November 19, 1999), A71.

¹¹ Beth McMurtie, "America's Scholarly Societies Raise Their Flags Abroad," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 46, no. 21 (January 28, 2000), A53.

¹² The Nature Conservancy, *The Nature Conservancy's Freshwater Initiative*, Arlington, VA, 1999, 10.

¹³ G. Allen Andreas, *ADM this Quarter*, November 29, 1999, 2–3.

¹⁴ The White House, *A National Security Strategy*, 4.

¹⁵ The White House, *1999 National Security Strategy Report*, press release, January 4, 2000. The actual report adds "and human rights" to the third objective.

¹⁶ The White House, *National Security of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1990), 1.

¹⁷ Samuel R. Berger, *American Leadership in the 21st Century*, remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, January 6, 2000.

¹⁸ See, for example, J. Brady Anderson, "Waging Democracy—The McDonald's Rule," *Rhodes College* 7, no. 1 (Winter 2000).

¹⁹ Richard Saul Warren, *Understanding*, 1999 report of The Markle Foundation.

²⁰ Edward D. Mansfield, "And Now the Bad News," *Hoover Digest*, no. 4 (1999), 77.

²¹ For more on the Rapid Dominance concept, see Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance* (Washington, DC: National Defense University/Government Printing Office, 1996).

²² Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, *Rapid Dominance—A Force for All Seasons* (London: RUSI Whitehall Paper Series, 1998).

²³ Ullman and Wade, *Rapid Dominance—A Force for All Seasons*.