Strategy Essay Competition
     Essays 2001

Broken Promises: The United States, China, and Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nathaniel H. Sledge, Jr.

The end of World War II and the anxiety that it spawned gave rise to grave concerns throughout the free world and posed many challenges for the new and reluctant superpower, the United States. The entire world was recovering from the deleterious effects of global war. Imbalances in political, military, and economic power emerged globally and regionally. Moreover, regional instability and the advent of the Cold War, waged against the communist monolith, promised protracted global conflict. Most ominous, however, was the emergence of the nuclear age and its endemic bipolar competitiveness.

Since the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, the nations of the world have been apprehensive. Russia acquired a nuclear weapons capability in 1949, then Britain (1952), France (1960), the People's Republic of China (1964), and Israel (1967-1969).¹ Since then, India (1974), South Africa (1979-1980), and Pakistan (1987-1990) have achieved a nuclear weapons capability.

The Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 precipitated not only an energy crisis but also the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials. Many nations sought to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels, prompting them to turn to nuclear energy to meet ever-increasing needs. Then, in 1974, India exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device and triggered fearful reactions around the world, particularly within the U.S. Government. India assured the world that its intentions were peaceful, but a nuclear explosion is, nonetheless, a nuclear explosion. India purchased its reactors and nuclear technology from Canada, an ally and neighbor of the United States. America learned the lesson that nuclear technology sought for peaceful purposes could potentially enable other, more militant intentions.

It is past time to recognize the common practice of "peaceful" nuclearization as cover for nuclear weaponization. Since China is arguably among the worst proliferators of nuclear and missile technology, halting its nuclear exports is a vital U.S. strategic interest. In fact, it is among the most important national security issues facing the United States.

Given U.S. global predominance and China's prospects for economic growth and influence, the United States must engage China to ensure Asian regional stability. Experts are pessimistic about Russia and Japan taking leadership roles in Asia, yet they are optimistic about China's emerging role. At this critical time, China could become a constructive force in the region or the spoiler of Asia's fleeting fortunes. Informed observers expect China and the United States to share important, though unequal, leadership roles in shaping Asia in the 21^st century.² In anticipation, China appears to be seeking engagement with the United States. Consider Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States in 1997 and his sitting for an unprecedented interview with 60 Minutes-correspondent Mike Wallace in September 2000 to open a dialogue to promote "mutual respect and friendship" between the two nations.³

The door of opportunity is now open for positive U.S.-Chinese dialogue on a broad range of issues. It is incumbent on America to take advantage of this opportunity to secure better relations and trade with China and, more importantly, to encourage greater adherence to nonproliferation regimes and, hopefully, to human rights conventions. China, however, resists pressure to join and act within the spirit of the major nonproliferation regimes, preferring a deliberate, incremental approach. It will not consider greater cooperation on various nonproliferation regimes in isolation, unless the United States and the international community address its prestige and its economic and security issues first. America must respect China and allow it to save face because China is not only led by suspicious and paranoid leaders, but it also is considered a second-strike nuclear power with unwieldy and outmoded, yet immense, conventional forces. This feeling-out process will take time, perhaps decades. Therefore, the United States must have a long-term perspective. As China becomes more engaged with the U.S.-led global economy, the hope is that it will transform into a more democratic and prosperous society, less inclined to threaten its neighbors and proliferate nuclear weapons. Such optimism resides in the theory that a flourishing Western-style, free-market economy encourages democratic government. If America is unwilling or unable to commit idself to making the most of this historical opportunity, the world must face the dire consequences.

Introduction

I know there are some who have never seen an arms control agreement they like--because rules can be violated, because perfect verification is impossible, because we can't always count on others to keep their word. Still, I believe we must work to broaden and strengthen verifiable arms agreements. The alternative is a world with no rules, no verification, and no trust at all.

-- President William Clinton, March 16, 2000,
Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference

Nuclear proliferation and U.S. efforts to stop it began in earnest in the late 1960s and early 1970s. With China's detonation of a nuclear device in 1964, the number of nuclear powers increased to five. What was then regarded as an inevitable act by the world's largest communist regime sowed the seeds for nuclear proliferation among other ambitious and resentful rogue states, or states of concern. China's accession to nuclear weapon status ushered in an era of state-level competition, bringing into focus the specter of a globe rife with nuclear weapons.

But it was India's explosion of a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974 that compelled the United States to adopt a tougher stance toward nuclear proliferation. Specifically, America began to seek international ratification of stricter controls on the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology and fissile material. On balance, U.S. efforts have been successful. Unfortunately, U.S. attention to the issue of nuclear nonproliferation has been inconsistent and, by some measures, ineffective. A case in point is American nonproliferation policy and its implementation with respect to China. Evidence suggests that, despite some observance of nonproliferation norms over the years, China has continued to proliferate nuclear and missile technology and materials to states of concern, taking advantage of U.S. reluctance to enforce nonproliferation agreements.

This essay assesses the U.S. policy of nuclear nonproliferation with respect to China. It offers recommendations for improvement of that policy to keep it effective over the next generation. It also addresses several fundamental questions: What are China's motivations for proliferating nuclear materials and technology? Has U.S. nonproliferation policy been effective during the last quarter century in stemming the export of Chinese nuclear technology, materials, and delivery systems? Is current U.S. policy likely, over the next generation, to deter Chinese assistance to emerging nuclear weapon states, many of which are either hostile to U.S. vital interests or threatening to regional stability? How can U.S. policy be improved?

The Stakes

Since the advent of the atomic bomb, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been a primary U.S. foreign policy goal. The Cold War focused U.S. strategy clearly on the Soviet threat and encouraged unity of purpose in implementation of the national security strategy. In the wake of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation is now more important for several reasons. While East-West tensions have subsided, other challenges are giving the National Command Authorities greater cause for concern. First, the world is more precarious without the stabilizing elements of the Cold War. Second, religious fundamentalism, nationalism, narco-trafficking, and transnational threats are gaining momentum, and terrorism is the likely means of advancing these interests. The ultimate terrorist tool is the leveraging of nuclear weapons for international blackmail or revenge. Third, the fragmentation of former Soviet satellite governments has spawned criminal enterprises that are likely to traffic in nuclear-weapon-grade materials and technology in the global black market, with total disregard for nonproliferation accords. Additionally, the virtual disintegration of the Russian government and military, accompanied by widespread economic malaise, indicate lax security and inadequate physical control of nuclear weapons and materials.⁴ Consequently, U.S. nonproliferation policy is of much greater strategic significance today than it was during the Cold War. Nuclear nonproliferation agreements are not autonomous or self-policing.⁵ Therefore, maintaining the "powerful norm of nuclear weapons renunciation" will require aggressive enforcement. Vigilance (certification and verification) is essential for any hope of success.

If the United States does not effectively enforce its nonproliferation treaties and agreements with China, several undesirable consequences may follow: evisceration of its nonproliferation policy, encouragement of states of concern to develop nuclear weapons, discouragement of previously cooperative nonproliferators, loss of credibility in Asia and globally, challenges to American leadership, Asian political, military, and economic instability, emergence of a regional nuclear arms race, and diminished national security.

China's Motivations

Security

China's primary motivation for sending nuclear exports to Pakistan is to strengthen its security against India, which China perceives as having hegemonic ambitions in South Asia.⁶ China and India enjoyed mutual respect and friendly relations in the early 1950s. But since 1962, when the two nations fought a war over Chinese border incursions, relations have been strained. Having gained territory in the Ladakh and Aksai Chin regions, China considers itself the victor in the conflict.⁷ Both countries did become optimistic about their future relations after Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 1988.⁸ But in 1989, India's test of a medium-range missile capable of hitting Chinese targets chilled relations well into the 1990s. India's provision of refuge for the Dalai Lama has further aggravated relations. Chinese overtures to India have appeared disingenuous because of China's simultaneous assistance to India's traditional enemy, Pakistan.⁹ Indian display of nuclear prowess in May 1998 has increased Chinese vigilance and may inhibit both Chinese good will and its efforts to stem proliferation. China is likely to continue to leak nuclear technology and materials to its ally Pakistan as long as the former feels the need to keep India in check.

China may also be reluctant to cooperate fully with international nonproliferation regimes because it disagrees with U.S. plans for theater missile defense (TMD) and other military assistance to Japan and Taiwan.¹⁰ The mere notion that the United States would provide TMD to Taiwan is particularly unsettling to the Chinese. Beijing perceives Taipei as a political threat whose example of democracy may embolden those inside China who tire of living under a dictatorial regime.¹¹ Taipei is at the heart of China's desire to gain complete control of its territories; it symbolizes the essence of Chinese government suspicions and paranoia in regard to both internal and external threats. Internally, the Chinese have much to contend with: Taipei's quest for independence and hesitation on talks, Buddhist and Falun Gong religious sects, Islamic insurgency in Xinjiang, demands for human rights, environmental degradation, overpopulation, unemployment, corruption, insecure bureaucracies, and a nationalistic and hawkish military seeking resources for modernization.¹² Externally, the Chinese are suspicious of Western alliances, a united Korea, and their historical competitors: Japan and America. The Chinese believe that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries may eventually include Japan, make overtures to Taiwan, and ultimately back China into a political corner.¹³ Moreover, a united Korea in conjunction with a powerful Japan might challenge China's economic ascendancy and remove its security buffer zone. The Chinese also remember the Korean conflict, American "gunboat diplomacy" in the Taiwan Strait during the Korean conflict and in 1996, the 1954 bilateral defense treaty and decades of military assistance to Taiwan, and more recently, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the Chinese perceive the 1999 U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia on behalf of independence-seeking Kosovar Albanians a dangerous precedent.¹⁴ Thus, China's perception that the United States is meddling in its internal affairs vis-à-vis Taiwan underscores its regional insecurity and belief that America seeks global hegemony. This insecurity helps drive Chinese nuclear modernization and proliferation.

Ambition

In the 1960s, China openly favored proliferation as a rallying point against imperialism and as a counterbalance to U.S. and Soviet power.¹⁵ National pride, the desire for dignity and prestige, and regional ambition still motivate China to develop and modernize its nuclear arsenal. Proliferation is an extension of China's ambitious modernization effort. China views proliferation as a means to assert itself and compete with the United States, despite the restrictions of nonproliferation regimes.¹⁶ Thus, China considers the verification provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as discriminatory, particularly to militarily weak states such as itself.¹⁷ Regarding nuclear weapons, America acknowledges the discriminatory nature of the nation-state hierarchy, but it does not intend to disarm any time soon because of its unprecedented leadership role and the opportunity to maintain global predominance. Nuclear weapons are also needed as a hedge against Russia and China.¹⁸ Thus, nuclear weapons are still an essential part of the U.S. strategy to deter aggression.¹⁹ Consequently, China's nonproliferation officials argue that the United States continues to maintain a Cold War posture because its weapons are offensive in nature and it has rejected the idea of no first use.²⁰ Therefore, China will likely continue to proliferate nuclear weapons to redress the overwhelming inequity in nuclear and conventional military power compared to the United States.

Economic Ascendency

China is also proliferating nuclear technology and materials to bolster its economy. China is an emerging economic power in Asia. Given the infancy of its more powerful role in Asia, China has sought hard currency buyers for its products, including nuclear technology and materials. Also, because of its "aggressive effort to increase its economic prosperity," it is expected to strengthen its business sectors and keep afloat pseudo-government and semi-autonomous commercial entities, seeking to protect them from foreign competition.²¹ These enterprises include those trafficking in nuclear and missile technology and materials. China continues to earn hard currency however it can to implement its comprehensive reform plan, to execute major capital projects (for example, Three Gorges Dam), to achieve open trade with the developed world, to stabilize its currency, and to maintain a high annual growth rate (greater than 8 percent) necessary to achieve real long-term growth.

On September 19, 2000, after much wrangling and despite impassioned pleas by Cold War conservatives, the Senate approved normal trade relations with China. The vote was 83 to 15, indicating strong support for commercial, business, and trade ties with the world's largest market. Supporters of the bill hope that the new trade relationship will prompt China to soften and eventually abandon its stance on human rights violations and nuclear proliferation. Without Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the United States and without membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), China would be deprived of first-class global economic status. If history is any guide, it will take a considerable amount of time for the mutual benefits of PNTR to accrue to either the United States or China. In the meantime, and for the foreseeable future, nuclear sales will be considered important contributors to China's economic bottom line.

Other Motivations

Media articles, political punditry, and statements by prominent U.S. public figures alleging Chinese attempts to influence the 1996 U.S. Presidential elections in favor of the Clinton-Gore ticket have angered the Chinese. Since the early 1990s, implied aücusations of Chinese nuclear espionage at Los Alamos and other U.S. national laboratories have left Chinese officials equally infuriated. The U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Serbia in spring 1999 unleashed broad and violent Chinese animosity toward America, resulting in attacks on the U.S. Embassy in China and cooled relations that still have not warmed appreciably. Finally, Chinese officials bristle at continuous allegations of human rights violations in reference to the Tiananmen Square "massacre" and at the Congressional legislation that it spawned, which demands unequivocal assurances that China is not proliferating nuclear technology.²²

U.S. Policy

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has advocated a nuclear nonproliferation policy designed to impede the spread of nuclear weapons, associated technology, and delivery systems. When the potential devastation is taken into account, the spread of nuclear weapons poses risks to U.S. economic interests, including the free flow of trade and access to natural resources. Accordingly, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 1999 asserts that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a vital national interest. To achieve its strategic goals, America seeks verifiable arms control, arms reductions, and nonproliferation agreements.²³

President Clinton acknowledged the widespread skepticism regarding effective nonproliferation. He knew compliance in nonproliferation might not be perfect, but he believed that the United States had no other choice but to continue to seek multilateral agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. At the Non-Proliferation Conference in 2000, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson reinforced the President's theme: "[Our policy] is the dismantling of weapons, the securing of materials used to build arms, the diminishing of nuclear peril around the world, and the allying of former foes in friendships for the ages." To realize this vision, Secretary Richardson recommended diplomatic initiatives, provision of economic aid, support of social development, promotion of technical dialogues, emphasis on regional interdependence, and pursuit of energy cooperation.²⁴

U.S. policy also includes the military element of power. The NSS provides for counterproliferation action similar to Israel's June 1981 bombing and destruction of the French-built Osiraq nuclear reactor facility near Baghdad to thwart Iraqi nuclear ambitions.²⁵ However, the negative consequences of such action would be ominous for the United States, making this use of the military element of power an unlikely last resort.²⁶ Short of preemptive military strikes and other active military enforcement, America seeks to deter nuclear expansion through the existence of its own formidable nuclear arsenal and through the credible deterrent embodied in sizeable, projectable, and forward-deployed conventional forces.

The United States has succeeded in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to many countries that have the desire or the capability, or both, to develop them: Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine. Washington has arranged security alliances with many of these countries to win their compliance. With others, economic, developmental, and regional considerations have made the difference. Selected nations, realizing that they could not afford the expense of developing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, have abandoned their ambitions for nuclear weaponization.²⁷ In the cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, the United States has successfully brokered the disarming of formerly de facto nuclear states.²⁸ South Africa is unique in that it was a full-fledged nuclear weapons aspirant that did an about-face by dismantling its existing nuclear warheads and joining the nonproliferation mainstream.

These successes notwithstanding, it is no surprise that several countries appear oblivious to U.S. efforts to constrain their nuclear ambitions. After all, possession of nuclear weapons can transform a country into a superpower in meaningful ways. In any case, the number of nonproliferation policy failures presents a challenge to global peace and prosperity. These include Algeria, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria. For most of these states, U.S. goals are too casual (low expectations). U.S. coping strategies such as economic sanctions and counterproliferation through economic isolation, stepped-up monitoring, and military deterrence have failed to halt proliferation in these states. Because in the past Russia and China have enabled some of our policy failures, they too should be added to the list. Few would dispute that Chinese technology transfers to Pakistan enabled the dueling demonstrations of nuclear weapons capability in May 1998.²⁹

China Policy Assessment

U.S. policy calls for "comprehensive engagement" with China.³⁰ Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, asserts:

The long-term objective of [U.S.] policy is to enhance the security and prosperity of the American people by encouraging China's integration into the world community, thereby fostering China's adherence to internationally-recognized norms and standards of behavior. . . . On non-proliferation, we have made clear our determination to fully implement our laws and to respond forcefully to irresponsible behavior. At the same time, we have obtained important new public Chinese commitments through active consultations. [italics added]

In other words, the United States seeks to reduce South and East Asian regional threats and improve Chinese nonproliferation compliance through deterrent economic measures and better, more constructive U.S.-China relations.

Former National Security Advisor Samuel (Sandy) R. Berger stressed that the United States "will not shrink from the fight against weapons of mass destruction." Berger outlined a more specific U.S. nonproliferation and arms control policy at the 1999 Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference. He summarized it as "strengthening the non-proliferation regime, addressing regional threats, and bolstering defenses." ³¹ While all general U.S. policies outlined earlier apply to China as well, Berger cited U.S. policy specifically with respect to Chinese nonproliferation: "A second set of priorities focuses on the most pressing regional proliferation challenges, [which include] working with China on common non-proliferation goals. We will continue to express our hope that [China] will join the MTCR." ³²

The U.S. policy of engaging China has been effective. Nevertheless, China is sowing the seeds of future insecurity with its continued violations of nonproliferation regimes. It continues to proliferate nuclear technology and material to bolster its security in the context of its tenuous relationship with the United States. Further, China is selling nuclear technology to sustain its dramatic economic growth. America has tolerated this behavior because it is unwilling to impose real sanctions on China for fear of losing commercial and trade ties. Moreover, U.S. policy implementation has failed to address China's primary motivations for proliferating insecurity and potential conflict with India and Taiwan. Some observers view U.S. failure to engage China on arms control as either too casual (perceiving China to be far from a genuine nuclear threat to the United States), disrespectful (misreading China's ambitions to become a peer competitor), or capriciously indifferent (not expecting China to observe global standards). Moreover, the American proposal to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system for the United States and TMD for Taiwan has compounded this detachment, further alienating China.

Successes

The United States has been successful in getting China to participate in many nonproliferation and arms control agreements and in persuading China to take actions in the spirit of nonproliferation regimes.³³ For example, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January 1984 and pledged to apply IAEA standards on its nuclear exports. In January 1989, China participated in the convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In 1992, China joined the NPT and pledged to uphold the original 1987 MTCR guidelines. In July 1996, China ceased nuclear testing and announced a moratorium on further testing. China was also instrumental in gaining North Korean acceptance of the Agreed Framework (1994).³⁴ Between 1995 and 1997, China suspended plans to give Iran two 300-megawatt Qinshan-type nuclear power reactors and suspended plans to construct a uranium conversion facility for Iran. Additionally, in October 1997, China officially joined the Zangger Committee.³⁵ In 1997, China agreed to halt further nuclear cooperation with Iran and pledged during Defense Secretary Cohen's visit not to provide Iran with cruise missiles or related technology. The Chinese white paper, China's National Defense (July 1998), demonstrates China's recognition of the importance of nuclear transparency. Finally, as of 1998, China has pledged to stop producing fissile material.³⁶

Failures

While China has been a signatory to the major nonproliferation agreements and has made some progress in cooperating with multilateral coalitions dedicated to nonproliferation, its participation is conspicuously absent from certain important regimes. Likewise, China's nuclear technology export policies continue to threaten world peace and reflect stagnant U.S.-China relations. The following concerns are summarized from the most recent international nonproliferation conference report: ³⁷ China is not a member of other multilateral export control regimes, such as the MTCR, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).³⁸ China has not ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (nor have the United States and Russia), nor did China approve indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. U.S. dual-use exports intended for peaceful uses have been diverted to military-related facilities under the noses of presumably lethargic Chinese officials. Additionally, China has not adopted explicit export control measures for missile and dual-use technologies. Finally, China has had difficulty establishing and enforcing export controls it has adopted for nuclear weapons.

American conservatives consider China's many assurances of cooperation on nonproliferation to be little more than a façade covering a body of Chinese violations, covert and overt. It can be argued that China practices a policy of exceptionalism and selectivity in adhering to nonproliferation regimes. Simultaneously, China cooperates, proliferates, and deflects criticism.³⁹ In response, the United States has imposed sanctions three times against China for missile-related exports. In each case, the sanctions were slight financial blows of a perfunctory nature.⁴⁰ The Department of State has acknowledged that Chinese assurances have become meaningless.⁴¹ Only recently, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report charged that "the People's Republic of China consistently fails to adhere to its non-proliferation commitments. . . . Beijing merely mouths promises as a means of evading sanctions." The report adds that the Clinton administration was lax in enforcing nonproliferation agreements and "has shown nothing but consistent disregard for [U.S.] non-proliferation laws." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has subsequently tried unsuccessfully to amend the recent legislation that granted China permanent normal trade relations, calling for sanctions against China for selling nuclear-related technology to states of concern and for violating IAEA safeguard provisions.⁴²

Trade versus Security

Inconsistency between U.S. declared policy and its execution is to blame for the mixed record in nuclear nonproliferation. Critics of the Clinton administration called for action because talks with China have generally been lengthy and inconclusive.⁴³ But China has broken the code for dealing with the United States. That is, it spreads nuclear technology in return for hard currency and depends on U.S. commercial interests to bail it out when pressured by the U.S. Government to comply with nonproliferation agreements. In short, the United States has put Chinese trade concerns and business ties above national and regional security and the containment of nuclear weapons.

Seeking improved trade relations, America has turned a blind eye to China's nuclear proliferation. Since 1985, when China made nonproliferation pledges to the Reagan administration, it has provided unsafeguarded help to Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. Since 1992, such Chinese assistance applicable to nuclear weapons clearly violates the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. U.S. failure to criticize China over nuclear proliferation, while applying tough sanctions for intellectual property violations (software and audio and video recordings), sends the wrong message on our priorities.

Not surprisingly, China continues to export hardware and technology to unsafeguarded nuclear plants.⁴⁴ China has continued to assist Iran and North Korean covertly with their missile programs.⁴⁵ Other than making public statements and delaying PNTR, the United States has done little in the wake of China's export of 5,000 centrifuge magnets to the Pakistani Kahuta enrichment plant in May 1996.⁴⁶ Informed observers find China's professions of ignorance about such technology transfers insulting. Such disregard indicates how lightly the Chinese take U.S. threats of sanctions under the auspices of the NPT, which they joined in 1992.⁴⁷ China's behavior is particularly egregious in view of Pakistan's refusal to accept safeguards that prohibit any NPT signatory from exporting technology to it. Under U.S. proliferation law, international missile-related sales that violate the MTCR require the United States to impose sanctions against China.⁴⁸ Given its documented violations of the MTCR, it is astonishing that China's behavior has been tolerated. But in addition to lax enforcement, U.S. failure to enforce nonproliferation policy has only heightened China's security concerns regarding India, and vice versa. Therefore, China's clandestine proliferation to Pakistan, while disturbing, is predictable. It can be expected to continue until America helps allay China's security concerns.

Arms Control

Lack of U.S.-China bilateral arms control agreements exacerbates the difficulties of nonproliferation dialogue. U.S.-China relations, while lacking the enmity and conflict of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms dialogue, have failed to address bilateral arms control, instead focusing exclusively on nuclear nonproliferation. This oversight is indicative of the immaturity of U.S.-China dialogue, as well as U.S. reluctance to engage the Chinese as it has the Russians.⁴⁹ The Chinese may perceive this reluctance as another example of U.S. arrogance and global hegemonism. In fact, China wants U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals dramatically reduced before it engages in any nuclear arms reduction talks (in accordance with START II).⁵⁰

Missile Defense

China's efforts to build up its nuclear arsenal and improve its missile technology could evoke responses in kind from India and states in East Asia to deter China. Over the next generation, the Pacific Rim could become a hotbed of nuclear weaponization and missile development. The United States considers the provision of TMD under its security umbrella as a way to trump China's nuclear and conventional missile capabilities.

The Chinese see little reason to adhere completely to nonproliferation regimes while America advocates national and theater missile defense programs. The Chinese believe that the international security promoted by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) of 1972 is undermined by U.S. plans to deploy NMD in the 2006-2007 timeframe. In fact, Chinese officials have hinted in recent years that deployment of NMD may lead China to increase its nuclear arsenal.⁵¹ Nevertheless, NMD policy must be viewed in the context of China's ambitions to improve its strategic nuclear missiles and warheads to reach targets in North America.⁵²

The NMD program has received mixed reviews among U.S. officials. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen supported plans to continue the development of NMD. President Clinton supported this program until September 2000, when, despite Secretary Cohen's advice, he decided to postpone until the next administration a decision to deploy the NMD system. NMD testing and development will continue, but construction of a radar facility needed for system deployment has been delayed. Congressional opponents claim that President Clinton postponed the decision to placate Russia and China. The postponement is expected to have a positive impact on U.S.-China relations and, by extension, to enhance progress on nuclear technology and missile proliferation and arms control dialogue. In the meantime, Congressional conservatives are clamoring for nuclear testing. They believe that the NMD program will sustain U.S. global supremacy, chasten China, and prevent nightmarish scenarios of nuclear blackmail by states of concern such as North Korea, Iraq, or Iran. The Senate refusal to ratify the CTBT is indicative of regressive conservative "saber rattling" on U.S. nuclear weapons development. It portends scrapping the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia and reducing U.S. leadership in nuclear nonproliferation.⁵³

On the other hand, given the gains in nuclear nonproliferation and the unwritten ultimate goal of denuclearization, detractors of NMD are mystified by the mere consideration of NMD. Daniel Plesch, the director of the British-American Security Information Council, a security and defense issues research group, asserts, "With increased focus on creating a national missile defense system, the U.S. is no longer a reliable leader in the area of international legal controls on nuclear and other armaments. Its actions reinforce a steadily strengthening view against relying on mutual nuclear deterrence in national strategy." ⁵⁴ More troubling is the message that this perceived lack of leadership sends to China and the weakening effect it could have on nonproliferation regimes and nuclear weapon-free zones.⁵⁵ It is hard to predict what, if any, impact the NMD policy battle will have on Pakistan and India, which are considering a moratorium on nuclear tests.⁵⁶ But the effect is unlikely to be positive.

In sum, U.S. flirtation with the idea of another Star Wars-like missile defense program provides Beijing and states of concern political cover for their proliferation activities. Further, it undermines U.S. credibility and leadership on nonproliferation issues.

Recommendations

The U.S. strategic goal is to impede the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, and missile delivery systems from China to states of concern. Additionally, U.S. interests are best served by the emergence of a strong, stable, open, and prosperous China.⁵⁷ The recommendations that follow support these goals. Recommendations are systematically presented in the context of ends, ways and means, and elements of national power. While the recommendations call for exploiting U.S. strengths, they are constructive. In general they do not call for exploiting China's weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Instead, they focus at the level of national (or grand) strategy.

General

The United States should retain the policy of comprehensive engagement with China to integrate further a freer, more prosperous China into the international community and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and related material and technology to states of concern. America, however, should redouble its efforts to implement the policy consistent with its declarations, something that has been lacking in U.S. policy implementation. Comprehensive engagement requires consistent and focused engagement andüenforcement, which are the keys to successful policy. Engagement means that the United States should continue to develop a dialogue with the Chinese government and nonproliferation professionals. In doing so, U.S. officials should avoid mirror-imaging when engaging the Chinese.⁵⁸ Instead, America should attempt to understand better Chinese culture, values, and objectives, including their commitment to and timetable for reforms. Such a critically informed environment will provide truly comprehensive engagement and the realization of real progress toward the goal of ending Chinese nuclear proliferation.

The United States must avoid the appearance or fact of being a paper tiger on nuclear nonproliferation. Enforcement means that the United States must exercise the political will to discipline China informationally, politically, and economically in a global context, through multilateral and transnational economic and political institutions. America must do as President Ronald Reagan once said of nuclear arms control, quoting an old Russian proverb, "Trust, but verify."

China, as a member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, is a major power. Therefore, the alternatives of threatening to use military force against and/or to contain China in support of nonproliferation objectives are counterproductive, impractical, and contrary to encouraging a freer and more prosperous China. Further, such aggressive options do not advance U.S. nonproliferation goals. Military force and containment should be avoided if possible. The United States can call upon a host of other military, economic, and political ways and means.

Political

The United States must meet its security commitments to Taiwan without alienating China. It must continue to assuage Chinese security and sovereignty concerns through diplomacy by not recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation while reaffirming cooperative security arrangements with it. This will enhance both Taiwanese and Chinese perceptions and reality of security and help reduce China's motivation to proliferate. This strategy must be buttressed with public policy statements that solidify our friendship with all Chinese. Comprehensive dialogue is essential for guarding against the festering of sinister perceptions. For example, America should continue the modest scientific exchange between U.S. and Chinese national laboratories and nuclear technologists and between nongovernmental organizations and policy research institutions.

The United States should leverage international organizations to improve Chinese prestige and gain international support for its reforms commensurate with its cooperation with nonproliferation regimes and treaties. America's unprecedented standing provides it overwhelming power to ratify and legitimize agreements. China desires the referent power and influence that it can gain through cooperation with the United States, but the United States cannot court China in a vacuum. The United States should seek to reinforce its cooperative security agreements with the major players in South and East Asia to enhance the perceptions and reality of security, obviating the need for China's proliferation to Pakistan. Given its mixed record of cooperation, continuous diplomatic pressure must be applied to China both unilaterally and through transnational organizations to ensure that China meets its responsibilities to the nonproliferation regimes and treaties. Finally, America should leverage its informational and political power to persuade the Chinese people to choose democracy because, theoretically, "democracies do not go to war with other democracies." ⁵⁹

Economic

The United States must move quickly to make permanent normal trade relations with China a reality to lessen China's need to traffic nuclear and missile technology, a practice that currently provides needed hard currency. The annual approvals of trade relations were perfunctory and irritating to the Chinese. PNTR will pave the way for China's entry into the WTO, which in turn will further integrate China into the economic mainstream of the global market and speed domestic reforms, increasing China's stake in cooperating. PNTR will also improve China's economic prospects and give it access to international banking organizations, loan capital, and the world's largest trading partner. But trade policies should approach parity incrementally because of the asymmetries in size and efficiency of the economies involved. The United States can also provide China access to its strong and dominant bond market. Additionally, it should encourage its commercial banking institutions to share financial expertise and provide economic and legal education to improve China's fiscal policy and strengthen and reform its fragile banking institutions. The United States should share nuclear technology, hardware, and material slowly and commensurate with China's nonproliferation compliance. It should demand certification of China's export controls, but such demands must be broached carefully, since China is sensitive to its status as a world power. For either constructive or punitive purposes, it should also use its formidable economic influence in multilateral, transnational sanctioning bodies to moderate Chinese behavior. Only amid a general and deep economic crisis should debt forgiveness be considered. Similarly, the freezing of monetary assets, seizure of real property, and embargoes should be reserved only for those unlikely conditions in which a state of grave hostility exists between America and China.

Military

Shaping and responding are the two centerpieces of U.S. military strategy.⁶⁰ Forward-deployed conventional forces, force projection assets, and a visible blue-water Navy must continue to deploy in Asia to guarantee security, provide the backdrop for genuine engagement, and present a formidable deterrent. To allay Chinese security concerns, America should limit the deployment of TMD to East Asian states and abandon NMD deployment. It should also consider maritime TMD for Asia. Extensive Taiwan-based TMD would be particularly counterproductive, since China considers Taiwan a rogue province, and U.S. security assistance to Taiwan only serves to aggravate Chinese nationalism and paranoia. NMD deployment is too divisive and of dubious utility. The United States should alter its cooperative security agreements to be inclusive of China. However, separate cooperative security agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan should remain in force over the next generation, when Chinese security, prosperity, and compliance are expected to improve. America should withhold strategic nuclear expertise, satellite and missile technology, and dual-use technology until Chinese compliance with nonproliferation regimes is confirmed. The United States should continue to engage in comprehensive signals intelligence, selected human intelligence, and close monitoring of Chinese immigrants, as long as China retains a formidable nuclear weapons capability. Military-to-military contact short of joint exercises with China will increase positive U.S.-China engagement, assuage fears and suspicion, and inörease mutual understanding between the military establishments. Finally, engaging the Chinese on arms control is paramount. Therefore, despite China's charges of discrimination and hypocrisy, the United States should retain its nuclear deterrent through 2020, but not indefinitely. It must be willing to decommission a sizeable portion of its arsenal to lend credibility to the notion that someday it will eliminate all nuclear weapons.

Conclusions

Evidence indicates that Chinese compliance with nuclear nonproliferation regimes has been less than desired. The United States is partly to blame because it has neglected its security for the benefits of commerce and trade. In the hierarchy of a nation's interests, consideration of national and regional security reigns supreme. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, technology, and delivery systems should have primacy over trade concerns and business ties. But security and commerce are inextricably bound to one another, particularly in an era of increasingly globalized interaction and interdependence. Therefore, security and economic imperatives must be pursued concurrently to achieve an effective synergy. The optimum policy recognizes this symbiosis and requires long-term, consistent, but flexible implementation of the national security strategy. The required policy is comprehensive engagement.

Notes