Chapter 1

Globalization and Sea Power: Overview and Context

Sam J. Tangredi

Globalization can...be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.¹

Globalization entails an accelerating rate and/or higher level of economic interaction between nation-states and national economies.²

[Globalization is] the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before—in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.³

This, with the vast increase in rapidity of communication, has multiplied and strengthened the bonds knitting the interests of nations to one another, till the whole now forms an articulated system, not only of prodigious size and activity, but of an excessive sensitiveness, unequalled in former ages.⁴

Which of the above quotations is not a description of globalization circa 2002? Even experts on globalization are likely to consider all four as accurate depictions of the widely discussed economic phenomenon of the 21st century. Contemporary globalization doesýappear to link local events to international effects, to be fueled by continuing advancements in the speed of communications, to be characterized by an accelerating rate of international economic and social relations, and to result in an articulated system in which more and more activities are extremely sensitive to occurrences in distant nations. Many experts emphasize the fact that today’s globalization is occurring at a degree unequalled to similar trends in the past.

Thus, it might come as a surprise to point out that the last quotation appeared in an American journal in 1902 and was written by a then-popular historian who would be uncharitably described by later scholars as a nationalist, jingoist, and imperialist. The author was U.S. Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, known to both supporters and detractors as the father of the concept of sea power.⁵

Therein lies an initial clue to the little-explored relationship between sea power—or in the unifying terminology of this volume, maritime power—and globalization. The similarity between the intrinsic elements of the concept of sea power as popularized by Mahan—accelerated communications and international trade, multinational use of a “global common,” reduction in the security and sovereignty of (certain) nation-states—and the recognized components of the modern version of globalization seems almost uncanny. But this similarity, as pointed out in the Introduction, is not a coincidence. If, as many scholars contend, modern globalization is but the continuation of a process that began contemporaneously with the development of nation-states,⁶ the dominant facilitator of the process of globalization has always been the sea. As argued later (in chapter 12), the human ability to navigate successfully across the vast oceans was the historical turning point that enabled higher levels of international trade (and profit) to spark the evolutionary trend toward economic globalization. Ocean navigation is unique in that it represents the initial means by which humans were able to use routinely a fluid medium that could not be normally inhabited as a primary means for communication and commerce.⁷ Fast-forwarding to today, the development of the Internet and e-commerce—which observers like Thomas Friedman consider the defining characteristic of the modern version of globalization⁸—represents a step similar to ocean navigation: the Internet is a new fluid medium that humans cannot physically inhabit but can use for communications and commerce.

As the primary military element of sea/maritime power, naval forces—and specifically the naval forces of the world’s dominant political and economic power, the United States—contribute to the international security function of protecting the mediums and markets critical to this increasing international exchange known as globalization. Indeed, the very nature of navies appears to make their protective role uniquely attuned to the new-era dynamics created by globalization. This is as true in 2002 as it was in 1902. Moreover, because the U.S. Navy is the sole global navy in existence today, it plays a vitally important role in ensuring the favorable outcome of the current globalization process. In that sense, the Navy and its traditional partner, the U.S. Marine Corps, are both globalized and globalizing forces.

What Is Sea Power?

To understand the linkage between sea power and globalization, one must first unlearn the popular characterization that sea power (and the work of Mahan) is exclusively about war at sea. The term sea power is not exclusively synonymous with naval warfare. It is a much broader concept that entails at least four elements: the control of international trade and commerce; the usage and control of ocean resources; the operations of navies in war; and the use of navies and maritime economic power as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and political influence in time of peace. Unlike the concepts of land power or air power, which are generally defined only in military terms, sea power can never be quite separated from its geo-economic purposes. Navies may be the obvious armed element of sea power. However, maritime shipping, seaport operations, undersea resources (such as oil), fisheries, and other forms of commerce and communications through fluid mediums can all be seen as integral to a nation’s sea power.

Mahan himself often seemed confused about the most appropriate definition for sea power; his writings focus largely on the “clash of interests” created by the desire of nations to possess a “disproportionate share” of the “sea commerce upon which the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen.”⁹ From this perspective, he concluded, “the history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war...largely a military history.”¹⁰ Yet he routinely described sea power in terms of characteristics that fall outside of the military realm.

Mahan identifies six characteristics as “principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations”: geographic position, physical conformation (including natural resources and climate), extent of territory, population, character of the people, and character of the government.¹¹ Modern naval historians have updated and reformulated the list, and a recent depiction includes economic strength, technological prowess, sociopolitical culture (as “first order” conditions), and geographic position, dependence on maritime trade and sea resources, and government policy and perception (as “second order” conditions).¹² Whether first or second order, all of the characteristics cited contribute to a vibrant, powerful economy and hence play a role as a potential participant in the beneficial aspects of globalization. In short, the characteristics that, in Mahan’s words, tend “to make people great upon the sea, or by the sea”¹³ are the same characteristics that make a people economically powerful overall and—theoretically—willing participants in the globalization process. Thus, our first conclusion is that sea power and the ability to participate in and benefit from globalization share common characteristics.

In a broad sense, modern sea power can be defined as the combination of a nation-state’s capacity for international maritime commerce and utilization of oceanic resources, with its ability to project military power into the sea, for the purposes of sea and area control over commerce and conflict, and from the sea, in order to influence events on land by means of naval forces.¹⁴ As noted, this broad concept is often challenged by a more narrow view of sea power as “a military concept, that form of military power that is deployed at or from the sea.”¹⁵

Globalization Begins at Sea

From a historical perspective, the linkage between sea power and economic power is indeed obvious. Beyond sharing defining characteristics, sea power is a facilitator of economic power, and the quest for economic power is, in turn, a motivator for the development of sea power. Some have defined the era of pre-World War I colonialism as an earlier period of globalization—sort of a globalization by force. Critics have charged sea power (and Mahan specifically) as being both a symptom and progenitor of imperialism.¹⁶ No one denies the linkage between seaborne commerce and global economic development, although some have questioned the cumulative effect of naval expenditures and national economies.¹⁷ But in the confusion of interpreting the details, few have truly grasped the continuing truth of Sir Walter Raleigh’s dictum, “Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”¹⁸

Those who would find Raleigh’s words a bit too Elizabethan (or grandiose) for the reality of today’s economic system would do well to consider the synergy between four facts of the contemporary world. The first is that over 70 percent of the world’s surface is covered by ocean. Second is that over 90 percent of international trade, when measured in weight and volume, travels by water. This includes most of the world’s raw materials.¹⁹Third is that the majority of the world’s major cities and urban populations lie within 200 kilometers of a coastline. Fourth is that international law provides for freedom of the seas in which any nation can use the open ocean for purposes of trade or defense without infringement on another’s sovereignty, subject to international agreements on pollution and exploitation of resources.

These four facts have remained fairly constant throughout the last century and appear to likely remain so throughout this one. When placed in context, it is evident that the seas have been a major factor in the history of human economic and industrial development—and the history of war. In that sense, our second conclusion is that the historical impact of the sea in the pursuit of wealth and the development of a global economy has been as a facilitator or driver of globalization.

But the fact that sea power is ultimately about global trade and that globalization is based on the effects of global (presumably free) trade do not capture yet another similarity between the workings of the global market in a capitalist economy and the acquisition of dominant sea power in a competitive international political system. As noted in the introduction, the sea is relatively free for the use of all states (and even nonstate actors), but it also remains a self-help system. Its use is most beneficial to those actors who have the resources (and desire) to use it effectively, either for the harvesting of resources or for international trade. For example, the fact that the most modern cargo ships require expensive unloading facilities (discussed in detail in chapter 7) limits the number of ports that receive the greatest portions of world trade. To develop such a hub port requires an expenditure of private or public resources that would prove unaffordable to economically lesser developed states. Lesser developed states may indeed benefit from the increase in world trade that hub ports facilitate, but it is likely that the owners of the hub ports initially benefit more.

Likewise, the international law of the sea may provide for equal access to trade and resources, but the means to defend such access against interdiction ultimately lie in the possession of an effective navy. To build such a navy—particularly one that can operate globally—requires a level of state resources that is within the reach only of great powers. Enforcement of the freedom of the seas (against the threat of closure) by a global navy benefits all members of the international economic system. But in terms of sovereignty and freedom of action, the possessor of that global navy would appear to gain more leverage. Our third conclusion is that access to the sea is a metaphor for access to the global economy, both functioning in similar marketplace fashion with a linkage between resources invested and results.

In that sense, access to the sea can be thought of as the perfect economic market model. All parties involved benefit from an efficient market that allows free access and supply to match demand, but the profits to all parties in an efficient market are not equal. Those with better or more desirable products (facilitated by greater knowledge or production resources) make greater profits than those whose products are less desirable. Freedom of the seas as codified in international law allows benefits to be awarded in similar fashion—which drives the historical quest of nations for naval power.

Naval Power and the Global Economy

The importance of a navy rests on twin pillars: its ability to affect events on land and its ability to control use of the sea. The importance of the first ability has evolved with technology as naval weapon systems have continually increased their reach. The importance of the second has continually increased with the world’s growing dependence on international trade and ocean resources. If, in a globalized economic system, we are all more dependent on international trade, then naval power becomes more important to all.²⁰

Even as accelerated globalization appears to have made naval power as an element of sea power more important to the workings of the global economy, the number of truly global navies has shrunk to one: that of the United States. Largely this has been the result of historical circumstances—the Cold War victory of democratic capitalism. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the global naval competition that pitted the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) navies, along with other allies, against the expanding Soviet Navy. With this Western victory and the fact that the United States intended to keep a superpower-sized navy, there seemed little political reason for nations satisfied with the evolution of the international system to maintain much of an oceangoing navy at all.

This historical circumstance allowed previous security issues to recede and economic concerns to emerge—which is in itself why economic globalization became the prime issue of the post-Cold War international system. And, beyond the disappearance of the immediate security threat, the most obvious reason for the demise of navies is economic: navies require tremendous resources. The main economic inhibitors are the costs of maintaining the logistic capabilities required by an oceangoing fleet and of acquiring the modern naval technology to make such a fleet combat credible in the modern world. Most nations simply cannot or do not want to afford it, particularly if their focus is on competing in the globalizing economy. When combined with the general lack of a naval threat to the security of most nations, the motivation to afford a global oceangoing navy disappears. The result is that the U.S. Navy can be considered a globalized, as well as a global, navy. In essence, it is no longer solely the U.S. Navy; it has become the world’s navy—delivering the security of access function across the entire world system. It is this security of access function that represents the primary contribution of naval power (as an element of sea power) to peacetime globalization. During periods of conflict, this access function allows the United States (and the globalized world) to project power into contested and otherwise inaccessible regions.

From Global to Globalized Navy

By protecting access to this open market to all those who accept international law, the U.S. Navy performs a common security function on a global basis. In reality, it provides the protocols and security structure of the “maritime Internet,” which, in terms of international trade in goods, remains the ultimate Internetted exchange.

Arguably, everyone “uses” the U.S. Navy. With the exception of the “states formerly known as rogues,” global terrorists, and (at least rhetorically) the Chinese Communist Party, no one expects any harm from the U.S. Navy. Japan, which remains potentially America’s number one economic rival, even allows the Navy to homeport both a carrier battlegroup and an amphibious ready group in its own port cities—and pays for the infrastructure to do so. When building its own ships, Japan routinely licenses technology used by the U.S. Navy. Russia, with a military still often suspicious of the West, has conducted post-Cold War exercises with NATO and U.S. naval forces. The Navy is welcomed in ports around the globe, and the forward naval presence of U.S. warships is readily accepted—if not always articulated—by most nations as a sound policy for maintaining regional security.

U.S. naval forces are frequently called upon to provide restabilization during periods of potential or real crisis. This is true of land forces as well, but the principle of freedom of the seas provides a unique advantage to navies; they can operate during peacetime in an environment close to the location of the crisis without infringing on the sovereignty of any other state. Thus, the United States can send its naval forces into the Taiwan Strait to defuse a brewing China-Taiwan crisis without infringing the sovereignty of either China or Taiwan. It can even maintain a forward presence there after the crisis is over without any legitimate legal challenge. In this way, naval forces can provide for a stabilizing or calming effect on international markets that might be adversely affected by impending regional crises.

Of course, freedom of the seas can be said to benefit the dominant sea power—the United States—in ways similar to how critics (and even proponents) see globalization as benefiting the dominant economic power. As a globalized service, the U.S. Navy can—within certain limits—determine the location, timing, and procedures of the world’s maritime exchanges, as well as control access to land regions. This represents an omnipresent influence of U.S. sea power on the global economy and the overall globalization process. The United States simultaneously operates major fleets in the Mediterranean, Arabian Sea, and Western Pacific, and it has individual ships and squadrons in almost every major locale. U.S. naval presence influences not only economic commerce but also the new-era geopolitics of regions in stabilizing ways. One’s view of this situation reflects one’s overall view of the role of the United States as the stabilizing influence (read, sole superpower) of the international system. Right now, the majority of international political actors and the entirety of the global economic system value the stabilizing role to a degree that appears obvious but is difficult to measure (although chapter 6 reports on attempts to measure it.)

Like the U.S. dollar in international commerce and the use of the English language in the development of information technology, the U.S. Navy has become the benchmark and dominant standard for all things naval.

Participant in Globalizing Functions

In addition to being a globalized navy, the U.S. Navy facilitates at least four key globalization functions. First, it provides the world standards for naval operations. Second, it conducts direct interactions—such as combined training and exercises—with almost every other national fleet. Such interactions, which the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) previously referred to as engagement but now falling under the term security cooperation, are expected to promote the existing and future policies of the engagement and enlargement of global democracy.²¹ Third, it carries out the long-term mission of naval forward presence (that is, the continual deployment of naval forces to potential regions of crisis to provide stability and deter hostilities). Fourth, it provides naval weapons technology to selected foreign navies—a globalization, so to speak, of naval power. All of these functions contribute in important ways to the expansion of cross-border networks and flows.

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy has replaced the British Royal Navy in providing the world standards for naval operations. With the exception of Russia, China, and states formerly known as rogues, such as Iran and North Korea, almost all national navies use concepts of operations and procedures derived from or similar to those of the U.S. Navy. This ensures a considerable degree of interoperability. Even those navies that do not have the technology to establish electronic links with U.S. tactical information networks are generally well versed in Allied Tactical Publication 1, the NATO signal book for naval operations. The signals and tactics of the United States and NATO have become global; they are used to facilitate naval communications and tactics throughout the world.

This degree of interoperability is solidified and enhanced by combined exercises and operational training around the globe. The U.S. Navy routinely conducts combined exercises and operations, as well as policy discussions, with almost every other fleet. Operations range from the highly integrated NATO Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean; to frequent exercises with Latin American and Asian navies and with that of Australia; to passing exercises with friendly coastal navies; to occasional exercises with Black Sea navies, including that of Russia. A biannual seminar, the International Seapower Symposium, brings high-level representatives from almost every naval staff—including those of Russia and China—to the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, for discussions of naval policies. The location is familiar because many of the flag officers of the world’s navies are graduates of the Naval War College. Bilateral talks between the Chief of Naval Operations’ staff and its foreign counterparts are also routine.

As a primary mission of U.S. naval forces in peacetime, forward presence—the continual deployment of naval forces to potential regions of crisis—places the U.S. Navy in the forefront of the proverbial global security market. (Chapter 15 discusses the presence function from a joint perspective and in the context of the 2001 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review Report.) Like the best of global corporations, the Navy maintains representatives in the immediate vicinity of its significant customers. Not a day goes by in which U.S. naval forces cannot strike in some fashion at the forces of Saddam Hussein, ethnic cleansers, international terrorists, or maritime drug traffickers, to name but a few potential threats to global and U.S. security. Most international decisionmakers express their support (privately, if not publicly) for the Navy to continue performing this regional deterrence and stability function.²² This is a de facto globalization of a common concept of deterrence and security.

Finally, the U.S. Navy provides naval weapons and technology to selected foreign navies or develops systems jointly with allies, and it includes foreign weapon systems on board some of its own ships and aircraft. A few examples of the former include the AEGIS air defense system outfitted on destroyers of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the Cooperative Engagement Capability under development with the United Kingdom; examples of the latter include the German-American rolling airframe missile ship self-defense weapon, unmanned aerial vehicle prototype systems from Canada and Israel, and the Italian OTO Melara 76-millimeter gun on U.S. FFG–7 class ships.²³ This exchange of systems, which the United States dominates by virtue of its robust defense industrial sector, increases the level of global naval interoperability.²⁴

Effects of Globalization on the U.S. Naval Force

Globalized and globalizing, U.S. naval forces—like all American maritime assets—are directly affected by the overall trends in globalization. The multidimensional aspects of naval power (and sea power itself) magnify these effects. Modern navies operate not only on the surface of the ocean but also in the depths below it and the air above it, and they project power both individually and jointly onto land and into space and cyberspace. Ultimately, sea power has an inseparable connection with air power, although that is not necessarily an understanding with which independence-minded theorists of the strategic bombing concept of air power might agree.²⁵ The multidimensional aspect of naval warfare is illustrated by the range of different naval platforms (ships, submarines, aircraft) and weapon systems (sea mines, guns, torpedoes, cruise missiles) specialized for use in particular maritime environments. Although a platform or system may prove decisive in one environment—such as the dominance of the aircraft carrier and its air wing in long-range open ocean combat—no one platform is necessarily dominant in all aspects of naval warfare. Even the nuclear-powered submarine, with its advantages of undersea stealth and relatively unlimited energy source, is at a disadvantage in shallow water or in conducting operations that expose it to surface attack. U.S. Marine Corps and other naval expeditionary forces add a littoral land warfare focus. The point is that different components of multidimensional naval forces may be affected differently by the various trends of globalization—which is why later chapters in this volume examine the effect of globalization of the individual components in some detail.

Globalization is also a multidimensional and multidirectional process. Numerous globalization trends have a direct operational impact on the U.S. Navy of today and will have implications for future naval policy and force structure. As identified in the introduction, seven of these trends are increasing nonstate and transnational threats to U.S. security; increasing maritime traffic and trade; increasing American concerns about economic security; military (including naval/maritime) presence and intervention in locations not previously considered of vital interest; new, unpredicted effects on alliances and coalition-formation and their maritime components; proliferation of information technology and high-technology sensors and systems; and proliferation of advanced weapon systems and development of antiaccess or area denial strategies by potential opponents.

Development of Nonstate and Transnational Threats

The term nonstate threat is used to denote a threat to national security that is not directly planned or organized by a nation-state. Today, the foremost among these threats are acts of global terrorism, particularly those carried out without direct sponsorship by a rogue state. (An act of terrorism identified as sponsored directly by a rogue state could be considered an act of war, that is, a threat by another nation-state.) However, there is a loosely defined spectrum of nonstate threats, increasing in intensity from humanitarian disasters to mass migrations, to piracy, to computer network attack (hacking), to organized international crime and drug trafficking, to terrorism with conventional weaponry, to terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Along this spectrum, terrorist WMD use is the threat of greatest possible concern, although one with the lowest likelihood.²⁶

The term transnational threat indicates a threat to national security (presumably a nonstate threat) that is not confined within the boundaries of any one state. The National Defense Panel of 1997 referred to such activities as transnational threats—with the implication that such threats could be subject to potential multinational control. Indeed, the panel report states, “Transnational challenges and threats, by definition, reside in more than one country and require a multi-partner response.”²⁷ A simpler definition states, “transnational threats include terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime, and illegal trade in fissile materials and other dangerous substances.”²⁸

Whichever term is preferred, it has become evident that the tools of globalization facilitate the cross-border movement of individuals and financial flows involved in crime or terrorism. Transnational threats will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, but it should be pointed out that the term nonstate can also include international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and multinational interest groups, the increase of which is frequently cited as evidence for globalization and the reduction of state sovereignty. Of course, that is not to imply that the activities of such entities are seen as threats to the security of nation-states; however, their actions can sometimes be interpreted in such a fashion.²⁹

On issues in which popular opinion is at odds with governmental policy, it is recognized that NGOs can galvanize opinion to change national policies or even affect international policies by promoting a degree of discomfort for a certain state. This level of influence is also taken as evidence of political globalization. A prime example in maritime affairs is the Greenpeace-led campaign to change Japanese or Russian policy toward whaling and toward the creation of an international/global moratorium. On the other hand, even the most aggressive issue-oriented NGOs have found limits to their ability to challenge national sovereignty. When a Greenpeace chapter attempted to prevent the U.S. Navy from conducting an underwater test launching of submarine launched ballistic missiles by positioning a vessel in the launch area, ³⁰ they were rammed, towed, and arrested without a flutter in popular opinion.³¹

Other NGOs—from commercial maritime associations to arms control lobby groups—have significant potential to affect maritime affairs. These hardly constitute threats, but terrorist groups such as al Qaeda can also be considered NGOs.³² The bombing of the USS Cole in Aden harbor has been attributed to al Qaeda, and naval units of many coalition partners have been involved in the interdiction of possible al Qaeda members fleeing via the Indian Ocean. In addition to this deadly NGO, almost all of the transnational threats mentioned above have a maritime component.

Some have argued that nation-states are as vulnerable to transnational threats as the choices they make—such as for greater commercial dependence on the Internet or for wider ranging free trade agreements—require or permit them to be. Others argue that globalization effectively removes any such freedom of choice.³³ As a commercial phenomenon, globalization has tied the economies of advanced states tighter together, but it is still unclear what the effects of a severe downturn (along the line of the Great Depression of the 1930s rather than the recession of 2001–2002) in the global economy might be on the process of globalization itself. Individually, some states will choose greater degrees of autarky than others, cutting their vulnerability to certain nonstate threats. For example, states that erect significant physical barriers to immigration will be less vulnerable to the effects of mass migrations than those that do not. Such barriers often involve action by naval forces (which will be addressed in chapter 4).

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century has identified the evolutionary nature of nonstate threats through the juxtaposition of two of their findings. The growth of nonstate and transnational threats is acknowledged by the observation that “All borders will be more porous; some will bend and some will break.” But at the same time, the resilience of the nation-state in retaining its role as primary international actor is recognized by the finding that “The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but will endure.”³⁴Yet such endurance will obviously require action.

Increases in Maritime Trade and Traffic

A key effect of economic globalization is the continuing increase in maritime trade and traffic. While the new economy that helps fuel globalization is knowledge-based, the fact is that knowledge needs to be transformed into goods and services. These goods and services need to be transported internationally. While personnel may travel by air, most goods can travel economically only by sea. If globalization indeed results in an increase of world trade and cross-border networks and flows, it will necessarily result in an increase in maritime traffic.

At the same time, ongoing trends could make maritime trade more vulnerable to disruption. As discussed in chapter 7, modernization of maritime off-load and on-load is being consolidated in a handful of megaports or hub ports such as Rotterdam, Singapore, Kobe, Vancouver, and Long Beach. The impact of future crises near these megaports—or the sea lines of commerce leading to them—will have a greater overall effect on international trade than it had in the past, when there were many more ports open to the most modern ships. Obviously, this increases the potential workload of the Navy and Coast Guard in providing the maritime security function, whether against bellicose states or against piracy and international crime.

The impact of a global navy and a “national fleet” of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels³⁵ is directly related not only to its workload but also to the perception of stability that it brings to the international environment. This argues that the requirement for naval forward presence—naval forces operating within the regions of potential crises—will become even more important under continuing globalization. Indeed, the demand for forward presence forces could increase sharply with an increase in the number of small-scale contingencies (SSCs) and peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in which the United States and its military become involved.

Emerging Concerns about Economic Security

The proliferation of WMD, potential threats to commerce, potential denial of access, and erupting national conflicts have created emerging concerns about U.S. economic security. Homeland security, rarely a topic of popular discussion prior to September 11, 2001, has been of increasing interest to political, business, and economic leaders. Of particular concern is the potential for terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons on U.S. soil. While the effects on individuals are frightening to contemplate, there are also concerns as to what impact the very existence of such an ever-increasing threat may have on U.S. prosperity. Can the United States be truly open to the beneficial aspects of cross-border networks and flows without becoming more vulnerable to terrorist and hacker attacks on individuals, infrastructure, and computer networks? At the same time, there are emerging concerns as to whether U.S. or multinational businesses operating overseas can be protected against what appears to be a increasingly chaotic world filled with WMD-capable terrorists, disgruntled ethnic groups, and increasingly sophisticated international criminal groups. Demands for increased homeland and overseas protection could have significant impact on naval forces. These demands are discussed in numerous chapters in this volume and particularly in chapters 17 through 23.

Presence and Involvement in Locations Not Previously Considered of Vital Interest

In their foreign policies of engagement and humanitarian intervention, the post-Cold War administrations of George H.W. Bush and William Clinton greatly increased U.S. military involvement in many world crises. Supporters of these policies argue that the end of the Cold War lifted the lid off many national and ethnic conflicts and that the United States can make positive steps to contain and reduce them. Opponents argue that such conflicts have been steady throughout history and that U.S. involvement, while worthy and effective in certain cases, is akin to bailing water from the sea. Whatever position dominates, one effect of globalization is to make it appear that such crises have greater effects on the rest of the world than they did in the past. Thus, there is a perception that the increase in cross-border networks and flows necessitates international involvement in the internal crises of far-off nations, to include such supposedly smaller-scale contingencies as NATO bombing of Serbian forces and peace enforcement and peacekeeping in a variety of locales.

Although much of the actual stability operations/peace enforcement and peacekeeping involves ground forces, strong support from air and sea is often a prerequisite. As a part of the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps is a naval service, thereby bringing direct naval involvement to day-to-day peacekeeping on the ground. The Clinton administration also increased the use of sea-based force in such peacetime SSCs, even using sea-launched Tomahawk land attack missiles to strike terrorist targets in landlocked countries. Such actions now appear as precursors to the more extensive use of naval power in Operation Enduring Freedom (counterterrorism). Additionally, naval forces have direct involvement in enforcing international sanctions, such as those against illegal maritime traffic with Iraq and the southern no-fly zone. If globalization continues to increase, along with the perception that such missions are a vital American responsibility, the Navy operational tempo may continue to increase. This would have a significant impact on the numbers and types of naval forces required for such contingencies.

U.S. Navy and Marine forces, of course, will also continue to play important roles in defense strategy for waging major regional wars. The Marines provide about 25 percent of the Nation’s active duty ground forces. Together, the Navy and Marines generate about 40 percent of the Nation’s tactical air power, including the capacity for precision strikes. Often, the Navy and Marines will be among the first U.S. forces to converge on the scene of a war, where they will play an important role in halting enemy attacks to provide time for larger U.S. forces to deploy to the scene. Once the U.S. buildup is complete, they will contribute importantly to counterattack plans and ultimate victory. Should some future conflicts be primarily maritime events, their role will be even larger.

Maritime Components of Alliance and Coalition Formation

The tight Western alliance systems that were the hallmark of the Cold War have retained much of their structures, but they have had to transition from their original purposes—containment of the Soviet Union—to other, less encompassing issues. Some argue that NATO has exceeded expectations in this regard, gaining members from the former Warsaw Pact. However, issues such as Balkan peacekeeping are, in reality, indirect threats to the Alliance and therefore do not provoke an immediate, unitary response. For issues outside of the traditional regional interests of Western Europe, Japan, and Australia, the United States has had to forge new coalitions of the willing (for example, in order to prosecute Operation Desert Storm or the campaign against al Qaeda). This does not mean that traditional American allies are likely to choose not to join in such coalitions, only that the process of alliance and coalition formation has changed.

Globalization—bringing its wealth of economic and political issues and concerns—has transformed what were previously seen as merely distracting concerns into political disputes among long-standing allies, even as it makes the same states economically interdependent. Economic interdependence magnifies the effects of such disputes at the same time that the lack of a pressing security threat makes the United States less likely to forego economic concerns for alliance unity (the so-called free rider effect). Such concerns inevitably affect the maritime aspects of alliances. These effects include more than burdensharing; they involve agreements on interoperability, access to training areas and live-fire ranges, and the imposition of ever-increasing environmental restrictions on naval activities. Disputes include the sale of military technology to nonallies, with the United States expressing concerns about the sale of European systems to China and Middle Eastern states (such as satellite imagery), and European allies feeling discomfort on U.S. matériel support for Taiwan (such as the pledge to provide diesel submarines). Negotiations over overseas basing rights have become more complex and contested.

Commitment of military forces to U.S.-led interventions outside of NATO or the Western Pacific becomes a matter for debate for states that do not perceive the same level of threat as Americans. To a considerable extent, it has been easier for many to commit naval forces rather than ground troops to such efforts as the campaign against the Taliban. Naval forces from France, Japan, and Germany—among others—have been included in the coalition effort to prevent the flight of al Qaeda members by sea. This creates both new opportunities and new challenges for naval cooperation. Integration of less-capable coalition ships in a way that provides for meaningful participation without adding an additional burden on U.S. logistics requires considerable planning and imagination. Political considerations in allowing for coalition participation may outweigh limited contributions to military effectiveness. Economic concerns may add limitations to the where and when of coalition participation. Rules of engagement (ROE) may vary between coalition units. Chapter 14 discusses the role that multinational naval doctrine might play in standardizing ROE and facilitating maritime coalitions.

Overall, the effects of globalization add complexity to commitments that were presumed throughout the Cold War. Chapter 13 discusses this complexity from a European perspective. At the same time, the freedom of the seas environment may encourage naval cooperation while roadblocks exist on other issues.

Proliferation of Information Systems and Sensors

Another likely effect of economic globalization is a continuing increase in the capability and proliferation of high-speed information systems and remote sensors. Of particular concern to naval forces is the increasing availability of commercial satellite imagery, as well as satellite communications and navigation systems. Satellite imagery is the key element in military reconnaissance and targeting. Satellite navigation systems allow for accurate attacks. Space-based communication systems are more difficult to jam and allow communications between units in difficult operating terrain, including urban terrain.

As part of a revolution in military affairs, many sources claim or imply that naval forces will be more detectable in the future because of the proliferation of space-based imagery. Transformation advocates within the defense analysis community have argued that surface vessels have become vulnerable to detection and strike by antiaccess weapons, particularly in littoral regions, and are no longer viable warfighting platforms. This argument is challenged by sources pointing out the inability of most potential opponents to strike moving targets, particularly at sea.³⁶ An additional debate concerns the continued use of commercial satellite imagery, navigation, and communications during actual hostilities. The availability of such information to potential opponents of the United States during time of war remains doubtful.³⁷ But whatever the actually survivability of U.S. surface ships may be, the reality of commercial targeting data becoming widely available is of considerable concern and is a globalization trend that should be taken into consideration in naval planning.

Additionally, as a recent study notes:

the diffusion of information age technologies has eroded American technological supremacy especially in areas of weapons production. As technologies have spread through transnational corporations and new communications mediums such as the World Wide Web, states and other potential adversaries have found it easier to pursue asymmetric military strategies to counter U.S. and western military power.³⁸

This spread of asymmetric strategies and system can be referred to as antiaccess weapons proliferation.

Antiaccess Weapons Proliferation

A key trend is the proliferation of advanced weapon systems and sensors, particularly to the few nations—mostly states formerly (and now informally) known as rogues—that might seek to challenge U.S. military power. Although the United States does share military technology with selected nations, advanced technology from the former Soviet Union (some of it in continued Russian production, and some of it surplus) has also emerged on the world market.³⁹

The technology being marketed includes weapons that the Soviet Union would not export to other Warsaw Pact states during the Cold War.⁴⁰ Also, the end of the immediate Cold War threat has prompted several Western states to seek aggressively new markets for their weapon technologies—markets they might have previously pursued with caution. The cost of developing modern military technology has become so high that many individual nations—even well-developed economic powers—need to pursue foreign arms sales to be able to start technological development on systems designed for their own defense.

The proliferation of advanced military systems—such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, sea mines, and WMD—parallels the intellectual proliferation of a post-Gulf War operational concept on how to defeat U.S. forces, known as antiaccess or area denial strategy. This strategy recognizes the difficulty in defeating U.S. power projection forces after they have entered the region of conflict and are ready for combat. Instead of fighting U.S. forces on a regional battlefield (where the results might be similar to those of the Gulf War), the potential opponent could attempt to prevent U.S. forces from entering the region at all. In the logic of the antiaccess approach, a potential opponent would initially seek to destroy any forward-based U.S. forces stationed in the region, and then seek to block U.S. maritime and air forces from entering and bringing troops into regional littoral waters and territory by massive attrition attacks using the proliferated weapons systems.⁴¹

According to this construct, if there were threats to U.S. naval operations, they would come from asymmetrical weapon systems designed to deny U.S. passage through maritime chokepoints or Navy ability to conduct operations near land.⁴² The Office of the Secretary of Defense publication Proliferation: Threat and Response reports the steady proliferation of such weapons as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, diesel-electric submarines, sophisticated naval mines, and fast patrol craft.⁴³

Under current trends, the U.S. Navy may not have to face another globalized navy in the future, but it may have to face globalized antiaccess weapons. In an antiaccess scenario, with regional land bases capable of supporting U.S. forces destroyed and littoral access denied, the opponent may have effectively extended its defenses out to the entry points of its region. The United States could find itself in the position of having to undertake potentially costly forcible entry operations against a range of high-technology weaponry. Even in this war of attrition, it is likely that the United States would eventually breech the antiaccess defenses, both through naval operations and the use of standoff weapons stationed outside the region or in the continental United States.

However, the real goal of an antiaccess strategy is to convince the United States and its allies or coalition partners that the cost of penetration is simply too high.⁴⁴ Hostilities could thereby be ended via a diplomatic agreement that, in effect, grants the regional power its wartime objectives. Such an agreement might be encouraged by international organizations that traditionally advocate negotiated peace. In these ways, an adversary whose military forces are inferior to those of the United States might still be able to attain its political objectives notwithstanding the opposition of U.S. forces. This holds the potential for transforming wars—their nature, their prosecution, and their end states—in the era of globalization.

Conclusion: Considerations Governing Disposition of Future Naval Forces

The existence of a relationship between the modern phenomenon of globalization and the concept of sea power is evident. The extent of that relationship requires additional analysis, but at least four major conclusions can be drawn. First, the concept of effective sea power and the ability to participate in and benefit from globalization share common characteristics. Second, the sea (and the control of it) has played a significant role in the historical development of international trade, global economy, and globalization. Third, the use of the sea and development of sea power appears to be a metaphor—and potentially a research model—for certain aspects of the globalization phenomenon. Finally, distinct effects of globalization on sea power, particularly naval power, can be detected (of which seven provide a starting point for this study).

The overarching questions concerning naval forces and globalization revolve around whether today’s U.S. Navy and Marine Corps—and the Coast Guard—are configured so as to be able to deal with the challenges just described. Do they need to make significant changes to support the beneficial aspects of globalization or protect us from hazardous trends? If globalization is a continuing phenomenon, how should naval forces adapt? Are future Department of the Navy programs designed to deal with the anticipated trends in globalization? Are other platforms, platform mixes, and operational concepts needed? How joint do naval forces need to be, and how much jointness is needed to deal with the maritime effects of globalization?

Linking naval force structure requirements directly to the globalization process requires considerable analysis. Force structure choices are presumably based on the anticipated threat and related military requirements. Current U.S. naval force structure is also tied to the requirements of a robust policy of naval forward presence. Globalization, as it is currently construed, is a recent and not fully understood phenomenon. Nonetheless, it is possible to suggest how current, planned, and proposed naval systems might fit in a globalized world. More importantly, the seven globalization effects discussed in this chapter provide a framework for which programs can be evaluated. Appropriate questions concern the versatility of proposed future systems: whether they can be utilized in the interdiction of transnational threats, are rapidly deployable to unexpected locations for use in varying intensities of conditions, and justified in terms of economic security concerns; whether they would promote interoperability with current and unanticipated allies and coalition members and retain their capabilities throughout the steady proliferation of information systems and sensors; and how they would perform in an expanding antiaccess environment.

In the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2001, the Bush administration indicated its desire to move to a capabilities-based approach to defense, which it defines as a model focused “more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur.”⁴⁵ Including the seven globalization effects in the methodology of future requirement assessment would prove helpful in developing such a capabilities-based approach. And where the basis for concrete suggestions may be lacking, at the very least questions for future analysis can be posed. Such would be a method of which Captain Mahan, with his desire to analyze the underlying principles of current history, would have undoubtedly approved.

Notes

¹ Anthony Giddens, director, London School of Economics, 1990, accessed at <http://www.ihizittau.de/bwl/studienablauf/b2/begriffsdefinitionen.ppt>. BACK

² Gerald Epstein and Richard Polin, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts, 1998, accessed at <http://www.ihizittau.de/bwl/studienablauf/b2/begriffsdefinitionen.ppt> BACK

³ Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 1999), 7–8.BACK

⁴ Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,” National Review, July 1902, 701–719, in Mahan on Naval Strategy, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 284.BACK

⁵ A succinct critical treatment of Mahan is Phillip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 444–477. Efforts to defend and rehabilitate the image of Mahan among scholars are found throughout the works of Jon Tetsuro Sumida, particularly Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).BACK

⁶ A main premise of David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), especially 16–21, 32–87.BACK

⁷ It has been argued elsewhere that control over such activities defines what constitutes a navy (as opposed to armies). See Sam J. Tangredi, “Beyond the Sea and Jointness,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 9 (September 2001), 60–63.BACK

⁸ Friedman, xviii.BACK

⁹ Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), 1, in Hattendorf, 1.BACK

¹⁰ Ibid.BACK

¹¹ Ibid., 25–61.BACK

¹² Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 229–232.BACK

¹³ Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783, 1.BACK

¹⁴ See further discussion in Sam J. Tangredi, “Sea Power—Theory and Practice,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colin S. Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 111–136.BACK

¹⁵ Grove, 3.BACK

¹⁶ For example, Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansionism, 1860–1898 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), 85–101. Also see discussion in Crowl, 462–469.BACK

¹⁷ Which is the premise of Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Ashfield Press, 1976), and (on military expenditures overall) Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).BACK

¹⁸ Sir Walter Raleigh, Historie of the Worlde, 1616, quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 288. BACK

¹⁹ To put seaborne commerce in perspective, a medium-sized oceangoing cargo vessel carries tonnage on one voyage approximately equivalent to that carried by 300 of the largest cargo-carrying aircraft.BACK

²⁰ Even in Mahan’s day, there was considerable debate on the relationship between naval power and economic dominance. For example, Sir Norman Angell (author of the historically controversial book The Great Illusion) argued that “England’s unquestioned naval predominance...has given England no privilege not freely possessed by the commerce of all nations.” See Norman Angell, The World’s Highway: Some Notes on America’s Relation to Sea Power and Non-Military Sanctions For the Law of Nations (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1915), 3. Today critics point out that the largest number of merchant ships is registered in Liberia and Panama, hardly naval powers. Setting aside the fact that those two nations are merely flags of convenience for owners residing elsewhere, the advantage of naval power is the assurance of market access in the face of potential threats and—if necessary—the closure of access to all others. This does not give a direct market advantage to U.S. trade goods over those of other states—it simply ensures that such a market can exist unhindered by violence. Sir Angell accepted as much, noting that command of the seas means “that the state obtaining it can carry on its maritime commerce without interruption or with only slight interruption from the armed ships of the enemy” (120–121).BACK

²¹Engagement and enlargement were terms used in the Clinton administration to describe measures used to reinforce America’s traditional support for democratic regimes elsewhere. Although the current Bush administration does not use these terms in articulating a formal policy, America’s support for democratic governance internationally remains relatively constant. Indeed the post-Cold War resurgence in intellectual support for expanding democracy worldwide originated in the later years of the Reagan and Bush administrations.BACK

²² See discussion in Sally Newman, “Political and Economic Implications of Global Naval Presence,” in Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future Prospects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 48–50.BACK

²³ A brief discussion of joint development programs is George K. Hamilton, “Foreign Cooperation Is Essential for Force Protection, “ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 7 (July 1999), 44–45.BACK

²⁴ However, critics charge that the U.S. Navy does not do enough to increase the exchange of technology by buying promising non-U.S. developed systems, particularly as U.S. allies appear to be falling behind in military technology and interoperability.BACK

²⁵ Naval strategists have always viewed aviation as an essential component of sea power. Historically, this is a legacy of World War II, in which the aircraft carrier replaced the battleship as the capital ship of fleets. Today, this view is evident most strongly in the composition of the U.S. Navy, in which there are more officers and sailors assigned to aviation commands than to surface ships or submarines. Almost 40 percent of the Navy is involved in naval aviation activities, a much larger percentage than other world navies but indicative of a common sea and air linkage.BACK

²⁶ A short, balanced assessment of this possibility is the Congressional Research Service Report to Congress 97–75 ENR by Zachary S. Davis, Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Terrorist Threat? (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 8, 1997). A more recent and lengthier official source is Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, First Annual Report: Assessing the Threat (Washington, DC: RAND, December 15, 1999). A list of recent sources on the topic of catastrophic terrorism can be found in U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21^st Century, September 15, 1999, as fn. 95, 48. An argument that “superterrorism” is unlikely and that measures taken to prevent it may be counterproductive is made in Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1998), 110–119.BACK

²⁷ National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21^st Century (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 1997), 16–17. The panel was chartered by the Secretary of Defense (at the prompting of Congress) to provide alternatives to the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 and reflected Congressional concern over defense transformation. This need for a multipartner response creates distinctions between the National Defense Panel report, other definitions of transnational threats, and those sources using the nonstate threats term. Although nonstate threats may cross boundaries, it is not assumed that a multinational response is the sole means of defense. Additionally, the term transnational threats can also be applied to dangers that are generated through nation-state action such as mass migrations prompted by genocide. The subtle difference between the two terms creates a degree of analytical confusion when comparing sources.BACK

²⁸ The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), 14.BACK

²⁹ Such interpretations vary according to philosophical views of the world system. See discussion in Sam J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward A Consensus View of the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), 58–63.BACK

³⁰ “Ship Rams Greenpeace; Sub Unleashes Trident 2,” San Diego Union Tribune, December 5, 1989, A10; Jeffrey Schmalz, “After Skirmish with Protestors, Navy Tests Missile,” The New York Times, December 5, 1989, A1. On public reaction, see “Greenpeace’s Risky Tactics,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 7, 1989, A35.BACK

³¹ Likewise, Greenpeace’s opposition to the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm caused such a significant loss in U.S. contributions that a number of local chapters quickly backed away from that position.BACK

³² This argument is made in Moises Naim, “Al Qaeda, the NGO,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2002), 99–100.BACK

³³ Thomas L. Friedman refers to this effect as “the golden straitjacket.” See Friedman, 101–111.BACK

³⁴ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 142.BACK

³⁵ On the “national fleet” concept, see Thomas Fargo and Ernest Riutta, “A ‘National Fleet’ for America,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 4 (April 1999), 48–51; and Bruce Stubbs, “Whither the National Fleet?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 5 (May 2001), 72–73.BACK

³⁶ See discussion of this debate in Sam J. Tangredi, “The Fall and Rise of Naval Forward Presence,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 5 (May 2000), 29–32.BACK

³⁷ See discussion in Tangredi, All Possible Wars? 65–68.BACK

³⁸ Peter Dombrowski et al., “National Security Policies from the Dombrowski Scenario,” unpublished paper, Naval War College, January 30, 2002, 5.BACK

³⁹ Additionally, numerous Western European nations—notably Sweden, France, and Italy—sell advanced naval systems. China is the original source for many weapons that emerge in the hands of “states formerly known as rogues.” North Korea has a reengineer and reexport network with other states, such as Iran.BACK

⁴⁰ A primary example is the SS–N–22 Sunburn (Russian name Moskit) antiship cruise missile, which was considered one of the most potent ship killers of the Cold War. According to reports, the United States had attempted in the mid-1990s to buy the entire former Soviet inventory of 841 Sunburn missiles from Russia before they could reach the global market. The attempt failed. See discussion in Norman Friedman, World Naval Weapons Systems 1997–1998 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 243–244.BACK

⁴¹ The term asymmetrical includes weapons designed to attack U.S. weaknesses and take advantage of the geographical features of the region, such as straits and narrow passages. From the naval perspective, these weapons can be considered asymmetrical because the U.S. Navy is largely configured for open-ocean operations. But historically, use of such weapons or their antecedents might be considered a normal aspect of naval warfare in narrow seas. An excellent study of the historical and environmental factors influencing near-shore naval operations is Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).BACK

⁴² A good discussion can be found in Tim Sloth Joergensen, “U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 20–29.BACK

⁴³ Detailed in Office of Naval Intelligence, Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1997).BACK

⁴⁴ For discussions on antiaccess, see Thomas G. Mahnken, “America’s Next War,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1993), 171–184; and Mahnken, “Deny U.S. Access?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 9 (September 1998), 36–39.BACK

⁴⁵ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001), 13.BACK