Characteristics and Requirements of the Evolving Security Environment

Frank G. Hoffman and Sam J. Tangredi

And there will be other ways and means which no one can foresee at present, since war is certainly not of those things which follow a fixed pattern; instead it usually makes its own conditions in which one has to adapt oneself to changing situations.¹

—Thucydides

Neither our security environment nor our understanding of the complex interactions inherent to conflict are constant. As Thucydides pointed out 2 millennia ago—and as sadly reinforced by the events of September 11, 2001—the future is often unforeseeable and frequently violent. There are immutable elements to war: its clash of human wills, political basis, and dramatic unpredictability. But the physical characteristics of conflict and the demands placed on the military component of any strategy are always evolving. Today is no different. Globalization has accelerated changes in the ways and means of conflict and may yet instill enough fear and disruption to generate new ends for war itself.

Since war is “certainly not of those things which follow a fixed pattern,” our approach to thinking about it cannot remain rigid or inflexible. New strategic goals and security interests must be advanced when opportunities arise or protected when threatened. The new threats that emerge may be only dimly recognized at first or may be the unintended consequences of previous actions.

Need for Continuous Evaluation and Adaptability

For a global power with far-ranging interests like the United States, a constant evaluation of ends and means is in order. In short, the methods of advancing and protecting the interests of the United States must adapt themselves, as Thucydides suggests, to changing situations. In this respect, our current global campaign against terrorism and reemphasis on homeland security are natural, appropriate adaptations in policy. But to be effective, there must be concurrent adaptation in the means and institutions needed to carry out the policy.

History records distinct advantages to those adaptive institutions that anticipate and boldly incorporate new concepts, structures, and innovative technologies that respond to these altered circumstances. But history also offers a litany of examples about outmoded capabilities and complacency bred of success and arrogance. Often, the most successful institutions face the hardest time adapting, their previous fortune blinding them to altered circumstances.²A major shock or failure may be the only means of forcing change. Such historical warnings should serve to spur American military leaders to critically examine fundamental assumptions, standing organizational constructs, and operational paradigms for their continued utility and relevance in today’s turbulent era. Whether the tragedies of September 11 can be considered failures is irrelevant, but they do point to the need for critical examination.

The 21st century, a global century, offers vast opportunities and pernicious problems.³ If history is any guide at all, naval forces along with all other aspects of national power will continue to have critical responsibilities in support of American strategic interests. This chapter explores the elements of globalization that will continue to affect the future security environment, including political, economic and technological trends, and resulting impacts on defense policy.

The Security Environment

Geopolitics: Power in Flux. In the Cold War’s aftermath, several commentators trumpeted today’s “unipolar moment.”⁴There is little doubt that America’s military power and economic clout today is impressive. However, while current dominance is a given, its continuation will be contested. Political history is largely defined by a struggle for dominance. The unipolarity of today’s international system could well prove to be a short-lived, transitory phenomenon, as it masks many political, economic, and military trends that could undermine American power and security. The relative uncertainty of potentially seismic changes in geopolitical competition is a major complicating factor in national security planning and thus in sizing and shaping our military component.

Both history and current trends point toward greater plurality in the international system. Power, measured in real terms, is becoming widely distributed among many more countries, groups, and players. Since 1990, more than 40 nation-states have joined the United Nations, and the number of nongovernmental groups has exploded into the hundreds of thousands. In the next decade, traditional nation-states, ethnic groups, and even individuals will wield both political and military power. The appearance and potential effectiveness of such nonstate power will be magnified by global media; witness the influence of an exiled religious extremist hiding in the mountains of the world’s poorest and least globalized region.

In the economic dimension, nation-states no longer control their own currencies, and they may not even control their own finances and economies. They are subject to rapidly shifting capital investment funds, which one commentator calls the Electronic Herd.⁵Political, economic, and technological changes are altering what constitutes national power, and industrial age measures of mass and natural resources are growing less relevant. National power is thus measured in different and less absolute or nonlinear terms.⁶ More and more, small players on the world stage—international terrorists being the most obvious example—will yield inordinate power, more evidence of nonlinearity.

Today’s unipolar or “hyperpower” experience will not last forever. While a competitive superpower on the scale of the United States is considered less probable, a more multipolar system will probably evolve over the next several decades. From the commanding heights it now dominates, America’s relative power could decline gradually over the next 25 years.⁷ The causes of this readjustment will vary, from political change to technological advances and economic adaptation. A number of scenarios can be postulated that constitute contradictory power transitions that sharply alter the aggregate position of the United States and its allies. In this regard, the United States might find itself in the same position as Great Britain in the 19th century. Britain adapted early and seized most of the benefits of the industrial revolution but ultimately failed to adjust as other powers and new technologies emerged.⁸

Sources of Challenge. The relative decline of American power can come from power fluxes in multiple directions. Rising powers such as China represent one such example. China’s economic transformation could produce a gross domestic product half as big as that of the United States.⁹Its regional interests, rising energy needs, and internal political cohesion could all sharply alter the status of the geopolitical competition. India is another large, populous, and technically agile state whose aggregate national power could grow.¹⁰ It is feasible, although unlikely, that the evolutionary integration in Europe could produce a European Union whose economic competition constitutes a substantial threat to U.S. interests.¹¹ A coalition of radicalized Islamist states can also be contemplated, whose energies might be directed toward confronting the West.

Relative decline or new threats can also come from fragmentation and collapse. The collapse of the U.S. economy is very unlikely, but the continued decline of Japan’s economic fortunes could alter U.S. relationships in Asia. Russian decline appears very likely, very deep, and very darkening.¹² The disintegration of Russia could also create destabilizing impacts, including the loss of control over significant amounts of dangerous materials. In the wrong hands, such materials could substantially threaten U.S. forces and interests. Equally dangerous, if China’s leadership fails to successfully adapt its political and economic systems to meet demands for employment and growth, its devolution might regenerate ideological conflict or give rise to an extreme form of nationalism that could foment significant challenges for itself and others.

Disintegration of other populous states, such as Pakistan or Indonesia, may not be as direct a threat to U.S. security but would send a shock wave through the globalized system and would directly threaten other U.S. friends and allies.

Wholly unpredictable are a number of permutations of states whose balancing and bandwagoning could produce coalitions to counteract American interests. Such alliances may already be emerging, although there are inherent contradictions within some of the potential anti-American coalitions.¹³

Globalization’s Discontents. Globalization, shorthand for the interdependence of political and economic systems, has generated an economic transformation and a degree of convergence in today’s international community. Politically, liberal democracies seem ascendant. Concomitantly, free market economies are steadily increasing and increasingly interdependent. Globalization is even generating what looks to be a convergence toward Western culture. To some, the defining characteristic of the age is integration, an interwoven degree of connectedness generated by trade and information technology. The world is moving past the divisive walls of the Cold War to the unifying networked webs of political, economic, and social interaction.¹⁴

But globalization generates both discontents and polarities, producing both winners and losers. It is far more than an economic phenomena, generating sharp social and political changes.¹⁵ There are forces of both integration and fragmentation at work all around the planet. Global dynamics are causing distress about cultures, values, jobs, and governance. This distress is captured by the term globalocalization.¹⁶ The word captures contrasting benefits and losses from globalization. Globalization generates great tensions between forces of change and stability. As James Rosenau puts it, “The simultaneity of the good and the bad, the integrative and the disintegrative, and the coherent and the incoherent are at the heart of global affairs today.”¹⁷ The term fragmegration captures this pervasive tension and the confluence of forces pushing and pulling today’s world.

Already a backlash and resentment of both globalization and America is clearly palpable—and growing. One level of this spectrum is reflected in the protest movement that stalks the various meetings of the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. The other, more sinister and dangerous level is exhibited in the terrorist acts purportedly committed in the name of the Islamic world. Arguably, Osama bin Laden’s war is against the effects of globalization rather than any deliberate Western policy.¹⁸ Globalization also abets a loss of sovereignty and accountability at the state level, which stresses governments and generates crises of authority. States are weakened from above, within, and below as a result of globalization’s many faces.¹⁹ The pluralism of international organizations and the bewildering array of unseen economic and political forces at work lessen the confidence of some populations in their governments and lead them to seek other groups for identity, support, and security.

The impact of these fragmegrative forces is not yet clear, but the world is being divided into “haves” and “have nots”—those who benefit from and those who have no stake in or receive no benefit from a globalized world. The divisions occur among states but also within states and cultures. In an age of extreme power and knowledge gaps, income disparities, and health deficits, the potential for an angry reaction exists.²⁰ The means to translate this sense of rage into violence will be more available, as we see in the next part.

Technological Diffusion. Today, the most profound technological development has been the revolution in information technology (IT). To many, the information age represents the most significant development since the industrial revolution. The world will encounter more benefits from IT and in other areas of science and technology over the next 2 decades. New applications and continued convergence of information technology products will arise and become quickly assimilated, at least by certain societies.

The rate of diffusion may be greater than anticipated since demand is high and rates of assimilation appear to be accelerating.²¹ New IT developments require minimal infrastructure, which will only reinforce the diffusion of modern communications in developing areas of the world. Continued diffusion will also empower nonstate actors—whether benevolent or malevolent.

But the next decade will probably witness a new wave of technologically driven change. Biotechnology will emerge as the source of the next wave of innovation and sociopolitical challenge. One the one hand, great advances are anticipated, as illustrated by the mapping of deoxyribonucleic acid. On the other hand, great fears are engendered, as with the continuing potential for terrorist attacks with anthrax or other biological agents. The coming biotech age will benefit (or suffer, if results are weaponized) from advances in computer processing, which will radically accelerate the diffusion of biotech research. A continuing series of autocatalytic revolutions in information technology, biotechnology, materials science, and nanotechnology will generate a quantum leap in new research and investments. Undoubtedly, such developments will prove to be disruptive technologies with unknown consequences.²²

Because the fields and applications that biotechnology can help are so fundamental to the world economy (food, medicine, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, health services, and environmental remediation), the biotech revolution’s impacts will be sharper, steeper, and deeper than those of information technology. We can expect an enormous advance in science with great benefit to humanity, but we have already seen and may continue to see individuals and groups who will abuse their access to this technology. The dark side of the biotech revolution contains consequences that are potentially catastrophic and make the current anthrax scare seem as innocuous as a mild cold.²³

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related technologies (some of which are biotech) probably will continue to proliferate. The proliferation of WMD will alter the dynamics of conflict and potentially further escalate small conflicts to larger regional (or even intercontinental) wars. In contrast, the availability of WMD could motivate states and others to revert to more indirect forms of conflict, including state-sponsored terrorism, to avoid direct combat—although this is something the global campaign against terrorism is designed to prevent. Suspicions about WMD proliferation, however, undoubtedly will trigger preemptive conflicts or spur other states to become proliferants to build deterrent forces to hold their neighbors at bay. Even as Russian and American nuclear arsenals are reduced, other states—as evidenced by India and Pakistan—may seek their own share of the ultimate deterrent.

Conflict and Military Revolutions. No evaluation of the emerging security environment would be complete without consideration of the impacts of political, economic, and technological change on the nature and character of conflict. Given the discussion to this point, the potential for military revolution—discontinuous leaps in military effectiveness—should be readily apparent. The advent of new technologies and different military applications has major implications for strategists, since the development of new systems and combinations of new technologies generates possibilities that may radically alter the balance of power in some regions and obviate existing strategies and operational advantages.²⁴ New technologies offer distinct advantages to both military and business organizations that can effectively transition their doctrine, hardware, and organizational structures.²⁵

Those nations and military forces that can harness new ideas and make the transitions needed to fundamentally transform themselves will enjoy distinct advantages. The current situation is still fraught with uncertainty, but enough illumination exists to suggest that substantial change in the way industrial age military forces operate is in the offing. The exact nature of the transformation of the military and its adoption of new concepts, force structures, and operating platforms is not completely clear but strongly suggests aggressive exploration.²⁶

The risk of war between major developed countries appears to be of low probability, but it cannot be ignored entirely. War might be less productive, but it is not an obsolete means of political interaction, no matter how much we dream for it. The international community will witness numerous other forms of conflicts ranging from minor internal or civil wars to less frequent but highly disruptive regional interstate wars.²⁷ Combat can take the form of terrorist attacks against civilian populations; in fact, much of the conflict in the developing world already takes that form.²⁸

Conflict could arise from various rivalries in Asia, or it could emanate from ancient confrontations of the Middle East. Energy and water disputes may further increase the possibility of future conflict as some areas face continued unfilled requirements.²⁹ Long-term demographic trends point to increased instability from urban areas as well as resource shortfalls. The lethality of interstate wars could grow substantially, driven by the availability of WMD, longer-range missile delivery systems, and other technologies.³⁰

Internal conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, economic, or political disputes will continue and may even increase in number.³¹ Failures to stem this tide of misery could further heighten instability and conflict. For the next decade, the most frequent source of instability will be intrastate conflicts. Such internal conflicts will also become increasingly more lethal as a result of both the strong political enmities and resource conflicts unleashed during this era and the higher availability of more destructive weapons and deadly technology. Such conflicts will be violent and emotionally charged, making them extremely difficult to terminate, leaving massive human displacements, disease, and other flotsam in their wake. They also may not be remedied by the investment in high-technology weapon systems that are optimized for great power conflict.³²

Asymmetric Warfare. The United States has already had its first taste of asymmetric warfare in the form of hijacked aircraft striking symbolic buildings. However, such asymmetric attacks are not necessarily solely within the provenance of terrorism. Against military targets, they hold considerable tactical logic. Future adversaries will recognize the overwhelming military superiority of the United States in conventional terms and seek techniques and technologies that will deter or deflect American intervention. Instead of resigning themselves to expensive losses or subordination, they will try to avoid or minimize U.S. strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses. U.S. opponents—state and nonstate actors—will not want to engage the American military on its terms.³³ Pitting strength against weakness is a fundamental aspect of warfare throughout history, but options will exist for adversaries to think beyond asymmetries at the tactical or operational level of war. These will include forms of conflict inconsistent with traditional approaches of the Western way of warfare or the codified laws of war.³⁴

Asymmetric capabilities need not be a very costly proposition for countries, given increased access to technology, information systems, and resources. Present and potential adversaries will continue to pursue these capabilities against U.S. forces and interests abroad as well as on U.S. soil.³⁵

The proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems has been rising for the last decade.³⁶ Nonproliferation regimes seem to be fragmenting, and proliferation of advanced unconventional weapons appears contagious. Most of this proliferation is oriented toward regional threats and serves as a deterrent. However, the diffusion of dangerous technologies fuels expenditures and breeds too much exposure to potential use in crisis. Missiles capable of delivering WMD or conventional payloads with great precision against fixed targets will be available. Key nodes for transportation and theater reception at major air and sea ports, logistics bases, and facilities will increasingly be at risk, vastly complicating U.S. power projection operations.³⁷

Simultaneously, the nature of globalization and its accompanying technical diffusion will permit highly diverse transnational networks or groups to expand in influence and lethality. Failed states or “states of despair” could elect to revert to terrorism or become inadvertent or deliberate hosts—as we have seen in Afghanistan.³⁸ Terrorist tactics will continue to advance in sophistication and focus on achieving mass casualties. Conventional attacks will continue to be more probable, but highly lethal means will be sought and eventually used. As President George W. Bush has frequently maintained, only a long-term, sustained campaign would appear to hold success against the potential for continued, increasingly lethal terrorist attacks.

Summary: Hypercompetition. America will live in an unpredictable world dominated not by its own hyperpower, but by hypercompetition (perception of zero-sum competition in the economic marketplace), vulnerability, and substantial uncertainty.³⁹ It is a world that classic realists will readily recognize.⁴⁰ Despite any of the beneficial effects of globalization, the international arena itself has not changed. It is still anarchic, highly competitive, and based on power politics. The balance of power is still paramount to security, although national power may be more difficult to measure. The threat posed by rising anti-status-quo powers, as well as dying states, represents the greatest threat to stability and order. However, the nonlinear opportunities afforded by the dynamics of globalization only exacerbate the competition by providing minor players the capacity to act globally on a scale heretofore reserved for major state actors. In particular, some nonstate actors can acquire means of competition in the military sense that have usually been associated only with major powers.

Violent tensions will be an ever-present force in a hypercompetitive world. The prospects for violence are inherent in the contradictions of today’s global environment, as one student of international tension puts it:

The effects of globalization will challenge both parts of this world. The Last Man will survive and perhaps even master it; the First Man will not. The resentment of Hobbes’ First Man could inflame and empower more hatreds than ever before. Thus, Samuel Huntington’s thesis that future conflict will be along cultural lines is partly correct. Some cultures and civilizations will thrive and prosper, others will try to merely survive. Others will succumb, not to the clash of civilizations but to the crash of globalization. But their demise will not be with a whimper. Huntington correctly points out that conflicts borne of this crash will “more frequent, more sustained, and more violent.”⁴²

As the unipolar moment fades away, the world will revert to traditional power dynamics with untraditional players. This is a world far different than the stability of the Cold War, a world of constant conflict and “nasty little wars.”⁴³ But, excepting the effects of technology and the inclusion of new actors, it may not be all that different than humanity’s pre-Cold War experience—for good or for ill.

Implications for U.S. Strategy and Military Capabilities

The contradictions of the globalized environment that are illustrated by Fukuyama’s Last Man and Hobbes’ First are apparent in elite attitudes toward the U.S. military. As described by one commentator, even among those most optimistic about the human condition:

We are envisioning...an era marked by both an increasing integration of societies and a need for greater commitment of military forces. This might seem an inherent contradiction, but it is possible nevertheless.⁴⁴

How to deal with the contradictions of globalization and resulting threats to national security is the most critical question of the 21st century’s first decade. An examination of the military implications of this postulated security environment leads to a series of policy recommendations that can be concisely summarized as follows:

Conclusions

Our perspective of the future from the year 2002 is considerably different than it was in 1992. Even then, the outline of increasing globalization was evident; however, it seemed largely a beneficial outline. The fall of the Soviet empire and loosening of client states presaged a worldwide expansion in democratic governance. The crushing coalition victory in Operation Desert Storm seemed to herald a new world order in which aggression and international violence would be senseless and rare. Strong countries would defend and assist the weak. Capitalist markets expanded, and the tide appeared ready to lift all boats. But such transformations are never smooth and never seem to match our idealistic views.

As the 1990s continued, it became more apparent that not every society or culture shared these idealistic views. Opposition to globalization—often propelled by fear, illogic, or misinformation—grew. But this opposition still appeared manageable through explanation, dialogue, and negotiated social, economic, and ecological safeguards. Few would suspect that opposition to globalization—masked by expressions of religion or nationalism—would lead to brutal, ferocious attacks of international terrorism.⁵⁹ Few would also recognize the resilience of international power politics in the face of internetted economics and culture.

The resulting security environment is more anarchic, perhaps more traditional, than expected. Globalization has magnified human behaviors that lead more to war than to peace. When combined with the dark side of human ingenuity and the advance of technology, these behaviors suggest the prudence of dynamic, relentless, but tailored military planning and preparation on our part. Increasing the equality of benefits may reduce some of the motivations for violence, but clearly not all. Force will remain a necessary instrument.

In assessing globalization, if—metaphorically speaking—all boats rise with the tide, we should be prepared to find both warships and pirate ships hiding among the world’s ostensibly peaceful commercial fleet.

Frank G. Hoffman served on the professional staff of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) from 1998–2001 and participated in drafting all three commission reports, including their futures assessment New World Coming. He is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Sam J. Tangredi is the author of All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000).

Notes

¹ Robert R. Strassler and Victor Davis Hanson, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Pelopponesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996), 106. BACK

² Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, 1997). BACK

³ Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, eds., The Global Century: Globalization and National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001). (Hereafter referred to as Global Century.) BACK

⁴ For example, Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs (February 1991), 24–25. BACK

⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 1999), 12, 93–114. BACK

⁶ Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, Melissa McPherson, and Jerry Sollinger, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Washington, DC: RAND, 2000). BACK

⁷ This domination reflects the fact that the Cold War was indeed a stupendous victory for the West and the United States in particular. This theme is laced throughout Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999). BACK

⁸ Regarding British failures to adapt to the telegraph and chemical industries, see Howard Bloom, The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition into the Forces of History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995). BACK

⁹ Brzezinski argues that “China will not be emerging as a global power in the foreseeable future. Even in the most unlikely circumstance of continued rapid economic growth, China will not be top-ranked in any of these domains for many decades to come.” Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Strategic Triad: Living with China, Europe and Russia (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), 6. BACK

¹⁰ On China and India, see U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21^st Century: Supporting Research and Analysis (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999), 71–91. BACK

¹¹ In this regard, Fred Bergsten warns, “The United States and the European Union are on the brink of a major trade and economic conflict,” in “America’s Two Front Economic Conflict,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2001), 17. BACK

¹² Brzezinski notes that Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) is one-tenth of the United States, half of India’s, and still declining. He estimates that Russian GDP will be 2 percent of world GDP by 2015 (The Strategic Triad, 57–58). BACK

¹³ Henry Chu and Richard C. Paddock, “Russia Looks to China as an Ally Amid West’s Ire,” Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1999, 1; “Herding Pariahs: Russia’s Dangerous Games,” February 8, 2000, accessed at <www.stratfor.com>; Susan Glasser, “Russian, Iran Renew Alliance Meant to Boost Arms Trade,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2001, A14. An argument against a possible Russia-China coalition is in Jennifer Anderson, The Limits to Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 315 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, December 1997). BACK

¹⁴ Friedman, 8. BACK

¹⁶ This term describes the local impact of seemingly unrelated political and economic events taking place globally. E.J. Dionne, Jr., “The “Glocalization” Problem,” The Washington Post, June 6, 2000, A27. See also Friedman, 295. BACK

¹⁷ James N. Rosenau, “Stability, Stasis and Change: A Fragmegrating World,” in Global Century, 127–154. BACK

¹⁸ Thomas P.M. Barnett, “Globalization is Tested,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 10 (October 2001), 57; Kurt M. Campbell, “Globalization at War,” The Washington Post, October 22, 2001, A19. BACK

¹⁹ Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 96–101. BACK

²⁰ Friedman’s assessment is echoed by Richard L. Kugler, who notes, “What globalization likely will produce is not a homogeneous zone of prospering happy capitalists, but instead a diverse pattern of winners, losers, and canoe paddlers: i.e., countries struggling to stay afloat.” Kugler’s comment accessed at <www.ndu.edu/inss/spa/1kugler.html>. BACK

²¹ Peter Brimelow, “The Silent Boom,” Forbes Magazine, July 7, 1997, 170–171. BACK

²² Clayton Christensen has used the term “disruptive technologies” to describe new and transformative developments in commercial applications, but for political and social impacts, see Clayton Christensen, Thomas Craig, and Stuart Hart, “The Great Disruption,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2001), 80–95. BACK

²³ For the most dramatic concerns see Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired, April 2000, 238–262. On the potential for bioterrorist attacks on food supplies (and a response plan), see Henry S. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002). BACK

²⁴ Lonnie Henley, “The RMA After Next,” Parameters 29, no. 4 (Winter 1999–2000), 46–57, and Thomas K. Adams, “Radical Destabilizing Effects of New Technologies,” Parameters 28, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), 99–111. BACK

²⁵Andrew F. Krepinevich, “From Cavalry to Computers: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest (Fall 1994), 30–42. BACK

²⁶ Steven Kosiak, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers, A Strategy for a Long Peace (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2001). BACK

²⁷ Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Coming Conflicts: Interstate War in the New Millenium,” Harvard International Review (Summer 2001), 42–46. O’Hanlon provides a concise and logical review of potential flashpoints and causes of conflict, including potential conflict over resources. BACK

²⁸ See the prolific writings of Ralph Peters, particularly Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph? (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 32–48. BACK

²⁹ National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001), 20–23; and Michael Klare, “The New Geography of Conflict,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2001), 49–61. BACK

³⁰ Others argue that modern technology makes war less lethal for noncombatants. For a discussion of this debate, see Sam J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), 97–100. BACK

³¹A conclusion shared by the U.S. Commission on National Security and the Central Intelligence Agency. See New World Coming, 46–47, and Global Trends 2015, 8. BACK

³² Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “How We Lost the High Tech War of 2007,” The Weekly Standard, January 29, 1996, 22–28. BACK

³³ For a superb study, see Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the 2001 QDR (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000). BACK

³⁴ Dunlap, 22–28; see also Charles J. Dunlap, “21st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths,” Parameters 27, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), 27–37; Peters, 44–48. BACK

³⁵ For a disturbing study of the homeland security problem, see Richard Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel: NBC Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). BACK

³⁶ See the biennial Department of Defense report, Proliferation: Threat and Response (January 2001); accessed at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs>. BACK

³⁷A key conclusion of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21^st Century (Washington, DC: 1997), 22. See also Tangredi, All Possible Wars? 73–82. BACK

³⁸ Thomas L. Friedman, “Altered States,” The New York Times, October 1, 2000, A17. BACK

³⁹Arguably, this world is still less dangerous than it was at the height of the Cold War, when huge nuclear arsenals were targeted on civilian populations. BACK

⁴⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Random House, 2000), xi; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no.1 (Summer 2000), 5–41. BACK

⁴¹ Kaplan, 24. BACK

⁴² Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), 22–60. BACK

⁴³ Ralph Peters, “Constant Conflict,” Parameters 27, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 4–14. See also Anatol Lieven, “Nasty Little Wars,” The National Interest (Winter 2000–2001), 65–76. BACK

⁴⁴ Thomas Keaney, “Globalization, National Security and the Role of the Military,” SAISphere (Winter 2000), accessed at <www.sais-jhu.edu/pubs/saisphere/winter00/indexkk.html>. BACK

⁴⁵ Jonathan T. Howe, “A Global Agenda for Foreign and Defense Policy,” Global Century, 189, and U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking A National Strategy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2000), 16. BACK

⁴⁶ This is the main argument of Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999). See also Howe, 189; Ellen L. Frost, “Globalization and National Security: A Strategic Agenda,” in Global Century, 56; and Harlan K. Ullman, “Influencing Events Ashore,” in Global Century, 502. BACK

⁴⁷ Richard L. Kugler, “Controlling Chaos: New Axial Strategic Principles,” in Global Century, 101. BACK

⁴⁸ For an historical argument for a more institutionalized approach to post-war order, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). BACK

⁴⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Military in a New Era: Living with Complexity,” in Global Century, 399. See also New World Coming: Supporting Research and Analysis, 55. BACK

⁵⁰ Howe, 188. BACK

⁵¹ For discussion of the effects of nonlinearity, see Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). BACK

⁵² Howe, 192. For a strong argument on joint forces, see William A. Owens with Edward Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000). BACK

⁵³ Cordesman, 419. BACK

⁵⁴ Richard L. Kugler, “Future U.S. Defense Strategy,” in Global Century, 365. On naval presence, see Sam J. Tangredi, “The Fall and Rise of Naval Forward Presence,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 5 (May 2000). For an assessment of forward presence and “shaping,” see Edward Rhodes, et al., “Forward Presence and Engagement: Historical Insights into the Problem of ‘Shaping,’“ Naval War College Review (Winter 2000), 25–61. BACK

⁵⁵ This runs against the prevailing Powell Doctrine, which reflects the U.S. Armed Forces’ reluctance to address unconventional conflict or complex contingencies where American military strengths cannot be employed without constraints. This is a major theme of F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force: A New American Way of War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). BACK

⁵⁶ For an indirect approach see Robert H. Scales, Jr., “The Indirect Approach: How U.S. Military Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Future Urban Warfare,” Armed Forces Journal International (October 1998), 68–74. Such an approach does not support U.S. political objectives and appears to ignore the “CNN effect” or temporal limitations to modern crises. BACK

⁵⁷ Kugler, “Future U.S. Defense Strategy,” in Global Century, 367. See also Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999). BACK

⁵⁸ A need recently argued in John McCain and Evan Bayh, “A New Start for National Service,” The New York Times, November 6, 2001, A23. BACK

⁵⁹ One exception was Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). BACK