Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce Resources

Donna J. Nincic

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was considerable concern over the security of the world’s sea lanes of communication (SLOCs)¹ and their attendant chokepoints, which were considered vulnerable to Soviet threats. For example, sea lanes in the eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean were within range of Soviet Backfire bombers based in southern Afghanistan.² Similarly, Moscow’s desire to acquire military facilities in Mozambique was interpreted in part as a desire to control the Mozambique Channel, a chokepoint on the critical East Africa/Western Europe–United States mineral trading route.³ Concerns were not limited to this part of the world. In the Caribbean Sea, the fear was that the Soviets, in conjunction with Latin American allies in the region, could present a direct military threat to U.S. shipping routes in the Gulf of Mexico and could interdict key supplies at times of crisis.⁴ Thus, at the height of the Cold War, there were worries that armed conflict could occur due to Soviet threats to freedom of navigation through key strategic SLOCs and chokepoints.

Concern over sea lane and chokepoint security has abated considerably since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, because of the globalization of the world economy and the corresponding dependence of a greater number of nations on foreign trade, the security of global maritime trade remains as critical as ever. Now, however, the threats to maritime chokepoints stem less from direct attack than from indirect threats such as piracy, collisions, and regional instability, all of which could reduce their utility to ocean-borne trade. When taken together, these indirect threats to a natural resource—the SLOC chokepoints—can impede passage through maritime trade routes or make them economically scarce and subject them to a greater likelihood of conflict. Thus, the current threats to global sea trade routes and their implications for U.S. trade and national security are best grasped when chokepoints are viewed as increasingly scarce natural resources.

Resource Scarcity, Conflict, and Sea Lanes

In the 1960s, concern about the natural environment led to recognition of the limits imposed by nature on human ambitions. A first wave of writing warned of the dangers of environmental degradation and advocated policies to avoid catastrophe, but it did not explicitly link environmental concerns to national security. In recent years, the concept of environmental security has evolved to merge these two areas. While this concept may refer to the application of security theories to environmental issues⁵ or the environmental deterioration resulting from conflict or war,⁶ it has typically come to refer to the conflict that can result from scarcities of natural resources stemming from population and/or economic growth.

This latter approach is most closely associated with the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon, whose Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict has highlighted the relationship between population growth, which leads to environmental degradation—particularly of nonrenewable resources—and ethnic and regional violence in developing countries.⁷ For example, farmland deterioration in Bangladesh, leading to migrations into neighboring India, subsequently led to a violent insurgency in the 1980s between the original Buddhist and Christian population and the Hindu migrants.⁸ Similarly, disputes over access to the fertile farmland along the Senegal River led to an explosion of ethnic violence between blacks and Moors in Senegal and Mauritania in 1989.

Other authors have written on the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict as well. Nazli Choucri and Robert North were among the first to establish a relationship between growth, resource scarcity, and conflict. In Nations in Conflict, they suggest that natural resource scarcities within a country may provoke wars with other countries over access to alternate supplies of that resource.⁹ Arthur Westing also noted that over one dozen 20th-century wars—including those not particularly noted as “resource wars”—often had a resource scarcity component to them.¹⁰ According to his argument, both World War I and World War II were concerned in part with access to oil, iron, and other minerals. More recently, the Falklands conflict between Britain and Argentina was as much about control over the rich fish and oil reserves around the islands as it was about historical sovereignty claims. While emphases may differ among each of these and other authors, all argue that resources that are both economically important and scarce can produce conflict between the nations and groups that need and/or use them. Additionally, most authors tie resource scarcity directly to the twin processes of population growth and economic growth.

There is some debate, however, on whether issues of environmental degradation can or should be considered matters of national security. Typically, this is suggested because of a belief that environmental degradation is so acute and serious as to threaten the conditions for human life and that because national security by definition implies the protection of human life, environmental degradation must become a security issue. The threat from, and protection against, acid rain or deforestation, for example, is considered on par with protection against invasion or terrorist attacks. Responses to environmental degradation, therefore, span a continuum from viewing the problem within a national security paradigm to military action to address either the ecological damage or its consequences. In the first instance, imposing a national security framework on the issue is believed to increase the likelihood that resources will be devoted to the objective and the problems resolved. If political leaders and the public believed, for example, that meeting the challenge of the deterioration of the ozone layer is as important as meeting the Soviet challenge was during the Cold War, greater funding would probably be devoted to the problem. In the second instance, it is believed that many problems of environmental deterioration will elicit a military response to prevent more bloodshed in the future. It may be increasingly necessary to militarize environmental politics—in some cases of migrations provoked by deteriorated farmland, for example—to prevent ethnic conflict in the future between the indigenous and migrant populations. While some may disagree with this perspective, it is clear that some natural resources are generally considered so economically vital as to make them national security issues. Oil is the prime example here.

However, other economically important resources not typically considered “natural resources” can be considered scarce and capable of provoking conflict: specifically, the chokepoints of the world’s maritime trade routes.¹¹ The world’s SLOCs and chokepoints are vital to the world economy, especially to an increasingly globalized economy. Maritime transport still remains the most inexpensive means of transporting bulk goods; consequently, over 80 percent of the world’s trade involves ocean transit.¹² In the United States, more than 95 percent of all foreign commerce is maritime, flowing through more than 300 deep draft ports.¹³ And international trade is projected to reach 2 billion tons within the next 20 years—twice today’s levels.

While there are hundreds of chokepoints of regional and local economic importance, fewer than two dozen lie on the world’s international maritime trade routes (see figure 8–1), endowing them with global economic significance. Of these, nearly half are vulnerable to a form of stress or threat that could make them economically scarce resources. As such, they may become a source of conflict between nations.

Sea Lanes as Scarce Resources

The security of maritime trade hinges on the conception of sea lanes and chokepoints as scarce resources. Resource scarcities are typically characterized as absolute (the resource is nonrenewable) or relative; that is, “limited with respect to human wants and needs”¹⁴ (some scholars refer to these as Malthusian and Ricardian scarcities, respectively), but what all definitions have in common is that resource scarcity reflects the forces of supply and demand. In other words, scarcity of a resource implies that the quantity available and/or accessible falls short of effective demand. A resource is scarce when its supply is threatened: either the resource is nonrenewable or it is being used up too quickly to renew itself. Scarcity also exists when there is an increase in demand for the resource and, for whatever reason (typically because the supply of the good is fixed or diminishing and it has few, if any, substitutes), the market cannot set the price high enough to regulate the demand for the resource (the resource is price-inelastic).

Fixed Supply

Even at the end of the 20th century, most of the world’s goods continue to be traded by ship. Despite technological advances in transportation systems, prevailing winds, as well as ocean currents and predominant weather patterns, still determine the safest and most efficient trade routes. Certain parts of the oceans are off-limits during certain times of the year due to the threat of waves of severe destructive force. Zones of violent wave activity exist in the Atlantic and North Pacific during the winter, primarily between latitudes 50° and 60°N (including the British Isles and North Sea countries), and in the corresponding latitudes during the summer in the southern ocean (affecting the increasingly used Cape Horn and Strait of Magellan routes). Similarly, ships transiting the Indian Ocean, the tropical southwest Pacific, the West Indies, and the China Sea during the monsoon season may also encounter waves of destructive force sufficient to damage or sink even a modern merchant vessel.

For these reasons, the world’s ocean trading routes have remained relatively fixed for centuries, and few have been added to regular use. There are only a few exceptions: as ship design and technology have allowed for larger, faster, and stronger ships, some shippers have become more willing to transit their fleets through increasingly dangerous waters. For example, the Cape of Good Hope (around southern Africa), the Straits of Magellan and Cape Horn (around South America), and, to a lesser extent, the Northwest Passage across North America are now routinely used most months of the year.

Another factor unrelated to the physical nature of the ocean that discourages the addition of new trade routes is the extremely high cost of creating manmade routes where none existed before. Projects such as the Panama and Suez Canals are not likely to be replicated in the future. One notable exception involves the oil trade, where pipelines are increasingly replacing shipping. This is the preferred option for many oil producers in the new oil fields around the Caspian Sea. Instead of shipping through the already congested Turkish Straits, producers would rather expand the existing network of pipelines to bypass the Straits altogether. Similarly, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz have lost some of their traffic to pipelines in recent years. For nonoil and gas trade, however, the available supply of SLOCs and chokepoints must be considered reasonably fixed. With the addition of the Cape Horn, Cape of Good Hope, Northwest Passage, and Strait of Magellan routes, very few areas of the ocean are left where it is feasible or necessary to add new trade routes.

Increased Demand

On the demand side, chokepoints can also be considered scarce resources because of the growing volume of global maritime trade. Pressure on existing SLOCs is increasing because more nations than ever now belong to the global capitalist trading system, and most of the world’s international trade moves by ship. More trading nations mean more shipping nations, which, in turn, mean more ships on the world’s sea lanes and transiting global chokepoints. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD):

In the United States, foreign waterborne commerce increased by 41.6 percent between 1980 and 1999, as can be seen in figure 8–2.

While maritime trade has grown worldwide, nowhere is increased demand more evident than in Asia. Since coastal areas achieve faster growth than do inland areas, even in the same country,¹⁶ exports from this region are moving primarily by ship throughout the region’s extensive access to ocean sea lanes and inland waterways. Dependence on shipping in this part of the world is intensified by a scarce land and air transport infrastructure for large-scale trade. Rapid economic growth in the world’s coastal areas places an increased demand on SLOCs and chokepoints. What was true in Adam Smith’s time remains true today: despite technological advances in rail, road, and air transport, sea-based trade remains the most cost-effective means of international trade.¹⁷ Consequently, merchant shipping tonnage has doubled in the western Pacific in recent years,¹⁸ and maritime traffic on the United States–Asia dry bulk cargo routes is expected to double in the next century.¹⁹

Other chokepoints are also under stress due to increased demand. The Panama Canal is currently described as “clogged due to heavy use by ships,”20 and demand is only expected to increase in the future. The canal, already operating at full capacity, is anticipating an 18.5 percent rise in traffic by 2010 and a 48 percent rise (from current levels) by the middle of the century. A planned $1 billion program to boost capacity by ²⁰ percent will only take care of short-term needs.²¹ Additionally, the special pressures placed on those SLOCs and chokepoints feeding the Middle East oil trade must be considered. The U.S. Department of Energy anticipates that world demand for oil will grow by 44 percent between 1995 and 2015, with most of the increase being met by the Persian Gulf nations.²² As will be discussed in detail in chapter 10, much of this oil will be flowing to the Far East through chokepoints.

Decreased/Threatened Supply: Physical Constraints

Chokepoints are affected both by decreased supply and increased demand. While the physical supply of them is, for all practical purposes, fixed, and there are few current, economically viable, substitutes, the effective supply—that is, availability—is threatened by a number of factors (piracy, physical degradation, and the like) that may reduce or restrict their availability. Threats to supply can take two forms: physical constraints that restrict passage and actions by states or nonstate actors that threaten or restrict free passage through the chokepoint.

The geographical characteristics of many of the world’s chokepoints present increasing problems to global maritime traffic, and the greater numbers of ships using these transit points magnify many of their physical limitations. The problem is two-fold: the physical characteristics of some chokepoints, combined with the increased size (length, width, and draft) of new merchant ships, have rendered a few chokepoints impassible. At the same time, the geography of some chokepoints, combined with both the increased size of new ships and increased traffic, has increased the likelihood of accident and environmental damage. While problems in their own right, accidents and environmental damage may also require temporary closing of, or at least restricted access to, a chokepoint.

Many chokepoints are extremely narrow, often only a mile or two at their narrowest point. Some are so narrow (the Turkish Straits, for example) that they have to be closed to two-way traffic when the largest ships are in transit, because their breadth requires the simultaneous use of both the inbound and outbound traffic lanes when they negotiate turns. In other cases, navigation difficulties of the larger ships through the narrowest straits are compounded by attendant tide, current, and wind extremes. In still other cases, depth is the paramount issue, as silt begins to accumulate in the narrow passageways.

Depth is a serious issue for the Suez Canal as ships, especially oil tankers, have become considerably larger over time.²³ Traffic through the Suez Canal fell by 9.4 percent in 1995 over 1994 levels and by 8 percent during the first half of 1996.²⁴ In an effort to lure back lost traffic, the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) has frozen canal tolls at 1994 levels,²⁵ has agreed to consider extending existing bulk carrier rebates for longer periods (an act intended to attract ships that would otherwise use the Cape route),²⁶ and is seeking an agreement with its main competitor, the Sumed (Suez-Mediterranean) pipeline, to prohibit any tanker small enough to transit the canal from using the pipeline.²⁷ Despite the SCA attempts to lure back lost traffic, the canal still cannot handle the world’s largest oil tankers. The fully laden very large crude carriers require transit depths of 68 to 70 feet; current dredging operations will attain a depth of only 62 feet by the year 2000.²⁸

Depth is also a serious issue for the Panama Canal. Currently, the canal can only accommodate ships up to 65,000 tons, meaning that the new megaships of 150,000 tons, with correspondingly deeper draft, have to use the longer, and more dangerous, Cape Horn or Strait of Magellan routes or avoid the canal trade altogether. While these “post-Panamax” ships currently comprise only 8 percent of the world fleet, they are expected to account for 30 percent of it within the next 30 years.²⁹ During the 1997–1998 El Niño event, draft restrictions were particularly severe. In normal years, maximum allowable draft in the canal is 12.04 meters. During the El Niño, which resulted in drought conditions in the canal zone, the maximum allowable draft had to be lowered to as little as 10.52 meters.³⁰

Accidents are an increased concern in many chokepoints as near-misses or actual collisions or groundings highlight the dangers of ever-larger ships carrying cargoes that could create an environmental or human disaster if an accident should occur. We are all familiar with oil spills caused by human error in navigationally challenging situations, but these are not the only dangers that exist. Many ships carry chemicals that, if released, could result in great loss of life. A close call occurred in the narrow entrance to the San Francisco Bay when a tanker carrying lethal liquefied anhydrous ammonia lost steering and threatened to collide with the Golden Gate Bridge. Attempts to regain control of the ship, which were ultimately successful, were complicated by the fact that the 561-foot tanker had little room to maneuver in the narrow shipping channel.³¹

Another problem area is the Turkish Straits, due to the recent development of the Caspian Sea oil fields. The early oil from these fields will pass through the Bosporus and Dardanelles from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea by pipeline, through the Sea of Marmara, and out into the Mediterranean by ship, adding to an already near-capacity flow of traffic through the Straits. Turkey has expressed strong environmental concerns about any increase in shipping traffic, citing its fear of increases in collisions and major oil spills. These worries are not without foundation: between 1988 and 1994, the number of collisions increased dramatically, including a major oil spill in 1994 that burned for a week in the narrow Straits.³² In 1996, Turkish Energy Minister Nusnu Dogan said that the amount of oil transited through the Bosporus could be raised safely by only an additional 20 percent. More than that could mean closing the strait to two-way sea traffic for 8 hours “almost every day.”³³

Decreased/Threatened Supply: State Challenges to Free Passage

The behavior of a handful of nations has threatened free passage through some of the world’s chokepoints. Those most affected include the straits in and bordering the South China Sea; the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf; and the Turkish straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. In each case, littoral powers have undertaken or threatened actions that—sometimes inadvertently—have threatened free passage. State challenges to free passage are of two forms: disputed state claims and state military actions.

Disputed State Claims

Unhindered navigation is currently or has been recently disputed in three sea lanes of concern to the United States: the Northwest Passage, the Turkish Straits, and in Indonesia. In the Northwest Passage, national security and future oil trade are at stake. In the case of Turkey, the trade—especially the oil trade—of our European trading partners is affected. In the case of Indonesia, safe and efficient passage through the archipelagic straits is of vital national security importance for the United States.

The Northwest Passage. The Northwest Passage is the long-sought-for trade route into the Arctic Circle above Canada. Accessed from the Davis Strait on the East and the Bering Strait on the West, it passes through waters that are ice-bound for much of the year. Although it was first navigated successfully by ship in 1906 by the Norwegian explorer Roald Amundson, it was not until 1969 that the first commercial vessel—Humble Oil Company’s Manhattan, a refitted tanker specially strengthened for ice conditions—made its way, with the additional assistance of two ice breakers, through the passage. Between 1942 and 1998, about 50 successful transits were made of the Northwest Passage, about half of which were by icebreakers.

The Manhattan voyage sparked the beginning of a dispute between the United States and Canada over the sovereignty of the Northwest Passage. In May 1969, Ottawa informed the United States that Canada was claiming, among other things, the Arctic waters as national terrain. The United States believes the passage through the channels of the Canadian Arctic archipelago is an international strait. As such, it challenges Canada’s understanding that the passage is part of Canadian internal waters.

At issue is the degree to which Canada can assert control over the passage. If, indeed, the passage is part of Canadian internal waters, full Canadian sovereignty obtains: Canada can require states to request permission to transit the passage, and Ottawa can impose environmental restrictions on its use. However, if the passage is declared an international strait—the U.S. position—Canada can impose only limited restrictions on the innocent passage³⁴ of ships using the strait.³⁵

The dispute took on new importance in 1985, with the voyage of the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea through the passage.³⁶ Until the sailing of the Manhattan, U.S. interests in the passage had been essentially strategic. Canada had long been considered a first line of defense from the Soviet Union, primarily as part of an early warning system for protection against the threat of Soviet nuclear ballistic submarines (only icebreakers and nuclear submarines can transit the passage unaided). The Manhattan voyage shifted the focus to the economic viability of the passage as a trade route for Alaskan oil; the Polar Sea transit shifted the focus back to U.S. security.

The argument could be made that as long as commercial traffic requires the assistance of icebreakers, the Northwest Passage is unlikely to become a viable commercial route, thus making the dispute purely academic. However, a final note is in order. Global warming is occurring to such a degree in Arctic waters that, with the polar ice cap melting, commercial ships may start using the Arctic route instead of going through the Panama Canal—a shortcut of more than 4,000 nautical miles.³⁷ While the route is not expected to be entirely ice-free, advances in oil tankers, such as double hulling, make it feasible to consider transit without icebreaker assistance. Furthermore, the rise in oil prices makes the production of Alaskan oil more feasible and, when oil production in the North Sea winds down, the passage could become important for oil exports to Europe.³⁸ This scenario is examined in considerable detail in chapter 9.

Clearly, Washington has not desired an overt conflict with Canada; the intent has always been to play down the dispute and “agree to disagree.” Nevertheless, the concerns—most actively voiced by the U.S. Defense Department—have been about the international precedent that might be established were any agreement reached that recognized Canadian claims. If Canada were able to limit transit passage on the grounds of national sovereignty or environmental conservation, then other coastal states with straits of national security importance to the United States (such as Indonesia and the Philippines) might be able to do the same.

The Turkish Straits. The Turkish Straits—the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, anchoring either end of the Sea of Marmara—are historically among the strategically most important straits in the world. Connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, they provide Russia and many of the former Soviet republics with the only warm-water access to the rest of the world. With the increased importance of the Caspian Sea oil, the Straits become even more vital, as they provide at the moment the only viable means of transporting the oil to the rest of the world.³⁹

The Turkish Straits are currently operating at capacity. By some estimates, it is three times busier than the Suez Canal and four times busier than the Panama Canal.⁴⁰ This has led the Turkish government to seek means of restricting and/or controlling the passage of ships through the Straits; in 2001, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem announced that Turkey intended to levy substantial tolls on oil passing through the Bosporus.⁴¹ This poses a significant challenge to international law; the Straits are an international waterway, covered by international treaty and law and, as such, can have only limited passage restrictions placed on them. While states are allowed to impose restrictions on international waterways for environmental reasons, some fear Turkey’s proposed toll scheme is a way to gain control over the lucrative Caspian oil trade. If this were to occur, and as more oil comes from the former Soviet Union, the Bosporus could become a strategic chokepoint comparable to the Strait of Hormuz.

The Russians are particularly opposed to any further Turkish attempts to restrict passage through the Straits. When the Straits are closed to two-way traffic to allow for the passage of ships in excess of 150 meters in length, ships must wait at the entrance to the Bosporus for the Straits to reopen. As it is, two-way traffic was suspended for 1,550 hours in 1997, forcing delays for some 3,774 ships.⁴² The Russians are concerned at the extent of the wait and are trying to change the International Maritime Organization ruling that granted Turkey the right to impose a traffic separation scheme in the Straits. Russia’s position is that as the Bosporus and Dardanelles are an international strait, no restrictions should be allowed.

An argument can be made in support of the Turkish position that congestion has reached a point in the Straits where environmental and human disasters become a significant risk. Between 1988 and 1992, 155 collisions occurred in the Straits. With so much of the Straits traffic comprised of oil, the threat of environmental damage is significant. For example, in 1994 the Greek Cypriot tanker Nassia collided with another ship in the Straits. Thirty seamen were killed, and 20,000 tons of oil were spilled into the Straits, creating a slick that burned for 5 days.⁴³ Major spills plus the routine release of contaminated ballast water has contributed to a decline in fishing levels in the region to one-sixtieth of their former levels.⁴⁴

The United States currently has no formal position on the Turkish Straits dispute, but this may change as Caspian oil becomes increasingly important. With oil reserves estimated at the size of those of Kuwait, U.S. firms are responsible for much of the Caspian oil exploration and extraction. It then becomes critical to ensure that the oil gets to market safely and securely. It should be noted that the United States has opposed one of the more favored plans for Caspian oil transportation, which would allow the oil to bypass the Straits altogether: a series of pipelines through Iran to the Persian Gulf. This means that for the foreseeable future, Caspian oil will be transited through the Straits. Any attempt to affect significantly the flow of oil would raise serious concerns—as in the case of the Northwest Passage—about transit rights in other critical chokepoints and waterways of the world.

Indonesia. In 1996, Indonesia announced that it intended to restrict military and commercial shipping to three lanes running through the archipelago (the Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java, the Lombok Strait between the islands of Bali and Lombok, and through the Moluccan Sea). Access to the critical Strait of Malacca was to be restricted. The United States lodged an “angry protest” with the Suharto government, as Indonesia’s actions would keep U.S. naval forces out of the sea lane that runs between Java, Sumatra, and Borneo, thereby hindering the movement of its naval forces in a crisis.⁴⁵ The immediate crisis was resolved, but concerns remain. For example, in fall 1997, the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz was deployed in Asia; at the same time, the crisis over United Nations (UN) inspections in Iraq was beginning to intensify, and the Clinton administration decided it needed quickly to position a credible military threat in the Persian Gulf. With guaranteed navigation rights, the Nimitz was allowed to sail through the South China Sea, through the Strait of Malacca, off the coast of India, and then up to the Gulf. Without these rights, it would have had to have circumvented Australia to remain in international waters at all times, adding some 5,800 nautical miles and 15 days to the trip (assuming a speed of 15 knots). Additionally, restrictions on transit through Malacca would add millions of dollars to the cost of shipping between Australia and Japan.

State Military Actions

Wars have been justified by maritime trade route security concerns on several occasions since the end of World War II. In 1956, when Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, British and French troops, along with Israel, invaded the Canal Zone. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower pressured Britain, France, and Israel into agreeing to a cease-fire and eventual withdrawal from Egypt. The war itself lasted only a week, and invading forces were withdrawn within the month. Suez was again the scene of conflict in 1967. Having excluded Israeli ships from the Suez Canal since May 1948, Egypt’s Nasser blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba in 1967, Israel’s only access to the Red Sea. Israel responded, resulting in the Six-Day War. On June 6, 1967, Egypt closed the Suez Canal and broke relations with the United States. UN Resolution 242, passed in its aftermath to lay down the principles for Middle East peace, had as one of its conditions free navigation for all ships through international waterways such as the Suez Canal. However, the canal remained closed for the next 15 years due to continued military skirmishes in the canal region.

During the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, military actions between the warring parties threatened the passage of tankers through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s threats to disrupt oil tanker traffic led Kuwait to seek protection from the Soviet Union, an overture that dramatically raised the stakes for the United States. At the urging of the Department of State and the Pentagon, the United States undertook the reflagging of 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers and provided a naval escort for their transit through the Strait of Hormuz.

A final example of military action to keep a vital sea lane open occurred with the U.S. military intervention in Panama. Guillermo Endara was elected to the presidency in May 1989, but General Manuel Noriega, who was considered threatening to U.S. interests in the region, annulled the elections. While the primary objective of Operation Just Cause in December 1989 was to restore Endara to power and to remove Noriega, a secondary objective was to keep the canal open. Noriega had, on more than one occasion, threatened to close the canal by sinking several ships in it.

Currently, military actions—large, visible naval buildups—are of concern in two areas: the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz.

The South China Sea. Concerns arise largely because of China’s claim, in 1992, to 95 percent of the South China Sea as its territorial waters.⁴⁶ Contrary to international law, which recognizes only a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea plus a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, this area extends up to 1,000 miles from the Chinese mainland and includes Japan and the Philippines within Beijing’s security range. This area also includes the Spratly, Paracel, and Senkaku island chains, which China claims as its own and which are contested in varying degrees by six other states: Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia. The Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim specific parts of the South China Sea, while China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all of its islands, islets, and reefs. In addition, China and the Philippines have staked a claim to many of the submerged features as well (most of the reefs, cays, and shoals are under water much of the year.)⁴⁷ The disputes over the Spratly Islands—230 islands, islets, and reefs comprising a mere 3.1 square miles of entirely uninhabitable land—are the most worrisome as they lay directly in the path of shipping lanes that converge on the Indonesian Straits. These vital sea lanes transport oil from the Middle East to Japan and the west coast of the United States. Approximately one quarter of the world’s total shipping trade passes through this contested area every year.⁴⁸

China has backed its claims with armed force on more than one occasion. In March 1988, Vietnamese and Chinese forces clashed, resulting in the deaths of 72 people, the loss of 2 Vietnamese ships, and the occupation by China of 6 islands.⁴⁹ A more recent example is its brief military standoff with the Philippines in 1995 over Mischief Reef in the Spratlys. China has also engaged in a number of large and sometimes bellicose military exercises, such as those that coincided with the presidential elections in Taiwan in March 1996 when Beijing engaged in live-fire wargames off the southeast coast near the Taiwan Strait involving more than 10 warships and as many aircraft dropping bombs.

China’s contentions with Indonesia—the world’s largest natural gas exporter—over the Natunas Islands is particularly troubling. In dispute since 1993, when China published a map showing “historic claims” to the islands, the Natunas are rich in oil and natural gas. In September 1996, the Indonesian military conducted its most extensive wargames in 4 years on the islands; the location was chosen to carry the message that “the Natunas belong to Indonesia.”⁵⁰

China’s perceived ambitions are not the only concern in the South China Seas. In July 1997, Singapore increased the number of its armed vessels patrolling the South China Sea with the intent of securing the area’s sea lanes. The addition of two navy patrol vessels was justified on the grounds that “freedom of navigation through the Malacca and Singapore Straits as well as the South China Sea is fundamental to the continued survival and prosperity of Singapore,” in the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Law, Shanmugam Jayakumar.⁵¹

In none of these incidents has merchant shipping been the direct target of state actions. Rather, the worry is that were a regional territorial dispute to escalate, merchant shipping would have to be detoured—for reasons of safety—around the zone of conflict. This loss, even temporarily, of some of the world’s most important shipping lanes would disrupt trade, extend transit schedules significantly, and result in higher prices. At the same time, were a conflict to occur, merchant ships bound for an adversary’s territory could be intercepted, harassed, or worse.

The Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz, by far the world’s most critical oil chokepoint, lies at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Over 14 million barrels of oil pass through the Strait each day. At its narrowest, the Strait consists of two 1-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a 2-mile-wide buffer zone. Closure of the Strait could require the use of longer alternate routes, if available, at increased transportation costs.⁵² The most serious concerns in the region center around Iran and Iraq, Iran being considered the greatest long-term threat to U.S. interests in the region because of its strategic position at the entrance to the strait, controlling access between the Persian Gulf and the rest of the world. In early 1995, Iran deployed some 6,000 troops and heavy weapons on Abu Musa (also claimed by the United Arab Emirates) and other islands at the entrance to the strait. At the time, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry said that the deployment, which also included antiship Silkworm missiles and air defense missiles, “can only be regarded as a potential threat to shipping in the area.”⁵³

Passage through Hormuz is an issue of concern several times a year when Iran holds its wargames at the mouth of the Gulf. In April 1996, the Iranian Navy conducted a series of naval maneuvers that had the effect of slowing ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The action intimidated oil tanker owners “into holding their ships back from potentially risky passages through [the] Strait, thus temporarily raising spot oil prices and helping fuel the dramatic ‘week of hell’ price drop in U.S. capital markets.”⁵⁴ (According to chapter 6, this incident was an example of the market effects of a lack of naval presence.)

Freedom of Navigation Program

In 1992, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps detailed a new strategy in a white paper entitled...From the Sea (rearticulated in 1994 by a follow-on paper, Forward...From the Sea). This strategy is based on power projection and crisis response in littoral regions. The new doctrine recognizes that, for the foreseeable future, naval control of the sea is not likely to be challenged; rather, the threats that the Navy will be called upon to counter are expected to be regional, not global, and the potential opponents will be diverse, potentially dispersed, and individually far less powerful than the former Soviet Union. Rather than blue-water sea control, the new concept calls for control over littoral areas and support of land activities through integrated operations with the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force.

The strategy calls for the U.S. Navy to operate more actively in coastal zones—precisely the area that is being used most intensively and the area to which states are making increased claims. An emphasis of the new U.S. littoral focus has been to ensure that other states recognize the legal right of all to operate freely in international waters and respect the navigational provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III. This is critical for U.S. naval—as well as commercial—mobility through the world’s sea lanes and is directly tied to the rise of regional threats and the need to respond quickly to these threats as they arise. Because of this consideration, the U.S. Navy has been charged with the Freedom of Navigation program, introduced during the Jimmy Carter presidency. The objective of the program has been to ensure that all states recognize the legal right to operate freely in international waters and respect the navigation provisions of UNCLOS III. Since 1979, U.S. military ships and aircraft have asserted navigational rights against excessive claims of more than 35 countries, at the rate of 30 to 40 per year.

Decreased/Threatened Supply: Nonstate Challenges to Free Passage

As explained in chapter 4, nonstate actors increasingly challenge the sovereignty of states and their ability to have an effect on international affairs. While the state remains the predominant actor on the world stage, nonstate actors—especially those whose actions defy the norms and values of the international community—will play an increasingly significant role.⁵⁵ Nonstate actors “undermine law and order, and...create conditions conducive to instability and conflict.” For commercial traffic through chokepoints and SLOCs, pirates and maritime terrorists are the primary concerns. Unlike nation-states, pirates and terrorists will not attempt to resolve their differences through diplomatic means, using “violence and intimidation” to undermine states and the international system.⁵⁶

Maritime Piracy

Threats to merchant shipping from piracy are a serious, if little-known, problem and have been on the rise worldwide since the early 1990s.⁵⁷ The international shipping industry regards several key areas of the world’s oceans as particularly at risk from attacks by pirates. In Asia, these include the Singapore Strait, Indonesian, Vietnamese, and Philippine waters and, to a lesser extent, the whole of the South China Sea. Other risk areas comprise West Africa—especially from Mauritania to Angola—and the eastern coast of South America, as well as occasional occurrences off the Horn of Africa, East Africa, Sri Lanka, India, and Bangladesh. Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela are highlighted in South America, with attacks also occurring in Mexico in Latin America and the Caribbean. Somalia is of special concern, and mariners are routinely warned to transit at least 50 miles from the coast to avoid attack. Pirate attacks are increasing throughout the entire Caribbean Sea, with attacks on shipping often aimed at seizing vessels for use in drug trafficking.⁵⁸ Additional attacks have been reported in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Most of the attacks in Asia and the Caribbean occurred while the ships or yachts were in transit; the majority of the remainder were reported in territorial waters, while the ships were at anchor or berthed.

The United Nations Convention on the High Seas (1958) and Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) define maritime piracy as “an attack mounted for private ends on a ship, involving violence, illegal detention of persons or property, or the theft of destruction of goods” that is “directed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.” Inside territorial waters, the laws of littoral states determine what actions constitute piracy, and most subsume piracy under offense categories such as murder, assault, robbery, or theft. However, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), an offshoot of the International Chamber of Commerce, has adopted a practical, rather than legal, definition of piracy within a largely commercial frame of reference. The IMB definition refers simply to “any act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other crime and with the capability to use force in furtherance of the act.” It is thus wider than the UN definition and ignores questions of jurisdiction. For our purposes, the majority of pirate attacks could simply be described as “armed robbery at sea” or the intent to commit such an act.

While data on pirate attacks is difficult to obtain,⁵⁹ the cost of pirate attacks is estimated at $16 billion a year,⁶⁰ and evidence suggests that these attacks are increasing.⁶¹ The number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported to the International Maritime Organization was 228 in 1996, a rise of 96 over the figure for 1995. Since 1984, 968 such acts have been reported.⁶²

The typical pirate attack occurs at night and generally lasts no more than 15 or 20 minutes. A small number of individuals tend to be involved, with an average of 4 to 6 persons, although numbers over 30 have been reported. The pirates generally board the vessel by coming alongside in small high-speed boats and using grappling hooks. The pirates are armed typically with knives, but crowbars and bayonets also have been used successfully. Guns are becoming more common, with the result of a steep rise in casualties in recent years. Pirates killed 72 seamen in 2000, up from 3 reported deaths in 1999.⁶³

While most pirates are lightly armed bands of outlaws, there is some concern that states are complicit, if not overt, participants in the piracy. For example, in the early 1990s, Russian ships made allegations of piracy against the Chinese Coast Guard regarding irregular searches and seizures. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has been implicated as well. Recent reports describe documented attacks on a number of ships on the high seas that were boarded by personnel from military gunboats bearing the markings of the PLA Navy, with the pirates dressed in PLA Navy uniforms. While piracy is certainly not condoned officially in China’s regional maritime security forces, the temptation to participate in it or to turn a blind eye to it in exchange for kickbacks or bribes appears to be very strong.⁶⁴

A successful response to an attack is complicated by the fact that the threat is usually from a rogue element within the state and not from the state itself. Delicate jurisdictional issues arise regarding sovereignty and must be carefully balanced. This said, dealing with pirate attacks has three components: detection, deterrence, and response. Detection is generally regarded as the responsibility of the ship itself; if the ship can spot the pirates before the attack occurs, the pirates lose the element of surprise, greatly mitigating the likelihood of attack. As Tom Keller, director of public affairs for MAST (Maritime Anti-Terrorist Security Team, a California-based security organization) states:

To this extent, the responsibility for deterrence has generally been thought to lie with the ship as well. Having a vigilant crew, standing good watch (most pirates have boarded the ship before the crew is aware they are alongside), or maintaining on-board armed security personnel have been the usual means of deterring pirate attacks. This, however, may be changing. As the number and violence of pirate attacks increase, shipping companies may find themselves increasingly unable to deal with the situation on their own. Furthermore, as the typical pirate is more often a member of a large organized crime syndicate than a “down-on-his-luck local,”⁶⁶ and as governments in whose waters these attacks have occurred have been unable to deal effectively with them,⁶⁷ an international role in deterrence and response becomes more likely. To this end, the U.S. Coast Guard has offered its expertise in the fight against maritime piracy in Southeast Asia, citing similarities to the U.S. battle against drug smuggling.⁶⁸ In an interview with The Shipping Times, then-Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James Loy said:

Maritime Terrorism

Maritime terrorism is functionally different from maritime piracy. Pirate attacks occur for economic gain; terrorist attacks occur for political or social gain. The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”⁷⁰ While no official definition of maritime terrorism exists, in 1988 the Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was open to international signatories.⁷¹ Although sidestepping a formal definition, the convention states its deep concern “about the world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms” and is directed against any person who “seizes or exercises control over a ship by force...performs an act of violence against a person on board...or destroys or seriously damages maritime navigation facilities,” no matter the motive.⁷²

In the post-September 11 world, three forms of maritime terrorism are of particular concern: an attack on an individual ship, the hijacking of a ship carrying dangerous materials, and the use of a ship as a weapon to attack port or land facilities.

Terrorist attacks on ships—passenger, commercial, and military—are not new. From the hijacking of the Portuguese-flagged passenger vessel Santa Maria in 1961, to the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro,⁷³ to the 2000 attack on the USS Cole,⁷⁴ attacks on individual vessels have been cause for increased concern. Since the September 11 attacks, this concern has increased. Iran and Libya are reported to have provided diver and underwater training to terrorist groups based in the Middle East.⁷⁵ Other terrorist groups also have developed a maritime attack capability. The Sri Lankan Tamil Sea Tigers, for example, have conducted multiple maritime terrorist attacks. Two of the most recent of these attacks occurred in October 2001 when a Tamil Tiger suicide boat hit the oil tanker MV Silk Pride off northern Sri Lanka, setting the ship on fire⁷⁶ and in October 2002 when a suspected al Qaeda suicide boat detonated alongside the French tanker Limburg off Yemen. The Philippine-based Abu Sayyang group has also committed a number of terrorist attacks at sea. In the future, cruise ships are expected to be particularly vulnerable to maritime terrorism.

One of the greatest concerns regarding maritime terrorism stems from the transport of nuclear material at sea. Twenty-two countries possess or control a worldwide estimated total of 1,000 metric tons of separated plutonium in various forms for use in both military and civilian applications.⁷⁷ The strategic value of plutonium gives rise to fear that nuclear terrorists might hijack ships carrying nuclear materials. Such ships could be used for blackmail, where terrorists threaten to blow up the ship unless their demands are met.

An example of this concern occurred in the mid-1980s.⁷⁸ Japan, due to its lack of oil and other energy resources, has relied increasingly on nuclear energy for its energy needs. Much of the plutonium for its reactors comes from Europe and is transited by ship. In 1984, the United States and environmental groups expressed great concern when an unescorted Japanese cargo vessel carrying 253 kilograms of reprocessed plutonium applied for a permit to transit the Panama Canal; passage was approved only after provision was made for armed naval escort. A 1988 bilateral agreement now requires Japan to get approval from the U.S. Government for any plan to transfer reprocessed plutonium from Europe.

A future concern is that ships will be used as weapons against port or land facilities. Either ships will be used for the transit of hazardous material that could be transmitted into a country or they will themselves be used as weapons against ports or harbors. Regarding the former, much has been made of the fact that only some two percent of all containers entering the United States on ships are currently inspected.⁷⁹ While no current evidence of culpability exists, these containers could be used to transmit anything from anthrax or other biological agents to chemical agents into the United States or into any other nation.

The use of a ship as a weapon, in the manner of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, is a troubling scenario. While this has never occurred, accidents or near-accidents in certain parts of the world suggest how devastating a purposeful attack could be. For example, if a ship carrying liquid petroleum gas were to explode in the Turkish Straits, scientists estimate the impact would be the same as an 11.0 earthquake on the Richter scale:⁸⁰“it will threaten the whole of Istanbul like an atomic bomb, and it can also reach 50 kilometers in diameter.”⁸¹

Maritime security experts say that any one of the tens of thousands of containers entering U.S. ports on a daily basis could conceal “a weapon of mass destruction aimed at the heart of America.”⁸² Of particular concern are tankers loaded with liquefied natural gas or a nuclear device hidden on a container ship. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Boston Mayor Thomas Menino asked a U.S. Federal court to ban liquefied natural gas tankers from the city’s port, saying there was no adequate plan to cope with any explosion.⁸³ A nuclear device need not be particularly sophisticated: Clifford Beal, editor of Jane’s Defence Weekly, said that enriched uranium wrapped around a conventional explosive could be used “to deadly effect.”⁸⁴

The problems of combating terrorism resemble those of combating piracy— identifying a priori those who intend to commit such acts and bringing to justice those responsible for such attacks. Additionally, as maritime terrorist attacks—just as maritime pirate attacks—are overwhelmingly likely to occur in a nation’s territorial waters (the UN definition of piracy notwithstanding), there remain significant sovereignty and jurisdictional problems with responding to foreign attacks. Effective response will require international coordination of coastal states and cooperative regional regimes to respond to and deter piracy and maritime terrorist attacks.

In the case of attacks against U.S. ports or in U.S. territorial waters, the problem will be twofold: manpower and economics. With only two percent of containers currently inspected in U.S. ports, significant delays will certainly obtain if a greater percentage of containers is to be inspected. These delays will add (perhaps meaningfully) to transportation costs and may even create serious transportation bottlenecks. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard, currently charged with port security, is facing significant manpower shortages. Since the September 11 attacks, the Coast Guard expanded its missions to include port patrols, cargo and passenger ship escorts under bridges, and even service as air marshals aboard U.S. commercial flights. To meet these new demands, the Coast Guard has had to call up about one-third of its 6,000 reservists and has had to expand the use of the 35,000 volunteer members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Even so, other critical functions, such as search and rescue and drug interdiction, have suffered.⁸⁵

Decreased/Threatened Supply: Summary

Figure 8–6 summarizes the importance to the United States and current security threats for SLOCS whose transits are being challenged.

Sea Lane Security: Conclusions

Resource scarcity has many components. It arises from increased demand or insufficient or threatened supply when economically viable substitutes are few or lacking altogether. At the same time, the supply remains relatively fixed and, with the exception of oil transport via pipeline, few affordable alternatives exist that have not already been put in place. Demand on global sea lanes is increasing, since more of the world’s nations than ever are part of the global capitalist trading economy. The majority of this increasing global trade moves by ship through ocean sea lanes and chokepoints. Supply threats are twofold: physical threats posed by the geographical placement, size, and shape of the chokepoint, and security constraints from either state or nonstate actors that threaten a ship’s ability to use a passage.

Many threats and concerns face the sea lanes and chokepoints that the United States depends on for its international trade. They can be understood not only by the source of the threat—increased demand and supply threats such as physical constraints, disputed state claims, state aggression, and nonstate actors—but also by the solutions they imply. Within the broad objective of preserving national, international, and global trade security, responses include: diplomacy, policing measures concerned with the maintenance of law and order at sea, and when necessary, active military responses.

Little can be done to reduce demand on the world’s sea lanes of communication or their attendant physical constraints in the near future. For demand to reduce, alternate means of transportation would have to be provided. Although this is possible—much could be done to develop the road and rail infrastructure throughout Asia, for example—it is unlikely to occur to a significant extent to alleviate pressure on maritime transportation routes. Similarly, there is little that can be done to mitigate the physical constraints facing key chokepoints and trade routes; while the Panama and Suez Canals could be deepened and widened, capitalization is insufficient to make this certain. Alleviating the physical constraints on the natural maritime chokepoints, even if it were technologically feasible, would almost certainly be under-capitalized as well. Lastly, as has been discussed, the addition of any new trade routes—barring the Cape Horn, Strait of Magellan, and Northwest Passage routes—is not likely to occur.

In each of the cases of disputed state claims (Canada and the Northwest Passage, the Turkish Straits and Indonesia and the Strait of Malacca), the conflict occurred with a state considered friendly to the United States. At no time did any of these disputes threaten to escalate beyond the measures of active diplomacy. Additionally, in each of these examples, a case could be made that the littoral states attempted to impose restrictions for the purposes of environmental conservation or maritime safety. The Arctic is a fragile and unique ecosystem, particularly vulnerable to pollution and oil spills. The Turkish Straits have witnessed excessive traffic congestion, pollution, and maritime accidents. The Indonesian Straits are among the most crowded in the world, and collisions and groundings are routine. Nonetheless, it is vital to U.S. and global commerce that these sea lanes remain open with minimal state restrictions and interference. Active diplomacy is the best means of resolving the concerns of the littoral states and global maritime trade.

Potential threats to sea lane trade security from states typically will require policing measures. Currently, the states most worrisome to maritime trade are China, with its ambition to exert its control throughout the South China Sea, and Iran, with its control of the Strait of Hormuz. While each threat should be taken seriously, China and Iran would stand to suffer as much as anyone were hostilities to obtain. As will be discussed in chapter 10, if maritime trade was threatened in the South China Sea and traffic became diverted, China would stand to lose its lifeline to Middle Eastern oil. With almost no domestic oil of its own, China depends on the free transit of shipping through the South China Sea. Furthermore, China is fast developing on the strength of its ability to export; were this ability threatened, the Chinese economy might experience significant contractions.

The case is similar for Iran: While it may have the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran would end up as one of the greatest losers. Some 90 percent of Iran’s foreign exchange earnings come from oil and, consequently, from safe and secure access through the Persian Gulf. This said, states have been known to act against their own interests in the past. Consequently, the U.S. Navy must continue to enforce the Freedom of Navigation Acts by maintaining a significant blue water presence in those parts of the world critical to maritime trade.

Threats from nonstate actors—essentially pirates and terrorists—imply a direct attack on U.S. interests and will be best met by means of active defense. Pirates and terrorists are rarely amenable to negotiations, and they must be prevented and deterred by force. However, as most pirate and terrorist attacks occur in the territorial waters of another state, it is problematic to speak of a unilateral U.S. military response. Regional rapid reaction capabilities, such as those already under way in Asia, must be promoted, and the United States must be an active participant. Currently, the U.S. Department of State and Coast Guard participate in regional seminars and workshops on piracy and armed robbery in Asia. While a start, this is insufficient. Actions must be taken to create the conditions in known pirate areas for the pirates to be apprehended, tried and convicted, and punished for their crimes. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard can provide training to its foreign counterparts, and economic assistance can be linked to aggressive pursuit of maritime crime.

Viewing sea lanes and chokepoints as scarce resources has two important functions. First, it provides a constant reminder that conflict can obtain when a vital economic resource is threatened. That most of the world’s critical ocean arteries are under some kind of threat or stress means that we must be alert to the possibility of conflict, armed or otherwise, over safe and secure access. Second, viewing sea lanes and chokepoints as scarce resources provides a framework for a policy response best suited to each existing threat.

Notes

¹ As suggested in chapter 1, in modern terms SLOCs might properly be conceived as sea lines of commerce. Although the traditional and military term remains sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the civilian maritime community frequently refers to such zones of transit as sea lanes of communication. To combine the commercial perspective with the imperative to defend maritime commerce using military forces, the author deliberately chooses sea lanes of communication and the acronym SLOC for use throughout this chapter.[BACK]

² Miroslav Nincic, How War Might Spread to Europe (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 18.[BACK]

³ Ibid.[BACK]

⁴ A major theme of Michael C. Desch, When the Third World Matters: Latin America and United States Grand Strategy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).[BACK]

⁵ This is to say that the ecological balance has some features reminiscent of a “balance of terror.” This approach emphasizes the need to “deescalate” from the environmental “brink,” noting that the desired outcome cannot be achieved unilaterally, but only through compatible choices made by all.[BACK]

⁶ Here we note issues such as the Iraqi destruction of the Kuwaiti oil fields during the Gulf War; land mines rendering farmland essentially nonarable; and the dumping of military nuclear waste at sea.[BACK]

⁷ See, particularly, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes As Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991), 76–116; and Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), 5–40.[BACK]

⁸ Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities,” 21–23.[BACK]

⁹ Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975), 283–284.[BACK]

¹⁰ Arthur H. Westing, Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).[BACK]

¹¹ While ships can, in theory, travel anywhere on the world’s oceans, the most efficient means of getting from one point to another by sea have remained fairly constant for more than 100 years. In spite of technological advances in transportation systems, prevailing winds, as well as ocean currents and predominant weather patterns, determine the safest and most efficient maritime trade routes, or sea lanes of communication/commerce (SLOCs). A chokepoint is a narrow strait or passage on a SLOC through an isthmus (the Panama Canal), a group of islands (the Straits of Malacca), or between two continental shores (the Bosporus and Dardanelles). Chokepoints can be vulnerable due to natural hazards (shallow depth or dangerous shoals, for example), or the danger of collision can increase due to “bottlenecking” and increased congestion. Furthermore, because they are, by definition, proximate to land and to land-based means of military power, they are at risk of being closed or threatened by an unfriendly state.[BACK]

¹² Independent World Commission on the Oceans, The Ocean, our Future....The Report of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 186.[BACK]

¹³ “Marine Transportation Policy,” National Governors Association, accessed at <www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_POLICY_POSITION^D_490,00.html>.[BACK]

¹⁴ Edward B. Barbier, Economics, Natural-Resource Scarcity and Development: Conventional and Alternative Views (London: Earthscan Publications Limited, 1989), x.[BACK]

¹⁵ “Dry Bulk Volumes Grow,” Hong Kong Shipping News International, no. 27 (November 10, 1997), n.p.[BACK]

¹⁶ Jeffrey Sachs, “The Limits of Convergence: Nature, Nurture, and Growth,” The Economist (June 14, 1997), 19.[BACK]

¹⁷ Ibid.[BACK]

¹⁸ John R. Anderson, “Multi-National Naval Cooperation into the 21st Century,” Halifax Maritime Symposium (Halifax, Nova Scotia: May 22–23, 1996).[BACK]

¹⁹ Paul de Bendern, “Booming World Trade Threatens Panama Canal Status,” Reuters, September 23, 1997.[BACK]

²⁰ Ibid.[BACK]

²¹ Ibid.[BACK]

²² Richard N. Cooper, “The Gulf Bottleneck: Middle East Stability and World Oil Supply,” Harvard International Review 19, no. 3 (Summer 1997), 20–21.[BACK]

²³ Ironically, the problem is of its own making. The canal was closed between 1967 and 1982 due to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The extended closure of the Suez Canal further encouraged the use of supertankers (very large crude carriers), developed in the 1960s, which are too large to use the Suez Canal but which offer cost-effective transportation for the Cape of Good Hope route around southern Africa.[BACK]

²⁴ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Egypt,” accessed at <http://www.eia.
doe.gov/emeu/international/egypt.html>.[BACK]

²⁵ Ibid.[BACK]

²⁶ “Suez Authority to Rethink Bulker Rebates,” Hong Kong Shipping News International, no. 18 (September 8, 1997).[BACK]

²⁷ U.S. Department of Energy, “Egypt.” [BACK]

²⁸ Ibid.[BACK]

²⁹ de Bendern.[BACK]

^{30 1} “More Panama Canal Draft Reductions Loom,” Hong Kong Shipping News International, no. 50 (May 11, 1998).[BACK]

³¹ “Piloting: Chemical-laden Tanker’s Hair-Raising Close Call at the Golden Gate,” Marine Watch Institute, accessed at <http://www.marinewatch.com>.[BACK]

³² U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Turkey,” accessed at <http://www.eia.
doe.gov/emeu/international/turkey.html>.[BACK]

³³ Ercan Ersoy, “Chevron Talks Straits, Pipeline with Turkey,” Turkish Daily News, May 17, 1996, 1.[BACK]

³⁴ The right of innocent passage, one of the fundamental tenets in the International Law of the Sea, states that all ships enjoy the right of passage through another state’s territorial sea, as long as that passage is continuous and expeditious, and as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. “Commentary—the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the agreement on implementation of part XI (Law of the Sea Convention),” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 6, supp–1 (February 1995), 5.[BACK]

³⁵ To assert their respective positions, Canada granted the Manhattan transit permission, even though the United States refused to request it.[BACK]

³⁶ In spring 1985, the Polar Sea, based in Seattle, was unexpectedly required to resupply the U.S. airbase in Thule, Greenland. The Polar Sea could have been sent through the Panama Canal, but this would have allowed insufficient time to return back through the canal to the western Arctic to complete its assigned western mission.[BACK]

³⁷ Ruth Walker, “Arctic Thaw Opening Up Lucrative Shipping Route,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 2000, 1.[BACK]

³⁸ Ibid.[BACK]

³⁹ While the Straits do not connect to the Caspian Sea, which is landlocked, a series of pipelines transits the oil from the Caspian to ports on the Black Sea, where it is put on ships and then moves through the Straits into the Mediterranean.[BACK]

⁴⁰ “State Minister Mirzaoglu Says Maritime Traffic Capacity in Turkish Straits Has Reached Its Limits,” Turkish Maritime Pilot’s Association, March 28, 2001, accessed at <http://www.turkishpilots.org>.[BACK]

⁴¹ “Turkey Threatens to Tax Oil Shipped Through Bosporus Straits,” accessed at <http://www.stratfor.com>.[BACK]

⁴² Jolyon Naegele, “Turkey: Caspian Oil Presents Challenge to the Straits,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 23, 1998, accessed at <http://www.rferl.org>.[BACK]

⁴³ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Turkey: Environmental Issues,” accessed at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkenv.html>.[BACK]

⁴⁴ Ibid.[BACK]