Economic and Strategic Implications of Ice-Free Arctic Seas

Jessie C. Carman

One of the principal public concerns about the globalization process is environmental degradation resulting in climatic changes. Aside from a multitude of effects on agriculture and human health, such changes hold other direct national security implications. Global climate predictions forecast the largest temperature change to be in the Arctic, and preliminary observations support the magnitude of Arctic change. National strategic scenario documents occasionally touch on global climate change as it pertains to such issues as disease, agriculture, or water availability; however, they do not perceive the impact of an Arctic change. A reduction of Arctic ice will open Arctic sea routes to commercial shipping and fishing and Arctic regions to economic hydrocarbon removal, producing significant global strategic implications. Impediments to Arctic development arise from the Russian economic situation, bipolar military security issues, Law of the Sea issues, physical infrastructure, and the risk of environmental damage. These and other impacts of this major change are worthy of consideration in long-range U.S. policy and force planning. This chapter details such a climate change scenario from a military planning perceptive, making recommendations for an appropriate naval response.¹

Projection of Arctic Climate

An increasing accumulation of scientific evidence supports projections that Arctic ice will be dramatically reduced or possibly disappear during part of the summer as soon as 2050. The evidence comes from a variety of sources, such as changes in ice thickness as reported by U.S. and British submarines,² satellite measurements of ice coverage, and climate modeling. Conservative estimates calculate a 12- to 40-percent reduction in summer ice extent has already occurred.³ Commercially viable Arctic sea lanes are anticipated to be opened for part of the year well before 2050, which could make the Arctic Ocean a major global trade route.⁴ The transit of the Northwest Passage by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police patrol ship St. Roch II in August 2000 without encountering ice supports this prediction.⁵ Additionally, technological progress in shipping indicates that the hydrocarbon industry will not wait for sea lanes to open for exploitation.⁶ Obviously, these trends have the potential to profoundly alter the international geopolitical and economic environment.

Current Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change climate projections call for a global average temperature increase that ranges from 1.4 to 5.8 C over the next century. This temperature increase will be greater for areas over land than over water and greater in polar than in temperate regions. In particular, the projected increase for the northern high-latitude winter exceeds the projected average global increase by 40 percent. The projected Arctic warming is highly seasonal, with an increase by mid-century in summer temperature of only 1 to 2 C but of 8 to 9 C in winter. The variability in predictions is almost as large as the warming itself, with variabilities ranging from 1 to 2 C in summer to 5 to 6 C in winter.⁷

An increase in global average water vapor concentration and precipitation by about 1 centimeter per month is projected to accompany this prediction, although the variability in precipitation predictions is wider than the variability in temperature predictions.⁸ Nevertheless, all projections hold that changes will be manifested first and with greatest magnitude in polar regions.

These temperature and precipitation projections translate into summer and winter Arctic weather conditions that remain harsh. A more ice-free ocean or longer ice-free season would lead to an increase in heat and moisture transfer from the ocean into the Arctic air, producing more low cloudiness, poorer visibility, freezing mist, and drizzle. These conditions would also contribute to more localized low pressure formation and hence increasing precipitation and high wind events.⁹ Freezing precipitation accompanied by high winds and seas implies significant ship superstructure and aircraft icing.

Exact ice conditions cannot be predicted, considering the range of variability in the climate conditions. However, model runs conducted by the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration show considerable loss of ice along the Arctic borders, although these results should be considered as suggestive for further research rather than as predictions of specific conditions. As ice coverage decreases, ice advection with wind and currents will cause considerable movement in non-landlocked ice, resulting in transit passages opening and closing on a scale of days.¹⁰

Review of National Scenario/Strategy Documents

Long-range geostrategic trend projections by different Federal agencies share a feature that is common in expert predictions:¹¹ the issues of the day tend to frame our thoughts, and the underlying assumptions that are the important issues of the present are assumed to retain their importance in the future. Our traditional map projections do us a psychological disservice, creating the impression that the Arctic Ocean is extremely large and at the edge of the economically powerful world. Without a sea-ice barrier to maritime communications, the Arctic Ocean becomes an internal ocean less than four times larger than the Mediterranean, a traditional highway of commerce.¹²

The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2015 identified key drivers and critical uncertainties for the period through 2015. Early in this time period, many of the changes will remain small, but effects should become apparent by its end in 2015, particularly since the largest changes are predicted for Arctic regions. The ice-free Northwest Passage transit of the St. Roch II in 2000 confirms that such changes are already occurring. Global Trends 2015 identified one key driver of the geostrategic environment as “natural resources and environment.” However, the document restricted its view to issues of food production and water scarcities. Climate discussions touched on some water and health-related issues but made no mention of the Arctic. Regarding global warming, only polar ice melting, sea level rise, and an increasing frequency of major storms are mentioned.¹³

Another geostrategic driver cited was energy resources. These were projected to remain concentrated in the Persian Gulf region, the Atlantic Basin, and to a lesser extent, the Caspian region and Central Asia.¹⁴ The report mentioned only that technological applications are opening remote and environmentally hostile areas to petroleum production.¹⁵ Global Trends 2015 went on to cite the possibility of “global energy supplies suffering a disruption” as a key uncertainty.¹⁶ The likelihood of this uncertainty could grow if changes progress as discussed below.

The National Defense Panel report Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21^st Century addressed the period 2010 to 2020 but made no mention of any climate issues in its extrapolation of geopolitical, social-demographic, economic, or technological trends. It hypothesized four plausible alternative world futures, essentially permutations o‡ current social and political circumstances. However, the natural environment was not considered even to the limited extent it was in Global Trends 2015.¹⁷

The Report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming, projected global scenarios to 2025. The document predicted that the national security of all advanced states will be increasingly affected by the vulnerabilities of the evolving global economic infrastructure and that energy will continue to have a major strategic significance.¹⁸ However, the document made no mention of Arctic trade routes and their potential significance for the economic infrastructure or the implications of access to Arctic energy sources for national strategy.¹⁹

In sum, most of the various national geostrategic scenario documents show some awareness that climate change will have an effect on the international strategic environment but do not address the possible implications of an Arctic Ocean open to transit.

Strategic Importance of the Arctic Ocean

The Arctic Ocean is an enclosed basin surrounded on all sides by technologically advanced countries with significant natural resources. It follows that an ice-free Arctic passage would provide for direct access to natural resources and hence enhanced opportunities for trade to those coastal areas. Additionally, routes through the Arctic dramatically shorten transit distances between existing commercial regions and trade centers.

Trans-Arctic trade. Trade routes through the Arctic translate into significant decreases in transit distances between the globe’s economic centers. For instance, the Northern Sea Route between Europe and East Asia is 40 percent shorter through the Arctic than through the Suez Canal. The over-the-top route will be primarily of interest for trade between Europe and the Far East, between Europe and the west coast of the United States, and between the Far East and the east coast of the United States.

One assessment estimates that the Northwest Passage could be open for navigation for most of the year within 10 to 20 years.²⁰ This route will almost certainly spur an increase in trade between opposite coasts of major continents.

Ice-breaking currently makes Arctic navigation expensive. With a decrease in ice, some ice-breaking programs may be cut back, but interannual variability in ice thickness and location will prevent its elimination altogether. Ironically, the demand for newly available routes may be such they will need to be kept open longer, at either end of the summer season, thus driving up the cost again.²¹

Fishing industry. Increased access to polar waters will greatly affect the fishing industry. In polar regions, the number of dominant fish species is small. The poleward expansion of bordering species might produce better yields for temperate species, but some cold-water species are very sensitive to temperature change in their spawning grounds. These might be destroyed by changes in water properties, making prediction of future fishing stocks difficult.²² As troubled fishing stocks continue to dwindle, increasing pressure on fishery resources in the North Pacific and North Atlantic may cause the fishing industry to “push the limits” and attempt to exploit the Arctic sooner than natural conditions permit. Naval and Coast Guard rescues of fishing vessels caught in ice may become routine long before sea ice degradation allows extensive civil transport through the Arctic Ocean.²³

Hydrocarbons. In the past decade, the gas and oil industries have shown serious interest in using the Northern Sea Route with ice-capable tankers even before practical ice-free use of the route becomes available. The Finnish company Kvaerner-Masa Shipyards has developed an effective propeller and hull design, with which the tanker Uikku has passed her 5-year survey;²⁴Uikku and her sister ship Lunni have operated on the Northern Sea Route since 1993.²⁵ Fortum Shipping has ordered new double-acting tankers from Sumitomo Heavy Industries in Japan for delivery in 2002. Built to Finnish/Swedish specifications, these ships will enable year-round operations in the Pechora Sea.²⁶ Lukoil added ice-capable tankers to its fleet after acquiring Murmansk Shipping Company.²⁷ Gazprom and the Norwegian companies Statoil and Norsk Hydro were active in the southeast Pechora Sea in summer 1998. These developments have already prompted the statement that the “legendary Northern Sea Route is losing its Russian appearance.”²⁸ The implication is that foreign (non-Russian) shipping is already moving to open and develop the Northern Sea Route for resource access and trade.

Siberia’s huge oil and natural gas resource reserves are the reason for economic pressure to open the Northern Sea Route. Reserves are estimated to be comparable to those in the Middle East.²⁹ Oil amounts are estimated at over 10.5 billion tons in Tyumen Oblast and Krasnoyarsk Kray alone, of which 5.5 percent has been exploited.³⁰ Extraction of resources on land is already feasible from an engineering standpoint; the difficulty is getting materials out economically. Current infrastructures place severe restrictions on transporting oil from these regions, because of the aging Russian pipeline system (under control of the Russian state company Transneft) and the limited handling capacity at sea ports on the Baltic and Black Seas. At this time, there is no way to transport Siberian oil to the Russian Far East, but given that Asia will be a primary energy customer in the early part of this century, there will be a strong impetus to create an export route toward the east.³¹ (Increasing Asian requirements for oil are discussed in detail in chapter 10.) Local and consortium projects to pipe oil to ports on the Northern Sea Route and ship it out are under development, creating a transportation infrastructure more under control of the investors and, incidentally, opening up new oil and trade markets both eastward and westward.³²

In short, the hydrocarbon industries are already moving to exploit Arctic regions through new technologies and consortium projects. Climate change will make their task easier and more economical. An interesting sequela to this newly available source of energy is that, when economically feasible, the resources will all be the property of technologically developed countries with diversified economic bases, which are already major consumers of resources (in contrast to the supply monocultures of the Middle East). This change could dramatically alter the balance of trade with other resource-producing countries. An influx of currency would greatly help Russia to overcome its economic woes, although infrastructure and health problems will suboptimize economic benefit in the immediate future.³³

Increased access for the hydrocarbon industry will occur in conjunction with increased fishing activity and trade possibilities, all of which could act together to promote dramatic development if policies are implemented to foster that development in a sustainable fashion.

Impediments to Arctic Development

Great potential clearly exists for economic development when Arctic coastal waters open up. However, several impediments will make development more difficult or uneven.

Russian economic situation. A key impediment is Russia’s economic situation. The Russian North has been painfully affected by the post-Soviet transition of the country because the area’s former state-owned, nearly monoculture economy has been incapable of self-regulation. Economic woes have triggered a massive emigration; state programs and funding have been insufficient to mitigate the crisis. ³⁴ However, international cooperation in the Northern Sea Route is part of current Russian economic strategy; the country is working with Conoco, Amoco, Exxon, and Texaco in a joint venture to extract petroleum deposits from the Barents and Timano-Pechora basins.³⁵ The principal need is for transport systems to link the Arctic region with other parts of Russia and overseas partners. One problem decreasing the economic competitiveness of the Northern Sea Route has been ice-breaking fees.³⁶ However, as the need for ice breaking decreases, such fees should be lessened or discontinued. Additional foreign investment in Arctic commercial ships, both foreign and Russian-flag, and in ports and associated infrastructure will be necessary for the Northern Sea Route to flourish.³⁷

Bipolar security issues. Political perceptions of the Arctic sea routes may be another problem. These perceptions are a legacy of the Cold War-era bipolar security paradigm. Moreover, the underlying assumptions have little validity.³⁸ During the U.S.-Soviet standoff, control of Arctic sea routes was thought crucial for surveillance, ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) stationing, and as a communications link for Russian Navy interfleet transfers. Examination of these points shows they are not robust. The Northern Sea Route is not important for surveillance, as any classified information obtained visually from a ship’s deck is more likely available via satellite.³⁹ As a station for SSBNs, the Northern Sea Route is too shallow, except in extremely constricted locations (submerged chasms), which are poor tactical choices.⁴⁰ As a route for interfleet transfer of Russian Navy ships, the Northern Sea Route has been hazardous: Russian ships are constructed with thin hulls for speed; during the Cold War, one in three suffered damage due to ice during transit and one in five naval transfers spent the winter ice-bound in Arctic waters.⁴¹

In contrast to the sea routes, the strategic importance of the marginal ice zone and open ocean is much greater; as the open waters become more benign, their use may increase, driving an increase in naval interactions.⁴² Therefore, as ice retreats, the Arctic will witness an increase in surface naval activity over subsurface activity. From a post-Soviet Russian point of view, the true importance of the Northern Sea Route should be not military but economic. This importance has grown as many temperate ports that were part of the former Soviet Union were lost to the new republics.⁴³

Law of the Sea issues. Another impediment to Arctic development may be diplomatic and turns on different interpretations of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) issues. UNCLOS III defines various terms for legally establishing a country’s maritime territory. The baseline is the line from which the outer limits of the territorial sea and other coastal state zones, including the contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone, are measured. UNCLOS III also defines permissible points for locating baselines around indented coastlines, fringing islands, and bays.

In the case of Russia, there are discrepancies between Russia’s declared Arctic baselines and the traditional criteria. For instance, Russia draws baselines connecting Novaya Zemlya and Vaigach Islands to the mainland, rendering the straits between (connecting the Barents and Kara Seas) to be internal waters. These islands are only arguably “fringing islands” and do not form a screen masking a large proportion of the coast from the sea. However, several other countries draw baselines having large degrees of deviation from the general direction of the coast or lying large distances from the coast.⁴⁴ Similar and more detailed analyses can be made for Russian baselines joining Severnaya Zemlya and Novosibirskiye Ostrova to the mainland. Additionally, some areas of the mainland coastline have baselines drawn that fail to meet UNCLOS III requirements for enclosing bays or determining points to establish baselines.⁴⁵ However, Russia has moderate support for its position in state practice, for some 12 states have enclosed failed juridical bays and some 14 states have located basepoints at sea. Additionally, Russian claims have been largely unopposed; only the United States has protested.⁴⁶ U.S. legal positions regarding these straits are based more on perceptions of the straits’ strategic importance than on their legal relevance; thus, a stand on this issue could cause more difficulties than it is worth.⁴⁷ Although the waters enclosed by these baselines can arguably be claimed as internal waters, if they could not previously have been considered as internal waters, the right of innocent passage exists. It must be noted that Russian claims only impact transits of limited numbers of straits; exclusive economic zone issues and control of resources are unaffected.

The Canadian attitude toward sovereignty over Arctic waters is tangled. Ottawa’s positions have not developed consistently with time, showing an ad hoc policy on Arctic archipelagic waters motivated largely by reaction to U.S. actions and to public perceptions.⁴⁸ As a maritime nation and one concerned about international precedent, the United States has taken the position that the waters north of the Canadian landmass are “international straits” through which freedom of navigation prevails.⁴⁹ The Canadian position has developed over the years in an uneven path, with Canada finally claiming the waters to be internal in 1985 by declaring straight baselines around the archipelago.⁵⁰

In 1988 the Arctic Cooperation Agreement between Canada and the United States declared that navigation by U.S. icebreakers within those waters claimed to be internal by Canada would be undertaken with Canadian consent; the agreement did not address the status of the waters.⁵¹ The agreement temporarily stabilized the situation, but it only addressed icebreakers under the assumption that any commercial vessel would require the assistance of at least one icebreaker.⁵² As climate conditions change, this assumption may be invalid, and the situation may become uncertain again.

Physical infrastructure. Another impediment to economic development in the Arctic is the physical infrastructure—or rather, its lack. Arctic travel depends on ice roads in winter and water routes in summer.⁵³ These roads are fragile and at risk with climate change. Widespread loss of permafrost will trigger erosion or subsidence of ice-rich landscapes. Liquefaction of the thawed layer will result in mudflows on slopes in terrain that is poorly drained. Building roads on transient landscape will be problematic. Additionally, with earlier snowmelt and with more precipitation falling as rain than as snow, the seasonality of river flows will change; since many such rivers are north-flowing, cross several climate zones, and will carry a heavier load of sediments, predictions of river trafficability or bridge requirements are further complicated.⁵⁴ Thus transportation of goods and people will be uncertain, and engineering solutions will become a major challenge.

Environmental issues. Spills will present a major difficulty to resource exploitation in the Arctic. For various reasons, oil spills present a greater problem to the Arctic environment than to temperate areas.⁵⁵ While several sources contribute to the Arctic load of hydrocarbon contamination (marine shipping, burning of fossil fuels, long-range transport, natural oil seeps), oil and gas development is the major cause of contamination.⁵⁶ Accidental oil spills and chronic releases from poorly maintained pipelines and ships are the greatest threat. The Russian pipelines are old, lack safety valves, and are constantly plagued by leaks. Oil is often left flowing while repairs are made because losing oil is less expensive than building a bypass and stopping the flow might cause the oil in the pipeline to solidify.⁵⁷

Based on statistics outside of the Arctic, the probability of spills over the production period of specified Arctic petroleum reserves can be estimated. In the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, there is a probability of 0.58 to 0.99 of between 1 and 8 spills equal to or larger than 1,000 barrels. Spills exceeding 10,000 barrels have an estimated probability between 0.24 and 0.92.⁵⁸

Tanker spills present the largest shipping pollution risk; most incidents occur at terminals where tankers load or unload. Most damage is usually localized to the immediate area around the port.⁵⁹

Many legal instruments are already in place to address this issue—for example, UNCLOS III, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), and the London Convention of 1972; ⁶⁰ compliance is another problem when enforcement capability is limited.⁶¹

Thus, for all the real benefits to be gained with increased Arctic development, there will also be risks and problems to manage. Many of these problems could act as triggers for international incidents.

Impacts on Non-Arctic Regions

During the early part of the 21st century, the impact of global warming will be less visible in other parts of the world than in the Arctic, since the climate change “signal” is largest in the Arctic, and the more dramatic changes will be seen later in the century. The environment and infrastructures of various world regions will be stressed in different ways.⁶² Two key problems will be reduced water availability due to salt water incursions into ground water, and increased concentrations of sewage waste and industrial effluents due to a projected drop of water level in dams and rivers.⁶³ These changes could lead to an increase in water politics internationally.⁶⁴

In addition to these general pressures, most of the Arctic changes described so far will likely have negative consequences for the Middle East. Much of the Western motivation to support local regimes can be summed up in one word: oil. If—or when—effective competitors for providing resources arise, Middle Eastern regimes will have less Western support. This could mean, in turn, that existing demographic problems, social unrest, religious and ideological extremism, and terrorism already occurring will become more acute. Most Middle East regimes are change-resistant, buoyed by continuing energy revenues, and will likely find it difficult to make necessary reforms to change these trends.⁶⁵

The emergence of Arctic oil sources could decrease long-term dependence on Middle East sources, but due to the impediments discussed above, the shift in primary source will not occur overnight but will involve a transition period in which Middle East sources are still important but of decreasing criticality. This stress could trigger one of the Global Trends 2015 key uncertainties, by producing conflict among key energy-producing states, sustained internal instability in two or more major energy-producing states, or major terrorist actions leading to such a disruption.⁶⁶ Such instability could drive shippers to choose Arctic routes not only for their shorter length but also for their greater safety.

New Theater of Operations

The inexorable changes in the Arctic will have dramatic impacts on the international environment, and the United States should position itself carefully to benefit responsibly. Planning for external policy issues should emphasize diplomatic and economic options so long as minimal military support requirements are met.

Rather than allowing legalistic intergovernmental conflicts to determine the tone of international relations, the United States should pursue a leadership role in external policies to promote effective, responsible, and sustainable development of Arctic trade. This changing world picture will involve enough difficult issues as to require strong leadership with a long-term global perspective.

The government should promote strong intergovernmental ties through participation in such efforts as the Arctic Council and its subsidiary organizations. Through these organizations issues can be addressed that affect wide regions. By actively promoting a view for the Arctic based less on territorial sovereignty and more on overlapping and interpenetrating authority in economic, political, cultural, and environmental affairs,⁶⁷ some of the sovereignty issues discussed above can be seen in a larger perspective. Policies should emphasize sustainable development, emergency preparedness and response, and conservation issues in the face of a changing climate.

For instance, increased traffic will require an increase in policing, rescue, and environmental needs to enforce existing legal requirements. Canadian funding for Arctic patrols is insufficient to meet an increased demand; the maritime forces have no capability to operate in the north.⁶⁸ Past funding efforts, such as the Polar-8 icebreaker program and fixed underwater surveillance systems, were cancelled in 1990 and 1996 respectively.⁶⁹ A collective security agreement could allow U.S. assistance for some events; due to sovereignty sensitivities the specific events in which the United States would assist could be limited by agreement to search and rescue, vessel rescue, pollution incidents, or similar activities.

The United States should actively participate in the development of unified and international ship standards specifically addressing polar ships, to strengthen polar ship safety and enhance protection of polar marine environments. Canadian and Russian experience with “Canadian Arctic Pollution Prevention Regulations” and “Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route” respectively provide a major body of experience.⁷⁰

The United States should promote coalitions with the European Union and Eastern Pacific countries to support trade, which will benefit from shorter routes.

The economic effects of changing resource availability and trade will particularly hurt the Middle East. This change could lead to an increase in religious or ethnic resentment, activism, and organized terrorism as the only means of fighting. Economic aid and diplomacy to help these countries adapt to changing circumstances could mitigate the effects; the United States should additionally maintain an alert posture to ensure the protection of its interests against potential threats.

Old Mission in a New Region

The above-described policies will incur some force requirements, particularly for maritime patrol in the Arctic. Protection of SLOCs does appear in various strategy documents; this naval obligation will extend to a new region with a harsh environment. Additionally, protection and ice rescue of fishing vessels, tankers, and cargo ships will add to Coast Guard obligations.

We are currently unprepared for such obligations, as current warships do not have ice strengthening; it must be factored into future designs, in particular to protect bow-mounted sonar domes and arrays.⁷¹ When planning such designs, we should assume likely operation of surface warships in the Arctic could be in an area of “first-year” ice, less than one meter thick, covering no more than 60 percent of the total area of operations. In this situation, American Bureau of Shipping rules require strengthening of the bow and stern areas.⁷² U.S. Naval ships do not meet such requirements; to have any ships capable of meeting these requirements, long planning times must be factored in. The U.S. Coast Guard has three icebreakers, the USCGC Polar Sea and USCGC Polar Star, built in the 1970s ⁷³ and the USCGC Healy, built in 1997.⁷⁴ These assets will be insufficient to meet realistic patrol requirements.

This new operational region involves primarily a presence mission. As noted in chapter 15, a force planning methodology based on analyzing threat-based major regional contingency scenarios tends to underestimate the military forces required for overseas presence.⁷⁵ Using the interests-to-military-tasks methodology, a key political interest within the Arctic will be protection of SLOCs and an unimpeded flow of oil at fair market value. The military objective associated with this political interest is “protection of shipping.” To support this objective, a force must be capable of air defense/superiority; littoral undersea warfare; strike/surface fire; intelligence/surveillance/command, control, and communications; escort operations; maritime interdiction operations; mine countermeasures; and gas/oil platform operations. The force required for this objective includes five surface combatants (three Aegis), two mine countermeasures ships, and supporting surveillance and logistics assets.⁷⁶ Coast Guard maritime security cutters could be an alternative to some of these ships, to fill the gap between U.S. Navy destroyers and patrol boats. Such assets would also permit integration of U.S. Coast Guard maritime security experience into the Navy force or would conduct maritime-intercept tasks, coastal patrol duties, or environmental defense activity with less impact on political sensitivities. All of these assets must be capable of operating in an Arctic environment without needing assistance themselves, able to conduct flight operations in conditions of heavy aircraft and superstructure icing and occasional heavy fog. There must additionally be sufficient resources to permit rotation of forces in the region.

Concurrently with physical resources, support for missions in these areas must be planned and programmed. Northern basing, probably in Alaska, would help logistical support. Not only logistics and training but also operational environmental support for operations under harsh Arctic conditions must be prepared for. Operational support, however, is an easy problem relative to the financial outlays involved in ship, aircraft, weapon, sensor, and logistic support.

While these issues involve increases in naval resource requirements, opening Arctic sea lanes will also shorten U.S. interfleet transfers just as it shortens merchant routes. Since carriers and large-deck amphibious ships are too big to transit the Panama Canal, they currently travel around Cape Horn when transferring from one coast to the other. As a comparison, the route from Norfolk to Yokosuka via the Northwest Passage is roughly half the distance via Cape Horn; the route from Norfolk to San Diego via the Northwest Passage is roughly two-thirds the distance via Cape Horn. As an additional benefit, a ship making such a transfer could conduct its “protection of shipping” mission in transit.

Planning Considerations and New Scenarios

Current scenario-planning documents reflect a historical mindset, assuming that the only effect of the Arctic on global politics is from a Cold War security standpoint and that the only effects of global warming are the environmental stresses (which are, in fact, projected to be significant). The report Transforming Defense—National Security in the 21st Century identifies geopolitical and economic trends for the period 2010 to 2020, but none of the above.⁷⁷ The Clinton administration National Security Strategy committed the United States to supporting freedom of navigation/overflight and mentions environmental and health initiatives.⁷⁸ Its section on integrated regional approaches discusses different world regions from the point of view of security and promoting prosperity; however, the Arctic was not one of the regions discussed.⁷⁹ LConsequently, the National Military Strategy mentions freedom of navigation ⁸⁰ and Joint Vision 2020 projects changing transportation, communications, and information technology, ⁸¹ but neither registers that these missions will occur in new environments. The assessments and recommendations in these documents describe valid issues that will undoubtedly affect the world in the next 20 to 25 years; the documents simply miss a change that could transform the global geopolitical balance.

This silence is a symptom of the apparent invisibility of Arctic issues in national security policy. No longer seized by a Soviet threat, the United States perceives no substantial interests specific to the Arctic.⁸² The trend presently occurring is unrecognized, in spite of early indications such as ice-free summertime passages and the petroleum industry’s preparations to open shipping through the North whether or not open sea routes appear. Thus, in dealing with international cooperation regarding management of Arctic waters, the United States is not playing the leadership role it could and should.⁸³

While these force-planning recommendations may appear slanted toward maritime rather than joint forces, it must be realized that the current topic is a “new” ocean basin with all that implies. This is a presence mission like others; expanding the area required will impact deployment coverage, while expanding the environment will drive platform capabilities. One may ask why we need to extend our capabilities to the environmentally harsh but relatively peaceful Arctic environment. However, incidents tend to arise overnight, and the impediments discussed above could provide ample potential triggers; let an economically important region produce an incident to which the nation is materially incapable of responding, and we will find ourselves forced to accept an undesirable political or economic outcome.

This chapter has concentrated on a basically peaceful vision of Arctic opening. The presence of technologically capable nations along the Arctic rim does, however, raise the possibility of a peer competitor intent on aggressively confronting U.S. interests within the time frame included here. The interests-to-military-tasks methodology yields the force required to meet the military task of “credible U.S. naval combat force in situ”; that force is a carrier battlegroup and an amphibious ready group with embarked special-operations-capable Marine expeditionary unit and supporting forces.⁸⁴ Forces again must be capable of operating in an Arctic environment without needing assistance themselves, able to conduct combat operations in the harsh Arctic environment, and with sufficient resources to permit rotation of forces. Hopefully the United States can exert sufficient diplomatic and economic leadership to minimize this possibility.

The resource planning implications of these changes are considerable, and the large range of variability remaining in the climate projections for this century means a wide range of scenarios to plan/program for. Further research to more closely quantify the rate of ice thinning is necessary to narrow the climate predictions and permit more timely planning of programs requiring long lead time for acquisition. In the meanwhile, defense and foreign planning scenarios should reflect the possibility that a globalized ice-free Arctic Sea could become a region of economic and political conflict.

Notes

¹ The climate changes discussed in this chapter are among the many documented and projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), but rather than address all the impacts of climate change, this discussion focuses on how the Arctic changes will affect global political and economic issues. Warming in the Arctic will have dramatic effects on the lives of local peoples as well as local flora and fauna; however, external geopolitical and economic forces may arguably drive more change in the Arctic than climate does. This chapter does not address climate mitigation policies, as their implementation is part of a decisionmaking process separate from the military force planning process.[BACK]

² D. A. Rothrock, Y. Yu, and G. A. Maykut, “Thinning of the Arctic Sea-Ice Cover,” Geophysical Research Letters (December 1, 1999), 3469–3472; P. Wadhams, and N. Davis, “Further Evidence of Ice Thinning in the Arctic Ocean,” Geophysical Research Letters (December 15, 2000), 3973–3975.[BACK]

³ G. W. Brass, ed., The Arctic Ocean and Climate Change: A Scenario for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Arctic Research Commission Special Report (Arlington, VA: U.S. Arctic Research Commission, 2001), 7; Institute of Ocean Sciences, Sidney, B.C., “Is Arctic Sea Ice Rapidly Vanishing?” accessed at <http://www.sci.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/osap/projects/jpod/projects/arc_thin/thin1.htm>.[BACK]

⁴ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Special Report, The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers, November 1997, 8.[BACK]

⁵ James Brooke, “Through the Northwest Passage in a Month, Ice-Free,” The New York Times, September 5, 2000, A3.[BACK]

⁶ “Opening up the Northern Sea Route,” The Naval Architect (November 2000), 6–8.[BACK]

⁷ IPCC Working Group 1, Contribution to the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC, Climate Change, 2001: The Scientific Basis (Draft), Summary for Policymakers, January 21, 2001, 8, available at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/spm22–01.pdf>; IPCC Working Group 2, Contribution to the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Draft), Summary for Policymakers, February 19, 2001, 1, accessed at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/wg2SPMFinal.pdf>. Climate effects due to unexpected events like climate-change-induced marine current changes have not been considered, as they cannot be predicted at present. (See IPCC, Special Report, The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers, 1, accessed at <http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/regional/501htm>.) Most models show a weakening of the ocean thermohaline (temperature-salt, or “conveyor belt”) circulation leading to a reduction of heat transport into high latitudes of the northern hemisphere; however, even models in which the thermohaline circulation weakens still show a warming over Europe due to increased greenhouse gases. Current projections using climate models do not exhibit a complete shutdown of the thermohaline circulation by 2100. (See IPCC Working Group 1, 10.)[BACK]

⁸ Brass, 5.[BACK]

⁹ Ibid., 8.[BACK]

¹⁰ Wieslaw Maslowski, Naval Postgraduate School, personal communication, December 28, 2000. With this ice melt predicted, a sea level rise of 0.09 to 0.88 meters is expected by 2100. (See IPCC Working Group 2, 1.) This range includes thermal expansion of the oceans as well as expected melting of ice caps; melting of floating ice will not alter sea levels.[BACK]

¹¹ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21^st Century, Study Addendum (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 15, 1999), 4.[BACK]

¹² National Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World, 7th ed. (Willard, OH: R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 1999), 135.[BACK]

¹³ National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialog about the Future with Nongovernment Experts, NIC 2000–02 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2000), 32.[BACK]

¹⁴ Ibid., 9.[BACK]

¹⁵ Ibid., 28.[BACK]

¹⁶ Ibid., 39.[BACK]

¹⁷ National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21^st Century, December 1997, accessed at <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2/pdf>.[BACK]

¹⁸ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21^st Century, Major Themes and Implications, Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21^st Century (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 15, 1999), 4–5.[BACK]

¹⁹ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concept for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, Phase II Report on a U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21^st Century (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2000).[BACK]

²⁰ Canadian Directorate of Defense, Arctic Capabilities Study, June 2000, accessed at <http://12.1.239.251/arctic/Arctic%20Study%20Final%20–%20Canada1.htm>, 6.[BACK]

²¹ IPCC, Special Report: The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, November 1997, accessed at <http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/regional/054.htm>.[BACK]

²² IPCC, Special Report: The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, November 1997, accessed at <http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/regional/053.htm>.[BACK]

²³ Brass, 11.[BACK]

²⁴ “Opening Up the Northern Sea Route,” 6–8.[BACK]

²⁵ Lawson W. Brigham, “The Northern Sea Route, 1998,” Polar Record 36 (2000), 19–24.[BACK]

²⁶ “Opening Up the Northern Sea Route,” 6–8.[BACK]

²⁷ Ibid.[BACK]

²⁸ Brigham, 19–24.[BACK]

²⁹ “Opening Up the Northern Sea Route,” 6.[BACK]

³⁰ Valery Kryukov, Valery Shmat, and Arild Moe, “West Siberian Oil and the Northern Sea Route: Current Situation and Future Potential,” Polar Geography 19 (1995), 234.[BACK]

³¹ Kryukov, Shmat, and Moe, 228; United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 79.[BACK]

³² Kryukov, Shmat, and Moe, 230–232.[BACK]

³³ Murray Feshbach, “Dead Souls,” The Atlantic Monthly (February 1999), 26–27.[BACK]

³⁴ Alexander G. Granberg, “The Northern Sea Route: Trends and Prospects of Commercial Use,” Ocean and Coastal Management 41 (1998), 183–184 and 198.[BACK]

³⁵ Ibid., 200.[BACK]

³⁶ Ibid., 200–201.[BACK]

³⁷ Lawson Brigham, “The Northern Sea Route: Soviet Legacy and Uncertain Future,” British East-West Journal (September 1998), 3–4.[BACK]

³⁸ R. Douglas Brubaker, and Willy Østreng, “The Northern Sea Route Regime: Exquisite Superpower Subterfuge?” Ocean Development & International Law 30, no. 4 (October–December 1999), 323.[BACK]

³⁹ Ibid., 310.[BACK]

⁴⁰ Ibid., 306.[BACK]

⁴¹ Ibid., 305.[BACK]

⁴² Ibid., 310.[BACK]

⁴³ Ibid., 303; Granberg, 182.[BACK]

⁴⁴ R. Douglas Brubaker, “The Legal Status of the Russian Baselines in the Arctic,” Ocean Development & International Law 30, no. 4 (October–December 1999), 209–210.[BACK]

⁴⁵ Ibid., 213–217.[BACK]

⁴⁶ Ibid., 218.[BACK]

⁴⁷ Brubaker and Østreng, 323.[BACK]

⁴⁸ Rob Huebert, “Polar vision or tunnel vision: the making of Canadian Arctic waters policy,” Marine Policy 19, 1995, 343.[BACK]

⁴⁹ Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel, “Still Unresolved after Fifty Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American Relations, 1946–1998,” American Review of Canadian Studies 29, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), 409. See also Donald R. Rothwell, “The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A Reassessment,” Cornell International Law Journal 26, no. 2 (Spring 1993), 347.[BACK]

⁵⁰ In 1969, the SS Manhattan with a small cargo of oil was deliberately sent through the passage by its owners to demonstrate that an icebreaking bulk carrier was capable of year-round sailings between Alaska and the east coast of the United States. At the time of the passage, Canada had not asserted any sovereignty claim over the archipelago’s waters other than a 3-mile territorial sea; consequently, most of the passage fell under the regime of high seas navigation. Although the Manhattan carried a Canadian government representative and was accompanied by a Canadian Coast Guard vessel, public controversy over this voyage caused Canada to implement the Arctic Waters Pollution Act, extend its territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles, and withdraw its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for matters regarding Canada’s Arctic jurisdiction (Rothwell, 339–340). In 1985, the United States sent the USCGC Polar Sea through the passage, informing Canada and carrying two Canadian Coast Guard captains as “invited observers” but not asking official permission. After this voyage and the media controversy it generated, Canada declared straight baselines around the archipelago, withdrew its reservation to the ICJ, and called for construction of the Polar Class 8 icebreakers (ibid., 344). This declaration made all enclosed waters “internal” and provided for enforcement. Legal support exists for both the U.S. and Canadian positions (ibid., 345). The 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement between Canada and the United States provided for both states to facilitate and develop cooperative measures for icebreaker navigation in their respective Arctic waters, for both states to take advantage of their icebreaker navigation to share research information, and for navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal to be undertaken with the consent of Canada (ibid., 353–360). Then the Polar Class 8 icebreakers were cancelled in 1990 in part as a result of the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement (Huebert, 356).[BACK]

⁵¹ Rothwell, 345.[BACK]

⁵² Huebert, 360.[BACK]

⁵³ Granberg, 176.[BACK]

⁵⁴ IPCC, Special Report: The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, November, 1997, accessed at <http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/regional/048.htm>; Brass, 10.[BACK]

⁵⁵ The Arctic environment responds differently than extra-Arctic regions to oil spills. The ice provides surfaces both above and below the water where oil can be trapped. The undersurface of ice can be very rough, with large pockets in which the oil can remain for as long as the ice stays solid. Some of the oil may become encapsulated and move with the ice. Thus, on the edge of the multi-year pack ice, oil can move about 150 kilometers per month in winter. Oil encapsulated in ice will not break down but will appear essentially unweathered at the surface when the ice starts to melt (Arctic Council/Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report, June 1997, 8, accessed at <http://www.amap.no/assess/soaer10.htm>). Degradation and cleaning by bacteria and fungi that use hydrocarbons as an energy source proceeds slowly due to the short season in which temperatures are high enough for bacteria and fungi to be active. Natural cleaning after a spill may therefore take decades rather than years (ibid., 14). Lack of equipment and methods to contain oil and to clean ice-infested areas increases the potential threat from oil spills in the Arctic (ibid., 8).[BACK]

⁵⁶ Arctic Council/Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.[BACK]

⁵⁷ Ibid.[BACK]

⁵⁸ Ibid.[BACK]

⁵⁹ Ibid.[BACK]

⁶⁰ Arctic Council/Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy: Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines, June 13, 1997, 4.[BACK]

⁶¹ Arctic Council/Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.[BACK]

⁶² IPCC, Special Report, The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers; United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming, Supporting Research and Analysis to the Phase I Report, 58–115; National Intelligence Council, 60–82.[BACK]

⁶³ IPCC, Special Report, The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers, 6.[BACK]

⁶⁴ Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” in Strategy and Force Planning, 3d ed., compiled by Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 398–399.[BACK]

⁶⁵ National Intelligence Council, 16.[BACK]

⁶⁶ Ibid., 39.[BACK]

⁶⁷ Franklyn Griffiths, “The Northwest Passage in Transit,” International Journal 54, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 196.[BACK]

⁶⁸ Canadian Directorate of Defense, 18.[BACK]

⁶⁹ Elliot-Meisel, 417.[BACK]

⁷⁰ Lawson W. Brigham, “An International Polar Navigation Code for the Twenty-First Century,” Polar Record (1997), 283–284.[BACK]

⁷¹ Brass, 14.[BACK]

⁷² Ibid., 13–14.[BACK]

⁷³ U.S. Coast Guard, “Polar Class Icebreakers (WAGB),” accessed at <http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/icepolr.htm>.[BACK]

⁷⁴ U.S. Coast Guard, “USCGC Healy,” accessed at <http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/healy/>. [BACK]

⁷⁵ Philip A. Dur, “Presence: Forward, Ready, Engaged,” in Strategy and Force Planning, 473.[BACK]

⁷⁶ Ibid., 475.[BACK]

⁷⁷ National Defense Panel, 5–7.[BACK]

⁷⁸ White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), 12–13.[BACK]

⁷⁹ Ibid., 29–47.[BACK]

⁸⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997), 29.[BACK]

⁸¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, June, 2000, 4.[BACK]

⁸² Franklyn Griffiths, “Environment in the U.S. Security Debate: The Case of the Missing Arctic Waters,” Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Spring 1997, 22, accessed at <http://ecsp.si.edu/pdf/Report3a.pdf>.[BACK]

⁸³ Ibid., 21.[BACK]

⁸⁴ Dur, 474. [BACK]