Implications for Multinational Naval Doctrine

James J. Tritten

Globalization has shattered the reliable predictability of the Cold War, engendering greater interdependence, opportunity, and perhaps insecurity as we move into the global 21st century. It will be a century that has continued conflicts over territory and new conflicts with nonstate actors—much the same as previous global wars against piracy. There are natural breeding grounds for conflict born out of deep-rooted historical animosities, regional instability, vulnerabilities, and the proliferation of the means of war.

Despite efforts to bring global outliers being left behind into the growing prosperity and stability offered by the new global 21st century, governments have an obligation to be prepared to use military forces and force to achieve political objectives. The future use of military power will continue to include operations in areas that do not have prepared support infrastructure, thus making operations from the sea a national core competency that must be maintained. The U.S. Armed Forces will need to be able to wage major theater warfare (MTW) and major regional contingencies (MRCs) as well as execute small-scale contingency operations (SSCOs) and lesser regional contingencies (LRCs) and a whole series of military operations other than war (MOOTW).

The implication for navies in such an environment is to shift to a capabilities-based fleet that maximizes its flexibility to respond to a wider range of wars than the heretofore canonical MTW scenarios. The U.S. Navy and all of the U.S. Armed Forces are now in an international security environment that mandates the participation of other nations if we are to succeed in any actions taken at the MTW/MRC level—if for no other reason than the need for host nation support. SSCOs/LRCs might be undertaken unilaterally but would naturally benefit from the contributions and legitimacy afforded by the participation of other nations.

What Is Multinational Navy Doctrine, and Why Is It Needed?

One way to increase the combat potential of U.S. forces is to improve their ability to act with allied or coalition forces that join together for specific military actions. The U.S. National Military Strategy in the 1990s specifically highlighted recent efforts to strengthen allied doctrine as a means to improve readiness.¹Doctrine is a term that is not often or fully recognized by fleet sailors and is used often by other nations and academics in a way that does not parallel its use by the U.S. military. Just what is this doctrine, and how might it help achieve readiness?

The primary definition of doctrine is “something taught” or “a piece of instruction...that which is taught...in the most general sense.”²Doctrine is also defined as “a principle or body of principles presented by a specific field, system, or organization for acceptance or belief” or “a body or system of principles or tenets; a doctrinal or theoretical system; a theory; a science, or department of knowledge.” From an organizational perspective, doctrine is those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession. Doctrine also determines the behavior of the profession. Doctrine is not meant to be just what is taught or the ink in booklets that line bookshelves.

Doctrine is a form of policy. Less perishable than current policy, it is policy nonetheless. General policy is not designed to standardize decisionmaking—military doctrine is.³ Doctrine is the basis of the “contract” under which forces provided by nations are expected to operate. Because they are expected to operate under doctrine, these forces can and do fit quickly into multinational ad hoc joint organizations.

Like other professions, militaries have always had doctrine that defines how they do their job. Unlike some professions, however, military doctrine does not have one standard approach or common thread that can be found in all nations and in all military services. In some cases, doctrine in the armed forces has been written and centralized. In other cases, doctrine has been unwritten and decentralized. In many cases, especially in U.S. Navy and other navies, doctrine was not published under that term and instead doctrinal publications had other titles, such as War Instructions or Fighting Instructions.⁴

The term is used in some countries in a fundamentally different manner. Doctrine under Soviet, and now Russian, military terminology refers to a determination of who will be fought in war, the character and objectives of the armed conflict portion of a war, the type of armed forces needed for war and their organization, the resources required for war and the overall preparation of the armed forces for war, and the strategic-level methods for waging war.⁵ This use of the term is often also found in other nations that were influenced by Soviet military thought and also in the writings of many Western academics who use the term to refer to national military policy or grand strategy—for example, the doctrine of containment or flexible response. This political-military use of the term is not the focus of this present chapter.

The official starting point in the U.S. Armed Forces for a definition of doctrine is the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1–02.⁶ According to this authoritative publication, doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”

Generally in the United States, the word also applies, conceptually, to subordinate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The joint doctrine development process includes management of both doctrine and joint TTP.

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, mentions the term military doctrine. Military doctrine:

A subset of military doctrine would be that doctrine that applies to the navy. Another subset would be multiservice doctrine that applied to navies and their associated naval infantry or Marine Corps-type organizations. A final category would be maritime doctrine or that applying to the navies, naval infantry, coast guard and similar border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary shipping managed by governments, the civilian merchant marine, and the like.

There are two essential elements in all forms of military doctrine: how the military profession thinks about warfare and how it acts when in combat. Without each element, doctrine would be incomplete. If it were merely how we thought about war, such a doctrine would be just the unfulfilled wishes of the leadership. If it only codified how we acted, without having created a theory, it might represent the documentation of mob violence.

Doctrine also has a multinational dimension. The term multinational refers to anything international—that is, bilateral, regional, global, ad hoc, standing alliances, etc. Multinational doctrine could be defined as the fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by participating nations.

The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition defines doctrine much like the United States does with the exception of removing the word national in front of objectives: “Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”⁸ The importance that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) places on doctrine is demonstrated by how that organization defines commonality: “The state achieved when the same doctrine, procedures, or equipment are used.”

For clarification, since the terms are often used interchangeably, doctrine and concepts are not the same thing. The United States and NATO define a tactical concept as “a statement, in broad outline, which provides a common basis for future development of tactical doctrine.” Thus concepts are future doctrine—ideas that might become doctrine if validated and supported.

If we are going to operate more with other nations, it would appear that we are going to have to agree upon those principles or professional practices that will allow successful interaction. Fortunately, modern navies have operated for years from a very large base of shared professional knowledge. That knowledge was the basis for successful multinational operations that have been conducted at sea for hundreds of years. In today’s new political environment, including the fundamental change in threat, resources, and goals for military forces, and the intrusion of ground, air, and joint force doctrine into the maritime realm, navies must get together to once again agree on this shared basis. That basis has now been changed since the end of the Cold War, resulting in fundamental changes to national navy doctrines that mean that if navies are to operate again successfully in the future in a multinational manner, they must agree upon the doctrinal basis for such actions.

One possible solution to the need for multinational navy doctrine would be to release existing NATO doctrine to non-NATO nations. This could be a quick solution, assuming that all NATO nations agreed. This problem is exacerbated when it comes to the release of classified NATO doctrine. Efforts to prepare generic tactical-level signaling books⁹ based upon existing NATO doctrine is insufficient—released NATO doctrine cannot provide all the multinational doctrine that is needed.

Governments can and will spend their national treasure on new hardware for their militaries. Unlike expensive hardware, doctrine development is relatively inexpensive. Not all advances in combat potential, and therefore readiness, need come about by the purchase of new equipment. Relatively small amounts of money spent on training the force with existing hardware in accordance with current doctrine could yield a visible improvement in readiness. Additional small amounts of money spent on concept development to improve doctrine again based on existing hardware could also yield visible improvements.

As an example, by the mid-1930s, the Imperial Japanese Navy recognized that, despite all of the technological and industrial efforts being made to upgrade the fleet, its projected capabilities would not result in a force capable of meeting the rapidly improving U.S. Navy in a decisive battle at sea—the preferred doctrine on both sides. The Japanese, therefore, gave impetus to the development of night tactics and eventually formed specialized night combat groupings (yasengun) that would weaken the U.S. Pacific Fleet to such a degree that, subsequent to night battle between main fleets, daylight battle would be a foregone conclusion.¹⁰ Thus a major improvement in combat potential was made as a result of doctrinal innovation.

One final aspect of the importance of doctrine in the new international security environment is that of shaping the behavior of other nations. When NATO initiated its Partnership for Peace program to train and exercise with nations that were formerly in the Warsaw Pact, it needed doctrine as the basis for the training and exercises. If our intent is now to expand that effort to other nations to bring them into the fold of supporters of democracy and the free enterprise system, we will need doctrine as the basis for this expanded training/exercise program. Navies will have to play their part and will have to deliver doctrine to these new partners.

Preparation of Multinational Naval Doctrine

There are many ways to approach the preparation of multinational navy doctrine. At one extreme, the United States could assume that the United Nations (UN) would take over the supervision of navies, a recommendation that periodically appears in journals.¹¹ Despite the initial views of some in the Clinton administration to embrace UN control over peacekeeping operations, it is clear that the U.S. Congress is not ready to support a transfer of command or significant amounts of control to the UN, and this option is not currently realistic, nor supported by the administration of George W. Bush.

Existing regional organizations could be used to prepare multinational navy doctrine—there are many existing NATO tactical-level doctrinal publications on which to draw. Although many of these doctrinal publications are classified, unclassified versions are being prepared. These publications, however, do not address all of the tasks that navies currently need to face, and they also were primarily designed for a European-centered war within a standing alliance with decades of experience operating together. The use of existing NATO doctrine would really only be a temporary substitute for more robust multinational navy doctrine designed for all forms of multinational navy interactions.

The U.S. Navy routinely prepares national tactical-level navy doctrine and TTP used by its battlegroup commanders and below and limited amounts of operational-level naval doctrine that serve the Navy-Marine Corps team.¹² It also contributes to the preparation of U.S. joint TTP and operational-level joint doctrine. The Navy has a long history of contributing to and operating routinely under NATO tactical-level doctrine, and it is currently developing NATO joint doctrine for the operational level. All of these efforts are necessary but are not enough.

What seems to be needed is more generic navy doctrine that can be used by all nations and navies—including nations that have not previously been included in U.S. Navy exercise programs. An overarching framework of operational-level doctrine in a non-NATO environment is needed in addition to the tactical-level signal books and TTP that will be easier to prepare. A start would be to rekindle the efforts made by the former Naval Doctrine Command in producing generic navy doctrine. An entire series of publications was envisaged, but only one has been produced.¹³

Dealing with the issue of multinational navy doctrine outside of NATO will be somewhat new for the U.S. Navy. It is not new at all, however, for nations who field medium-power navies. Rear Admiral J.R. Hill of the Royal Navy prepared an excellent study on the role of medium-power Western navies during the mid-1980s, when such navies were struggling to understand their role vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy when national missions had to be performed that would not automatically involve the United States. Hill described medium powers as those that lie between the totally self-sufficient and the insufficient. Medium powers “try to create and keep under national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain coercive actions whose outcomes will be the preservation of its vital interests.”¹⁴ The keyword defining a medium-power’s aspirations is autonomy.

A medium-power navy, therefore, is a navy of a nation-state that can use the sea to manipulate power to its own advantage—primarily to preserve national autonomy. The most important issue facing a medium-power navy is its relationship to a superpower navy. There was no way that a medium-power navy could successfully challenge the navy of a superpower in combat during the Cold War era; hence, alliance with a superpower was axiomatic. Obviously even smaller navies have successfully challenged medium-power navies in operations other than war (OOTW)—the 1976 Icelandic/British “Cod” War being an excellent example.

The self-identity of a medium-power navy was determined during the Cold War not only by its ethnocentric view, but also by its relationship to the superpower with which it was allied. For this reason, it was the medium-power navies of the Cold War era that championed the use of allied doctrine. Such doctrine would establish the behavior of the superpower vis-à-vis the medium-power navy and the roles that each would play in operations.

During the Cold War, the self-identity of the U.S. or Soviet Navy, however, was not expressed in terms of its relationship to allied and friendly medium-power navies. Rather, the self-identify of the U.S. Navy was determined by its relationship with its major competitor. Hence, the Navy approached the preparation of NATO maritime doctrine with recognition that it was necessary but without the need to use doctrine to establish its relationship with its allies. NATO allies knew that the U.S. Navy was supreme. Under today’s international security environment, the Navy is in a class by itself, and it is likely to assume an international position of leadership more than anyone else.

After World War II, the U.S. Navy issued a doctrinal publication entitled Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947, USF–1. Signed out by then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, this publication set forth the “general instructions to the naval service in the preparation for and conduct of future wars.” USF–1 addressed a number of issues that can cause difficulties when operating with multinational partners. There were the obvious problems of:

International liaison officers populate many U.S. military commands charged with the development and review of military doctrine. Such officers were in residence at the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command during its existence. Similar arrangements exist for U.S. officers assigned to multinational staffs. All of these foreign officers have been requested by the U.S. Armed Forces, and they bring a wealth of experience and talent that contributes to the development of U.S. military and multinational doctrine. The influence of these foreign and combined staff liaison officers, however, does not extend to having formal review authority.

The United States has published Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Publication 3–16. This publication, like all joint doctrinal publications, was not officially staffed by any foreign governments, although it is likely that foreign liaison officers attached to U.S. commands did review the draft. Joint Publication 3–16 addresses substantive issues during the planning and execution of multinational operations, saying “U.S. commanders should expect to conduct operations as part of a multinational force (MNF).”¹⁶ The assumption must be that this U.S. doctrinal document will govern U.S. behavior and should also be understood by multinational partners who intend acting with us.

One possible way to develop multinational navy doctrine is to build upon this joint model by use of existing U.S. Navy or multiservice naval doctrine. It would be offered to foreign nations or international organizations, such as Joint Publication 3–16 apparently would be. Although this would appear to be an easy plan, it might not be once nations more carefully consider the sources of any U.S. doctrine.

Military doctrine is derived from various national considerations: government policy, available resources, strategy and campaign concepts, existing doctrine, the threat, history and lessons learned, strategic and service culture, fielded and/or emerging technology, geography and demographics, types of government, and existing doctrine and TTP. It is extremely hard to see how many foreign governments would allow U.S. military doctrine, at the strategic or operational levels, to govern the behavior of their own national military forces. Figure 14–2 illustrates the various inputs that influence the creation of doctrine.

More likely, foreign governments would prefer to participate in the creation of any operational-level doctrine that would dictate how their forces would behave in a multinational scenario. Foreign navies can, and should, assist in the preparation of doctrine in many specific areas where they have demonstrated expertise. On the other hand, for some nations, such as Japan, there may be constitutional limitations on the type of combat or other actions that they are allowed to explore.

The creation of TTP would likely be reviewed as a professional military matter not requiring political oversight—hence it might be possible to simply transfer some existing U.S. joint (or other) TTP at this level directly to a medium-power navy. The one stumbling block here might be that U.S. joint doctrine and TTP have taken on more of a prescriptive tone. Since 1994, U.S. joint doctrine and joint TTP have a standard phrase in the front of each publication: “This doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.” Such direction might cause U.S. military doctrine to be rejected out of hand by foreign navies that have no requirement or desire to have a doctrine that must be followed except in “exceptional” circumstances.

Another very real problem is associated with the foreign perception of various terms that are taken for granted in the United States. For example, the term power projection may be viewed as threatening to some nations whose governments might not allow their navies to cooperate with any doctrinal development that uses such words. Although expeditionary is a term the U.S. Armed Forces have used frequently and for many years, European navies might be reluctant to embrace such concepts for fears of being associated with colonialism.

Similarly, ballistic missile defense, whether it is against tactical, operational, naval, or strategic missiles, is a loaded term that has association with the Strategic Defense Initiative, still commonly referred to as “Star Wars” by foreign nations. Despite successful U.S. efforts to distinguish theater ballistic missile defense efforts from “Star Wars,” this subtlety is lost on some foreign governments that will reject any participation in such doctrinal development. As U.S. joint military doctrine and emerging naval doctrine embrace such terms, they will be more difficult to “sell” to foreign governments.

The Tricky Problems of Interoperability

When the Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947, was issued, it addressed the need for standardized communications capabilities: “allies of this nation should standardize with us.”¹⁷ Unwritten is the assumption today that U.S. Navy doctrine is the standard to which medium-power navies will have to adapt if they desire to be fully integrated with a U.S. Navy that continues to evolve with costly new technology. If they are unable to integrate fully, such as with some navies within NATO, then a separate command structure and area of operations provides them an opportunity to perform tasks under national military doctrine.

It is possible to have a medium-power navy operate successfully in support of the U.S. Navy without fully integrated doctrine. It is entirely possible that U.S. Armed Forces might have one doctrine when operating in a national environment and another when working a combined force. It is also possible for a medium-power navy to be the lead agency on doctrine for which the U.S. military services operate in a supporting role. Many foreign navies have specialized expertise in other areas, such as diesel-electric submarines and mine warfare. In these cases, the U.S. Navy would operate as a supporting agency or service. Could there be parallels for multinational naval doctrine specialization?

The reality of multinational military operations is that although it is entirely appropriate to have full interoperability by military forces, more often, only navies will have the ability to cooperate in the attainment of multinational military objectives with coordinated but separate military activities. For example, although some NATO navies have diesel-electric submarines, their operations are not always fully integrated with NATO nuclear submarines. Usually submarine operations are separated into different sectors, but all submarines contribute to the attainment of appropriate naval tasks and missions.

Another paradigm would be the full interoperability of a medium-power navy with the U.S. Coast Guard (essentially a medium-power navy), probably in a discrete sector. From the perspective of a small- or medium-power navy, interoperability with the U.S. Coast Guard might be preferred since it would occur without the political “baggage” associated with the U.S. Navy.¹⁸ An example is that a Royal New Zealand Navy relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard might be a stepping-stone to resumption of normal relations between the “Kiwis” and the U.S. Navy.

It is also possible that a medium-power navy will have to be assigned a separate sector where it pursues independent maritime tasks—being interoperable with neither the U.S. Navy nor other national armed forces. This does not mean that such navies are less capable, only that they must be dealt with differently. Smaller navies would most likely need to be handled in this manner—capable of working toward a common political goal despite not being interoperable with the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard.

It is also possible for a medium-power navy to operate successfully in a multinational context totally integrated with U.S. Navy. The U.S. Coast Guard attempts to do this. A nation that desires to influence U.S. political decisionmaking may strive for such a degree of interoperability in order to ensure that they are represented “at the table.”¹⁹

Many medium-power navies, however, can be interoperable with the U.S. Navy but might not be fully interoperable with their national air forces. Given the choice of being joint with their own national military services or interoperable with the U.S. Navy, many medium-power navies might opt for the latter since it probably would be less expensive and provide a higher payoff to that navy.

In addition to a range of possibilities with medium-power navies within NATO, there exists the need to consider operations with other medium-power and smaller navies outside of the NATO environment or North Atlantic Treaty-approved areas of operations. Although the smaller navy will have more difficulty in integrating with the U.S. Navy, it will have fewer problems with the Coast Guard and navy forces operated by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), since their missions are not dissimilar to those of the Coast Guard or USSOCOM.

The smaller navy and some medium-power navies may prefer to operate with the U.S. Coast Guard rather than the Navy. Indeed, many medium-power and smaller navies make no artificial distinctions between the navy, constabulary, and special operations forces. Since the Navy maintains such distinctions, it is necessary for medium-power and smaller navies to have a relationship with the Coast Guard and USSOCOM in addition to one with the Navy. This suggests that multinational navy doctrine also must have an interagency component.

At a minimum, this relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard should be studied and form the basis of how we might approach the role of the U.S. Navy vis-à-vis other medium-power navies. That is not to say that the Navy and Coast Guard relationship ought to define the Navy’s relationship with medium-power foreign navies. Creative parallels may need to be drawn between such issues as the difficulties in creating multinational rules of engagement (ROEs) and the difficulties in training the U.S. Coast Guard in both civilian law enforcement standards (such as the “use of force continuum” dealing with a suspect who has not exhibited manifest intent to harm) and military combat ROEs designed to deal with “hostile intent” prior to actual hostile action. This issue becomes readily apparent during the efforts of allied and coalition navies (with potentially conflicting ROEs) in conducting maritime interception operations.

Complicating the integration and interoperability of navies will be the impact of the various transformational efforts that attempt to harness the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA). Most of those associated with the concepts being investigated with an RMA tend to assume that once the new technology arrives, it will be fielded and used by the fleet. Internalizing the RMA is much more complicated and includes a major role to be played by doctrine and challenges for multinational interoperability.

Doctrine has a major role in the RMA and the transformation of the armed forces to operate in the new international security environment. This role is primarily that of being an engine or a voice of change.²⁰ Once all parties agree to new concepts for warfare, they need to be codified in doctrine that all agree to teach and use in military exercises and actual operations. Without the training and education to support change, doctrine is merely the unfulfilled wishes of how one would like to operate.

Many of the specific concepts being studied in U.S. national transformation efforts include similar activities such as smart and rapid targeting of key vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Doctrine writers will need a list of such weaknesses in order to formulate how to gain the advantage. From a navy perspective, this list might include such things as: geography, training, readiness, organizational and doctrinal rigidity, intelligence and warning, reconnaissance, damage assessment, combat beyond visual range, combined-arms/joint/multinational warfighting, command and control, battle management, targeting, air support for naval operations, air control, air defense, all-weather and night combat, munitions lethality, maneuver and mobility, sustainability and logistics, and countermeasures.²¹

Concepts associated with the RMA also tend to address taking advantage of windows of opportunity as they occur. Naval forces would be shifted from secondary to main areas of combat actions in order to mass them for the main effort during a window of opportunity. It is not easy to know when windows of opportunity are going to be available, let alone to create them, in a multinational maritime environment. New concepts also stress the need to maximize opportunity and also achieve synchronization or strength—both inherently good at sea but in need of balance by the navy commander. Multinational combat leaders will need to decide when to take advantage of opportunities with forces at hand or to await the advantages of greater strength as the result of massing.

Political Issues and the Sector Approach

The Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947, is instructive in other areas, because when it was written, the United States had just fought a coalition war on two fronts and had ample experience with multinational partners. Admiral Nimitz highlighted difficulties associated with “differences of national aims and involvement.”²²

Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations states, “The degree of involvement of each participant is likely to be a purely political decision, and the commander must be cognizant of national mandates placed on individual units. It may be necessary to employ the force according to national and political considerations.” ²³ The text of this 2000 joint doctrine publication was influenced by the results of Operation Allied Force, undertaken by NATO in 1999, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. One of the most important lessons from that operation was the degree that political decisions influenced military actions. A 2001 U.S. General Accounting Office study observed:

military commanders of multinational operations should not expect to always apply decisive military force with a strict adherence to military doctrine. As a result, to balance the variety of interests and concerns that arise during multinational operations, these operations may not be conducted as effectively or efficiently as operations that more closely follow U.S. military doctrine, which may lead to higher costs.²⁴

Whereas a current U.S. task force or task group commander might have as his objective the attainment of a U.S. military objective, it is clearly the political objective of some governments of medium-power navies today to use their fleets to influence U.S. behavior. This is generally accomplished by having their fleets integrated into American forces and by attempting to stake out staff and subordinate command positions.

An extremely good example of this is the continuation of submarine forces by many navies of the world who might otherwise not find them cost-effective. Although there might not be a viable combat mission for submarines by many medium-power navies, the mere possession of such forces gives that government entrée into world of underwater traffic management. This is an extremely important method of learning about what is going on not only in distant international waters but also in one’s own exclusive economic zones, archipelagic waters, straits, and transit lanes. With no need to declare submerged transit through these waters, an effective way to learn about submerged transit and perhaps to influence planned transits is to be a player at the table of subsurface operations.

The fact that navies of the world routinely train together today is not a commitment to actually fight together in any MRC/MTW that their government chooses to oppose. If the U.S. Government allows medium-power navies to become so integrated with the U.S. Navy that the American force will not be able to operate on its own, we may find ourselves unable to provide a unilateral LRC/SSCO combat capability. Although the size of the U.S. Navy will probably not shrink to that level, it must have a balance between the ability to operate under joint and multinational navy doctrine so that national tasks are not precluded.

The governments of medium-power navies determine whether their navies are sent to MRC/MTWs or LRC/SSCOs merely to provide the impression of participating or to actually participate in combat. Some forces will be sent merely to be seen as having participated—casualties are neither expected nor desired. Yet it may be necessary from a purely U.S. perspective to have foreign forces participate in a crisis response. Hence, multinational navy doctrine is needed to account not only for how to fight together, but also for how to ensure that the forces of some navies are perceived as participating without being placed in harm’s way—without it looking like that.²⁵

Multinational naval doctrine should both provide navies with honorable options to operate in a multinational environment as a fully integrated member of a U.S.-led task group and as a foreign-led separate task group operating in separate waters. Although the current group of medium-power navies probably views full integration as the only honorable alternative, this will become increasingly difficult as the U.S. Navy adds even more costly technologies to the fleet, thus precluding full integration even by the U.S. Coast Guard.

During World War II, the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) operated in a separate sector and not as an integral part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet even though fully integrated forces were in the Atlantic. The BPF had even adopted U.S. Navy doctrine and aircraft. Yet its aircraft carrier design and lack of an integrated logistical train precluded the BPF from fully integrated operations. In the Atlantic, convoy escort duty presented fewer difficulties in integrating forces from a variety of nations. There was no issue of diminished honor or respect due the Royal Navy because the BPF operated on its own. Perhaps it is time to remember that in history, navies from different nations have rarely operated in a fully integrated manner.

During the Persian Gulf War, coalition navy forces were divided into three main task groups that were organized around their political instructions.²⁶ One group was committed to perform the original UN-sanctioned tasking of maritime interception operations. Another group under more expanded political authority was permitted to engage in support tasks and protection of the sea lines of communication. Finally, the third group was permitted to participate in the wider range of offensive tasks associated with the U.S. Navy. Within each group, national subgroups were organized related to levels of risk allowed and proximity to the battle area.

During coalition naval operations off Haiti from 1993 to 1994, national forces were divided into three distinct missions. A range of multinational participants enforced UN sanctions. U.S. naval forces conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation. Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard handled refugee control.²⁷

Unfortunately, by acknowledging the sector option as an honorable alternative, the U.S. Navy would undermine the argument made by medium-power navies to their governments that they need additional technology or more capable forces. In turn, this might affect the sale of technologies or hardware to these countries. The unintended consequences of multinational doctrine development might not be apparent to officers whose primary expertise is with the various combat arms.

Foreign navies operating under some multinational context will eventually come up against multinational tasking that conflicts with their own national policy. An example might be the deliberate testing of the right of innocent passage or the sailing of ships into waters considered closed to non-littoral nations. If a foreign warship is operating with a U.S. task group that has been asked to perform such a mission and that ship’s government opposes such a move, procedures will need to be established to provide a face-saving way out. This issue does not appear to be insurmountable but should be addressed before the situation occurs so that standing doctrine can guide behavior in the fleet. More complicated will be the handling of national missions that are intended to be carried out while operating as a part of a multinational force—for example, the gathering of intelligence.

Rules of engagement are another problem area for multinational naval operations. During the Persian Gulf War, coalition navy forces had different ROEs for different nations. The usual issues with terms such as hostile intent came up for interpretation and debate, as it does when the U.S. Navy addresses this issue with other U.S. Armed Forces. In 1993–1994, UN-sanctioned operations in the Adriatic against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia saw German ships restricted by national ROEs from firing of weapons except in self-defense and lacking a charter to conduct boardings.²⁸

Because ROEs do not drive doctrine, the inability to reach prior agreement on them does not preclude the development of multinational navy doctrine.²⁹ The problems associated with ROEs themselves are not insurmountable, and navies have demonstrated the ability to operate in highly complex environments in which ROEs might actually change during the flight of naval aircraft launched from an aircraft carrier but operating under the tactical control of some other organization. Different national ROEs may themselves force the use of a sector approach and force a multinational commander to accept less than direct command over coalition forces.

As a precedent, the Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947, stated:

It has been the practice of this government to recognize and to require the right of communications, and if necessary of appeal, through national channels in order
to allow:

(1) Notification to a government by its national commander if he considers that his force is in danger of reduction that would imperil its further effectiveness for the purposes of its own government.

(2) Protest to a government by its national commander if he considers that his force is being subjected to unusual or discriminatory action.³⁰

Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations addresses the need for individual nations to have appropriate lines of communication to their parent nation.³¹

Levels of Preparation for Warfighting

Most medium-power navies cannot afford to be provided with capabilities for both the high end of warfighting and for constabulary national missions. Over time, the U.S. Navy has evolved and been expected to provide certain capabilities to the medium-power navy, thus eliminating the need for the governments of such navies to provide them for themselves. For example, the U.S. Navy provides to most medium-power navies: modern aircraft carriers with fixed-wing aircraft capable of a full range of missions; nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-powered attack submarines; a power projection across the beach capability; various intelligence sources and capabilities; and certain training facilities.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the U.S. Navy provides the bulk of the expertise at the higher ends of warfighting—power projection. On the other hand, medium-power navies have provided things that the U.S. Navy does not normally concern itself with, including escorts, diesel-electric submarines, patrol craft, mine warfare capabilities,³² and expertise in nonmilitary operations other than war. Again, the U.S. Coast Guard is an excellent parallel. The U.S. Coast Guard is maximized for performance at the lower spectrum of conflict and has divested itself of certain open-ocean antisubmarine warfare capabilities and offensive surface warfare missile systems.

A number of substantive questions stem from this current division of labor. Is doctrine one of those things that the superpower navy should provide to other navies of the world? Where other nations have demonstrated expertise in various individual aspects of combat or OOTW, should the U.S. Navy ask them to take the lead on the development of multinational navy doctrine? If not, is there an alternative way to gain their expertise so that the U.S. Navy need not “reinvent the wheel”? Since destroyers and frigates are capital ships in many medium-power navies, we might find that some doctrine for the employment of these forces has been more fully developed in foreign navies than it has in the U.S. Navy. Not all navies are capable of all missions that can be performed by the American one. On the other hand, medium-power and smaller navies routinely perform tasks that are not performed by the U.S. Navy.

Can navies train equally well for both the high end of warfighting and OOTW? An Indian observer noted the failure of American forces in Somalia to master the doctrine of low-intensity conflict and counterinsurgency operations and contrasted it to the extensive experience of Indian forces in these same areas and their relative success in Somalia.³³ Although the theoretical answer is “Yes, navies can do both,” the behavior of the U.S. Navy has demonstrated that it prefers to dominate the high end and to “subcontract” OOTW functions to the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard routinely provides detachments aboard Navy warships to handle OOTW functions for which U.S. Navy officers have not been trained. Similarly, the Coast Guard has moved away from being able to be fully interoperable with the Navy in offensive and undersea warfare at sea. Such an approach does not appear to be a problem; both the Navy and Coast Guard appear to be comfortable in their roles and self-identities.³⁴

Such a division of labor is liable to have unintended consequences for medium-power navies with histories that include significant combat at sea. The self-identity of most navies is still that of a combat force. The more that navies are forced to move into the area of OOTW, the less likely that they are going to seek and be successful at combat at the higher end of the warfighting spectrum. Naturally, most medium-power navies will have the opportunity to retain warfighting skills at commensurate levels of capability. Navy officers may resent being considered only “good enough” to handle medium or lower end tasks and OOTW. Yet the reality of future hardware procurement by many governments that field medium-power navies is that they will be increasingly specialized out of the higher ends of combat.

As younger navy officers in some medium-power navies having more self-identity with constabulary and other OOTW tasks advance into leadership positions, they will probably embrace these roles for their own navy, thus changing their service culture. Today, the identity of the U.S. Coast Guard is more akin to the policeman rather than the combat warrior. The Coast Guard protects its noncombat roles from “mission creep” by the U.S. Navy.

Perhaps medium-power navies could provide detachments, like the U.S. Coast Guard, in multinational scenarios for OOTW areas of expertise that are not developed by the U.S. Navy. Currently this is done by the Coast Guard, but neither the Navy nor Coast Guard have a sufficiently trained cadre of foreign area officers—an area of expertise that might be better provided by multinational navy partners rather than turning to the U.S. Army for that support. Navy detachments offer a foreign government the ability to advertise its presence and participation in a multinational crisis response at far less cost than sending even one small ship. They also offer these governments an opportunity to influence U.S. behavior and extremely low visibility when they do not desire to advertise participation.

Visibility is another area that can be highlighted or reduced, depending upon the political object of governments. When a nation does not desire to advertise its support for a multinational effort, it can do so with assistance in the areas of communications, intelligence, transportation, logistics, and other inconspicuous assets. The United States could use “stealthy” support when it is not in the best interests of the attainment of the political objective to send in a U.S. warship. In such cases, multinational navy partners can provide the visible presence while the United States operates behind the scenes, essentially invisible to the world press. There are ways to interact multinationally other than sending a ship.

Some will suggest that the U.S. Navy not take the lead in the preparation of multinational navy doctrine and that such efforts should be better left to organizations such as the United Nations. If the Navy is left to take the lead, it will undoubtedly work out the issues described herein and in doing so will satisfy the need for medium-power navies to establish their working relations with the superpower navy. It will also satisfy the need for the United States to determine how it will operate in an MTW/MRC and LRC/SSCO environments with partners. The writing of lower-end doctrine for MOOTW and OOTW tasks could be a collective effort of medium-power navies or one that could be championed by one of these navies, to include the U.S. Coast Guard.

Conclusions

In the 21st century, the U.S. Navy stands at the crossroads of national doctrinal development and multinational leadership. The Navy is fully cooperating with the development of U.S. joint doctrine and is a partner with the Marine Corps in the development of multiservice naval doctrine focused upon warfare in the littorals. The Navy also has the ability to act as the inspirational leader of the navies of the world with the development of multinational navy doctrine that may be equally as important as the development of joint and naval doctrine.

Some medium-power navies might be more willing to embrace multinational navy doctrine than to become joint-capable within their own nation. The U.S. Navy and many medium-power navies have no choice but to be both joint and multinational. If the U.S. Government and Armed Forces count on multinational navies for the attainment of U.S. national security and military objectives, then the development of multinational navy doctrine for navies that are not also joint-capable is also a priority. Doctrine is needed for both navies that can fully integrate with the U.S. Navy and those that must cooperate without full integration.

Regardless of the degree of cooperation between navies in the development of doctrine, in routine operations at sea in time of peace, in conducting multinational naval exercises, in various exchange programs, and so forth, the fleets remain instruments of national power wielded by government. As has happened in the past, we may see nations, including the United States, plan to operate together, train to do so, and then fail to act in a collective manner.³⁵ This reality must be accounted for in our doctrine; otherwise, we will have no viable options.

If the U.S. Navy desires to get into the business of providing multinational navy doctrine to other countries, a series of extremely sophisticated political and diplomatic issues of substance will need to be addressed. This strongly suggests that expertise in areas other than actual combat arms is required for such doctrinal development and, if not made available to the U.S. Navy, might result in unintended international repercussions.

Many nations that field medium-power navies do not have stand-alone doctrine commands or centers. They do, however, have some dozen or so academics that are interested in navies and may even have a group of political retired navy officers. These individuals have an extraordinary ability to influence force development and policy in these nations. The U.S. Navy would probably be well served by a continuing dialogue with such academics and retired officers so that the major issues that have been raised in this essay can be fully discussed with such influential individuals. Discussions only with navies are not a satisfactory manner to deal with the operational level of multinational navy doctrine.

Dealing with the sector approach is the single most important challenge facing naval doctrine in the near future. The solution to this challenge is to write doctrine that has a more reasonable basis than the unrealistic but politically correct assumption that navies will be fully integrated and interoperable. That basis should start with the assumptions that naval forces will have different political objectives and restrictions and they will not be fully interoperable. The doctrinal challenge is then how to operate as a multinational force given those assumptions. Differences do not mean that multinational operations are not possible, only that in performing them, the participants need to acknowledge those differences and find solutions. It is in the best interests of the United States to ensure that mechanisms are in place, to include doctrine that will allow a diverse array of forces to join in unexpected and unplanned ad hoc coalitions and will permit U.S. forces to operate in a less than favorable environment.

Notes

¹ General John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1995), 18. BACK

² Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary (Boston, MA: The Riverside Publishing Co., 1984, 1988); The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1991 [reprint with corrections]). BACK

³ See especially on this issue, Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., “The Power in Doctrine,” Naval War College Review 48, no. 3 (Summer 1995), 9–31; a response by Irving Brinton Holley, “Doctrine on the Wrong Foot,” Naval War College Review 49, no. 1 (Winter 1996), 117–118; and two responses by Hughes and Mike Bowman, “Doctrine on the Wrong Foot,” Naval War College Review 49, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 108–112. BACK

⁴ For an example of the finest U.S. Navy doctrine written, see Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, War Instructions: United States Navy, 1944, F.T.P. 143(A) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 1944). BACK

⁵ Genrikh Trofimenko, The U.S. Military Doctrine (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986). BACK

⁶ Director of the Joint Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1–02 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 12, 2001), 132. This document was used for all definitions hereafter unless otherwise noted. BACK

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 14, 2000), vi, I–1, I–8. BACK

⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), AAP–6(V) Modified Version 2 (August 7, 2000), 2–D–6. This document is the source for NATO terms used in this chapter. BACK

⁹ Barry Coombs and Les Sim, “The Russians Are Here,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 1995), 69, discusses the creation of an unclassified NATO publication, Maritime Maneuvering and Tactical Procedures (Experimental Tactic [EXTAC] 768) and a bilateral set of terms based upon the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1–02, shared with the Russians. BACK

¹⁰ David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun [Navy]: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 273–280. BACK

¹¹A skeptical but balanced discussion of various proposals prior to 1990 is Sam J. Tangredi, A United Nations Navy: Solution, Illusion or Delusion? Working Paper in International Studies I–91–1 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, March 1991). More recent proposals are advocated in Robert Stephens Stanley, The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1992), and Michael C. Pugh, ed., Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). BACK

¹²A good example of multiservice naval doctrine is Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Warfare, NDP–1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 28, 1994). BACK

¹³ Naval Doctrine Command, Multinational Maritime Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1996). BACK

¹⁴ John Richard Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 31. BACK

¹⁵ Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947, USF–1 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, May 1, 1947), 9–4, 9–5. BACK

¹⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Publication 3–16 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 5, 2000), I–3. BACK

¹⁷ Nimitz, 9–6. BACK

¹⁸ Bruce B. Stubbs, “The U.S. Coast Guard: A Unique Instrument of U.S. National Security,” Marine Policy 18, no. 6 (1994), 513, documents a number of instances of use of the U.S. Coast Guard to show U.S. resolve but with a force that has a humanitarian and law enforcement image. BACK

¹⁹ See, for example, the rather frank admission by Fred W. Crickard and Richard H. Cimblett, “The Navy as an Instrument of Middle Power Foreign Policy: Canada in Korea 1950 and the Persian Gulf 1990,” in Maritime Forces in Global Security, ed. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1995), 335: “In terms of Canada’s national interest, leverage with coalition partners and in particular the United States was as important as defeating the enemy.”BACK

²⁰ Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 14, 2000), I–8–I–9. BACK

²¹ List is suggested by Anthony H. Cordesman, “Compensating for Smaller Forces: Adjusting Ways and Means Through Technology,” in Strategy and Technology (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, April 1, 1992), 16–19, and Australian Maritime Doctrine, Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 1 (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2000), 112. BACK

²² Nimitz, 9–5. BACK

²³Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, III–2. Of interest is more cautionary wording found in a March 1995 draft of the previous edition: “that the national objectives of participating forces may interfere with or limit how their military contingents participate [and]...National mandates may differ when forces are committed to a multinational operation, even if the nations are in agreement with respect to the ultimate objective.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, draft Joint Publication 3–16, March 1995, I–14, IV–1 and IV–2. BACK

²⁴ U.S. General Accounting Office, Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures, GAO–01–784 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, July 2001), 15. BACK

²⁵An early draft of the previous version of Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations stated that: “It may be necessary to divide the force according to national and/or political considerations. For example, in an environment in which hostilities become likely, a portion of the multinational force (those nations authorized the full range of forces) may be assigned to offensive operations, a second group (with more political constraint) may be assigned to support and to protect lines of communication in the theater, while a third (with greater constraint) may be assigned to interdiction operations on the periphery of the theater.” Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, draft Joint Publication 3–16, IV–2. BACK

²⁷ Peter Jones, “Multi-National Operations: Their Demands and Impact on Medium Power Navies,” Maritime Security Working Papers No. 3 (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, May 1996), 54. BACK

²⁸ G.R. Maddison, “Operations in the Adriatic,” in Griffiths and Haydon, 198–199. BACK

²⁹Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, III–19, states: “Complete consensus or standardization of R[ules] O[f] E[ngagement] should be sought, but may not be achievable.”BACK

³⁰ Nimitz, 9–3. BACK

³¹Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, II–7 and II–8 (figure II–3 clearly shows these national lines of command). BACK

³² Indeed, the lack of maturity in U.S. Navy mine warfare was the apparent cause for a Royal Navy commodore to refuse to risk his ships under an American-designed plan. See Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller, Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 254. BACK

³³ Vinod Anand, “Evolution of a Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces,” Strategic Analysis (July 2000), 733–750. BACK

³⁴ Colin S. Gray has recommended that the U.S. Coast Guard be transferred to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). In making this recommendation, Gray cautions, “Above all, a Coast Guard within DOD would need to preserve its distinctive warrior-policeman culture.” See “The Coast Guard and Navy: It’s Time for a ‘National Fleet’,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 3 (Summer 2001), 133. BACK

³⁵ Joe J. Sokolsky, “NATO’s New Maritime Role: The Sea Power Solution or Allies Adrift?” in Griffiths and Haydon, 150. BACK