Chapter 18

Globalization and Naval Aviation

J. Kevin Mattonen

The trends identified in this volume as affecting maritime roles in a globalized world have a demonstrated impact on naval aviation. As of the time of writing, carrier-based naval aircraft are operating with great effect against terrorist and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. But the roles of naval aviation are multiple and complex, and this complexity increases as the result of globalization. Depending on one’s perspective, aviation in the U.S. Navy may be viewed as approaching a crossroads or a precipice. The crossroads signal questions for naval aviation: Will naval aviation be able to compete with technologically advanced threats and doctrines designed to confound conventional application of force while avoiding needless destruction? Can naval aviation continue along planned growth rates with iterative improvements through the established budgeting and acquisition process, or must it break with that plan?

The precipice represents the question of whether naval aviation will decay to a point of no longer being capable of fulfilling its envisioned role because of the cumulative effects of increasing tactical threats and decreased operational readiness due to aging, training, retention, and other conditions of its own making. The dilemma for naval leaders is that to take a wrong turn at this juncture may seal its fate. The outlook for naval aviation is further complicated by a myriad of internal factors that—unlike the overall force of globalization—are within the span of control of both military and legislative leaders.

Globalization Trends and Naval Aviation

The earlier chapters introduced readers to an emerging panorama of global challenges to maritime forces. This chapter attempts to address the specific impact of some of these challenges on naval aviation.

Antiaccess Weapons Proliferation

Denial of access to U.S. and friendly forces is by far the least expensive and most effective strategy that a potential adversary can adopt. This trend of denying access appears to be the single greatest military threat to maritime forces operating in the new globalized environment. Several already existing antiaccess capabilities directly affect the ability of naval aviation to complete its missions.

Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). Over the next decade, advances in air defenses, such as terminal guidance in long-range surface-to-air missiles and improvements in man-portable air defense systems, will continue. These air defense systems and their anticipated variants will continue to present a tangible threat to our attack and reconnaissance aircraft. Specifically, advances in and exports of the Russian S–300 (SA–10) series of missiles and associated acquisition and guidance systems currently present strike packages with a formidable counter that can engage aircraft at ranges of more than 120 nautical miles. Their supporting radars are capable of functioning from hardened sites, providing them with an additional defensive layer against radar seeking missiles.¹

Global Positioning System (GPS) Jammers. These systems present a threat to current and future standoff weapon systems, including cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.² The experience of allied forces in the air campaign over Kosovo revealed that sortie rates could be reduced by as much as one-half with a concomitant increase in the dependence on GPS-guided munitions to overcome weather obstructing target sites.³ In February of 2001, naval aviation forces struck against predetermined target points in Iraq with GPS-aided munitions and achieved disappointing results. While there is considerable debate in the public domain as to whether this was a failure of targeting or the result of GPS jamming, the military establishment has already identified and acknowledged the susceptibility of their newest generation GPS-assisted weapons to jamming.⁴ Without the availability of precision munitions and the conditions necessary for their successful employment, the requirement for numbers of sorties and the risk associated with every strike increases exponentially.

Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CCD). These comprise measures that an opponent can employ to deny or mislead our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. CCD may result in incorrectly deploying U.S. combat assets or wasting limited collection assets chasing false targets. Disrupting and delaying the search-locate-identify-attack loop buys time for adversaries to mask intentions, redeploy forces, and strengthen defenses.

None of these particular measures should be viewed as directed solely against carrier-borne aircraft. Land-based patrol and reconnaissance forces add a vital element to developing the operational intelligence picture, identifying targets and launching weapons against those targets. Hence, they too would be affected by such antiaccess measures. Conditions that preclude patrol and reconnaissance forces’ entry into viable operating areas or that disrupt their ability to reconnoiter and attack further degrade the overall safety and efficiency of naval aviation.

Other elements of the antiaccess suite further hinder naval aviation in planning and executing its role in a combat or near-combat environment. These elements are those directed against forces at sea or their support establishments ashore. Because the fates of aircraft and the place from which they must launch or recover are intertwined, these threats are potentially as lethal to mission accomplishment as those discussed above.

Sea Mines and Submarines. Antiship mines can close sea lanes and ports. Potential adversaries already possess submarines in their inventories with new technologies making them difficult to detect and neutralize. Experts anticipate advances to reduce further detection vulnerability and increase the killing power of submarine weapons systems. Antiship cruise missiles are far less expensive for an adversary to acquire than surface ships designed to slug it out with the modern carrier battlegroup. All of these antiaccess measures serve to restrict the sea room that has been a great advantage of naval forces since battle was first joined on the seas. Restricting the mobility of naval forces can, in turn, restrict the options available to the entire joint force with which they will operate.

As discussed in chapter 20, the experience of the U.S. Navy in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm is illustrative of the effects that mining can have on ships at sea. Because of political restrictions, continuous in-situ surveillance of the approaches to Iraq and Kuwait was not allowed during the 5 months preceding Desert Storm. During this time, the Iraqis laid more than 1,100 mines of a design dating back nearly 75 years. Upon commencement of Desert Storm, the Iraqis had effectively neutralized the option for large-scale amphibious assault by eliminating havens for maneuver within the potential amphibious operating area within the Kuwaiti littoral. The fates of two ships, USS Princeton and USS Tripoli, were cast in doubt after both struck mines.⁵ Intelligence indicating large numbers of floating mines in restricted waters may only confound operational planning for carrier operations. The potential impact of a hit on an aircraft carrier operating in space already restricted because of coordination requirements and airspace or draft limitations might well be devastating.

The lessons of the British in the Falklands conflict are also instructive when considering what havoc the mere reported presence of a hostile submarine can wreak upon maneuver forces afloat. During the period of hostilities, a single Argentine submarine could not be located. Hundreds of sightings were passed over the reporting networks, and more than 50 antisubmarine warfare torpedoes were launched without a single weapon ever endangering the San Luis, a relatively modern quiet diesel powered submarine. Had the captain of the San Luis not suffered the same miserable weapons performance that beleaguered his air force counterparts, the outcome of the conflict could have been considerably different.⁶

Theater Ballistic Missiles. Theater ballistic missiles, while difficult to impossible to deliver against mobile maritime forces, can negate access to in-theater ports, airfields, and staging areas that may be required for logistical support to forward deployed naval forces. Terrorist attacks against logistical and command and control centers should be anticipated, especially when operating from a lodgement on foreign soil. Low-technology yet highly destructive measures have already been employed to disrupt the tempo of battle for naval aviation and its supporting assets as witnessed in the environmental warfare tactics employed by the Iraqis, who ignited oil wells throughout Kuwait to mask their movements.⁷ Using “human shields,” collocating of military operations and sensitive cultural features, and choosing urban terrain for combat are options that must be considered further when trying to anticipate obstacles to naval aviation in a combat role.

To echo the point made in chapter 1, the absence of a globalized maritime adversary does not mean U.S. naval aviation will not have to contend with threats. In fact, because the investment in antiaccess capability is minuscule compared to the economic burden of building and maintaining a globally capable and competent navy, leaders and planners must anticipate encountering any or all of these capabilities and operate with a healthy respect for the new enemy.

Proliferation of Information Systems and Sensors

Proliferation of high-speed information systems and remote sensing capability does not appear to present the direct threat to forces of naval aviation that the antiaccess suite entails. Even if one were to argue successfully that combination of these two elements places maneuver forces at sea at risk, there has been little discussion to argue that they present a danger to operations of elements of naval aviation. What may be argued is that any combination of high-speed information processing and survivable high-data-rate communications, especially if combined with near-real-time imagery or other sources of detection, increases the efficiency of both offensive targeting and defensive reaction measures.

Increases in Maritime Trade and Traffic

Modern navies clearly have a role in protecting sea lines of communication against threats that would disrupt the free movement of trade between nations. This authority derives, in part, international legitimacy from Article 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 87 specifically identifies the freedom of nations to operate aircraft over international waters.⁸ The role of the U.S. Navy with regard to protection of seaborne trade is vaguely articulated in their only current strategic “operational concept” entitled Forward...from the Sea.⁹ While the forces of global navies and their aviation components have only rarely been called upon to defend directly the free movement of maritime commerce between nations in contemporary times, their role in that regard is nonetheless vital.

This was borne out to some extent by the rapid decision to deploy U.S. Navy forces for the specific role of homeland defense including the protection of ports and harbors on the day that terrorists hijacked commercial aircraft and struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.¹⁰ While this volume was in draft form, protection of homeland seaports for the United States was considered a potential role for Navy forces. The deployment of the USS George Washington and its embarked air wing to an operating area in Long Island Sound brought that potential scenario to reality.

The escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in 1987 during Operation Earnest Will was the most conspicuous armed escort of U.S. shipping to and from ports of call since World War II. Although conducted on a relatively small scale (only 11 Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged), the effort nearly cost the Navy the loss of two ships and ultimately resulted in lives lost. While the conditions that generated the reflagging and escort initiatives were arguably the fault of both Iran and Iraq, military action by U.S. forces was directed only against Iranian interests, most notably in the strikes conducted during Operation Praying Mantis.¹¹ Earnest Will was to be a campaign with limited military goals, yet the U.S. Navy suffered loss of prestige and credibility when the USS Vincennes mistakenly downed an Iranian commercial aircraft subsequent to an engagement with Iranian Republican Guard forces operating from armed patrol craft in the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz.

As noted in chapters 4 and 8, the increasing prevalence of piracy and armed robbery at sea has gained the attention of ship owners for bulk carriers and passenger liners, insurance brokers, professional maritime organizations, and military planners.¹² What role the U.S. Navy may play in suppressing criminals who strike on the seas has not been publicly discussed in any depth in recent times. It may be worthwhile to remember that naval forces have a long tradition of fighting piracy in earlier times, and, therefore, a look at the history books might be due in short order.

Because discussion of the Navy role in protection of increased maritime trade and traffic is not well developed, the same follows for the role of naval aviation (for example, antipiracy has received only passing mention in Pacific Fleet and Pacific Command public briefing materials and speeches). As these explorations mature, determining the contribution that naval aviation can play should follow quickly because the extant and near-term capabilities of naval aviation are well known.

The recent attacks on American territory and the accompanying threats of follow-on terrorist actions should focus the thinking of military and government leaders. Global shipping clearly carries the weight of world commerce on its shoulders. Increasing attacks upon maritime shipping can serve to disrupt the free flow of goods between nations. More frightening are the implications of providing terrorists with platforms from which to stage or launch further attacks on maritime ports.

Peace Operations, Small-Scale Contingencies, and Regional Warfighting

The trinity of peace operations—peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement—are usually murky distinctions in the mind of the naval aviator. All three can entail risk beyond the inherent dangers of aviation. Attaching the peace connotation to their label does nothing to reduce the negative consequences that can occur. The same can be said for the diminution that is implied in small-scale contingencies and regional war fighting. One would have to doubt that individual aircrews consider these differences in mission planning.

The same should not hold true for those who are faced with the task of analyzing needs and requirements for training, readiness, and force structure. Operations Southern Watch, Vigilant Sentinel, Desert Thunder, Desert Fox, Somalia, the Taiwan Straits, North Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics patrols are but part of the list of exhausting contingencies that naval aviation has faced through the past decade. Developing a budget plan for a two-major-theater-war force structure was a frustrating exercise in trying to make the real world fit into the constraints of domestic political considerations. The multitude of contingency operations involving potential and actual hostile fire through the past 10 years is fairly clear testament that these operations will continue and, in all likelihood, increase in frequency in the near term. The reality is that the intensity and frequency of these operations is placing a heavy burden on maintaining a ready force.¹³

Emerging Concerns about Economic Security

The attacks of September 11, 2001, brought home the reality of war waged on American soil and their direct ties to globalized economic security. Despite a suspension of trading on many exchanges, the reverberations were tumultuous throughout world financial markets. Previously only discussed as a scenario,¹⁴ these strikes brought relevance to the role and mission of naval forces in homeland defense.

The impact of the attacks and the accompanying shift to defense of the homeland outlined in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review will undoubtedly be significant in the totality of the Nation’s defense budget.¹⁵ What is less clear at this point is what that budgetary and operational impact will have on naval aviation.

Naval Aviation: “Inside the Lifelines”

Naval aviation as an entity bears examination before undertaking further discussion of potential changes for naval aviation driven by increased globalization. Major factors are negatively affecting the future of naval aviation. These issues include recapitalization, retention, and ranges. The label inside the lifelines is attached to these issues because changes in these areas are within the span of control and business practices of the uniformed, political, and legislative leadership of the government. One must attempt to foresee the totality of change that may be necessary throughout the naval aviation community, both to support the benefits of increased globalization and to protect the Nation and its partners from emerging threats.

Recapitalization and Readiness. For the first time in its history, the average age of naval aviation aircraft is older than the average of ships in the fleet: nearly 18 years old.¹⁶ Even if the Navy and Marine Corps were to achieve their most optimistic goals of procurement and delivery, the situation with respect to the average age of aircraft in the inventory is not predicted to improve but rather worsen, especially with regard to tactical aircraft.¹⁷ To place this aging into perspective, consider the decline of patrol aviation and the P–3C with an average age per airframe exceeding 22 years. Had these conditions prevailed during the Cold War, the Navy would have fielded airships and PBY Catalina flying boats in Vietnam.

Aging has been exacerbated over the past 4 years by the unplanned migration of more than $6 billion in funding that was targeted to procure new aircraft to readiness funding to meet the commitments of everyday operations.¹⁸ Even at planned procurement rates, the Government Accounting Office has determined that for tactical aircraft, aging will not be reversed until 2011. The situation is even bleaker for the Air Force tactical inventory, as its average age is expected to climb to 21 years by 2011.¹⁹ As Admiral Vernon Clark offered in his prepared testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, “For too long, we have deferred modernization and recapitalization of our force and paid for mission accomplishment by postponing maintenance and the repair of our infrastructure. That trend now poses, in my view, in my opinion, a serious risk to our Navy’s future.”²⁰

There is a wide range of effects that accompany the aging of aircraft. They include decreased reliability, increased maintenance requirements, decreased readiness, lower availability for training, and increased operating and support costs. In 2000, the inspector general (IG) of the Navy delivered a detailed analysis of these and other factors continuing to plague naval aviation.

Achieving and maintaining combat readiness for naval aviation has become increasingly problematic. Availability of spare parts has been near the forefront of the problem, but this alone does not encompass the entirety of the issue of how aging inventory has affected readiness. Furthermore, however convenient it might be to try and place the blame on the support of the systems commander, this would not be fair.

The lack of adequate spares has cascaded throughout the entire community. This is not a chain of events with a discrete end and beginning, but, as the IG noted, it is a loop of interrelated activities, causes and effects. These complex interrelationships and their potential effects have only recently become visible:

Naval Aviation and its myriad supporting organizations suffer from a lack of total system visibility, connectivity and single-point managerial oversight. During times of more robust funding and ample asset inventory, these disconnects in linkage tended to be masked and compensated for by the (sic) shear vitality and numbers, and at times, excesses, of the system’s various component parts.²¹

The term bathtub effect has become pervasive in discussions about readiness dilemmas. From a broad view, this phenomenon is marked from the point where a squadron departs its homeport nominally manned, trained, and equipped to fulfill its deployed assignments. As the deployment ends, the squadron is assigned a lower priority for spares, manning, and training. It is forced to transfer aircraft and parts to those following them. This begins the downward slide (as measured in readiness terms) of entering the bathtub.

As the interdeployment training cycle (IDTC) progresses, the squadron must begin the workup cycle anew. In more prosperous times, this might have meant the transfer of one or two aircraft to extensive depot-level rework and increased time in training flights, but there would be a relatively steady state maintenance workload. In the current environment, squadrons are routinely subjected to multiple aircraft transfers to other squadrons (which entails additional paperwork and maintenance man-hours). Because spares are not readily available, the aircraft that are assigned to the individual units experience significant periods of unavailability for training. Squadrons are then forced to “cannabalize” parts from other aircraft in an effort to patch together sufficient numbers of flyable aircraft to achieve a minimum of training proficiency. This describes the bottoming-out phase of the IDTC where readiness simply cannot get any lower.

The climb back to full readiness (out of the bathtub) for deployment begins as aircraft and parts are made available. These aircraft must be inducted, inspected, and flown before they can be accepted as part of the squadron inventory. Training intensifies along with the accompanying workload to prepare people and aircraft for deployment. As the squadron deploys, it has ideally reached the pinnacle of its readiness to fulfill its wartime assignments.

The IG pointed out that systemic faults in the naval aviation support system were worsened by the decades-long practice, which was only corrected in fiscal year 1998 by action of the Chief of Naval Operations, of using the type commander’s (Naval Air Forces Pacific and Atlantic) operating funds as a source of funding unforeseen expenditures. In recent years, these have included computer buys, temporary additional duty funding, range support, and contingency operations. As these funds disappeared off the balance sheets of the type commanders, something had to give. In many cases, it was funding for aviation spares (usually deferred until the following fiscal year) and depot-level maintenance. This deferral created a bow wave because the supply systems could not obligate funds to support their customers until the next fiscal year. In depot-level maintenance, this meant that work was stopped for often months at a time until funding was available to support that work. At one point in 1998, the Pacific Naval Air Force had more than 200 bare firewalls (that is, aircraft engine compartments without engines) as a result of the lack of funding.²²

These costs of doing business were made all the more inimical to readiness by the aging of aircraft beyond what any of the forecast models could foresee. The reality appears to be that as aging increases, support increases in proportions that are almost logarithmic. As a result, despite well-intentioned forecasts of requirements, support systems have been ill prepared to predict the support and spares requirements for the inventory.

Seemingly innocuous budget designations, such as program-related engineering and program-related logistics, have long been buried under various subtitles within the myriad of budget documents. As yet another target for underfunding, the effect of doing so did not appear until the situation achieved glaring visibility. In 1999 and continuing into 2000, the SH–60 community was unable to fund the printing of sufficient numbers of the Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) flight manuals to provide one to each pilot and aircrewman undergoing training in the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS). One of the workarounds was to use squadron funds for operation to contract private printing of the manuals. Unfortunately, the manuals did not include enclosures such as wiring and systems diagrams. The potential impact on safety of flight for aircrew not operating with current and readable flight manuals quite plausibly crosses the line of “acceptable levels of risk” for naval aviation.

The Chief of Naval Operations has testified rather bluntly that “the cost of operating Naval Air, because it is so old, is spiraling out of control. And there is no magic way out of this except [to] buy new airplanes.”²³

Retention. As mentioned earlier, the aging of aircraft results in decreased reliability and increased maintenance requirements. The increase in workload on sailors in particular, and to some extent marines as well, has created a host of morale problems that range across the entire rank structure. In what must have been a startling revelation, Navy leadership found that more than 70 percent of those queried responded that the conditions under which they were working negatively influenced their decision to stay in the Navy.

Across the board in aviation-related ratings for sailors, the Navy was found to be undermanned. Even today, the desired retention rate of 42 percent for pilots and naval flight officers has not been achieved for several years.²⁴ The result is a loss of combat-experienced aircrew and an increased workload for the training and recruiting commands.

Long an institutional bugaboo for those who have served in the operational forces of the Navy has been the inability of the personnel system to stabilize manning for deploying forces. The stories of training the ship or squadron to “get up to speed for deployment” only to have a host of newly reported bootcamp and FRS graduates show up in the 2 weeks prior to getting under way are a common theme. The burden of training and qualifying new people in what should be an arena manned by experts is usually made all the more difficult by the departure of senior and experienced people throughout the course of the deployment. In the report of the IG investigation, the frustration of the fleet with this situation is clearly evident. What may surprise sailors is the revelation that the Marine Corps has simply refused this situation as an acceptable mode of operations. Marine manning is stabilized 6 months prior to deployment, and no gains or losses (except for exceptional circumstances) are allowed during that time.

Another highlighted frustration to optimal manning has been the long accepted practice of reassigning people to temporary additional duty from their ordered billets. For many years, this was looked upon as an almost necessary rite of passage wherein sailors, including those who had completed advanced courses of instruction in aviation systems, were welcomed aboard and promptly assigned duties such as “compartment cleaning” and food service attendant (FSA, commonly referred to as mess cooking). This loss of a sailor could constitute anywhere from 8 to 12 percent of his availability during his tour. The IG report pinpointed especially egregious instances wherein aviation technicians assigned to depot-level facilities ashore were reassigned to duties as FSAs aboard flagships, duties for public relations oriented event support, “honors support teams,” and auxiliary security forces. Coupled with the financial bow wave phenomenon discussed previously that complicates workload management and productivity for depot-level maintenance, this is yet another bothersome factor, well within the span of control of the Navy, that can be ameliorated.

Ranges. Rather than attempt to document the numerous sources that have testified to the necessity of live fire ranges for maritime forces and naval aviation, we must realize that no one within Navy leadership is presently on record as supporting the elimination of that capability.

Much attention has been garnered by the controversy surrounding Navy use of impact ranges on the island of Vieques, a part of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rico Operating Area has been an integral part of naval task force training evolutions since World War II. Debate concerning continued Navy use of the Vieques range became divisive and contentious throughout the Clinton and Bush administrations. The death of a government employee on the range during a bombing exercise in April of 1999 seemed to ignite a conflagration of lobby and legal proceedings, including the filing of more than 2,000 tort suits. This public pressure ultimately resulted in the Bush administration decision to leave the island by 2003 and search for alternatives.²⁵

One of the profound effects of not being able to collocate live fire target ranges with the other ranges used for deployment preparation has been the expense involved in finding suitable alternatives. In recent congressional testimony, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics estimated these costs at more than $1.5 billion for the most recent fiscal year.²⁶ These expenses have the potential to become extraordinary unfunded requirements over the coming years. As discussed above, unfunded requirements have decimated the recapitalization efforts of naval aviation. Further pressures on the budget will increase the likelihood of further degradation of readiness.

A further point of consideration is in what ways the factors outlined above, which can be summarized as reduced training opportunities, affect the ability of naval aviation to deliver ordnance accurately and effectively.

Carrier air wings, and more recently maritime patrol aircraft and strike capable helicopters, deploy to the Naval Strike and Warfare Center (NSAWC) in Fallon, Nevada, for 4 to 5 weeks of intensive strike oriented training prior to their deployments. At the Fallon ranges, where access is essentially unencumbered (as opposed to Vieques), ordnance delivery accuracy has displayed alarming and declining trends. Over a 2-year period, the percentage of aircraft able to hit their targets successfully in the first week of training declined from an historic average of 60 percent to 40 percent. In the words of the IG, “air wings are receiving people, parts, critical combat systems and advanced ordnance training later in the [interdeployment training cycle]...air wings are arriving at NSAWC less prepared for graduate level training effort because they have not received the support required to train in the basics.”

The readiness bathtub discussed above appears to be a problem more vexing than the lack of suitable target ranges. What the IG report appears to reflect is that even if naval aviation is provided all the range capacity that it desires for delivery of ordnance, it will be essentially unprepared to do so. The leadership of NSAWC apparently shares this belief as reflected in the following from the report:

NSAWC believes that the lack of training opportunities with FMC (Full Mission Capable) aircraft, FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) Pods, and PGMs (Precision-Guided Munitions) has resulted in strike success rates in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia far below those that should be achievable.

Quo Vadis, Aircraft Carrier?

Any number of perspectives enters into this debate, most of which center around programmatic decisions about how many of what does the Navy need to get the job done for naval aviation operating in a globalized environment.

One fundamental question deals with the very nature of the aircraft carrier. Three specific issues are generally debated with regard to the carrier. The first is whether we should have carriers. The second is how many of them are needed to do the job. The third is what size should they be. The debate tends to be joined on all fronts by active duty and retired military, individual services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, any number of lobbying agencies and think tanks, shipbuilders, weapons and system design companies, scholars, and observers. The realities of carrier construction are ultimately in the hands of the elected officials in Congress. Their individual and collective votes in committee or meeting as a body of the whole are the quintessential arbiter in these debates. Thus, it is Congress—not the lobbyists or think tanks—that has to remain convinced as to the value of large aircraft carriers. But to maintain this conviction requires that the Navy understand the opposing arguments and participate in the public debate, not merely dismiss the critics.

A recent journal article by two respected former carrier-qualified aviators likened aircraft carriers to “today’s battleships—national treasures that may become too valuable to risk when some Osama bin Laden figures out (soon) how to do them in....[T]he danger here is that carriers and their aircraft constitute a senile weapon system, rapidly approaching obsolescence.” The authors go on to advocate adoption and innovation in development and use of unmanned airborne vehicles and unmanned combat airborne vehicles.²⁷ While these arguments are certainly debatable, they are illustrative of contending points of view to the conventional wisdom of press statements and advertising brochures.

Numbers of aircraft carriers have been operational and legislative conundrums for years. During the Gulf War, the Navy had six carriers forward deployed to support combat operations. This was possible because the Navy inventory of carriers was 15 (although this total included the soon to be decommissioned USS Coral Sea and the recently commissioned USS Abraham Lincoln, neither of which were available for combat operations.) The Navy has attempted to maintain a carrier presence in the Mediterranean since shortly after the end of World War II and in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean since the early 1970s, along with a forward presence in the Western Pacific. Under the anecdotal calculus applied in the Cold War, this required three forward-deployed aircraft carriers at all times; three in post-deployment standdown and training; three in deployment preparations; three undergoing extended overhaul; a combination of three more nearing decommissioning or commissioning; and perhaps up to three more in transit or on alert for surge operations for a total of 18.²⁸ One of the more pragmatic and operative equations was that envisioned under the maritime strategy of the Reagan years. This equation required 16 carrier battlegroups forward in event of hostilities with the Soviet Union.²⁹ However these equations were calculated or debated, their numbers were determined by Congress, and the end result is that there are 12 aircraft carriers on active duty today.

The final debate centers around so-called large deck (Nimitz-class and beyond) carriers and alternative designs. Commonly discussed alternatives have included smaller-deck carriers, mobile offshore bases, and significant changes to the carrier force structure. The near-term reality is that a large-deck Nimitz-class derivative design (CVNX) will be the newest generation of aircraft carriers for the U.S. Navy.

The Nimitz-class design was introduced in the late 1960s. Incremental upgrades to ship systems have been developed and installed over the years that reflect changes and advances in communications, navigation, sensors, and information warfare systems (a term that did not exist in Navy doctrine at the time of the ship’s original design). As currently approved, an evolutionary approach to ship systems upgrades will be incorporated over the build of the next three carriers, CVN–77, CVNX–1, and CVNX–2.³⁰ Envisioned changes include an integrated combat systems package, advanced propulsion plant (with reduced operator support requirements), eventual incorporation of electric-drive systems, and potentially an electromagnetic launch system that would eliminate steam powered catapult systems.³¹

The decision to adhere to an evolutionary incorporation of emerging technologies was supported by a years-long research effort that focused on a myriad of potential carrier designs. This study, led by the Center for Naval Analyses, concluded that continuation with the large-deck configuration yielded economies of scale that could not be replicated through other alternatives. The commonly quoted analysis is that a large-deck carrier with 75 aircraft assigned can deliver 100 percent more sorties than a ship with 55 aircraft with only an 8 percent increase in overall operating expense.³²

Even as debate was appearing to diminish about the long-term plans for aircraft carriers, the Secretary of Defense directed the Defense Science Board to conduct yet another study to assess the future naval environment, the role of the Navy over the next half-century, and what transformations might be necessary for carriers to incorporate to adapt to the changing world.³³

What Does It Take to Win?

Congressman Ike Skelton (D–MO), at the end of a long day of testimony by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps, decided to impart a history lesson to the leadership of the Navy:

Admiral Clark, a few moments ago, [I] asked the question, what does it take to win? And that question, of course, is usually asked at the time a conflict begins. But I refer to 1934 when this Congress passed the Vincent Trammel Act that authorized eventual construction of 92 war ships, which was the birth of the two-ocean Navy.

Those members of the Congress asked themselves, what does it take to win? They had no idea of the threat that was hanging over us from the empire of Japan. But thanks to the question, the ships were built. None of the ships that won the battle of Midway were built after the war started. They were built as a result of what the Congress did in anticipating worst-case scenario.³⁴

This author does not presume to have the answers to all or any of the questions previously discussed. What can be offered, however, is the reasoned argument that should the Navy and its aviation community desire to play a continued and survivable role in a globalized environment, significant changes must take place.

The Navy must identify doctrinal and technological counters to the emerging antiaccess regimes of future adversaries. These are right now threats. A scenario of denied forward basing, denied access to the littoral, denied overflight, and unacceptable risks in the vicinity of targets will not allow naval aviation to fight and win.

Increasing requirements for military responses to global contingencies will continue to increase the demands on naval aviation. Should national leadership continue to choose to respond at the rates of the past decade, the effects of attrition on aircraft, ships, and people must be reversed through increased procurement, increased end-strength, and increased training opportunities to hone combat skills and maintain the required edge of readiness.

Most troubling to Navy leadership should be the potential for a continued downward spiral in readiness of naval aviation due to the conditions and trends identified by the inspector general in his report. This environment is not survivable if allowed to continue. Aggressive and continuous response and monitoring are required to reverse these trends.

These answers are within the span of control of elected and appointed leaders of the military forces. All of the above will require significant financial investment. Naval aviation cannot continue along its present path and remain a viable force in a globalized maritime environment.

J. Kevin Mattonen is currently a consultant to several national security organizations, including Joint Forces Command. He served for over 20 years as a naval flight officer and naval strategic planner and earned the master of arts in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. In addition to service in numerous maritime patrol (P–3) squadrons, the U.S. Naval Academy, and as a staff member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, he commanded the Undersea Surveillance Station in Keflavik, Iceland.

Notes

¹ Various sources. Data available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300pmu.htm>. [BACK]

²Norman Polmar, “A Problem with Precision?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 4 (April 2001), 4–6. [BACK]

³ See discussions by Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 29, 1999, accessed at <http://www.csis.org/kosovo/Lessons.html>. [BACK]

⁴ David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall, and John D. Morrocco, “Strikes Hit Old Targets, Reveal New Problems,” Aviation Week, February 23, 2001, accessed at <www.aviationnow.com/avnow/new/channel_military.jsp>. [BACK]

⁵ Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 1992), 200–208. [BACK]

⁶ John Lehman, Command of the Seas (New York: Scribners, 1988), 285–286. [BACK]

⁷ Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 147. [BACK]

⁸ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, accessed at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm>. [BACK]

⁹ Department of the Navy, Forward...from the Sea, 1994, accessed at <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/forward.txt>, 3. [BACK]

¹⁰ Robert Burns, “Warships on Guard Amid High Alert,” Hampton-Newport News Daily Press, September 13, 2001, A4. [BACK]

¹¹ Accessed at <www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/ds1.htm>. [BACK]

¹² The United Nations International Maritime Organization provides sources of information on international agreements and forums relating to maritime piracy through their Web site at <www.imo.org>. Current worldwide incident reports are available through <www.maritimesecurity.com>. [BACK]

¹³ Scott C. Truver, “The U.S. Navy in Review,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 5 (May 2000), 76, 78. [BACK]

¹⁴ Alarik Fritz, et al., Navy Role in Homeland Defense Against Asymmetric Threats, Volume One: Summary Report (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, September 2001), 13–14. [BACK]

¹⁵ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), 14, 17, 27. [BACK]

¹⁶ John Nathman, “‘In Harm’s Way’––Naval Aviation at the Dawn of the 21st Century,” articles and interviews with Hook, Association of Naval Aviation, and Seapower (Navy League of the United States) accessed at <http://www.anahq.org/In%20Harm’s%20Way%20–%20%20Naval%20Aviation%20at%20the%20Dawn%20of%20the%2021st%20Century.htm> [BACK] .

¹⁷ Government Accounting Office, “TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce Average Age of Aircraft,” GAO–01–163BR, February 16, 2001, accessed at <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/ has193000.000/has193000_0f.htm>. [BACK]

¹⁸ Hearings on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002: H.R. 2586 and Oversight Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session, July 12, 2001, accessed at <http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/01-07-12clark.html>. [BACK]

¹⁹ Government Accounting Office, February 16, 2001. [BACK]

²⁰ Ibid. [BACK]

²¹ U.S. Navy, Navy Inspector General, Final Report of Naval Aviation Spares and Readiness, April 28, 2000, 2. [BACK]

²² John Nathman, Interview, “A Balanced and Lethal Force,” Seapower, June 2001, accessed at <www.navyleague.org/seapower_mag/june2001/balanced_and_lethal.htm>. [BACK]

²³ HASC, July 12, 2001. [BACK]

²⁴ “Running the Fleet Ragged—Duct Tape Aviation,” Navy Times, September 10, 2001. [BACK]

²⁵ Remarks of the Secretary of the Navy Gordon England at Vieques, Puerto Rico, June 15, 2001, accessed at <www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/england/speeches/eng-vieques.txt>. [BACK]

²⁶ U.S. House of Representatives, House Armed Service Committee, Hearings on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002: H.R. 2586 and Oversight Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session, Military Readiness Subcommittee Hearings on Title III—Operation and Maintenance, May 22, 2001, accessed at <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has142030.000/has142030_0f.htm>. This hearing was marked by an almost surreal discussion of environmental issues, including the fate of the snowy plover that overtook most of the discussion of the impact of “‘encroachment” on military ranges on readiness and training. [BACK]

²⁷Joseph A. Gattuso, Jr., and Lori J. Tanner, “Naval Force in the New Century,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 1 (Winter 2001). [BACK]

²⁸A more recent version of this ratio—based on operations research analysis techniques—appears in Gregory V. Cox, Keeping Carriers Forward Deployed: Harder Than It Seems (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2000). [BACK]

²⁹ Lehman, 115–143. [BACK]

³⁰ Scott C. Truver, “Tomorrow’s U.S. Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 3 (March 2000), 107–109. [BACK]

³¹ J. Talbot Manvel, “The Next-Generation Aircraft Carrier,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 6 (June 2000), 70–72. [BACK]

³² David Perin, “Are Big Decks Still the Answer?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 6 (June 2001), 30–33. [BACK]

³³ Robert Holzer, “Rumsfeld Directs DSB To Assess Future Role of U.S. Aircraft Carriers,” DefenseNews.com, August 29, 2001, accessed at <www.paxriver.org/news/010829.htm>. [BACK]

³⁴ U.S. House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, June 12, 2001. [BACK]