Globalization and Surface Warfare

Norman Friedman, James S. O’Brasky, and Sam J. Tangredi

Surface warfare is the soul of the Navy. Yet within all souls, there are sometimes issues of faith and periods of doubt and reassessment. For the surface warfare community, the end of the Cold War brought a period of reassessment that is still ongoing. It will not be complete until the community grapples with the implications of the era of globalization and resolves a series of issues that appear to place long-term faith in collision with current requirements.

We say that surface warfare is the soul of the Navy because all operational concepts for naval forces—and to a great extent, land-based tactical air forces—have their historical origins in the individual ship-to-ship, fleet-versus-fleet, and fleet-versus-shore combat that constitutes traditional war at sea.¹ The aircraft carrier and submarine have indeed replaced the surface vessel as the capital ship and primary sea control ship, respectively. But the development of fundamental tactical concepts, crew structure, and naval culture lie within the historical evolution of the surface ship. Arguably, if one understands the organizational structure of the prototypical surface warfare ship—the destroyer—one can understand the internal functioning and departmental structure of almost every U.S. Navy organization.

What Is Surface Warfare?

Surface warfare can be narrowly defined as warfare conducted from maritime surface platforms against surface targets. This is a preferred definition for those looking solely at the technologies or individual tactics optimized for a particular type of engagement—hence, surface warfare (against surface targets) differs from antisubmarine warfare (against subsurface targets), antiair warfare (against aircraft or missiles), or strike warfare (strikes against targets ashore). But the individual surface ship operates at the very nexus of the air, surface, undersea, and littoral (coastal) environments and is generally designed to conduct all the above types of engagements. In that sense, the surface ship is the most multidimensional of naval platforms. To capture this multidimensionality, surface warfare can be more broadly defined as any activity carried out by multipurpose surface ships.²

Utilizing such a broad definition is, in fact, one of the issues where faith (or perhaps culture) collides with requirements. If one looks at the organizational chart of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), one would note that the Director for Surface Warfare has no direct responsibility for amphibious warships. This is of considerable irony since the current Department of the Navy vision,...From the Sea (with slight modifications by Forward...from the Sea), implies that littoral warfare—of which expeditionary and amphibious operations would appear to be the dominant component—is now the primary focus of the surface fleet, carrier battlegroups as well as amphibious ready groups. This vision makes considerable sense, since the collapse of the Soviet Navy at the end of the Cold War resulted in a historically rare situation in which there is but one global navy (the U.S. Navy with maritime allies) against which there is no effective maritime opposition. In other words, fleet-versus-fleet surface warfare has become the least likely form of combat in which the U.S. Navy will engage for the foreseeable future.³

And yet the amphibious fleet appears to remain relegated to second-class status in the culture of surface warfare (represented in OPNAV by a Marine general), and surface platforms look and function much like they did in the later stages of the Cold War—technological advances in ordnance aside. In creating a new land attack platform suitable for littoral operations in a fleet combat-absent and globalized world, the initial preference (DD 21) of senior surface warfare leaders was a modified fleet destroyer.⁴ DD 21 was subsequently cancelled by the Secretary of Defense under the impression that the program was not suitably “transformational.”⁵

Along with the declining possibility of a major fleet-on-fleet engagement, the combat experience of modern combined arms naval forces indicates that asymmetrical attacks tend to produce more efficient results at longer ranges than symmetrical means. Thus, aircraft and submarine attacks against surface ships have become the preferred means of surface engagement, rather than surface ship versus surface ship combat (which explains the dominance of aircraft carriers and submarines).⁶

Our conclusion from the above observation is that one of the first steps facing the surface community in any attempt to adapt to the implications of globalization would be to redefine surface warfare to be more inclusive of the activities that it is most likely to perform: landing and supporting ground forces ashore. Until it does so, the surface platforms required for these activities will neither keep up with the potential technological advances nor be optimized to perform these missions in an antiaccess environment.

In fairness, it must be admitted that the surface community has adapted to two of the other significant roles that it performs and/or will perform in the future security environment: long-range land attack with Tomahawk cruise missiles and ballistic missile defense. Then again, both missions are adaptable to destroyers. However, recent development of the littoral combat ship (LCS) concept does indicate recognition that nontraditional platforms might be future requirements.⁷

Impact of and on Globalization

Like the other aspects of maritime power, U.S. naval surface forces are directly affected by, and in turn, directly involved in, globalization. For the purpose of this chapter, we focus on six of the seven effects identified in the introduction but in a different order: interventions in locations not previously considered of vital interest (effect 4), increasing nonstate and transnational threats (effect 1), increasing maritime traffic and trade (effect 2), proliferation of antiaccess or area-denial weapons and strategies (effect 7), new effects on alliances and coalitions (effect 5), and proliferation of information technology and sensors (effect 6).

Increasing Interventions and the Revolution in Surface Warfare. Naval forces in general are uniquely well equipped for global operations, because, unlike land-based forces, they can remain in place for a protracted period without the support of, or permission from, local governments. Moreover, ships can carry heavy enough weights of weaponry to make their presence off a foreign coast a meaningful gesture either of support or of coercion.⁸ But to handle increasing intervention requires either a more efficient manner of employment or a bigger fleet.

The great question for any navy is how many areas it must affect simultaneously. During the Cold War, when the U.S. Navy was built around carrier battlegroups (CVBGs) composed of an aircraft carrier, one or two replenishment ships, and six or seven surface combatants, the answer was generally no more than two or three areas: one locale in the Mediterranean or the Middle East and one or two in the Far East; later the Arabian Sea was added. Surface ships did in fact visit many more places at any one time, but there was little expectation that they would actually have to fight in these various places. Toward the end of the Cold War, the Navy acknowledged that the CVBGs could not cover enough contingencies. It therefore formed surface action groups (SAGs) around the four battleships. The battleship SAGs presaged an important likely future role of surface combatants in a more globalized world.⁹

Complementing the realization that the U.S. Navy could not afford the number of CVBGs required for true global coverage, a revolution in surface warfare occurred through the development of the land-attack cruise missile. The development of the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile in the 1980s effectively increased the striking range of an individual surface ship from approximately 24 nautical miles (the range of the largest battleship gun) to over 1,500 nautical miles. Effectively demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm, by 1998 the sea-launched Tomahawk had become a contingency weapon of choice, being used for strikes in even a completely landlocked country (Afghanistan). Brushing aside the question of whether this was the wisest use for such a weapon,¹⁰ the success of the Tomahawk effectively globalized naval surface warfare—at least for the surface forces of the U.S. Navy and her closest allies. This allows SAGs—even without the now-decommissioned battleships—to have an independent strike capability that they had not had since the beginning of naval aviation, at a range unfathomable to the classical naval strategists.

SAGs were now strike groups; they derived their value from the Tomahawk land attack missiles they deployed—but also from the defensive capability of the Aegis antiair combat systems aboard some of the ships. The combination of these capabilities meant that SAGs now had a capacity to defend themselves from sophisticated air attack as well as strike targets deep inland.

Thus, our second conclusion is that with the advent of the long-range land-attack cruise missile, the U.S. Navy had already answered one of the major effects of globalization: the ability to affect contingencies in areas not previously considered of vital interest. And it is now able to do so with platforms (surface ships) that were not previously viewed as having a strategic impact. This brings up another question of faith: why can’t SAGs deploy as forward presence formations to critical locations in lieu of our overtaxed CVBGs? Globalization implies the need for great agility on our own part. Whatever forces the United States brings to bear must appear quickly. They must be self-contained, in the sense that they enjoy independent endurance, can defend themselves against a realistic scale of attack, and, perhaps most importantly, can execute significant offensive operations. Carrier battlegroups are self-contained and have enormous offensive and defensive firepower, but they are also massive and expensive, and it seems unlikely that the United States can ever afford a large number of them. The next level down has to be SAGs, with individual high-capacity surface combatants another level down.

Our second recommendation is that the Navy fully use this capability by breaking the traditional cycle of providing a CVBG as the standard deployment formation in every situation. Surface SAGs would seem to have the appropriate capabilities for many deployment locations and could increase the number of places where the United States could maintain combat-credible forces. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations has recently initiated development of a concept of an expeditionary assault group consisting of Aegis guided missile destroyers, nuclear attack submarines, and combat logistics ships attached to (and trained with) current amphibious ready groups. If put in place, these adjustments may prove beneficial in satisfying the recommendations of chapter 15 concerning shifts in overseas presence requirements.

The continuing reduction in forward land-based forces and the emergence of antiaccess threats place a variety of increased demands on sea-based forces, including the emerging need to operate sea-based forces in littoral regions in the continual presence of threat. New combinations of naval assets in tailored task forces would appear the solution to maximize our capabilities. For example, the global war on terror may require strike and small-scale amphibious operations on short notice and in the absence of accessible infrastructure. Relying on a limited number of standard-configuration CVBGs/ARGs no longer makes sense. Discussion of alternative task force combinations (naval operational architecture) is the focus of chapter 28.

Increasing Transnational Threats and Increasing Maritime Traffic. Experience since the Cold War has shown that surface combatants also play very important roles in embargoes and sanctions enforcement, in which numbers of units may be more important than unit strike capability. The most prominent cases in point are the sanctions against Iraq, interdiction operations against Serbia in the Adriatic, and now the effort to prevent members of the al Qaeda terrorist network from fleeing Pakistan by sea. Newspaper reports suggest that there may be an essential U.S. security role as well, since the sponsors of al Qaeda apparently control merchant ships that may be used to transport weapons or other terrorist materiel to the United States.¹¹

Chapter 4 discusses the potential roles of surface combatants in interdicting transnational threats, so we will not describe them here. Similarly, chapter 8 describes the increase in maritime traffic and potential need for greater sea lane security, a mission that presumably will be assigned to surface ships (of which most are helicopter equipped) and maritime patrol aircraft. Ocean, coastal, and riverine surface transportation will increase in volume and value with the rise of littoral economic activity. We may expect that the demand for transportation in the newly and rapidly expanding urbanized and industrialized areas will overwhelm land and air transportation infrastructures, creating even greater dependence on maritime transportation features. This plethora of high-value ocean and coastal commerce and the concentration of economic and political activity in the littoral regions create a large and valuable array of potential surface targets to defend or attack.

Our observation on these points is in consonance with our first recommendation: there are more aspects to the surface fleet than cruiser/destroyer-type combatants. If the need for interdiction/sea lane security is increasing, it would seem logical to also assign amphibious warships, the remaining fleet of patrol combatants, and the future LCSs to these tasks. As noted in chapter 4, this has been done to some extent in the Persian Gulf, but could also be done elsewhere (such as the Malacca straits). Interdiction does not require Tomahawk-capable ships; our third recommendation would be to balance this globalized role throughout the surface community. This might require increased cross-training between platforms and greater professionalism regarding these missions. These missions also call for the development of coalition fleets, a function in which the U.S. Navy has previously proved quite adept.

Proliferation of Antiaccess Weapons: Battle Space and Ballistic Missile Defense. Extensive discussion of antiaccess weapons proliferation appears in chapters 25 and 26 in this volume. There is a significant debate on the level of threat that antiaccess or area denial weapons entail and whether potential opponents are actually acquiring robust and integrated antiaccess defense systems. Chapters 25 and 26 reflect this debate and reach different conclusions—both of which hold differing implications for the surface fleet. A robust antiaccess network would suggest a greater opportunity for opponents to target large surface platforms, suggesting the need for smaller, potentially expendable ships—networked in line with the network-centric warfare principles of retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski’s Streetfighter concept. We will discuss the issue of smaller surface combatants later; however, two elements related to the globalization of antiaccess weapons are indisputable under any interpretation: that the littoral battle space is collapsing (that is, becoming more difficult and dangerous to operate within), and that development of ballistic missile defense capabilities for surface ships would be a very significant means of ensuring both expeditionary force and allied state survivability in an antiaccess environment.

The challenge of the contested littoral battlespace is much greater than that faced by the surface fleet in the open ocean. In the complex cluttered littoral, survival depends upon an even higher standard of situational awareness, requiring low signature platforms operating in quiet modes and quick reaction weapons of a most discriminate and effective nature. This high standard of situational awareness demanded by sustained littoral operations can be achieved only if a well-instrumented battlespace can be created and sustained in the face of a determined and adaptive enemy with relatively large local resources (no matter their level of sophistication). As noted in Admiral Cebrowski’s proposals, a comprehensive sensing grid could develop sufficient information to allow a conditioning of the littoral battlespace so as to reduce the effectiveness of antiaccess threats before the entrance of U.S. and allied forces. But layered defenses are still problematic. The possibility of attack from a hidden position at relatively close range cannot be ignored. The only viable countermeasure is a well-integrated hard-kill and soft-kill defense of a low signature platform—which might be, of necessity, vastly different in configuration than today’s surface combatants.

In such a collapsed battlespace, mutual support distances rarely exceed 30 nautical miles. This is both an advantage and disadvantage for U.S. naval forces. A network-centric sensing grid may enable the documentation and reconstruction of the engagement to characterize the enemy attack mode and platform. This would facilitate the orchestration of a force-level response to a platform-level attack. (This assumes, of course, that the opponent has fewer naval platforms available than U.S. and allied naval forces.) But conversely, the short operating distance means that U.S. naval forces themselves could be subject to greater detection and repeated attacks from land-based missiles and aircraft.

This is a particular danger for unalerted surface platforms performing a forward presence mission. To be an effective deterrent, forward-deployed forces must maintain access to the theater and provide essential services to the joint and combined force commanders. These functions require the ability to rapidly assert maritime battlespace dominance in the open ocean approaches to the theater and in the littoral regions of the theater. But they also expose a forward-deployed force to a “battle for the first salvo” in a no-warning engagement.¹²We conclude, therefore, that combat in a contested littoral will involve platform losses. We may also conclude that the modes of combat that are suitable for operations in the “relatively expansive desert” of the open ocean will prove quite ineffective if not counterproductive in the “ urban sprawl” of the littoral. Regardless of the size and characteristics of U.S. warships or the sophistication and robustness of enemy antiaccess systems, littoral operations will require tactics much different than those in open-ocean fleet combat. This tactical development has begun only recently.¹³ Our fourth recommendation is for the surface community—in addition to internal tactical development—to strenuously encourage discussion of littoral tactics in the open professional literature as an intellectual “force multiplier.”¹⁴

The ballistic missile defense mission could bring back a naval role that has not been a major mission of the surface navy since 1918: defense of coastal cities. Access to ballistic missile technology is widespread, despite diplomatic efforts to restrict it. The current effort to develop a sea-based theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) integrates nicely with our current forward presence posture since TBMD is generally predicated on the need to protect allies against enemies, and at the least to protect necessary points of access, such as container ports, against attack. Prime threats would be such rogue states as North Korea and Iraq, both of which have developed medium-range ballistic missile capabilities. It should be noted, however, that many of our current allies or friends oppose other allies or friends. It may well be in our interest to be able to negate strategic attacks one tries to mount against the other. As this is written, India and Pakistan, both armed with nuclear-tipped missiles, seem to be on the point of war. They may well not fight, or their fight may be on a much smaller scale. However, American policymakers would probably prize the ability to cool off such a fight by intercepting opposing missiles from a neutral position—from the sea.

The related but more difficult mission of integrating sea-based missile defense with a national missile defense (NMD) to protect the U.S. homeland is discussed in detail in chapter 24. Until recently, surface navy leaders have been reluctant to countenance NMD as a major surface fleet mission due to the perception that such an assignment would force ships to remain close to the continental United States, thereby taking them away from their real missions of providing forward presence and crisis response overseas. This view has since begun to change, particular in light of the Bush administration’s unwavering commitment to NMD. Our fifth recommendation is that the surface navy begin to develop the concepts and tactics for this inevitable mission.¹⁵ As the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states, “To be effective abroad, America must be safe at home.”¹⁶

Effects on Alliances and Coalitions: Toward a Global Coalition Navy? Globalization has a complementary economic face: very wide-scale access to markets, not only for peacetime commodities, but for military products. That face affects the projected capabilities of possible enemies and also those of allies and potential partners. As noted in chapter 11, it may also affect the fortunes of producers of military systems and thereby the course of weapon system development globally. Earlier we asked how the United States could gain the numbers of ships it needs for some operations, such as maritime interdiction.¹⁷ The answer may be coalitions with navies that individually are weak but that together operate large numbers of frigates and smaller oceangoing craft.

Paradoxically, in recent crises it has been the U.S. ability to operate independently at sea that has drawn other governments into coalitions with us. In the political vernacular, the ability to act unilaterally is the catalyst to attract multilateral participation. Indeed, other governments see coalition operation as quite important, to the point that, for example, the Danes are buying substantial frigate-sized ships (a size larger than those in their current fleet) specifically to participate in allied/coalition operations—a trend not seen since the Cold War.¹⁸ Such is the allure that a global-capable navy, such as the U.S. Navy, has for the professional naval services of like-minded nations. Unlike their army counterparts, which frequently rely on conscripts, most world navies are highly professional and have enjoyed the benefits of personnel trained at staff colleges (including attendance at the U.S. Naval War College and National Defense University) for several generations. The very best have and maintain very high professional standards. These navies can be both formidable opponents and valued partners.

Our observation is that the current level of maritime dominance of the United States is the best way to dissuade potential enemies from building large oceangoing navies and the best way to attract a maritime coalition of friends and allies. Other navies see interoperability with U.S. naval forces as substantial support to their own defense policies. Since international law of the sea allows global naval operations without infringement on sovereignty or the need for permanent foreign bases, it is easier to draw skeptical potential allies/former antagonists into combined naval exercises than it is to persuade them to allow combined land exercises—Russia being an example in this regard. Naval dominance (used thoughtfully) holds positive diplomatic benefits in a globalized world. Our sixth recommendation is for the United States to make every effort to retain the overall naval dominance (in an operational and technological sense) developed during the Cold War and use it as a prime method of political-military engagement—even with Russia, China, and, in the future, reformed/modified rogue states.¹⁹

Proliferation of Information Systems and Sensors. We have left the discussion of the proliferation of information systems and sensors (effect 6) for last, because we are uncertain of the real effect that this has had on naval surface fleets other than those of the United States and its closest allies. Obviously, naval surface combatants appear to have become more capable in almost every navy. For example, China has recently taken delivery of two more Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia (for a total of four). The Sovremenny-class is a legacy system of the late Cold War, armed with SS–N–22 Sunburn cruise missiles, still reputedly the most fearsome ship killer.²⁰ Increases in weapons capability are dependent on increased capabilities in detection and battle management. Individual warships have indeed been transformed through increased access to tactical and navigational information and communications via satellite. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Navy at the end of the Cold War, no non-NATO nation has developed a comprehensive, sophisticated maritime surveillance system that could significantly improve its surface warfare capabilities (that is, for long-range maritime defense). From this perspective, there has thus far been a definite limit on the effect that information technology (IT) proliferation has had on surface warfare globally.

This is a fact (as discussed in chapter 26) that places the more alarmist views of the need for radical military transformation into question. Nations that operate sophisticated integrated air defense systems (such as the Russian-built SA–10) simply have not developed the comparable maritime information systems that would make their surface (as well as undersea and air) forces substantially more effective. This may be due to the perception that sea mines, diesel submarines, and land-based antiship missiles—currently the primary weapons of maritime antiaccess—do not need extensive cueing and battle management in the short distances of the collapsed littoral battlespace.²¹ (See discussion of sea mines in chapter 20.) Or it may be due to the fact that these expensive systems are not high in most militaries’ budget priorities. Operating such systems requires a level of training and maintenance outside the current capabilities of most nations (no matter their level of naval professionalism). This is particularly true of the rogue states.²²

Our conclusion in this regard is that global advances in IT have made surface warships individually more lethal, but outside the U.S. Navy and NATO partners, these advances have not been applied to increasing overall maritime power. One result is that in a coalition context, the United States must contribute the essential intelligence to support sanctions/embargo operations. Both in the Gulf and in the Adriatic, it seems that U.S. systems built to track the Soviet fleet during the Cold War played an essential role in tracking and then intercepting merchant ships. A decade after the Gulf War, the United States still enjoys a near-monopoly on such capability, although our allies certainly contribute vital information in support of the effort. The U.S. contribution is very much in the emerging spirit of network-centric warfare: the tactical picture (which is much of our part of the operation) makes up much of the cost and value of the operation.

More generally, surface combatants gain their offensive firepower largely from their ability to fire weapons, particularly cruise missiles, beyond their horizons. Thus, they must rely on remote targeting, which will come from some sort of netted large-area picture of a remote area. The picture must be available wherever surface combatants have to operate. Our experience even during the Cold War, and certainly since, has been an almost total inability to predict venues of conflict, and at the least an inability to guess national priorities (imagine writing the same analysis before and after September 11, 2001). Thus integral with future surface warfare ought to be a globally agile sensor system—which means space-based sensors. The United States already enjoys unparalleled space-based sensor systems; few other nations have any such capability. Our recommendation is for the U.S. Navy to maintain and improve these capabilities, even to the extent of considering a ship’s satellite antenna its primary sensor.²³

Streetfighter, the Littoral Combat Ship, and the Case for Smaller Warships

Do littoral operations in the antiaccess environment globalized world ipso facto require the U.S. Navy to rely on smaller ships? This is a primary question in the debate over military transformation. Many of the proponents of transformation—arguing that opposing forces will be replete with high-technology information systems and sensors—view surface ships as increasingly easy targets, especially in the littoral but at sea as well. (See chapter 25.) To some extent, this view is a legacy of the “carriers as sitting ducks” debate that first emerged during the Carter administration and that periodically resurfaces—a debate based on budget concerns but on little, if any, tactical analysis. However, even supporters of a robust surface fleet have become convinced that a Streetfighter-type vessel—netted together by an extensive tactical network and sensor grid—is needed to conduct high-intensity combat in the collapsing littoral battlespace. Having fought strenuously against the Streetfighter concept since its articulation by Admiral Cebrowski, the surface warfare leadership now appears to have (of necessity) endorsed it in the form of the LCS program.²⁴ But is this a valid conclusion?

Our answer appears a vacillating one: it depends on the missions that the surface force is expected to carry out. If the primary mission of U.S. surface vessels will be to strike targets ashore in support of a joint and combined campaign against a regional opponent (that is, a major regional war), their primary weapon would be long- and medium-range cruise missiles. Substantial missile firepower is expensive in ship size. The bigger the ship, the larger the magazine, the more firepower that can be placed on target. If this is the dominant mission, smaller ships would not seem to present any advantage.

Probably the appropriate measure of a globalized U.S. surface combatant force is the number of separate self-sufficient units that can be maintained abroad at any one time. That leaves open a choice between larger, effectively self-sufficient ships and smaller ones that must operate in groups. Hull steel is relatively inexpensive, and in terms of personnel, the smaller number of larger ships would probably be far less expensive to operate. The argument in favor of smaller ships—say, the size of existing frigates—would be that some important operations, such as maritime interception, require a more dispersed force. It may also be argued that the more numerous smaller ships are more difficult to destroy. However, a larger ship can probably survive several hits, whereas a smaller one may succumb to only one. Moreover, the cost to support units of smaller ships may be prohibitive.

A key point is probably that a smaller ship would buy very little in terms of armed presence, because it would have so little inherent capability of its own; it would be effective only as part of a larger group, if then. That is, a large ship can accommodate both substantial defensive and offensive armament; it takes a major effort to sink. A smaller one would be armed with either offensive or area-defensive weapons, and quite possibly with very few in either case. Numbers of smaller ships could combine to provide serious capabilities; but one or two such ships would have neither. It must be admitted that at present, foreign navies seem quite content to use ships with very limited capabilities for naval presence missions, presumably on the theory that the locals are not sophisticated enough to realize just how empty their threat may be.²⁵ Alternatively, they may feel that a weak ship suffices, on the theory that the locals realize that attacking it will bring down a much more massive attack from really powerful forces beyond the horizon. But, most recently, that has been bluff. When the Iraqis nearly sank the USS Stark, there were no real consequences for them.

However, if a primary mission of the surface fleet is to maintain littoral sea control throughout a sustained joint military campaign in which the United States seeks to place land forces ashore—while the enemy retains the capability to repeatedly strike naval forces from shore—then Streetfighter/LCS-type warships in sufficiently large numbers would be key assets in any balanced fleet portfolio. This was a lesson the U.S. Navy learned during combat in the Pacific archipelagoes in World War II. Streetfighter/LCS can only be a successful innovation with a network-centric approach. But network-centric does not mean being unconcerned about numbers—smaller ships are effective as a coordinated fleet, not as individual units. The case for smaller ships is only convincing if they are bought in sufficient numbers, provide stealth advantages in a confused littoral battlespace, and can maintain their network capabilities even in the face of inevitable losses. Streetfighter/LCS development cannot be about cost savings because, as the discussion above indicates, they will not provide the economies of scale that a smaller number of bigger ships might provide.

Global Warship Trends

What, then, of that other side of globalization—the diffusion of the defense and shipbuilding industry? In contrast to the Streetfighter approach, foreign navies are now building larger ships because they expect to operate further from home, which means that they can join in the sort of out-of-area operations that were previously almost the exclusive domain of the U.S. Navy. In the past, that would have been very good news for specialist warship-builders in the United States, Britain, and France. However, as in the world of merchant shipbuilding, assembly of hulls and machinery is increasingly the province of other countries with lower labor costs. For example, just as the Republic of Korea gained prominence in merchant ship construction, it is now building frigates and has just exported one to Bangladesh (which presumably could never have afforded a European-built ship). China has sold frigates to Egypt and Thailand. This trend has not gone very far yet, but it is not too difficult to imagine a future in which very few countries feel compelled to go to classical builders for their hulls. (See discussion in chapter 11.)

Combat systems, as indicated above, are still a very different proposition. The Bangladeshi frigate is Western-equipped. The latest Thai frigates, built in China, have a mixture of Western and Chinese (reverse-engineered Russian) weapons and sensors, and U.S. experts had to modify the Chinese combat direction system to suit Thai requirements.

Since combat systems make up as much as half the cost of a ship, Western makers of naval systems probably will not suffer too badly in future global competition. However, U.S. shipbuilders may well be driven to the wall. Even now they are in substantial trouble. The trend for decades has been toward smaller numbers of larger ships with more elaborate systems on board. The smaller number of hulls requires less shipyard effort; more and more of the total naval ship procurement budget goes to systems. The net effect is likely to be to focus innovation on systems rather than on hull and machinery combinations. The U.S. choice of all-electric machinery does go against this trend, but then again it was justified on the ground that it made for better combatant performance, including better resistance to damage. In the past, few navies have been willing to analyze their requirements to a comparable depth.

The preeminence of U.S. combat system design may be our greatest military advantage in creating a global coalition navy under U.S. leadership. Right now, a NATO battlegroup is held together by formatted data links, particularly by Link 11. The data links work because ships all have computer combat direction systems amenable to processing the linked picture. At one time, most non-NATO ships of Western origin, even if they had computer-based combat direction, used a much less capable Link Y. Because computers are now so much more capable, and because money was available for combat direction development, a Link Y Mark 2, comparable in capacity to Link 11, was developed and is now installed on board many non-NATO ships. Such a link makes possible coordination with NATO ships, given the appropriate translation devices.²⁶

Of course, not everyone operates combat direction systems similar enough to ours to be compatible. It may be that the great technological challenge of the next few years will be not some implementing of stealth but rather gaining the ability to cooperate with dissimilar systems such as those of Russian warships. After all, before September 11, who would have thought of the Russians as likely partners in the war against al Qaeda?

At the least, globalization will mean that potential partners have the technical wherewithal actually to be coalition partners, but only if we can provide them with the necessary data inputs. That in turn may allow us to concentrate our own limited resources on the sort of surface combatants we cannot expect our potential partners to provide for joint operations.²⁷

Norman Friedman has been a consultant to the Department of the Navy on numerous issues, including surface ship design. James S. O’Brasky formerly served with the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division. Captain Sam J. Tangredi commanded USS Harpers Ferry (LSD–49).

Conclusions

Our conclusions on the future of the surface navy in a globalized world take the form of recommendations.

First, the surface warfare community must define itself more broadly, working to eliminate the status distinctions among platform types and to distribute firepower across all warships. To launch land-attack missiles in a relatively benign environment does not require cruiser/destroyer-type ships. Assets should not be confined to their traditional roles.

Second—and in order to implement the first recommendation—the U.S. Navy should experiment with new deployment configurations and operational architectures for surface groups. Suggested configurations are discussed in chapter 28.

Third, transnational threats will require the surface navy to utilize its assets in a more creative fashion for interdiction. This will require distribution of the mission across assets as well as greater interoperability with coalition forces. The key to achieving such interoperability remains tactical information (an in some cases the necessary information systems) provided by United States forces.

Fourth, the network-centric approach to future fleet capabilities remains sound logic and should be continued. If the Streetfighter/LCS concept is adopted, network-centricity becomes even more important in achieving effective contributions from smaller ships.

Our fifth recommendation is that the surface navy needs to embrace the national missile defense mission as well as the countertransnational threat role. Or, if a deliberate decision is made to utilize U.S. Navy assets only for forward-deployed overseas operations, then substantial deep-water resources need to flow to the U.S. Coast Guard to be effective in the NMD and countertransnational threat roles.

Sixth, there are clear political-diplomatic reasons for the United States to actively maintain its naval dominance in a post-Cold War world. These reasons make maritime coalitions more likely and maritime rivals less likely. No apparent action/reaction arms race dynamics are currently in place to make maritime supremacy a hazard.

Seventh, the surface navy needs to improve its tactical development for littoral operations and seek to provide open forums for creative and unorthodox tactical thinking. Professional associations such as the U.S. Naval Institute and Surface Navy Association could help best in that regard. But the keys are open forums and professional rewards.

Eighth, the surface navy must retain its strong interest in connectivity with space-based assets—which are probably the best way to maintain U.S. naval global capabilities, even with a shrinking fleet. (This is not meant to advocate a shrinking fleet, only to advocate preparations to maximize assets no matter the number of platforms.) Space is and will be a part of the multidimensional medium of naval combat—especially for surface forces.

Ninth, the decision to adopt Streetfighter/LCS concepts hinges on a clear understanding of the missions that the surface navy is expected to undertake in a future antiaccess environment. Also, the difficulty of this antiaccess environment must be patiently analyzed, not taken for granted. Our sense is that the surface navy has not yet accepted the difficulty of the future challenge (currently we are unchallenged), but that the transformation school is also overstating the enormity of the antiaccess threat. In any regard, a balanced fleet that combines high-end/low-end, large/small assets in a broad portfolio is the best naval insurance policy toward the future security environment. We hesitate to use former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s term of high/low mix because of the historical baggage that term brings, but the concept still makes considerable sense if prudently applied. Surface ships are not obsolete—but one size (type) does not fit all.

Finally, the health of U.S. warship construction capacity hinges not on shipbuilding but on combat systems. (Chapter 11 also comes to this conclusion.) Primary effort to maintain U.S. leadership in naval technology must focus on combat systems development. This is also the most important aspect the United States brings in encouraging the development of an effective and interoperable global coalition navy.

The effects of globalization may require some collective self-searching, but surface warfare seems destined to remain the soul of the Navy.

Notes

¹ One school of thought argues that amphibious warfare and strike against shore actually predate the history of war at sea. See representative discussion in Sam J. Tangredi, “Sea Power: Theory and Practice,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colin S. Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 118–119. [BACK]

² Although aircraft carriers, amphibious warships, mine-countermeasure ships, and combat logistics ships all operate on the surface of the ocean, they can all be specialized, not multipurpose. However, new technologies are gradually eliminating such distinctions. [BACK]

³ See argument in Sam J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, McNair Paper 63 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, November 2000), 73–78. [BACK]

⁴ See, for example, Timothy LaFleur, “Taking Defense Littorally,” Washington Times, August 5, 2001, B5. [BACK]

⁵ One of the new program “transformational concepts” is spiral development. See Nathan Hodge, “Admiral Sees Stiff Competition For New Surface Combatant,” Defense Week, February 4, 2002, 2. [BACK]

⁶ Similarly, air-to-ground and surface-to-air engagements tend to achieve air superiority more efficiently than air-to-air engagements. [BACK]

⁷ Dale Eisman, “Navy Moves to Develop a Novel Type of Warship,” The Virginian-Pilot, February 4, 2002. [BACK]

⁸ It is sometimes argued that small surface ships are excellent as means of observing a developing situation, pending arrival of more substantial forces. For example, a surface ship might define a baseline situation, so that significant changes would be detectable. No transient detector, such as a satellite, would offer the same coverage. However, the surface ship would also advertise U.S. interest and thus might well aggravate a situation. The observation role, then, would more likely be appropriate to a submarine operating sensors such as unmanned underwater vehicles and small unmanned aerial vehicles. [BACK]

⁹ During the Cold War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for as many as 22 carrier battlegroups for wartime. The Navy’s judgment was that no more than 15 were affordable, even at the height of the Reagan budget. The number of battleship surface action groups (SAGs) was based entirely on the number of battleships available; suggestions to activate a pair of heavy cruiser SAGs (to exploit the two available hulls) were dropped, presumably because of affordability. All of this was for a significantly less distributed set of potential crises than are anticipated today. [BACK]

¹⁰See discussion in Sam J. Tangredi, “Are We Firing Tomahawks Too Easily?” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 122, no. 12 (December 1996), 8, 10. [BACK]

¹¹ In December 2001, British authorities detained and searched a bulk carrier headed for London, on the official ground that they had received a tip that it was carrying “terrorist materials.” It was released after a fruitless 3-day search, as “other information” (presumably that the first tip was false) had been received. However, British newspapers carried claims that Norwegian intelligence had identified a fleet of 20 “terror ships”—ships controlled by al Qaeda interests—but that identifying them was proving difficult because the financial network involved was so complex. [BACK]

¹² “Battle for the first salvo” was a phrase used in the writings of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov to indicate the Soviet Navy’s doctrinal requirement to detect and strike the enemy first in any naval engagement. In Gorshkov’s view, history indicated that ships that launched the first well-aimed salvo would inevitably be victorious. Soviet pre-engagement tactics were continually focused on maneuvering to ensure victory in the initial positional struggle to launch the first salvo (for example, fixed missile launchers pointed directly at the enemy’s high value target). See Milan N. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 44. [BACK]

¹³A representative change occurred in the highly regarded book on tactics by Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), whose second edition (2000) is now titled Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. The best overall publication on littoral operations is currently Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999). [BACK]