Chapter 13—
Protecting Cyberspace
Jacques S. Gansler
Information systems are the critical elements in the transformation of
both military operations and the functioning of society, and they will
be increasingly vital in the future. In the military area, the centrality
of these systems varies from growing dependence on the real-time linking
of distributed intelligence “sensors” and distributed “shooters” (through
complex networked command, control, communications, and computers [C4]
systems) to the rapid responsiveness provided by modern information-based
logistics support systems. On the civil side, it includes the exponentially
growing dependence on computer and communication networks for everything
from government operations to the full infrastructure of the financial,
medical, transportation, utilities, and other systems that determine the
effective operation of modern society. The problem, of course, is that
with this growing dependence on information systems, we expose ourselves
to a rapidly growing and increasingly dangerous spectrum of information
warfare (IW) operations. These might include direct military information
system attacks aimed at prevention, disruption, intelligence gathering,
or deception; cyberterrorism attacks on civil infrastructures, such as
banks, water and power systems, air traffic, and hospitals; and even combined
and simultaneous attacks on both military systems and their supporting
civil infrastructures.
This vulnerability of modern military and civil society to information
warfare must be addressed with appropriate defenses. Clearly, however,
the potential benefits of offensive information warfare are also likely
to be fully exploited by all sides. To better understand this cat-and-mouse
game of offensive and defensive information warfare operations, consider
the almost-ubiquitous Internet.
Origins of the Internet
The Internet has evolved from its roots 30 years ago as an academic
research tool to become a global resource serving millions of individuals
as well as providing critical connectivity for national security, industrial,
economic, and governmental functions. To understand the current issues
of Internet security, it is important to understand its history and heritage.
The Department of Defense (DOD) Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA),
now DARPA, sponsored the initial research on packet-switching technology,
the enabling technology for the Internet, and published a plan for a computer
network called ARPANET in 1967. In October 1969, the first four nodes
were established at the University of California at Los Angeles, the Stanford
Research Institute, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and
the University of Utah.
The potential utility of computer networking was not lost on other communities,
and by the mid-1970s other computer networks began to spring up at the
Department of Energy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), the National Science Foundation (NSF, which funded CS-NET), and
throughout a variety of academic communities. These networks were still
largely incompatible until 1986, when ARPA and the NSF made their networks
interoperable using the ARPA- developed communication protocol known as
TCP/IP. The high-speed national links developed by the National Science
Foundation (NSFNET) became the national backbone for this combined network,
but it was still restricted to research and education; commercial use
was, in fact, prohibited. Security was not believed to be an issue, since
access was restricted to trusted users.
By 1990, the Internet had grown from 4 hosts to 300,000. The ARPANET
was formally shut down, and the NSF began to manage the Internet. In 1991,
liberalized restrictions on commercial use coupled with the growing availability
of personal computers fueled the explosive growth of the Internet. In
1995, the Internet was privatized, and by January 2001, it had grown almost
twenty-fold to 109,574,429 hosts.1
Based on the nature of the Internet’s early evolution, however, security
was not a primary consideration in the design. Partly for that reason,
the Internet continues to provide many security challenges.
Increasing Public-Private Activity
In the near future, the Internet will be ubiquitous, transparent, and
integrated into everything we do. The benefits of this cheap, reliable
communication have been enormous. As the public and private sectors continue
to look for ways to take advantage of opportunities created by the Internet,
the interaction and activity between the two sectors will continue to
increase in ways that often obscure the ways in which we are becoming
dependent on it.
As a result of advances in information technologies, it is possible
for us to tie together infrastructure, data, and daily operations in ways
not possible before. Today, computer networks control the Nation’s powergrids,
natural gas pipelines, and transportation systems. Both Federal Express
and United Parcel Service, for example, depend upon computer networks
to get packages where they are going on time. U.S. industries design and
manufacture products on computer aided design/computer aided manufacturing
(CAD/CAM) systems (for example, Boeing designed the Boeing 777 in “virtual
space”). More than people realize, these systems and networks are all
interconnected on the Internet. The business sector, early on, recognized
the commercial potential of the information revolution and quickly made
the Internet a commercial medium. Although there have been some setbacks,
electronic commerce has a bright future; business-to-citizen revenues
are estimated at $96 billion in 2001, and business-to-business online
revenues at $448 billion, nearly double the previous year.
Most of the initial Internet-related efforts by Federal and state governments
were aimed at making information available to internal users and to the
citizens at large; the Federal Government, for example, maintains approximately
100 million Web pages at 25,000 Federal sites. DOD placed virtually all
of its unclassified data online, including what was, in hindsight, sensitive
data, such as the floor plan of the home of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; the operational status of Air Force wings; and unit personnel
rosters. (DOD Web sites have since been “sanitized” and are continuously
monitored for sensitive data.)
Government has absorbed lessons from private industry (for example,
reengineering processes to reduce paperwork and delays can improve performance
and efficiency). As government use of the Internet has broadened and become
more sophisticated, so-called E-government is booming. Both Federal and
state agencies are actively migrating many essential functions to the
Internet. Agencies are now turning to the Internet to provide interactive
electronic public services. For example, the Internal Revenue Service
has a working presence online and is actively encouraging taxpayers to
get help and to file their returns online. In 2001, 28 percent of U.S.
returns were filed electronically. Federal employees are now able to access
and manipulate their pension funds online, and some can monitor and manage
their pay online. In the near future, we can expect that many other generally
available services, such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, will
be conducted primarily online, offering citizens better service and improving
agency performance.
Additionally, agencies are turning increasingly to the Internet for
“paperless acquisition.” Since Federal, state, and local governments spend
approximately $550 billion annually on goods and services, there is significant
incentive for process improvements and savings. The Department of Defense
already has several mature electronic procurement sites, including the
DOD “E-MALL,” an initiative to provide a single entry-point for DOD customers
to find and acquire off-the-shelf goods and services, such as information
technology (IT) equipment, textiles, and training from both the commercial
marketplace and government sources. The E-MALL target market is in excess
of $4 billion annually. The Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support
(DMLSS) program is an integrated system to accommodate the needs of the
Armed Forces at the wholesale and retail levels for medical logistics
support. It relies on electronic commerce and Web-based technology to
speed delivery of pharmaceutical, medical, and surgical items to customers,
negating the need to stock large inventory at depots and military treatment
facilities. At the Great Lakes Naval Hospital, one of the first sites
online, inventory was cut from $3 million to $3,000 using DMLSS.
These examples illustrate the kinds of programs that the government
is migrating to the Internet to make available and integrate fully online
as many functions as possible with private citizens and private industry.
Not only as we expand our definition of national security interests, particularly
since September 11, to include financial security, healthcare, education,
and personal privacy but also as ownership of critical IT infrastructures
moves increasingly into private hands, it is clear that the Internet will
require a public-private partnership with a high degree of collaboration
to develop effective policy, goals, objectives, and, especially, defenses
against information warfare attacks.
Growing Vulnerability
In the United States, we are blessed with wonderful geography
from a national security perspective; we have friendly countries to the
north and south and large oceans to the east and west. In the past, few
enemies have ever had the means to threaten our homeland seriously. So,
for most of our history, we have not had to worry about being attacked
at home. There was a 40-year period during the Cold War when Soviet bombers
and intercontinental ballistic missiles were poised to attack our cities,
but with the demise of the Soviet Union, the successes of strategic arms
reduction talks, and the warming of relations with Russia, we once again
felt safe. Recent terrorist attacks, however, have reminded us of our
physical vulnerability.
At the same time, we also are making the transition to the new borderless
geography in cyberspace. As we grow more dependent on the Internet, its
inherent vulnerabilities have put all of us—government, military, industry,
and citizens—at risk. The Internet was originally designed to be open,
based on the premise that users were known and trustworthy. Security was
not designed in from the beginning, so as the Internet has evolved into
the current global network of networks, we have found it difficult to
provide security for our data and transactions. The rapid pace of technical
innovation introduces unanticipated vulnerabilities with every advance,
and commercial software suppliers are often more eager to get their new
products out in the market than they are anxious to assure their invulnerability.2
Our security planning, often based on the older models of mainframes or
well-defined networks within a single organization, have proved inadequate
for this new environment with its ever-increasing threat.
Shared Threat
Cyberspace tends to level the playing field between the entities in
that space and offers attackers many high-value, low-risk targets. The
threats can come from a hacker, an insider, a criminal, a terrorist, a
hostile nation-state, or even some combination of these. The motivations
can be equally diverse—mischief, theft, data collection, disruption of
operations, falsification of data. The threats, obviously, can be aimed
equally well against military or civilian targets. The weapons, with innocuous-sounding
names like worms, viruses, and even Trojan horses, are themselves readily
available on the Internet. Most important, the Internet itself is a very
attractive target.
Unlike physical break-ins, Internet attacks are easy. An attacker who
gets access to a Web site can roam around freely and from a safe distance.
Although in the past, a great deal of technical sophistication was required
to penetrate a computer network, attacks are now possible even by much
less well-informed adversaries; successful intruders share their programs—often
with “hacking for dummies” type scripts—enabling anyone to duplicate their
efforts.
Attackers can and do obfuscate who and where they are, making Internet
intrusions and attacks difficult to trace. Additionally, because the Internet
allows packets to flow easily across political, administrative, and geographic
boundaries, cooperation from many different entities, many without a vested
interest, may be required to trace an attack. Consequently, attackers
often operate (or appear to operate) from other countries, and thus international
cooperation is required to trace and investigate attacks.
Internet attacks are low-risk: since the attackers do not need to be
physically present, the risk of identification is greatly reduced. Much
of the activity is often masked by legitimate or unrelated activity, and
because multiple jurisdictions may be involved, prosecution can be difficult
and sometimes impossible.
As a result of these factors, and in spite of increased awareness and
security measures, attempted penetrations of Internet sites are steadily
increasing. The number of incidents reported worldwide grew from approximately
2,000 in 1997 to 21,756 in 2000. Fully 15,476 incidents had been reported
in the first half of 2001.3
Since this reporting is voluntary, these figures presumably understate
the actual number considerably and reflect merely the trends in the numbers.
The Department of Defense
Hundreds, and more likely thousands, of attacks are attempted against
DOD systems and networks each week. DOD estimates that, in 2001 alone,
it was likely to face around 40,000 attempted attacks.4
Most of these are unsuccessful, but in 2000, 715 documented attacks were
reported that achieved varying degrees of success. Of course, many others
may have gone undetected.
ülthough the threat to and vulnerability of U.S. information systems
has been the focus of much discussion, DOD perception of the information
warfare threat has particularly been shaped by several real-world events.
In 1997, recognizing that the American information infrastructure was
at risk, DOD planned the first large-scale exercise to test Defense ability
to respond to a cyber attack on the national infrastructure, nicknamed
ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 97 (ER97).5
It was planned and executed by a team of National Security Agency (NSA)
computer specialists.6
Their role in the exercise was to play the adversary making a concerted
effort to hack into U.S. systems.7
The offensive team operated under many restrictions: they had to conduct
their attacks without violating any U.S. law; they could not take advantage
of any insider information or collateral intelligence; and they could
only use tools that could be claimed to be in an adversary’s hands (all
tools and techniques were based on unclassified, open-source data).
During the exercise, NSA specialists scripted attacks that would have
resulted in a series of rolling electricity blackouts and an overload
of the 911 emergency telephone service in Washington, DC, and a handful
of other cities. The potential for attack on the powergrid was demonstrated
by simulated attacks on the computerized sensing and control devices that
are commonly used in operating electrical, oil, gas, transportation, and
water treatment systems.8
Even with restrictions and a tight 3-month schedule, the exercise demonstrated
many weaknesses.9
It was clear that a dedicated and moderately sophisticated adversary with
modest resources could inflict considerable damage unless the target systems
were more effectively protected.10
In 1998, the United States was involved in a serious weapons inspection
crisis with Iraq, which was refusing to permit United Nations (UN) inspectors
unrestricted access. The United States, in addition to being involved
in the UN negotiations with Iraq, was preparing for possible military
strikes.11
Several cyberattacks—unauthorized intrusions into approximately six military
networks around the country—were picked up in the U.S. Air Force’s Information
Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas.12
Five hundred domain name servers were compromised. The attacks used the
same technique to exploit a vulnerability in the Sun Solaris operating
system. The intrusions were initially tracked to Abu Dhabi in the United
Arab Emirates.13
Under the circumstances, there was considerable concern about a major
asymmetric attack by Iraq or its sympathizers on logistics, medical, or
resource systems during the crisis period.14
The newly established National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)
coordinated a multiagency investigation into the attacks (code-named SOLAR
SUNRISE) that determined within a few more days that they were not the
work of Iraqi agents operating from the Middle East but were in fact orchestrated
by two California teenagers with the help of an Israeli citizen.15
The Department of Defense was still evaluating the implications of ER97
and the SOLAR SUNRISE investigation when, in January 1999, DOD, the Department
of Energy, military contractors, and civilian university computer systems
were attacked in the largest assault yet.16
Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), quoting Deputy Secretary of Defense John
Hamre, stated: “We are at war right now. We are in a cyberwar.” Weldon
characterized these attacks as being in a different class from the approximately
400 probes picked up each week: “These attacks are organized, very capable
efforts that have very specific goals, based upon what we’ve seen.”17
The attacks, which apparently originated in Russia, began at a low level
in January and reportedly gained “root access” to certain systems. The
penetrations were on unclassified but nonpublic systems; they apparently
achieved no access to classified data. Nevertheless, the damage could
be significant because these unclassified systems often contain useful
and sensitive information.18
After 3 years of investigations and thousands of files stolen, the evidence
still points to Russia. James Adams, a consultant who serves on the NSA
Advisory Board, wrote in May 2001:
the assault has continued unabated....Despite all the investigative
effort, the United States still does not know who is behind the attacks,
what additional information has been taken and why; to what extent the
public and private sectors have been penetrated; and what else has been
left behind that could still damage the vulnerable networks.19
A more recent example was a malicious denial-of-service attack that
took place on July 19, 2001. According to the NIPC, Code Red, an Internet
worm, infected more than 250,000 Internet systems in just 9 hours; Computer
Economics, Inc., estimated over 1,000,000 infections worldwide.20
Code Red damaged sites by defacing Web pages; it also denied access to
certain Internet addresses by sending massive amounts of data, which effectively
shut down the addresses. As a result of the attacks, DOD was forced to
shut down its Web sites; the White House was forced to change its Internet
address; the Department of the Treasury Financial Management System was
infected and had to be disconnected from the Web; users of the Qwest high-speed
Internet service experienced outages nationwide; and the Federal Express
package-tracking system was infected, causing delivery delays. The initial
economic cost was estimated at over $2.4 billion in costs associated with
cleaning, inspecting, and patching servers, as well as damage to productivity.
Shared Responsibilities
Public and private sectors are increasingly dependent on the Internet,
even with its many systematic vulnerabilities to a broad range of threats.
There is no question that defending against information warfare and assuring
unhampered access to the Internet is a responsibility shared by both public
and private sectors. The government has a clear responsibility in the
protection of information systems, especially where national security
is at stake. One of the Federal Government’s fundamental responsibilities
is to protect the Nation from all threats, foreign and domestic, and this,
of course, includes protection from threats to the collective information
systems that comprise the Internet. There are, additionally, law enforcement
responsibilities for protecting these systems against terrorist threats
and criminal activity. While attacks to date have not caused devastating
disruption, the potential for catastrophic damage is significant. As the
events of September 11 demonstrated, sometimes even the unimaginable is
possible. Cyberterrorism is clearly a growing and very real probability.21
The private sector, on the other hand, owns most of the information
infrastructure and develops most of the technology and software that
enable it. As a result of these factors, the shared public-private responsibility
of providing security to our information systems suffers from a misalignment
of authority, responsibility, and capability: “those with authority to
act often lack the capability, while those with the capability to act
often do not have the responsibility.”22
Directions for Solutions
As the way in which we use information and information systems continues
to evolve, it may be some time before the public and private
elements are correctly aligned. In the interim, if we are to improve our
capability against cyberattacks, we must do a much better job of sharing
information between the public and private sectors. First, having information
on threats and on actual incidents experienced by others can help an organization
better understand the risks that it faces and determine what preventive
measures should be implemented. Today’s nuisance incidents may in fact
be tests or probes for future attacks. Information attacks cannot be launched
blindly but, like any other weapon, must be tested. In addition, urgent
real-time warnings can help an organization take immediate steps to mitigate
an imminent attack. Finally, information sharing and coordination after
an attack are critical to facilitate criminal investigations, which may
cross many jurisdictional boundaries. After-the-fact coordiaation will
be essential to speed the recovery from a devastating attack, should one
ever occur.
The government has recognized its central role in this information-sharing
function and has several developing efforts. At the Federal level, for
example, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, located at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was established to serve as a focal
point in the Federal Government for gathering information on threats,
as well as to facilitate and coordinate responses to incidents affecting
key infrastructures. It is also charged with issuing attack warnings to
private-sector and government entities, as well as alerts about changes
in threat conditions. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
is building a database containing detailed information on computer attacks.
The Federal Government also sponsors the Computer Emergency Response Team
Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University, which studies Internet
security vulnerabilities, handles computer security incidents, publishes
security alerts, researches long-term changes in networked systems, and
develops information and training. Early in 2001, the Department of Commerce
sponsored the formation of a private-sector nonprofit alliance, the Information
Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC). Its mission
is to exchange information on potential and known threats and vulnerabilities
for the information sector and sharing that information with Federal law
enforcement. (It joins existing ISACs for the energy, financial services,
transportation, and telecommunications sectors.) IT-ISAC has 19 members
so far, including major corporations, such as AT&T, IBM, Cisco, and
Microsoft. President George W. Bush has appointed Richard Clarke as a
special adviser to work with Governor Tom Ridge in the Office of Homeland
Security to coordinate the protection of the Nation’s computer infrastructure.
One of the key elements to the success of information-sharing partnerships
is developing trusted relationships among the broad range of stakeholders
involved with providing information assurance, including the public and
Internet community at large, law enforcement, government agencies, the
intelligence community, providers of network and other key infrastructure
services, technology and security product developers, incident response
teams, and international standard-setting bodies. Information sharing
must be seen as equitable, and it must provide value over and above the
costs that it imposes. There are some real and perceived industry concerns
that range from antitrust issues of sharing information with industry
partners to subjecting information to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
disclosures. Inadvertent releases of trade secrets or proprietary information
are a concern because they could damage reputations, lower consumer confidence,
and hurt competitiveness. Sharing information with law enforcement could
result in costly compliance with strict rules for preserving the integrity
of evidence. The government is reluctant to share classified information,
even though it could be of value to the private sector in deterring or
thwarting electronic intrusions and information attacks. This is particularly
the case with any potential offensive tools and techniques, which are
extremely sensitive from a national security perspective but are, of course,
necessary for effective testing of defensive capabilities. The government
clearly must work with industry to develop mechanisms to overcome each
of these impediments.
Specific Recommendations
Some useful actions to decrease U.S. vulnerability to information warfare
include the following: First, we need to have meaningful information sharing,
and for this, we must develop standard definitions and terminology for
use throughout the government and industry. A clear understanding of what
is meant by an attack and how to categorize an incident will be
essential to enable faster and more efficient reporting, responding, and
remediation. Distinguishing between an incident that is classified as
criminal and one that is a national security threat will help determine
the type and timeframe of the response. We may, for example, choose to
let potential criminal activity proceed to gather evidence but may need
to react immediately to a national security attack.
Second, we need to overcome information-sharing roadblocks. Information
sharing between the government and private sector remains a vitally important
yet elusive goal. Among the several Federal Government initiatives, its
primary focus is with the NIPC, which is housed within the FBI and has
a decided emphasis on criminal investigation. This creates a problem within
the government since it puts the FBI in a position to decide what information
other agencies need to see. Industry, to say nothing of any international
partners, will also naturally be reluctant to report
incidents to the FBI. Another source of private-sector reluctance to share
information with the government is the requirements imposed on government
by FOIA.23
To facilitate uninhibited information exchange and protect competitive
positions, sensitive industry data needs to be exempted from FOIA requirements.
Other models for collection and dissemination of vulnerability and threat
information—for example, a single nonprofit information clearinghouse—should
be explored and developed.
Finally, government needs to develop mechanisms to share sensitive and
perhaps even classified threat data about pending attacks with industry
partners, both domestic and international. This will help ensure that
all information is available to those entities that are best equipped
to mitigate the impact. Government must be willing to share all appropriate
information in response to industry concerns if it hopes to overcome the
hurdles to achieving a mutually beneficial partnership.
Although improving organizational information sharing can significantly
improve our ability to defend against an IW attack in the near term, there
are still many technical challenges to providing security and assurance
within a distributed information environment. Our goal should be to create
an Internet infrastructure that is highly automated, adaptive, and resilient
to all types of attacks. An obvious first step is to improve the overall
quality of software security. Identifying products with easily exploitable
vulnerabilities and preventing them from being widely used will reduce
the more pedestrian attacks. Incentives should be created for firms to
improve the attention and resources that they devote to enhancing their
software and system protections; this suggests a useful role for government
managers and buyers, and even more for senior industrial managers and
buyers.24
In addition, there are technologies that could, if properly developed,
be useful in resisting and responding to inevitable cyberattacks. Among
those that merit increased attention are some in the area of intelligence
gathering. We should be developing tools that allow us to take the initiative
to gain insight into the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries.
For example, it would be quite useful to have an active software agent,
using secure mobile code, that could monitor and collect information on
hostile entities in order to provide early warning of attack. We currently
have difficulty identifying novel attack patterns, especially against
the Internet’s widely distributed network. Insiders pose a particular
threat to all information systems; therefore, developing systems to automate
the processes of detecting, identifying, and analyzing novel attack patterns
and anomalous behavior would improve our ability to provide warnings and
reduce false alarms.
Opportunities for disruption will only increase as the complexity of
the Internet networks increases. We need to continue research and development
to guard against unknown attacks and to protect against systems with unknown
flaws. We need to develop automated mechanisms to detect and nullify malicious
codes that may be left behind in an undetected attack. We have designed
many fault-tolerant systems to cope with naturally occurring faults and
failures, and we need to extend these capabilities to develop networks
that are resistant to insertion of intentional faults and to denial-of-service
attacks conducted by adversaries. Present capabilities for detecting large-scale
intrusions against multiple systems are limited. We need to accelerate
the development of an advanced intrusion detection capability that can
fuse and correlate information from distributed sensors.
Even with an adequate warning system and good defenses, some attacks
will be successful. Thus, we need to have the technology in place to address
the consequences of these attacks. We need to be able to assess systems
quickly and answer important questions: Was something done to the system?
If so, what was done? Is the system okay? What is the reliability of the
data? When we understand the answers to these questions, we need to be
able to move quickly to restore user trust in the system. If a system
has been attacked successfully, we need to be able to recover quickly
from the attack, bring the system back to full performance, and take corrective
action so that it will not be susceptible to a similar attack.
This discussion has focused on information-sharing processes and technology,
but we should also recognize that one of the most critical elements in
any comprehensive defense against an information warfare attack is the
people who use and operate our systems. Whatever else we do, we must develop
a continuing program to promote understanding of security policies and
controls and of the risks that prompted their adoption. Better understanding
of the risks will allow executives to make more informed decisions regarding
the resources required to protect their systems. The first line of defense
is the system user, who must understand the importance of complying with
policies and controls.
One of the most effective ways for both the private and public sector
to assure secure systems is to conduct frequent red team attacks on their
own systems. Skilled attackers can test the vulnerabilities of systems
and fix them before someone else finds them. While many in the private
and public sector have a reluctance to test their own systems, the return
on investment here is extremely worthwhile.
Conclusion
While this discussion has focused on the illustrative case of the Internet,
its expansion to other systems—both military and civilian—is obvious.
Today, we know that 20 foreign nations are developing information warfare
doctrine, programs, and capabilities for use against U.S. military and
private sector networks; numerous terrorist networks have similarly recognized
the potential of these “weapons of mass disruption” and have begun to
exploit them. Of course, the United States can also take full advantage
of the offensive military potential of information warfare to broaden
its military options and capabilities. However, as a military force and
as a civil society, the United States is already the world’s most dependent
on information systems, and we are moving more and more in that direction.
As we transform our forces and our society in the information age, we
become ever more vulnerable. Thus, we have a very real requirement to
address our information systems vulnerabilities before it is too late.
Notes
- 1. Based on
data from the Internet Software Consortium. A host denotes a
single machine on the Internet. However, the definition has changed
in recent years due to “virtual hosting,” in which a single machine
acts like multiple systems (and has multiple domain names and IP addresses).
Ideally, a virtual host will act and look exactly like a regular host,
so they are counted equally. For the research above, and in many other
areas of this chapter, the author is deeply indebted to the assistance
of William Lucyshyn. [BACK]
- 2. Moreover,
to lower costs, many software firms now go offshore for their programming,
further raising the chance of vulnerability. [BACK]
-
- 3. Statistics
are from the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coordination Center
at Carnegie Mellon University. [BACK]
-
- 4. D.A. Fulghum and
R. Wall, Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 5, 2001,
26. [BACK]
5. John J. Hamre,
Congressional testimony, February 23, 1998. [BACK]
6. Bradley Graham,
“Hackers, Simulation, Expose Vulnerability,” The Washington
Post, May 24, 1998, A1. [BACK]
7. Stephen Green, “Pentagon Giving
Cyberwarfare High Priority,” Copley News Service, December 21, 1999.
[BACK]
8. Graham. [BACK]
9. Goss. [BACK]
10. Kenneth Minihan,
Statement before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Hearing
on Vulnerabilities of the National Information Infrastructure, June
24, 1998. [BACK]
11. “Prospect against
Iraq Prompts Demonstrations,” The Washington Post, February 15,
1998, A31. [BACK]
12. Graham. [BACK]
13. Gregory L.
Vistica and Evan Thomas, “The Secret Hacker Wars,” Newsweek,
June 1, 1998, 60. [BACK]
14. Protecting
the Homeland, 2. [BACK]
15. Michael A.
Vatis, Statement for the Record on the National Infrastructure Protection
Center before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, March 1, 2000. [BACK]
16. Gregory L.
Vistica, “We’re in the Middle of a Cyberwar,” Newsweek, September
20, 1999, 52. [BACK]
17. John Donnelly
and Vince Crawley, “Hamre to Hill: ‘We’re in a Cyberwar,’” Defense
Week, March 1, 1999. [BACK]
18. Vistica. [BACK]
19. James Adams,
“Virtual Defense,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (May-June 2001),
98. [BACK]
20. A worm
is an attack that propagates itself through networks without any user
intervention or interaction. [BACK]
21. See Mike Toner,
“Cyberterrorism Danger Lurking,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
November 4, 2001, A4. [BACK]
22. Arnaud de Borchgrave,
Frank J. Cillufo, Sharon L. Cardash, and Michele M. Ledgerwood, Cyber
Threats and Information Security: Meeting the 21st Century
Challenge, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December
2000, 4. [BACK]
23. The Freedom
of Information Act guarantees that the public has a right of access
to Federal records and that these records must be made available to
the public, unless specifically exempt from public release. [BACK]
24. In early 2002,
the U.S. Air Force explicitly began to address this issue with suppliers.
See Byron Acohido, “Air Force Seeks Better Security from Microsoft,”
USA Today, March 11, 2002, 3B. [BACK]
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