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The Process of Negotiation in El Salvador

by

Brigadier General Nelson Ivan Saldaña Araújo⁵²

During the 1970s and 1980s, El Salvador, like a majority of Latin American countries, was convulsed by the activities of insurgent movements, self-described as liberationists. Inspired by the triumph of the Cuban revolution and supported by the socialist bloc countries, these sought to take power via the non-democratic route of armed violence. In El Salvador the armed conflict took place between the government and the insurgent movement calling itself the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). This conflict lasted approximately fourteen years, and ended through a process of negotiation. The negotiations began in 1984⁵³ and ended on December 31, 1991, the last day of the term of United Nations Secretary General Dr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, a principal protagonist.

The process itself can be divided into two phases, one of negotiating sessions inside the country, and the other of sessions abroad. In the initial phase the Catholic Church played a predominant role. Though not officially named mediator as such by the parties, the church’s mediating role was accepted by both sides, and the first discussions were held in provincial Catholic churches. By the end of this phase, the meetings were taking place at the residence of San Salvador’s Vatican envoy. This phase of the negotiation process represented the first face-to-face contact of the conflicting sides at a negotiating table. Unfortunately, circumstances were not optimal. One side took advantage of the initial negotiation efforts to mobilize its mass support and engage in political posturing, at the same time drawing out the meetings in an effort to give breathing space to its fighting forces. During this time the FMLN still wagered on a military victory, believing this could be achieved with the outside support on which it counted.

The negotiating process, held under U.N. auspices, began to consolidate those areas marked by points of convergence, then progressed to address alternative solutions on topics of greater disagreement. Once these disagreements were overcome, both sides

began to establish mechanisms for achieving disarmament, demobilization, and the insurgents’ reincorporation into society. Also established were the mechanisms needed to verify compliance with the accords, signed on January 16, 1992, in the Castle of Chapultepec in Mexico City.

At that moment, what was FMLN’s objective at the negotiating table? Simply put, to obtain all that it had not managed to conquer through armed struggle. For its part, the government sought to end the fighting, disarm the insurgents, reincorporate them into society, and attain the lasting peace so strongly desired by the Salvadoran people.

The peace accords resulted in a series of changes in Salvadoran society itself and in its structures. These changes took shape through reforms to the Salvadoran constitution.

Two institutions of importance for the Salvadoran people were created at the end of the conflict: the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos), and the National Civilian Police, or PNC (Policía Nacional Civil). The first is responsible for safeguarding respect for citizens’ human rights. The ombudsman is elected by the legislative assembly, that is to say, not appointed by the government in power. The second institution, the PNC, was created to safeguard public security, formerly the responsibility of the armed forces, and carried out through different specialized units. The peace accords modified the mission of the armed forces, now responsible only for defending the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of the national territory. The new role and doctrine of the armed forces within society are based on the following principles:

• The armed forces are a permanent institution at the service of the nation. It is obedient, professional, apolitical, and nondeliberative. Furthermore, its institutional regimen and activities are framed by principles deriving from the rule of law, the primacy of individual security, and the respect for individual rights. As an institution, the military is subordinate to the constitutional authorities.

• The armed forces must respect the political order chosen by the sovereign will of the people, as well as all socio-political changes generated by the expression of that will.

• As an institution of the state, the armed forces have an instrumental, rather than decision-making role in the political realm. Consequently, only the president of the Republic and the basic governmental bodies can call upon the armed forces to effect any measures they have adopted given their respective constitutional mandates.

• The doctrine of the armed forces thus is based on the distinction between the concepts of security and defense. The armed forces’ responsibility for national defense has as its objective the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity against a foreign military threat. The idea of security, while encompassing this notion, is a wider concept based on strict respect for the individual and social rights of the person.

• Preservation of internal peace, order, and public security stands outside the regular mission of the armed forces. In accordance with the constitution, the only possible exception would be by strict order of the president of the Republic.

• The armed forces recognizes the importance of developing awareness of, and applying human rights practices, in order that members of the armed forces consciously and with conviction defend and respect these rights.

Our military doctrine inculcates values and convictions designed to strengthen democratic values. For those human rights issues touching upon military ethic, the exact definition of the following concepts has been emphasized, as follows:

• Strict discipline based on carrying out orders within the strict framework of the law, developing the basic idea that no order can be given or obeyed outside the margins of the law;

• Military honor emphasizing that any violation of human rights constitutes a violation of military honor;

• An esprit de corps based on the idea that any member of the military who commits a serious crime deserves no protection, but rather should be sentenced by a judicial authority and removed from the ranks.

Our armed forces learned several lessons from the peace process, including the following general considerations:

• It is important that the armed institutions have their own human rights organizations and offices, in order to follow up on and evaluate the growing awareness and application of human rights measures. Such organizations are important also because they are the ones that must investigate all complaints of human rights violations leveled against armed forces’ personnel. These investigations lend credibility to the military institution.

• The end of the armed conflict should bring the members of the armed forces into participation in political life through appropriate representative mechanisms. The limits on power must be clearly established.

• Resolving internal conflict such as that experienced by El Salvador requires the political will and desire to find a solution.

• The best way to resolve internal problems such as those of El Salvador is not through arms.

• An increasing level of violence is evident in conflicts of this type, as is the use of ever more technologically sophisticated armaments, when what is really needed is a different type of ingenuity. The case of El Salvador provides an anecdotal example. The FMLN began its struggle with homemade weapons. By the war’s end the FMLN possessed SA-17 missiles.

• Because of the level of mistrust generated by the conflict, it is necessary to find a mediator. Often no local mediator can be identified whose impartiality will be acceptable to the conflicting parties.

Upon seating themselves at a negotiating table, the parties must agree from the very beginning that neither of them will get up for any reason.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002