Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

The Colombian Peace Process

by

Daniel García-Peña⁵⁵

Despite all the difficulties encountered in the peace process during the Ernesto Samper administration (1994 to 1998), these last four years have not been lost ones; in fact, one can look ahead to the near future with moderate optimism. It is paradoxical that while Colombia is facing one of its worst moments from the perspective of intensified war, political polarization, a deteriorating human rights situation, and signs of renewed dirty war, there is at the same time a greater consensus than ever before within the state and society on the need for peace through dialogue.

Civil society has mobilized to an unprecedented degree and the peace movement has blossomed. For years limited to the left and human rights groups, the peace movement today includes a broad range of social sectors, some of which--most notably the Catholic Church and the business community--had been indifferent, if not outright hostile, to previous peace efforts. An indication of this broadening is the fact that business leaders participated in events marking the one-year anniversary of the murders of Center for Investigation and Popular Education (CINEP) workers.⁵⁶Indeed, the armed conflict, once viewed as something remote, has been transformed into the principal topic on the national agenda.

Much of this transformation is due to the fact that there is a better grasp of the costs of the war for the nation and its economy. Recent preliminary findings by Colombia's National Planning Department indicate that direct costs of the war and violence represent close to three and a half percent of the gross domestic product.

There is widespread recognition that there is no possibility of a military solution, and that the peace that is required must be "integral," that is, it must include social and structural changes that address the social and political contexts that are the root causes of the war. Likewise, there is growing understanding that a peace process is related to advancing human rights and that respect for international humanitarian law must serve as an essential framework on the road to peace. A role for the international community, once a taboo subject, is also now accepted. Last, there is the recognition that a peace policy must involve the state as a whole--as well as civil society--and not simply the executive branch, as was the case in the past.

Just as important has been the evolution of the state's attitude toward the paramilitary groups, reflected most strikingly in the arrest of emerald dealer and paramilitary leader Víctor Carranza by the Attorney General’s office. The issue of paramilitary violence is no longer just a theme raised by the left; rather, it has begun to be perceived quite rightfully as a major threat to the rule of law.

However, the state's response to paramilitarism is still highly disproportionate. In 1997, the government staged 546 attacks on the guerrillas, and only six operations against the paramilitaries. Military links to paramilitary groups should be broken and severely punished, as they constitute the worst attack on the legitimacy of the state.

The guerrilla groups have achieved several important victories over the army that clearly place them on their best footing ever in military terms. However, today they are quite weak in political terms.

Much of their loss of prestige is linked to the widely held accusation that they have strong ties to drug trafficking and have become a "narcoguerrilla" or simply a new cartel. However, to view the guerrillas as "mules" for the drug lords is wrong. While it is evident that the guerrillas collect so-called "people's taxes" on all the activities related to the production of illicit drugs that take place in areas where they exert influence (as all other legal businesses are "taxed"), there is no proof whatsoever that the guerrillas participate directly in the drug trade.

It is also mistaken to think that they have abandoned their revolutionary ideals for financial gain. On the contrary: It is precisely because of their strongly held ideological convictions that the guerrillas require large financial backing. The guerrilla movement is a political organization that believes there is no other way of defending its ideas other than through armed struggle. Making war requires guns, and guns cost a lot of money. Therefore the guerrillas’ "wealth" is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Wealth does not bring personal enrichment to the guerrillas, but simply provides the means to buy weapons and equipment for the organization.

It is an important strategic mistake to treat the guerrillas as if they were drug cartels. These two groups have completely different interests and modes of conducting their criminal activity.

The guerrillas are peasant armies seeking to reform land. Even though the capacity of the guerrilla movement to relay a clear political message to the nation is in crisis, it has gone through an important evolution. Its program is now more reformist than revolutionary. The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), for example, no longer calls for the nationalization of natural resources and the expulsion of all transnational corporations, as it did just several years ago, but rather proposes that oil revenues be used to further social and economic development. This not only differs very little from the official government position, but is in many ways already part of present constitutional mandate.

Colombia requires an ample political opening that can further the new spaces emerging over the last few years. It also needs to allow for the creation of new openings that allow the insurgent groups to take part in the democratic system without being killed off, as was the tragic case of the Patriotic Union (UP) party.⁵⁷

Likewise, it is important to see the peace process fundamentally as a political process and to place the military element in its proper context. I am highly skeptical and fearful of calls to "recapture" ground through increased military activity, as well as of the notion that the guerrillas must be hit hard in order to have a more favorable "balance of power" for the negotiations.

It is important to strengthen the Colombian armed forces, clean up their corruption, and improve their effectiveness on the battlefield, so as to show the guerrillas that they are not going to win militarily. The guerrillas are brought to the table, and more importantly, to a real peace process, not through military might but through the opening political spaces for them. But it is also essential not to forget the fact that the military strategy has failed for decades. Nevertheless, it is critical to bring the military itself into the peace process.

Other key issues must also be kept foremost in mind:

• While the war persists, there is no possibility of prevailing in the fight against drug trafficking, regardless of the kind of measures adopted in the vast regions where the fight is being waged.

• Pressure from the United States is fundamental in such areas as human rights and peace, and would be much more beneficial to Colombia than the current fixation with the drug issue. However, it would be a mistake to see Colombia as only responding when threatened.

• Even though any peace process has to include all the groups participating in the armed conflict, it is very important to differentiate between them. Paramilitary armed groups, which almost always attack unarmed civilians and not the guerrillas, cannot be granted the political status that they are seeking (and which implies an amnesty); nor should they take part in the talks on political and social affairs with the rebels. What is up for discussion with paramilitary groups is their demobilization and disarmament.

• Recent rumors and reports in the press about possible U.S. military intervention, and reports that the insurgents could take power in a matter of five years, only serve to fuel the war and encourage the guerrillas themselves. We must internationalize the peace, but not the war in Colombia.

All of these considerations allow me to remain moderately optimistic about the near future. The incoming president will have a golden opportunity to build upon a solid foundation that has been laid over the last few years.

For the first time in the ELN's history, it is talking of negotiation. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has also begun to open up. Peace is not only about the end of the war, but more about creating a historic chance for Colombia to confront its underlying problems, including rural backwardness and exclusionary democracy. Unfortunately, history has been crude in teaching us that as we advance towards peace, the conflict tends to exacerbate. That is, things will get worse before they get better.

Nevertheless, I do not share the bleak forecasts that Colombia’s conflict is eternal and unsolvable. I believe more in the capacity of Colombians to finally work together, with the help of the international community, towards the building of firm and lasting peace.

| Return to Top | Return to Table of  Contents |

Contact Us
NDU Press Home Page
NDU Home Page
INSS Home Page

Last Update:  September 30, 2002