Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

Elsewhere in this workshop,⁵⁸ policymakers and analysts alike have expressed a degree of pessimism regarding the prospects for a peace process in Colombia in the short, if not medium term. Indeed, Colombia has had the longest peace process in the Western Hemisphere, spanning five administrations including that of President Andres Pastrana, and resulting in the demobilization of approximately a half-dozen groups or fractions of groups. Throughout these years that began in the early 1980s, however, Colombia’s armed insurgency has grown and the conflict intensified. As former Colombian peace advisor Jesús Antonio Bejarano has noted, Colombia has learned how to negotiate demobilization, but not the underlying conflict.⁵⁹

What might other peace processes in the Hemisphere reveal in terms of lessons or examples for Colombia? As a backdrop to the following comparative discussion, one must keep in mind two basic caveats: That peace processes are not templates that can simply be transferred from one country to another; and that the complexity and number of actors in Colombia’s violence, as well as the involvement of the guerrillas and paramilitary groups in narcotrafficking, present unique challenges requiring a novel and uncharted approach.

Granted the uniqueness of the Colombian situation, there are still numerous precedents, if not actual lessons, derived from the Latin American experience of the last decade, which include the following:⁶⁰

• Legitimacy is important, particularly if presidents are to lead the process and overcome the resistance of powerful sectors in opposition. Hence, the difficulty of a settlement during the administration of President Ernesto Samper gave way to the promise of the Pastrana years. Overall, the legitimacy of the guerrillas is less important as long as what is accorded at the bargaining table reflects the demands of a broad majority of society.

• In the absence of legitimacy, or to compensate for the political weakness of either side, civil society has a crucial role to play in fostering contact between the parties in advance of a formal negotiation. Further, it can participate by presenting proposals for formal consideration, and applying pressure on the parties to conclude and implement a peace agreement.

• If El Salvador represented the classic "hurting stalemate" in which conditions on the battlefield obliged both sides to sit down at the bargaining table, one must also remember that in Guatemala the government negotiated a broad settlement with an essentially defeated Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala (URNG). The military situation influences, but does not solely determine, the outcome of a peace process. In the case of Colombia, the guerrillas’ desire to "Salvadoranize" the conflict by stepping up military pressure may actually lead away from, and not toward the bargaining table.

• The "need to negotiate" stems not only from so-called objective conditions such as a battlefield stalemate or the level of economic ruin, but also from political will and perceptions of interest. These calculations include visions of one’s future with or without a peace settlement.

• Part of the change in perceptions and calculations of interest is the recognition that a peace process provides an historic opportunity to renegotiate dysfunctional elements of the political system. In other words, it can achieve reforms that had not been possible through normal political channels, and address—or attempt to address—the root causes of conflict.

• Even if international actors can work to create a more favorable climate for peace negotiations, the role and involvement of the international community must follow, not precede, a change in the will of the parties to seek a solution.

• Peace processes often begin with intermediate accords such as those governing human rights, which serve as confidence-building mechanisms, as barometers of the good faith of both sides, and as harbingers of a new institutional order founded on strict adherence to the rule of law.

As the preceding presentations demonstrated, an internal process of debate and dialogue within the armed forces during and parallel to the formal negotiations can greatly enhance their chance for success. What must not be lost is the opportunity provided by a peace process for the armed forces to redefine its role as a professional, modern, and apolitical institution in a democratic system, casting off such politicized missions as internal security. The presentations by General Saldaña, General Pérez Molina, High Commissioner Ter Horst, and Dr. García-Peña converge on such issues as the difficulty of making peace, the levels of distrust that must be overcome, the complexity of the Colombian situation, the centrality of human rights, and the firm conviction that changes brought about as a result of a peace process have been for the better. With these comments in mind, the panel is now open for your questions.

QUESTION: In the cases presented of El Salvador and Guatemala, the civilian governments and the armed forces both recognized that human rights were more important than achieving a solution to the insurgency. When did that recognition take place?

ANSWER: There was an apparent need to define human rights prior to the negotiations, to specify that the government needs to enforce these rights. The military began to investigate on its own the accusations of violations by military personnel, and this gave legitimacy to the institution. The process began when the military took the issue seriously, when it recognized that the human rights issue affected institutional honor.

QUESTION: Please comment on the role of the media in the process. For instance, the use of statistics such as the number of municipalities in Colombia under the control of the guerrillas, which varies by a margin of 1000 percent, and in some cases exceeds the number of municipalities in Colombia. Also, the media comments on the wealth of the insurgents, giving them credibility and political power beyond their military capabilities. Are the media unquestioning shills of the leftist groups? What should be their proper role in a peace process?

ANSWER: There is no way to control the guerrillas’ access to the media. But the armed forces needs to hold press conferences frequently to present its point of view, ideas, and commentary. Skillful use of the media is critical to any peace process. The best objective is to keep the peace process as transparent as possible, so that the population can monitor the process and react accordingly.

Comment: The media is vital to any peace process, if only to let the population know that the government (or the military) places a high level of importance on the process. This helps reduce the level of conflict, taking away the insurgents’ argument that a military conflict is the only option for dealing with problems. It is critical that the military publicize issues, that the population know the military’s view of issues and situations. It is also critical that the military know of the insurgents’d skills in using the media. For instance, there were cases in El Salvador where the military encountered reporters at ambush sites, leading to the conclusion that the insurgents were informing the media of times and locations of ambush sites, to get press coverage of the armed forces being defeated or inflicting human rights violations.

QUESTION: In Orlando Fals Borda’s study of La Violencia, current Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) leader Tirofijo is listed as a common bandit, a bandolero. But now he is presented as a leader of freedom fighters. Can you please comment?

ANSWER: Fals Borda also points out in his description of Tirofijo that he was a liberal victim of conservador depradations, his family annihilated by the military. He fled the violence against his family and formed his first armed group when he was fourteen. After escaping the military attack on Marquetalia, he founded the FARC, where his military expertise helped gain advantages on the battlefield, and he’s been promoted accordingly. Now he’s the oldest living guerrilla in the world, leading the oldest guerrilla movement in the world. That’s a pretty good record for a common bandit.

QUESTION: The 1991 Constitution incorporated as law many of the reforms demanded by the guerrillas. Comment?

ANSWER: The 1991 Constitution obviates many of the insurgents’ demands, but few of its provisions have ever been implemented. It could be argued that the insurgents are now fighting for the incorporation of the social reforms mandated in the constitution.

QUESTION: Do the Geneva Conventions apply to the counterinsurgency war in Colombia?

ANSWER: Yes, articles 2 and 3 relate directly to insurgency wars.

Question: Talking specifically in terms of the mechanics of the principal parts in the negotiation, could you please provide some analysis on how to decide with whom to talk?

Answer: First, I’d say that it is critical to identify from the beginning who are the important actors, which in all cases include the civil society and its leaders (formal and informal), the institutions represented by all the parties, and especially the military hierarchies of the combatants on both sides. There are also other important actors in establishing the agenda and the methodology for the negotiations, such as the Catholic Church and its Protestant counterparts. The non-governmental organization community, such as the human rights community, can be a source of pressure to include its issues on the agenda, which is in any case something vital; also the NGO community can serve as a communications link, although I’m not sure this has ever been the case. Another source of direct support is the international organization community (e.g., the OAS, the U.N., the Friends of Colombia group). We’ve already talked about the role of the press. Without getting into too much detail, because it is the topic of a session later in this workshop, as I understand, there is always the role of the United States to keep in mind.

Speaking specifically of communication channels, there is a great difference, as has been learned throughout the long history of peace processes, between the formal and informal lines of communication. The informal ones have caused some problems, because one never knows with whom one is speaking, and how many filters or steps there are in the chain. These are in any case very important in the initial steps leading to dialogue between the combatant factions. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations have been used in both cases to initiate contact prior to direct discussions.

| Return to Top | Return to Table of  Contents |

Contact Us
NDU Press Home Page
NDU Home Page
INSS Home Page

Last Update:  September 30, 2002