Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

The Colombian Armed Forces and National Security

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I appreciate the opportunity to address what I feel is a tremendously important issue for the future of Colombia. I’m going to give the view from Bogotá but from a decidedly U.S. perspective, and admittedly through the prism that U.S. personnel who have lived and worked in Colombia have developed. All of us in this room share a mutual concern regarding the future of Colombia, not only the stability of the country itself, but also the stability of its neighbors and the entire region. We also share a common goal of ensuring the permanence of Colombian democracy. What role does the military play in all this? There’s no real external threat to Colombia to speak of, even though some of my military colleagues may disagree with that assessment. Instead, Colombia has an internal conflict, one that involves myriad enemies and diverse threats that include insurgents, narcotraffickers, paramilitaries, and criminal violence of a general nature—virtually all of which affect the entire region. I’m currently a military attaché, and in that role I represent the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Why should this department be concerned about what’s going on in Colombia?

The U.S. military has a long-standing, extremely close relation with the Colombian armed forces and police and therefore feels it has a stake in their success. It also realizes that U.S. national security interests to a great degree correlate with Colombian national security interests. Otherwise, there would be no U.S. presence in Colombia, and the U.S. has by far the largest overseas embassy in Bogotá. Sometimes that this presence is not welcomed; at times it is even resented, and understandably so. The reason for these large numbers is that the U.S. wants to help Colombia, primarily by helping Colombians to help themselves, so that the U.S. is not perceived as interfering in Colombia’s internal affairs.

I’ve lived and worked in Colombia for almost three years; during this time I’ve witnessed the Colombian armed forces suffering a series of setbacks on the battlefield against the guerrillas, beginning in April 1996 with the ambush of an army convoy in Nariño Department. A series of situations since then have led to heavy criticism of the Colombian military. I hope today to put in perspective what I’ve witnessed: The good points or strengths of the Colombian military and the weaknesses, or vulnerabilities. I also hope to provide an idea of what can be done to correct the situation. During these two painful years, it has become apparent that the Colombian military needs not only more resources, not only more mobility to get around to the various points of threat on the battlefield, but also more financial and moral support from its own government. Still, none of this will produce success in the long run if there is not a deep-seated commitment from the political leadership to resolve the conflict and to demonstrate what has become almost a trite expression -- political will. That political will is required from the entire Colombian society if the military is to be able ultimately to win in this very complex, multifaceted conflict.

To win this conflict, and we’ve touched on this already in this workshop, a national strategy involving all the instruments of power must be developed. When I attended the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) a few years ago, a lot of time was spent discussing the various instruments of national power required for national problems. Colombia needs to use not just the military instrument, which is being used in some cases effectively, in some cases not so effectively, but the total panoply of instruments. The political, the economic, the psychosocial, and the diplomatic instruments must all be brought together and dedicated to bringing an end to this conflict.

In my personal opinion, the pain of this war has not yet been felt sufficiently by the elites in Bogotá or in the other major urban areas. The rich, powerful families have not been sufficiently touched by the violence and intimidation, which are more prevalent in the rural areas, to prompt them to seek a radical change to the status quo. Earlier in this workshop Dr. Pizarro used the term "abandon" in his presentation: Many sectors of Colombia have abandoned their role or their stake in this conflict. Similarly, Dr. Maingot used the term "detached:" Some Colombian people feel detached from what is occurring out in the rural areas. It seems to me that many Colombians have actually become desensitized to the endemic violence. After forty to fifty years of violent events going on around them on a daily basis, it is almost as though they have become accustomed to it, or worse, complacent in accepting their fate. No one is willing to take either the military or the political risks necessary to reverse these downward trends. Now of course, the armed forces of Colombia bear a heavy burden in helping resolve these problems. Some would venture to say they bear too much of the burden, working for a government that does not share that level of commitment.

In analyzing this situation, it is important to first look at the strengths of the Colombian military. Years ago I studied Samuel Huntington’s theories about military professionalism, Morris Janowitz’ theories on civil-military relations, and others considered forward thinkers in similar fields. In applying these theories, I see the components of a professional military force of a very mature and developed institution in Colombia. What am I talking about here? For one thing, the Colombian military has a defined structure, a clear-cut hierarchy, and a credible chain of command. It is not the least bit mysterious or foggy who is in charge and how that military organization is supposed to work. There is also a sense of corporate character and a certain pride in being a member of the Colombian military. I witnessed this and felt it every day in dealing with my Colombian comrades. The Colombians also have a mature military educational and training system. Unfortunately, it is more mature in the garrison and classroom than in the field, based on the type of standard schools that officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) attend, no doubt in part because of the tenor and operational tempo of the real-world conflict confronting them. There isn’t as much unit training out in the field as I would expect given the circumstances, and that is one of the things the Colombian military really needs. Another aspect of professionalism, and a requisite core value, is that there exists a profound ethical basis -- a tangible sense of honor and duty -- within the institution.

A major factor mentioned frequently is that the Colombian government has the longest and strongest democratic tradition in the region, in that the Colombian military by and large is apolitical. Its members avoid interfering in internal domestic politics to a degree not witnessed in many other Latin American countries. This is an admirable fact: I’ve served in some countries where the U.S. embassy was always on a "coup watch," trying to find out who’s going to do what to whom and when, what cliques are going to form around which generals, internal power struggles, and that sort of thing. Happily, that is not something I’ve had to watch closely in Colombia because the chances of a coup there are extremely remote.

Another positive trend for the Colombian military is the fact that its members have managed to survive two years of decertification by the U.S. government. I won’t get into a discussion on the merits of the certification process, but I was deeply concerned, when the first negative decision was made in March of 1996, that this could totally destroy the military-to-military relations so assiduously cultivated between the U.S. and Colombia. I am pleased to say that this storm has been weathered: Bilateral military-to-military relations have not suffered too much as a result of this mainly political action. Of course, there has been a gap in some of the key U.S. security assistance programs – International Military Equipment and Training (IMET), Expanded IMET, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Military Training Team (MTT), and other such examples of alphabet soup that I won’t detail here. Some officers had their hearts set on going to service schools in the United States but were unable to realize those goals. Now that the pipeline has opened up again, however, we can continue our long-standing tradition of having a large number of Colombian military and police members training in the United States.

Colombia’s regional relations are relatively healthy. Colombians are working closely with their neighbors, realizing that many of these threats are global or regional in nature and cannot be resolved by one country acting alone. Colombia also has a very long record of international coordination and participation in various allied coalitions. Many Colombian officers are veterans of the Korean War and are very proud of the fact that they served with the United Nations during that conflict as the only Latin American country to participate. In fact, to this day Colombia still maintains a token presence in the U.N. Command in Korea.

The Colombian army participates in the multinational force and observers in the Sinai with the deployment of an infantry battalion. Many of the Colombian soldiers I’ve met have served in this vital peacekeeping capacity in the Middle East. Moreover, Colombia is a strong participant in the Conference of American Armies and its counterpart organizations in the air force and the navy. Some of the Colombian participants at this workshop are serving currently with the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and there are a large number of Colombian students in the IADC, several more than when I attended six years ago. I think all this represents a very positive trend.

Also in the international arena, Colombia is the designated host for the third Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA), which will be held in Cartagena in the latter half of 1998, following then Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Esguerra’s offer during the second Defense Ministerial in Bariloche, Argentina, to host the session. My office has been working closely with the secretary general of the Defense Ministry trying to get a commitment from the U.S. secretary of defense to participate personally. We have offered to assist to the extent requested, to help ensure that DMA III is a tremendous success.

Another strength that Colombia definitely possesses, and probably one reason that it has been able to survive so many years of conflict, is its historically strong and diverse economy and its rich natural resource wealth. Many other countries less rich and less diverse than Colombia probably could have never survived so many decades of internal turmoil. It is truly a shame that the economy of this once vibrant country has now been strained and that, for security reasons, foreign tourism cannot contribute to its healthy recovery.

Yet one more strength is the fact that, even though there is a lack of an overarching national strategy, the Colombian military forces have produced their own military strategy, published at the end of 1997. This document, written under the guidance of General Manuel Bonett Locarno, includes the important components of counterinsurgency warfare and counternarcotics efforts. It talks about combating the paramilitaries with the same aggressiveness as the other "generators of violence," a term used in the strategy. It discusses civil-military relations and talks a lot about respect for human rights. The human rights record of the Colombian military, which has received a very bad rap over the years, is rapidly improving. As reflected in the U.S. Department of State’s last annual human rights report, less than seven percent of the total number of human rights abuses identified during 1997 were attributed to the security forces of Colombia. In the meantime, those violations perpetrated by the guerrillas and especially by the paramilitaries more than made up for the reduction in violations by government forces.

Finally, a positive development some of you may have read about, was the shoot-down of a drug trafficking aircraft earlier in 1998. This is something the U.S. has been urging for a long time. The policy was in place, but now that the military actually shot down an airplane, it’s more than just a policy. It’s a demonstrable, credible action that hopefully will deter the narcotraffickers in the future or at least send them a strong signal that this sort of illicit behavior will not go unpunished.

In contrast to all these strong and positive trends, I will briefly review some of the weaknesses. I’ve discussed these with my Colombian friends and I don’t think it will surprise or offend anyone to hear this analysis, much of which is in the public domain and subject to domestic debate. The lack of an overarching national strategy, and with it the commitment of the entire society to resolve the conflict, is the most serious deficiency Colombia faces. Without the commitment of the national government and the provision of adequate resources to the armed forces and police, the military strategy General Bonett published is nothing more than a statement of principle, a general guideline for action, or an expression of intent. Without a total national strategy, it is impossible for the military to develop a full-fledged doctrine, let alone translate it into a tactical campaign plan.

There is the oft-mentioned lack of budgetary support to consider. I won’t go into any details here; everyone has access to the statistics. The proportion of the Colombian national budget dedicated to the military for a country that is fully at war is woefully deficient. From time to time it is cut back even more in the middle of the year, which makes it very difficult for planners in the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces to try to project what they’re going to have to work with. As one result, military units are spread too thin. With the pressure to have a military presence in all the remote parts of the country, a platoon is sent here, a company is sent there, the flag is raised over a skeletal headquarters, and there is only a symbolic military presence outside of the cities. Yet what does this accomplish? In some cases the military ends up doing nothing more than whetting the appetite of the guerrillas, who see these small, isolated outposts as excellent soft targets. Consequently, the armed forces need to be increased, but in a broad, rational way -- not just one extra brigade here, one additional battalion there, which will not necessarily change the balance of forces and in some ways could end up being counterproductive.

The conscription system is another problem. There’s a high proportion of conscripts in the Colombian army, ill-prepared to serve in the conflictive areas to which they’re assigned and by and large merely trying to survive their terms and return home alive. Military service is seen as something to avoid, not as a patriotic duty that should be sought out. I’ve already talked about the lack of training for units in the field. Much of the training ends up being "OJT"-- on-the-job training. Because of this, there is neither the time nor the wherewithal for people who have undergone training -- perhaps at schools in the United States or in other countries -- to come back, share lessons learned, or pass along these skills to other soldiers in their unit.

There is also a lack of continuity of leadership in the military forces. This is not the leadership’s fault in many cases. In the time I’ve been in Colombia there have been four defense ministers, three foreign affairs ministers, four military forces commanders, three army commanders, three joint directors of intelligence, and six army directors of intelligence. I hate to admit it, but in some of the other cabinet ministries it’s even worse. This revolving door syndrome makes it very difficult for anyone to make or implement long-range plans. And after the August inauguration of a new president, we can expect yet another major shakeup in the high command.

Another obstacle is the difficulty the military faces in shaking off charges of collusion with paramilitary elements. Some progress is being achieved here, but as long as that problem haunts the Colombian military, it will make it difficult to mobilize support within the governments and non-governmental organization (NGO) communities of certain key allies. Moreover, too many of the troops out in the field are committed to guarding static infrastructure, providing security support to multinational corporations, and protecting the economic sector. Many are tied up this year in providing security during the elections, which of course is very important. "Plan Democracia" is the sort of thing the military should do, but it also is extremely labor-intensive. About 30 percent of the military forces are tied up performing some sort of static security mission.

We’ve already talked about weaknesses in mobility, intelligence, and communications, so I won’t belabor that point. Another vulnerability is the parochialism that exists between certain elements of the military and certain segments of the National Police, though this is slowly improving. There is some professional jealousy and a strong dose of competitiveness, which can be creative and useful, but in some cases it can be carried too far. Parochialism breeds mistrust, duplication of effort, and redundant logistical structures, not to mention a reluctance to fully embrace the military concept of "jointness." The United States works very hard with its Colombian friends to convince them and help them do things more in a joint way, and there is some hope for improvement, as can be seen in the recently established joint task force at Tres Esquinas. I visited there earlier in 1998 with U.S. Southern Command Commander in Chief General Charles E. Wilhelm, and he was impressed that this may very well be the role model for the future and suggests the type of joint and combined operations that can succeed in Colombia.

The U.S. government wants to help. There are certain things it can do and certain things it can’t do, either for policy or financial reasons, and this is the topic to be addressed in more detail during the workshop discussion period later today. But in the meantime, I will present some brief bullets, summarizing what the Colombian military must do first to help itself:

• It must work with the new government come August to develop a national strategy. This is not something the military can stimulate by giving a direct verbal order to the new government, but somehow there’s going to have to be an impetus to work together to develop such a strategy.

• Armed forces commanders need to devise more realistic training. They must invest in the future by training the right people now, and this involves better use of the military resources already provided. Granted, Colombia needs more resources, but the amount available now can be used in a more efficient and effective way. Military leaders are going to have to fight for more budget priority. If they don’t get this and don’t receive a commitment from of their government on what sort of funding can be expected in the out years, it’s going to be impossible to do any long-range planning. Part of this is the training of the civilian cadre, i.e., civilians working in the defense sector. The National Defense University’s Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, an exciting new element of this university, can go a long way in helping develop the sort of highly professional civilian cadre needed in countries like Colombia.

• The military has to do a better job of public relations, though this is gradually improving. Some of the units and some of the commanders with whom I’ve dealt have highlighted and publicized the human rights abuses of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries in their areas. The U.S. Embassy has tried to help them by providing detailed reports to Washington. In many cases, though, I am convinced that the guerrillas’ public relations capability is much more advanced than is the military’s.

• The armed forces have to realize that some of its public relations efforts can be counterproductive, however, when it continues to use terms that confuse external supporters. An example is the so-called "FARC cartel." We get into fruitless arguments over what a cartel is and what a cartel isn’t, and sometimes the visitors who come down from Washington or Europe spend most of their time arguing over semantics and never get into the real substance of the argument. When I first arrived in Colombia, I heard a lot of comments within the armed forces about a "human rights NGO conspiracy." That sort of talk, despite a genuine concern over the potential for such a conspiracy, is not helpful and does not lend any credence to a healthy discussion about how to resolve the lingering human rights problems that do exist.

• A "narcoguerrilla connection" to the illegal drug business has been documented. The degree of that connection is somewhat contentious; nevertheless, continued use of such terms as the "narc-FARC cartel" and other politically charged rubrics does not really contribute much to the discussion.

• The military has to continue cleaning up its human rights record. The more vigorously and rapidly it does that, the better.

• Corruption also has to be cleaned up, whether it be narcocorruption, corruption in the procurement or contracting arena, determining who gets to go on overseas trips and training,, who gets promoted, or whatever.

• Assuming that more support is available for the military, this has to be focused on a few select units. The Colombian army has mobile brigades, but they’re not truly mobile. They are dependent on the availability of helicopters to get them from point A to point B. Perhaps given more U.S. support in the future, the army can concentrate on some truly mobile, elite units that can actually seize the initiative from the guerrillas and develop more offensive-type tactics.

• We talked a little bit yesterday about reforming the military. I won’t go into that in detail here, but I do think that there are certain aspects of the military, such as the justice system and the training regime, that merit thoughtful reform.

• Units should be redeployed more prudently to better counter the narco threat. The runway enhancement project at Tres Esquinas is one such project. Colombia needs to be able to move assets, be they military or police, around the battlefield to counter the threat and, better yet, to stay ahead of it.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002