Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

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What I’d like to talk about today is something different from what we’ve focused on thus far. Your agenda lists me as talking about drugs, and right away everybody’s thinking that I’m going to talk about how many tons of cocaine, how many tons of heroin, who’s cultivating what and where. But I’m not going to do that, because everyone already knows all those statistics. I’m going to talk about Colombian drug policy as crisis: Crisis decision-making and how we can think about solutions to the problem of crisis decision-making.

The making of drug policy in Colombia may be characterized as a crisis situation for successive Colombian governments⁶¹ with both international and domestic elements. Colombian drug traffickers, employing extreme violence and corruption in order to coerce the government to not take action against them, comprise the domestic source of pressure for decision-makers. The use of illicit drugs in the United States, Canada, and the states of Western Europe and the resulting pressure by the governments of these states to stop the flow of narcotics are external source of pressure on drug policy-making in Colombia.

More precisely, the crisis for the Colombian government stems from the use of violence and extortion by Colombian drug traffickers. This has led to a crisis of legitimacy for the criminal justice system of Colombia, forcing decision-makers to grapple with making policy choices that aid the cause of domestic order but fail to satisfy the international community, and specifically the United States. The international dimension involves the international community in terms of international criminal law and specifically the issue of extradition. The United States has repeatedly pressured Colombia to enforce the 1979 U.S.-Colombia Treaty of Extradition. However, violent reactions by the drug cartels led Colombian officials to reverse policy, in this case by changing the constitution, only to later once again allow extradition, mostly to placate the United States.

While the basis of much international law lies in some conception of international morality, one of the arguments used by the United States for Colombia to pursue a particular drug policy is a legal one: The flow of drugs is illegal and should be stopped. However, it has been argued that in reality this is essentially a U.S. foreign policy goal seeking to remedy a U.S. domestic policy problem vis á vis Colombia. Colombians would argue that the use of international law to pursue a foreign policy strategy amounts to tampering with Colombian internal affairs and turns the international legal regime into a coercive foreign policy vehicle for strong states against weak states. As in all international law, however, these arguments are all debatable.

International practice is not uniform when it comes to jurisdiction, especially in criminal matters. It is generally accepted that each state may deal with offenses committed within its territory as it sees fit, without regard to the nationality of the offender. There is also general agreement that states may assume jurisdiction over offenses committed by their own nationals abroad, although not all states choose to exercise that option. However, the question of jurisdiction becomes murky on the subject of under which circumstances a state may punish a foreigner for an act committed outside its territory, and therefore at a time when the act was subject to another state's criminal laws. Furthermore, while states are not normally averse to applying foreign law to civil disputes that contain a foreign element, they generally "refuse to apply the criminal laws of other states in their territories."⁶²

The United States generally asserts jurisdiction under the subjective territorial principle that supports prosecution of conspiracy of an offense consummated outside the United States but with a constituent element of the offense occurring in the United States. Furthermore, U.S. law considers the crime to have occurred where the effect or result impacted, which is the objective territoriality principle. The point here is not to go into an expanded discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction but rather to illustrate how Colombia might be viewed as being an uncooperative country in the international legal regime.

Decision-making in crises has been written about extensively, especially in the fields of psychology and political science. In virtually every case, researchers have agreed that the threat to important values, which basically defines a crisis, produces a pronounced pattern of changes in the decision-making process.⁶³ Typically, as the crisis escalates, the environment becomes more unstable and induces increased perceptions among leaders of time pressure and restricted options.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, their adversaries’ options are perceived as increasing, and leaders tend to resort to short-term "quick fixes" rather than to long-term planning. There is also a tendency to rely heavily on preexisting information, rather than on new sources, while at the same time communicating less with mediators and adversaries and more with perceived allies.⁶⁵

Not only can the Colombian drug problem be characterized as a crisis, but it may also fall into the category of a Catch-22, the dilemma in which the victim cannot escape insurmountable obstacles, or perhaps more aptly, a Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which there is a tendency to forgo cooperation in the pursuit of self-interest. This situation is one in which a zero-sum game applies as the result of two diametrically opposed forces with vested interests exerting pressure on the Colombian government to "do" (the U.S. position), or to "not do" (the mafias’ position) something about drug trafficking in Colombia. The gain for one side has in both cases not only meant a loss for the other side, but a loss for Colombia, no matter what the outcome.

In crisis situations, officials are more inclined to define and explicitly compare available alternatives in cost-benefit terms because they are more focused and pursue information more vigorously. In the Colombian case, there is a paucity of available alternatives.⁶⁶ Bringing drug traffickers to justice in Colombia partially satisfies the United States, but it is deleterious to the health and safety of Colombian justice officials – in addition to general order in Colombian society. Attempting to bargain with the drug traffickers to turn themselves in, as former President Gaviria did, does not completely satisfy the United States that the Colombians are doing enough to combat drug trafficking. Nor has the United States been convinced of Colombian efforts by the fact that on May 22, 1997, the Colombian Senate voted 53 to 14 in favor of a bill to reestablish extradition of future convicted drug traffickers.⁶⁷ The legislation is largely without teeth as it offers exceptions for those offenders who turn themselves in or have already been sentenced in Colombia; jailed leaders of the Cali cartel will remain where they are rather than be extradited to the United States. Despite the constitutional prohibition and in light of past reactions by drug traffickers, reestablishing the extradition process was nevertheless an important step for the Samper government.⁶⁸ While it is more satisfactory to Colombian cartel members to be incarcerated in a Colombian institution than to be extradited to the United States, as former Medellín cartel leader Pablo Escobar and others aptly demonstrated, they are unlikely to go or to remain willingly for very long.

Colombian policy-makers suffer from the same pathologies that attack other leaders in crisis. They are burdened by a reduced span of attention to all of the information, including possible consequences.⁶⁹ Former President Barco displayed this lack of attention to the possible consequences when he openly declared war on drugs in 1989 and unleashed one of the bloodiest periods of violence perpetrated by drug traffickers against the Colombian state to date. His successor, President Gaviria, could not renounce this war quickly enough when he came to office but suffered from increasingly displeased U.S. policy.⁷⁰ Because President Samper was accused of accepting bribes for his political campaign from the Cali cartel, the negative pressures brought to bear on his decision-making were great, and resultant policies must be considered as being crises-driven.

Leaders are also burdened by cognitive rigidity. This is often the result of undue reliance on a preconceived set of concerns and a limited tolerance for ambiguity or points of view that deviate from prejudiced perceptions. Leaders tend to seek out only that information that confirms their personal views, they are inclined to overvalue them and turn to small, cohesive groups for both emotional rewards and comfort.⁷¹ This has the effect of reducing the information and restricting the alternatives available.

The inability to consider realistic alternatives and choose narrowly perceived options leads decision-makers to expect overly optimistic outcomes and underestimate the actions of an opponent. Stress, coupled with a distorted sense of time available, not only lends a sense of urgency to the decision-making, but causes the constriction of the decision-making group involved and a lack of consideration of long-term consequences.⁷² Problem-solving abilities are thus severely hampered, and simple decisions may be ignored because of the multitude of poor communications, difficult tradeoffs, varying actors’ interests, competing or conflicting goals within the leadership group, and a variety of other factors. These all contribute to stress and impede the ability to make decisions.⁷³ Thus, a crisis may lead to a rigid reliance on old problem-solving strategies that are inappropriate for the matter at hand.⁷⁴

What is the solution to this dilemma? In a word, planning. Most policy in Colombia is made under conditions of adversity. To effectively change that, an analysis is required that understands all of the factors involved as well as the fact that all drug policy to date has been reactive and crisis driven. Such an integrated application study might include five prime heuristic phases: Identification of main capacity deficits; improvement feasibility domain mapping; evaluation redesign proposals; interdependence testing; and reevaluation in terms of principles and strategies.

A detailed study needs to be made of the various problems that exist in Colombia. A plan needs to be drawn up, perhaps by distinguishing the variety of problems, analyzing them separately and then jointly. In other words, a definition of the problem with all of its complexities will be more helpful than simply assuming that the outcomes, such as acts of violence or corruption, define the problem. What do I mean by that? Take the example of drugs: If we look at the problem of drugs on U.S. or Canadian streets, they are a problem. Drugs are illegal, and people are using them. But for the Colombian government, in the absence of high levels of domestic consumption, drugs are the outcome of a problem. They are being cultivated, processed, and shipped through Colombia, when they could just as easily be cultivated, processed, and shipped through some other country. The problem in Colombia is defined as a whole range of issues, such as poverty, violence, lack of policy, and U.S. and Canadian consumption. The illegal drug business in Colombia is the outcome of a whole range of other problems.

The next step requires the consideration of all possible alternatives along with any contingent consequences. In this step, identifying the specific criteria for resolving the drug problem is not sufficient in and of itself. That any of the possible solutions might themselves trigger another set of problems must also be analyzed. For example, the issue of extradition demonstrates that attempting to bring Colombian drug traffickers to justice may satisfy the United States, but it provokes an equally challenging set of problems, such as violence perpetrated by the drug cartels in response to the prospect of being extradited. A concurrent and systematic consideration of possible alternative policies or decisions is also crucial at this stage, e.g., massive human rights violations, capitulation to the drug mafias, or simply doing nothing.

The next part of the process involves the exploration of the political and economic feasibility of the alternatives. While there will always be special interests, if not in some cases vested interests, to consider, the policy decision should reflect a solution that will best satisfy the constitutional tradition of the country. This is where values come into play: Not only must values be defined, they must also be systematically considered, especially if the democratic process in a free society is to be respected. At this point there will doubtless be conflicting values, and a methodology for measuring the criteria must be developed. A cost-benefit or ranked analysis is helpful at this juncture, that not only requires defining and measuring costs, but also ensures that the benefits are not overvalued. It will also aid in comparing increments of change under resource constraints and choosing among alternatives given their defined costs or benefits over time.

Human welfare is an important component to be taken into account when evaluating the possible policy consequences of options under consideration. Insofar as welfare is viewed as being a long-term value, the prominence of human life and life conditions, reported levels of satisfaction and happiness, and the conditions of equality and liberty are factors by which the planning must be guided. A plan that resolves the drug problem but that leads to societal chaos will obviously be inconsistent with the elements of equality and liberty from which democracy draws its strength.

Thus far, what I’ve been presenting is basically a rationalist policy plan. Incrementalism could come into play throughout the process: Changes should be brought about incrementally, if only because too many people have been murdered and terrorized in reprisals for government policies in Colombia. If change is brought about gradually, augmenting and slowly altering existing policy while always following a chosen plan of action, the violence will be at least minimized. Some headway has been made in Colombia in this regard. For example, the policy decision of the Colombian government to bring drug traffickers to justice has been difficult, but some constitutional changes, such as the development of courts where "faceless" judges are hidden behind one-way mirrors, have helped in the implementation of these value compromises.

The pressure of varying forms of international state and nonstate actors on the sovereign decision-making structure of Colombia has led to what may be characterized as a crisis situation for successive Colombian governments. Colombian policy-makers have gambled with quick fixes, rather than using long-term planning, demonstrating that in such an environment, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make effective and lasting policy to combat drug trafficking. Because of this, Colombian drug policy-making may be characterized not only as a highly complex process, but also as disjointed, sporadic, and largely reactive. The preceding analysis tends to confirm that the incremental model is the one that best explains the current dynamic in Colombia. In fact, one of the conclusions that may be drawn is that because Colombia is subject to a variety of internal and external forces that affect its drug policy, a return to the incremental/rational policy debate would relieve some of the policy gambling characteristic of crisis decision-making.

Unfortunately, there is no ready solution to such a complex problem. According to the "Millett Principle," "... for every solution you generate, one or more additional problems requiring additional solutions emerge."⁷⁵ In its own desperation to stop the flow of drugs, the United States has coerced Colombian policy-makers into decisions that comply with its definition of the war on drugs. But clearly Colombia lacks the resources to combat a global problem and has reacted to this pressure to "do something," but without great success. And when steps such as extradition were taken to combat these organized criminal groups, the violent reprisals were so detrimental to social order that desperate officials quickly reversed their policy decisions. These reversals, while temporarily restoring peace in Colombia, did not appease the United States. The conclusion is that Colombia cannot win this war on its own, even if the United States supplies military assistance. Global problems require global solutions, and crisis decision-making quick fixes cannot replace the need for long-term strategic planning.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002