Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

by

It is obvious that Colombia’s insecurity problems -- violence, guerrilla warfare, drug trafficking, political corruption, and growth of paramilitary groups -- have had and continue to have substantial transnational consequences. Many examples are possible, but I would limit consideration to three specific cases.

One is Colombia’s relations with countries of the Caribbean basin. At one time an assertive foreign policy intrusion into the Caribbean basin held a great deal of promise for Colombia as it sought to break out of its traditional foreign policy mold.⁹⁸ That mold had confined Colombia’s basic relationships to the countries of Central and South America and, of course, the United States. The Caribbean basin offered Colombia the opportunity to fill a vacuum of leadership and become a force in the region. Although Venezuela was already establishing influences in the area, Colombia had a more compelling reason: In addition to its extensive coastal waters in the Caribbean, it had possessions that required protection. I refer, of course, to the archipelago of San Andres and Providencia. The need for protection of those islands became evident and immediately necessary when Nicaragua issued its Libro Blanco in 1989 laying claim to them despite the 1928 Treaty of Barcenas-Esguerra.⁹⁹

And so, starting with the administration of Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974 -- 1978), Colombia began a process of involvement in Caribbean affairs. This involvement expanded with President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978 -- 1982) and President Belisario Betancur (1982-86) and ultimately with PresidentCesar Gaviria (1990 -- 1994) who gave the involvement its greatest impetus.¹⁰⁰ Colombia sought and obtained membership in the Nassau Group, which was created to carry out the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), a U.S. program of economic assistance for the region. There was commercial liberalization with countries that were members of the Caribbean Commercial Community (CARICOM) and joint ventures were developed with Caribbean island countries in such areas as tourism, education, health, and agriculture. Embassies were established in Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago. To Gaviria and his administration, the Caribbean was a region where a growing purchasing power by the countries of that area would result in significant opportunities for Colombia’s exports.¹⁰¹ Finally, Colombia’s interest in the Caribbean basin was codified in article 9 of the 1991 Constitution by specifically referring to the Caribbean as an area where Colombia would be involved.

Those prospects, however, and all the steps taken by Lopez Michelsen, Turbay Ayala, Betancur, and Gaviria to build a foundation for a leadership role in the Caribbean, may have been fruitless as the Caribbean basin becomes a vortex for the trafficking of drugs out of Colombia. The use of the Caribbean basin as part of an elaborate system for the transportation of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana into the United States and European markets has created a significant obstacle for any Colombian foreign policy initiative in the area.¹⁰² For the countries of the Caribbean basin, the criminality, corruption, money laundering, and addiction problems created by the drug trafficking constitute a serious threat to their security and sovereignty. Certainly, the drug trafficking has had and will continue to have a deleterious impact on the social, economic, political, and military institutions of the countries of the Caribbean basin, thereby constantly testing their ability to govern. Under the circumstances, Colombia, as the country most responsible for these problems, can hardly be expected to take the lead in the Caribbean regional system. The drug trafficking problem is such an overwhelming issue that it poses a large stumbling block for anything beyond routine relationships.¹⁰³

A second example of the transnational impact of Colombia’s domestic problems is its relations with Venezuela. Venezuela is the country with which Colombia has had its most complicated and competitive relationship. Historically, there have been several periods of hostility between them fueled by border disputes, the migration of undocumented Colombians into Venezuela, and cross-border firefights between their armies.¹⁰⁴ More recently, however, the relationship has distinctly improved as the two countries focus on a process of integration in several areas and on mutually beneficial trade agreements, including the G-3. This new approach has resulted in a considerable rise in trade between the two countries, exemplified by the 300 percent growth between 1989 and 1993.¹⁰⁵

On a day-to-day basis, Colombia’s insecurity problems have not directly affected the progress of this new relationship except perhaps to slow the pace of greater integration and to hinder a faster implementation of G-3 agreements. However, the potential for an explosive rift as a result of drug trafficking, terrorist attacks, border conflict, and large-scale migration is never far removed. A recently published map in U.S. News and World Report showed that narcoguerrilla groups were active along the entire Colombo-Venezuelan border from the top of the Guajira peninsula in the north to the Orinoco River to the south.¹⁰⁶ It is therefore only reasonable to assume that any attempt by the Colombian government to dislodge narcoguerrilla forces from the area would produce a considerable amount of stress on the relationship with Venezuela since the narcoguerrillas would seek refuge over the border, and Colombian armed forces would not be reluctant to pursue them.

The third example is Colombia’s relations with the United States, where the consequences of Colombia’s insecurity problems have had the greatest impact. The internal conditions of insecurity in Colombia have radically reversed a bilateral relationship that was based on historical friendship, mutual support, and cooperation into one of open hostility, disdain, and humiliation. Although various presidents, beginning with Carlos Lleras Restrepo, have sought to create greater "wiggle" room for Colombia in its relationship with the U.S., until recent years Colombia was often the Latin American country the U.S. could most rely on. The history of U.S.-Colombian relations is full of instances in which Colombia found itself in support of U.S. policies and programs at crucial moments -- during World War II and at various crisis points of the Cold War.¹⁰⁷

However, the introduction of large quantities of drugs from Colombia into the U.S., the perceived failure of the Colombian government to deal with the criminality engendered by the drug trade, the corruption of high government officials, and recurring questions surrounding human rights violations have produced an image of a country that is out of control. Colombia now appears to the U.S. as a country that has been taken over by the criminal element, is no longer a country that can be trusted, and is only worthy of censure. The political process, despite much prodding, has been unable or unwilling to allow the extradition of drug dealers wanted in the U.S. For the U.S., the last straw came in 1994 when there was conclusive evidence that then President-elect Ernesto Samper had accepted large sums of campaign funds from the drug cartels. Consequently, in its relations with Colombia, the U.S. has assumed the role of arbiter of that country’s political behavior and withholds privileges such as visas and certifications in a vain attempt at modifying its actions. It is only possible to speculate how the U.S. might change its policies toward Colombia, faced with the realization that the insecurity problems are not going to end anytime soon. A new president has taken office in Colombia and he has pledged to seek peace with the guerrillas and to end wanton impunity, widespread corruption, and the general lack of accountability, but the prospects of achieving these goals are not very great. Domestic considerations in the U.S. as well as the tendency on the part of its politicians to use the "Colombian drug problem" to gain partisan advantages may, in the end, have more influence on the relationship than any other factor.

Finally, while we can point to specific examples of how the consequences of its problems of insecurity have affected its international relations, perhaps the greatest damage has been to Colombia’s ability to take on a greater leadership in regional relations. Colombia, many would agree, has every reason to believe it is a natural leader in the region because of its geographical location, economic resources, intellectual orientation, political traditions, and institutions. Indeed, during the recent administration of Gaviria, Colombia’s leadership in the region was widely recognized. To quote Juan Gabriel Tokatlian and Arlene Tickner,

...one might highlight the consistent backing Gaviria gave among others, the G-3, the commitment adapted in favor of strengthening the Andean Group, the active support offered to the Rio Group, the dynamic participation in the Group of Friends to the General Secretary of the UN in consolidating a peace agreement between the government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberación Nacional (FMLN), and the permanent efforts devoted to the Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.¹⁰⁸

Gaviria’s own selection as the General Secretary of the Organization of American States (OAS) can only be considered as further evidence of his and Colombia’s leadership among the countries of Latin America. However, the problems of drug trafficking, violence, inability to enforce its own laws, and rampant corruption have created such a negative image for Colombia that its leadership in the regional area currently lacks moral and political credibility. This is indeed a loss not just for Colombia but for the Latin American community as a whole.

| Return to Top | Return to Table of  Contents |

Contact Us
NDU Press Home Page
NDU Home Page
INSS Home Page

Last Update:  September 30, 2002