Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

The project that started this book consisted of four phases: A briefing to the Director of the Joint Staff; a study of possible scenarios for Colombia’s future; a workshop directed at recommending specific solutions to Colombia’s security problems to both the U.S. and Colombian military leaders; and this book. Fortunately, this project coincided with the rise of a new optimism in Colombia that a peace process through negotiations was the best route to a solution, giving the participants ample material for analysis and thought. Also, this increased interest in a peace process provided a more optimistic scenario, because none of the other scenarios resulted in a peaceful transition to stability for Colombia. But before reviewing the scenarios, it is necessary to look at where Colombia stands, to define the problems, and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of all the actors involved.

Governance in Colombia is at such low levels that it is almost possible to talk of anarchy. Violence is so common that nothing shocks the population for more than a day or so, a result of suffering through an increasingly dangerous war for more than thirty years. This war has been one of low intensity, though it is now reaching unprecedented levels which threaten the future and democratic stability, not only domestically, but also in terms of relations with its immediate neighbors and within the regional context.

Many studies have been made diagnosing the reality of Colombia's problems, both by Colombians and by foreigners. There are many studies of the insurgents, drug traffickers, and more recently, the many paramilitary groups springing up throughout the country. These three different groups' propensity to produce damage, their tactics and strategies are well known, their methods of operation well quantified, and yet, until Andrés Pastrana was elected on a campaign promise of negotiating with everyone, there was no credible plan or analysis for dealing with these groups. The primary problem is a general lack of consensus on what to do. One of the points brought up throughout this project is that Colombians need to examine their own domestic institutions of governance, to determine the current capacity to confront the threats to their own state. Well-defined policies and strategies developed through consensus are required, on which society can base plans of action throughout the country to implement an open process to reform and eliminate the forces working against peace. Colombia needs a consensus of governance in order to survive as a state, to develop as a society, and to produce an environment of peace and stability in which all Colombians share equally the responsibilities and benefits of democracy.

Much of U.S. policy toward Colombia is funneled through the issue of drugs: Certification, counterdrug assistance, military support of eradication programs, and other such issues. And for a good reason: drugs are a serious problem for both the U.S. and Colombia. In 1996, for instance, the U.S. suffered 1.5 million arrests for drug violations, 3.6 million chronic users of cocaine, generating an estimated $30 billion gross income from drugs ($8 billion net to the mafias in Colombia). Hundreds of millions have been spend on reducing the flow of cocaine and heroin from South America, thus far with little net effect. But the problem for U.S. interests is that drugs are a symptom of the security problem in Colombia. The cause is a lack of justice that fosters an environment of insecurity in which corruption, insurgency, drug trafficking, and common crime flourish. Not only Colombia and the U.S. are affected: Justice and security in all the neighboring states, and especially the smaller ones in Central America and the Caribbean, are seriously undermined.

A second funnel for U.S. policy toward Colombia is the issue of human rights violations. This is a vital issue for any peaceful accord ending Colombia's instability: People must have confidence that their government can and will protect everyone from violence and impunity. But this is also a symptom of Colombia's ills, not a root cause. The low level of justice available to anyone in Colombia has created an environment of impunity in which those with the will and capacity to prey on society do so, with no fear of retribution. Thus, if a guerrilla fighter fears no reprisal for attacking an undefended town, or if a paramilitary fears no reprisal for killing suspected supporters of the guerrillas, or if a rogue military official fears no reprisal for extra-judicial law enforcement, human rights violations continue apace. It is the role of the government to provide an environment in which these illegal acts do not occur with impunity. The solution for Colombia is not to retrain government officials (including the military) to respect human rights, though this is a credible mission. Colombia needs to enforce justice to the point that guerrillas, self-defense groups, and criminals fear being held accountable for their actions enough to not prey on those they consider weaker. It is the failure of the government to provide security that allows what the Colombian army leaders call the "agents of violence" to exist and succeed.

Adding to Colombia’ instability is the fact that the general population and the institutions of governance have become accustomed to the constant barrage of bad news, and take these in stride with great ease. Occasional outbursts of indignation can be heard demanding change, but after each case the public debate recedes, and society returns to its normal state of acquiescence, until the next outrage occurs and a new outburst begins all over again. The U.S. State Dept. Report on Human Rights for 1997 indicates that only three percent of criminal cases go to court, and conviction rates are low. With such a pessimistic statistic, it is no wonder that Colombian society accepts violence as a way of life: Justice is what individuals can make of it, not what the state provides. The bottom line is that impunity is extremely high among individuals with the force or will to do anything about protecting themselves and their property. The result is an increased anarchy, in which private force groups impose their version of justice or governance, creating an environment in which insurgency, the illegal drug business, self-defense groups, paramilitaries, and criminals all flourish.

Colombia's security policies are non-existent, and strategies to implement stability as a result tend to be reactive and defensive. In the absence of guidance from the civilian government, the military still uses the strategy developed during La Violencia, protecting only the principal cities and making incursions into the rural areas. Thus the FARC and ELN operate in over seventy percent of the national territory, and control outright over an estimated forty percent. No strategic plan has been developed that carries the force of law upon which the armed forces can base adequate battle plans, training, or operations to re-conquer Colombia from the insurgents.

The basic role of the armed forces, as written in the 1991 Constitution, is to take up arms and defend the states' independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, and defend public institutions (title VII, ch. 7, art. 216, 217). But the president, as supreme commander of the armed forces, is charged with directing the military (title VII, ch. 1, art. 189). Further, he is to maintain public order, restore it when perturbed, and direct the war effort where necessary. It is not even necessary to wait for a congressional declaration of war -- the president is allowed, with full cabinet support, to declare a state of domestic commotion, though the senate must ratify the measure within a specified time limit (title VII, ch. 6, art. 213). No Colombian president has taken this responsibility seriously enough to write a security policy, though the war against the FARC has been on-going for thirty-two years. The optimum alternative for Colombia would be the election of a president with enough knowledge of military issues to write or propose a national security policy on which the armed forces can then base doctrine, budget, training, and missions to prosecute and win the war against the insurgents. Unfortunately, this optimum was not one of the project’s credible scenarios.

Policy options for the U.S. depend on the desired outcome. Doing nothing is always an option, though in this case doing nothing has dire consequences for the U.S. The insurgents have the upper hand in the war, and the resultant instability provides the environment necessary for the illegal drug business to flourish. Both are situations the U.S. cannot afford.

Other options involve a change in U.S. policy, such as re-defining its stand on human rights abuses (changing the Leahy Amendment), removing legal (and attitudinal) barriers to providing counterinsurgency (COIN) assistance to Colombia, and recognizing the insurgents as fully involved in the illegal drug business (thus removing barriers to counterdrug assistance to the military for COIN operations). A less optimal option is accepting a role in a multilateral grouping to deal with the problem of instability from a regional perspective, a solution that has little history of success.

One aspect of the project involved writing possible scenarios for Colombia’s instability over a period of ten to twenty years into the future. Several scenarios were debated ad nauseum, most of them were discarded as not credible or feasible. One such discarded idea was that of a possible narco-state, where the drug mafias take over the country. There is not enough credible evidence that the drug mafias have any intention (or need) to govern Colombia, and an overwhelming volume of evidence that they prefer to operate in the environment of instability provided by the insurgents, paramilitaries, inefficient national military forces, and weak, corrupt government institutions.

The four remaining scenarios include the following:

• Idealistic (which included a peaceful negotiation).
• Inertia (the "muddle-through" scenario).
• Guerrilla victory.
• Dirty war.

This scenario was thought to have one of the lowest probabilities of success, though if it played out, would be the best and most lasting one for Colombia. In it, the civilian government is successful in negotiating an agreement on the proper balance of power and governance among the different sectors of society, which would include the leftist insurgents, the paramilitaries, the drug mafias, and society in general. A concerted effort is made to combat corruption and the lack of justice, and as a result, the efforts to eradicate the illegal drug business succeed. With the drug profits dried up, the insurgents are unable to maintain their budgetary requirements to run a war, and the lack of popular support results in a rapid decline in numbers. Within ten years of the initial agreement, peace and stability are achieved, allowing the government to turn its attention to other issues of governance. The current peace process is a variation on this scenario, one that lengthens the process of achieving consensus on governance by negotiating with one actor at a time, possibly stretching the timeframe out to thirty years. Because of the lack of clarity of purpose and method and the lack of commitment by all the parties involved as of early 1999, the on-going peace process does not increase the probability of implementing this scenario as a long-term resolution to Colombia’s instability.

From the U.S. and Colombian perspectives, this is obviously the preferred method of achieving stability. However, given the history of tolerating violence and the entrenchment of corruption and the illegal drug business, it is highly unlikely that any agreement could be made on just what constitutes good governance and stability. The principal advantage of this scenario is that slow and deliberate changes tend to be more lasting than quick and possibly not well thought through changes, making the results of the scenario more credible and worthwhile in the long run.

The peace process headed by president Pastrana has taken over the debate over security in Colombia, and rightly so. Many sectors of society are now calling for support to the negotiation, though there is still little consensus on who or how and why. Thus far the primary venue is between the government and the FARC, though the ELN and the paramilitaries are always given lip service as possible participants. Attendees at the workshop, who included academics, civilian government officials and military officers from both the U.S. and Colombia (and presenters from other countries), all agreed that a peace process was a good thing: But there were as many views of the process as there were attendees. Some saw it as a venue for national dialogue on the future of governance; others as a more specific process for negotiating an end to the insurgency; others as a way to study ways to implement existing law. Debate ensued over who should participate, with disagreement on the need for including the disenfranchised electorate, the paramilitary groups, indigenous groups, the drug mafias, or the insurgents. Even the timing of the process could not be agreed to, some claiming that the government needed a stronger bargaining position by defeating those operating outside the law on the battlefield, others pointing out that political (not military) power was a better indicator for deciding on the timing of any peace project.

This last point is one that needs further analysis if it is to be useful to Colombia’s negotiators. In the examples of the Central America peace negotiations, it is useful to review the timing of the negotiations in relation to the battlefield. In the case of El Salvador, the Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) guerrillas’ failed November 1989 offensive to capture San Salvador made it clear that the insurgents could not win the war, just as their acquisition of SA-14 surface-to-air missiles changed the power balance enough to ensure that the government forces could not win either. This power balance made it clear that a negotiated settlement was the only possible resolution to the war. In other words, events on the battlefield decided the timing of the negotiations. The Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua constantly wrote of their willingness and need to achieve military superiority in order to negotiate from a position of strength. In 1988, two years after the U.S. cut funding to the Contras, their continued presence in Nicaragua exacerbated the economy to the point that the Sandinistas recognized their inability to afford a solution on the battlefield. The final solution was to settle the issue through an election, in a sense negotiating by letting the population choose which side had won the war. Again, events on the battlefield dictated when to negotiate. In Guatemala, the negotiations to end the war with the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala (URNG) took place despite the inability of the insurgents to win on the battlefield. By 1985, the government forces had broken the URNG’s military back, and thus saw no need to negotiate a settlement. But the civilian government took the initiative to open negotiations nonetheless in an effort to regain state legitimacy in the international arena. With victory on the battlefield assured, the government felt confident enough to initiate negotiations for its own reasons.

The lessons for the Colombian government are clear: Successful negotiations are best conducted from a position of military strength, with clear objectives and the will to see the process through. The concern for the current process is that the government is negotiating from a position of military ambiguity or weakness, and thus has little to offer the FARC except political legitimacy and an increased political role in the national arena. There is little public knowledge of either side’s agenda or credibility, and the absence of a strong third party "cushion," an international mediator such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Catholic Church, or another country, reduces the credibility of the entire process.

This scenario was thought to have the highest probability of occurring, but a low probability of success, because the current situation is so chaotic. "Muddle through" implies reaching a livable consensus among all the participants, in this case one that keeps the state together. Given that the insurgency currently occupies up to half of the national territory, muddling through may be a buzzword for de jure recognition of the currently de facto partitioning of Colombia. This is not an acceptable long-range solution. President Pastrana’s implementation of a peace process provides evidence that Colombia is not interested in simply muddling through. But because it does not address the symptoms of the country’s instability (drugs, human rights violations, corruption), it is not an acceptable solution for the United States, either. If the negotiations fail, this scenario will be put back on track as the most possible to unfold in Colombia’s future.

This scenario was considered to be feasible within a five to ten year time period. The FARC in fact has a multi-year strategy for this scenario, though its timetable has slipped several times. The Colombian government has helped the timetable by providing an environment of instability that the insurgents have exploited to their advantage, gaining strength in numbers and territory controlled, as well as capabilities to confront the military with larger forces in direct combat.

Should this scenario emerge, Colombia would become a Marxist state, authoritarian in nature. The economy would be statist (and follow Cuba’s lead into ruin), though the legal cultivation, production, and export of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and hash oil would help ameliorate the situation. The economic drop would not be as rapid as happened in Cuba, if only because of the diverse and wealthy advantage Colombia enjoys today.

Relations with the U.S. would be terminated, and U.S. assets possibly seized and nationalized. There would be a massive "purge" of society, most of it voluntary, as people with the means to do so left by the droves prior to and shortly after the FARC take-over.

Governance in Colombia would be unstable for many years. The current power structure is decentralized, and Marxist philosophy (and the FARC) is very centralized. The imposition of centralized power would take time to solidify, as remnants of the military and the paramilitaries fragment and attempt to carve out strongholds of resistance: Violence would increase in the short term if the FARC is unable to root out these groups.

This scenario would be the most damaging for U.S. interests, because the long term impact is one of an intensification of instability and violence. The internal instability (remaining elements of the military and paramilitaries attempting to regain their lost power) would slowly push across the borders; incursions would increase, causing problems with Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama. U.S. assistance would be requested by these states to deal with a strong, belligerent, Colombian FARC government. It is doubtful the FARC would seek to expand its revolution outside of Colombia during the first five years of its existence.

Department of Defense (DOD) involvement would be intense, however, should the U.S. leadership decide to help restore a democratic government in Colombia. It would take a large-scale, lengthy war, preferably with the assistance of Colombia's neighbors, to retake Colombia from the FARC, probably longer than five years duration. The geography, topography, and sheer size of the state would ensure high casualties and a high cost in terms of specialized materiel.

A dirty war scenario was considered one of the most likely for Colombia. The scenario would unfold thus: Unhappy with the increasing violence and instability, the ruling elites (not the government) would bypass the government and seek accommodation with the military and police forces. The security forces would be provided with assurances of a budget and policy strong and broad enough to prosecute a war of extermination against the FARC and ELN, with promises of immunity from prosecution after the fact. The armed forces would then unleash its intelligence units to seek out insurgents and suspected supporters, attack and exterminate all of them, possibly with the assistance or subordination of the existing paramilitary groups into its war plans.

Once the FARC and ELN forces are eliminated, the mission could be expanded to include action against the drug mafias. After a dramatic period of loss of life, the military would then cede the reigns of government to the civilian elites, who would form a new government to capitalize on the new stability. If elements of this scenario sound familiar, one needs only remember the chaos of the Bogotazo and its resolution through the Frente Nacional.

The main problem with this scenario is the violence. The final outcome is one very desirable to the U.S. (e.g., similar to Chile after the initial years of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's rule), though the complete loss of civil liberties would be unacceptable for U.S. policymakers. A major impediment to the implementation of this scenario is the strong tradition in Colombia of the military’s respect for civilian authority and democratic rule: Only once in the past hundred years or so has the military taken over the government. This took place in a scenario very similar to this one, where the ruling elites admitted their failure to stop violence, and asked the military to take power for a short period of time, allowing enough "breathing room" until a civilian solution was found (Gen. Rojas Pinilla's "asumo mando de la nación" coup in 1953-7). The main difference in these two situations is that in 1953 the violence was urban, and now the violence is almost exclusively rural: Few of the ruling elites are specifically involved or affected.

The impact on Colombia in the long term is actually good, if the scenario unfolds as have other such models in Latin America (Chile, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, Colombia). Despite the nastiness of the dirty war, the ruling elites (and this is true especially in the case of Colombia in the 50s) have managed in these cases to put together a system of governance that proved superior to the status quo ante bellum. But it takes a serious decision to cast aside what little rule of law currently exists in Colombia in the hopes of developing the scenario along the guidelines of the models used by other Latin American countries.

The impact of this scenario on the U.S. would be primarily political, depending on the government's reaction (in Colombia and in the U.S.). If Colombia asks for help (troops, materiel, tactical advice, intelligence), DOD may be forced to look the other way on human rights violations. If DOD is authorized to help, the war against the insurgents will intensify in the short run, causing a high level of U.S. casualties (personnel and materiel). However, if this scenario takes place and follows the models mentioned, the U.S. reaction will be to refuse assistance and to sanction or diplomatically alienate Colombia until some point in the future when the end objectives have been achieved. In other words, Colombia would have to recognize that it would have to "go it alone," a prospect made more daunting than experienced elsewhere because of the resources available to the opposing forces.

The most likely scenario to emerge is probably a combination of these four. I have heard from several officers in the Colombian military that they are complaining of the lack of a security policy written by the president. Perhaps this will give the needed push for the current administration to define the role of the military, a critical piece of knowledge needed during the negotiation process. I have heard from several academics and journalists that the military does not have an adequate strategy for conducting the war. Perhaps the recent high command changes will ensure enough talent and initiative is present to develop such a strategy, moving away from reaction toward proactive prosecution of the conflict with the objective of winning the war. My personal recommendation would be to develop a conventional military strategy based on conquering and controlling the country’s infrastructure: Expand the existing riverine combat element program and add an army component to occupy and pacify the areas conquered by the marines. By controlling the rivers, for instance, the military can deny the insurgents (and the drug mafias) their principal means of communication and transportation. Without these, the insurgents will be forced into more conventional military tactics, where they are vulnerable, or into a reversion to conventional guerrilla tactics, where they become more of a nuisance than a threat. Either result is preferable to what exists today in Colombia, and either one makes an ultimate victory by the government more feasible.

But the internal instability in Colombia did not occur overnight. It has developed throughout the country’s history, and most likely will take a long time to resolve. As pointed out several times throughout this collection of presentations, there is an overabundance of diagnosis and recommendations. It is the responsibility of the Colombian government to decide which one is accurate, and which one to implement. Ultimately, which scenario will play out in the future is up to the Colombian electorate, not to the United States or other neighboring countries. Colombia cannot last much longer under the tremendous strain imposed by the multiple actors involved in the current crisis. For this reason I hope that the analysis presented in this book can be of use to policymakers in Colombia, as well as to policymakers in the United States, so that both can develop the best policy, strategy, and methodology to end the security crisis that afflicts the people of Colombia.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002