Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

United States Priorities in Colombia

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United States relations with Colombia are complex, marked by a pursuit of several important priorities, including combating drugs that represent an extraordinary threat to our country; supporting the institutionalization of democracy and the protection of human rights that has been a guiding principle of our policy in Latin America since the late 1970s; responding to the threat of terrorism that is so acute in Colombia; dealing with the abduction and extortion of Americans; and preventing the destabilization of Venezuela, Panamá, and Ecuador by criminality and narcoterrorism. My presentation will review the current state of affairs in Colombia.

U.S. - Colombia relations — and the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Colombia — have been hampered throughout the government of Ernesto Samper, since the earliest revelations that his presidential campaign received substantial support from drug traffickers. The U.S. has found it difficult to tolerate, let alone support in the pursuit of common goals, a government that has been isolated as a virtual pariah in the international community. That same government has been alienated from its own domestic population by virtue of its notorious corruption, rendering it an especially inviting and vulnerable target to armed rebel groups.

This notorious corruption propagates itself. In just recent months, we have witnessed how Colombian political leaders and even the population in general have sought "accommodations" with narcotics traffickers. Politicians have offered up narco-friendly laws — such as the schemes to alleviate prison overcrowding by releasing drug criminals and offering furloughs that are little more than generous vacations to narcotraffickers. Also, we have read recently of how the population of Medellín is getting used to the heirs of Pablo Escobar — accepting them into their midst provided that these criminals mind their manners.

The guerrilla groups that remain active in Colombia today represent the most serious such threat in the Americas, numbering 10,000 to 13,000 men under arms. Since the advent of the 1990s — just as other guerrilla groups in the Hemisphere were on the wane — the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army) have actually been growing.

These groups have benefited from new sources of men and money. Guerrilla recruitment in rural areas has been fueled either by ideological appeals or coercion, opposition to coca eradication (which has emerged as a common cause shared by guerrillas and campesinos), and displacement of one million Colombians by drug activities or political violence. These guerrilla organizations have also come to rely on the illicit profits of narcotrafficking to fuel their activities: Colombian officials estimate that 60 percent of the $450 million that the guerrillas need to subsist is generated by the drug trade.

Recent months have been bleak: We witnessed an unprecedented level of guerrilla violence during the October 1997 elections. There is at least a potential threat to the June 1998 presidential balloting. The guerrillas have carried out record attacks on infrastructure, targeting oil pipelines and hydroelectric facilities. These attacks have raised the ante against Samper in particular and democratic institutions in general, clearly aimed at gaining the upper hand before pursuing any prospective political settlement. Such attacks have also shown new boldness in challenging antidrug efforts; in the last three years, the FARC has attacked antidrug sorties 160 times and killed or wounded hundreds of antidrug police.¹¹⁴ Frankly, in light of the lucrative benefits of making common cause with wealthy drug traffickers, it is questionable whether most, if any, of these guerrillas would lay down their arms (and their share of drug profits) as part of a political settlement.

Paramilitary groups have sprung up throughout conflictive areas in Colombia, existing with at least the tolerance if not the support of Colombia’s security establishment. We understand that many of these groups, now totaling about 5,000 men, were thought to be fighting a common enemy: guerrillas. However, it is clear that many of these paramilitaries are out of control and represent as much a threat to the rule of law (because of both extrajudicial killings and drug trafficking) as the guerrillas and drug traffickers themselves. Like the guerrillas they purport to fight, they have been responsible for gross violations of human rights, targeting not merely guerrillas but peasant noncombatants.

Colombia’s military lacks the resources and training needed to robustly defend the rule of law — particularly when compared to the guerrillas who have tapped the narcotraffickers for funds. About one-half of Colombia’s military is needed for static security, the only task for which this mostly conscript force is adequately prepared. With most of Colombia’s military barely professional, perhaps no more than one-fifth of its armed forces have the training, equipment, and experience to be considered "combat-ready." Moreover, it is fairly apparent that Colombia’s high command has no strategy for dealing with the stepped-up guerrilla threat.

In recent months, Colombia’s military has suffered a series of humiliating defeats. Just two examples are the forced demilitarization of Caquetá last June and the recent murderous attack at El Billar, in which the elite Brigade 3 suffered eighty dead and twenty-seven captured. At its very best, the Colombian military might manage to contain or control the guerrilla threat — defeating it outright is out of the question. Last March, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command told Congress, "The performance of the Colombian military to date provides little cause for optimism that they will be able to reverse the erosion of government control."

While the popular moniker "narcoterrorist" may overstate the relationship between the guerrillas and drug traffickers, it is clear that a symbiotic tie exists between these illegal groups. In terms of funding, arms, geography, and political interests, the guerrillas and narcotraffickers are, at the very least, concentric circles. It is in our interest to help Colombians fight the traffickers, but it is understandable that American policymakers blanch at the thought of taking sides in a bloody domestic struggle. Granted, the lessons of Vietnam are fresh in our minds, but I simply must insist that U.S. policy planners should be able to find a middle ground between the inadequate level of support we are lending Colombia today and "another Vietnam." Remember, too, that Colombians are no more interested in being our next "El Salvador" than we are in having them as the next Vietnam.

One thing is clear: the U.S. has been and is still today trying to fight the drug war "on the cheap." The aircraft that we are providing in fits and starts (such as UH1H "Hueys") are older than the Colombians who are flying them. Today, those Hueys are grounded. If and when we get them flying again, the State Department proposes to "upgrade" them rather than giving Colombians the (UH-60) Blackhawks that many in Congress believe they should have.

The upcoming presidential elections represent an important opportunity for Colombians to begin to put their own house in order. A new government will enter office with new legitimacy, on a stronger footing to prosecute a settlement, both through military pressure — so that the government is dealing from a position of strength — and through a political dialogue. Moreover, I believe that U.S. and international support will be more forthcoming after a new president takes power. In particular, I believe a new government will be able to appeal for multilateral support for its efforts to restore the rule of law.

Let me be clear that the U.S. government is absolutely impartial in these elections. It is up to Colombians alone to choose. However, it is fair to observe that Colombian commentators believe that Horacio Serpa represents continuismo. If he were to win — seeming to continue the Samper era — Colombia will continue to be isolated and remain in a downward spiral. If Andres Pastrana wins, he will be well-advised to form something akin to a government of national salvation drawn from all sectors of Colombia’s political class.

Regardless of who wins, I predict a fresh state in U.S.-Colombian relations. This is predictable due to the extraordinarily compelling U.S. interests that are at stake in Colombia. Moreover, I believe that the intense congressional pressure that we have seen in the last several years will drive the Clinton administration to find opportunities to intensify our cooperation with Colombia against common threats. For example, I believe that Colombia may receive new forms of military training and equipment in the new year. This is certainly consistent with congressional wishes, but in designing and advocating this additional support, the administration must lead.

Let me conclude with several comments about human rights, which is an issue that has been front and center in the debate over supporting Colombia. Whether discussing the records of the military, paramilitary, or guerrillas, it is too easy to find examples of abuses. This pattern of abuse has created a climate of impunity that represents a threat to every Colombian alive, in every walk of life.

We cannot ignore or neglect condemning the abuses of irregular forces. But the military — a representative of the power of the state, a professional institution, and defender of the rule of law — must go the extra mile to clean up its ranks. Let me say, however, that our policy should not be crippled (as it has been in the last year) by a bureaucratic "lawyering" that has blocked material support to security forces over human rights concerns. We should take great care in the fastidious judgments we make in the name of defending human rights, lest we consign Colombia to a state of anarchy in which no one has human rights.

The situation in Colombia is bleak but not hopeless. The upcoming elections represent a new beginning and new opportunities. It is in our interest to work with those courageous Colombians — the vast majority of that country — who are willing to fight with us against the common enemies of lawlessness and anarchy.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002