Crisis? What Crisis? Security
Issues in Colombia
Crisis? What Crisis? Security
Issues in Colombia
Workshop Session
Moderators: James L. Zackrison and Dan D. Darrach
We’ve heard analysis of many aspects of the problems afflicting Colombia, and it’s now time to work on solutions. We have available a wide range of options, from doing nothing, to President Samper’s statement that Colombia needs assistance from no one, to General Bonett’s comment that he would accept even atomic bombs from the U.S.
There are several points of analysis worth summarizing prior to beginning discussion on options available for both the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the Colombian Ministry of Defense (MOD). These include, in no particular order and without value judgment attached:
An earlier presentation provided a long list of U.S. policy objectives for Colombia. Another presentation summarized those interests in terms of the four Ds (democracy, development, drugs, and derechos humanos) which is a good way of thinking about it. The most important need, probably because it is a national preoccupation, is the need for a sound policy on drugs. This is just an idea on how to understand how the U.S. government thinks.
We’ve also been given the sense in some of the presentations when we talk about US government policies that the U.S. is monolithic. It is not. It is far from monolithic. We saw some evidence of that during an earlier question-and-answer session in a little disagreement between the representatives from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Congress over a detail of policy. In dealing with Colombia, it must be remembered that there is a long list of agencies and issues that must reach consensus or at least approval before policy can become public. There is a lot of talk about an interagency process within the government that brings together all the different agencies. For instance, the ONDCP focuses on drug issues; the Department of State works with diplomatic initiatives, human rights, drugs, military assistance, governance; the DOD deals primarily with security and intelligence issues and also drugs and human rights; the Department of Commerce focuses on economic issues; the Department of Justice deals with drugs, crime, and money laundering; Congress reviews all issues and focuses on the financing and application of programs (e.g., certification). There are innumerable other agencies with international components and interests in Colombia. The impression is given that consensus can be achieved on specific policy, but this impression is not accurate. It must also be taken into account that Congress may react to any issue, as will non-governmental organizations, especially in cases as complicated as Colombia, and then everyone has to start over to find policy consensus under new conditions or limits. In many situations (particularly human rights issues), government analysts must think of the policies or recommendations and how to sell these policies to the affected agencies, groups, or states. In many cases, it is impossible to predict how the National Security Council, the White House, or other interested parties will react to specific proposals. So it’s simply not possible to try to speak with one voice, despite all attempts to coordinate policy throughout the U.S. government.
Having said that, however, this workshop must remain within the limits of the National Defense University (NDU) and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) charter of working for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and support the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Thus, what this workshop is looking for today is suggestions from the participants on what DOD can do within the interagency process to assist Colombia in resolving the problems of instability outlined in great detail during the past two days. What kinds of policies should DOD try to push in these areas, particularly in the areas of security policy and counternarcotics policy, and what can it do in terms of military support for Colombia?
With these comments in mind, the session is open for discussion.
COMMENT: Among the preliminary conclusions presented, there is one missing, and that is the issue of a military victory. It is quite possible that militarily, this is not a winnable thing. And I think that for many of the conclusions that one must draw, for security issues or for combating drug production or reaching any agreement with the parties to the conflict, that must be a very important piece of the puzzle. I don’t perceive that there has been agreement on that idea that a military victory in Colombia is or is not possible. Is it even a requirement that one side of the conflict achieve military superiority in order to force the other to the negotiating table? I think there has been disagreement about this issue and whether it is a useful idea to extend the conflict any further in search of such military superiority.
COMMENT: I would like to follow up on that idea, because the key point is that one way of analyzing the security dilemma, based on the discussions we’ve heard over the past day and a half, is to focus on the peace process as a starting point for the discussion. It would be good for the purposes of discussion to question the validity of some of the assumptions of this workshop. For instance, is a military success required for a solution to Colombia’s ills? Is it possible to reach consensus among the different actors? Focusing on the idea of a peace process as a general methodology, I’d like to emphasize several points, provided in no particular order:
QUESTION: It seems that the workshop discussion presupposes that the FARC is willing to negotiate. But I’ve also received the impression that the FARC is in a position of power and has no need to negotiate, is comfortable with its current situation. Other guerrilla movements have negotiated with the government with short-term success, but their long-term situation was not very favorable. I don’t see the FARC in that position now, in terms of having more to gain from the negotiating table as opposed to fighting in the jungle. Given this situation, how does Colombia test the insurgents’ agenda?
ANSWER: There is a little evidence that the FARC wishes to negotiate. However, the International Red Cross has good access to the lower ranks of the FARC, with about seventy fronts, as well as with three or four National Liberation Army (ELN) fronts, for humanitarian operations. There is no contact at the secretariat level, which is in some kind of autistic mode, not coming out to talk with international organizations or declaring much. It appears from this low-level contact that the insurgents give the impression of willingness to negotiate. However, the examples of El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, and Guatemala are not applicable, because there is no willingness to surrender their arms in exchange for land or money and then disappear into society. It appears that the insurgents in Colombia are in favor of a lengthy negotiation process or a lengthy dialogue, in order to gain a platform for political legitimization and push the agenda of social reform in Colombia. Specific issues the insurgents would be willing to push in the Colombian agenda include social changes such as democratic issues of representation, agrarian reform, and the exploitation of natural resources.
The insurgents expect this dialogue to last a very long time: They are sort of in a ten-year mode of thinking and cannot be expected to lay down their weapons before that time is up. The key issue is how to start the negotiations, keeping in mind that they have a very hardline position of unwillingness to leave Colombia for a neutral location. This issue reinforces their autistic mode and makes them less amenable to international pressure. It will take a lot of pressure to talk them down from the mountains. Also, the insurgents demand the demilitarization of large areas of Colombia, which, although it does not in international law mean abandoning sovereignty if it is for the purpose of starting a peace negotiation, is unacceptable to Colombia. Again, the key is what methodology is useful in starting the dialogue. Just getting them to talk would be a great achievement, in getting the insurgents open to the outside world (which includes their own countrymen). There is no credible way to get the guerrillas to change their perception of their own power, whether the government strengthens the armed forces or not.
QUESTION: Who needs to start that negotiation? Would that be the military or would that be the civilians?
ANSWER: The civilian government needs to start, manage, and conclude the negotiations.
COMMENT: I have two simple concepts to present. I think this workshop has already brought out something very important, and that is the idea of a national, integrated plan. This plan should be part of the peace process. My second point is that, although covered superficially throughout this workshop, the worst problem facing Colombia is one of the agents of violence, and I’m talking about impunity. The government has made some efforts to reform the justice system, but these efforts served simply to increase the number of judges, which increased the cost by some 500 to 800 percent. Nevertheless, it is painful to report that despite this statistic, only one conviction has resulted from this tremendous cost. These two points should be included in the final report of this workshop, because they are critical to understanding the problems of violence and instability in Colombia.
COMMENT: My first comment is that the solution to the conflict is not totally the responsibility of the state. Society must provide the support for any solution proposed. But I think there are some structural changes required of the government, as part of the solution. My second point is that the structure of the security and defense sectors needs to be strengthened. I do not wish to point fingers or discuss specifics, but the reality is that Colombia has passed through a period of security limbo. There are organs and security institutions that are obligated by the constitution to provide the principal and second-level documents related to national security. These documents are required to define the strategies for managing the conflict in an integrated manner, and these issues need to be strengthened. They need to work, to engage the military tactics currently in existence at the lower levels with the national level strategies.
My third point is that Colombia needs to engage its legislation to support the war effort. Existing legislation was written for a country at peace and needs to be adapted to the reality of the war effort. If the insurgents do not have a strategy of seeking negotiation, the military must have in place a vision based on the strategy of containment through sustained offensive actions to achieve one of two things: weaken or subject them. To do this the force structure needs to be strengthened dramatically.
The government needs to prioritize its war effort. There needs to be a process of planned escalation in place. I do not have the solutions required, and I’m not sure there’s one single solution to Colombia’s conflict, though this workshop has gathered enough talent that I think we can propose successful solutions. But I’m willing to outline a series of ideas that can be used to develop this planned escalation. First, there needs to be some way to humanize the conflict. By that I mean increased emphasis on respect for human rights and the conventions on waging war. This could be a first step in reducing the level of the conflict, by suspending the use of terrorist acts that not only affect the economic structure, but also do irreversible damage to the ecology, the environment, and the territorial biodiversity of Colombia. A second step would be rejecting the use of the illegal drug business as a source of funding, making a strong declaration repudiating the use of drugs. I suggest strengthening the culture of human rights, developing a culture of peace.
There is a need to conduct an evaluation of the role of the National Police in counterdrug projects, as opposed to the increasing involvement of the armed forces. We should not forget that the business of illegal drugs is a chain composed of many links, and not all these links can be found in Colombia. Many can be found in the U.S., Europe, and other countries, which means that the solution to the problem of illegal drugs is an integrated, multilateral one. The counterdrug mission must be conducted at the lowest possible level of citizen security in Colombia. This morning we heard the statistic that of the 30,000 murders conducted annually in Colombia, less than 10 percent are a result of the conflict involving the private justice and insurgent forces. This means that there is a complete lack of peaceful coexistence in Colombia. There should be a great effort to increase the climate of peace and coexistence among the citizens of the country.
These are several ideas that could be used to analyze the problem of pacifying Colombia. This analysis perhaps does not have the final answers but could be a starting point for reducing the level of violence.
COMMENT: With all due respect, I’d like to make a short recommendation on that topic, and it involves accountability and responsibility. There is a vicious circle of recrimination in Colombia, but everyone pointing their finger at everyone else forgets that this gesture leaves at least three fingers pointing back at the accuser. Something must be done to stop this circle of recrimination, because it endangers the public safety by polarizing society and leaves the impression internationally of an uncertain, confused, and violent society.
COMMENT: It is important to be careful when discussing the concept of political warfare, because this has caused Colombia lots of problems when dealing with the insurgents. Political warfare involves an integral, complete action, composed of propaganda, psychological operations, administration, management of non-governmental organizations, and other operations carried out in a premeditated manner to obtain specific outcomes. This concept of action should be supported by diplomacy outside the country, monitoring insurgent movement and activities. Its impact is echoed throughout the civil society, so it must be carried out objectively, with a complete understanding of the problems confronted by the states. I mention this because the view from behind a desk in Washington is dramatically different from the social reality in the Caquetá or Putumayo regions. It is imperative to visit the affected regions to fully understand the problems.
My final comment is that the Colombian state requires support. Sometimes I hear debates over the need for assistance or support. I believe that in many cases the material assistance is not as important as the moral support, because wars are not always won or lost on the battlefield, but rather in the minds of people. The process of material modernization and reorganization of the public safety forces is important and must be continued so that leaders can define the roles and missions of the military and police forces both now and in the future. The commanding general has defined these roles as those of a citizen soldier. This sounds a bit utopian, an unachievable dream, but some day the Colombian soldier must become a defender of the institutional continuity, of the consolidation of democracy in Colombia. Through the mechanisms available to Colombia, it is important to encourage the development of such a defense strategy to work for peace.
COMMENT: I agree that it is important to modernize the public security forces. No one can argue with that. But what methodology must be used? This is a serious question. For instance, this morning we heard a suggestion that the national defense budget should be increased. Why? As currently organized, the armed forces have a large budget, one that was increased by Samper and later cut without affecting the operations very much. That indicates a lack of capability to absorb budgetary increases, and it also indicates a lack of efficiency in expending the current budget. There must be specific recommendations for military reform, not just abstract suggestions such as "reform the military structure." Does the high command require modernized equipment to better carry out a strategy of combating the insurgents? Or does the reform involve more abstract concepts such as developing the culture of peace? What does that mean? I’ve also heard comments about developing legislation for a wartime stance. What specifically does that mean? I’m acquainted with this kind of jargon, and that phrase usually means granting the military functions such as those given to the judicial police, giving them arrest authority. But there are so many contradictions and different points of view that it is almost impossible to appreciate the magnitude of the problem. Thus far in studying the Colombian armed forces, I’ve not discovered a logical methodology for developing long-range plans or strategies. What is the methodology for changing policies? Is it necessary to increase the defense budget to change strategies and policies?
The armed forces cannot win the war as they are currently organized. It is a requirement to foresee the structure required to win the war before attempting to develop a culture of peace. Reorganization is required, because the current force structure is not efficiently conducting the war. Military leaders must demonstrate that they can use their current budget efficiently before asking for increased funds.
COMMENT: I’m following orders and offering advice to two countries, neither of which I’m a citizen of, though I’m not sure on whose policy we’re meant to be advising. So I’m going to start of by giving advice to the United States. My first piece of advice is to calm down a bit, and my second piece of advice is to be less absolute. In listening to some very interesting papers and comments during this workshop, I did think that people were a bit absolute on two subjects: One was the apparent total absence of strategy, and the other was the issue of democracy. Colombia has had four years of hazy disarray, though that doesn’t mean there has been an elaboration, positive development, or recoverable things during that time. There has been at certain times a sense of direction and a sense of momentum and a sense of analytical capacity, which leaves much to be recovered. Thus, there is much less strategy than one would like, certainly, but it isn’t quite such an absolute absence of civilian guidance to the military.
One speaker this morning recommended that one had to somehow install liberal democracy in Colombia, as if it did not exist already. Now certainly what is around is imperfect, by which I’m referring to the subject of accountability in terms of having worked for a long time with the Colombian government, with which I’m probably understandably frustrated from time to time. It does seem to me that democracy is something not entirely absent either. And I think that these absolutist judgments are not a good thing when one is thinking in terms of the sort of policy that the United States ought to have vis-à-vis Colombia, as well as the sort of influence that it should perhaps seek to exert. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for instance, had a justice program, and I don’t think its effect in Colombia was fully evaluated. So I think that the recommendations ought to be based on analysis that’s a little less absolute and a perhaps a little less pessimistic in its judgments of the Colombian scenario.
My third recommendation is a human rights policy conceived in a way that will actually decrease the number of human rights abuses, rather than one that looks better than the effects it has. And that, I feel, is a high-priority problem and something to which a good deal of thought has to be given. One of the speakers concluded that the answer to Colombia’s governance crisis was not in an increase to the firepower of the Colombian government, which is not a very precise phrase to analyze what should be in human rights terms a justifiable policy vis-à-vis the Colombian armed forces. Rather, that implies institutional improvement, institutional strengthening, rather than disengagement. I don’t entirely disagree with the idea that a military conflict can be won. But it does leave an awful lot unsaid about what remains to be done militarily or what a clear policy should be vis-à-vis the Colombian armed forces. I’m not a soldier but I imagine that even for an army to stay still in one place is actually a rather complicated act. These are dynamic circumstances. For example, should the Colombian army try to contain the guerrillas, to beat them? Well, how do you do that? That in itself is a complicated problem, because containment doesn’t mean just standing still and being there. Containment is something that requires more of a dynamic to do it properly, more resources than have been dedicated to it, certainly more brainpower than has been dedicated to it by civilians in recent years. So I think that this is a complicated military problem.
My fourth observation is on the internationalization of things and the possible role of outside countries including, and perhaps particularly, the United States. One rarely gets a chance to address this topic in this Olympic fashion before two large nations, and thus my advice to Colombia and to the United States is to take great care. I’ve noticed recently a very marked tendency to think that the outside world is prone to take up these problems, that it has solutions to them, and that the increase in the number of international players is something thoroughly positive. It could be something thoroughly confusing and something similar to Vietnam (but we must keep our sense of proportion in making this comparison), the United States may find itself involved in a diplomatic bog with unforeseen complications. I am reluctant to go back to the days of the Alliance for Progress, during which lots of people came to Colombia from Wisconsin and recommended that Colombia be turned into some tropical version of Wisconsin. This is not a wise procedure, and it is one I think will eventually become very conflictive, because it will increase the local expectation that somehow the rest for the world is about to provide resources, men on the ground to resolve the conflict. I don’t think it is at all likely that the United States will commit, for example, ground troops in Colombia. But many Colombians think, some with apprehension and some with delight, that this might occur.
One of the speakers stated that this is a conflict about land, and it has conflicts about land, though not very many. This conflict goes back to the reading of FARC demands, which I read with an interest verging on boredom, because I’m interested in why they picked that particular list of demands. A great many the FARC’s demands arise out of the conflict itself: The demands directed against the armed forces for a redesigning of the country’s security policies, for instance, which in the absence of a conflict would be irrelevant. The difficulty is that the perception remains that some agenda points are not serious and can be easily accomplished, which in turn leaves the perception of a lack of commitment, momentum, and impetus to work toward a resolution. I’m not quite sure how genuinely negotiable these situations are, because these are still very vague concepts and still have to be sold to the rest of the country, which may be disinclined to accept.
COMMENT: It is important to remember that the Colombian military is primarily organized in a defensive posture. To win the war, this institution must be able to develop capabilities based on concrete action plans fully supported by the civilian government. A comprehensive strategy or policy that can be developed from the top down in a prioritized manner is required. Plans must be transformed into action at some point, and this is not an easy transition. A differentiation must be made between what is specifically tactical planning and therefore tactically achievable, and what is national strategy or international strategy. Perhaps, I think, the most difficult of these proposals to put into action is obtaining support and political commitment from the civilian authorities and the population in general. From my point of view, the most important contribution possible is the answer to the question of how the armed forces could achieve such a commitment, so they can develop strategies and tactics to win the war or at least contain the insurgents until a negotiation process yields results.
COMMENT: I totally agree with our luncheon speaker’s comments on the existence of a national security strategy or even a comprehensive national strategy. It is absurd that one does not exist, given the high number of different agencies, all working on their own doing their own thing. Many have an impact on the efforts to pacify or reduce the violence, but none are working in a coordinated fashion. It is ridiculous to consider a reform or modernization process without first defining the purpose of the effort. Is it to win the war, or to contain the insurgency, or something else? Without such a policy, it is even impossible to decide if the budget is excessive or too low, let alone allocate resources to effectively combat these factors that generate violence.
COMMENT: I’d like to add to my earlier comment about the FARC’s willingness to negotiate. I would not try to imply that it is not willing to negotiate, but rather that it doesn’t see the need for negotiation. From everything I’ve heard and seen and read, it would seem that the FARC is quite happy with its current situation: It controls its own territory, it makes a lot of money, it has the initiative. There may be a desire to end this whole thing through a negotiated peace process, but I do not see anything that encourages it to even go to the negotiating table with the Colombian government. For that to happen there probably has to be an entire change in the strategic operational situation first. Then the FARC might find it in its interest to negotiate a settlement.
COMMENT: One of the problems with this type of conversation is the volume of speculation or extrapolation on the basis of written documents of what the guerrilla movement wants or thinks or has as its objectives. One of the lessons learned very clearly from the peace process in El Salvador, and one applied directly to the Guatemala peace talks, is that the channels of communication supposedly in existence between the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) insurgents and the government through intermediaries were not as open and as fluid as originally believed. This led to a lot of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. I think this problem was corrected early on in the Guatemalan process by establishing a direct contact with the Unión Nacional Revolucionaria de Guatemala (UNRG), not in the sense of legitimizing it or conveying any sense of status, but simply to facilitate the process of negotiations, making a direct contact to increase the flow of information. I’ve raised this issue before in reference to the Colombian guerrillas, and I understand that there are very deep passions about the number of U.S. citizens kidnapped by the FARC, as well as the number of people who are still missing. My question, and this is simply a question to consider, is whether that situation should play a determining role in the U.S. position vis-à-vis the guerrilla forces including the period leading up to a negotiation or in the event that there are actual talks.
QUESTION: Under current U.S. law, have the FARC and ELN been listed as terrorist organizations? Can the U.S. government even talk to them?
ANSWER: The U.S. State Department can talk to these two groups. It cannot do anything else, such as advise anyone to deal with them or give them a visa to come to the U.S. But it can talk. This not a Colombia-specific policy: This is a standard policy toward terrorist groups engaged in what is viewed as systematic threats against U.S. citizens abroad. I know we’re talking about Colombia in this workshop, but it is a general policy across the board that the U.S. government would only talk to them about our American citizens who they kidnap or kill or don’t account for.
COMMENT: The problem with this policy is the potential to paint yourself into a corner, because in the last few weeks the FARC has explicitly declared that it has no information about the kidnapped missionaries. That may or may not be the truth. How do you know whether it is the truth or not? What passes for evidence? If it is the truth, does the lack of freeing hostages or turning up bodies prevent the government from having some kind of dialogue?
COMMENT: In looking at U.S. policy discussions, I always keep in mind two very pertinent slogans that I’d like to repeat. One is a very wise one I saw in the office of a colleague at Quantico (Virginia), which proclaims that the success of a rain dance depends greatly on timing. There is a sense in this country that a lot of what we do is rain dancing. Our ability to influence things in a basic way is highly limited. It has become quite clear that very much depends on actions taken by the Colombians and that, while we can encourage and discourage, the ultimate responsibility for resolving Colombia’s instability lies in Bogotá. I think that’s the very first thing to keep in mind. The second thing that comes to mind is the Hippocratic oath: Above all else do no harm. The U.S. has a great capacity in our struggle to often do the wrong thing or send the wrong message. We should have learned long ago the delicate balance between providing support and encouragement and promoting dependency. This is a line the U.S. has to be incredibly careful about crossing, partly because of the variations in U.S. policy from moment to moment and crisis to crisis. There are times in which having opened a pipeline, having assured people of aid and then suddenly suspending it for whatever domestic political reason, there has been a more negative effect than if there had never been any U.S. involvement. We’re back to the above motto: Do no harm.
But the U.S. needs to take a very long-range approach in Colombia. This is a problem with profound historical roots. It is not one that has -- as has been quite clearly indicated in this workshop -- any quick solution. And there is a little bit more that can be learned from the Guatemalan process, which took years of discussing issue after issue after issue after issue, and the great frustration of that may have been the only way to deal with the problem. So there are two close lessons that can be learned: First, get a much clearer dialogue within the U.S. policy community about what on earth the situation is in terms of U.S. interests. This workshop has been a very good beginning to coming to grips with U.S. interests. Second, the U.S. policy community needs to avoid doing what I call "watching the birdie" -- getting all tied up in arguments about what kind of helicopter to provide to Colombia. That is not going to resolve the situation in Colombia, because it is not the prime or fundamental issue. Arguing about the type of hardware to provide before agreeing on the mission is not going to resolve anything. So I think the U.S. needs to make very clear first of all, its fundamental objective. Decide what it is the U.S. can do and, equally important, what it cannot do. And what is it that the Colombians must themselves do first? That to me is the place to begin.
Second, in terms of objectives, I have some slight disagreement with something that was said earlier in this discussion. It is possible to influence the guerrillas’ perceptions of their options. You can influence certain groups’ perceptions of their support, of their ability to recruit, of their perception of your will. And these are the sorts of things that the U.S. can perhaps encourage. The U.S. can help train the trainers in Colombia for certain missions without ever exaggerating the roles. It’s going to be a long-range conflict. It’s going to require a commitment by the Colombian state. One of the best things stated here is that there must be some sense of administration of justice. Colombia must have some positive presence of state at the local level before it can even begin to talk about turning around the perception of the guerrillas that they even have a role. There are situations that have no military solution: These require an integrated effort on the social front.
Finally, obviously the U.S. must recognize and accept that there are other countries that are deeply concerned, such as the countries that border on Colombia. These countries have legitimate concerns, and they also need to be included in all discussions of how the international community approaches the situation, rather than making it predominantly a unilateral U.S. approach, which, as I stated before, may in some ways do more harm than good.
COMMENT: The policy from Washington has been one of combating drugs, regardless of its impact on internal stability in Colombia. But there have also been contradictory messages. At the very least, there is that impression of a lack of consensus, based on the scheduling of a workshop dealing with domestic stability in Colombia with the possibility of discussing foreign intervention sponsored by the Department of Defense and another conference in Cartagena sponsored by the Department of State discussing the peace process. As it turned out, I was invited to join either the hawks in Washington or the doves in Cartagena. At the very least, I suggest that one of the conclusions of this workshop should be a search for consensus within Washington on U.S. policy toward Colombia. Without such consensus, it is impossible not to speculate about Washington’s intentions, and that almost always has negative results. Colombia will continue being the center of a reform effort very isolated from the region, because of the peculiarity of its situation. My second suggestion for this workshop is a recommendation to accept the political decisions being made in Bogotá, seeking a pragmatic relationship to reduce the appearance of a confrontational style of diplomacy. This confrontation makes a solution to the domestic instability much more difficult.
We’ve also heard the assessment that the negotiation process should be thought of in terms of a ten-year schedule. I don’t think Colombia can last for another decade in the condition it is in currently. There must be an increase in military capability, a strengthening of military power, to limit the growth of the insurgents. There must be a complete reform of the military, if possible linked to an increase in the operating budget, requiring specific results of the institution. The armed forces must substantially improve its performance on human rights issues, must clearly distance itself from the paramilitary groups, and should sanction all its members who are playing with fire, as it were, involved with these paramilitary groups. There should be an increase in the operating budget of the armed forces, but it should be tied to specific goals.
An important point to consider is that of the role of relations with the neighboring countries. Colombia must coexist with its neighbors and seek their assistance in resolving the domestic problem. I’m talking about a Group of Friends offering their good offices, as was the case presented yesterday about El Salvador and Guatemala and their experience in the peace process.
And finally, I believe there does not exist in Colombia a long-range development policy. This is most evident in the lack of justice. Such a policy is clearly required for all the instruments of national power to work together -- justice, prosecutors, police, military, all of them. There needs to be a policy on justice before anyone can effectively deal with the violence that is the subject of this workshop.
COMMENT: I have one very quick observation in terms of policy options. I think one of the things the U.S. needs to do is retain its options before choosing them. Two incidents come to mind where the U.S. has lost its option to act to a greater degree than needed: The Helms-Burton law and the U.S. policy toward Guatemala following Jennifer Harbury’s intervention. In considering what the U.S. needs to do, it must be prepared to react very quickly and effectively to these types of influences, which become very powerful in influencing U.S. foreign policy and restricting U.S. options.
COMMENT: Any integrated national plan to resolve any conflict must include a peace process. But more important and basic to the situation in Colombia is that the government needs to address the issue of impunity. And I’m not just talking about impunity by the military. I’m referring to the fact that there’s too much impunity by too many groups and individuals in Colombia. Part of the reason for the current instability is that only one in six criminal cases ever goes to trial. This is an appalling situation. It points to a complete lack of consensus on what Colombia is, on what the Colombian government should do. No one can depend on anyone in Colombia for anything.
In these terms, I’d like to make four points: First, the solution to the crisis is not necessarily a military one. A peace process can work to resolve the instability through a national dialogue leading to consensus on governance. But before any peace process -- and this is my second point -- the security structure of the government needs to be strengthened. The civilian government needs to write the basic documents of national strategy, on which the military can then base its strategy, budget, and tactics. Third, the government needs to pass legislation appropriate for times of conflict not just appropriate for times of peace. Much of the legislation being passed either ignores the conflict, or assumes that another institution is responsible for dealing with the problem. Legislation cannot operate in a policy vacuum, it must be based on reality. Fourth, the government needs a plan of action, a vision, on which it can act to contain the insurgents. It is necessary prior to any peace process to contain the guerrillas, to limit their military strength and thus improve the negotiating power of the government. And I think this plan needs to address modernizing the military, because one good and necessary way to strengthen the armed forces is to provide it with the proper equipment to adequately prosecute the war against the guerrillas. Few disagree with this fact, though there is little consensus on just what it means to modernize the military. There are many definitions, such as increasing the budget and reforming the force structure. But basic to any modernization is making the forces adequate and efficient to carry out the conflict, to develop a culture of peace. This does not mean reform will take place simply because the budget was increased or the military was given arrest authority, which is not a good idea to begin with.
COMMENT: Colombia lacks justice, in terms of physical safety. There is a vicious cycle of recrimination and finger-pointing that assumes no responsibility and never resolves anything. But we must be careful in applying the concept of political warfare. General Bonett includes in his policy the concept of the citizen soldier. Such symbolism is required to increase the support from and for the National Peace Commission, and thus the idea of a culture of peace is good and required for a successful peace project. But this does not mean a commitment to combat and war; military efficiency is required now to convince the FARC that it cannot win militarily. Objectivity is required, but this cannot be adequately provided from the distance of Washington, D.C. Material assistance is required, but the symbolism of support from Washington is almost as important. A priority for the government of Colombia is to stop the degradation of government influence. This means humanizing the conflict by improving the record on human rights, stopping terrorist actions (by both sides), getting the FARC to reject drug trafficking, and strengthening the culture of human rights and peace.
COMMENT: This workshop needs to recommend a study of the role of the police in the drug business. This business is like a chain, with many links outside of Colombia, and thus it cannot be stopped by Colombia. Counterdrug policies must be internationalized.
COMMENT: For Colombia to achieve any results, it is necessary to delineate all options. In other words, the solutions must respond to threats, or nothing will come of any talks. Is there a need to negotiate with the insurgents? The first priority is to change the strategic balance in favor of the government. But who will use the list of options? How will the list be prioritized? It will take another conference just to prioritize the list on the agenda. This will result in at least a consensus on the issues. Colombia needs to organize an interagency coordination process, because there are too many agencies involved with overlapping responsibilities.
COMMENT: Three years ago, U.S. diplomats stated publicly that drugs are the most important issue, regardless of the consequences. Now, the U.S. is changing that concern toward stability and governance. On that theme, I offer the following five comments. First, U.S. policy is not consistent, which hurts Colombia’s options. Second, the U.S. must deal with Colombian politicians without prejudice, regardless of personal feelings. Third, we’ve heard that the insurgents have indicated a preference for a long-term (ten-year) negotiation process. Colombia cannot last that long, which indicates a need to strengthen the military capabilities despite the concerns for human rights issues. For this to work, point four, Colombia needs support from the international community, from formal groupings such as the United Nations (U.N.) and Organization of American States (OAS), and from informal groups such as the Friends of Colombia. And finally, fifth, there is no long-range policy planning on justice in Colombia. Colombia needs to write a unified justice policy that incorporates all aspects of the issue.
COMMENT: There seems to be some unanswered, lingering question among my fellow workshop members I may be able to clarify, if you don’t mind. First, there’s a good article in the newspaper on the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) project, which I think gives a pretty good understanding of what the U.S. government is trying to do.115 In terms of defending this conference today, I don’t think it’s necessary to think of the U.S. government in terms of, for the lack of a better word, a sort of diplomatic schizophrenia. It’s not necessary to think that the Department of Defense has an agenda it’s pushing, or that the Department of State has an agenda of its own, simply because there’s a meeting on the peace process concurrently in Cartagena while we’re attending a workshop on security issues in Washington. In fact I would argue that the U.S. government can in fact walk and chew gum at the same time. It can in fact demonstrate concern about the security situation in Colombia and at the same time demonstrate interest in a viable and credible peace process in Colombia. These are not mutually exclusive; this is not diplomatic schizophrenia. Diplomatic schizophrenia in U.S. policy toward Colombia is a good title, but I don’t think it describes reality. I also don’t see a major split between the efforts of the Department of Defense and the Department of State in terms of interests in the peace process and concerns over the security situation. In fact, I would suggest we view them as links.
I would like to make it very clear that in terms of what we could call enhanced engagement, it is extremely clear that the marching orders throughout Washington dictate evenhanded measures and an evenhanded approach toward all the leading presidential candidates in the current electoral campaign in Colombia. I have been assured, off the record, by a number of Colombians that Harold Bedoya is my man; I’ve been told by other people that Horacio Serpa is our man because he’s tough and can negotiate with the insurgents in a way that Andres Pastrana cannot. And I’ve been told by others that Pastrana is the person the U.S. should be supporting. My answer to all these comments is that the U.S. will deal with and respect whoever the Colombian people elect to take over in August. Period. The U.S. had a uniquely bad problem with the presidency of Samper. God forbid that any one of us should spend our time in government service dealing with that kind of problem again. It was not helpful in the bilateral relationship. There’s a full plate of issues, concerns, and problems, and Colombia has enough problems without the U.S. becoming an additional problem during the elections.
COMMENT: The best way the U.S. can help it in terms of overall policy objectives is to state that it believes in democracy in Colombia. In terms of U.S. policy toward dealing with the FARC is a statement posted on the State Department home page on the Internet, which is the first U.S. appeal to the FARC to provide information on the whereabouts of the New Tribes missionaries.116 The U.S. knows the FARC did it: The intelligence is in hand; there is a smoking gun. The State Department knows the FARC kidnapped these folks in Panamá and will continue to press the FARC to account for the whereabouts of the missing New Tribes missionaries. The fact is that the FARC has replied, I think three times, implies that it is starting to feel a little bit of the diplomatic pressure being exerting on it, not just in terms of public press statements but also in terms of the State Department’s work with other governments.
COMMENT: I’ll just reiterate some comments made earlier but before I do, I want to say that I appreciate the breadth of discussion that we’ve experienced in this workshop. Many times I’m asked about issues that are beyond my expertise, outside of the realm of security, and it was refreshing to hear the discussion that this isn’t just a military issue, it is not just a tactical issue. The solutions presented involve socioeconomic problems, administration of justice, and other factors that play into the whole question of security. I’d like to point out that the U.S. Southern Command contribution to helping Colombia is limited in ways, as mentioned earlier, to training the trainer. The U.S. armed forces can contribute if the Colombian armed forces request assistance in modernization or training, which is a small role given the complexity of this issue.
COMMENT: It seems that throughout this discussion of the topic of instability, options for Bogotá and Washington, the Ministry of Defense and the Department of Defense, that we have forgotten the principal actor in the region of greatest conflict: el campesino, the peasant. Where is the campesino? He lives in a region where there is nothing: no cities, no running water, no electricity, nothing. In the cases I have studied of insurgencies, in Africa, in El Salvador, and elsewhere, the insurgents exist because they are providing something to the campesino. To the campesino, the most basic need is to exist, to survive. If survival requires support, support will be accepted from any source.
In Honduras, for instance, the insurgents provided food to the peasants. In El Salvador, the insurgents came mostly from the middle class and made a strategic blunder in destroying a major source of income, which was leña (firewood). As a result, the peasants had nothing to cook with, nothing to sell for income, and so, withdrew support of the FMLN. What happened? The Salvadoran army provided leña so the peasants could cook, and the peasants lost all faith in the FMLN. The government was able to capitalize on the situation and negotiated from a position of political strength. If Colombia wants to attack the base of support of the FARC and ELN, it should do nothing to damage the peasants’ basic needs for survival. Colombia needs to identify methods to take away the peasants’ support for the insurgents. Protect the cities, of course, but provide more and better civic action programs in the rural regions, establish a credible government presence to provide better service than is being provided by the insurgents. The insurgents are already firmly established, have established a power base. And its structure is a communist focus, be it Marxist or Maoist. And can anyone think of a better structure for running the illegal drug business?
If the Colombian military continues confronting the insurgents in the way it has for the past decade, it is going to lose the war. People have to live in these regions, for whatever reason. Interfering with their livelihood will alienate them and help the insurgents.
That’s my advice for Colombia. But the primary recommendation I could make to the U.S., and especially to the Department of Defense, is to keep the U.S. presence low, to reduce the perception of intervention in Colombia’s domestic affairs.
COMMENT: The U.S. should never overestimate what it can do. As pointed out earlier, there is a credible interest in keeping the U.S. profile relatively low. There has been a long tendency to alternate, in dealing with much of the Hemisphere, between absolute crisis -- to believe that what the U.S. does decides everything -- and the exhortation mode. The tendency is to face a microphone and tell anybody how absolutely critical the decision the U.S. is about to make really is. In the long run, this can be counterproductive because the more this happens, the more the policy gets shaped not by what would work in the field but by what was played in the Washington political arena. That is always disastrous for policy. There is a real argument for taking the Colombia situation very seriously, understanding that what decisions Washington makes and what decisions are made bilaterally with Colombia can have an important effect on the outcome. But avoid emphasizing the impact of U.S. policy, and above all keep that profile low. Not trying to push anything too high on the public agenda is always a good idea, because the profile will simply get in the way of dealing with the basic, long-term, underlying issues.
COMMENT: I would like to suggest that there is a need to change the terms of reference in the dialogue on security assistance inside the Beltway, and I’m talking about specific words with specific connotations that raise mental blocks and hinder the dialogue. For instance, I know that there is a policy prohibiting counterinsurgency assistance, to any country in general, and, for purposes of our discussion, to Colombia. Recognizing that, the U.S. can shift its focus away from the concept of counterinsurgency, toward the concept of conventional military capabilities, simply by no longer referring to the aid to Colombia as "counterdrug" or "counterinsurgency." Refer to it simply as "military assistance," or come up with a palatable bureaucratic alternative, such as "conventional military capability assistance," and give it an acronym for legitimacy. The reality is that the Colombian government, through its military, must reconquer (and in some cases, conquer for the first time) all of its national territory. A second reality is that the current military successes of the FARC demonstrate that it is no longer a traditional insurgency, and has moved on to greater conventional military capabilities. Following the theoretical model of an insurgency such as Mariategui, or Guevara, or Mao, these groups are now on a transition to the third tier of development, converting from guerrillas to conventional military force.
To successfully combat the FARC and ELN, Colombia’s national military capabilities must be improved, in terms of light infantry, air and land mobility (combat and transport helicopters, light armor), riverine combat elements, engineering, intelligence and psychological operations (PSYOPS), military police, and administration. The new capabilities should be used in traditional offensive operations, to occupy greater areas of the national territory, establishing control to facilitate the creation of civilian governments in the newly occupied areas. There is a role for international peacekeeping forces in this last phase. The current Colombian emphasis on counterinsurgency is not the best way to resolve its security problems, not the least because of opposition in Washington to counterinsurgency (though not general military) assistance.
Of course, as pointed out several times throughout this workshop, none of this will work without a stated security policy written by the president, with the force of law. Without a clear statement of the government’s intentions, it is impossible to expect the armed forces to carry out a coherent war plan. Someone earlier talked about increasing the military’s efficiency, which no one can argue against. But how do you measure that efficiency? It is measured by comparing actions to goals, and in the absence of goals, there’s nothing on which to compare actions, and thus it is impossible to measure efficiency.
So my recommendation to the U.S. DOD is to work with the Colombian government and MOD, apply pressure if necessary, to elaborate a national security policy. Then it will be possible for the Colombian military to implement plans to reduce human rights abuses, write strategy and tactics, increase efficiency, accept assistance from the U.S. in a coherent manner that coincides with Colombia’s written guidelines and strategies. The policy need not be geared directly toward the war effort. The president can write a policy that says Colombia is dedicated to the peace effort, and will work hard toward that goal. But in the meantime, the military is charged with containing the guerrillas to the despeje (demilitarized) zones, or to other specific areas, or whatever. Without stated policies, Colombia will be doomed to following Tirofijo’s lead, which is not a good idea. Colombia needs strong leadership, a leader willing to elaborate a plan of action to lead his country to a solution to the serious problems of instability and near-anarchy it currently suffers from. I sincerely hope the upcoming elections produce such a leader.
| Return to Top | Return to Table of Contents |
Contact
Us
NDU
Press Home Page
NDU Home Page
INSS Home Page
Last Update: September 30, 2002