Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

The premise of the workshop was that security in Colombia is increasingly becoming an elusive ideal. Violence by multiple actors, including guerrilla insurgents, paramilitary groups, drug traffickers, and individuals within the state itself, is undermining democratic governance, affecting domestic and regional stability. This instability affects the United States' ability to achieve policy goals, which include the reduction of illegal drug flows, the consolidation of democracy, and the strengthening of the rule of law to reduce human rights violations. How to respond to Colombia's violence and fragmentation poses questions for U.S. policymakers, including the Department of Defense, both now and in the future.

The purpose of the workshop was to discuss ways in which all the parties engaged in designing and writing policy for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the Colombian Ministry of Defense (MOD) can work together to address instability and violence in Colombia. It was primarily a workshop dedicated to provoking new and creative thinking on these problems and to finding recommendations and innovative solutions for policymakers. A few points of consensus were achieved: (1) Colombia’s instability is exacerbated by a lack of appropriate government policy; (2) a peace process is a viable venue for dialogue to resolve Colombia’s instability; and (3) U.S. policy should focus on the root causes (lack of governance), not the symptoms of instability (drugs, human rights violations).

The workshop, held in a non-attribution environment, was sponsored by the National Defense University's (NDU’s) Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD-SOLIC), with the collaboration of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Peace and stability in Colombia are in everyone’s best interest. The challenge for Colombia is to find a holistic solution addressing the root causes of the instability, while understanding that a military solution may not be the best or only option. The discussion throughout the workshop underlined the complexity of Colombia’s instability. Most attendees agreed that the root problem is one of democratic governance: Colombia does not have a genuinely representative democracy. Real power is wielded by a small, elite aristocracy behind a façade of elected officials and institutions, who have not yet been negatively affected by the insecurity to change the situation and are comfortable with the existing conservative economic policy and weak institutions of government. This lack of cohesive governance has produced an environment conducive to impunity, Marxist insurgents, illegal drug mafias, private justice groups (paramilitary, self-defense, or other), rogue military or police elements, and criminals (organized or otherwise).

Everyone agreed that the U.S. and Colombia have long enjoyed a close relationship. Only recently has it deteriorated and become politicized, since the U.S. put drugs and human rights at the top of its agenda (regardless of the impact on other issues), and since the allegations that President Ernesto Samper’s electoral campaign accepted funds from the drug mafias. These two factors have politicized the dialogue and damaged relations.

International efforts to support a peace process are important and could take several forms. The Organization of American States and the United Nations can assist as venues for dialogue with the insurgents and in monitoring the implementation of any successful peace accord. Informal international groupings, such as a Friends of Colombia group that could include Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Panamá, and Peru, can reinforce the negotiations. Whatever the venue or organization, however, workshop participants considered it vital that this support follow, rather than lead, Colombia's efforts to improve governance. It was pointed out that any assistance from the U.S. must be based on a formal request from the Colombian government.

Three major recommendations were developed, generally conceding the need for further research on specific issues. These were:

• The discussion points and recommendations elaborated during this workshop should be shared with the DOD and the MOD in an executive summary. A joint study group should be convened to develop methodologies for implementing specific recommendations deemed appropriate.

• An interdisciplinary study group should be formed between the U.S. and Colombia under the leadership of the respective executive powers, with representatives of government and society, to continue the process of dialogue between the United States and Colombia, to generate ideas, and to make recommendations for coordinating all the instruments of national power in improving governance.

• A presentation on security issues should be offered to the president-elect before he assumes office, to encourage the new administration to elaborate a defense policy directed at resolving the military problems of instability in Colombia. A dual-track approach was recommended: a presentation by the Colombian military in Bogotá, supported by a DOD presentation during the president-elect’s visit to Washington prior to his inauguration. These presentations should encourage the president-elect either to convene the bilateral study (mentioned below), or to implement recommendations resulting from it.

A fundamental requirement of any peace process or policy is the commitment by the national government and society to find a solution to the crisis in governance. This commitment is currently questionable because there is no absence of appropriate law in Colombia: The 1991 Constitution is considered one of the most responsible, accountable, and participatory charters in the region. The problem is that existing law is seldom applied or is applied parsimoniously.

Colombian governance was viewed by the workshop participants as reactive, responding to political pressure (from the U.S., the insurgents, the illegal drug mafias, the paramilitaries, and the non-government organization [NGO] community) rather than following a consistent set of goals based on long-range planning. A primary example is the absence of a stated policy for national security, despite the constitutional requirement to have one, and notwithstanding a guerrilla war spanning three decades.

This inconsistency was compared with the situation of the insurgents, who have little political power and yet have the initiative because of cohesive leadership. Their specific goals and objectives are largely unknown, though they apparently favor a long-range (ten-year) peace negotiation process. There have been several attempts to initiate the process, including some from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Secretariat, but no concrete action has yet resulted.

One point of consensus in the workshop was the viability of a negotiated peace process as a venue for national dialogue on governance. The objective of the process was not as important as the process itself: Opinion varied on the issues to be addressed, the relative bargaining strengths of all the parties, exactly who should be invited to the table, and the specific methodology of the process. Most agreed that the Colombian president after the June 1998 elections will be well positioned to start the process, supported by the security forces, other civilian agencies, and the international community. United Nations support (peacekeeping or monitors) can help during the implementation phase.

There was only one major recommendation to Colombia, but it must be regarded as the key to resolving the instability in the country. Many conference attendees expressed surprise that this recommendation was necessary.

• The civilian government must write a national policy regarding the problem of instability, on which all the agencies (Armed Forces, Justice, Peace Commission, and Treasury) can base operational strategies. This policy should define the specific roles and missions of the different agencies, to prevent "mission creep" or overextending the assets or resources of any one agency.

U.S. policy regarding Colombia was viewed by the workshop as reactive, responding to political pressure, rather than following a consistent set of goals based on long-range planning. All the Colombians and most of the U.S. academics at the workshop agreed that U.S. policy interests address only the symptoms of instability (economics, drugs, and human rights). But forcing the relatively weak institutions of government in Colombia to concentrate their efforts on the symptoms prevents them from addressing the problems of governance. The strategy of dealing with root problems first has long been taught by the DOD training schools and used effectively in other cases (Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala); it should be used in Colombia as well.

U.S. support for a peace process is vital to any peace process in the region. However, military assistance or diplomatic contact should be kept as low-key as possible, given the history of U.S.-Latin American relations and perceived interference in the domestic sovereignty of Colombia.

The workshop attendees agreed that the current U.S. approach to Colombia was too confusing to be workable. The recommendation suggests addressing this issue.

• An interagency strategy should be coordinated and implemented through a formal review process to shift the focus away from dealing with Colombia’s symptoms and address long-range U.S. interests in terms of improved governance. That does not mean ignoring the drugs and human rights issues, which should be incorporated into the overall policies designed to reduce instability in Colombia and the region. The workshop in general indicated that it would be easier for the U.S. to achieve its current policy interests in an environment of law and order possible under a strong, representative, inclusive government in Colombia.

There are good relations between the U.S. and Colombian armed forces. There is a history of international cooperation (World War II, Korea, Sinai), training, and assistance. There is a history of working together to improve bilateral relations and studying issues of mutual interest. DOD assistance must be provided within the overall context of U.S. policy on Colombia based on a request from the Colombian government.

Workshop attendees again acknowledged the need for more research on specific issues.

• A bilateral study of the Colombian Armed Forces' roles, missions, requirements, and strategies to achieve them is needed. Assuming a request from the Colombian MOD, participation by a DOD team that includes representatives from the Joint Staff, the U. S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and NDU was recommended. Participants agreed that the study should address the lack of a defense or security policy, force structure modernization, concepts of mobility and logistical support, joint and combined operations, training deficiencies, institutional and individual corruption, and the lack of a code of honor.

There is a high sense of honor and respect for civilian authority within the Colombian Armed Forces. However, relations with the civilian government must be increased and improved. The military must push for a national policy on which to base doctrine, strategy, budget, training, and assistance requirements.

There is an urgent need to strengthen Colombia’s security forces to improve stability and order. This is a difficult issue for the Colombian Armed Forces because of cultural and historical factors that contribute to the military hierarchy’s lack of quality leadership and to its suspicion of initiatives originating outside of the institution. Positive changes can be achieved, however. This means increasing the number and quality of combat-capable forces, mobility, and support. This strengthening is needed in part to make the military more efficient in combating the insurgents and paramilitary groups. The example presented was the multi-agency commission used to reform the National Police into a more modern, efficient, and well-respected institution.

Accountability for violations of existing law is too low throughout Colombia, and impunity in violating existing law is too high. The result is instability based on a basic lack of justice, leading to the rise of private justice. This problem affects many issues within the armed forces, the government, and society in general, such as human rights violations, corruption, leadership, and lack of efficiency. Specifically, the armed forces must reduce corruption (e.g., the use of promotion as reward and the use of government assets for private gain), reform the procurement process (to eliminate kick-backs and commissions), and eliminate contact with drug mafias and paramilitary groups.

The workshop highlighted the issue of human rights abuses by the armed forces. The Colombian military must improve its human rights record. The examples highlighted were El Salvador and Guatemala, where human rights were specified as part of the military code of honor and justice. General Manuel Bonett Locarno's announced disbanding of the 20^th Military Intelligence Brigade is a step in the right direction.

The workshop was much more specific on the need for reform at the strategic and tactical levels of the armed forces than it was on general government policy, reflecting the military credentials of the participants.

• There is no government policy on which to base military strategy. The armed forces should work with the government to write a national security policy to:

• Improve budget consistency for strategic planning.
• Enhance high-level leadership continuity.
• Reduce parochialism and inefficiency.
• Implement the constitutional provision regarding domestic commotion, to implement appropriate legislation, extraordinary measures, and resources to resolve the situation.
• Limit "mission creep" in areas not specifically related to national defense, such as combating crime and illegal drugs, nation building, and governance.

• Strategic management needs to be enhanced. This involves modernizing the force structure, concepts of mobility and logistic support, joint and combined operations. The focus on management should be on mid-level officers, as well as on the senior leadership. Specific recommendations include:

• Reduce the reliance on conscripts and on-the-job training. Specifically, reform the limits on type of service (soldados bachilleres, volunteer troops, and regular troops), to increase morale and retention.
• Write and implement an honor code of conduct.
• Enhance C3I (Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence).
• Improve and use strategic intelligence capabilities, such as long-range studies of the insurgent and paramilitary groups' tactics, trends, objectives, and weaknesses in the war effort. Improve joint or interagency intelligence cooperation, establish an intelligence specialty career track, and integrate intelligence with operations. Eliminate the use of intelligence assets in clandestine or covert operations.
• Improve management of procurement and force increases.
• Enhance mid- to large unit tactics through field training exercises. Training is high, but not at the tactical or unit level.
• Improve mobility through better use of existing assets through joint operations, including operations with the National Police.
• Enhance maintenance management training and support through long-term resource commitments.
• Redeploy units to better counter the insurgency threat. The current emphasis on garrison and static defense cuts into combat capability. The military is spread too thin: Symbolic presence creates targets for the insurgents.
• Increase the transparency of force and objectives through improved relations with the media.
• Increase and improve humanitarian and civic action programs to improve support from society.
• Increase discipline through the uniform implementation of military doctrine and programs and accountability to the organic laws of the institution.

There are good relations between the U.S. and Colombian armed forces, which should be enhanced by increased bilateral cooperation. DOD can help by changing its approach to military assistance.

Most of the workshop’s recommendations reflected the limited ability of DOD to assist Colombia resolve its security problems.

• The Colombian military must work more closely with the civilian sector. Though it is acknowledged that the talent, knowledge, and expertise already exist in Colombia, the reality is that these are not being used at full potential. One possible venue for DOD assistance is an in-country session of NDU's Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies seminar, subject to MOD specification of requirements.

• The U.S. can work with the Colombian military to improve training at the tactical and unit levels in the areas of counterdrug operations and basic skills. This can be accomplished through Mobile Training Teams and exchange programs (to continue or increase existing programs). Specific programs can be created involving multilateral training with other regional forces (Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador).

• DOD can assist in force modernization programs, and improving or updating doctrine, operations, and equipment.

• The Colombian Armed Forces must improve its budget priority process. DOD can assist with advice and training.

• The U.S. can work with the Colombian military to improve its public relations programs, advertise successes, and increase transparency of objectives and plans (not tactics). Psychological operations (PSYOPS) are required to undermine the insurgents' credibility. One useful venue could be infrastructure projects (roads, potable water, and electricity) in the areas the insurgents claim are in need of social programs.

• Some workshop attendees urged DOD to change how the topic of security assistance is discussed. While recognizing that the current policy prohibits counterinsurgency assistance, the U.S. needs to shift its focus away from the concept of counterinsurgency and toward the concept of conventional military capabilities. In reality, the Colombian government must reconquer (and in some cases, conquer for the first time) all of its national territory. The current military successes of the FARC demonstrate that it is no longer a traditional insurgency and has moved on to greater conventional military capabilities. To successfully combat the FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia’s national military must improve its capabilities in the following areas: light infantry, air and land mobility (combat and transport helicopters, light armor), engineering, intelligence and PSYOPS, military police, and administration. The new capabilities would be used in traditional offensive operations to occupy greater areas of the national territory, establishing control to facilitate the creation of civilian governments in the newly occupied areas. There is a role for international peacekeeping forces in this last phase. The current Colombian emphasis on counterinsurgency is not the best way to resolve its security problems, not the least because of opposition in Washington to counterinsurgency (though not to general military) assistance.

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  Last Update:  September 30, 2002