Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

The View from Washington

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I've been asked to provide an analytical view of the crisis in Colombia -- specifically, the security situation as viewed from Washington, and more specifically, the Department of State. So I will start with a quick look at U.S. interests in Colombia; I’ll give an overview of the scope of violence currently buffeting Colombia and how this violence affects U.S. interests in Colombia; I’ll then finish up with a few comments on the future of peace talks. I must emphasize, however, that my comments do not represent the official opinion of the Department of State or the U.S. government. These are my personal opinions, provided for your consideration and comment.

Policymakers in Washington have viewed with increasing concern the developments in Colombia during 1998. Specifically, there have been a series of threats against U.S. officials in Colombia, as well as threats against private citizens. Colombia's largest insurgent group (and the Hemisphere’s longest-lasting insurgency), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is increasingly becoming a menace to the public in general. There have been a series of elections, including presidential elections, in which the guerrillas have threatened democracy and attempted to disrupt those elections. Also, during 1997 and 1998 the guerrillas have conducted a series of military campaigns, demonstrating an increasing capacity to threaten the national armed forces, demonstrating the relative weakness of the Colombian Armed Forces as an institution.

Colombia has a violent history. There have been a series of civil wars and periods of general violence and bloodletting. La Violencia, which began in 1948 and lasted into the mid-1960's, caused the death of over 260,000 people. Since 1982, the level of political violence has tripled and the violence continues to worsen. Last year there were 25,000 murders in Colombia. There were more than 1,800 kidnappings; over half of those were attributed to the guerrillas. Internal migration patterns show that there are hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. A recent poll showed the increasing passiveness of Colombians themselves, in that at least half of Colombians (from different economic classes) would like to leave Colombia, for economic reasons and also because of concerns for their physical safety. Both are compelling reasons. The violent situation in Colombia is complex, especially because of the number of violent actors.

Turning now to the view from Washington: What are the U.S. interests in Colombia? There is an easy way to describe these, in what we call the "Four Ds" (but you have to mix English and Spanish to get this formula). The four categories are democracy, development, drugs, and derechos humanos (human rights).

First I’ll talk about democracy. We've already mentioned that despite Colombia's terrible violence, it is the oldest democracy in the region. And the 1991 Constitution is known as one of the most accountable, responsive national charters and is one that allows the most popular participation of Latin America's constitutions. Yet the promise of this constitution is still not being realized. The violence present in Colombia’s society threatens its democracy, and the biggest example of that is the most

recent one -- the October 1997 elections, in which the guerrillas murdered a number of local officeholders, kidnapped many others, and forced well over a thousand to resign or quit the election.

Another severe problem and threat to Colombia's democracy has been the narcocorruption, which in fact has hollowed out a number of democratic institutions. A survey done last year by an international organization [Transparency International] rated Colombia the third most corrupt country in the world, after Nigeria and Bolivia. President Ernesto Samper, who came into office hoping to be the president of social progress and to bring peace to the long-running insurgency, has instead, because he accepted six million dollars in campaign money from the Cali cartel, spent his entire term defending himself. So his legacy now will be political survival, but at a great cost to his country. No advances have been made in his social programs; inflation is high and the budget deficit has grown to an estimated 5.1 percent of the gross domestic product. Rather than getting better, things are worsening.

Congress has also been influenced by drug money. It has tried at every turn to thwart the passage of effective antidrug legislation. But the great coalition of antidrug legislators, certain members of the administration, former prosecutor Alfonso Valdivieso, and some in the media ensures that important antidrug legislation is passed. The judiciary is also heavily corrupted, bought by drug traffickers and anyone who has the money. Colombia is not alone on this count, as it is a continental problem, a fact that worsens the violence. It is a fact that most crimes (98 percent) are never punished. This level of impunity simply worsens the violence.

Under the category of development can be included all types of economic relations and activities. The trade between Colombia and the United States amounted to almost $10 billion in 1997, making Colombia the fifth most important partner in Latin America. Over 100 major U.S. companies have offices in Colombia, making the U.S. the largest foreign investor, accounting for some 34 percent of all foreign investment, for a total of $3.7 billion being invested by U.S. businesses in Colombia. There is increasing concern on the part of U.S., other foreign, and Colombian businessmen over the deteriorating security situation. And in the last several months, six multinational corporations working in the oil sector have announced that they will either pull out of Colombia or reduce their level of operations. This is a direct result of the violence, but it is also a result of the continual changing of the rules of the game for investment in Colombia.

Related to the topic of business and exports is the third D, drugs. Colombia is now the largest producer in hectares in coca leaf and of processed cocaine in the world, which makes it the largest supplier of cocaine to the U.S. Colombia is an important source of heroin as well. It goes without saying that the U.S. government strongly supports the Colombian government’s efforts to fight drugs through education, breaking up drug trafficking organizations, and a number of other programs. But as I mentioned earlier, there have been increasing threats against the U.S. personnel, most likely because it serves as a warning to the U.S. to not get further involved in eradication. This is especially true in southern Colombia, where there has been the most growth in coca cultivation.

And the final D category is derechos humanos, human rights. Colombia has the region’s worst record in human rights, with a frightening number of executions, killings, disappearances, and other great crimes. An encouraging sign is the sharp decrease in the number of abuses attributed to the Colombian security forces, which has resulted, unfortunately, in a large increase in the abuses attributed to the so-called paramilitary groups. There are no institutional links between the military and the paramilitary groups, though there is evidence that individual officers have that link. This of course is a major concern to the U.S., and there are very strict procedures to ensure that no U.S. assistance and training goes to either individuals or units that harbor these human rights abusers.

Now, let’s look briefly at the cause of this crime and violence that so pervasively afflicts Colombia. There is basically no deterrence from the justice system, as seen in the virtual impunity from prosecution in Colombia. There has also been tremendous turmoil in the countryside, as drug traffickers purchase huge tracts of land and expel the campesinos, the tenant farmers. There also have been expulsions by both the guerrillas and the paramilitary groups. In general, the lack of an effective state presence in large areas of rural Colombia means that whoever holds the gun writes the law.

At this point it is necessary to look at the insurgency itself. There are 10,000 to 17,000 guerrilla fighters in Colombia. They have steadily grown over the last several years in size, in the tempo of operations, and in the areas where they have influence. Currently they have influence in at least two-thirds of the municipalities in Colombia, exercising control through the selected use of terror and through political action groups, especially in these areas where there is very little state presence. During the last several years they have shown an increasing capability to mobilize forces and use sophisticated tactics. They are self-sufficient and depend on no foreign support at all, relying instead on a combination of involvement in drug trafficking (mainly through providing security for drug cultivation), kidnapping, and extortion. However, they do not really have a lot of popular support in Colombia. Their support comes primarily from those drug-producing areas where they provide protection to the farmers. Their lack of political support was demonstrated in the October 1997 municipal elections when in the urban areas, where the guerrillas have much less influence, voters ignored the guerrillas’ calls to boycott the election. The campesinos voted in masses for the peace initiative on the ballot, showing just how much the Colombian people support peace instead of the Marxist dogma forced on them by the guerrillas.

A more recent phenomenon has been the paramilitary groups, which started back in the 1980s as an attempt to regain a measure of control from the insurgents. These groups are also used by drug traffickers to protect their various interests, including property, labs, and transportation networks. Many of these groups were initially legal, working within the laws written for self-protection militias. Later many became illegal, getting more and more abusive or getting directly involved in the drug business. There is a wide variety of these groups. Some are legitimate self-defense groups under the Convivir rubric, who are protecting ranchers or large farmers, and there are many city-based security companies involved in physical plant security for individuals or communities. But there are also many narcotrafficking paramilitary groups. The final type of paramilitary group, such as the 2,000-member militia led by Carlos Castaņo, seeks to eradicate the insurgency.

One of the fundamental problems in Colombia has been the lack of a comprehensive political/military strategy to turn back the insurgency. The political and economic elite in Colombia, who live mostly in the cities, are not directly affected by the insurgency and the violence. And even though these problems represent an increased cost of doing business, the cost has been tolerable. As a result, there has been no push to solve the problem. President Ernesto Samper, who has been very weak politically, has not shown any real leadership in trying to solve the problem, either. Deficiencies in the security forces include the lack of transport, problems of logistics, intelligence, communication, and training, and an overall lack of effectiveness even with the resources available.

Given all these difficulties, what are the prospects for peace in Colombia? Basically the prospects are very poor, certainly in the short term and in the medium term. But there are some fundamental things that need to happen before serious negotiations can take place. First, the guerrillas must be stopped and even rolled back in both their capabilities and their influence, because there is currently no incentive for them to negotiate. Why should they negotiate, if they continue to increase in both their areas of influence and their power? All there has been to date is a lot of talk, which indicates that serious prospects to negotiate don’t exist. Then on the other side of the equation is the fact that the government and society as a whole need to decide to stop the insurgency and at the very least make peace a priority.

Unfortunately, President Samper is very weak and has no political legitimacy on which to base any specific policy related to stability. It will be a very difficult task for the next president to undertake: Providing leadership, convincing society as a whole to mobilize and put pressure on the guerrillas to increase the possibility of some kind of prospect for peace. In the short and medium term, this will be very difficult. And it will take a long time to build up the political will and find the resources to end the conflict.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002