Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

The View From Bogotá

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Good morning. I’d first like to thank the National Defense University for the invitation to this workshop, which will be an important venue for suggesting solutions to the different problems afflicting Colombia today. I am convinced that the communication between the individuals and institutions represented here is fundamental to finding a solution to these problems. I believe that one of the best objectives of this seminar is to develop an environment that enables a sincere dialogue to not only find out who is responsible for the crisis in Colombia, but more important, to find solutions we can develop and put in place to prevent a worsening of this crisis. Thus, I offer my thanks for the invitation in the name of all my colleagues from Colombia present here. It is important, however, to state that what I will present throughout my talk is not the position or opinion of the Colombian armed forces or of the Inter-American Defense Board where I currently work. My presentation is my personal opinion of the situation in Colombia.

The purpose of my talk is to generate ideas that can serve as a basis for discussion of alternatives for viable solutions to the security problems of Colombia. My approach to the topic will be to provide a general framework, based on the following criteria, which I will apply to the analysis.

First, there is a wide understanding of Colombia’s situation among the participants of this workshop, and thanks to your participation we will increase that understanding. Second, Colombia’s problems have been overdiagnosed. There are many types of diagnoses, some complicated, others less so, depending on the point of view or focus of the individual or institution conducting the analysis. Also, many of the proposed solutions generated over time do not lend themselves to adequate implementation or do not appropriately address the issues and thus do not achieve results to satisfaction. Thus we search for proposals to be applied in the short, medium, and long term with a high probability of success.

Colombia is a state that has lived with a growing war for more than forty consecutive years. This conflict has reached a level that makes it impossible to predict future stability or its international relations within the context of the American continent. Many diagnostic studies have been written about the reality of Colombia, by nationals and foreigners, but these have not become more than predictors of the country’s problems seen from different viewpoints, some more worrisome than others. None has reached a level of analysis deeper than a partial solution.

I believe Colombia’s population and institutions have become accustomed to hearing bad news and assimilating it as they would a calm before a storm. After specific crises, everything returns to what is known as normal. A new crisis makes one think for a short while, but "normality" then returns again. Colombia has many types of internal threats, as I will present here and as will be shown by others throughout the workshop. As Mr. Wolfe stated earlier, Colombia was catalogued last year by Transparency International as the third most corrupt state in the world; others have listed Colombia as the most violent state on the planet. It is the largest producer of cocaine, it has the strongest crime syndicates, and despite tremendous efforts, it cannot shake itself from its current serious situation. But it still plays a critical role, despite the magnification of it’s problems in the press.

A list of Colombia’s strengths is quite long, and if its difficulties are well known, its strengths should also be well known. I’ll also present a list of the traditional threats, which are well known, and the factors that affect national security, as well as the consequences that hinder security. I will end with a list of questions and ideas proposed for discussion later in the workshop.

I’ll start with the strengths. First, Colombia’s geographical position, with access to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, makes it a point of entry to the entire South American continent. Its topography provides a diversity on which are based many kinds of natural resources. Exploiting these has made Colombia a major exporter of coffee, coal, emeralds, petroleum, bananas, flowers, and a number of products available to the U.S. market.

Perhaps the most important strength is the people. Despite the serious problems caused by a minority, most Colombians are honest, good people who abhor violence. As mentioned earlier, it is one of the most stable democracies in the region, with organizations, personalities, development, and work based on values and principles shared throughout the civilized world.

Another strength is the institutions of public security, and specifically the armed forces, which are well equipped and organized. These, despite having suffered some inconveniences throughout the prolonged popular war, have been the bastion that contains the advance of the subversion over time. I wish to remind you of the basic mission of the armed forces, as it is written in articles 2 and 217 of the Constitution of Colombia:

To defend the sovereignty, the independence, the integrity of the national territory and constitutional order to protect the life, honor, goods, beliefs, and other rights and freedoms, assuring the fulfillment of social responsibilities of the state and of individuals.

And related to security, as it is understood in Colombia and is the purpose of this workshop, the mission is to maintain order, the absence of domestic conflict, pacific social coexistence, and a reduction of risk and danger to individuals who live within the national boundaries.

The strategic objectives accorded at the appropriate level include the following:

• Integrated development. This is related to national defense, specifically the preservation of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.
• National unity. This relates to public order, the maintenance of national order, reestablishing it if lost, and the neutralization of those factors disturbing national order.
• Preservation of fundamental rights. This relates to the physical safety of citizens and involves efforts by the armed forces contributing to and guaranteeing the peaceful coexistence and internal democracy necessary to prevent, avoid, if that fails, investigate the commission of crimes and contradictions to domestic order.
• Preservation of democracy. This can be accomplished by strengthening and maintaining the viability of the institutions of government.

I’ve summarized the internal situation within this framework, to emphasize several factors that generate violence, such as corruption, impunity, unemployment, and social imbalance.

The agents that generate violence include armed subversion and its form of terrorism, narcotrafficking and the terrorism and corruption it engenders, organized crime and its terrorism, and common delinquency. I’d like to quickly analyze these generators of violence in Colombia, though I will not go into great detail on every one of the organized groups of common delinquents. The important point to determine is that the situation is very violent, and the numbers of homicides are increasing annually. These homicides are approaching 28,000 per year, though only approximately ten percent are carried out by the armed insurgent groups.

The narcoterrorist group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), has a relative presence in the national territory amounting to sixty-one squads with approximately 6,000 bandits in arms. Also, the group has its own popular militias and support groups to provide intelligence and administrative assistance. That is why in many cases there’s talk of 17,000 troops in this subversive group. It is important to analyze not only their operational methods but also the process developed to achieve their proposed objectives. After 1964 and until 1982, they developed what is called the war of guerrillas, which is based on ambushes, quick strikes, assaults on towns, and general harassing actions. From 1982 until 1990, the guerrillas developed a new method of operations, based on the accumulation of combat intelligence, reconnaissance, evaluation, and compartmentalization. Tactics included knowing and dominating terrain and conducting combat strikes to locate government troops, ambush them, and in some cases, assault and strike unit-sized patrols.

Since 1990, the bandits have attempted to generate what is called a war of movements. I say attempted because they definitely do not demonstrate the proper characteristics to carry out a war of movements. This technique consists of developing offensive operations of rapid strikes over large theaters of operation. It is characterized by mobility, flexibility, and the capacity to concentrate and deploy rapidly, attacking troops on the move by concentrating large deployments of guerrilla forces and taking advantage of favorable terrain, enemy vulnerabilities, support from the local population, enemy fatigue, and carelessness. This was the case in the attacks in Caguan and Yarí, and especially in the eastern regions of Colombia. The insurgents do not genuinely control any territory, and they do not have a genuine regional government as has been suggested several times, because governmental presence has the capacity and presence in a majority of Colombia, where the need and numbers exist.

The other insurgent group with any significance is the National Liberation Army (ELN), with close to 5,000 troops and 7,000 weapons. Its fundamental objective is geared toward attacking the oil and hydroelectric infrastructure of Colombia. This group also develops guerrilla operations, but not in a direct confrontation environment that requires permanent support with regular troops.

The next major point I wish to discuss is the consequences brought about by the violence in Colombia. The primary factor is economic, namely, the annual loss of three percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The growth index is less than four percent, which is evidence of a very complex situation. There is a stagnation in socioeconomic development in various areas and a related loss in the growth patterns of trade with neighboring countries. These are related to the actions of the bandit and narcotrafficking groups. Other indicators of economic problems include private, national, and foreign capital flight and the loss of public resources for social investment, all linked to the need to increase the cost of business imposed by the security problems. This surcharge for safety imposes an inflationary pressure on Colombia’s economy.

These security problems have created problems in foreign relations by generating an aura of mistrust of Colombians. The country suffers from a bad international image and a deterioration of relations with neighboring countries, especially in countries where the insurgents operate to avoid contact with the Colombian military.

Political instability is also growing, increasing the lack of confidence in government institutions and the loss of credibility in those governing Colombia, despite the rationale or justification.

In discussing the social aspects of the instability, it must be pointed out that there has been a social and regional fragmentation. Internal migration is increasing, especially movement from the rural sections to the great metropolitan regions. Displacement of peasants by the violent conflict has been reported throughout the country. There has been a deterioration of the moral fiber, especially visible in the behavior of individuals in the regions where coca and poppy cultivation takes place. But perhaps the worst aspect has been the inability to provide for the basic needs of the population because of the economic hardships imposed by the physical displacement of people from the conflict zones.

In terms of destruction to the ecology and environment, there is a large quantity of deforestation resulting from the actions of those cultivating coca and poppy, as well as from aerial spraying. Both increase erosion and a loss of sources of water and result in a loss of the great diversity of wildlife normally found in Colombia. There is a high level of contamination, which damages the food supply of this wildlife, as well as a reduction in land available for agriculture.

Within the military, there has been a reduction in the capacity and strength required to maintain an effective and decisive control over the national territory. Colombia needs an increase in its military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and rightfully so, because it is a country at war and should invest in its security.

I will now develop some perspectives for Colombia for the beginning of the next century. The first is that the cost of the insurgency is not sustainable, which means that the situation is deteriorating and will reach a point in the mid-term (2000 to 2002) where we cannot predict if the situation will be manageable. The deterioration (economic, environmental, sociopolitical, and diplomatic) requires immediate steps to propose solutions that are basic and lasting. Peace cannot be achieved in the short run if a national consciousness cannot be built that identifies with the national interests. Peace will result from an integrated policy that makes possible a negotiation process. Without this integration, without this alignment of all the elements of national power, it will be very difficult to achieve peace.

To guarantee a correlation of forces favorable to the state of social right in the peace process, it is necessary to strengthen the state’s public forces. It is important for the government to avoid a situation in which the bandits arrive at the peace table under favorable conditions, demanding many prerogatives from the government. And finally, the public force is a necessary element, important to the development of this war, but is not enough to resolve the crisis. As mentioned earlier, Colombia’s problems are not exclusively the military’s to resolve. Colombia’s problems belong to all Colombians.

I promised a list of questions that can serve as a basis for further discussion in this workshop, and these are as follows:

• What is the security system most appropriate for Colombia?
• Are the conditions adequate to work on and put in place a strategic plan integrating all the state organizations necessary to achieve success?
• If the state had all the necessary resources, could it end the internal aggression?
• What scenario will be adopted after the elections, regardless of who wins?
• What support will Colombia receive from the international community?

My final comments will be about possible actions:

• Colombia needs to find a national consensus to confront a very diffuse threat. There are many complaints, but little consensus.
• Security procedures need to be restructured.
• Policies and plans need to be elaborated that involve all the instruments of national power. This needs to be a process implemented from top to bottom.
• The threat need not be confronted exclusively by the military and police forces. The entire country needs to be involved.
• The administration of justice needs to be reformed, because, quite frankly, the lack of it is generating high levels of impunity.

This concludes my presentation. I hope it has been sufficiently clear and concise, and that I have provided a good basis for future discussion.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002