Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

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Not until Gunnar Myrdal’s categorical assertion that corruption was fundamentally detrimental to the development process did the problem become a serious topic for social science analysis.⁸ Up to that point it was regarded as unimportant, beneficial – because it cut red tape – or to be relegated to the preaching of moralists.

The enormous contemporary interest in the subject can be gleaned from the most important compilation published so far, that of Arnold J. Heidenheimer, et. al.⁹ The variety of theoretical approaches evident in that volume attest to the universality of the phenomenon but also to the absence of any single body of theory with which to study it. Each student starts the theoretical debate anew. The comprehensive and incisive study by Stephen D. Morris,¹⁰ has to begin by a long discourse and analysis of the existing theories and why they do not apply to his case. The applicability of his model has yet to be tested by others. The conclusion one has to arrive at is that there is no single, widely accepted body of theory for the study of corruption.

In the more widely read literature on politics in Colombia since 1952, the theme of corruption hardly figured. T. Lynn Smith¹¹ never even mentions the word. He has one paragraph on what Colombians call corbata: sinecures. Robert H. Dix’s very comprehensive study also limits his single, and brief, analysis of corruption to the issue of employment and this within the following general context: "Colombian administration is reputed not to be particularly corrupt in the more flagrant sense of large-scale bribery. But nepotism, ‘connections’ (palanca), petty bribery, and similar means of acquiring private influence and advantages are widespread." ¹²

In one of the most provocative studies of the period, James L. Payne¹³ presented the issue again as one of employment opportunities, this time, however, placed within a broader sociological framework in which three key variables interact: high social status consciousness, weak barriers to social mobility, and availability of status-providing jobs. Everett E. Hagen¹⁴ also emphasized the status-consciousness of Colombian society and saw the highland elite’s denial of status to the Antioqueños as the basis of the latter’s motivations and entrepreneurial energies. Never is the issue of corruption raised.

Interestingly enough, it was the U.S. Army’s Area Handbook for Colombia¹⁵ that had the most useful conceptual formulation for an understanding of the particular political culture in which corruption prospers. A key element, they noted, was the survival in Colombia of the colonial notion of the fuero: No one general law applies to all and at all times; each individual is regulated by whatever "law" he can secure from his leaders. "A politician expects to demonstrate his ability to shield his supporters from the rigorous application of the laws."¹⁶ The constant and all-pervasive quest of any leader, thus, is to secure prerogatives for one’s subordinates. The one who does that best is, in the local parlance, un verraco; the one who does not seek – or cannot secure – such prerogatives is un pendejo.¹⁷ Again, however, the Handbook does not speak of corruption per se.

There are two probable explanations for the absence of discussion on corruption. First, the concept had not yet become a subject for study anywhere. Second, there appears to have been an excess of caution and cultural sensitivity, i.e., do not pass judgment about probity and honesty in other cultures. Such total relativism is evident in Glen Caudill Dealy’s assertion that the favoritism, nepotism, and graft that characterize Latin American public and private relations cannot be judged or called corrupt by "cultural outsiders." The "insider," says Dealy, knows that this system is really "the law of reciprocal favors," which "foreshadows and reinforces culture-wide rationality in Latin America."¹⁸

Mercifully, Colombians need not be concerned with the false insider-outsider dichotomy. It is true that they started really late in the game. This is a universal characteristic of studies in corruption: They are post facto; they are studied after the deed and only once the consequences are evident. This is, of course, true of all historical research; the difference is that studies of corruption tend to promise theoretical formulations and policy relevance. Be that as it may, there are some pioneering studies out. Perhaps earliest were those of Francisco Thoumi, who published two critical essays and later his own book,¹⁹ all of which emphasized three key factors: (1) the long history of corruption (mostly through contraband), (2) the delegitimization of the state and government system generally, and (3) the growth of the informal economy specifically. It was the Antioqueño, says Thoumi, who was best, though not exclusively, situated to take advantage of these Colombian conditions to exploit the opening of the U.S. drug market.

As praiseworthy as Thoumi’s work is, it is largely limited to drug trade related corruption and, clearly, that is not the only type of corruption which exists in Colombia. This is where the very important study by Fernando Cepeda Ulloa fills a long-felt need.²⁰ It is not Cepeda’s purpose to be theoretically innovative. His purpose is to introduce Colombian decision-makers and scholars to the systematic study of the phenomenon. As such, the study adopts Robert Klitgaard’s²¹ framework, which is policy oriented and which stresses seven variables: institutional inefficiency, scope of individual discretion in decision-making posts, degree of monopolization over the values desired, benefits that can be derived from those monopolies, probability of being discovered, weight of punishments meted out, and level of condemnation of corrupt acts by society as a whole. It is evident that unless one can attach causal weights and causal sequences to these variables, the framework operates more as a taxonomy than as an explanatory-predictive theory.

The question then becomes, can there be "a theory" of corruption in the sense of an "if … then" explanatory system that has general applicability and on which policymakers can formulate strategies? The answer here is that it is not possible, as the following brief analysis of the exposure of corruption in Colombia will attempt to prove.

Included in this paper (Appendix A) is a report which appeared in Semana in 1991 and was part of a special issue on corruption inthe magazine Hemisphere (Summer 1991), which I edited. The level of corruption revealed there is evident. But the corruption reported is "administrative," i. e., the illegal private use of public monies. Many of the theories in existence and most of the actual coverage in Colombia deal with precisely that type of corruption. Note, for instance, the special reporting in El Tiempo:²² The concern is with the absence of accountability and the consequences for state and society. They conclude that with what the corrupt have stolen from the state in the past two years, the state could have executed a three-year agrarian reform program without any difficulties. Appendix B details some of the ongoing prosecutions. It is enough to note that the Procuraduría (Office of the Attorney General) detected 2,092 illegal contracts between November and December 1997. In Cundinamarca alone, there were illegal contracts for more than 59, 000 million pesos right after a memo from the attorney general ordered strict adherence to Law 80 of 1993 (the Ley de Contratación Estatal, the law governing state-issued contracts). All this, according to journalists, confirms the old saying, hecha la ley, hecha la trampa (When a law is made, a trap is also made). Anticorruption legislation is clearly not enough.

In a similar vein, El Tiempo carries a report entitled "Corruption Continues Apace."²³ Again, the malfeasance is of state funds, using the following schemes:

• The purchase of large inventories that rot or are stolen.
• Labor dismissals settled.
• Favoritism among certain contractors.
• Public works not completed or of no use to citizens.

Because of the numerous instances in the press of such administrative corruption, one is reminded of Gunnar Myrdal’s concept of the "soft state" -- a state in which virtually no public transaction is carried out without some act of corruption. What happens, however, if one attempts to explain the role of corruption, public and private, in the general political, social, and economic situation of the country? Existing studies, both theoretical and applied, begin to show their lack of reach and adequacy.

In a survey without any scientific pretensions, I decided to inquire from five well-informed Colombian friends what they considered the most important cases of gross corruption in the past decade or so. I used the list presented by Semana of the fifteen most dramatic events of the past fifteen years.²⁴ Five were positive:

• The economic opening (liberalization).
• The entry of the M-19 into the political system.
• Constitutional reform.
• Legalization of divorce.
• The September 3, 1993 soccer victory (5-0) over Argentina.

These positive happenings, however, pale in comparison to Semana’s most terrible events, any one of which would have shaken most Latin American political systems -- or at least the government of the moment--to its very foundations. Not surprisingly, my "jury" selected those events with the greatest political connections. They were ranked as follows:

No. 1, the Proceso 8.000, as Semana calls it, without doubt, the narcofinancing of the campaign that carried Ernesto Samper to the presidency is the largest scandal in the political history of Colombia. The Proceso 8.000 demonstrated that the country suffered from an illness worse than it appeared: corruption at the highest levels of power.

No. 2, the confession of Minister of Defense Fernando Botero that President Samper knowingly took the $6 million contribution from the mafias.

No. 3, the November 6, 1985, assault on the Palace of Justice by the M-19 and counter-attack by the army which killed ninety-five people, including seventeen members of the Supreme Court. Thirteen people disappeared; their fate has never been revealed. Up to today, no one has been able to confirm or deny the role of the drug mafias (bent on destroying the files) or of certain military people, also interested in destroying files. Did this assault have a clear and well-known objective carried out by known actors, or was it part of something different and perhaps more sinister?

No. 4, the generalized "narcoterrorism" that assassinated presidential candidates and journalists and blew up civilian passenger planes. This was the terrorists’ response to the state's efforts to stop their impunity; as Semana puts it, up to the mid-1980s, they could do everything, could obtain everything, could buy everything.

No. 5, the growth of paramilitarismo now financed by the drug mafias and new land owners who were being extorted, kidnapped, or boleteados. A full civil war has been careening out of control, with both sides using drug monies. Did this growth have clear and well-known objectives carried out by known actors, or was it part of something different and perhaps more sinister?

No. 6, the assassinations of journalists. With thirty-three assassinated, Colombia is first on the morbid list of members of the mass media murdered.

The preceding events do seem to involve deep and pervasive corruption. Even so, one is compelled to ask whether the events related to the drug traffic generally, and narcoterrorism specifically, are understandable through the available theories of corruption, or are they a phenomenon so different in origin, purposes, and methods that it requires a separate body of theory?

The next event shows how the conceptualization of corruption has to be expanded to include an international dimension; it could not be fully understood in purely national terms.

No. 7, the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán, fervent opponent of the mafias. The role of corruption was evident both in the internal Colombian aspect of this crime and in the external. If one takes into account the offshore dimensions of this case, i.e., the roles of Israel, Miami, and Antigua in the perfidious world of arms smuggling and military expertise, there is no doubt about the role of corruption.²⁵ Unfortunately, this international dimension will probably increase in importance as the violence in Colombia escalates and each group finances its weapons acquisition through drug trade monies (as has occurred in most civil wars, from Afghanistan to Lebanon). This international dimension is especially evident in the next case which, again, not surprisingly, the "jury" listed last. The exact political or public administration links are not readily evident.

No. 8, the financial crisis and collapse of Jaime Michelsen Uribe’s economic empire, an "octopus" of 210 businesses. This failure was the first major institutional collapse in Colombian financial/banking history but it certainly was not the only one in the early 1980s. What Semana does not say is that the Michelsen Uribe collapse was but the largest of some of twenty bank failures, all part of what one Colombian expert calls los piratas de la bolsa (the pirates of the exchange).²⁶ Colombians tend to understate the international dimensions of this case. This is a mistake. To understand how Michelsen Uribe built such an empire is to understand the role of offshore financial centers such as those in Panamá, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, and Curaçao in the creation of boilerplate companies, financial transfers, and, crucially, access to apparently inexhaustible supply of U.S. dollars. It was this "cash cow" (mostly from Panamá) that generated the liquidity necessary for the purchase of so many businesses simultaneously.²⁷ How much of all this was a result of corruption, however defined, is not clear to Colombians. The issues are too complex and cover too many jurisdictions to be explainable through the existing conceptualizations of corruption. Additionally, there is an evident disinterest on the part of government authorities in controlling and regulating monopolistic and oligopolistic businesses.²⁸

It is evident that existing theories of corruption cannot explain the complex situation in Colombia. The new mix is a diabolical brew combining:

• Historical forms of corruption in public employment such as the corbata and the palanca, along with traditional forms of smuggling and tax evasion.
• The sophisticated manipulation of national and international financial markets with the active connivance of offshore operations whose actions are legal in their jurisdictions.
• The violence, whether political or related to the drug trade.

It is evident that in such a situation the opportunity cost analysis as to whether a corrupt act is worth it has a dramatically different context than one where violence is not as prevalent. The plata o plomo (silver or lead: money or bullets) offer presents most people with a Hobson’s choice. The absolutely important thing, however, is that not everyone accepts it to be a Hobson’s choice. Not everyone in Colombia is corrupt. Why? Established theories of corruption cannot tell us why some people are corrupt and others are not, under the same circumstances and opportunities.

Given the wide variety of opportunities for corruption, one has to go beyond the individual act and focus on the general world view or Weltanschauung: the distinctive outlook of the members of a society at a particular historical period. This world view will be based on the common experiences that express common social and cultural conditions. I believe the concept of alienation is useful fundamentally because while it points to the feelings of dissociation from the surrounding society, it never assumes that all individuals will be alienated.

One has to understand that the concept of alienation has a long and varied usage and that it has been applied mostly after the fact to explain multiple ills. This is not the place to review the literature, however. I merely suggest that parts of Melvin Seeman’s sociological usage are applicable to Colombia.²⁹ Although Seeman spoke of "five variants" of alienation, two of these appear to have particular applicability to the situation in Colombia. I list them and give some examples from the contemporary press.

Category No. 1. Powerlessness – the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behaviors cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes or reinforcements he seeks. Note the latest poll on attitudes:³⁰

"Generally speaking, do you believe that things in the country are heading down a good or a bad road?"

Good Road                   19 percent
Bad Road                      78 percent
No Answer                      3 percent

Note the evident exasperation of two authors with the apparent sense of powerlessness of the citizenry:

In a country in which no one seems willing to bet a cent to moderate the threat hanging over a neighbor, a minister of state, a prosecutor general, four presidential candidates, 1,500 leaders of the Patriotic Union, almost a thousand police and half a thousand journalists, had paid with their life to defend the ideal of a triumph over the mafia.³¹

There is a generalized, and so far futile, anger at what Colombians call impunidad, which El Tiempo calls "the miserable role of the fairy godmother of the criminals."³²

Category No. 1 is undoubtedly an important alienation and can go a long way in explaining a generalized rationalization that "if everyone is doing it and no one is ever punished, why not do it if it pays." It is Category No. 2, however, that is the most damaging type of alienation, it is destructive of individual initiative and, when widespread, saps the national spirit, encouraging escape, cynical acceptance of deviance, or futile rebellion. In other words, it undermines the will of those whose lack of corruption is fundamental to the survival of civil society.

Category No. 2. Self-estrangement -- loss of intrinsic meaning or pride in current work so that the individual performs only for anticipated rewards.

The fundamental importance of the single personal testimony presented here has to do with the personality involved. Thirty-six years ago, Umaña Luna, along with Orlando Fals Borda and Germán Guzmán, published the most important and influential work on violence in Colombia, La Violencia en Colombia. Even after the most thorough review of the brutalities of the violence that killed perhaps 250,000 peasants, Umaña Luna's views on the Colombian people revealed no hint of alienation: The political leadership was changing, the military was reforming, but fundamentally, it was the Colombian people themselves:

… where the great transformations in Colombia are being conceived. It is a people of immense possibilities, of values that should not continue to be underestimated … a people that despite everything, still believes, loves, and hopes.³³

Move the scene to 1998 and witness the response of this same sociologist upon hearing that his human rights activist son had been assassinated:

… this is a country of cowards, of shamelessness, of vagabonds, of thieves and assassins. I don’t give a damn about the country, it pains me to be a Colombian and to live in the midst of a bunch of assassins.³⁴

Rafael Santos, editorialist for El Tiempo, believes that the country was "on the threshold of anarchy," and that Umaña Luna’s words, though caused by the death of his son, hit the nail on the head.³⁵ The fundamental aspect of all this is that it goes beyond the individual, it is the society that is now beyond just being scandalized and shocked by the situation; it is that plus a sense of powerlessness and detachment. Note the response of the most influential journalist in the country, Enrique Santos Calderón:

In the midst of the consternation and indignation, the impunity of so much political crime overshadows the pathetic impotence of the government.³⁶

It should come as no surprise that there is already talk of an "asylum syndrome:" a recent poll shows nearly half of all Colombians from all social classes want to leave the country.³⁷

The importance of such a sociological approach to alienation is that it compels the researcher to seek not individually driven sources of anxiety but collective feelings of powerlessness in the face of particular social phenomena such as corruption and violence. It never assumes that everyone in the society is alienated, just as not everyone is corrupt. In fact, the approach sets itself the fundamental empirical task to explain why, given the same social context, some are alienated and some are not, some are corrupt but most are not.

A theoretical question in studies of alienation is whether it is cause or effect of corrupt behavior: Is alienation the generative social condition or the consequence? Since it appears to be both, the question for policy is, how do you break the vicious cycle of cause-effect-cause?

Since the mass media are saturated with negative feelings about the situation, feelings that are amply expressed by the polls, it might be well to reverse course and do what is called "deviant case analysis", i.e. studying cases of evident nonalienation. What are the signs or evidence of such postures in Colombia? For the sake of brevity I shall mention a few that strike me as of particular importance.

First, and absolutely foremost, is the terrible price those who have resisted have paid. It would be a serious mistake to merely compile statistics on the murdered, kidnapped ,and persecuted, without noting that many, if not all, of those were individuals willing to be among those counted on the side of decency. Candidate Luis Carlos Galan and journalist Guillermo Cano Isaza are but the most outstanding; like them, there are legions in politics, the press, the judiciary, the universities, the military, and the police. They appear to be disorganized as a social movement. But the very number of sacrifices speaks of their numbers and indomitable courage.

Second is the rise in social prestige of the National Police, which prior to 1995 was a cesspool of corruption and lawlessness. In a social prestige or status-ranking poll James Payne and I did in Colombia in the early 1960s, police officers ranked at the very bottom (thirty-ninth out of thirty-nine choices) of the scale. Things have changed. National Police Director General Rosso José Serrano has brought about such dramatic changes that despite the heavy casualties the police are taking in constant combat, the number of applicants to the police academy keeps climbing. The capacity for change under good leadership is evident.

Finally, and quite surprisingly, the continued functioning of Colombian electoral politics, the important existence of a vibrant press, and the still dynamic and diversified nature of the economy are all telling factors. It is true that the economy is in a slump, unemployment up and standards of living down. If both the important press and the political elite (facing crucial elections soon) keep on asserting and doing the positive and be seen doing the positive, I am convinced that there will be no shortage of followers among the people. Again, the number of martyrs attests to the courage of the Colombians. What is needed is a national leadership with the legitimacy to build on this solid, though slipping, foundation.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002