Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

This session dealt with the internal problem faced by Colombia policymakers. Dr. Pizarro spoke about the situation of internal instability and how Colombia is often compared with Bosnia and Vietnam, though the situation is clearly very different. He then provided some insights on why the guerrillas and paramilitary groups exist and some ideas on what it may take to resolve the problems created by their existence. For instance, the military needs enhanced resources, but more importantly it needs a concerted show of political and public support encompassed by a national strategy. Dr. Maingot spoke about the problems of reality and perception created by corruption. He explored the interesting theme of considering corruption as part of Colombia’s tradition, or whether it is a new phenomenon. He argued that the international community perceives Colombia as a highly corrupt country, though this perception is based for the most part on the vocal complaints aired by Colombians themselves. This social opposition may indicate that corruption is an aberration, and thus not part of Colombia’s tradition. Unfortunately, because of time constraints Colonel Spracher’s presentation was moved to another panel, so questions on his presentation will be accepted then.

All the panelists made excellent points about the internal state of the country and how change can only be achieved through concerted efforts involving all the sectors of government and society. Some things that might be considered, in light of reality and the perception of corruption, include the following: how does the international community perceive Colombian efforts to fight its internal problems? If the Colombian military does not receive the legitimacy it needs from the Colombian public, is that partially due to the fact that Colombia has received a black mark against it from the United States for its efforts in the drug war? Is U. S. policy, in turn, partially a lack of understanding of the complexity of internal problems in Colombia? If so, how can the U.S. not only change its policy, but assist Colombia to resolve some of these difficulties? With questions such as these in mind, the question and answer portion of the panel is now open.

QUESTION: Looking at the historical roots of the situation, instability in Colombia is not necessarily a crisis: Instability is normal for Colombia.

ANSWER: There is an element of truth to that, but it is different now from the past in that there is an increased reliance on private justice (the paramilitary groups, the guerrillas, transnational organized crime, private security forces, self-defense groups) to fill in the vacuum created by the failure of government institutions. This indicates a loss of legitimacy on the part of the government. Which came first, the power vacuum or the instability? How can one focus on the causes of instability when the situation is so chaotic? To quote Dr. Francisco Thoumi, if there are no rewards for honest behavior, how can we expect anyone to pay attention to the rule of law and order?

COMMENT: Yes, instability is "normal" to Colombia, for many historical reasons. But the situation now is different. For instance, was Ernesto Samper the only president in the region involved in drug corruption? Why did the U.S. deny a visa only to Samper? What are the criteria for denying visas? There are other cases of presidents (or presidential candidates) accused of drug corruption. But in Colombia there is a lot of internal dialogue on the topic, giving it attention. This dialogue shows there is a certain level of intolerance toward corruption in Colombia that brings attention to the problem. There is no such dialogue or intolerance in, for instance, México or Panamá. It is the presence of a dialogue within the country that becomes a major factor in how the U.S. deals with that government or that individual.

COMMENT: The task for Colombia is to build a state capable of dealing with the instability. The time periods of instability mentioned in the question, the partial collapse of the state in the 1950s and the 1990s, especially in terms of justice, do add evidence to the assumption that instability is normal in Colombia. The peace process in Colombia [today] is an historical opportunity to reach consensus on governance. It is an historic opportunity to make the difficult decisions on how to govern, in terms of justice, institutional accountability, and agrarian reform.

QUESTION: What do the guerrillas want, in terms of demands for negotiating a settlement?

ANSWER: The guerrillas show some evidence of schizophrenia: Internal documents demonstrate a commitment to the war effort to defeat the government of Colombia. But all their declarations to the press talk about their desire for peace. There is no evidence of the guerrillas’ willingness to negotiate for peace. The National Liberation Army (ELN) talks of negotiations on human rights violations, but not in the short run. Negotiating with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is impossible, because its commitment to military and political power is too strong, and yet there is no region within Colombia with enough commitment to Marxist ideology to support the FARC’s political agenda. The Colombian government needs to reorganize its forces to defeat the paramilitary groups and to prevent the insurgents from gaining any more territory.

QUESTION: There’s a lack of understanding of the situation in Colombia; there needs to be a redifinition of the international agenda (e.g., illegal drugs, human rights, the environment, migration). The threat to Colombia is very specific, and the international agenda splits the electorate within the country. Colombia needs a new culture of security to improve the cohesion within the government. A part of this new culture is the need for military reform, a revolution in military affairs (RMA), to use Pentagon jargon. What would be the impact of this international agenda on Colombia?

ANSWER: Colombia is in the eye of the hurricane because of the Cold War agenda conflicting with the agendas of the 1980s and 1990s. The U.S. erred fundamentally by making drugs the only issue on its agenda, emphasizing the international conflict. In the process, it lost a lot of time and will continue to lose time in rectifying the situation. The U.S. needs to recognize that the issue of instability is far worse than the issue of drugs. The international agenda should emphasize domestic cohesion, and as you mention, military reform is required, but not within the framework of a peace process -- rather, outside of this framework. The current strategy in Colombia is decades old and no longer applicable to the current problems.

QUESTION: According to the 1991 Constitution, it is the responsibility of the president to provide guidance to the military, in terms of military reform, strategy, objectives, roles and missions. But that guidance is lacking. Why?

ANSWER: Sometime during the 1960s, the political elites abandoned the peace agenda. The armed forces assumed the agenda. Government officials after Defense Minister Rafael Pardo ignored the issues, and there has been no institutional or national debate over security. Civilians do not assume responsibility for root causes, for instance, agrarian reform, and instead tell the armed forces to rectify the situation. There is a need for a new culture of security, but it must be at the national level and be broad based and across the board. There are now in Colombia perhaps five or six civilians knowledgeable on issues of national security, but they find it very difficult to dialogue with the military because of the institutional bias against civilians.

Comment: In Miami, there is a large following of General Haroldo Bedoya, but their analysis is similar to the old analysis, in which a strong military with a wide mission is undercut by the civilian fear of a strong military. The armed forces in Colombia are the weakest in the region because of a lack of civilian support. There is little political will to support the military.

Comment: The general weakness of the armed forces is traditional and historic, because of a basic fear of a strong military institution capable of translating military power to political power. This explains the absence of coups in Colombia, but it also explains the presence of paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and private security forces. There is a strong sense of respect within the military for civilian government. But this changes when officers retire: There is a tradition of retired military officers seriously criticizing the civilian government on security issues. While in uniform, military officers are loyal to their institution and to their government. But after retirement, they voice their disillusionment with the civilian government and work hard to do something about it.

QUESTION: Colombia needs military reform, despite the serious ignorance on the part of civilians of security themes. Colombia needs reform also in its civilian government. For instance, all presidents in the past couple of decades have organized a peace process, despite a complete absence of knowledge about war and what it takes to run a war or negotiate a peace. Knowing this, where does one start?

ANSWER: It is possible, despite all the problems you pose. The National Police was reformed based on the recommendations of an internal commission and an interagency oversight committee. There were periods of high tension, but the result was a greatly improved National Police. The process managed to overcome the attitude (perhaps more well developed in the armed forces) that all comments about the institution are considered an affront to the institution. If that attitude is maintained, nothing will ever be reformed. But the armed forces need to consider that they have been fighting a counterinsurgency for about forty years without either reform or victory.

| Return to Top | Return to Table of  Contents |

Contact Us
NDU Press Home Page
NDU Home Page
INSS Home Page

Last Update:  September 30, 2002