Crisis?  What Crisis?   Security Issues in Colombia

The Peace Process in Guatemala

by

Brigadier General Otto Pérez Molina³⁸

The internal armed conflict in Guatemala began during the 1960s. Principal among the causes of the war was the closing of political space and of opportunities for participation. This practice was carried out by a succession of anticommunist governments, following the overthrow of the second government of the Guatemalan revolution, led by Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán.³⁹ Arbenz’s government was deposed with the support of the United States. The guerrilla movement had among its principal founders former officers of the military, who had participated in a failed uprising against the government of General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes.⁴⁰

In 1982, after almost twenty years of armed confrontation, the military government of General Efraín José Rios Montt made a first attempt to find a negotiated settlement. This was rejected by the guerrilla movement. The early 1980s represented the most difficult period of the war, when the guerrillas numbered 12-15,000, and the army approximately 55,000. Subsequently, in 1983, a group of states known as the Contadora Group⁴¹ launched an international effort to assist in the search for peace throughout Central America. In 1987, the presidents of the Central American states, determined to achieve peace in the region, signed the Esquipulas Accords, which established mechanisms to achieve peace and reconciliation through political means.⁴²

In 1991, the government of Guatemala, then headed by President Jorge Elías Serrano, decided to open direct negotiations with the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).⁴³ An agenda was established, and the talks were moderated by the president of the National Reconciliation Commission.⁴⁴ The United Nations participated as an observer.

Finally, after more than five years of negotiation, two changes of government, and modifications in the negotiation procedures, a peace accord was signed in December 1996.

The negotiations covered an agenda containing essentially eleven themes divided into two groups: substantive issues, having to do with the deep-rooted problems of the country, and operational issues, which dealt with the deactivation of the armed conflict and the reincorporation of the insurgents into normal life. The negotiations themselves had three stages.

The beginning and rupture (1991 to 1993). Both the government and the URNG established relatively large commissions of approximately ten members to participate in the negotiations. The president of the National Reconciliation Commission moderated the sessions, and the United Nations participated as an observer. This first phase lasted approximately two years, with few advances. The positions taken by both commissions were very hard-line, and the levels of resistance and distrust very high. Nevertheless, the talks created an environment in which, little by little, one could envision that the long internal armed conflict would end at the bargaining table. This first phase ended with a virtual break in the negotiations, due to a failure to advance on the issue of human rights, and the end of President Jorge Serrano Elías’ term.⁴⁵

The point of no return (1993 to 1995). After the Serrano crisis was resolved democratically on June 6, 1993, the new administration of President Ramiro de León Carpio named a new commission. New approaches aimed at restarting the negotiations bore fruit six months later.

A new framework for the talks was established, containing the following elements:⁴⁶ the United Nations ceased to function as observer, and was asked to become moderator of the talks; a Group of Friends of the peace process was established;⁴⁷ civil society was to participate through the creation of the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (Assembly of Civil Society); and a new calendar for the talks was agreed to. This new framework, in addition to the new political situation in the country, made it possible to make important advances on several difficult issues.⁴⁸ The United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was established, and agreement was reached on four other issues. The negotiations reached a point of no return. This phase of the peace process ended with the change in government in January of 1996.

End of the process (1995 to 1996). The conditions necessary to complete the negotiations were created when the new government took over in 1996.⁴⁹ A climate of greater trust between the parties was established, and the negotiating commissions of both sides were reduced to four members each. This made the discussions more fluid. In addition, both sides confirmed their will to end the negotiations as quickly as possible, without sacrificing the content of the accords.

Extremely important advances were made throughout 1996, which made it possible to finish the discussion of the issues and sign the final accord. The framework for negotiation during the final phase was the same as during the previous one.

During the thirty-six years of internal armed conflict, the Guatemalan army showed itself to be an institution that could adjust and respond to changing circumstances. The peace process was no exception: Even with the initial difficulties, the military was one of the institutions that most understood and cooperated with the process.

Prior to the negotiations, in 1987, after the signing of the first and second Esquipulas Accords, the army was deeply distrustful that negotiations could serve as an alternative to end the internal armed conflict. During this time, the army debated internally the role it had played in previous years under military governments, as well as the role it should play in support of the democratic process. This was a difficult process, with a great deal of opposition by those disposed to continuing the armed conflict. But over time this internal dialogue, as well as changing political circumstances, permitted the military to go to the negotiating table.

In 1991 when the direct talks began, the military had not yet reached an internal consensus on the issue. Nonetheless, one could note the beginnings of a favorable inclination toward the peace talks. With time, and as the talks progressed, the balance began to tip in favor of the negotiations. During the final three years, a high percentage of members of the army believed in and supported the process.

Discussion of the armed forces took place as part of the negotiations over "the strengthening of civilian power and role of the army in a democratic society." What was agreed to included the following:

• Constitutional reforms to article 244 on the composition, organization, and functions of the army; article 219 on military tribunals; article 246 on responsibilities and powers of the president regarding the army; and an addition to article 186 on functions of the president.
• Doctrine and educational system of the army.
• Size and resources (a reduction in force and budget).
• Intelligence agencies.

The accords related to the armed forces were to be implemented in the year following the signing of the peace accord. By mid-1998 it could be said that implementation has been satisfactory. The reductions in both budget and troop levels took place; the army was reduced from approximately 46,000 to 30,000 troops within the prescribed timeframe, and the budget in 1997 was cut by 33 percent relative to 1995. The reforms to internal laws that govern the armed forces had not been carried out by mid-1998; procedurally, the constitutional reforms needed to be approved before the changes could be implemented.

The redeployment of the armed forces in the country has been taking place. By mid-1998 five military zones in the interior of Guatemala had been closed; this is a process that must continue alongside the reorganization of the armed forces. Changes in the area of intelligence have been rescheduled, in essence to allow for the approval of corresponding laws at the same time that personnel are trained.

There are numerous differences between Colombia and Guatemala that affect the usefulness of the model presented here. These differences have to do with the size of the national territory, the number of inhabitants, the number and complexity of actors involved in the violence, the level of national resources, the origins of the conflict, and, of course, the resources that the guerrillas receive from narcotrafficking. Nonetheless, Guatemala holds a number of useful precedents for Colombia. Keep in mind that in Guatemala many maintained that ours was a unique case, that the Salvadoran experience was irrelevant to ours, that in Guatemala a negotiation was next to impossible, etc. In the end, however, we found many similarities, and the experience of El Salvador and its armed forces were a useful and constant point of reference.

Similarities between Guatemala and Colombia include the following:

• The exhaustion of the population after long years of armed conflict and the loss of innumerable lives--a majority of them civilians, who have been caught in the middle of the conflict and obliged in one form or another to collaborate with one or another of the parties.

• The interest of the international community, manifest through international bodies, individual states, and non-governmental organizations, in finding a solution to the armed conflict through peaceful means. These actors were very effective in Guatemala--and, I believe, will be effective in the case of Colombia -- through arbitrating, moderating, or observing the process and assisting in the negotiations. ⁵⁰

• The armed forces’ initial resistance to the negotiations, because the military’s knowledge of the guerrillas was much deeper than that of any other sector. This intimate knowledge produced a deep lack of trust, to the point that many believed that the only solution to the armed conflict was to eliminate the guerrillas, not negotiate with them.

From these similarities, one can draw the following lessons for Colombia:

• There is a distinction between the formal and informal channels of communication between the parties. In the case of Guatemala, when the formal talks stalled over difficult issues, we found it useful to search for other channels of contact that were separate from the negotiating table. For example, several of us in the military met informally with some representatives of the URNG, completely outside the structure of the formal talks. In that way, we got to know each other better and understand each other’s point of view.⁵¹

• The armed forces’ vision of the peace talks is also important to consider. In Guatemala, the position of the armed forces changed over time, from an almost total rejection of the peace process to a clear position during the last two years of the negotiations that they were the way to end the internal armed conflict. The president made the political decision to open negotiations with the guerrillas, and while not everyone in the army was convinced that this was the adequate way to achieve peace, the military supported the president’s decision and ultimately became the governmental institution that most supported the process. It became understood that Guatemala in peacetime would mean a change in the role of the armed forces, and these changes had to be accepted. Instead of doubts, fears, and suspicions of the peace process, we came to see it with a certain optimism; we came to recognize that giving in on certain matters was better than continuing the armed confrontation.

• The process of discussion within the armed forces was key. Having a representative on the governmental Peace Commission was critical, as was maintaining direct communication between the negotiating table and those soldiers and officers located in the most remote zones of the country. A group of officers not directly participating in the negotiations formed a Comisión de Apoyo (Support Commission) which analyzed the defense and security issues under discussion, making observations and recommendations and transmitting information throughout the military. This commission helped ensure that, through meetings and internal discussions, the peace process was understood and debated within the armed forces. In addition, following each formal round of talks, I made sure that the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff, and other senior officials, were completely informed about what had taken place. These channels of internal communication were crucial to the success of the process.

The process was a long one, with many difficulties, and on various occasions reached a total stalemate. Only with the support of the international community, the rejection by the Guatemalan people of continuing with the armed conflict, and the will of the parties not to abandon the negotiating table, was it possible to finally sign the peace accords. Ultimately, the talks produced a situation in which no one lost, and all institutions and sectors believed that they had won. There have been significant changes, and these continue. The peace process has created an environment in which all Guatemalans can discuss matters and seek solutions to our common problems, in order to build a better country.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002