U.S.-Russian Partnership:  Meeting the New Millennium

11. RUSSIA AND THE NONNUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA

Yuri E. Fedorov

INTRODUCTION
The view that nuclear weapons are losing their strategic mission is increasingly prevalent. With the end of the Cold War nuclear forces are regarded mostly as an instrument for deterring hypothetical threats. But nuclear armaments will not be used in local wars or paramilitary conflicts, which remain most likely types of armed conflicts in the predictable future.

In these circumstances, nonnuclear weapons, including chemical and biological armaments which are often named "poor man’s atomic bomb," are of growing significance for global and, especially, regional security environment. American expert Brad Roberts, editor of The Washington Quarterly, was absolutely correct when he mentioned in October 1994 that a threat of "a post-nuclear trap" resulting from a feasible proliferation of biological weapons could emerge.1 In this light, a control over nonnuclear weapons will be an important point of the coming arms control agenda.

However, nonnuclear arms control per se is not a well-structured concept. It includes, by definition, all issues not related to nuclear weapons and technologies despite principal dissimilarity of their military characteristics, strategic mission, and technical nature. Each plays its own specific role in various international situations, and therefore Russia is developing individual approaches to particular problems and dimensions of the "non-nuclear" arms control agenda.

Russian policies in the related fields result from controversial sets of motivations. Among them are strategic considerations, political attitudes, and ambitions of different groups and lobbies in Russian bureaucratic and military communities, and commercial interests of Russian defense industries. They are also products of changes of the global strategic environment, of perceptions of these changes by Russia’s elite, and of the developments in Russia itself, first of all, of its radical economic and military decline. The controversy behind Russian policy resulted in its dubious character. And in view of that, the principal question is whether nonnuclear arms control is emerging as a new field of international cooperation, including cooperation between Russia and the United States, or as a new field of rivalry, where nations are competing in a traditional geopolitical way for better strategic postures.

As for Russia, the most important dimension of nonnuclear arms control efforts seems to be the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, through which the Russian military and bureaucratic elite hope to restrict the number of troops and armaments that could be stationed on the territories of the new NATO member-states. The missile technology control regime, as well as fulfillment of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, may prevent a proliferation of new military technologies near Russian borders. The participation in the conventional arms export regime is politically important for Russia, but at the same time commercial interests of Russian defense-related industries are incompatible with more or less effectual restrictions on the international arms trade.

THE SOURCES OF RUSSIA’S POLICY Toward NONNUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
There was a lot of optimism immediately after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War has radically decreased the risk of large-scale military conflict in Europe and in the wider global arena. The prospect of a "strategic partnership" of Russia with leading Western powers and the United States has emerged. In view of that the traditional—or the Cold War type—nonnuclear arms control agenda and strategies seemed to lose their importance and even their very raison d’être. In the beginning of the 1990s, most of Russia’s concerns were related not to the policies and intentions of the Western states but to the local wars and low-intensity conflicts rising in the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union, including a part of the Russia’s Northern Caucasus. There was also concern over hypothetical confrontation with China and over the apportionment of the former Soviet Armed Forces among the new independent states.

Of course, even in the beginning of the 1990s, arms control issues were objects of a political struggle in the Russian elite. Groups like managers of defense-related industries, a part of the military command and Communist and nationalist opposition in the Parliament opposed constructive approaches to arms control, including nonnuclear dimensions. They used both strategic and economic arguments, insisting especially that costs of disarmament would be unbearable for the shrinking Russian economy. However, the main direction of Russian foreign and security policies were then to cooperate effectively with the Western partners in preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as in other efforts aimed at providing more security at the global and regional levels.

Further development has demonstrated that the traditional geopolitical coordinates and strategies for conventional arms control have not lost their significance for the Russian policy-making elite. Internal conditions in Russia are favorable for militant nationalistic movements that are basically anti-Western. A number of groups and lobbies interested in a kind of "controlled confrontation" with the West have emerged. Of equal importance could be a transformation of the present regime, a rise of imperialistic and "great power" ambitions in the ruling elite. Zbigniew Brzezinski was quite right when wrote, "The Russian elite—especially Moscow’s political elite—still sees itself as leading a global power and craves recognition as such from the world at large. In contrast, the Russian people, preoccupied with their daily travails, are bitter and alienated from the ‘new class,’ and not particularly interested in Russia’s global status or in its old imperial status."2

The formation of a basically left-wing government headed by Yevgeny Primakov in early September 1998 seems to result in the growing influence of the military-industrial complex on the shaping of Russia’s foreign and security policy. The deep crisis of the Russian military-industrial complex is among the basic internal factors that affect the Russian approach to strategic issues, including nonnuclear arms control. Russia has inherited about 60 percent of former Soviet GDP and approximately 80 percent of its military industry and science industries. Thus, the relative militarization of Russia’s economy is even higher than it was in the former Soviet Union. According to most reliable sources, Soviet defense expenditures at the end of the 1980s accounted 15 to 17 percent of the GDP. Just before the fall of the USSR, 79 percent of all R&D was conducted by research facilities of the military-industrial complex, while the share of military research was 53 percent.3 That was the definite result of the Soviet strategy of global military confrontation with NATO, Japan, and China.

After the crash of the USSR, Russia had neither the resources nor reasons to maintain the same armed forces and defense industry. In 1992-97, serious reductions in armed forces and defense spending took place. According to Russian officials, defense expenditures in 1997 were about 9 to 10 times less than they were in 1990. Western assessments of Russian defense expenditures were much higher but also confirmed their serious decline in this decade. This evoked a negative response from social groups associated with the military-industrial complex, provoked to a high degree by neglect of democratic reforms, and caused the growth of nostalgic sentiment and clear-cut hostility to proposed integration of Russia into the community of democratic nations. The elite of the Russian military-industrial complex lobbies actively for the regeneration of Russian military strength and accuses Yeltsin’s government and “democrats” of deliberate destruction of the Russian military-industrial complex at the behest of the West.

The military-industrial complex needs a potential enemy that either threatens national interests or encroaches on the country’s rich natural resources, to justify its existence and realize its goals. In fact, this can be only the West. The military-industrial complex vision of foreign policy incorporates, in particular, a rapid and substantial growth of arms supplies, and exports of advanced technologies including those with dual military and civilian applications. They promote also a resumption of ties with some former Soviet partners, such as Iraq or Libya, and an intensive search for markets for their products.

The political influence of the MIC and some other groups with similar attitudes stimulates the traditional geopolitical view of the world as an arena of often conflicting interactions of a number of “power centers,” typical for current Russia’s political thinking. It includes the understanding of military force as a principal factor of international status. Recently appointed Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has expressed that attitude, which he clearly stated at the end of 1996: “An effective economy and impressive military might of Russia are necessary for the strengthening of the fundamentals of the multi-polar world.” 4 This general picture of international relations resulted in a perception of arms control, both nuclear and nonnuclear, as an instrument of improving Russia’s position in a number of regions, rather than as a means of strengthening regional or global security.

These general features of Russia’s policy are manifested inter alia in Moscow’s approach to the modernization of the CFE Treaty. Russian perceptions of the emerging security environment in Europe include growing suspicions of Western intentions and policies and stimulate the interpretation of NATO enlargement as a clear-cut military threat to Russia. In the second half of the 1990s, especially after Yevgeny Primakov was appointed Foreign Minister, the prevention of NATO enlargement was declared to be the principal task of Russian foreign and security policies. Among other attempts to neutralize the eastward expansion of the Alliance, an important role is attached to the current negotiations on the adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The basic idea is to constrain stationed troops on territories of new NATO member-states by including proper provisions into the modernized CFE Treaty.

The principal characteristic of the global security environment after the end of the bipolar confrontation, which affects Russian arms-control policy, could be the "regionalization of security." It means, in particular, the growing role of regional powers, regional and local conflicts, regional balances and imbalances, and regional arms control regimes, as well as confidence- and security-building measures. The regionalization of security has affected Russia’s conventional arms control policy in a number of particular cases. One of them was the Russian offer of the package of security guarantees and confidence-building measures proposed to the Baltic states in 1997. This approach would be useful if it were designed not as an alternative to NATO expansion to the Baltic area but as a kind of supplementary arrangement to it. The other one is Russia’s stand on the flank issue, namely its request for her treaty-limited equipment (TLE) ceilings to be raised in the north and, especially, in the south.

The regionalization of security is influencing Russian stands on the proliferation of missile technologies, chemical and biological weapons. The prospect that some arising regional "power centers" will acquire missile technologies, chemical or biological capabilities, or increase radically their conventional potential, causes notable challenges for Russia. On the one hand, Moscow is interested in commercial transfers of weapons, military equipment, and defense-related technologies. And the principal importers of Russian arms and military equipment are clearly "power centers" like China, Iran or India. A part of the Moscow elite regards also the rise of regional powers as a confirmation of a "multi-polar world" concept and considers some of them as potential allies in a hypothetical confrontation with the United States.

But, on the other hand, if some regional powers, like Iran or North Korea, obtain missile technologies, especially combined with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, then it may result in substantial instabilities in the regions that are in close proximity to the Southern and Far Eastern areas of the former Soviet Union. This of course causes significant concerns in Russia’s ruling groups.

The traditional geopolitical attitudes are combined in the Russian security policy with a more reasonable and constructive approach. A number of important economic and political groups are very interested in cooperating with Western countries. With this view they consider, in particular, positive participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention, joining the Missile Technology Control Regime and some other international arrangements, apart from anything else, as manifestations of a spirit of cooperation and partnership with the West. Beside that, Moscow’s elite can not ignore the fact that the most dangerous threats to Russia’s security are coming not from the policies of the Western states, but originated inside the country itself and, as well are rooted in instabilities and conflicts nearby Russian borders.

Nonnuclear arms control must be considered in the context of the progressive degradation of the Russian Armed Forces and Russia’s economic conditions. Russia’s military reforms are aimed at reducing the total number of personnel and armaments, and to restructure land forces with a view to form a limited number—perhaps ten or twelve—full strength, fully manned, and well-trained units of division and brigade scale deployed in all military districts, but first of all in the Northern Caucasus and Moscow MD.5

If realized, this restructuring of land forces modifies some important aspects of conventional arms control approaches and issues. In particular, it may result in a decreasing importance of numerical balances and in a growing role of power-projection capabilities and battle readiness, training, and organization of the armed forces. Regulations related to armaments and military equipment in storage will be much more important then before. There could be some similarity with a situation that may emerge for NATO. Likely restrictions on stationing troops and armaments at the territories of the new NATO member-states may make mobility of forces and power-projection capabilities much more important factors than before. In view of these confidence-building measures, including notifications, information exchange, and other transparency procedures could play a more meaningful role in Russian-Western relations. However, currently the Russian approach to arms control in Europe is aimed at more traditional numerical parameters and balances.

ADAPTATION OF THE CFE TREATY
The CFE Treaty was often called a cornerstone of European security architecture. At the same time, the supposition of its inadequacy to the security environment in Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization is commonplace in any political analysis of the European international relations. However, this is only partly true. The CFE Treaty had provided the legal framework for the essential reductions of the conventional armaments in Europe and the physical destruction of several thousand weapons, and later for limitations on military personnel. It also increased to large extent the transparency and verification in the military field which is a vitally important element to any security regime in Europe.

The adaptation of the CFE Treaty is among the principal dimensions of Russian conventional arms control policy. Russia’s main task is to minimize the ability of NATO countries to station their troops and TLE on foreign territories, thus preventing the strengthening NATO military capabilities in Eastern and Central Europe. In the beginning of January 1997 Russian Foreign Minister Primakov even stated that the signing of the charter with NATO would be possible only if the modernized CFE Treaty would eliminate Russian concerns provoked by the coming enlargement of NATO.6 Later on this very definite link was canceled, but it was very typical for the Russian general approach to the problem in question.

Current negotiations on the modernization of the CFE Treaty began in January 1997 after the Document on the Scope and Parameters had been approved by the signatories to the CFE in December 1996, during the Lisbon summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Just before this summit, former First Deputy to the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov defined the main points of Russia’s starting position, insisting that the modernized Treaty should:

Among other principal elements of the Russian position were the refusal from regional limitations on TLE. This means, first of all, the elimination of the flank rules and a combination of a collective ceiling for a coalition with national ceilings. The logic behind this stand, which assumes the continuation of the "the group of the State Parties principle," was quite obvious. The only coalition in Europe is, in fact, NATO; therefore, if NATO is enlarged, then the number of NATO members would be reduced by the amount of TLE and personnel of "new" coalition members. Theoretically, the members of other group of the Spate Parties may pretend to raise their summary ceiling by the same amount. The proposed restrictions on the air force were the result of growing anxiety with a prospect of hypothetical concentration of NATO aviation near Russian borders in case of a conflict.

The initial NATO position on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty was presented by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at the meeting of the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna on February 20, 1997. The main element of the NATO approach is to replace the current group and zonal concept by a system of national and territorial ceilings combined with stabilizing measures. According to the NATO vision, the adaptation of the CFE should establish a structure of TLE ceilings comprising:

The NATO approach was based on the premise that the total of the future national ceilings of the ground TLE of its 16 members would be significantly less under the shaped treaty than their current group level. "In a view of this objective, the NATO proposal emphasizes, States Parties should review their current declared national maximum levels of holdings to assess whether they reflect current and likely future requirements. On the basis of that review, each State Party should reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, final conclusions regarding the scope for reductions. The resulting national equipment ceilings are then codified in the adopted Treaty."8

So, initial NATO proposals presumed the possibility to station troops and TLE on foreign territories. The numerical characteristics of stationed troops and TLE could be defined as the difference between individual territorial and national ceilings that are derived from current notified maximum levels of holdings. NATO presumed also at the beginning of negotiations that individual territorial ceilings do not have to be negotiated, but are derived from the current notified maximum levels of holdings. In setting of the territorial ceilings CFE, State-Parties will notify the distribution of their entitlements for the various territorial units.

Some specific stabilizing measures were also proposed. Principal among them was that territorial ceilings for all categories of ground TLE within Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and the territory of Ukraine not covered by provisions of the Article V of the CFE Treaty (as modified in the Final Document of the CFE Review Conference, May 1996) plus the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation, will be not higher than current national maximum levels for holdings for each State Party.

During the first six months of negotiations, Russia’s position was modified in a more pragmatic and constructive way. In the beginning of July 1997, the principal points of the Russian approach to adaptation of the CFE Treaty were defined by the head if the International-Legal Department of the Russian Defense Ministry Rear-Admiral Valentine Kuznetzov; Russia agreed to overrule the group and regional structure and to establish for each State Party national ceiling for the TLE based on the limits defined by the CFE, and it was necessary to preserve and invigorate the positive potential of the existing CFE, especially verification and transparency measures as well as system of limitations. At the same time, the Russian position was aimed at restricting the freedom of NATO deployment of armed forces and armaments to the territories of the states invited to join the Alliance. Russia opposed the introduction of territorial ceilings and insisted on prevention of any unlimited arms buildup of any existing or conceivable military alliance, and on developing the provisions of the Treaty regulating the deployment of the conventional troops and armaments stationed on the foreign territories. Also, the traditional Russian demand of revising existing regional limitations, first of all flank limitations, and exclusion of this “discriminatory element” from the CFE Treaty was reiterated.9

The following were the main controversies after the first round of negotiations:

Some of these related to the adaptation of the CFE Treaty were resolved in July 1997, when all 30 State Parties of the Treaty agreed upon the so-called "Basic Elements" of the revised Treaty:

So, some important differences between Russia and NATO were resolved somewhere in July 1997. It was very important that Russia agreed with the NATO to base the revised Treaty on the combination of national and territorial ceilings. However, a number of issues, especially the maximal levels for stationed troops and TLE, as well as prospective for changes of flank limitations, are not settled at the Vienna negotiations.

THE FLANK ISSUE
The flank issue is still one of the focal points of disagreements between Russia and NATO and perhaps the most complicated for the negotiations. After the partition of the former Soviet quotas among the new independent states, the total amount of TLE in active units allowed to be deployed in the Northern Caucasus and Leningrad military districts is 700 main battle tanks, 1,280 artillery pieces, and 580 armored combat vehicles. In addition, Russia may have 600 main battle tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 800 armored combat vehicles in storage in the Leningrad military district.

Since September 17, 1993, when President Yeltzin addressed the leaders of the CFE member-states, Russia has insisted on serious revisions of the CFE Treaty flank limitations, especially with respect to the south. It was said that the CFE Treaty zonal structure allowed Russia to concentrate a powerful grouping of forces somewhere nearby its western border where the military threat is minimal. However, the rise of conflicts and instabilities in the Southern periphery of the former Soviet Union both inside and outside Russia, as well as the disparity between Russian troops in the region and Turkish forces deployed in the Eastern Turkey, make it necessary for Russia to improve its military profile in the Northern Caucasus Military District.

The compromise solution of the flank issue was reached in May 1996 at the CFE Treaty Review Conference. The conference approved the U.S. initiative to redraw the maps and to change the territorial composition of the flank zone and thus to allow Russia to increase its ceilings there. On June 1, 1996, it was announced that certain administrative districts—Pskov, Volgograd, Astrakhan, and the part of Rostov oblasts—were transferred from the flank zone to the central zone. That allowed Russia to keep in the "old" flank zone 1,800 main battle tanks, 3,700 armored fighting vehicles, and 2,400 artillery pieces. Former Deputy Head of the Russian General Staff General Dmitry Kharchenko stated in June 1996 that after these changes the CFE Treaty satisfied Russia’s defense needs in the flank zone.10 However, up to the last moment Russia insisted on total elimination of the flank ceilings and preferred to cancel any limitations on deployment and re-deployment of its forces. In the beginning of 1998, Moscow proposed to substitute all regional restrictions by politically binding unilateral declarations on planned force levels, but that demand was unacceptable for a number of CFE State Parties—Norway, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and some others.

Russia’s strong demands to annul flank restrictions seems contradictory to the planned restructuring of its land forces and to the security environment in the south of the flank zone. Such a restructuring could be described in Lenin’s words—"Better fewer but better." This means that the amount of TLE plays a less important role than battle readiness, preparedness, and other. Also, threats to Russian security in the southern part of European Russia are basically from low-intensity conflicts and local instabilities but not from speculative, outside, large-scale aggression. If so, then forces able to neutralize such types do not need the thousands of tanks and other heavy armaments designed for "classical" large-scale wars but should have special skills and equipment developed for counter-guerrilla actions. When and if these circumstances are realized by the Russian political leadership and military command, a compromise solution of the flank problem and, consequently, of the Russian-U.S. partnership will emerge.

CONTINENTAL OR REGIONAL BALANCES IN EUROPE?
Modernization of the CFE Treaty will be an important move toward more stable security in the Central and Eastern Europe. However, it is, in fact, an attempt to find a kind of a "general" or "universal" solution that may be applied to any region.. Therefore, it does not take into account regional peculiarities some of which may be very important for security developments. It also poses the question of what could the conceptual basis be of the new or revised CFE Treaty that will accommodate it to the basic trends of the development of the strategic environment in Europe.

The principal idea of the "original" CFE Treaty was to provide the numerical equality of the conventional armaments like tanks, ACV, and artillery in the particular geographic zones related to the lines of contact of the armed forces of the former WTO and NATO, thus minimizing the capability for sudden large-scale offensive operations for both sides. The zonal structure reflected the configuration of the strategic situation in Europe; for that reason the solutions proposed by the CFE were a mixture of measures of the continental and regional scale. The application of the same principles to the new strategic environment in Europe poses a few problems: Is it necessary take into account the "continental" balance of forces? What are new zones and lines of hypothetical confrontation in Europe? What are the military balances in the corresponding subregions? What should be done to provide strategic and conflict stability there?

Some experts believe that despite the principal changes of the structure of the strategic environment in Europe the continental balance should be taken into account. That means in fact that they compare the total military assets of the NATO member-states in Europe with those of Russia and conclude that NATO military capabilities are greater than those of Russia. For instance, Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin wrote: "The over-all analysis of the NATO advantages in the number of personnel, armored units, artillery, and combat ships shows that the correlation of the battle capabilities of the general purpose forces of NATO and Russia is one to four."11 Such a perspective is used as proof that after NATO enlargement, its military superiority over Russia will increase substantially, and that the only thing the latter can do to protect its security is to increase reliance on nuclear weapons both strategic and tactical.

However, the ratio of one to four, used often by Russian military experts as typical for balance of forces in Europe, is not quite adequate, even if Russian currents holdings are compared with NATO CFE limits; it is necessary to compare either Russian and NATO limits or their holdings. But the main point is that very comparison of military capabilities of Russia and NATO as a whole is not correct. Such a comparison has any practical sense only in the event that armed forces of all NATO member-states are deployed somewhere near Russian borders and are able to be used in an armed conflict, but that is impossible even in a case of a "large" war in Europe.

For a less absurd vision, regional characteristics and balances should taken into account. For instance, the correlation of manpower between Russian conventional forces and those of NATO deployed in Central Europe plus the forces of three new NATO member-states is 1 to 1.12; of main battle tanks, 1 to 1.67; of ACV, 1 to 1,07; of helicopters, 1 to 0.77; and of aircraft, 1 to 0.62. This means that "enlarged NATO" will have serious—somewhere about 70 percent—superiority over Russia in tanks, but will be inferior to it in aviation. In other words, "enlarged NATO" will not have principal advantages over Russia in Central Europe.12

These assessments are also very primitive as they do not take into account a number of important circumstances. A significant part of Russian troops in the CFE area of application is located in the Northern Caucasus or in the eastern part of European Russia and are not to be included into the balance of forces in Central Europe. In case of conflict, NATO may re-deploy a large portion of aviation to Central Europe in a relatively short time and thus improve substantially its capabilities there. While Ukraine is neutral, the armed forces of Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot contact the Russian troops. All this confirms the fundamental importance of a kind of subregional approach to assuring of security and stability in Eastern and Central Europe, mainly the establishment of stabilizing regional balances, confidence- and security-building measures, and some other security regimes.

The emerging strategic configuration of a broad zone “between Russia and the NATO” includes three basic subregions:

The most important of these is the Southern Baltic region. In this strategic area, the immediate contact between the Russian and NATO member-states troops could emerge. The issue of the Russian communications, including military communications, with the Kaliningrad enclave may turn—at least theoretically—if not into a causus belli but into a source of confrontation. A dangerous crisis may come out if foreign troops are deployed in Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania.

The package of confidence-building measures related to the Baltic region was proposed by Moscow in 1997. It comprises a “hot line” between the military headquarters in the Kaliningrad regions and the Baltic countries for the effective solutions of the issues of security in sea navigation and aviation flights; exchange of information concerning major military exercises in the Baltic states and in the border regions of Russia, including exercises at any level with participation of non Baltic armed forces and observers; exchange visits of warships and establishing specific regions in the Baltic Sea where the parties would abstain from holding military exercises; and holding military exercises solely for the defensive purposes in the Kaliningrad region.13

 

SRBM

IRBM

ICBM

Cruise Missile
Russia + - + +
USA + - + +
Great Britain - - - +
France + + + +
China + + + +
Israel + + - +
India + + - +
Italy - - - +
Iran + - - +
Iraq + - - -
North Korea + + - +
Egypt + - - -
Libya + - - -
Pakistan + - - -
Turkey + - - -
Ukraine + - - -
Syria + - - +
Taiwan + - - +
Argentine - - - +
Germany - - - +
Norway - - - +
Sweden - - - +
Japan - - - +
Brazil - - - 0

Source: Gennady Chromov. "On Some Issues of Missile Proliferation at Present," Yaderny Kontrol 37, no. 1 (January-February 1998): 38, 40.

These measures per se look quite reasonable and could provide more security in the region fraught potentially with serious instability. The basic problem, however, is that they were designed as a substitute for NATO enlargement and therefore were unacceptable for the Baltic states. To minimize a risk of confrontation in the southern Baltic area, steps must be taken by all actors—NATO, the Baltic states and Russia. Of particular importance would be adhesion of the Baltic states to the CFE regime and other international arrangements design to provide security and confidence in Europe.

The other question is whether the defense alliance of Russia and Belarus or their military integration is a factor of stability in the region and of Russian security. Of course, it may strengthen Russian air defense, BMD, and, hypothetically, its "forward-based forces" if they are deployed near Polish and Lithuanian borders. At the same time, however, in that case, the long line of immediate contact between Russian and NATO forces will emerge, and Polish and Lithuanian leaders will have an additional argument for stationing NATO forces at the territories of their states in an essential numbers. Belorussian neutrality seems to be a more important factor of Russian—and regional—security than a Russian-Belorussian military alliance. Russian Armed Forces (with the small exception of Kaliningrad exclave) will be separated from NATO troops by a large neutral zone and that will be not only a military but a politically stabilizing factor.

Proliferation of missile technologies may turn into a serious destabilizing factor of a global scale. According to Russian experts, there are more than 20 countries developing ballistic or cruise missiles or actually producing them already. About that half of them are involved into international conflicts or their ruling regimes are unstable or unpredictable.

To control the transfer of technology and equipment that can be used for developing missiles able to deliver a load of 500 kilograms or more to a distance of at least 300 kilometers, the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987. Its principal rules include the strict prohibition of export of category 1 systems, which comprise all ballistic and cruise missiles of both military and civil use, related technologies, equipment and facilities for their production, and basic components like engines and guidance systems. Category 2 systems (like missile fuels and composite materials) exports were also prohibited if intended for production of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

In 1992, some new elements were added to the MCTR to prevent the proliferation of delivery systems that could carry chemical and biological weapons. According to experts of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies the main issues related to the effective implementation of the MTCR are:

Almost all Third World countries that are developing their ballistic and/or cruise missiles programs or have these weapons already are unable to acquire ballistic missile technologies (more than 1,000 kilometers). Russian expert Gennady Chromov has insisted that the 1,000-kilometer range is a kind of threshold that can not be passed by these countries without substantial imported technologies of guidance systems, advanced methods of calculating the flight dynamics, and solid fuel engines 15.

Since August 1995 Russia has been a member of MTCR and is fulfilling all its provisions. The long-term delay of Russia’s joining the MTCR could be explained by the commercial interests of Russian missile and space industry, which were (as they are now) interested in selling missiles and missile technologies and also by the concerns of the United States related to Russia’s behavior in this field. However, political and strategic considerations were recognized by the Russian government as more important than interests of some Russian enterprises. It was stated also by the experts close to the Russian official institutions that Russia is interested in improving existing missile technology controls and increasing its efficiency, for a number of reasons.

First, missile proliferation will reduce Russia’s role as the country with the widest range of missiles and missile technology. Second, most Third World countries intending to acquire advanced missile technologies are geographically close to Russia. For instance, if Iran or Pakistan obtain the effective missile technologies and thus are able to produce their own missiles in the range of several thousands kilometers, then the strategic situation in the southern part of the former USSR that is often regarded by Moscow as its own, special responsibilities and exclusive interests may change. Russia’s elite is also concerned with the prospect of emerging medium-range missiles in North Korea. In that case, a large part of the Russian Far Eastern area may turn out to be a hypothetical target for Korean missiles that in the future may have nuclear warheads. Third, missile proliferation may happen first in the areas of unsolved conflicts near Russia, both on the Korean peninsula and in the Middle East. And, fourth, the political advantages resulting from joining the MTCR were more important than discord with the leading Western countries resulting from actual or potential transfers of Russian missile technologies to Third World states, many of which are regarded as irresponsible or malicious.

The basic dimensions of strengthening the MTCR according to Russian experts could be:

Officially, Russia denies all allegations of clandestine transfers of missile technologies to Iran or Iraq as part of her governmental policy. Moscow explains reported cases of such transfers (like, for instance, the convey of gyroscopes to Iraq) by illegal activities of some industrial enterprises. This is a believable explanation, because some defense technologies have commercial applications, and thus export control does not always work. The Russian government inclines to cooperate with the other members of the MTCR with a view to fulfill its political obligations. In July 1998, Russia’s governmental commission responsible for the control over export transferred to American agencies the list of seven Russian design-bureaus and military-industrial research centers that were suspected in assisting Iran’s missile program. The U.S. President decided to impose sanctions to these organizations; import of their products into the United States is forbidden, and they are denied of any financial and other aid from any American sources.17

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTIONS
On January 13, 1993, Russia signed the convention on prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. This convention prohibits not only the use of that weapons, which was, in fact, prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, but also all technological and industrial activities related to the development and production of the chemical weapons. Moreover, each party of the convention is obligated to destroy both all stockpiles of military chemical agents and all production facilities. For five years, however, the Russian Parliament refused to ratify the convention because of political and economic reasons.

The Communists and their allies were basically against the convention. General Albert Makashov, one of the leaders of the Communists faction in the Lower Chamber of the Russian Parliament, presented the views of this part of Russian political spectrum rather openly: "I would not sign the convention today because its implementation will eliminate our chemical industry. . . . Under the convention we shall destroy all plants which have been engaged in production of chemical weapons, and we produced them at practically all plants. . . . Chemical weapons are defensive weapons, they are weapons of weak countries, they are cheapest and it is highly probable that developing countries will make use of those accumulated by developing nations. However, at the moment Russia is at the level of the Third World and some indicators are even below it."18

Despite such irresponsible rhetoric there were a number of more serious arguments. The first was that the destruction of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile would need about U.S. $4-4.5 billion.19 In March 1996 Russian government approved the program to destroy the chemical weapons stockpile and two facilities for eliminating chemical ammunitions are to be built. However, Russia lacks the resources required, and because of inadequate funding, construction of these facilities is more than two years behind the approved timetable.

The next issue is associated with conversion of the facilities that were used for the production of chemical weapons. According to the Russian position, that issue was not managed in the convention in a “clear way.” However, the corresponding provisions of the convention assert that any equipment made from some special kinds of steel and used for the production of the chemical weapons as well as facilities where it was manufactured should be destroyed. In Russia, however, some of the facilities used before for the fabrication of chemical agents have been converted for the production of some civil chemical substances. The problem is that these conversions must be proved irreversible. First Deputy to the Chairman of the Committee on the Conventional Issues of Chemical and Biological Weapons Alexander Ivanov recently said that one of the ways to do that is to establish joint ventures with Western partners that will use converted industrial facilities and equipment. 20

Despite these two basic problems, the Russian Parliament ratified the Convention on Chemical Weapons on December 5, 1997. Since May 1998, Russia has been a member of the Executive Council of the Organization on Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons. According to the timetable defined by the Convention by June 2001, Russia should eliminate not less then 1 percent (400 tons) of her chemical assets, while 100 percent of them are to be destroyed by 2007; cooperation with the United States and some other countries is of special importance for Moscow.

In June 1992 Russia signed the agreement with the United States according to which a number of American firms are supplying equipment and providing some services for two facilities that eliminate chemical weapons, one in the Kurgan region and another in the Central Analytical Laboratory. Funds allocated by the U.S. Congress is about U.S. $130 million. The German government provides Russia technical assistance and equipment for the destruction facility in Saratov region. In 1993-97, Germany spent about DM32 million for technical support on the Russian program.21

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The fascinating successes of genetic engineering in the last few decades make it extremely important to prevent any use military purposes. For Russia this task seems to be of a special significance. If some terrorist or criminal groups in Russia obtained any biological weapons, the consequences could be terrible.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was entered into force in 1975. It prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition by any other means of biological agents and toxins. The State Parties of the BWC had also pledged to eliminate all such agents and toxins, equipment and delivery means, in nine months.

There are a number of circumstances that narrowed positive influence of the Convention. No verification procedures were envisioned. Because it is not necessary to use large production facilities to manufacture biological weapons, and some biological agents are self-reproductive and their initial volume can be rather small, it is necessary to develop verification means. About 15 countries are suspected of developing military biological programs—Libya, Northern Korea, Iraq, Taiwan, Syria, Russia, Israel, Iran, and China are mentioned by experts as countries developing or producing biological weapons.

Since 1995 the Group of Governmental Experts has attempted to develop a legally binding verification protocol that should strengthen the convention. However, progress is rather slow, partly because the need for verification and the commercial interests of industries involved in the manufacturing of biological products. Some specific problems also created obstacles. The serious disagreements emerged whether to define the lists of biological agents, equipment, and activities subject to verification. Such definitions and lists may focus verification efforts and make them more effective, but at the same time they may limit the scope of verification. As a result, some new advanced technologies may avoid verification and thus some loopholes may emerge.

The former Soviet Union signed the BWC in 1972 but there was evidence that the Soviet military had produced some biological weapons. In 1992, President Yeltsin recognized the violation of the BWC by the former Soviet authorities but up to now there are controversial information on the current state of Russian research programs in this field. Officially Russia denies all allegations of violations and participates in the work of Group of Governmental Experts developing the verification protocol to the convention. According to the first deputy to the Chairman of the Russian Committee on chemical and biological weapons, Alexander Ivanov, Russia’s approach includes:

CONVENTIONAL ARMS EXPORT
Intensive arms export is regarded in Moscow as a vital factor for the survival of the Russian military-industrial complex, which has been affected by the radical decrease in military spending and general changes in Russian foreign and security policies. Despite the serious decline of the share of Russian commercial arms deliveries from 30 to 35 percent of total world arms trade at the end of the 1980s, to 7 to 9 percent in the first half of the 1990s, Russia is still among the first 10 principal exporters of armaments and military equipment. Still, it is not a totally satisfactory solution. In 1996-97, yearly hard-currency revenues from arms export amounted U.S. $2-2.1 billions.23 This sum is equivalent to 60 percent of the state indebtedness to the military industry, only a small share (2 to 3 percent of the resources transferred to the former Soviet military-industry complex in the late 1980s, and about 3 percent of the total volume of the Russian export in 1996-97).

Russia is not really interested in international control over the world arms trade. Some political reasons could also affect Russia’s position toward international regulations of arms trade. Russian Major-General Nikolay Pernikov said, “Low-intensity conflicts are dominating the security environment now and in such circumstances transfers of arms even small in costs and in physical volume may play important geopolitical role.”24 It means that some part of the Russian military hopes to influence developments in conflict areas by supplying arms and equipment to particular parties in conflict. That, perhaps, may explain why during the negotiations on the Wassenaar Arrangement Russia strictly opposed American proposals for a “black list” of states forbidden import arms or required to notify others regarding arms transfers.

At the same time, however, because of political reasons, Russia prefers to be a member of international institutions that coordinate arms export, if Russia itself is subject to restricted arms exports. That could be an explanation of Russia’s membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement, is a voluntary system of exchange of information on conventional arms transfers and dual-use technologies through a consultative forum.

It seems that prospective for Russian-American cooperation in the nonnuclear arms control is rather limited. Russia is interested mainly in such a cooperation that may help her to realize the chemical weapons destruction plans. There could also be some common Russia-U.S. interests in the control over proliferation of missile technologies and biological weapons, though some Russian defense-related enterprises may attempt to transfer some particular products and technologies that could be used for missile development and production. In the sphere of conventional arms export, Russia regards the United States rather as a rival than as a partner. As for adaptation of the CFE Treaty, a constructive U.S.-Russia partnership seems thinkable if Moscow turns to more constructive approach to the developments in Europe. Last, a new threat comes from extremist organizations and movements prone to terrorism through their efforts to obtain chemical and perhaps biological weapons or even to manufacture these weapons. This threat may be a factor for U.S.-Russian cooperation to fight movements of this type.

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Last Update:  January 24, 2003