INTRODUCTION
One of the most complex problems of U.S.-Russian security agenda is nuclear deterrence and arms control relationship, which interact in new ways with strategic concepts, weapon programs and budgeting policies of both parties in the context of post-Cold War international security environment.

The U.S.-Russian strategic relationship suffers from all the effects of uncertainty and internal controversy of transition from clear-cut confrontational interaction to unclear and unpredictable mixed mode of confrontation and cooperation. Moreover, post-Cold War environment is prone to a growing threat of proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as expanding regional and local conflicts, which may get nuclear powers involved militarily into local hostilities.

Basically, two highly important and complex questions of the post-Cold War strategic and political environment are emerging on the agenda for the foreseeable future. First, is it possible to accommodate the U.S.-Russian relationship of strategic stability (relying on reduction of offensive missile warhead numbers, de-MIRVing of missiles and virtually zero defenses against each other)—and the American (and potentially Russian) perceived need of protection against the existing and projected threat of ballistic missiles and WMD of rogue states of the Third World (however dubious the term after the end of Cold War)? In this case, U.S. and Russian strategic offensive weapons would essentially remain directed against each other’s territories within the framework of stable mutual deterrence, while defensive systems would take care of the third states’ offensive missiles. Second and more fundamentally, is the U.S.-Russian legalized relationship of strategic stability (which implies guaranteed, even if shrinking, mutual second-strike destruction capabilities) relevant for post-Cold War prospects for "strategic partnership" and the ability to address the new threats to their security, emanating not from each other, but from other missile/WMD-armed regimes or terrorist groups?

If MAD is no longer relevant for the future, than (in contrast to the first option) U.S. and Russian defensive systems may be permitted to expand their respective offensive weapons within the framework of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship so that they may overwhelmingly protect both powers against other states’ missiles. Much greater cooperation in early warning, defense deployments, and even command-and-control would be warranted. Also, unlike the first option, the residual and much smaller and cheaper U.S. and Russian offensive nuclear forces would serve as a deterrent not against each other, but against third states to enhance U.S. and Russian defensive capabilities against those opponents.

MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION
In a more general sense, the question of the relevance of MAD to post-Cold War U.S.-Russian relations is far from clear. MAD came to be closely associated with the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. Hence, the end of the Cold War allegedly should do away with MAD. However, when looking at the problem in a historic perspective it need not necessarily be the case.

Creation of nuclear weapons, unprecedented by their destructive power, historically coincided with the beginning of a period of unprecedented global bipolarity in international relations and concurrent rivalry, hostility, and confrontation between U.S. and Soviet alliances—the Cold War. This mistrust and preparation for global war did exacerbate the scale of the arms race and led to absurdly high levels of accumulated mutual nuclear overkill capabilities, which in their own turn had a double effect: it deterred super powers from actual war, and it prolonged the state of strategic and political bipolarity much longer, than warranted by the real evolution of the distribution of economic and political power in the world since early 1960s. Were it not for the unquestionable nuclear predominance of the two super powers, the emergence of new centers of power—China, Western Europe, Japan, India, and some regional groups of states—would have ended the bipolarity and Cold War a couple of decades earlier.

Nonetheless, the coexistence in time of nuclear arms and the Cold War has been a historic accident. It should be remembered that in the early 1940s nuclear weapons were being developed by the United States not against the USSR, its military ally, but against Germany, and in 1945 U.S. nuclear weapons were used against Japan. During the Cold War both Germany and Japan became American allies, while the USSR turned into its mortal enemy.

What was natural and unavoidable—the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons, when their number exceeded a few dozen, generated a strategic relationship and concepts of mutual deterrence between or among the opponents. The fear of horrible consequences of a real employment of such weapons is much larger than theoretical military advantages of initiating their practical use. Hence, the only imaginable alternative to nuclear deterrence—as long as nuclear weapons exist in active combat forces of states—is planning their employment as practical means of waging war to achieve some operational, strategic, and political goals (more or less like conventional arms with enhanced destructive capability).

Likewise, the end of Cold War does not necessarily imply the end of nuclear arms race or mutual nuclear deterrence. As long as Russia and the United States retain nuclear weapons technically capable of reaching each other territories, their relationship will be one of mutual deterrence. Not being enemies is not enough for making mutual deterrence irrelevant, unless and until former opponents become formal or informal but unquestionably real allies. That type of relations has been and continues to be the case with the formal alliance among the United States, Britain, and France. Informal relations of that mode exist between the United States and Israel, they operated between the United States and China from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, and they have evolved, with some reservations, between Russia and China since the mid-1990s.

In contrast, the United States and Russia up to now have not become formal or informal allies, although they are no longer principal opponents. Their "partnership" is quite an amorphous transitional intermediate state of relations, somewhere between rivalry and alliance. To reflect this new state of relations, strategic policies of the two nations have changed much more than usually recognized by the broad public. In fact, the existing and still high levels of nuclear weapons are not the main features of the present U.S.- Russian strategic relationship. Rather, they are the legacy of the arms race during the decades of Cold War. Also, these high levels reflect the bureaucratic inertia, present public indifference to nuclear matters and substantial costs of dismantling of these arms (as opposed to maintenance) in both countries. What is much more relevant as an indicator of the current strategic policies are the on-going R&D, procurement, and deployment activities of the two states. With this regard both have all but curtailed their nuclear arms modernization programs, compared to the 1980s (to say nothing of the 1970s or 1960s).

As recently as only 10 years ago the United States was simultaneously deploying four new strategic ballistic and cruise missile systems (MX Peacekeeper, Trident-1, ALCM and SLCM), one SSBN and one heavy bomber system (Ohio-class and B-1B), as well as developing and testing four more missile systems (Trident-2, Midgitman, ACM, and SRAM-2) and one new bomber type (B-2).

The USSR, in turn, was deploying six ballistic and cruise missile systems (SS-24, SS-25, SS-N-20, SS-N-23, SS-H-21 SLCM, and AS-15 ALCM), two new SSBN classes (Typhoon and Delta-IV) and one heavy bomber type (Tu-160 Blackjack), as well as pursuing R&D on at least four other ballistic and cruise missile systems (SS-27, new SLBM, SLCM, and ALCM types). Each side had about 10,000 to 12,000 nuclear warheads in its strategic forces and 15,000 to 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons of great variety.

At present, the United States is finishing construction of one last Ohio-class submarine and procuring at a slow pace the remaining of the B-2 bombers. Russia is conducting a low-intensity testing program and initial deployment in very small numbers of its follow-on to SS-25 ICBM called Topol-M (SS-27). What is most amazing, for the first time in 50 years neither of the two powers has any other high-priority well-funded strategic modernization program. Existing forces of the two states (numbering around 5,000 to 6,000 warheads each) have been transferred to a lower alert status and de-targeted. Alertness of their C3I systems has been relaxed as well.

At the same time, in line with START II Treaty as adapted at the Helsinki summit of March 1997, the United States and Russia are planning to reduce their strategic nuclear forces to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads by the year 2008. By the same date, if START II is properly ratified and implemented, the two parties have agreed to undertake still further reductions down to about 2,000-2,500 warheads by the START III treaty. Besides, both powers have reduced their tactical nuclear forces to 1,000 to 2,000 weapons, and in ten years those would probably be counted in the very low hundreds.

Economic and political problems (including the issue of NATO expansion) are presently hindering START II ratification in Russia. Nonetheless, even without a formal treaty, Russian strategic forces will be declining due to massive withdrawal of weapons with expired service lifetime and because of cuts in present funding for maintenance, overhaul, and modernization, which is justified by the absence of any war threat. Most likely the force will be around 1,000 warheads by the year 2008, if strategic force funding is not doubled in 1998 and during next several years. In the absence of START II the United States may support its strategic forces at the levels of START I (around 6,000 warheads) well into the next decade or two. Alternatively, the United States could opt for unilateral reduction down to the levels of START II (3,000 to 3,500 warheads) to save money on maintenance.

As for MAD, its meaning is changing, too. In the Russian military doctrine of 1993 and its currently revised version, the notion of "assured capability of devastating retaliatory strike" has been changed for "guaranteed capability of inflicting preplanned level of damage on aggressor." In fact, the "preplanned level of damage" is not any more a stated strategic goal, but for any given date in future—a function of projected available Russian force, depleted by a projected opponent’s preemptive counter-force strike. Depending on those calculations, Russian strategists will have to reconcile themselves with the prospect of reducing projected deliverable warhead number from thousands ten years ago down to a few hundreds or dozens ten years into the future. At that, they are more concerned not by the sheer reduction of the "preplanned level of damage," but by the United States preserving much higher levels of their forces’ countervalue and counterforce capability. As for politicians in both countries, they are virtually not conscious of these considerations, because in a post-Cold War environment the peculiarities of the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear balance have largely faded away from operational foreign policy making.

Apparently, such a state of immanent or residual mutual nuclear deterrence and strategic balance is quite adequate to the present transitional state of U.S.-Russian post-Cold War relations. Depending on strategic force funding and the future of START II/START III treaties, their force levels in 10 years may go down to 2000-1500 or even around 1,000 warheads (with part of these forces de-alerted or de-activated) without changing the basic mutual deterrent nature of their strategic relationship. Making a quantum jump to some really different basis—which is intertwined with the problem of introducing strategic defenses into the equation—would require a further shift to a much closer relationship, than "partnership"—to a formal or informal alliance.

The prospect of that will depend on many factors external to U.S.-Russian strategic relationship: Russia’s domestic evolution, NATO further extension and its effect on NATO-Russian relations, U.S.-Russian interaction around Caspian Sea basin oil and gas issues and on the Balkan conflicts, the evolution of Russian relations with Ukraine, the Baltics, Turkey, Iran, and China etc.

A failure to implement START II or START III, as well as a failure to accommodate each other interests on ballistic missile defense (BMD) issues—would hinder the prospects of formal or informal U.S.-Russian alliance. But in and of itself, START II/III or loosening of BMD limitations would be by far insufficient for shifting to allied relations or changing the mutual nuclear deterrent nature of U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.

If the Cold War will be superseded not by a U.S.-Russian alliance, but by a multipolar and much more flexible relations among the United States, United Europe, Russia, China, and Japan—the residual mutual nuclear deterrence may stay as a foundation of strategic relationship between United States and Russia for the foreseeable future. Moreover, instead of being revoked, it may rather be expanded to strategic relations between Russia and Western Europe (French/British nuclear forces), stay between Russia and China, as well as extend to the interaction of China and the United States.

Depending on whether U.S.-Russian post-Cold War relations evolve toward alliance, stay as pragmatic partnership, stagnate as cold peace, or even degrade to regional rivalry (regional Cold War), introduction of defenses would take different forms and would affect U.S.-Russian strategic relationship in different ways.

This is no less, and probably more important for these relationship, than technical and arms control particularities of theater and national missile defense (TMD and NMD) developments. Still, those developments for sure would have great impact on the state of strategic balance and nuclear deterrence. However, even if technology provides for strategic defensive systems of unprecedented high effectiveness (80 to 90 percent hit probability for each interceptor or DEW shot)—this would not negate, but rather "distort" nuclear deterrent capabilities. To be more precise, this might render counterforce strike and a broad range of limited strike options inefficient, but still would not negate countervalue strike capability. For that even 10 percent warhead penetration would be sufficient if targeted against urban-industrial centers; if the overall base-forces were at a level of at least several hundred warheads; and if strategic forces had as a minimum 20 to 30 percent survivability before launch. In this case, technically effective defenses, instead of doing away with mutual nuclear deterrence between primary nuclear powers, would rather confine it to finite countervalue mode, while pushing counterforce strategies into the realm of long-range, precision-guided nonnuclear weapons and sophisticated command control and information systems. In this realm, defense-offense competition may evolve more or less along the classic patterns, at some stages providing defense with predominance over offense.

Hence, it seems that actual future military-technological evolution will not follow a simplistic model of defense superceding offense and canceling nuclear deterrence. More probably, nuclear offensive deterrence would become much more limited and move to the background of the mainstream of strategic warfare (in a sense, like chemical weapons did after the First World War). Innovative nonnuclear strategic weapons and information systems would come into the foreground of the military balance and offense-defense competition.

THIRD-PARTY MISSILE STATES
Beside the strategic framework of U.S.-Russian offense/defense interaction, there are third missile states, against whom defenses might be designed or acquire inadvertent collateral capability: France, Britain and China. These states introduce a whole new dimension into U.S.-Russian defense/offense interaction. In particular, Russia’s deployment of even thin NMD may be encouraged by the United States, but would be opposed by U.S. allies France and Britain. They might feel concerned about their own nuclear deterrence and implement its buildup or integration into a joint European nuclear force. This would be detrimental to their joining an arms reduction regime and hence prevent Russia from reducing its forces together with the United States down to much lower levels than otherwise would be the case. That would tangibly affect both options: retaining MAD stability while introducing NMD or making a transition to a defense dominated world.

The factor of China is still more complicated. American attitude toward the legitimacy of China’s nuclear deterrence, which implies its right for mutual second-strike capability not just with Russia (which the United States is ready to grant), but eventually with the United States, is quite mute. U.S.-Russian deep reductions in offensive weapons (down to a level of around 1,000 warheads and below) would require China to accept arms control limitations in one or the other form, and this would imply its right for equal deterrence capability. On the other hand, it is primarily China’s intercontinental nuclear missiles, against which U.S. NMD may be designed in preparation for possible U.S.-Chinese rivalry in the 21st century. (Ironically, the first U.S. Sentinel ABM system was justified in 1967 precisely by the expectation of China’s ICBM development.)

China’s response to thin U.S. and Russian BMD deployments is easy to predict, with all the consequences for strategic arms race, stability, arms control, and political relations of the United States and Russia with China, which is also one of the greatest asymmetries in U.S. and Russian geostrategic situation and ensure controversy in Washington and Moscow.

Resolving the problem of a more fundamental shift in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship—toward a defense dominated balance—would imply a cooperative course of the two states; otherwise defense would never be able to negate at least a limited countervalue strike capability and the finite nuclear deterrence associated with it. Cooperative transition to a defense-dominated strategic relationship in its turn implies joint defensive systems development, deployment, and operation. Otherwise, one side (Russia) would feel disadvantaged because of financial, technical, and geostrategic handicaps. This would not leave anything to it, except reliance on nuclear offensive deterrent capability to make up for its deficiencies. Cooperative introduction of defense while downgrading offense means nothing less than very close alliance relations between the two states. In this case dealing with France and Britain (and their deterrence capabilities) would mean having them in this alliance, too, as well as other NATO states and Japan—for obvious reasons. Essentially, this would mean accepting Russia into NATO and developing U.S. cooperation with it at much more intimate level than between the United States and Britain after the Nassau summit in 1961.

The crucial question then will be: will this alliance be implicitly directed against China, the super power of the 21st century with all the political and military consequences? Or will China also be included in this alliance relationship and defense dominated great power framework? If yes, how about Taiwan, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel?

Then, which rogue regimes would warrant being opposed by such a mighty missile defense alliance—Iran, Iraq, Libya? And would there not be easier and cheaper ways to deal with them, relying on only a fraction of political and military cooperation compared to the one that would be required for a multipolar ballistic missile defense (BMD) system (or GPS, as proposed by President Yeltsin in 1992)? Unfortunately, the report leaves the reader guessing about the answer to such basic problems.

OPTIONS
From the strategic and technical views of Russia and the United States, there may be two principal options of introducing defenses. The first option is deploying BMD against third parties, while retaining stable mutual deterrence. It is easier to implement technically, but presents great political problems of dealing with France, Britain and China, prone with big political implications in Europe and Asia.

Theoretically, only two important provisions would be required: to permit in START III or START IV the revival of MIRVed ICBMs and to prohibit space-based interception systems in a revised ABM Treaty, which could permit expansion of BMD basing areas to 3-4-5 or more, as well as mobile, multiple and rapidly reloaded launchers. Historically, MIRVed missiles were the response to BMD development and deployment. From 1972 to 1997, the logic of arms control was strictly to limit defenses (ABMT) and de-MIRV offensive missiles, as stated in START II, which prohibited MIRVed ICBMs and limited the number of MIRV warheads on SLBMs.

By the same logic, liberalizing limitations on NMD against third parties, but alleviating Russia’s concern about its stable deterrence, would require permitting once again deployment of MIRVed ICBMs some time after the period from 2007 to 2010. Without space boost-phase intercept, NMD would have no chance of defending against MIRVed ICBMs, but might be quite effective against a limited number of single-warhead missiles of the third parties. Britain and France would be relatively assured with respect to such Russian defense, since they both have MIRVed SLBMs. Besides, in lower offensive force limits (1,500 warheads or less) it would be economically much easier for Russia to maintain parity and BMD penetration capability with MIRVed ICBMs, rather than with SLBMs or bombers. To take care of traditional counterforce fears, it might be agreed to allow MIRVed ICBMs only on ground-mobile launchers (like SS-24, or a new MIRVed versions of SS-25 and SS-27 systems).

The U.S. readiness to eventually agree on those conditions is a major test of the sincerity of the American claim that its NMD would not be designed against Russia and that after the end of Cold War the new U.S.-Russian political relations should make irrelevant old fears of destabilizing effects of NMD systems. If U.S. and Russian strategic forces will not be designed for use against each other, but retained at much lower levels for some other esoteric reason, then by the same logic the old notions of destabilizing effect of MIRVed ICBMs should be considered irrelevant as well. Although rogue regimes would hardly be able to develop MIRVed missiles to penetrate such a defense during several next decades, China is a different matter altogether. If China is not included into "defense alliance," it would be capable of developing and deploying MIRVed ICBMs during next 10 to 15 years. The United States might then demand the right to develop a space-based defense, which would affect Russia’s deterrent capability and violate the conditions of the first option. If Russia follows the U.S. example, or implements expansion of its limited land-based NMD, or builds up its offensive forces, France and Britain would react accordingly, if U.S. space defense does not protect them as well (which is technically unlikely).

The second option is transition to a defense-dominated strategic relationship. Apart from political problems of creating an alliance among NATO, Russia, and possibly some other states, this policy would have to resolve many technical arms control and verification questions, among them deep reduction and de-MIRVing of strategic missiles (and making sure TNWS join this process); the different geographical location and configuration of the United States and Russia; asymmetries of their strategic offensive forces; and tactical nuclear weapons capable of reaching Russian territory and of regional conventional imbalances (Russia-extended NATO, Russia-China).

CONCLUSION
Although up to now both the United States and Russia have been able to shirk the principal dilemma of their nuclear relationship for the next few decades, sooner or later it will be necessary to make this hard choice. Is the expected growth of the defensive component of the strategic balance a fix for a stable MAD plus NMD for protection against third parties—or a bridge to a defense-dominated balance between the United States and Russia (as well as TNWS)?

The difference may affect particular arms control provisions and weapons development for decades to come. In the first case, offensive and defensive missiles should be limited primarily by the number of delivery vehicles, permitting sufficiently high warhead numbers (no fewer than 1,000), allowing limited MIRVing of ICBMs to provide to the United States and Russia assured NMD penetration capabilities, enhancing survivability through ground mobility and sea-basing.

In the second case, limitation should be by warheads, implying very low eventual levels (low hundreds). The traditional emphasis on survivability and lowering counterforce capability of strategic forces (including incentives for transition to single-warhead missiles and to sea-based systems) could give way to cost consideration, favoring silo-based MIRVed ICBMs. In view of the long lead time and great costs of strategic weapons programs, force evolution, and arms control treaties implementation, the above dilemma may have to be realized by the leaders of great powers and answered much sooner than it looks at first glance. As soon as the current domestic turmoil and frustrations in Moscow and Washington are passed, the choice may already affect the START II/START III/ABM Treaty package, which will have to be sorted out by the next U.S. and Russian leaders soon after the year 2000.

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