Notes
1. Definitions of terms used by the U.S. Joint Staff, the U.S. Army, the United Nations, and NATO have been published by the U.S. Army War College, Peacekeeping Institute, "Peace-Keeping Terms and Definitions," and is available on the Internet (downloaded August 1, 1998) at: http://carlisle-www.mil/usacsl/org/pki/doctrine/define.html. For Russian definitions of terms, see Col. Andrei V. Demurenko and Alexander Nikitin," Basic Terminology and Concepts in International Peace- Keeping Operations: An Analytical Review," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement (Summer 1997): 111-126.
2. The Russian concept incorporates the use of military force to compel the compliance of local forces, much as Russian forces have done in their operations in the "near abroad." See Demurenko and Nikitin," Basic Terminology and Concepts," 117. See also Kevin P. O'Prey, "Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia," in U.N. Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 414-415.
3. Andrei Demurenko and Timothy L. Thomas, "Getting to Know You: the U.S.-Russian Totsk Peace-Keeping Exercise from a Russian Lessons Learned Perspective," Journal of Slavic Military Studies 8, no. 3 (September 1995): 479-83.
6. Major General Randolph W. House, USA, Major Mark R. Pires, USA, and Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, USA (Ret.), "Peacekeeper 95," Military Review (March-April 1996): 10.
7. Col. Yu. B. Gorskiy, "Practical Aspects of Peace Keeping in the Former Yugoslavia," text of a workshop presentation reprinted in Non-Traditional Operations Involving the Use of Armed Forces, trans. Robert R. Love (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, August 1995), 31.
8. William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultlines: U.N. Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," in U.N. Peacekeeping, American Policy, 241.
10. Such efforts are exemplified by the joint post-IFOR conferences held at St. Petersburg, Garmisch, and Moscow, in 1996 and 1997.
11. See, for example, Vadim Solovyev and Alexandr Shaburkin, "Russia's Armed Forces Left Without Money Again," Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 18, 1998, 3 (FBIS-UMA-98-232, August 20, 1998), and Col.onel Aleksandr Babakin, "Modernized Tanks, Armored Vehicles Needed," in Rossiyskaya gazeta, August 19, 1998, 3 (FBIS-UMA-98-233, August 21, 1998).
12. See, for example, Boris Talov, "US, Russian Peacekeepers Contrasted," Rossiyskaya gazeta, August 1, 1997.
13. For general discussion and case studies of recent operations, see Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., Policing the New World Disorder (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1998).
14. See, for example, Alexander Nikitin, "Non-traditional Operations Involving the Use of Armed Forces: Russian and International Experience," in Non-Traditional Operations, 9.
15. For a detailed discussion of spoiler management strategies in peace operations, see Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 5-53.
16. In Somalia, the Italian contingent was most notorious in the latter regard. See William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-Building' in Somalia," in U..N. Peacekeeping, American Policy, 345-347.
17. See Erwin A. Schmidl, "Police Functions in Peace Operations: An Historical Overview," in Policing the New World Disorder, 19B40.
18. See U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Annual Update Briefing to Member States on Standby Arrangements," New York, May 29, 1997. Available on the Internet at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/amb.htm. Downloaded August 31, 1998.
19. Thinly disguised unilateral action, moreover, is generally recognized as such. See S. Neil MacFarlane, "On the Front Lines in the "Near Abroad": the CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars," Third World Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1997): 509-525.
20. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, "The Conflict in the Area Dealt with by the Minsk Group," Internet (http://www.osce.org/info/facts/nagorno.htm).
22. See, for example, Oscar Schachter, "Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations," in Law and Force in the New International Order, eds. Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), who observes,
[R]egional bodies are indirectly authorized to undertake enforcement action inasmuch as Article 53 states that they may not do so without the authorization of the Security Council. Thus the failure of the Council to grant permission for enforcement action would bar such action. A permanent member could therefore prevent enforcement action by a regional organization (87).
The United States has long held that "recommendations" on the use of force by such organizations can legitimize it, but not in and of themselves constitute "enforcement action." Thus they are not governed by Article 53. NATO has taken pains to assert that it does not consider itself a regional arrangement or regional agency for purposes of Article 53. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) can painlessly offer itself as a regional arrangement because Moscow could always veto Security Council efforts to rein in CIS actions. Presumably, the United States, France, or Britain would similarly block Security Council efforts to rein in NATO.
Power politics notwithstanding, the whole issue of regional organizations and the use of force remains a matter of controversy among legal scholars. For discussion, see Tom J. Farer, "The Role of Regional Collective Security Arrangements," in Collective Security in a Changing World, ed. Thomas G.Weiss (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 161B166, and Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force (New York: Routledge, 1993), esp. 60B66.
23. Both sides have agreed that nothing in the Act restricts or impedes the ability of either side to take decisions independently. It does not provide NATO or Russia at any stage with a right of veto over the actions of the other. The Partnership Between NATO and Russia, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 20, July 1997. Online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/nato-rus.htm.