3. Post-Madrid: Ensuring Future European Security

U.S.-Russian Partnership: Meeting the New Millennium

3. POST-MADRID:
Ensuring Future European Security

Alexander Konovalov

INTRODUCTION

The Founding Act signed between Russia and NATO in Paris April 27, 1997, put an end to the most dramatic stage of political crises in post-Cold War European history. The crises that resulted from NATO plans for eastward enlargement were accompanied by collisions of different states’ political positions and a massive propagandistic campaign. By signing the Founding Act, Russia seriously changed its policy by shifting the focus of discussions from the prospects for Central European countries accession to NATO to the problem of Russia’s future role in a European security system and the security of Russia’s Western borders. But it would be completely wrong to consider Russia’s changed position as an acceptance of NATO enlargement. In the most concentrated form such an assessment was formulated by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who called for a "stop to the worrying about Russia" because the country understood the positive nature and political inevitability of the enlargement process and comprehended that it corresponds with Russian national interests. At the same time, special partnership relations, as declared in the Founding Act, were proper compensation for all Russia’s doubts and concerns about its security interests.

Unfortunately, such conclusions are the product of the worrisome trend growing in the post-Cold War period. Russia and the West are gradually missing each other. It looks likely that the political leadership of both sides are not concerned with these tendencies. Foreign and security policies of the West in general, and of the United States in particular, are increasingly guided by misunderstanding, misperception, and misinterpretation of Russia. To a lesser extent, the same is true for Russian policy toward the West.

NATO officials and high- level representatives of the United States took great strides to convince Russia that NATO enlargement eastward would not pose a military threat. They tried to explain that Russia does not have a "veto right" on the decisions of sovereign states to join the military Alliance. Russia’s struggle for a post-Soviet identity and new role in Europe fueled the opposition to NATO expansion more than antagonism toward the West. First, Russia, at least on the level of leading political elites, never considered NATO enlargement a direct military threat to Russia. The changes in Europe’s security architecture as a result of NATO enlargement were undesirable to Russia but were not seen as a main reason for concern. To say more, Russia was objectively interested in saving NATO as a functional mechanism able to play a core role in the future European security system. Russia was also interested in saving a permanent American presence in Europe, in all its aspects, including a military one; NATO was the most important political anchor linking the United States to Europe.

Europe is passing through a period of tectonic political changes. The previous political system that existed for a half of century—starting from the Yalta-Potsdam agreements—has collapsed, because it lost its relevance to contemporary political reality. One can evaluate this system as shameless and unjust because it sacrificed a number of Central European countries to Stalin’s regime. In exchange the West brought prosperity and stability to the Western part of the continent. But an evaluation of the Yalta-Potsdam system’s negative legacies is beyond the limits of this paper.

Whatever the assessment of the Yalta-Potsdam system would be today, it is impossible to refuse that it was "a system" with well-known rules of the game. Now this system is gone. The crucial problem for Russia and for the rest of Europe is to answer the question, what security system will substitute for the late Yalta-Potsdam arrangements? For Russia this question has a specific dimension—Europe is at a crossroads where the keystones should be put into the foundation of the future European political system. This new political system can be formed in two different ways: in one case Russia will be an integral part of this system, playing an active role in the decisionmaking process in military political sphere; in a second case Russia could be pushed out of the European political process (intentionally or unintentionally) and become alienated from Europe. To our mind this scenario is not in the interests of Russia or Europe. On the contrary, Russia is vitally interested in being an integral part of the European political process and the future European security system. At the same time, Russia today is not viewed as a partner, but rather is seen by Western analysts as a troublemaker of Europe. The predominant view is that Russia has little to offer European security other than problems.

But the enlargement of NATO inevitably prevents Russia from integrating into the newly forming European security system. All speculations about NATO enlargement as an open ended process which will gradually include Russia are far from reality. NATO ability to absorb new member-states is extremely limited, especially in its current form. Regardless of all the declarations about NATO openness to all democratic countries, no current or prospective member-states of the Alliance really envisions a future NATO with Russia as a full-fledged member. As they state, "For obvious, but unspoken, reasons, Russia’s full membership in Europe’s key security organizations (with the exception of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE), remains illusory."¹ Note that one of the authors of this statement is currently a Deputy foreign minister of Poland. Such an assessment is shared by respected American specialists who believe that "the United States must make its choices concerning European security without counting on constructive Russian participation in the process." That is why it is extremely important to clearly understand the reasons and motivations for Russia’s decision to sign the Founding Act and change its political strategy in relations with NATO.

THE FOUNDING ACT

Russia’s reasons and motivations to sign the document. After the Madrid NATO Summit in July 1997, when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic entered the final stage of their admission to NATO, Russia could have pursued four different political strategies.² The first variant was to resist the second possible wave of NATO enlargement and freeze its relations with NATO. Such a strategy definitely would have been counterproductive. Russia’s active opposition to NATO enlargement actually stimulates potential members to accelerate their efforts to join the Alliance.

The second possible strategy was to ignore NATO and recognize that Russia has too many domestic problems to deal with to be wasting time and resources on this anachronistic monument of the Cold War. But such a strategy could erode the key foundations of Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. In short, ignoring NATO would have meant political capitulation to the West. Such a move would undermine Russian positions not only in Europe but in the South and in the Far East.

The third possible strategy would be an attempt to catch the train which Russia is unable to stop"—Russian application for NATO membership. But such a strategy would be a defeat for Russian foreign policy. Formally speaking, Russia has already applied. Shortly after NATO was set up, the Soviet Union officially applied for membership to the Alliance, although the application was a political tactic absent any real intent. Soviet leaders were sure that their country would not be admitted to NATO. But this application exists in NATO archives and it has never been canceled by the Soviet side. Russia is a legal inheritor of the Soviet Union. So the West, whether it really wishes to see Russia among NATO member-states, could easily invite Russia for admission talks. Russian admission to NATO is a distanced goal but one that could be advanced by proclaiming such a strategic goal right now and identifying the conditions for membership. One should not forget that the contemporary level of European integration started with a primitive union of steel and coal that was guided by the declaration if strategic targets.

In general, the idea that the United States and the West should take the initiative in engaging Russia in new post-Cold War security arrangements was supported by respected American experts.³ Russia can’t take the initiative in this case because a new application for membership to NATO would have been a deadlock for Russian foreign policy. Russia’s application for membership to NATO would likely be viewed hesitantly and cautiously. At the same time, Russia’s application would likely strengthen European countries’ false conviction that membership to NATO is the only way to ensure their national security.

The fourth possible strategy seems the most difficult to be realized, but the only acceptable one to protect Russian national interests. It utilizes the opportunities given by the Founding Act and by the creation of the Joint Permanent Council of Russia and NATO. The main goals of such a strategy are to impact the ongoing process of NATO transformation in a way that corresponds with Russian security interests, and to formalize real cooperation between Russia and NATO in the security arena.

It is clear that the "gradual open-ended enlargement of NATO" proclaimed by the West gives no answer to the question: how to integrate Russia in the new European security system. NATO enlargement per se does not answer another basic question: how such a security system would look like. In one of his speeches to journalists, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov gave the following description of the Russian position with respect to NATO enlargement. He stated: "Plans to enlarge NATO worsen the situation dramatically for Russia in all aspects: political, psychological, military and geopolitical."

Russia is often told that NATO is not aimed against Russia, therefore it should accept its eastward enlargement. This is a weak argument. Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement does not mean that Russia pretends to have veto rights over the decisions of the sovereign states.⁴

To sum up, the Russian decision to sign the Founding Act in Paris should not be seen as agreement with NATO enlargement. On the contrary, it was an attempt to minimize the negative consequences of enlargement and to switch the train of European history from the wrong track—which inevitably resulted in a new division of the continent and political isolation of Russia—to another one, which has created a new model of cooperative security system in Europe.

The potential for cooperation between Russia and NATO. Speaking about the Founding Act between Russia and NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Donald McConnell said that this document "represents a breakthrough both conceptually and institutionally."⁵ Conceptual breakthrough is seen in the fact that NATO and Russia worked out a document where they try to fix the way out of adversarial relationships. "A strong NATO-Russia relationship is valuable for its own sake,"mentioned NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General McConnell in the remarks mentioned above, "it is neither an attempt to "buy off" Russia to accommodate NATO’s enlargement, nor is it playing mere lip service to Russia’s international status. Rather, the Founding Act is a recognition of a fundamental truth: that no viable European security architecture is conceivable without Russia."⁶

The Founding Act represents an institutional breakthrough because it establishes the mechanism to realize the conceptual potential of the document. The Permanent Joint Council gives a unique opportunity for consultations between NATO and Russia and their joint actions. The Founding Act proclaims that the parties will aim for "wide collaboration among the OSCE member states setting up in Europe the mutual zone of security and stability free of division lines, or spheres of influence limiting national sovereignty of any state."⁷

The potential contained in the Founding Act was viewed in different ways by prominent political figures and recognized experts. The first to drastically oppose the Founding Act and the creation of the Joint Permanent Council (JPC) was former U.S. State Secretary Henry Kissinger. In an article published in The Washington Post, Mr. Kissinger expressed serious concern that Russia got too much in the Founding Act. He predicted an erosion of NATO and Russian manipulation of the Alliance: "Russia will try to play the allies off against each other and American energies will be absorbed in navigating theses turbulent waters," he wrote.⁸ More importantly, he disclosed his vision of the purposes of NATO enlargement: "Any meaningful enlargement of NATO inevitably brings about a new dividing line—that is why the historical nations of Central Europe aspire to NATO membership. They want to join the old, not the new, NATO."⁹

Dr. Kissinger condemned the Clinton administration, which insisted on describing Russia as a partner and potential NATO member. "No neighbor of Russia," Mr. Kissinger proclaimed, "shares so benign a view of Russian’s purposes. No NATO country considers Russia’s size, territorial extent and distant non-European frontiers compatible with NATO membership." Of course such views support the political forces in Russia that do not believe in the possibility of partnership and cooperation between Russia and NATO. The view that the Paris document gave Russia too much influence in NATO was shared by the leaders of Central European countries which are to join NATO formally in 1999. Former Polish president Lech Valensa mentioned in particular: "This document creates empty hopes in Moscow about its possibilities to compete with the West in the military-political sphere."¹⁰

Some Russian analysts some of them were extremely skeptical of the Founding Act, but due to absolutely opposite reasons. They stated that the Founding Act is not a binding document and gives practically nothing to Russia. Even after signing this document it remains uncertain to Russia whether NATO forces, the NATO military infrastructure or its nuclear weapons will move eastward. The Founding Act does not include Russia formally in the international decisionmaking process on military-political issues in Europe. Most Russian analysts view the Founding Act as nothing but a shallow attempt to sweeten the bitter pill of NATO enlargement. On the other hand, one can easily see that the majority of Russian politicians and experts share the view that the Founding Act gives a unique opportunity to Russia. The Joint Permanent Council could give Russia possibilities to discuss with NATO any problem at any political level.

It is possible to agree with Henry Kissinger, whobelieves that the Founding Act gave Russia de-facto status that is higher than the status of any potential candidate for admission to NATO. The Joint Permanent Council may be efficiently used or completely missed. To a very large extent it depends on the activity and skills of Russian diplomacy. Paragraph III of the Founding Act identifies a broad range of possibilities for consultations and cooperation between Russia and NATO.

In the next 5 to 7 years, NATO and Russia should develop and formalize the most important pillar of the future European security system—the NATO-Russia partnership. Russia has to start movement toward this ambitious goal by identifying priorities in the list of mutual interests agreed upon in the Founding Act.

THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL: AN EMERGING AGENDA

The Founding Act provisions allow Russia to discuss with the Alliance a broad range of problems. In a television interview, Primakov stressed that the great achievement of the Paris document was the creation of a forum to raise questions that are the subject of the other international talks, such as amending the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Having such a wide set of options available Russian diplomacy has to work a clear cut strategy what to begin with. Several questions can be recommended as the top priority items for the NATO-Russia Council’s emerging agenda.

Modernization of NATO and the future mission of the Alliance. Russian concerns about NATO enlargement and the new military balance in Europe are viewed by NATO representatives as examples of "old thinking." Russia is repeatedly cautioned not to deal with the new NATO using confrontational ColdWar models of analysis. Up until now Russia has not had a clear perception of directions and goals of NATO modernization. It is widely known that the majority of NATO member-states diminished their defense budgets substantially. The arsenal of NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was reduced by 85 percent. But these reductions do not change the nature of the Alliance, which was designed to be and continues to be an instrument for collective defense.

It seems likely that nobody, including NATO officials, knows where NATO enlargement is going to stop and what are the real goals of enlargement. Nobody takes seriously speculations about the gradual open-ended enlargement process which will sooner or later reach the Ural Mountains and then continue further eastward. It is important to note here that such a plan would be deadly to NATO’s future. An erosion and even a collapse of the Alliance would have been an inevitable result of such a policy. It would contradict the national interests of Russia, which is in fact interested in saving NATO as a functional and efficient military-political organization.

Even now, as NATO is admitting three new member states, Henry Kissinger is sure that this represents a direct threat to the Alliance’s health: "The never-ever land emerging is characterized by a plethora of institutions that soon will compete for NATO consultation: the existing NATO Council, composed of the current 16 NATO members; the NATO-Russia Council, composed of NATO members plus Russia; the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, grouping NATO and most former Eastern Bloc countries; and the Partnership for Peace, composed of NATO and 11 Eastern countries, extending as far as Kazakhstan. Since all these institutions are served by the same staff and attended by the same NATO representatives, a dilution of traditional NATO purposes is inevitable."¹¹

A policy of open-ended enlargement for NATO gets less and less support in the American Congress. The Senate approved membership for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary with a solid majority (80 versus 19 votes). But already in April 1998, there was no longer widespread public support for NATO enlargement. Poll results showed that NATO enlargement was supported by 49 percent of respondents, the first time it was less then a half of the total responding contingent. What seems more interesting is the amendment of Senator John Warner, who proposed a moratorium on further NATO enlargement after the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. It did not pass through the Senate but had a correlation that looks much less convincing, 59 versus 41.¹²

In this situation NATO is intensively seeking a new mission, and broadly speaking, a new identity that is relevant in the new challenging environment. Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO McConnell proposed to see the NATO transformation as a return to the mission originally identified in the Washington Treaty, "to promote stability and well being in the North Atlantic Area." As Mr. McConnell says , "NATO can now return to its original, broader ambition of becoming an instrument for well-being and stability: it can move from safeguarding security to actively promoting it. Of course, this has required NATO to undergo a fundamental transformation. The NATO of the Cold War was not the right instrument to shape our new security environment. Change was needed."¹³

In this situation Russia should be ready to support the NATO transformation into an instrument for promoting security and stability in Europe and beyond. It might be too late to question why promoting stability and security starts with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Nothing threatens their security now, and in the foreseeable future, these countries belong to the most stable region of Europe. Promoting stability and security is also important to Russia, to the Balkans, and the states of the Caucasus. A discussion of NATO post-Cold War relevance and new possible interpretations of the original Washington Treaty is necessary. For instance, which threats are now or could in the near future lead NATO to extend nuclear guarantees to Hungary or to Poland? It seems that many politicians in the United States and in other NATO countries foresee that the admission of new members to NATO automatically extends nuclear obligations on their territories.

In general, it would be very important for Russia to clearly understand whether NATO is evolving into an international peace-keeping organization, acting under the auspices of the OSCE and the United Nations or whether its task is to create a new barrier defending the "island of prosperity and stability" in the Western part of the continent from uncertainties, political and military turbulence in the rest of Europe and beyond. But the last option would hardly be a proper answer on the real challenges and risks NATO is facing now. The real military dangers which can challenge the Alliance’s security and stability are rooted in the Balkans, in the Middle East, and in North Africa.

Prominent Russian analyst Alexei Pushkov considers that a process of NATO adaptation to new realities should go beyond admitting three new member states to include six other important components: cooperation with Russia on the bases of the Founding Act; development of special relations with Ukraine, saving "open doors for a potential second wave of new members, Europeanization of NATO or strengthening European component of NATO, developing European security and defense identity; working out principles and mechanisms for acting beyond the traditionally understood "zone of NATO responsibility"; cooperation in the PFP program with 11 more European and Asian countries."¹⁴

Russian diplomacy should use the NATO-Russian council to deliver to their counterparts one more point that seems extremely important but poorly understood by our Western partners. This notion is that NATO can use a dual-track approach to reach two goals simultaneously: gradual expansion of the Alliance and development of relations with Russia. It was always a wrong idea. The admission of three Central European countries to the Alliance did dramatically slow down all forms of cooperation between NATO and Russia.

The signing of the Founding Act and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council softened the negative consequences of this step and granted NATO and Russia a new, much more narrow "window of opportunity." As any opportunity, it can be successfully used or completely missed, And the principal choice must be done by the NATO side. Primakov characterized the invitation for admission talks to any former Soviet Republic as "crossing the red line," including Baltic states.

This is not an attempt to claim a veto right on the decision of sovereign European states. On the contrary, this is an explanation of the reactive component in Russian foreign policy. We have now two ways to go: in the first case NATO makes a practical break in its enlargement process and concentrates on developing and formalizing relations with Russia (of course keeping the Alliance’s doors open); in the second case NATO declares in 1999 the second wave of enlargement and invites five more states (for instance Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic republics) to begin the admission talks with NATO. The second option completely devalues both the Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council. Russia will have to freeze in all ways its cooperation with NATO. To select between these two options is NATO’s choice.

Problems of military security and arms control. The end of the Cold War did not result in a stable and secure Europe. On the contrary, Europe is filled with conflicts that would have been deterred in the period of bipolar confrontation. Conflicts in the Balkans, and in the territory of the former USSR, pose a direct military threat to security and stability on the continent. To oppose this tendency NATO and Russia need each other and must act cooperatively. One of the problems which can be discussed at NATO-Russian Council is the development of some universal principles to prevent further national and ethnic conflicts.

This problem has many dimensions. One is the interoperability of NATO military contingents with the other states’ troops in operations mandated by the U.N. Security Council or by the OSCE, in which the command chain integrates multinational components. The other problem is more theoretical. On the highest political level NATO and Russia have to work out a common approach toward the fundamental contradiction which exists in international practice now. This is a conflict between principles of inviolability of national borders fixed in the Helsinki final document and the right of nations to self-determination written in the U.N. Charter. Both these principles are actively used by political leaders of European (and not only European) states to either prove their separatist movements (right for self-determination), or to excuse repression against national minorities in respected countries (inviolability of borders).

The prevailing trend now is not to interpret the right for self determination as a direct right to secede and to establish a new state. Most likely it should be understood as minorities rights to have cultural autonomy and to be represented in the ruling bodies of the state. A common understanding here between NATO and Russia is absolutely crucial to avoid a double standard approach and to solve problems like those which exist in Kosovo, Bosnia, Georgia, etc.

The other subject for discussions between NATO and Russia at the Joint Permanent Council is military doctrines and military-strategic concepts. To begin with, the future of the nuclear deterrence concept and all aspects of nuclear strategy can be focused upon. It is a common view that nuclear deterrence was the key factor which prevented more war in Europe after 1945. At the same time we are witnessing the erosion of nuclear weapons deterrence function. It played no role in preventing national and ethnic conflicts ins the former Yugoslavia when nuclear powers like France and the United Kingdom tried to impact the situation and even used their military contingents under the U.N. Security Council mandate.

It did not prevent national conflicts in the states of the former Soviet Union, which were nuclear powers. It did not prevent the war in Chechnya, a region of Russia that inherited Soviet nuclear status and nuclear arsenals. In these last cases, nuclear weapons not only failed completely to be a stabilizing factor, but on the contrary, Russia had to urgently withdraw nuclear weapons from these feuding regions to avoid proliferation and losing control over nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons played no role when one nonnuclear state (Argentina) launched a military attack on a nuclear state (Great Britain), which was allied to a nuclear super power (United States) in the Falkland War.

NATO plus Russia represents four of five officially recognized nuclear states that have a lot to discuss together in the nuclear field. It would be interesting to work out a common view between NATO and Russia on the future role of nuclear weapons and a nuclear deterrence concept. The nuclear deterrence concept conflicts with the declared partnership between NATO and Russia. It is possible to understand, even if it is not accepted, the necessity to deter a strong adversarial state which does not share your values and principles and is convinced of its historical mission to impose its own ideology worldwide. But what is the role of nuclear deterrence in a situation where we have nobody to be deterred. The real partners do not need to deter each other.

It is clear that nuclear powers like Russia and the United States do not need nuclear arsenals of their current size and alert status. It is extremely important now to ensure the continuity of the nuclear disarmament process and move to the next stage of deep reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, to 1,000-1,500 warheads for Russia and the United States. Of course, these levels still substantially exceed the nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear powers but still represent an interest for the NATO Nuclear Planning Committee. Russian analyst Sergei Kortunov proposed transforming the START III talks into Strategic Stability Talks (SST), because the main idea of these talks should not be only and primarily a deep numerical reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, but also the restructuring of remaining nuclear arsenals and the transformation of the mutual deterrence model. The JPC NATO-Russia seems to be a proper institution to study the ways to give up a mutual nuclear deterrence model and to substitute it with a principally new type of strategic relationship that would ensure security and stability on nonnuclear bases.¹⁵

Such a discussion will be impacted by two negative trends. On the one hand, at the end of 1997, the President of the United States signed a secret directive on American nuclear strategy which leaked to the media immediately. This directive identifies nuclear strategy which is based on traditional deterrence stereotypes. Potential targets for American nuclear weapons are found in different countries and most of them in Russia and China. The United States reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first in case chemical and biological weapons are used against American troops.¹⁶

On the other hand, the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy is growing visibly. In 1993 Russia gave up its commitments to the "no first use" principle, which the Soviet Union followed in its declaratory nuclear policy for many years. Nuclear weapons are considered by many Russian politicians and military as the last attribute which proves Russian status of a great power. The meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation of July 1998, devoted primarily to Russian plans in the nuclear area, left no doubts that nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are seen as key elements of Russian military strategy for the foreseeable future. It looks highly likely that in the new military doctrine Russia will follow the American example and will proclaim its readiness to use nuclear weapons first in response to the use of chemical or biological weapons by any military opponent. The same may be said about a situation where Russia could be engaged in global conventional conflict or has no alternative way to ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. All these innovations are not the result of rethinking the role of nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence theory. It is simply an open declaration of a sad fact that Russia in its current economic and political situation is physically unable to successfully wage a large scale conventional war.¹⁷

To a very large extent changes in Russian nuclear strategy were triggered by the NATO enlargement plans. The Russian military literally repeated the arguments used by their NATO counterparts in the 1970s, when NATO considered tactical nuclear weapons as the only cheap equalizer to Soviet numerical superiority in the main categories of conventional weapons. For a long time the Soviet Union had a huge numerical superiority in all main categories of conventional weapons over any thinkable coalition of military opponents. Now NATO conventional arsenals exceed Russia’s two or three times. The qualitative gap in favor of NATO strengthens Russian conventional inferiority. With NATO enlargement the feeling of vulnerability will grow in Russia. In this situation one should not be surprised that the military and political elite do not see another way to ensure military security of the state but relying more on nuclear weapons.

The other important factor in the nuclear area which represents a mutual interest for NATO and Russia and should for the JPC is the possibility of nuclear proliferation. The problem increased dramatically after the nuclear tests launched by India and Pakistan. In this new situation NATO and Russia need to work out a coordinated policy toward possible official enlargement of the nuclear club. It seems likely that neither Russia nor NATO are interested in the erosion of the NPT treaty or uncontrollable proliferation of nuclear weapons. But if Russia and NATO nuclear states continue to see their nuclear weapons as a key element of their military strategies, if the Russian State Duma does not ratify the START II Treaty, if Russia and the United States interrupt mutual reductions of nuclear arsenals and develop independent nuclear strategies, if Russia makes clear that for a country that is poor and passing through deep economic crises the only instrument to ensure military security of the state is nuclear weapon—all these would be strong motivations for "threshold" countries to acquire own nuclear weapons. The decisions that are to be taken now will define the shape of the world in the not-so-distant future. The choice between two options is simple: in one case Russia with the United States and other NATO nuclear states continue reductions of nuclear arsenals and work out a principally new concept that substitutes nuclear deterrence and guarantees security and stability by nonnuclear means; in another case e see more and more states coming to the conclusion that the only mean to ensure national security is own nuclear bomb in the back yard.

The other important military security issue for discussions between NATO and Russia at the JPC is the modernization of the CFE Treaty. CFE modernization and its adaptation to new political realities in Europe are already moving forward. Two important principles of the modernized treaty were agreed upon by the engaged parties. One was proposed by the German side and deal with territorial limits which are aimed at preventing a dangerous concentration of heavy weapons in any part of the European territory covered by the CFE provisions. It is known that territorial concentration of heavy weapons is a necessary precondition for large scale offense or surprise attack. That is why the realization of such an idea will contribute a lot in organizing a stabilizing nonoffensive military posture in Europe.

The other was moved forward by Russia to prevent the appearance of imbalances in heavy weapons which may follow from NATO enlargement. It was proposed to introduce the summarized limits for NATO in each category of heavy weapons. This means that admission to NATO of new member-states should not result in an increase in the quantities of heavy weapons deployed by the Alliance. Of course, the proposed items for JPC agenda do not exhaust all aspects of the military security and arms control problem, but it definitely is enough to begin with.

Technical and economic cooperation in military field between Russia and NATO. This area of potential cooperation between Russia and NATO looks much less developed in comparison with all the others we mentioned already. At the same time it is well known that mutual economic interests strengthen security and stability more efficiently than political declaration. If NATO officials are frank and open saying that neither European security system is possible without Russia, we can find many areas for technical and scientific cooperation in the military field. Some Russian experts consider that we could cooperate with NATO in developing and exploiting a European tactical antiballistic missile system.¹⁸

Of course, the European tactical ABM system is not the only area for potential technical cooperation between Russia and NATO. Cooperation between NATO and Russia is possible in the design and manufacturing of transport aircraft, air defense systems, like S-300, etc. Unfortunately political and security reasons as well as state interests can be played out by the economic interests of national arms manufacturers. The competition in the arms markets is enormous. Take, for example, the contract between Russia and Cyprus in which Russia sold to this island one battery of air defense missiles S-300. The spector of a Russian manufactured weapons system to appear in this region was met hysterically by Turkey and other leading NATO states. It was repeatedly stated that deployment of these missiles in Cyprus would change the military balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey deployed in the occupied part of the island a squadron of F-16 fighters which mission is to destroy the Russian made missiles while they are shipped to Cyprus.

The Russian Foreign Ministry got an official collective note from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other large NATO states that said that Russia will bear responsibility for all the consequences of this shipment because NATO states will not be able to prevent Turkey from using armed forces. It is interesting to note that Russia shipped to Cyprus one radar, one command post, and from 8 to 12 mobile launchers of S-300 missiles, or from 32 to 48 air defense missiles. First of all, if the deployment of 50 air defense missiles which can be used for defensive purposes only and can’t attack any ground targets can change the military balance in the region , these are very good missiles. But many observers link NATO overreaction with the fact that the Russian missile complex is a direct competitor to the American Patriot system and this fact generated the reaction to the Russian Cyprus deal. The military markets themselves are narrowing because of the decrease of military power role in international policy. This all means that problems of technical and economic cooperation in the military field can be solved efficiently on a high political level only.

RUSSIA IN EUROPE: MOTIVATION FOR ENGAGEMENTS

Evaluating possible Russian engagements in Europe for the next century, prominent Russian expert Dr.Alexei Arbatov used in his analyses the basic economic indicators.¹⁹ As it was calculated by the specialists of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the United States produce 21 percent of the world GDP now. The EU shares in world GDP is roughly the same, at 21 percent, Japan, 8 percent, China, 7 percent, and Russia, 1,7 percent. In this economic indicator Russia places 16 among other countries, lagging behind India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea. The prognoses of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the year 2015 show that NAFTA-states (USA, Canada and Mexico) will produce 19 percent of the world GDP, EC, 16 percent, Japan, 7 percent, China, 10 percent, and Russia, 2 percent. But a forecast for Russia is based on the assumption that Russia will overcome its economic difficulties and its economy will grow 5 to 6 percent a year.²⁰

In this situation Russia has to look for a proper economic niche and economic and military strategy for the years to come. One strategy could be based on the proposition to increase the Russian role in the world economy by a type of Soviet renaissance. But the realization of such a strategy is highly doubtful due to political reasons and is not confirmed by contemporary economic trends. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) give today only 19 percent of total Russian foreign trade and most likely will decrease to 15 percent by the year 2005. The relations with the CIS states are extremely important for Russia, and these countries form a zone of special interests, but each of these states has a broad set of its own economic, political and security problems, to be solved before they can form strong economic commonwealth with Russia as a center of gravity. Even in this case one can expect that Russia’s share in the world GDP will grow to 2.5 percent.

The other strategy for Russia can be based on reorientation toward traditional partners like India and Iran. Political radicals add to this list Iraq, Libya and North Korea. Of course Russia will develop its economic cooperation with some of these countries to the extent it does not conflict with Russian obligations in international export control regimes and non-proliferation treaties. But it would be meaningless to expect that Russia can be fully integrated or even form an economic union with these countries. In many respects these countries compete for capitals and are interested in exporting the same energy resources.

The strategists who favor a strong Sino-Russian alliance that challenges the United States should bear in mind at least two factors. There are no signals that China is interested in establishing an alliance with Russia. It is not difficult to foresee who will play an older brother and a center of gravity role in such an alliance and who will absorb whom finally.

The dreams about close integration with the United States are not even mentioned nowadays in Russia. Russia is interested in having good relations with America. It is obvious that Russia is not seriously seen as a partner or as a competitor to the United States for the years to come.

All these observations lead to the conclusion that Europe seems to be the most efficient and suitable partner to cooperate with Russia. Already now this way of integration is proved by economic reality. EC countries consume 32 percent of total Russian exports and comprise 35 percent of Russia’s imports. Western Europe imports 41 percent of its energy resources from Russia.²¹ Compared to the biggest developed countries of Europe like Germany, France, or the United Kingdom, Russia will never look like a small and nonequal partner. Europe in turn will be interested to participate in the exploration of natural resources of Siberia and the Far East. Finally, the integration of Russia in Europe will make much easier for Russia to get closer to Ukraine and Belarus, which is of strategic importance for Russia.

There are many discussions about Russia’s Eurasian identity and unique paths of development. One can accept the argument that Russia is not a pure European country. Nevertheless, Russia definitely belongs to European culture, and what is more important for future Europe, Russia is the most important country in Eurasia beyond the EC. That is why Europe understands that Russia must be an integral part of the future Europe and its security system in the 21st century. Speaking at a conference on European security in February this year, German Chancellor Kohl stressed three key elements for Europe’s future security system:

European order can be stable only in the case if it includes both the United States and Russia.

European security is impossible if Russia is not its integral part, (Americans,- added German Chancellor,- should comprehend this inevitable reality and not to be suspicious about that fact).

It would be desirable for NATO-Russia relations to reach the stage of association at the beginning of the next century.²²

Russia’s integration with Europe makes even more sense in the situation when the idea of European Security and Defense Identity is getting more and more popular in Europe. Russia, because of its size, resource potential, and geostrategic position, could contribute a lot to the practical development of this idea. Of course Russian engagement in making Europe more capable of solving the continent’s security problems should not be seen as a substitution or counterbalance to the American role. On the contrary, Russia should complement the U.S. role as an extra important player on the European political scene.

NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM: THE MAIN BUILDING BLOCKS

The establishment of a new European security system that would substitute the Yalta-Potsdam arrangements demands the formulation of basic goals. First, the new security system should be capable of meeting new security risks and challenges that Europe is facing now and in the years to come. These are: ethnic and national conflicts; the fundamental contradiction between principles of border inviolability and territorial integrity of states versus rights of nations for self-determination which is often understood as a right to secede; organized crime and illegal drugs trafficking; illegal migration; proliferation of weapons of mass distraction; and dangerous military technologies. Finally, the new European security system should grant each European country equal access to security and not erect new dividing lines on the continent. The system should be ready to undertake cooperative defensive measures, whether or not military threat appears from outside Europe.

It is extremely important to base the future European security system on international law and international institutions that were constructed during the second half of the 20th century. Russia can’t accept the dangerous tendency when NATO tries to declare its right to act militarily in international arena without a U.N. or OSCE mandate. When respected Western analysts state that "even though all NATO member states undoubtedly would prefer to act with such a mandate, they must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed." Such attempts are seen with respect to the NATO approach toward Iraq and in Kosovo.

These attempts, while realized in practice, may completely destroy the key foundations of the international security system. This would undermine not only the idea of partnership between Russia and the West, but the general trust in international relations, and restore the situation of XIX century when the use of military force was seen as the most efficient instrument for states to reach their goals and to protect their interests. This tendency in NATO (primarily in American) policy can be characterized as "a syndrome of the lonely giant." This syndrome already results in destructive consequences.

NATO plans to admit former Soviet republics into the Alliance and expresses the view that the "security of the huge Russian inventory of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is a source of concern for all." Russia is suspicious of NATO declarations about its "legitimate right" to use military force unilaterally. This is illustrated by the military exercises undertaken by the long-range Russian aviation October 6-8, 1998.

A scenario developed and evaluated by the Russian military proposes that the military-political situation in Europe changes as a result of the enlargement of NATO that embraced the former Soviet republics.²³ As a result, some Eastern European states move forward territorial claims to Russia. NATO then demands that Russia improve security of its nuclear arsenals and threatens to use military force in case Russia rejects to fulfill its conditions. In this situation, Russia must use its long-range bombers to destroy the air carrier group and runways of the opponent to prevent it from realizing these plans. Of course this is nothing but a case scenario prepared by military staffs to test the ability and readiness of long-range aviation. But such a scenario could hardly appear in the case of real partnership between Russia and NATO.

The right sequence of practical actions to build up a security system based on real partnership should include some important items. First, after three new states join the Alliance in 1999, NATO should freeze the enlargement process. Of course this does not mean "to close the shop for an indefinite time." On the contrary, NATO may continue to proclaim its openness and readiness to admit new member-states, but the Alliance needs reasonable time to "process" new member-states and to rearrange itself for further enlargement. During this phase, 5 to 7 years should be spent developing and formalizing key elements of a European security system and constructing the pillar of NATO-Russia relations, engaging Russia in European political process as a full member.

It seems important to comprehend that freezing the enlargement process is an absolutely necessary prerequisite to reach a declared goal. It would be a historic mistake if the West continue to believe that developing NATO-Russia relations is compatible with further enlargement of the Alliance. If, for instance, in the year 1999 NATO states invited new European states, especially former Soviet republics, for admission talks, it would mean that the new European security system would be organized without Russia and contrary to her vital national interests. For Russia this would mean that Europe sees her as a potentially hostile power and no cooperation, not speaking about integration, is possible between Russia and NATO.

If, on the other hand, the West comprehends the imperative necessity to really engage Russia in Europe and makes it clear for Russia that the required time break is given and planned to be spent for construction a Russia-NATO pillar of European security architecture, the intensive political agenda described for the NATO-Russia Council can be brought in practice and added with a lot of extra details. The choice taken by the West before the year 1999 is extremely important. To a large extent it will define the military political shape of Europe at least in the first half of 21st century.

Russia is objectively interested in establishing partner relations with NATO. Russia sees itself as an integral part of the future European security system. Due to many reasons Europe is best suited to be a key partner to Russia than any other region or state.

The Founding Act and the JPC NATO-Russia open a window of opportunities for developing and formalizing relations between Russia and NATO but a lot of preconditions are necessary to successfully use this opportunity. Many options for the future place and role of Russia remain undetermined. Of course, scenarios for the future Europe have different probabilities which depend on variants of political strategies undertaken by the West in general, and by NATO in particular.

Last Update: January 24, 2003