U.S.-Russian Partnership:  Meeting the New Millennium

In recent years the United States and Russia have taken somewhat different approaches to the question of how best to pursue a secure future for Europe. The United States has emphasized the importance of keeping NATO active and relevant, of promoting inclusive participation in European security activities (including opening the door to NATO for qualifying states), and of strengthening all institutions that can contribute toward the goal of a secure and peaceful Europe. The United States has also emphasized that developments beyond Europe’s geographic boundaries can profoundly affect security in Europe.

Russia, on the other hand, has resisted the idea that NATO should be at the center of a new European security system. Russian officials have tended to portray NATO as the equivalent of the Warsaw Pact: components of an old Cold War structure of relations in Europe that are not relevant to Europe’s future. Russia has suggested that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (ONCE) provides the best framework for Europe’s future security system. At the same time, however, Russia signed the "Founding Act" with NATO establishing the Permanent Joint Council and has contributed forces to the NATO Implementation Force (FOR) and Stabilization Force (FOR) operations in Bosnia.

While experts on both sides of the Atlantic continue to project competing visions of future European security architectures—as Russian and American experts did at this conference—the road map toward a new European security system is being drawn, largely along lines determined by the United States and its NATO allies. Under current circumstances, Russian preferences have very little influence on the outcome of day-to-day developments in European security. This circumstance is not the result of any sinister Western plan, but the consequence of Russia’s current political, economic and military weakness. As this conference is held, Russia has fallen to its lowest level of coherence in all three areas in the post-Soviet history. To the degree that Russia exercises influence it is because of residual legal rights inherited from the Soviet Union (the veto in the U.N. Security Council, for example), because all NATO governments believe that Russia must have an appropriate role in any future European security system, and, frankly, because the NATO nations accord Russia influence to ward off Russian trouble making, either now or in the future.

Currently, Russia has little to offer for European security other than problems and potential. The Western countries do not wish to see Russia disintegrate or return to a Soviet-style dictatorial regime. They have invested significant political and financial capital in the hope for Russian reform. But today, they see Russian democracy looking down a long, dark tunnel and the Russian economy looking much like a bottomless pit into which international financial assistance vanishes, perhaps to be seen again only on the balance sheets of a few Swiss bank accounts.

This perspective on the future of European security, therefore, is set in a very uncertain context conditioned by a Russia whose future could lie in many different directions. The assumption of this approach is that Russia will not return to Soviet-style communism, but that neither will it resemble a Western style political and economic system anytime in the foreseeable future. The West cannot afford to ignore Russia, not because today’s Russia has anything very positive to offer, but because Russia could cause very serious problems, both in the near and longer term. In the near term, although Russia’s military poses no aggressive threat to anyone, its continued deterioration could become a major factor in Russia’s disintegration. Meanwhile, security of the huge Russian inventory of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is a source of concern for all. Looking further down the road, the kind of Russia that eventually emerges from today’s chaos is a critical variable affecting all assumptions one might make about the future of European security.

In these circumstances, the United States must make its choices concerning European security without counting on constructive Russian participation in the process while leaving the door wide open for cooperation with a willing and able Russian leadership. However, Russia’s future will not be determined primarily by U.S. security policy choices. Illustratively, the pace at which NATO enlargement proceeds will not be a major factor determining the fate of Russian democracy. To the extent that the United States and its allies can affect that future, they are more likely to be able to do so with political, financial and economic instruments of influence. But the United States and the NATO allies can, at a minimum, make it clear that they welcome the active participation and influence of a constructive, democratic Russian regime in any future European security system.

Within this broad framework, the following paragraphs suggest some recommended directions for U.S. policy in a variety of issue areas affecting European security relationships.

THE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

Even in the absence of a major direct threat to security in Europe, the United States has a vital interest in maintaining a stable, secure Europe. For the past fifty years, the active involvement of the United States in the European security system has been the single most important factor promoting peace and stability. In many ways, this remains true today. Removing the American role from the European security system would likely destabilize political and military relationships throughout the continent. On this issue, Dr. Alexander Konovalov and I appear to agree. U.S. withdrawal would lead many countries to re-nationalize their defense policies and new and unpredictable national competitions and conflicts could arise. The potential consequences of such an outcome are too grave to warrant a U.S. decision to "leave Europe to the Europeans," whether or not this phrase includes Russia. This conclusion does not automatically tell us exactly how continued U.S. involvement should be shaped. Several of the following paragraphs address that issue.

THE FUTURE OF NATO

NATO remains the most important venue for U.S. involvement in European security. This would not be so if NATO were simply a military Alliance focused only on providing a collective defense for its members’ territory. But NATO is much more than that. The North Atlantic Treaty establishes a broad foundation of values and commitments that undergirds a community of interests among the member states. It also provides a charter for cooperation among the member states on any issue that poses a potential threat to their security.

The process of adapting NATO to the new circumstances after the Cold War has been complex and, so far, largely successful. The United States has an interest in continuing this process of active adaptation. That process should seek to expand the roles of the Alliance to reflect contemporary security requirements and enlarge the circle of European nations that are intimately involved in its work.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN NATO

Ideally, the European security system should evolve toward greater European responsibility for their own security, both to respond to European hopes for more control over their own destiny and American desires for more effective burdensharing. Much of the work of creating a "new NATO" in the post-Cold War world has focused on beginning to create the possibility for more European responsibility in the Alliance, a process also supported by Konovalov. The Alliance should continue to evolve in this direction, but there are limits. The emergence of a meaningful "European pillar" in the Alliance will depend on whether or not the European nations develop the military capabilities for such a pillar and the political will to use them.

For the foreseeable future, the allies will be best served by sharing security responsibilities, as they have in Bosnia, rather than dividing them into "U.S." and "European" tasks. At the same time, NATO’s new potential for outreach to non-members, including the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Permanent Joint Council with Russia, and the "distinctive partnership" with Ukraine should all be used to ensure the broadest possible European contributions to the cause of a secure Europe.

ENLARGEMENT OF NATO

The NATO allies have pledged that the first phase of enlargement will not be the last and that the door to NATO membership will remain open to other states who wish to join and meet the requirements for membership. In spite of this general agreement, articulated at the July 1997 Madrid summit and since, the allies remain divided, both among themselves and internally within many allied states, concerning how to move ahead. Some clearly would prefer to pause after welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the Alliance. Others have strongly advocated giving enlargement a "southern dimension" by including Romania and/or Slovenia in the next enlargement group. Some in northern Europe, however, object to moving ahead with these two countries without giving due consideration to the desires of the Baltic states to join.

Having begun the process, the allies were obligated to demonstrate their commitment to the open door when allied leaders met in Washington in April 1998. To not have done so would have seriously upset current expectations about the future in Europe, even contributing to destabilizing regimes in the region that now count on moving toward NATO membership.

On the question of how NATO should pursue further enlargement, Konovalov and I have some disagreements. He endorses a pause in the enlargement process of 5 to 7 years. This, unfortunately, would artificially block membership for countries that may be, or may become, qualified for NATO membership according to Article 10 of the Treaty of Washington. It would also create the impression that the enlargement process had stopped, or was subject to being stopped during this "pause."

The broad options for the allies at the Washington summit included: inviting one or more candidates to begin negotiations for membership; putting all current candidates on the starting line with the assumption that each one will move toward membership at its own pace; or issuing no invitations at Washington but agreeing that one or more countries will be invited to join at a subsequent NATO summit. Of these options, only a formal invitation to at least one country sent a clear signal that the door is open. The starting line approach is one way to suggest the door remains open, but all candidates are effectively in the race already and may not see this option as significantly altering the status quo. Kicking the issue down the road to a subsequent NATO summit buys time but it also raises the danger that the membership door will be perceived closed by candidates or as susceptible to closure by Russia.

In addition, it appears that one or more former neutral states will eventually apply for membership. The allies must be prepared for the possibility of an Austrian application in coming years as well as one from Sweden and perhaps Finland somewhat further down the road.

At the Washington summit, the best option was demonstrating that the enlargement door remains open. In addition, all other candidates had to be assured that their progress toward an invitation would be reviewed on a continuing basis and that their progress and shortcomings discussed with them annually.

The allies must also avoid making enlargement decisions a competition between northern and southern candidates. The Baltic States deserve the opportunity to join NATO and the allies should continue to integrate them into the work of the Alliance. Candidates for membership should be judged with reference to the guidelines provided in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, regardless of their geographic location in Europe. As agreed by NATO leaders in Madrid in July 1997, no European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty should be excluded from consideration. Of course, the allies should carefully monitor the continuing process of enlargement and its effects on the overall security and effectiveness of the Alliance.

The possibility that Russia might one day meet the guidelines in the NATO enlargement study and request membership should not be excluded, even though Konovalov seems to dismiss the idea. Russian membership in NATO would surely change the nature of the Alliance, but perhaps more importantly, if Russia were one day to meet the guidelines for NATO membership, Europe and the world would have changed quite fundamentally for the better.

DEALING WITH NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

A changing and increasingly diverse world of potential threats, risks and challenges suggests the United States and its NATO partners will have to take a flexible approach to the defense of their interests in the 21st-century world. The potential for future threats to the territorial integrity of NATO nations, albeit small at the moment, is one that cannot be ignored. The situation in Bosnia demonstrated that NATO countries will require the ability to deploy military forces in coalition operations beyond national borders. It appears clear that, in both cases, NATO will be the best framework for the preparation and coordination of allied approaches to such challenges.

NATO undoubtedly will benefit from policies that seek to prevent international conflict through the use of consultation and cooperation with nonmembers, and particularly with Russia. When the allies can use diplomacy to prevent misunderstandings, remove sources of potential conflict, mediate differences, or deter threats, actual challenges to their interests will be substantially reduced. The United States and its allies will have to determine when NATO should be used to deal with new challenges such as terrorism, proliferation, mass migration, and other possible threats to the interests of NATO nations. In the 21st-century world, other organizations, particularly the United Nations, may be more effective in dealing with some of these challenges. For example, it will be important to ensure that Japan and other developed states outside the Euro-Atlantic area assume a fair share of such burdens. On the other hand, the NATO allies may not want to count on the U.N. structures in all cases. The NATO framework, with its potential for effective consultations and coordinated action, may be critically important in some circumstances

The North Atlantic Treaty imposes no formal constraints on the ability of the allies to decide to use their cooperative framework to deal with challenges that do not qualify as Article 5 (collective defense) missions. There is no limit on what kind of operations can be envisioned. There is no restriction on what forces and weapons can be brought to bear. There are no geographic constraints on where operations can be conducted.

In practice, however, there are some real political constraints. Very few allies, for example, would likely support using NATO for an operation in Asia. But there is a real possibility that the allies will face decisions concerning use of NATO structures even closer to home but beyond Europe’s borders, for example in the Middle East or in Africa. Just as NATO operations in Bosnia (beyond NATO Article 5 geographic parameters, as defined by Article 6) have been unprecedented, the use of NATO outside of Europe would be so as well. But, as noted above, the most likely challenges to peace and the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community will likely emerge in the Mediterranean region in the 21st century. Today, it looks as if there is no way that agreement could be reached in the Alliance in advance about reactions to such hypothetical contingencies. The allies probably will leave such decisions until they are confronted by a real-life scenario. The problem is that by not deciding the allies could de facto eliminate options, because they would limit the ability of NATO military authorities to plan and practice operations far from NATO territory and in a wide range of geographic and climatic conditions.

The emerging Euro-Atlantic security system clearly requires effective interaction between NATO and other organizations beyond the NATO structure. In terms of NATO’s future missions, the question of the NATO relationships to the United Nations and to the ONCE is critical. NATO allies have said that they would entertain requests from both organizations to undertake a specific peace operation.

Under current and foreseeable circumstances, very few NATO allies would be willing to engage the Alliance in a non-Article 5 mission without some sort of politically sustainable international legal basis for the operation. All, including the United States, would prefer that such a mandate come from the United Nations, giving the operation the broadest possible international support. An ONCE mandate, if relevant, would be welcome, even though it would represent a less universal political base. In the future, however, we may encounter a case in which neither a United Nations nor an ONCE mandate is possible, perhaps due to opposition from Russia. Not only would such an instance threaten to sour NATO-Russian relations, but it could also create serious divisions among the allies, between those willing to go ahead without a mandate and those reluctant to do so. The Kosovo conflict has already posed this issue quite directly.

In sum, the allies must always seek to act in unison, preferably with a mandate from the United Nations or the ONCE. Even though all NATO member states undoubtedly would prefer to act with such a mandate, they must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed. All NATO actions should nonetheless be based on appropriate legal authority.

THE BALKAN CHALLENGE

There cannot be peace and security in Europe as a whole if there is a tinderbox in the Balkans. The peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not likely to become self-sustaining in the next few years. However, the NATO commitment to provide a security environment there creates the opportunity for the process of reconciliation and reconstruction to move ahead.

Despite the remarkable progress that has occurred over the years since the signing of the Dayton Accords and deployment of a NATO-led, peace-keeping force, the Euro-Atlantic nations will be devoting forces and money to Balkan stability for some time to come. Although this can be regretted as an unwelcome burden, the Bosnia experience has had two important silver linings: First, it has been remarkably successful and has thereby strengthened appreciation for NATO relevance in the post-Cold War world. Second, the Allied operation demonstrated the validity of the new NATO mission concepts. The role of NATO in the peace process has been facilitated by a multinational task force that in everything but name only has been a combined joint task force. This task force—first called the Implementation Force and now called the Stabilization Force—has relied on a critical U.S. leadership role, but European allies now contribute the bulk of forces on the ground in Bosnia. Partner countries, including Russia, have been constructively incorporated in the operation. However, ensuring peace in the Balkans will remain a concern for the NATO allies in the 21st century until that region has settled into patterns of normal political and economic relationships emulating those in the rest of Europe.

The United States and its NATO allies must demonstrate that their cooperation can be put to practical use in the 21st- century world. The first challenge has come from the Balkans. The allies need to find a basis on which their Balkan involvement can be sustained within the political will and the financial capabilities of the allies. The successful military operations of both FOR and FOR demonstrate that NATO’s organizational strengths can and should be turned toward new security challenges.

Now that prolonging NATO presence in Bosnia is assured, the international community needs to put greater focus on and resources into rebuilding a functioning society and governmental system in Boznia-Herzegovina. The goal of NATO should be to provide the security necessary to create the opportunity for a self-sustaining peace. This task cannot be seen in isolation, as ethnic strife in Kosovo could reignite war in the region. Furthermore, the goal of a just and lasting peace in the Balkans requires that the allies continually reassess the viability of the framework established in Dayton. If that framework should be judged as inadequate, the allies and other states, including Russia, should collaborate in amending or replacing Dayton as necessary. In some way, the U.S. and NATO policies must strike a balance between maintaining the peace and ensuring a just and stable settlement. Over time, this means in particular that war criminals should be brought to justice and blocked from participation in Bosnia’s political or economic future.

THE ROLE OF THE ONCE

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (ONCE) was designed to promote peaceful relations among states "from the Atlantic to the Urals." The 1975 Helsinki Final Act established a series of agreed principles or "rules of the road" to govern relations among states in Europe. The ONCE members states (all European states plus the United States and Canada) have adopted further agreements and principles, given the organization some diplomatic tools for conflict prevention, and convene regular meetings under ONCE auspices to try to nip problems in the bud before they develop more serious proportions.

The United States and its NATO allies should declare that they value the ONCE as the collective security framework in the emerging European security system. This system should function not through balance of power, but through support of the principles for relations among states specified in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The allies should therefore strengthen ONCE ability to facilitate resolution of security-related disputes involving one or more non-NATO member European states. They should support the increased resources necessary for the ONCE to fulfill this mission.

ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

In the closing decades of the Cold War, arms control became an increasingly important way of regulating the relationship with the Soviet Union. The past importance of arms control in this relationship, however, should not blind us to new possibilities for the Russia-United States-NATO relationship that would be more consistent with a new cooperative European security system. Even if Russia does not initially choose to take advantage of all opportunities for cooperation, the allies should keep all these doors wide open. No matter what course the NATO-Russia relationship takes in the future, the allies must continue to make it clear that they seek a transparent and cooperative relationship, one which moves beyond Cold War assumptions and perceptions, and which is based on the values and goals articulated in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Arms control remains a critical tool for management of relations among states in Europe and in the international system more generally. In particular, adaptation and implementation of the treaty on CFE to the new European circumstances would be a source of reassurance and stability for many years to come. The allies must nonetheless ensure that the revised treaty does not restrict NATO flexibility to reinforce old and new member states in crisis situations and to conduct peace support operations. At the same time, the treaty should draw Russia even closer into the common European security structures, thus complementing the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

The goal of the United States and its allies should be to use defense cooperation with Russia to move beyond arms control to a qualitatively new level of political and military relationships. However important arms control treaties may be, the allies should persist with their attempts to create a European security system in which concepts like balance of power, zones of influence and strategic position are replaced by cooperative, integrative relationships. Long-term political stability must be based on the growth of democracy, economic development, mutual trust, and a system of cooperative security among all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. In this area, I see some common ground with Konovalov, who emphasizes the importance of developing NATO-Russia cooperation in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council. I can only endorse this approach, but regret that Russia has not yet chosen to make full use of all the opportunities that NATO has offered.

In addition, Konovalov’s suggestion that NATO-Russia consultations should include issues of nuclear doctrine and strategy and theater ballistic missile defense is well worth pursuing. Given the extraordinary overhang of short-range missiles in the Russian inventory, it is in the interest of NATO countries to develop a dialogue with Russia on these topics. A process of building greater mutual trust and understanding would hopefully lead to substantial reductions in Russian inventories of short range nuclear systems as well as a more stable strategic relationship between Russia and NATO.

THE EU AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

A critical key to the future of security in Europe is the ability of the European Union (EU) to act as the magnet for and integrator of democratic European states in a community where peaceful relations among its members is taken for granted. Only the EU has the mandate to serve as the foundation for a process of political and economic integration in Europe that will continue to spread the area of peace and stability out from the center already established in Western Europe. This suggests that the future security of Europe depends on the political and economic success of the EU and the enlargement of its membership to include all desirous and qualified European states.

Whether or not the process of European integration will proceed ultimately to the point of creating a united European state that will act autonomously on the international scene remains an open question. It will not be necessary for this to happen in order for the EU to make a substantial contribution to peace in Europe, and thus to serve as a political and economic keystone of the future European security structure.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

In sum, the best way to ensure a peaceful, prosperous future in Europe is to build a cooperative system of security on the foundation provided by the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the political/economic framework of the European Union, and the political/military operational structure of NATO. All participants in the emerging European security system must respect the sovereign right of all European states to make their own choices concerning organizational affiliations and levels of participation in cooperative security activities. Security relationships should increasingly be based on political/military cooperation, moving beyond the arms control foundations established during the Cold War. Participants in the system should base their security policies increasingly on transparency, dialogue, consultation and cooperation.

Important parts of the structure of a stable system are already in place. The vast majority of states in Europe agree on the basic goals and ingredients. They all remain concerned about the role of Russia in this system—they know that, one way or another, Russia will play an important role in the future evolution of security in Europe. To the degree that we can identify common approaches to Russia’s involvement in the European security system, the more hopeful we can be about the future.

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Last Update:  January 24, 2003