Rather than attempting to integrate the three papers on the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, they are summarized below under this cover document. In brief, the three papers find the present prospects for U.S.-Russia security cooperation in the Middle East, South Asia or East Asia to be limited. This does not mean that cooperation is to be ruled out, but that intensive cooperation will require a clearer understanding—and acceptance of—the respective national interests at stake. In this regard, although the Cold War zero-sum rivalry has ended, the two governments appear to be pursuing conflicting policies in these three critical regions:

Iraq: The United States sees Saddam Husayn’s regime as a fundamental threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf and views Russia’s soft line on sanctions as undercutting U.S. efforts to contain Iraq and bring down Husayn’s regime;

Iran: Washington is concerned with Iran’s support for terrorism and its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction; it sees Russia’s sale of advanced weapons technology is as advancing Tehran’s WMD programs

Central Asia: Russia sees the region’s raw material as important to its own economy and has a vital security interest in controlling the borders of Central Asia. Meanwhile, the United States has aroused Russian suspicions due to an active pursuit of Central Asia’s substantial oil and gas reserves and its advocacy of democratic reform. In this region, Russia cultivates close relations with Iran and is highly suspicious of Turkey, while the United States works closely with Turkey and is suspicious of Iran.

India-Pakistan: Russia has recently revitalized to some degree its military relationship with India, seeing it as an excellent market for Russian weaponry. In the context of the recent nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan this could increase pressure on Pakistan to enhance its missile and nuclear capabilities to offset India’s conventional advantage.

China: Russia’s fire sale of advanced weaponry is contributing to China’s military modernization. By strengthening China’s air and naval power projection capabilities in the South China Sea and against Taiwan, both areas of strategic interest to the United States, Russia is enhancing the risks to U.S. forward-deployed forces in East Asia.

Nevertheless, there are some areas where Russia and the United States could work together:

• Countering radical Islamic Fundamentalism, yet even here the geographic areas of interest of the United States and Russia differ

• Countering terrorism, yet Russia focuses its counterterrorist activities in along its Central Asian borders and does not accord fighting Middle East terrorism the same priority as the United States does

• Countering the flow of illicit narcotics traffic from South and Central Asia

• • Developing and exporting Central Asia’s energy resources on essentially a market basis; but this would be based on U.S. acceptance of a significant degree of continuing Russian influence in the region;

• Cleaning up the nuclear remnants of the Cold War in Asia

• In the process of Korean unification by working with other interested powers (China and Japan) to guarantee a peace treaty, establishing a united but denuclearized peninsula and to assure the elimination of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction from a unified Korean peninsula.

• Developing through the private sector the resources of Russia’s Far East; Japan’s cooperation would be helpful in opening this region to the markets of Asia.

Complicating the prospects for security cooperation is the weakness of the central government in Russia today and the perilous state of its economy and financial infrastructure. This has allowed Russia’s military-related industries to sell advanced weaponry and technologies to countries such as Iran, Iraq, and China. Such sales, with or without government complicity, put U.S. security interests at risk.

Perhaps the most promising prospects for United States-Russia cooperation rest in the private sector development of Russia’s and Central Asia’s vast natural resources. But such cooperation will likely require a clear understanding of the respective national interests at stake in these broad and diverse regions.

This suggests a final thought. Rather than discussing prospects for U.S.-Russia security cooperation in the next millennium (and assuming a correspondence of national interests as the basis for such cooperation), this conference would do well to examine the respective national interests of both the United States and Russia in critical regions. This would help to determine if in fact the basis for such cooperation does indeed exist.

Although there are issues in the Middle East on which the United States and Russia are in considerable accord and could find ways to cooperate, many more issues stand out as areas of likely competition between the two. It would be a great exaggeration to say that U.S.-Russian competition in the Middle East has returned to Cold War levels. Nevertheless, over the last few years, Moscow appears to have shifted its policy on several important regional issues—Iraq, in particular—and allowed agreements with the United States on other Middle East issues to lie fallow—such as the various agreements to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction technology to regional rogue states. These changes have created new tensions in the U.S.-Russian relationship.

In a sense, Russian-American relations regarding the Middle East have improved considerably since the Cold War. The two no longer arm regional states expressly to serve as proxies to undermine the interests of the other. Russia no longer constitutes a military threat to the vital communications routes and natural resources of the region, on which the United States and its Western allies are dependent. The two powers no longer support indigenous revolutionary movements working to overthrow governments friendly to each other.

However, on the key issues that define the contemporary Middle East, the two states increasingly pursue opposite policies. On those issues of greatest importance to U.S. policy-makers, Russia is rarely considered a supporter and, more and more often, is seen as an adversary. Washington believes that Moscow is deliberately attempting to undermine the U.S.-led containment of Iraq. The United States is frustrated with Russian sales of advanced technology for the manufacture of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to Iran and other regional pariahs. Washington works avidly to keep Moscow from "meddling" in the Middle East Peace Process. Even on those issues where cooperation seems most likely—such as combating the spread of Islamic fundamentalism—the tactics adopted by Washington and Moscow often are contradictory, though their intentions may be similar.

As a result, real opportunities for cooperation between Russia and the United States on critical Middle East issues will depend on long-shot scenarios. It will take unlikely events in the region (which, of course, is a region well known for unlikely events) to create the circumstances in which Moscow and Washington will have the kind of commonality of interests needed for meaningful cooperation.

Iraq. U.S.-Russian differences over Iraq are probably the most readily apparent and the least likely to be overcome in the near-term. The problems stem from a fundamental disagreement over goals. The United States believes that Saddam Husayn’s regime constitutes a threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf. Consequently, Washington has made it a priority to contain Iraq, to see it disarmed, and to prevent Saddam from rebuilding either his conventional or non-conventional military capabilities. Although earlier this decade Moscow appeared to have been in agreement with these goals, Russian priorities on Iraq appear to have changed dramatically in the last few years. Today, Iraqi disarmament is no longer a priority for Russia. Indeed, Moscow seems to have concluded either that Saddam could not again pose a threat to the Persian Gulf or, that if he did, other forces would check him. Instead, the Russians have made the lifting of sanctions on Iraq their highest priority in the region, and increasingly serve as Saddam’s advocate—and apologist—in international forums.

The prospects for cooperation on Iraq look bleak. The United States is unlikely to reevaluate its position that Saddam Husayn’s regime must be contained in some fashion. On the other hand, Russia is eager to have the estimated $7 billion owed it by Baghdad repaid, in addition to garnering future oil deals and possibly new sales of weaponry and heavy equipment. Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov is an old Middle East hand with a long and disquieting relationship with Saddam Husayn. Many in Washington believe that his commitment to the Iraqi cause is a product not only of Russian financial concerns, but also of Primakov’s desire to reassert Russia’s great power status in an important part of the world where Russia was once a major player. Along similar lines, some in Washington suspect that Russian opposition on Iraq may be something of a quid pro quo for U.S. support for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections.

Two scenarios suggest themselves as the only real possibilities for U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iraq. If growing financial problems were to force Russia to abandon its opposition to U.S. policies, the cooperation of the early 1990s could be restored. Alternatively, the demise of Saddam Husayn’s government would radically alter the nature of the Iraqi problem. Washington would likely see a relaxed threat to the stability of the Gulf and be more accommodating to a new Iraqi regime. Although the Russians would no doubt want to preserve their privileged commercial position with Iraq, both countries would share desires to 1) ensure that Iraq did not fragment, and 2) see a new Iraqi regime quickly meet its obligations to the United Nations and be rehabilitated as a member of international community. Unfortunately, neither of these two scenarios is probable. The result is likely to be continued competition and bitterness over Iraq. Even if the United States is forced to abandon elements—or even most—of the containment of Iraq, Russian support for Baghdad is likely to leave a bad taste in American mouths.

Iran. Unlike Iraq, the United States and Russia share many goals regarding Iran. Both would like to see Iranian support for Islamic fundamentalism curbed. They would both like to see a more restrained Iranian foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. They would both like to see Iran support (or at least not violently oppose) the Middle East peace process. And they would both like to see Iran exercise a moderating influence over the Taliban in Afghanistan.

However, there are also important differences between them. The United States is very concerned by Iranian support for terrorism and efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United States also would like to see Caspian Sea oil exported cheaply, through multiple pipelines. By contrast, the Russians have shown little desire to make countering either terrorism or WMD proliferation a priority and, in fact, have been among the worst offenders in transferring WMD technology to Iran. In addition, the Russians have shown a willingness to cut deals with Iran that would allow the two of them to dominate the export of oil from the Caspian Sea region.

Whether the United States and Russia cooperate or confront each other on Iran may well be determined by events inside Iran itself. Consequently, there is some room for optimism here. Both Russia and the United States appear to favor the continued consolidation of power by Iran’s new moderate President, Muhammad Khatemi. If Khatemi is able to make himself the true leader of Iran, this could enhance the prospects for U.S.-Russian cooperation and might dampen the sources of tension between them. Khatemi has made clear his own opposition to Iranian support for terrorism and the export of Islamic fundamentalism, his desire to improve relations with the West and with Iran’s Gulf neighbors, and his willingness to allow the peace process to work itself out free of Iranian machinations. Consequently, Khatemi’s success would likely go a long way toward emphasizing those goals on which Washington and Moscow agree, and removing some of the areas on which they disagree.

However, there are two potential problems with this rosy picture. First, despite initial successes well beyond what many in the West believed possible, Khatemi still faces major obstacles to consolidating power. He has not won yet, and he could still be ousted by his hardline opponents. This could create considerable problems in U.S.-Russian relations over Iran. In the past, the Russians have shown little compunction about dealing with Iranian hardliners, principally because they do not care about Iranian support for terrorism, WMD proliferation, opposition to the peace process, or efforts to undermine the moderate Middle Eastern states—which are core planks of the Iranian hardliners’ platform. On the other hand, the United States would be likely to oppose a new hardline regime in Tehran as staunchly as in the past, creating opportunities for renewed tensions with Moscow.

Second, even if Khatemi prevails, his victory might not eliminate the issue of Iranian WMD proliferation. Many Westerners would like to believe that Khatemi will end, or drastically slow, Iran’s efforts to build WMDs largely because there is a tendency to impart to Khatemi every trait we believe favorable and because Khatemi has espoused every other position considered positive in the West. But in truth, no one in the West actually knows where he stands on the issue of Iranian WMD development: he has been silent on the matter. It may be that Khatemi, as an Iranian nationalist, believes that Iran must possess a strong deterrent capability. Such a position would still be fully compatible with his other progressive positions. Iran lives in a very tough neighborhood, and it is easy to understand how any Iranian ruler would want a WMD capability purely for raison d’etat.

In this case too, we could expect considerable U.S.-Russian conflict over Iran. Russia might well continue to aid Iranian efforts to build weapons of mass destruction, based on their willingness to do so in the past. In the event the United States again attempted to contain Iran through sanctions, Moscow would likely oppose Washington’s efforts. Indeed, the two might find themselves involved in international legal disputes—such as the secondary boycott measures inherent in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which provide for penalties against firms that invest significantly in Iran’s oil industries.

Middle East peace process. The Middle East peace process may lie dormant for the next few years which would prove a problem for U.S. relations with the Arab states, but could remove a potential sore spot with Russia. At one level, the United States and Russia share the most basic objectives for the peace process: they both want it to succeed. This is a major change from much of the Cold War era when, arguably, both sides were more interested in bolstering their proxies than actually trying to "solve" the fundamental disputes between Arabs and Israelis. Moreover, this fundamental agreement on the peace process is likely to persist into the future.

The problems between the United States and Russia on the peace process lie at another level. First, the peace process—and indeed the entire Arab-Israeli confrontation—has become a secondary concern for the Russians over the last six years. As its pretensions to global power have faded, so too has Russian involvement in the peace process. Russia no longer has the military or economic might to wield real influence in the region and as a result, none of the confrontation states see Russia either as a useful backer or even a worthwhile intermediary in the negotiations. Consequently, Russia’s willingness to exert itself on behalf of the peace process has diminished.

Second, the United States has jealously guarded its role as broker of the peace process and excluded all other contenders, including Russia. In 1992, Russia was the co-sponsor of the Madrid talks which reinvigorated the peace process after the Gulf War. However, today, Washington tends to see Moscow as little more than a potential meddler where the peace process is concerned: unable to exert the kind of influence that could actually solve the problems, but convenient for one side or the other to bring in to try to muddy the waters. This U.S. perspective is not particularly anti-Russian. In fact, Washington acts in a similar manner toward France, the United Nations, and anyone else who attempts to set themselves up as an alternative to the U.S. role in the peace process.

Thus it is difficult to say that there is a likelihood of either cooperation or conflict on the peace process. By and large, Russia has lost the ability and the desire to play a meaningful role in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the United States has encouraged them to stay out. If the process itself were to suddenly rebound, this would be unlikely to create new opportunities for U.S.-Russian cooperation because Moscow lacks the economic resources to assist the confrontation states, and Washington is unwilling to allow the Russians to play any other role.

Only if the peace process were to die altogether and be replaced by renewed conflict would we be likely to see either renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation or confrontation. However, it is difficult to know where the chips might fall. On the one hand, because Russia is so uninterested in the peace process and may become increasingly dependent on the United States financially, a new Arab-Israeli conflict could elicit real cooperation between Moscow and Washington, if only at the level of the U.N. Security Council. On the other hand, if Russia saw in renewed Arab-Israeli conflict the opportunity to reassert its traditional great-power role in the Middle East, it might again adopt the Arab cause, albeit probably only diplomatically and rhetorically, in opposition to the United States.

Weapons proliferation. As noted above in the case of Iran, Russia’s willingness to seel advanced weaponry, and particularly weapons of mass destruction to Middle Eastern rogue regimes is a source of tremendous tension between Moscow and the United States. Although Iran is the issue of greatest conflict at the moment, Washington is equally frustrated by ongoing Russian relationships with other Middle Eastern rogues. Indeed, Russia has even been guilty of selling WMD technology to Iraq, providing gyroscopes for ballistic missiles which were uncovered by the United Nations’ inspectors.

Weapons proliferation is only likely to increase as an element of discord in U.S.-Russian relations. As additional countries develop WMD technologies that threaten Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other U.S. allies in the region—not to mention U.S. military forces deployed in the region—the United States will probably take an ever harder line against those aiding the proliferators. As a taste of potential problems to come, in the spring, the U.S. Congress voted to impose sanctions on Russian firms transferring Missile technology to Iran and only an unpopular Presidential veto prevented this from becoming law. If at some point the WMD arms race leads to an actual military clash the American backlash against Russia for contributing to WMD proliferation could be severe.

Moreover, it is at best unclear whether Moscow is able or willing to stop the flow of arms, technology and know-how to Middle Eastern rogues. In return for President Clinton’s Veto of the Iran-Missile Sales Act, Russia promised a vigorous effort to curb sales of WMD-related items by Russian firms. However, Russia has made such promises before and been unable or unwilling to deliver. Proliferation of WMD had been a central feature of the Gore-Chernomyrdin dialogue, but it never produced any tangible change in behavior.

Areas of potential cooperation. Two areas suggest themselves as potential ground for future U.S.-Russian cooperation: curbing the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism and fighting terrorism. These fields offer the potential for cooperation because both Moscow and Washington have an interest in combating both of these trends. Thus, these are among the few areas where U.S. and Russian goals are in close harmony.

However, significant obstacles remain even on these issues. Regarding terrorism, Russia simply does not accord fighting Middle Eastern terrorists the same priority as does the United States. Especially since the end of the Cold War and the retreat of Russia from the region, Middle Eastern terrorist groups have not targeted Russia to the same extent they target the United States—and its closest Middle East allies, Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Consequently, although Russia and the United States have a commonality of interests, the considerable imbalance in priorities could create frustrations and disappointment on both sides if the United States were to make a push to enhance cooperation on counter-terrorism.

Regarding the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the central difference is geographic: the Russians are most concerned with Islamist activity in the Central Asian states whereas the United States is principally concerned with Islamist activity in the Levant, the Gulf and the Maghreb. Moreover, the factors which have given rise to Islamism in these various states varies widely, making a region-wide approach difficult and potentially counterproductive. Consequently, the two countries would have to work hard to find joint initiatives that could address the different problems which have led to the rise of Islamism in these different regions.

In addition, democratization could potentially be a third area of cooperation between the United States and Russia, although it could just as easily be an additional source of tension. The United States is firmly committed to democratization of the newly-independent Central Asian states and is actively helping those governments develop the institutions and the civil society of functional democracies. Russia has made clear that its paramount concern for Central Asia is security and it is unclear if Moscow sees democratization as enhancing its security. Indeed, given that Russia’s security concerns in Central Asia center on ethnic conflict, the rise of Islamism, and general lawlessness—which nascent democratization could actually exacerbate—democratization of the Central Asian states may be a very low priority for Moscow.

Wild cards. There are a number of important wild cards in the deck which could have a significant impact on U.S.-Russia relations toward the Middle East over the next five years. On the U.S. side, a key question is whether Washington will continue to retreat from the containment of Iraq toward a policy of deterrence. If so, this would remove Iraq as a regular source of friction in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Similarly, if—as seems highly unlikely—the U.S. government decided to take a much harder line toward Israel to try to force progress on the peace process, this could reduce or remove U.S.-Russian tension resulting from the stagnation there. Of course, as noted above, the peace process is ultimately a very minor issue between Moscow and Washington at the moment, thus even its resolution would not make a huge difference to U.S.-Russian Middle East relations.

Several potential wild cards also suggest themselves on the Russian side. If President Yeltsin were to make a determined effort to crack down on "free agents" in the Russian bureaucracy this could eliminate many of the problems with non-proliferation between Washington and Moscow. Alternatively, we could arrive at the same outcome if Russia suddenly felt a threat from the WMD capabilities of Middle Eastern states. If the Yeltsin government were to moderate Primakov’s Russian nationalist approach to the Gulf region, this could ease or eliminate a variety of sore points between the two governments.

Prospects. Ultimately, the likelihood for real conflict or cooperation on the Middle East will be determined by the interaction of regional developments and broader issues in the U.S.-Russian relationship. On specific regional issues Washington and Moscow are more often working at cross-purposes than in harmony at present. Moreover, many of the most likely courses of events in the region appear to predict more opportunities for tension than cooperation between Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, the extent of real disagreement on regional issues will undoubtedly be moderated by the overall relationship between the two governments. In the end, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and North Africa are all of much greater concern to the United States than they are to Russia. Only Central Asia is a higher priority for Russia than it is for the United States. Moreover, the relationship with the United States is ultimately far more important to Russia than is its relations with the Middle Eastern states. Consequently, there is considerable room for the two states to make compromises on those issues of greatest importance to each other if they are willing to do some serious political horse-trading. Indeed, the greatest chance for real cooperative action between the United States and Russia on the Middle East may be for the two governments to strike a "grand bargain" in which Russia agreed to support U.S. positions for Washington’s highest priority issues—the peace process, Iraq, Iran—in return for American assent to support Russian positions for Moscow’s highest priority issues—Central Asia.

SECURITY COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA

Background. The end of the Cold War began in this region with the retreat of Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan in 1989, followed by the independence of Central Asian states from almost one hundred years of occupation and incorporation into Russia. Soviet and U.S. rivalry had been particularly acute in South Asia, starting in the mid-1950s when Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO and the USSR established close political and military relations with India. The Soviet military move into Afghanistan in 1978 brought this to a peak. The United States, Western Europe, China, Asia, and the Middle East states all supported the Afghan resistance—which was strongly motivated by a combination of nationalism and Islam—and also provided strong support for Pakistan as the base for anti-Soviet operations.

With the end of the Cold War, U.S.-Russian confrontation dissipated, as did Russian-Chinese confrontation. The United States and Russia also reduced substantially their respective support for Pakistan and India, although the fifty-year rivalry and periodic tension between the latter two has continued. Russian suspicion of Pakistan has remained high due to the latter’s support of the Taliban-Islamist movement in Afghanistan, which has taken control of most of the country despite Russian support for the Uzbek, Shiite, and Tajik forces opposing them. This also aroused a degree of suspicion of the United States, seen initially by many in Moscow to be behind Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in continued sup-port of Islamist-inspired opposition to those Afghans supported by Russia. Taliban’s potential to inspire and perhaps assist Islamic opposition to the regimes of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgystan is a justifiable fear, and an added burden on Russian security forces which are primarily responsible for border protection.

Recently, Moscow has revitalized its military relationship with India, seeing it as an excellent market as the latter expands and modernizes its armed forces in face of what it sees as threats from China and Pakistan, and in pursuit of a greater regional role. In the context of heightened tensions on the Subcontinent following India and Pakistan nuclear tests, this could be a destabilizing development, increasing the pressure upon Pakistan to further enhance its missile and nuclear capability to offset India’s conventional advantage. Moreover, India’s acquiring aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and cruise missiles could provoke Indian maritime confrontations with other countries, possibly even the United States

On the other hand, Russia shares with the United States a strong aversion to India and Pakistan becoming nuclear powers, opposes their admission to the NPT as such, and is working with the United States and the P-5 to discourage Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon development and deployment, as well as to stop proliferation of their capabilities to other countries. There is no reason to believe that Russia is deliberately encouraging India to confront Pakistan, although its residual Cold War attitudes, its need for Indian markets and its anger over Pakistan’s support for Taliban result in a pro-Indian tilt.

Despite the independence of Central Asia, these states have retained very close relations with Moscow. In varying degrees, all of the Central Asian states depend upon Moscow for security assistance—against possible outside intervention as well as internal threats to the regimes in power (holdovers from the Communist/Soviet era)—and their economics are highly interdependent with that of Russia. The latter sees Central Asia’s raw materials (e.g. oil, gas, cotton) as important to its own economy, and retains a strong proprietary interest in the well-being of the Russian minorities still living in these countries. There appear to be conflicting views within the Russian hierarchy over whether to welcome foreign investment and the opening-up of Central Asia as a source of world energy supply and for global commerce, or to obstruct foreign investment, insist that oil and gas be exported via Russia, and continue a rather closed economic system. Moscow has a vital security interest in controlling the borders of Central Asia with neighboring countries (e.g. Iran, Afghanistan, China), since there are virtually no border controls between Central Asian states and Russia proper and the serious problems of cross-border trafficking in narcotics and arms.

The United States has aroused Russian suspicion due to active pursuit of Central Asia’s substantial oil and gas reserves, pressing the desirability of democratic reform, and the fear that their influence would bring about a loosening of political and economic ties with Moscow. This is seen as adding to the centrifugal pressures generated by popular resentment of the regions in power, most of which have stifled aspirations for democracy and have presided over a sharp diminution rather than the expected increase in social and economic well-being for most of the population, and a growing gap between the "haves" and "have-nots." Periodic U.S. military exercises with certain Central Asian states, in the PFP context, including support for CENTBAT (a joint Uzbek-Kazak-Kyrgyz peace-keeping force) further aroused Moscow’s suspicions, as well as giving these regimes an added opportunity to play the United States off against Russia, implying that in the event of serious trouble Washington could be an alternative to support from Moscow.

Iran and Turkey also figure prominently in Central Asia-Caspian geopolitics, as Russia cultivates close relations with the former on regional matters and is highly suspicious of the latter’s intentions in the region, while the United States works closely with the latter on regional matters and is extremely suspicious of Iran.

Cooperation vs. confrontation. There are arguments to be made for U.S.-Russian cooperation in Central Asia, the Caspian region, and the Subcontinent (including Afghanistan), assuming that:

The two could overcome the suspicion and rivalry which has carried over from the Cold War;

U.S.-Iranian and Russian-Turkish suspicions diminish to the point that they are not impediments to cooperation in Central Asia and the Caspian by the two larger powers;

The United States accepts a significant degree of continuing influence by Moscow over Central Asia rather than pressing for rapid transition from the present regimes to free-market economics, while U.S. and Russian companies could work out a mutually profitable deal for developing and exporting Central Asian energy resources on essentially a market basis;

Russia moderates its military sales and assistance to India, particularly nuclear submarines and missiles, so as to reinforce rather than under-cut efforts by the P-5 and G-8 to stabilize the politico-military situation in the Subcontinent and minimize further development of the dangerous nuclear and missile capabilities of Pakistan and India.

By working together, the United States and Russia could be much more effective in combating large-scale trafficking in narcotics and weapons—a source of concern to all but especially Russia. They could also reduce regional politico-ethnic-religious tensions, including containing the pressures for Islamist radicalization not only in Central Asia but in Pakistan and Kashmir. The United States and Russia could work with China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Central Asian states to build a solid regional front against efforts by Taliban or Arab extremists in Afghanistan to export their brand of Islam, to minimize any cross-border encouragement of extremist movements in neighboring states, and to clamp down on support for terrorist activities by Islamist groups in other countries including the Middle East and Africa, as well as South and Central Asia. This would require a diminution of tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, but close U.S.-Russian-Chinese cooperation could help encourage this. The United States and Russia could also contribute to an overall reduction in tensions between Pakistan, India, and China, including restraint in weapon development and deployment of nuclear missiles, a moratorium on production of fissile material and continued tight controls by India and Pakistan on proliferation of nuclear technology.

By opening up the energy resources of Central Asia for rapid development by the United States, Russia, and other countries, and by ensuring that a sizeable portion of the new wealth actually reaches the people, the internal politico-religious pressure upon the regimes in this region would be significantly reduced. This, in turn, would reduce Russian fears and the need for such sizeable commitment of its security forces to assist the regimes in power. The latter could be encouraged to make a gradual transition to more open political processes, and to rebuild the economic and social infrastructure for the population as a whole, an infrastructure which has suffered greatly over the past ten years.

All of this presupposes a virtual revolution in strategic vision, by several nomenclatures in the United States and Russia—not only the government leadership, but also powerful conservative political forces in the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma, as well as private business interests with their own confrontational agendas. Given the current trends in both the United States and Russia, this seems unlikely. However, it may be possible to disaggregate the various issues and begin to build more limited cooperation on one or more of them rather than seeking the across-the-board collaboration which would be most desirable.

Promising starting points would be cooperation on reducing politico-military tensions and weapons build-ups in India and Pakistan, building regional constraints upon the behavior of Taliban and Arab radicals in Afghanistan, cooperation in combating terrorism, narcotics and arms trafficking, and strengthening the public security sector of Central Asia and Caspian states. A longer-term approach would be for the United States and Russia to hold a focused, intensive discussion (over several days) on the problems of Central Asian states (and the Caspian) with a view to identifying areas of possible common action, reducing suspicion and possibly moderating actions which have given grounds for competition or conflict rather than cooperation. Given the likely increase in instability of these states due to the worsening world and Russian economic situation (as well as the problem of Afghanistan), and the problems this will pose for Moscow in its weakened situation, such discussion might be mutually acceptable and could turn out to have some long-term practical utility, as problems and solutions identified are actually addressed.

Even with the ending of the Cold War’s zero-sum U.S.-Soviet rivalries, and Russia’s own on-going internal transformation, the prospects for United States-Russia security cooperation in East Asia are limited. This paper will examine the reasons why this is true. At the same time, within current constraints, it will also suggest areas where security cooperation could be advanced.

Background: the historical record. For much of this century Russia and the United States have been rivals, if not adversaries in East Asia. This rivalry focused on China. At the turn of the century, the United States perceived Russian expansion into Manchuria and Korea as the major threat to China’s territorial integrity and to the United States Open Door policy. President Theodore Roosevelt saw Japan as playing the United States’ game in opposing Russian designs on China. American financiers helped to bank-roll Japan’s war effort, and, with financial pressures building on Tokyo, Roosevelt brought the war to a diplomatic conclusion at Portsmouth.

Five years later, Secretary of State Philander Knox’s Manchurian Railroad Neutralization Plan aimed at breaking up Japanese-Russian collusion in Manchuria and North China. Knox saw both Russia and, in this case even more, Japan as threatening China’s administrative and territorial integrity.

The Bolshevik Revolution, and the United States’ war needs, led to the Siberian intervention. The last American forces were withdrawn from Siberia in 1920, but American concerns with the spread of communism, both internally within the United States and externally in Europe and Asia, precluded the establishing of diplomatic relations until 1933.

The Cold War In Asia. The end of the two-decade long civil war in China again defined Washington and Moscow as rivals. Mao’s victory and a strong American perception of Mao as Stalin’s junior partner established Moscow as a global ideological rival. The Korean war turned ideological rivalry in Asia into open hostility.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the discovery of the Sino-Soviet split, President Nixon’s opening to China and the emergence of a quasi-alliance strategic relationship with Beijing, aimed at restricting the appetite of the polar bear, structured U.S.-Soviet relations for close to a quarter century.

In East Asia, as elsewhere across the globe, U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War were defined essentially a zero-sum game. In Cambodia, the United States teamed-up with China to oppose the Vietnamese invasion and the regime subsequently installed in Phnom Penh. With China, the United States viewed Vietnam as Moscow’s stalking horse in Southeast Asia. Following United States-China normalization in 1979, the Carter administration acquiesced in China’s lesson teaching to Vietnam. Consistently, the United States opposed Soviet calls for multilateral security mechanisms in East Asia, seeing such initiatives as being aimed at undermining the U.S.-led bilateral alliance structure.

Post-Cold War Europe and Asia. The ending of the Cold War closed the book on the ideological and strategic rivalries that militated against U.S.-Soviet security cooperation. It also opened the relationship to new prospects for cooperation. This has been particularly evidenced in Europe, where the United States and the NATO allies evolved Cold War structures to invite Russian participation.

Russia has joined the Partnership for Peace and, under it, conducted joint military exercises with the United States. An association with NATO was established through the creation of the Permanent Joint Council, which gives Russia a seat at the table during consideration of various security issues. Russia has also participated in the NATO-established Contact Group on Bosnia, and Russian units serve as peacekeepers in Bosnia in association with IFOR.

Asia, however, lacks Europe’s institutional security structures. This is a reflection of Asia’s broad diversity and indigenous rivalries as well as a legacy of the Cold War. During the Cold war, the U.S.-led bilateral alliance system served as the foundation of the region’s security structure. This condition continues today. The result is that, with the exception of the ASEAN Regional Forum—a diplomatic talk shop, there are no multilateral structures that can be evolved to embrace Russia as a security partner in Asia.

Thus, initially, United States-Russia security cooperation in Asia must be developed along bilateral lines. From an American perspective, there are two opportunities here: the first, cleaning up the remnants of the Cold War in Asia; the second, dealing with the challenges of China’s military modernization. Over the long term, there is a prospect for the development of multilateral cooperation and the evolution of a multilateral security forum evolving out of the process of Korean unification.

At present, however, structural weaknesses of government in Russia today, the perilous state of Russia’s economy and financial world, as well as an increasingly inward-looking U.S. Congress will combine to circumscribe the prospects for wide-ranging security cooperation in Asia. The best prospects will be ones that are limited in scope and well-targeted.

Cleaning up the remnants of the Cold War. Across Siberia and the Maritime provinces are scattered the last vestiges of the Cold War. The safe disposition of nuclear and chemical wastes and the destruction of surplus military equipment are issues that require sustained attention by Moscow and the local authorities. Implementing provision of 1997 agreement with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and Tajikistan, which call reductions of military forces, armaments and equipment within 100 kilometers of the their borders will strain Russia’s already hard-pressed financial resources. Elsewhere in Russia’s Far East, nuclear submarines are reported to be rusting at anchor in Vladivostok. These ships pose a serious security issue and an environmental threat. While fissile material has been removed from many of the reactors, final disposition of the reactors has yet to be determined.

Across the region, getting the job done will require international financial and technical support. This is a potential area for U.S.-Russian cooperation, perhaps also involving Japan.

The Korean peninsula. Bordering on the Korean peninsula, Russia has a continuing interest in what happens there. Instability on the peninsula can directly affect Russian security interests. Today, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan as well as both South and North Korea share certain common interests; in bumper stickers terms, they are "No War; No Collapse; No Nukes."

An assumption of this author is that, at some point in the future, reunification will take place and that a process of integration leading to some form of unification is underway today on the peninsula. The core issues, economic and political cooperation as well as the pace and nature of the process, are in essence bilateral South-North issues, best left to Seoul and Pyongyang. On the security side, Washington does have an interest in issues that might affect the nature of U.S. deployments on the peninsula.

At the same time, the unification process will generate issues of broad regional concern in Northeast Asia. These issues include: the guaranteeing of a peace treaty, honoring the denuclearization of the peninsula, assuring the elimination of chemical and biological weapons, and the size of a unified Korean military, which if maintained at present levels would leave a unified Korea with one of the world’s largest military forces.

Given the nature of such issues , it is possible to imagine a multilateral chapeau, involving the United States a unified Korea, China, Russia and Japan, to deal with them. Over time, it is possible to see this security cooperation as providing the basis for a multilateral institutional structure in Northeast Asia. As will be suggested below, this structure could also expand to deal with the environment, energy, and economic development.

China. Russia’s rapprochement with China has served to enhance security in Asia. The demarcation and demilitarization of the border have removed one of the Cold War’s enduring flashpoints. This, in turn, has served to foster stability and advance Russia’s own economic development. Bilateral trade is expanding—from negligible levels in the early 1980's to $7 billion in 1996. In this decade, Russia’s exports to China have grown from $2.7 billion in 1992 to $4.6 billion in 1996.

Moreover, as Fisher points out, it is not clear that the central government "exercises strict control over its military technical relationship with China, which has deep access to Russian design bureaus and engineers who are selling their data to China." Indeed, it is reported that the General Director of the Sukhoi Design Bureau on his own negotiated the SU-27 package sale to China without Moscow’s authorization.

A brief, and by no means inclusive, sketch of Russia’s arms sales to China during the 1990s looks something like this:

Fighter aircraft: 72 Sukhoi SU-27s and agreed to co-produce at least another 200. China is training its pilots on the SU-27 as well as on other high performance aircraft: Tu-204, the SU-22 fighter, the SU-24 and SU-25 ground attack aircraft, the MiG-29 and MiG-31 fighters. China is also reported to be negotiating deal that would involve production line and manufacturing and technology rights, including production personnel, for the MiG-31 fighter, interceptor. China is also reported to be trying to purchase the SU-30 fighter.

Surface ships: 2 Sovremeniny-class missiles destroyers armed with the SS-N-22 supersonic anti-ship missile; Russia is also marketing a light weight supersonic anti-ship missile, the Yakhont;

Missiles: the S-300 air defense missile S-N-22 anti-ship missile cited above. China is also reported to have purchased the R-77 air-to-air missile and the Zvezda Kh-31 supersonic anti-ship missile.

It may be the judgment of Moscow that trade with China is essential for Russia’s own economic development and for the survival of Russia’s defense industries. It may also be the judgment of Moscow’s security planners that, given the current warming of relations, the fire-sale of Russian military hardware and technology will not put Russian security at risk over next ten-fifteen years.

However, from an American perspective there is cause for concern. The same warming of relations between Moscow and Beijing, which has enhanced stability along China’s northern land border, also allows China to shift its strategic focus to the South and to the sea. At the same time, Russia’s strengthening of China air and naval capabilities does enhance the risk to U.S. forces forward-deployed in East Asia.

Freedom of the seas and access to markets are two of America’s enduring interests in East Asia. For close to fifty years, the United States has sustained a security commitment to Taiwan, from 1954 to 1979 under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China and then a legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to help Taiwan to defend itself. A more capable PLA Navy and Air Force makes protecting these historic interests and honoring this legal commitment a more difficult decision for the United States.

Looking back on the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996 and China’s subsequent acquisition decisions, a former U.S. Navy admiral remarked that Beijing’s military objective was to raise the potential costs for the United States should it contemplate coming to the defense of Taiwan. At the same time, the Clinton administration’s decision to deploy two carrier battle groups to the waters off Taiwan will serve as a benchmark of U.S. commitment, making it difficult for any future administration to do less.

The same combination of China’s growing air and naval power projection capabilities will also strengthen its hand in the South China Sea. The area is not only the site conflicting territorial—and potentially resource—claims, but also the avenue along which move vital oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to America’s allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea.

The bottom line here is that to the extent Russia, government or private sector, helps significantly to advance China’s military modernization, it complicates the prospects for U.S.-Russian security cooperation in East Asia. This does not mean that such cooperation is to be ruled out, but it does mean that, without a shared strategic vision for East Asia, security cooperation between Washington and Moscow in the region will be limited in scale and scope.

Complicating the prospects for the development of a shared U.S.-Russian strategic vision is Russia’ own strategic partnership with China. At Russia-China Summits in 1996 and 1997, both governments expressed solidarity in working to foster a multipolar world and to oppose "hegemonic" powers—a.k.a. the United States. That said, the significance of such partnerships admittedly is difficult to divine, given the fact that China is also aiming to build a constructive strategic partnership with the very hegemonic power it is opposing in its partnership with Russia.

Nevertheless, the point here is that the murky and uncertain nature of long-term national objectives serves to work against comprehensive and well-integrated cooperation, leaving such cooperative efforts that do arise to many ad hoc actions.

Private sector. Perhaps the most promising opportunities for U.S.-Russian cooperation in the region rest with the private sector. For example, the development of Siberia’s oil and natural gas reserves would benefit Russia’s Far East and as well as neighboring countries in the region. American and Japanese private sector funding and development of the Siberian reserves could help to link Russia’s supply to the energy demands of the region, thereby helping to integrate Russia into the economic life of the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, by serving as a certain source of energy supply for China, such a consortium could help to make less tempting Russia’s own weakness in East Asia.

With the warming of Russia’s relations with Japan, a multilateral commitment to such a project may soon be approaching. Agreement could come as part of the process leading to the conclusion of a Russia-Japan peace treaty.

COMMENTS ON ASIA SECTIONS OF DR. PUSHKOV’S PAPER

Among the myriad security problems along Russia’s borders, Dr. Pushkov’s concern about Russia’s security interests in its Far East should not be overlooked. Although Beijing and Moscow have signed a border demarcation treaty and committed to a strategic partnership, Russia’s interests in the Far East can be affected by either a weakening of Moscow’s authority in the region or by the rise of a nationalist-expansionist government in Beijing. It is for this reason, that I have questioned Moscow’s present fire-sale of advanced military equipment to China. The real danger, as he points out, is that, given the present disarray in Russia, such sales often go uncontrolled with individual design bureaus and factories having their own, almost autonomous, China policy.

Does Russia really have an interest in advancing China’s military modernization and strengthening the PLA, given Russia’s on relative weakness in the region and China’s surging population? Certainly from a U.S. perspective, a stronger PLA, with power projection capabilities, can complicate U.S. security strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with respect to the South China Sea and Taiwan. As I have argued in my paper, this should be an issue for serious discussion between Washington and Moscow.

I would also agree with Pushkov that the issue of the Kurile Islands/Northern Territories is much a political than security issue. Former Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto made a dedicated effort to improve Japanese-Russian relations with his series of shirt-sleeve Summits with President Yeltsin. And both governments have made clear their interest in resolving this issue. In the run up to Prime Minister Obuchi’s visit November visit to Russia, I would expect a number of creative proposals to surfaced. Improving Russian-Japanese relations is clearly in the interest of the United States.

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