DOMESTIC CONTEXT
Russia is going through a complicated historical period. A search is taking place for the optimal path of development and the best form of state structure. Social-economic ties are changing in a fundamental manner. Along with the not insignificant positive results of the political and economic reforms that are being carried out, negative processes in the economy, in the social sphere and in the relations between the center and the regions are becoming clearly evident. On the international arena, Russia is confronting the desire of a number of countries to use the transitional period to promote their economic and political interests, often to the detriment of Russian national aspirations. Three overarching factors characterize the Russian domestic situation:

• The continuing systematic crisis in society, which began in the Soviet period

• The country's development crisis, which appeared during the transitional period

• The difficulties of overcoming the residues of the former totalitarian regime. (These problems are in turn linked to the global crisis that has resulted from the collapse of the Cold War order.)

Notwithstanding all the dimensions of the national and world crises Russia is experiencing today, at bottom Russia is suffering from a single phenomenon: a crisis of identity and national self-consciousness. It is closely linked with the inability to return to our traditional path of nation-state development, and corresponding need to define a place for ourselves within the international political and economic systems. The protracted nature of this process of self-definition risks depriving Russia of its legitimate, natural, and still widely recognized leading role in world affairs. Recent domestic development in Russia is of fundamental character and make strategic analysts to review some basic questions related to the role and place of Russia in the next century, which will have dramatic impact on US-Russia relations.

What we are facing right now in Russia is the end of liberal revolution, which began not in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR, but much earlier-back in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev took over in the Kremlin. As for the liberal idea, it became a driving force in the USSR even earlier-in the late 1950s-early 1960s, when for the majority of Soviet intellectuals it became absolutely clear that fundamental values of communism could no longer remain the global historical orientation of domestic development.

Now we are facing the end of the other historical cycle of this domestic development - liberal cycle. It is evident that liberalism, which was the super idea of the Russian state since 1991 and which provided the state legitimacy, is over. That means that the Russian state nowadays is lacking not only its identity but legitimacy as well. Liberalism failed to provide a sacrosanct approach of the national idea. (Communism did provide such a sacrosanct approach, being driven by historical project. As for the United States, it is the idea of global leadership and human rights which resolves at present the problem of the state legitimacy.)

The decline of the liberal idea became obvious in 1993, after the president fired the Russian Parliament and established an authoritarian presidential regime, which was enthusiastically applauded by the so-called civilized world, including the Clinton administration. The recent development means total collapse of the liberal idea, which is recognized by the majority of Russian society. Now liberals are a very small, marginal political group in Russia that will have no possibility of being a part of the decisionmaking process. Having said that, I would like to make a very important reservation. The type of liberalism formed in Russia in the 1990s has nothing to do with genuine liberalism. It is this perverted form of liberalism that has discredited the genuine form. The central idea of liberalism is the human being, to include demands and rights. This idea was cynically neglected by national liberals. In this sense Russian liberals appeared to be very good students and successors of Russian Communists.

The domestic policy of liberals was based upon several wrong assumptions, the first one being that Russian liberals operated on the premise that introducing a market economy and private property without social guarantees and without well-thought state regulation would automatically bring about a prosperous society in Russia. It was also believed that installing the institutes of democracy, such as free elections, parliament democracy, political freedoms, including free mass media, without the effort to build a real civil society, would bring about real democracy. That is why an attempt was made to form classical liberal capitalism-that is, capitalism of the 19th or even 18th century)-while the capitalist world had already switched to neoliberalism, introducing in its everyday life the whole spectrum of social guarantees and state-regulated economic measures. In this sense one can speculate about the wrong interpretation of liberal values in modern Russia and envision that genuine liberalism is still a fundamental challenge for Russia.

In foreign policy these wrong assumptions have been translated into exceeded expectations of quick benefits from integration into the world economy. The Russian government really believed that after it abandoned communism, Russia would be included in the major Western political and economical institutions such as G-7, London and Paris Clubs, NATO, and the EU as a full-fledged member. Russian government counted on massive economical assistance and support from Western countries and first of all from the United States.

Moreover, in this context Russia was ready to give up a geopolitical approach in general. Russia selected the United States as a major partner, neglecting its "near-abroad" neighbors, which explains why Russia left its geopolitical frontiers in Europe so rapidly.

In reality, the United States had another understanding of partnership. Russia was not treated as a full-fledged partner. Instead, the United States introduced the concept of its global leadership, which was equal to monopolar world. at least As was perceived in Russia, the United States used Russian weakness to advance their own narrow and short-sighted interests and began to play the "geopolitical pluralism card," encouraging new nations to distance themselves from Moscow. These activities and especially drive toward NATO expansion, despite Russian protests, were perceived by the elite as a betrayal of the mere idea of partnership and provoked deep disappointment in Russia. That, in turn, provoked the major problems in U.S.-Russian relations, such as rejection of the State Duma to ratify START II, Russian cooperation with rogue states, opposition to NATO enlargement, aggressive declarations by some Russian policy makers vis-a-vis Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states and so on. In turn, such Russian actions were labeled in the United States as "imperialistic ambitions." Although both countries managed not to fall into a new confrontation, the development caused mutual suspicions and misperceptions. As a result Russian political elite has made following unpleasant conclusions:

• Russia should rely upon its own potential and capabilities in restructuring its economy.

• The concept of integration into the world economy should be cautious and balanced.

• The concept of liberalism and democracy should be rethought, to include introduction of the fundamental prerequisites of democracy: market economy, rule of law, and civil society.

• In foreign policy, Russia has to identify and strictly adhere to its national interests.

It is time to admit that the attempt in recent years to implant foreign values onto Russian soil has met with a vigorous rebuff from the Russian people. Russians still do not measure personal success by wealth, and the national mentality scorns the so-called "New Russians" and their values. The ten years of trial and error in domestic and foreign policy, the excessive and naive expectations regarding the market economy, Western-style democracy, Russia's rapid integration in the world economy, the rush from globalism to isolationism-all this confirmed that Russia's path does not have an analogue in world history. Moreover, the crisis that has seized Russian society is tightly connected with the impossibility of transferring the ideology and practices of Western liberalism to Russia. It has become clear that to count on the Russian nation's submissively accepting the ideals, values, and social forms of Western civilization is a dangerous illusion not only for Russia, but also for the whole world.

The fact that the disagreements that arose in the recent two or three years between Russia and the United States on essential international issues did not develop into confrontation constitutes one of the major political achievements of those years. In the course of the Russian-American summits, both presidents generally preferred not to exacerbate bilateral relation; while making a note of their disagreements, were also ready to make certain mutual, albeit minor, concessions. Absence of confrontation can not conceal the obvious fact that the so-called "partnership" relations between Russia and the United States are going through a crisis, which became particularly noticeable in 1997 and 1998.

The vigorous promotion by the Americans of the idea of a NATO expansion, reluctance to seriously consider the Russian approach to the construction of a new European security system, unilateral steps toward settlement of southern problems by force, delayed resolution of crucial issues of bilateral economic cooperation, unwillingness to lift discriminatory trading restrictions in relation to Russia-all these factors were inconsistent with the spirit of earlier declarations of partnership. If the administration more and more often ignored our interests, the U.S. Congress demanded that Americans should toughen their policy in respect of Russia and "put Russia in its place."

The partnership crisis may be overcome in two ways one of which leads to the deliverance from euphoria, establishment of more pragmatic relations, determination of real common interests and constructive interaction in the resolution of the international problems that may be resolved only by joint efforts. The other way leads to the revival of alienation between Russia and the United States, new confrontation (slowly running this time) or, to be more exact, to the establishment of "cold peace" in which Russia will be in this or that form isolated from international community.

The crisis is primarily caused by the excessive expectations of the Russian political elite in respect to partnership with the United States. The elite's expectations inevitably resulted in unrealized hopes and further disappointment.

The end of the Cold War was characterized by a certain euphoria in such relations. Many people thought that the elimination of the ideological and military confrontation would once and for all put an end to the unnatural split of the world into two social and economic systems, and that Russia and other post-Soviet states that accepted Western liberal and democratic values would be immediately integrated into the world political and economic community. It was at that time that on the ruins of Cold War and of the USSR the concept of partnership was proclaimed. And though Russia and the United States made equal contributions to its promotion now it is apparent that from the very beginning their perceptions of that concept was different.

The new Russia understood partnership as an immediate entry into the world community of industrially developed countries characterized by its equal participation in all economic and political institutions of the United States; such an understanding was probably naive. Nobody can, however, reproach Russia for being insincere in its endeavors or for having applied any "double standards" in its relations with the United States.

We admit that five or six years ago many high-ranking politicians in the United States earnestly believed good relations with Russia was possible. However, Americans seriously thought that it was the United States rather than the democratic Russia and the Russian people that had "won" the Cold War. Therefore, in their policy they focused on fixing upon that "victory," trying, among other things, to turn the geopolitical changes to their own advantage. The administration failed to break through the boundaries of the primitive scheme based on the bipolar theory of the "zero-sum game," according to which all world political events are evaluated from the point of view of "success" and "failure" in respect of this or that political subject. That mere fact cast doubt on the entire philosophy of partnership since partnership between the winner and the loser is out of the question. The attitude toward Russia as a defeated country predetermined cooperation with it only as with a junior partner and, at the same time,, aroused strong suspicions that the evil empire has not changed. The United States failed to realize the profoundness of the changes occurring in Russia as well as the fact that such changes were part of the global changes that actually affected the whole world. Probably for that reason they did not venture to start their relations with Russia from scratch as if Russia was absolutely a new country nor did they come up with a real new Marshall Plan. A unique historic opportunity that presented itself after the end of Cold War was missed.

Thus, partnership to Americans in no way meant equality with Russia in world policy or its unimpeded integration with the basic international political and economic mechanisms and institutions. At best for Russia, this concept was of a declarative (action for the United States. As a result, in words the United States maintained "partnership" relations with Russia and in reality pursued the old policy of "balance of forces." That "double standard" was doomed to reveal itself sooner or later and lead to the crisis of relations with Russia. What is what actually happened.

It would be, however, unfair to put the blame entirely on American politicians. Partnership could not have arisen under the conditions when the national specifics of the external political interests of Russia remained obscure and subordinate to the abstract task of international solidarity of democratic countries. The obscure nature of the foreign policy priorities of Russia was perceived as a symptom of a new, post-Communist Russian threat and proved to be the most serious obstacle for the development of relations between Russia and its potential partners, who refrained from going beyond general political declarations about partnership.

The most vivid example of inconsistent Russian politics, which laid fair ground to U.S. scepticism as to the nature of the Russian foreign policy priorities, had been misleading signals on Russian-NATO cooperation. After the collapse of the USSR, which called for the simultaneous disbandment of two military blocks in Europe, the new Russian leaders intended to get membership in NATO. "Our desire to cooperate with and join this mechanism is natural," stated A. Kozyrev. Since NATO was created to restraint communism and Soviet expansion, the rejection by the new Russia of communism and the external policy of the USSR seemed to make it possible to put an end to confrontation, to establish close relations with the former enemies, and to achieve rapid integration of Russia into the Western community. NATO welcomed the pro-European orientation of the Russian leaders. However, the mere question of Russia's joining the Alliance caused a nervous response. Russia was not welcomed into NATO. Having lost the enemy, the Alliance needed to seek the new meaning of its existence. With the former number-one enemy in its ranks, the Alliance would not be able to continue its activity as a collective defense system. The access of Russia to NATO would shake the existing balance of forces both inside Europe and between Europe and the United States. Such a radical shift threatened NATO with the fate of the Warsaw Treaty. The desire to preserve the mechanism for coordination of interests of Western countries prevailed over centrifugal tendencies that predetermined further evolution of NATO as the major military and political Alliance of the West. Naturally, Russia was no longer considered as an immediate enemy of the Alliance, nor was it regarded as an integral part of the West.

Russian diplomacy had to put it into reverse. "Today we do not raise the question of the Russian entry into NATO; we are ready, however, to regard it as a long-term political objective." And that is how a new official position of Moscow was formulated.

As early as in 1994 it became absolutely clear that after a certain period of waiting, Western countries were re-grouping their forces in the Euroatlantic region for the purpose of consolidating those geopolitical changes favorable to them. Unfortunately, and perhaps because of our own passive, inconsistent, and contradictory policy, NATO's program, "Partnership In the Name of Peace"- originally aimed at the constructive cooperation with Russia and eliminating Russian concerns about the inevitable inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries into the NATO orbit-began transformation.

The final decision adopted by the Clinton administration late in 1994 on NATO expansion, with the tacit disagreement of a number of Western European and the active support of Eastern European countries, meant the crush of the Russian foreign policy both in the European and in the American direction.

Other serious miscalculations of Russian diplomacy include the creation by the United States of premises for a gradual departure from the traditional neutrality by such countries as Sweden and Finland and the soft but purposeful ousting of Russia from the adjacent foreign countries, contrary to the statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about our "vital interests" there.

Under such conditions the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put his hopes on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). NATO, however, did not seek to turn the OSCE into the mechanism for promoting security on the European continent but used it only as a diplomatic cover for the decision on NATO expansion. The United States strove to bring the OSCE down to the level of a discussion club with no real rights and obligations.

Driven into the corner, Russian diplomacy strongly opposed NATO expansion. In 1995 and 1996, fruitless discussions were spent on that issue with Central European and Western countries. As a result, Russia found itself in "brilliant diplomatic isolation," having set against itself the United States, Western Europe, and its former allies under the Warsaw Treaty. At the same time, the issue of the Alliance expansion turned into one of the major issues in the internal political struggle against the background of the parliamentary (1995) and presidential (1996) elections. A year of Primakov's skillful policy was required to break the deadlock into which Russia was led by Kozyrev's diplomacy.

This and other examples of inconsistent Russian foreign politics allowed one very important conclusion. A legal and viable system of partnership relations materialized into fruitful and equal cooperation on a wide range of fundamental international issues may be established only among those participants in world policy who clearly realize their national interests. Moreover, such interests form a reliable and indispensable basis of such partnership.

In this aspect, fundamental asymmetry still exists between the two countries. The American strategy of national security is clearly formulated. The United States long ago determined, and by all available methods protects, its regional interests. It knows quite well who is an ally and who threatens its interests. Accordingly, while defending its allies and having express obligations toward them, the United States deliberately pursues the policy of projecting military force in some regions. Conversely, Russia, unlike the former USSR, is no longer a super power with global interests incompatible with those of the United States. It is a new country undergoing the process of self-identification. At the moment we have neither a concept of national security nor clearly identified enemies. However, the absence of enemies does not mean that Russia has many allies. Russia has lost almost all former allies of the USSR and has no clear idea who are now allies.

The vagueness of Russian national interests cannot last for ever. Sooner or later those interests and, consequently, the limits of our potential concessions and compromise will be identified as well as our potential opponents, allies, friends and partners. At that time, other qualitatively different premises for interaction with the United States will probably be created.

The term "partnership" appeared in the United States as early as in the 1960s when the United States decided to redistribute in favor of its allies the financial, military and moral burden undertaken at the beginning of Cold War. In application to the Russian-American relations, that term was used for the first time in the Charter of Partnership and Friendship of 1992. Later, Russian diplomacy began to apply it to almost any country of the world, including Germany, China, Ukraine, etc., that to a significant extent caused its devaluation. However, it would be correct both from the historical and political points of view to analyze that concept by way of illustration of the Russian-American relations.

According to American tradition, partnership is more than cooperation. It is close interaction of strategic allies that allows coordination, agreement, and development of general policy in respect of third countries. For cooperation, the concurrence of pragmatic interests is sufficient. For instance, the USSR and the United States maintained close cooperation during the years of Cold War on such important issues as the prevention of nuclear war, arms control, and nonproliferation of mass-destruction weapons. Partnership suggests a different basis. It is either homogeneity (similarity) of the social structure or at least agreement upon the fundamental principles that determine the internal and external policy of cooperating states; it is either concurrence or closeness of strategic interests of geopolitical or economic nature; and finally, it is a high level of mutual understanding. It is evident that Russia and the United States have just set off on the path toward such model of interaction. The current cooperation of the two countries is far from being real partnership that would suggest a high level of trust and, in some cases, mutual aid. The executive documents and practical steps made by the United States do not provide evidence that Americans regard Russian-American relations as those of partners. Conversely, a certain reduction of the significance of the Russian factor in the American foreign policy may be observed.

The most far-seeing Western politicians warned long ago that the term "partnership" is inadequate in application to the relations between Russia and the United States. For example, in 1993, an article by Brzezinsky, "Premature Partnership," warned of the danger of the imperial ambitions of Russia on the territory of IS and declared that the major task of American strategy was "the consolidation of geopolitical pluralism" in the post-Soviet space.² That concept both cast doubt upon the idea of partnership and predicted the renewal of the Russian-American confrontation. And though that prediction made by Brzezinsky has not so far become a reality (unlike all his other predictions), it appears to be a sign of sudden change in the perception of each other from illusions and euphoria to disappointment and alienation, as well as the realization of the fact that the development of bilateral relations may be limited in some cases by the non-concurrence of interests. He also indicated that strategic partnership, which, by the definition, requires movement of the parties toward each other, may be considered only as an ideal long-term objective. Unless the term "partnership" has been deeply rooted in the political lexicon, it should probably be rejected and replaced with another one- for example, "constructive (positive) interaction," which is more consistent with the existing realities. In any case, both parties are required to develop more balanced mutual perceptions based on common sense and sober assessments of the reality, as well as to transfer to a pragmatic, calm, and weighted policy.

Further, it would be important to remove from the Russian-American relations the excessive declarative tendency and exclude some tasks that were long known to be impossible to fulfill, as the unsuccessful attempts to fulfill such tasks would be only detrimental to Russian interests. Our work should be focused on the development of equal and mutually advantageous interaction with the United States, maintenance of the fair balance of interests and adherence to the mutuality principle. The less equal the interaction, the less its chances for survival. In this sense, having agreed with the dependent role of Russia, Kozyrev seriously disrupted the prospects of such interaction. As a result, the idea of partnership with Americans was much discredited in Russia.

In order to save the idea of partnership, it is necessary to have a clear picture of the extent of concurrence of national interests of Russia and the United States. With rhetoric rejected, it should be noted that the United States supports any political and economic stabilization in our country that would secure the irreversibility of reforms and at the same time create the conditions for future American investments in the Russian economy. Washington realizes the danger of disintegration of the IS and the Russian Federation primarily from the point of view of the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies (if Russia collapses the situation will be much more dangerous than it was after the breakdown of the USSR) and is, therefore, interested in the stabilization of the situation on the territory of the former USSR. In this respect, the interests of the United States and Russia coincide, although the United States is not interested in a Russia in the role of a serious rival in world affairs. On the other hand, Russian interests include deterrence of the imperial ambitions of the United States, counteraction against American attempts to secure the status of a sole super power, consolidation of a multipolar world in which, with the mutual deterrence of the principal centers of forces. Russia will have many more opportunities for the realization of its interests as compared with the single-pole world.

The long-term constructive interaction between the two countries is also promoted by the new calls for international security made by the other countries willing to increase their status in the hierarchy of the international relations. Under the conditions of the multipolar world, Russia and the United States (provided they are not in direct conflict) would have common interests in restraining other centers of forces and permitting no creation of new super powers.

Finally, partnership between Russia and the United States may be fundamentally based on their common interest in the formation of a stable and safe system of international relations and, consequently, in the regulation by force of modern world processes, in the prevention and settlement of regional conflicts. The interaction of such type was exercised by the USSR and United States for the first time when they took retaliatory actions in response to the invasion of Iraq into Kuwait. At present, both countries are guided by common interests in their political approach toward China.

In this connection the necessity arises to comprehend anew the time-tested idea of the "breakaway in strength" of two traditional key players in world policy and that undertake major responsibility for the world order. Under the new conditions of the multipolar world, this idea may be implemented by the coordinated interaction of the United States and Russia in respect to third countries rather than by the revival of confrontation of two super powers. Such interaction will mean real (rather than verbal) strategic partnership. The more stable such a partnership is, the more the third countries will win, the more reliable will be the security of both the traditional allies of the United States and the immediate neighbors of Russia. Russian-American relations may form the backbone of security in the entire northern hemisphere and of the global security in the future.

In the long run, the idea is to transfer partnership from the declarative phase to that of practical actions. Among the existing objective premises for such transition are the absence of ideological disagreements, of severe economic struggle for the sales markets (except the market of weapons), of mutual territorial claims, and of gloomy recollections and mutual offenses in the historic memory of the two nations.

At present it is important and possible to transfer Russian-American relations from the phase of negative mutual dependence to a broad-scale positive mutual program. For that purpose it would be reasonable to focus on the real spheres of interaction on the strategic issues being of long-term mutual interest for both Russia and the United States. Such issues include, in particular, strategic stability, peaceful space exploration, nonproliferation of mass-destruction weapons and means of its delivery, control over the proliferation of conventional weapons and high technologies, cooperation in respect of involvement of other, primarily nuclear countries into the process of reduction and destruction of armaments, prevention and settlement of conflicts, military and technical cooperation, military and technological cooperation, disarmament and arms control, cooperation in environment protection, United Nations reform, and joint actions against international criminal structures, including terrorist organizations and drug dealers.

In addition to common interests, equal partnership implies the existence of the mechanism of consultations in decisionmaking and of the permanent interaction working bodies. Therefore, it is necessary to create a solid interaction infrastructure using U.S. interest in the resolution of the above issues, that is, a system of various conciliatory commissions and subcommissions, committees, regular working meetings at all levels, which, as practice shows, may serve as powerful regulators of a partnership inside the industrial world and concurrently as a shock-absorbing mechanism and guarantor of its stability and even irreversibility. The creation of such mechanisms is on the agenda but it is a task requiring long-term and meticulous work, the results of which will never be as spectacular as, for example, the agreements on disarmament.

Though the course declared by the United States consists in the intent to facilitate the integration of Russia into the world community, practice shows the trend toward its certain political isolation, limitation of its sphere of interests, and influencing the development of the situation on the territory of the former USSR, Europe, the Near and Middle East, as well as in the world as a whole. More than evident is the tendency toward strengthening the economic dependence of Russia upon the West and reluctance to grant it the status of an equal partner in world trade and international labor division. Frequent attempts have been made to put Russia in a subordinate position on such issues as security, the peace making, and vital interests such as export of armaments and production of fissionable materials. What is of major importance is that Americans are seriously concerned that Russia might economically consolidate the former republics of the Soviet Union, which will finally lead to the revival of the Soviet state almost in the former quality. Washington would prefer to see Russia weak and broken rather than a world super power capable of competing with the United States in various regions of the world. Therefore, the United States does and will keep doing its utmost to preserve in the post-Soviet space "the geopolitical pluralism" formed after the collapse of the USSR, in order to prevent the revival of a super power with military and economic potential comparable with that of the former USSR.

In the sphere of European security, the U.S. attempts directed toward the expansion of NATO directly contradict the national interests of Russia. This issue is of principal strategic importance for Russia. The neglect of its opinion cannot be considered other than an attempt to isolate Russia by not allowing it to join the European community. This is where Russia has a clear negative opinion based on the practically formed national Russian consensus. The policy pursued by the United States in this respect is understood by the Russian political elite as the crisis of partnership with the West and primarily with the United States. For the purpose of saving partnership it would be reasonable to slow NATO expansion until the results of the strategic dialog between the bloc and Russia are obtained and the relations between them are transformed into real interaction on a wide spectrum of issues of international security. It would be a great error on the part of the United States to think that Russia will "swallow" the expansion of NATO as it "swallowed" with protests the expansion of Germany.

Entry of the former allies of the USSR into NATO will not present a direct threat for Russia, but the unification of Europe without Russia with the military and political domination of the Alliance on the continent may lead to a complete loss by Russia of its influence in the European affairs. If Russia remains outside the security system being formed on the continent, the threat of a new split of Europe will become real.

The natural condition of partnership is the mutual understanding of the fact that no actions should be taken by either party to prevent the implementation of the vital interests of the other party. The promotion of such interests should in no way be considered as an alternative of partnership relations. Conversely, the stability of such relations should be based upon the ability of partners to comprehend the essence of each other's interests and to protect their own interests in the spirit of nonconfrontation.

Russia's vital interests include the IS. The attempts made by the United States to slow down the integration processes in that area and to reduce, directly or indirectly, the influence of Russia in no way correspond to the spirit of partnership. In the policy pursued in relation to the post-Soviet states, the United States at times departs from the principles of democracy and respect of human rights, declared by it as its priority target, regarding geopolitical aims as of paramount importance. To a great extent, the double standard is being applied in the American approach to the observation of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the IS and Baltic countries. All those factors affect the efficiency of the Russian-American cooperation in the settlement of regional conflicts on the territory of the former USSR.

The new neighbors of Russia are unlikely to represent any military threat to it. However, for a number of strategic, financial, and other reasons, Moscow would prefer to enter into military agreements with them either on a multilateral or bilateral basis. Whatever is the final result of such efforts, Russia will vigorously oppose the participation of new states in any military bloc of which it is not a member. It will also oppose the use of any military facilities of such countries by any third party.

Partnership is unlikely to be established if the United States prevents the restoration and development of the constructive interaction of Russia with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (primarily including the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty), the countries of the Near East, China, India, and other countries of the Asian and Pacific Ocean Region. Attempts to exert pressure upon Russia, as was the case with the construction of a nuclear power station in Iran, are not permissible. It is far from being a coincidence that in this respect Russia showed fidelity to its principles and resolution to adhere primarily to the norms of international law and its own national interests rather than to the American political and ideological preferences.

The question arises: to what extent is Russia capable of opposing the negative, including anti-Russian tendencies in the policy of the United States? It is clear that it cannot afford to apply the measures of counteraction by force. Such measures would be both counterproductive and burdensome. At the same time Russia is capable, by avoiding confrontation on minor issues, of rebuffing attempts to weaken its influence in the world, to prevent its access to the world markets, or to slow down its integration into the international community by imposing upon it unequal and unreasonable requirements. Honest and deferential partnership with Russia and respect of its interests will be mandatory for the resolution of the international and bilateral issues being of essential importance for the United States.

INTERACTION ON KEY DIRECTIONS
The major direction of bilateral interaction in the coming years will be military and political cooperation. It is clear that the nuclear strategy forming the basis of the AMD Treaty, START I, and START II is not the strategy called to serve the purposes of real partnership. Therefore, the main task now is filling the gap between the declared strategic partnership and preservation of the model of mutual nuclear deterrence in the relations between the two powers and, in the future, ensuring measured mutual controllability of military potentials, i.e. mutual impact upon the direction of defensive efforts of both countries at the early stages of adoption of the relevant political decisions.

One of the essential issues is the creation of the antimissile defense system. It is not only the fate of the Treaty of 1972 that it affects. If, under the pressure exercised by the Congress, the Clinton administration resorts to its violation, the entire regime of limitation and curbing of nuclear armaments may be disrupted, which, in its turn, will lead to grave aggravation of the bilateral Russian-American relations.

As long as Russia and the United States maintain strategic mutual relations characterized by mutual nuclear deterrence, the Anti-Missile Defense Treaty remains the cornerstone of strategic stability. At the same time, it would be appropriate to remember that we have a formal basis for continued negotiations on the strategic stability and further reduction of strategic offensive weapons in the context of which the issues related to antimissile defense may be also discussed-that is, the joint statement of June 1, 1991, in which, along with the purpose of further negotiations, the task was set to strengthen the strategic stability by taking a number of specific steps.

In the course of such negotiations Russia could come up with a proposal to discuss the most important issues, such as the achievement of the minimal nuclear deterrence level, new and relevant partnership philosophy and the model of strategic mutual relations between the two countries outside the framework of mutual nuclear deterrence. It is quite clear that if Russia and the United States did not possess tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of missiles, they would not start their manufacture now. It is natural that this paradox cannot be overcome now, at least in the near decades, by way of destruction of nuclear weapons. However, the profound re-orientation and re-organization of the remaining nuclear forces may become quite a realistic and important target of the Russian-American partnership. The relations between France and Great Britain in the nuclear sphere serve as a vivid example of how two neighboring nuclear powers with approximately equal potentials and technically capable of destroying each other manage to coexist peacefully without arousing mutual fears of sudden attack or creating any threat of confrontation.

In the forthcoming years, Russia and the United States will inevitably intensify cooperation in the prevention and settlement of regional and local crises. They will also make efforts to consolidate international and regional stability. Therefore, it is quite natural that Russia will keep insisting that the U.N. Security Council consult with Russia prior to making any decisions. Such consultations should become a component and mechanism for working out any political decisions within the framework of the OSCE and later for the political interaction procedure within the framework of NATO. Russian politicians are naturally concerned about the American attempts to replace the U.N. mechanisms by those of NATO and to leave unsettled the issue of the political control over the military operations in Bosnia. And, if to somebody's opinion the conclusion of Russian experts does not sound convincing, reference can be made to Brzezinsky's statement that the Dayton agreements "mean a 180-degree turn of the Clinton administration in foreign policy from its orientation toward the U.N. peace-making position and international cooperation in the multipolar world to the conventional position of strength of the sole super power with some reliance upon allies." Thus, formally declaring its adherence to collective efforts and willingness to share the responsibility for settlement of crises, in practice the United States intends to be tough in dictating its conditions and making individual decisions with account of its interests. It is obvious that such policy is capable of disrupting any joint peace-making efforts.

Settlement of conflicts in the post-Soviet space is a separate issue. The active involvement of Russia into the settlement of conflicts is explained by its vital interest in the stability of the situation along its borders and in the prevention of the provoking effect of such conflicts upon certain regions of the Russian Federation. Moscow can not ignore the fact that armed actions lead to the killings of Russian people and violation of rights of the Russian-speaking population. Russia has to meet floods of refugees whose settlement in a new place requires significant funds and whose migration aggravates the social and criminal situation. It seems to be clear that by preserving peace and stability in Eurasia, Russia acts not only in its own interests but also in the interests of the whole civilized world. Russia has turned into the major advance post of the West, rebuffing the waves of the religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and political extremism arising in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and other regions of the former USSR.

We have to state, however, that the United States and other leading Western countries so far have not shown adequate response or assistance to Russia in this respect. Russia's repeated calls to grant its military forces, primarily at the request of some CIS countries in which they are present, the status of U.N. peace-making forces and obtain the funds required for their maintenance have not been heard so far. Such a state of affairs can in no way contribute to the relaxation of the existing tension both in and beyond the IS. Concurrently, the United States and the West on the whole are not evidently in a hurry to undertake any responsibility for what is happening on the territory of the former Soviet Union (except the issues of nuclear nonproliferation). The Washington policy in Eurasia is similar to that of a dog in a manger: the United States itself does nothing but the Russian attempts to influence the situation are not welcome. It is typical that even in the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict, which does not effect the American interests either economically or strategically, the role of Russia as a mediator in the establishment of peace was met with opposition. The spirit of partnership should imply Washington's recognition of the leading role of Russia in the settlement of conflicts on post-Soviet territory and of the international and legal status of the peace-keeping forces of Russia in the IS. The attempts of the United States to play the role of an arbitrator in the relations between Russia and former Soviet republics and, moreover, to use conflicts on the territory of the former USSR to enhance its influence in the CIS to the detriment of Russian interests, will continue causing irritation in Moscow.

The approaches of Russia and the United States to nonproliferation coincide in many aspects. It is in the interests of Russia to take the additional steps agreed upon with the United States with the aim of ensuring the fulfillment of the validity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the Conference of 1995 and to establish effective cooperation in the followup of the negative processes in the sphere of proliferation of weapon of mass-destruction and means of its delivery as well as in the organization of the system of non-proliferation measures.

It is in the interests of Russia, in order to ensure nuclear security, to implement a program of cooperation with the technical assistance of the United States with respect to strengthening the accounting and control system, physical protection and security of nuclear materials, to interact on the issues of prevention of the illegal trade in such materials. At the same time, Russia will oppose attempts by the United States to put under its control the Russian nuclear industry and impose its own unilateral decisions in this sphere, which are detrimental to Russian economic interests.

Finally, it would be reasonable to hold negotiations with the United States with respect to forming into an intergovernmental umbrella treaty on full-scale military and technical cooperation under the state control exercised by both parties. However, it is necessary to determine the limits and framework of such cooperation; in the past, in a number of cases this turned into the means of "pumping out" advanced Russian technologies. Rather problematic is cooperation in the sphere of control over the proliferation of conventional weapons and high technologies, because this is where the competition between Russia and the United States has been already revealed, along with the policy of ousting Russia from world markets for weapons and military technologies. At the same time, an agreement setting forth some basic provisions would be appropriate, in particular, one listing the armaments not subject to export and the countries to which the deliveries of specific categories of armaments are forbidden.

Russia and the United States have apparent common interests in Europe. First is the provision of security in this major world region. In the future, NATO could become a military guarantor of all European security, if it were reorganized from a military alliance into a different entity with appropriate amendments made to its institutes and basic documents.

The next aspect is bilateral economic cooperation. Here it is important to resolve at least the issues formulated in the Joint Statement "Partnership for Economic Progress" signed by the presidents in 1994: further access to the American market by lifting remaining restrictions, opposition to the antidumping policy of the United States, and legislative assignment to Russia of the status of a country with a "transient economy."

At the same time it is necessary to increase the influx of American investments into Russia in accordance with the requirements of Russian law. Of course this requires political stability in Russia and an appropriate legal and financial climate favorable to foreign investors. Russia and the United States are developing cooperation in space exploration as well as in science, technology, and conversion. In this connection, the work of the Russian-American Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation (Chernomyrdin-Gore) can be positively assessed. Now it is important to utilize the resources of other high technologies, specifically, aircraft construction.

A serious irritant of Russian-American relations is the continuing prevention of Russian access to high-technology markets including the markets of defensive and strategic primary materials. It is inadmissible that Russia, being a cofounder of the post-COKOM mechanism of export control, should remain on the prohibitive export lists, including national lists. If the United States makes any additional conditions (besides those that have been already fulfilled) for excluding Russia from those lists the Russian-American cooperation, including the cooperation in the sphere of nonproliferation, will be seriously damaged.

CONCLUSION
Russian-American relations should become very pragmatic, avoiding not only confrontation but also euphoria and romanticism. As for U.S. support it should be political rather then ideological or even economical (see Kortunov's paper about the negative effects of U.S. financial assistance). Both countries should identify and advance common interests such as:

• Strategic stability, both global and regional.

• Controlling arms, to include dealing with arms control left-overs, nuclear restructuring, tactical nuclear weapons, across the board control over arms including small arms, ABM systems, setting up monitoring nonproliferation centers, dealing with nonproliferation in general especially as applied to Asia.

• Deterring other great powers from domination in different regions and preventing the appearance of new super powers in the world.

• Balanced and cautious integration of Russia into the world economy, including military technical space and information space.

• Dealing with the new challengers in the next century and putting special emphasis on transitional questions.

One should also think about how to remove irritating factors in the U.S.-Russian relationship, such as:

• U.S. concept of global leadership and domination.

• U.S. politics of geopolitical pluralism on post-Soviet space.

• NATO enlargement. Russia will never accept turning the Joint Permanent Counsel into a sort of "discussion club." That is why the present situation in Brussels where Russian diplomats are not allowed to address either CFE adaptation problems or modernization of NATO is not acceptable and is fraught with a scandal.

• The politics of U.S. export controls. Russia will insist on its exclusion from U.S. national lists.

• Use of U.S. military force without U.N. sanctions in Bosnia or elsewhere.

U.S.-Russian relations need to be switched from "damaged-limitation game" to "integration game." The current US-Russian agenda is dominated by a negative paradigm that is the legacy of the Cold War and should be refocused to a positive paradigm that goes beyond confrontation. It is obvious that the potential of U.S.-Russian relations is much bigger than the present level of cooperation.

Although both countries won't be able to implement much before, there are big prospects after 2000. I think a positive big project should be introduced in the agenda. It should address sustainable development concept (nuclear sites cleanup could be a good beginning). It should address also the integrity of rapid forces, which is now in doubt. We need a project demonstrating U.S. interests and support to keep such integrity. One can think in this regard about joint development of East Siberia, which represents a big potential both for the development of Russia and the world at large. (By the same token it can be a point of vulnerability both for Russia and consequently for the world at large).

The U.S.-Russian agenda of the next century will be dominated by new transnational challenges rather than by security ones. Russia must have a national idea. It is very difficult for any people to survive without such an idea, and it is impossible for them to preserve their culture without a vision of heir future. In 21st century Russia will not come back to communism and command economy. Russia should enter the next century as:

• A single integrated state. Russian sovereignty should still expand to Siberia, Kaliningrad, Far East, North Caucasus and so on.

• A democratic state. Russia should introduced neoliberalizm (or even post-liberalism) and open society standards (at present Russia is not an "open" but rather a "transparent" society).

• A state integrated into the world economy as a full-fledged member (actually Russia has already integrated itself in it, though Russian leaders do not understand it completely).

• A nuclear power, though one should realize that this situation will not last forever, because in the next century the world will get eliminate nuclear weapons.

• An information society.

• A technological republic.

The new Russia will not represent a threat to other nations, but rather will be a partner on the way to build a new, more humane world. Russia will contribute to it with its own national values.

When speaking about the crisis in the relations between Russia and the United States, many are prone to dramatize the current situation, but as translated from the Greek, the word "crisis" only means "the time for making decisions." It cannot be denied that Russian-American relations are going through such times. It is important now to comprehend what has happened in Russia and in the world in the recent five years. The United States must stop looking upon Russia as a defeated country and admit that forcing Russia to make unilateral concessions as the price of the political support of Russian reforms has proved to be a failure. The United States must also give up establishing a paternal partnership relations or relegating Russia to the role of junior partner.

The ambition of Russia to achieve a world position equal to that of the United States should be understood not for the reason of its past but in anticipation of its possible role in the future. And the time will come when the United States will be faced with the question of whether the Russian-American partnership will be able to stand the test of the revival of Russia as the world power with global interests. For Russia, relations with the United States must acquire the significance of powerful means for the resolution of Russian internal and external problems and for safeguarding both national and international security.

Russia and the United States are different civilizations. They will never become similar to each other nor will they ever join in political and economic, or cultural symbiosis. However, both countries overcome the past confrontation and striving for partnership in the future. It is in this context that the Russian President Boris Yeltsin assured that "cooperation between our countries is expected to last not for one year or decade but for hundreds of years, for ages."