The Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense, is attempting to understand the long-term consequences of the rise of China as a major world power. As part of that effort, it seeks to understand the views of the most important Chinese authors who have analyzed the future security environment. Some Americans wrongly believe Chinese views reflect a mirror image of their own. This study suggests instead that the Chinese have their own unique perceptions, which may be difficult to appreciate.

The risk of mirror imaging our own views was an issue also present in the study of the Soviet Union. Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessment, cautioned against assuming that a foreign nation's strategic assessment is merely a reflection of ours: "Soviet calculations are likely to make different assumptions about scenarios and objectives . . . perform different calculations, use different measures of effectiveness, and perhaps use different assessment processes and methods. The result is that Soviet assessments may substantially differ from American assessments."⁽¹⁾ This cautionary note also applies to understanding Chinese assessments of the future.

This study offers over 600 selected quotations from the writings of over 200 Chinese authors published from 1994 to 1999. Analysis and interpretation are kept to a minimum so that the Chinese may speak for themselves. Many Chinese scholars assisted with this study by providing hard-to-get books and articles unfamiliar to most Westerners. Half the authors were interviewed in China. They explained some of the viewpoints in recent debates about the future security environment. Debates in China are generally concealed, and frequently authors pretend they do not exist. However muted they may be, China's debates about the future nevertheless exist and merit attention if we are to understand the premises of China's national strategy and set a baseline from which to measure any future change in these premises.

China policy debates are not easy to understand fully. Western studies in the past two decades have suggested various approaches. The selection of Chinese quotations in this study is based on the analytical foundation laid by the pioneering scholarship of A. Doak Barnett, Thomas J. Christensen, Banning Garrett, Bonnie Glaser, Carol Hamrin, Michael Hunt, Iain Johnston, Samuel Kim, Kenneth Lieberthal, Lyman Miller, Michel Oksenberg, Jonathan Pollack, Gilbert Rozman, Thomas Robinson, David Shambaugh, Michael Swaine, Allen Whiting, and Donald Zagoria.⁽²⁾ One reason that the subject of Chinese policy debates is so complex and sensitive is because of the affiliations of the Chinese authors. They are not freewheeling scholars giving their personal views. The authors, who developed their writings in government-funded research institutes,⁽³⁾ are either military officers who hold positions at China's Academy of Military Science (AMS), the National Defense University (NDU), and other research organizations affiliated with the People's Liberation Army (PLA), or civilian analysts from leading government institutes, such as the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).⁽⁴⁾

This study's main finding is that for these Chinese authors, the future security environment is remarkably clear, even if some aspects are still subject to debate. Surprisingly, this clear picture is consistent with what Chairman Mao and Premier Chou Enlai told President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger 25 years ago: namely, a multipolar world was emerging and that four nations threatened China--Russia, India, Japan, and America.⁽⁵⁾ Although there is some debate among them, Chinese authors consistently express suspicions about other foreign powers, especially the United States, Japan, and India. As Stanford Professor of Political Science Michel Oksenberg states, "China's leaders are naturally suspicious of foreign powers. They believe that foreign leaders tend to be reluctant to welcome China's rise in world affairs and would prefer to delay or obstruct its progress. They fear that many in the outside world would prefer to divide China if given the opportunity. . . . China's leaders retain in their minds a strategic map of the points on their periphery that make them vulnerable to foreign influence."⁽⁶⁾

Two important influences on Chinese assessments are Marxist-Leninist doctrine (though it is seldom mentioned explicitly) and China's own history, particularly its ancient historical statecraft. As will be discussed in the Prologue, Chinese authors are heirs to a 5,000-year-old written tradition of statecraft that has been distilled into a few classic texts.⁽⁷⁾ Embedded in Chinese writing about the future are extensive references to this ancient statecraft. These allusions are often mistranslated. If the translator selects similar English language phrases, the translation will lose the reference to a specific historical meaning that was intended and that would be familiar to a Chinese. Obviously, this study cannot impart the subtle details of the entire corpus of Chinese ancient statecraft and its uses in China today, but important references to it will be pointed out. Indeed, in order to permit the reader to encounter Chinese views without delay, a number of issues have been treated in the Prologue and appendixes: appendix 1 defines what the strategic assessment process entails, and appendix 2 provides background about the major Chinese assessment institutions.

Some words of caution are advisable to any reader not fluent in Chinese or familiar with Chinese Government-sponsored documents. It is easy to set out the English language words with which Chinese analysts in government research institutes have described the future security environment. It is more difficult to attain a true understanding of the context and what these specific words actually signify to the Chinese. There are at least four obstacles to understanding Chinese views to keep in mind.

Readers unfamiliar with the Chinese language may not appreciate how wide a range of choice an interpreter has in translating Chinese terms from ideographic symbols, the semantic content of which has developed in a 5000-year-old cultural framework. For example, the Chinese word sixiang may be translated as "ideology," "thinking," "thoughts," and "doctrine," among other choices. Chinese verbs have no tense, so tense must be indicated by context, and Chinese nouns do not indicate singular or plural, again relying on context.

Some translation issues create only minor misunderstandings; others can be more significant. An example may help. Chinese writings on the future of warfare and the revolution in military affairs (RMA) frequently use three Chinese ideograms to signify something that can be used in a war that will surprise and overwhelm the enemy, vital parts of exploiting the RMA. The three ideograms (sha shou jian) literally mean "kill," "hand," and an ancient word for club, or "mace." U.S. Government translations have rendered this term as "trump card," "magic weapon," or "killer mace." None of these translations is wrong, but none captures the full meaning. The importance of the term can be seen in its continued usage over time, both originally in traditional Chinese novels and ancient statecraft texts, as well as today in the daily military newspaper. Behind these three ideograms may lie a concept of victory in warfare through possession of secret weapons that strike the enemy's most vulnerable point (called an acupuncture point), at precisely the decisive moment. This entire concept of how RMA technology can win a war cannot be fully conveyed by its simple English translation of "trump card."

All authors quoted in this study are Party members with access to a system of confidential Party documents, many of which deal with assessment of the future security environment. Debate must remain within the limits of Party guidance. Books by Party members clearly will contrast with the freewheeling debates in American books about the future. In the United States, there is certainly no "party line" from the White House about the nature of world politics in 2020. Yet, as "scientific socialists," the leaders of the Communist Party of China are expected to have an official view of the future security environment and to disseminate this in confidential Party documents to members. The line may be unclear between narrow doctrines that Party scholars are expected to accept uncritically and broad areas that may be debated. Foreign readers, even if they know the Chinese language, can become lost in the woods if unfamiliar with Party context--which points are ideologically mandated and which are open to debate. One clue appears when there is extensive repetition by Chinese authors of "boiler plate" (tifa) phrases describing the future. Such repetition probably signals quotations from Central Party documents, but to foreign readers such terms may appear to be an uncanny coincidence of the same phrases used by dozens of Chinese authors.

The Party seems ambivalent about open debates. For 20 years, Party leaders have even debated whether or not to have open debates. The 20th anniversary on May 11, 1998, of the publication of the article, "Practice is the Sole Criterion of Testing Truth," led to numerous pieces in the Chinese press commemorating the debate over economic reform and opening up, that was ignited by the article.⁽⁸⁾ Not only do they now praise the past debate, but they also advocate that in order to further carry out China's reforms, the country needs to "inherit the pioneering spirit of the debate . . . adhere to the ideological line of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts, and initiate a new stage for China's development."⁽⁹⁾ One book written as part of the commemoration of the "criterion of truth" debate and the reforms that it brought about may itself even be ushering in a new open form of academic debate in China.⁽¹⁰⁾ Jiaofeng (Crossing swords), by Ma Licheng and Ling Zhizhun, describes three periods of the "emancipation of the mind" since the end of the Cultural Revolution, in 1978, 1992, and 1997. According to a review in Ching Pao, the book broke all of the norms of Chinese veiled debates. "It criticizes people by name in total disregard of their 'face' or feelings. All parties involved in the sword crossing in the book are referred to directly by name and by the title of their works rather than by quoting and commenting on people's opinions as was usually the case in the past. It has been calculated that over 100 articles were cited. Even Renmin ribao and Qiushi [Party Central Committee publications] were cited. It is really clear where its spearhead is directed against."⁽¹¹⁾

The Prologue addresses several important examples of how ancient Chinese statecraft is used as a lesson or metaphor to assess the future. Chinese references to the "Warring States era" of 2,500 years ago remind Chinese readers never to forget the eternal verities of geopolitics and worst case scenarios. The Warring States era as a guide to the future is a rich subject, but it is never spelled out for foreign readers.⁽¹²⁾ Though significant, the true meaning of "the words" is never made explicit in a way Westerners need to know in order to understand what is really meant.

This obstacle can truly confuse foreign readers. China's future role in international politics (which Western scholars often assume will be significant) is seldom mentioned. One explanation is that this sensitive subject can be dealt with only in secret Party documents, not in the open source books and journals upon which this study completely relies. Glimpses of these internal documents sometimes come as "leaks" to the press. In 1994, a Hong Kong magazine, Cheng Ming, disclosed that a confidential report about the period 2000 to 2010, "War to be Won," had been circulated to Party members by the Policy Research Office of the Chinese State Council, the Policy Research Office of the Central Military Commission, and the Policy Research Office of the Communist Party Central Committee. The main points are that China's Comprehensive National Power (CNP) will be among the top three in the world and that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be unified.⁽¹³⁾ China's gross national product (GNP), excluding Taiwan, is estimated to become about U.S. $2.5 trillion by 2010. China will have two to four aircraft carriers and a PLA of 1.5 million, reduced from today's 3 million. By 2010, manned Chinese spacecraft will be launched and will have established a space station.⁽¹⁴⁾ In May 1997, Cheng Ming leaked another report on Sino-U.S. relations, done by the Central Policy Research Center, the State Council's Policy Research Center, the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry. This second report predicted that war between China and the United States was possible in the future. According to Cheng Ming, the report asserted:

If authentic, these documents represent rare samples of the kind of confidential forecasts Party members may be reading about China's future role that cannot be discussed in open books and journals.

These obstacles need not prevent all understanding, but together they limit the probability of fully comprehending China's assessment. Modesty is an appropriate attitude to adopt in any attempt to understand Chinese assessments. The need for further research and more extensive translations should be kept in mind.

The central finding of this study is that China has developed a remarkably detailed picture of the future security environment. The concluding chapter provides details about the range of Chinese debates on the features of the future. The extent of the debate is very restricted when compared to the freewheeling give and take that exists in the West. The mutually exclusive "scenarios" employed by Americans to explore alternative possibilities for the future do not exist in Chinese writings.⁽¹⁶⁾ China's clear picture of the future is an amalgam of Marxism and ancient Chinese statecraft from the Warring States era. All institute authors and PLA officers are members of the Chinese Communist Party, obligated to accept Party doctrine about the shape of the future. According to Deng Xiaoping, in order to preserve this clear picture of the future, Chinese should not "debate" because it can make things "complicated." Nevertheless, reformers continue to challenge orthodox ideological authors on sensitive issues. These debates are an important key to improving U.S. understanding of China.⁽¹⁷⁾ Western understanding of Chinese debates has improved since 1949 because of the remarkable efforts of only a few scholars, mostly Chinese who have emigrated to the United States or Americans. This study highlights veiled debates between reformers and orthodox authors on:

The following section outlines additional findings of this study: measuring geopolitical hierarchy, dangers and opportunities for China, probable scenarios for future warfare, Marxist taboos, including absence of self-criticism, and the premise that capitalist nations trigger wars.

Consistent with the texts of ancient statecraft, China's analysts believe in geopolitics. They try to calculate mathematically the hierarchy of the world's future major powers. At least two teams have done so at the orthodox Academy of Military Science and the reform-minded Chinese Academy of Social Science. According to the military forecast, China's CNP by 2020 will grow equal to that of the United States in a multipolar structure. Russia, Europe, and Japan will be "poles" three, four, and five, each with half the power level attained by the United States or China. According to the "reform" civilian forecast, the United States will lose its hegemony not to China but to Japan. Tokyo's national power will grow equal to that of the United States by 2010, followed closely by Germany. The civilians rate China only as number eight by 2010, not even one of the top five "poles." China and Russia score only half as high as the United States and Japan. Given these calculated power scores, Chinese analysts of the future focus intensively on assessing the intentions of Japan and the United States toward China, especially the strength of the "slanderous" and dangerous "China Threat Theory" in Tokyo and Washington.

China foresees a turbulent multipolar world. In contrast to wide-ranging Western debates about scenarios from the "long boom" to a more "dangerous world," since 1986, China's Communist Party has had an almost unchanging assessment of an "inevitable" multipolar future.⁽¹⁸⁾ This Chinese assessment draws heavily on both Maoist, pre-Gorbachev Marxist-Leninism, and ancient Chinese statecraft. It sees a relative decline in U.S. power so that the world will be "multipolar," much like the Warring States era. American security alliances will weaken, the United States will decline to become a regional power, and the post-World War II rules and norms set mainly by the United States and the Allies will give way to China's proposed rules, known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.⁽¹⁹⁾ China's authors warn of future wars. There will be intense competition among major powers to build CNP and to develop the RMA. There will be a danger of frequent "local wars," from future small wars in Africa to wars on the scale of the Korean conflict and the Gulf War. The main cause of wars involving major powers will be competitive struggles over natural resources (oil and gas). The "Yalta System" of stable "spheres of influence" must be replaced by the Five Principles, which have already been adopted by "most countries," including Russia, but not the United States or Japan.⁽²⁰⁾ Without a new "system," turmoil like that during the Warring States era will continue indefinitely. "Systems" tend to last at least 40 years, according to some Chinese authors.

China calculates power ratios and predicts American decline. Ancient Chinese statecraft from the Warring States era emphasizes the need to calculate future power ratios mathematically. Chinese national security research analysts have quantitatively analyzed the relative power of the nations of this inevitable new "world structure" in which the United States will decline economically, socially, militarily, and internationally to become one of five "poles" in a "multipolar world." Nothing can save the United States from this fate, which will include serious conflict with its former NATO and Japanese allies, a failure to exploit the coming RMA, and a fading away of all U.S. security alliances. Orthodox Chinese analysts predict that 15 to 20 years will be sufficient; reformers argue that it may take longer. U.S. influence is already said to be declining because the multipolar power of other nations constrains U.S. ambition. A domestic Chinese radio broadcast explained, "Even though the United States is currently the most developed country in the world, this does not mean that it can dominate everything as it pleases; and this is specifically the inevitable outcome of the world's accelerated pace toward creating a multipolarized pattern after the Cold War."⁽²¹⁾

This new multipolar world will present China with both dangers and major opportunities that parallel those of a rising power during the Warring States era.⁽²²⁾ Some rising states were brutally "extinguished" by the hegemon of the Warring States, a role the United States could play. Ancient strategists deceived or diverted the hegemon and even formed a coalition to balance it. As today's hegemon, the United States may already be maneuvering to prevent ("contain") China from entering this new multipolar world in which China's CNP continues to rise and grow closer to that of the United States. Orthodox authors argue that it is "too late" for the United States to "contain" China. They say U.S. military forces can be defeated through ancient strategic techniques known collectively as "the inferior defeats the superior" (yiruo shengqiang). Conversely, other authors assert that the inevitable process of America's decline has not gone far yet. One senior analyst created a probability chart of alternative policies China could pursue in order to delay for 10 years any U.S. military actions that would use force against a rising China to preserve American hegemony. Another author warns that this dangerous threat to China from the United States will not arrive until the decade 2020 to 2030, when the United States finally realizes the implications of becoming inferior to Chinese national power. Both orthodox and reform authors recommend tactical accommodation (including partnership) with the United States. However, both fear that if the China Threat Theory gains more influence in America, the United States will become so alarmed by China's rise that Washington will decide to contain, use strategic deception, or even attack China in order to preserve U.S. hegemony.

China's ancient statecraft urges the development and use of surprise "magic weapons" to win wars, a theory that today appears to influence China's view of the RMA. Five books about the RMA published in 1996-97 are striking evidence of the importance of this subject to the Chinese military. Analysts assert that the different rates at which major nations exploit the radical changes in warfare will change the world balance of power, as occurred during the ancient Warring States era. These authors' books boldly predict the United States will lose its initial lead within a decade and then fall behind other nations in this RMA competition. Such a forecast about U.S. failure to take advantage of the opportunities of a potential RMA is consistent with the calculations of other Chinese authors about the future relative decline of the United States. Russia and Japan will surpass the United States in exploiting the RMA, they say. Thus, the effect of the RMA will reinforce the current "inevitable" trend toward multipolarity and the end of America's superpower status.

Future Warfare

There is some evidence that there are three distinct schools of debate about which type of future warfare China will most probably face. There is not a direct debate, so this study labels the different schools of thought the "RMA" advocates, the "Local War" advocates, and the more traditional "People's War," or "Active Defense," advocates. The RMA advocates complain that China's current military modernization is too slow and ought to be aimed instead at leapfrogging the other major powers. Since the mid-1980s, Local War advocates have been seeking to reduce ground forces and develop a better navy and air force. The advocates of continuing Chairman Mao's approach of Active Defense and People's War focus on ideological training, large, lightly armed infantry, and a national defense mobilization base.

There may be a tacit link among these three schools of thought and the debate about the future security environment. RMA advocates would prevail in a budget debate if forecasts of the future emphasized that China would face no local wars or major land invasions but would need to defend itself after two decades against a United States bent on dismembering China to prevent it from challenging U.S. hegemony. Local War advocates benefit from forecasts that China will indeed be challenged in the near term--such as by aggression on China's border with India or Vietnam, or in the South China Sea, or by a declaration of independence by Taiwan. People's War advocates benefit from forecasts that focus on the suspicious intentions of major powers (Japan or the United States) to invade or to dismember, justifying a 3-million-strong army and militia mobilization base.

Some of the current strategic assessment was formulated secretly in the years between 1982 and 1985 through debate among the senior leadership in Beijing.⁽²³⁾ The procedure, which can be seen as China's "assessment cycle," brought about publication of a set of premises that began to shift during the decline of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s. There is now a new component--the United States as a potential threat to China's rise. It is remarkable that 20 years ago China saw the United States as a potential military ally and source of advanced weapons, yet today portrays the United States as a future long-term rival and even potential military opponent. Many Chinese note, however, that such changes were routine in the Warring States era.

There remain untested ideological taboos. One cannot publicly forecast certain scenarios. No Chinese author can today openly argue that the United States will grow relatively stronger than other major powers; U.S. relations will improve with capitalist Europe or Japan; Japan will weaken or remain a quasi-pacifist nation under its Peace Constitution; "multipolarity" as defined in China is unlikely; or it is wrong to suspect the United States of being a greedy hegemon seeking to dismember China's Tibet or Taiwan, because it continues to receive 70 percent of China's exports, remains among the top three foreign investors in China, and pledges to reduce arms sales to Taiwan.

One taboo prohibits forecasts or debates about China's own future security role. In sharp contrast to widespread Western interest and writing about the consequences of the rise of China, this subject cannot be addressed by Chinese analysts beyond certain boilerplate phrases used by senior leaders in international fora. There is no discussion of alternative scenarios about the rise of China as a great power. Analysts only repeat platitudes that China will never be a superpower, never seek hegemony, and always be a force for peace and stability.⁽²⁴⁾ Foreign commentary suggesting that China might behave as other great powers have done has been harshly criticized and punished.⁽²⁵⁾ A top Chinese analyst agreed in 1987 with the prediction by the U.S. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy that China will emerge by 2010 as the world's second economic power (after the United States and ahead of Japan and Russia). However, he warned that anyone who even considers unpleasant scenarios about China's future role, such as a "potential enemy," shows "a lack of sound strategic thinking."⁽²⁶⁾

Candid Chinese views of China's own possible future role as a great power either do not exist or are not available in open sources. This topic is avoided. Instead, daunting challenges are emphasized.⁽²⁷⁾ China's leaders repeatedly warn that no one should be worried about China as a rising military power. Li Peng stated, "It will take more than 30 years for China to achieve modernization. Therefore, the China Threat Theory is not an objective view. It was spread by anti-China forces in Western countries with ulterior motives to contain China."⁽²⁸⁾ Apparently, some authors fear that a growing trend in America and Japan will be to prevent China's rise as a future power. "Within the U.S. Congress and the Clinton administration (such as the Defense Department and the intelligence departments), there are a number of experts, strategists, and government officials who do not consider issues from the angle of political strife but instead focus on preserving the U.S. world hegemonist status and proceed from long-term geopolitical strategic awareness in holding that the rise of China will be an enduring challenge and even a threat to the United States. They call for maintaining strategic alertness and instituting strategic precautions against China. They fabricate and publish all kinds of 'reports,' and stir up all kinds of 'cases' for which there is no factual evidence, in order to create strategic opinion for the 'China threat,' 'alertness against China,' and 'precautions against China,' in a bid to attain their strategic and political goals in the world, Asia, and China (including Taiwan)."⁽²⁹⁾ Chinese concern about the reaction of countries in the Asia-Pacific region to the development of its military force and a potential China Threat is one reason that a plan to build an aircraft carrier was postponed to the 2000-2005 Five-Year Plan. According to one officer, "We do not want our neighbors to misread the signals . . . but we need an aircraft carrier if we are to complete plans to modernize the navy. We have no plans to threaten anyone with an aircraft carrier."⁽³⁰⁾

Chinese analysts have not engaged in public criticism about any aspects of China's foreign policy, in sharp contrast to the level of self-criticism in the USSR that Gorbachev permitted as early as 1987. No Chinese author has yet gone as far as Gorbachev's speech to the 19th Party Congress, which asserted, "It even happened that decisions of major importance were made by a narrow circle of persons. . . . This led to an inadequate reaction to international events and to the policies of other states and even to erroneous decisions."⁽³¹⁾ No Chinese author has yet agreed with Gorbachev's call for "de-ideologization of interstate relations," or with Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoli Adamshin's rhetorical question, "Why is injecting ideology into foreign policy so dangerous? . . . It is no less incorrect to suppose oneself the bearer of historical truth, the possessor of a patent on the future."⁽³²⁾ Nor has any Chinese yet followed Gorbachev's speech on November 2, 1987, which challenged the Leninist view of international politics by suggesting that capitalist nations can do without militarism and neocolonialism.⁽³³⁾ Allen Lynch concluded after this speech, "One may even speak of the emergence . . . of a new Soviet theory of international relations," while Sylvia Woodby referred to it as a "new world view."⁽³⁴⁾ Not so in China.

China's commitment to its version of Marxism rules out the public use of purely Western international relations concepts to assess the future security environment. This ideology prohibits using certain concepts to assess the future. Deng's national security advisor on the State Council, Huan Xiang, wrote in 1987 that "bourgeois theories of international relations" were to serve the interests of imperialist foreign policies.⁽³⁵⁾ One well-known Chinese analyst observed, "Differing from Western international relations theorists such as Hans Morgenthau, China's theory of international relations is based on dialectical and historical materialism."⁽³⁶⁾ Textbooks of international relations in use in China, such as a recent book by Liang Shoude and Hong Yinxian, emphasize the interpretations of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Deng Xiaoping.⁽³⁷⁾ Liang asserts that the foreign policies of nations depend on whether the bourgeoisie or the proletariat is in power.

Chinese textbooks state that bourgeois states are greedy and constantly plot war and intervention; they are blocked from this course only by the socialist states, who desire peace and development. Students in China from high school on are examined on these principles. Liang Shoude headed the commission that drafted the national syllabus in international politics for all universities. Chinese have publicly rejected Western international relations theory, including the school of thought known as Realism or Neo-Realism, which began to be discussed in 1982 in China.⁽³⁸⁾

In contrast to Western research that suggests miscalculation and misperceptions may be the leading cause of war, Chinese analysts assert that "scrambling for resources" causes war. "Economic factors are . . . the most fundamental cause triggering war."⁽³⁹⁾ This view may make it difficult for Chinese analysts to appreciate the role of miscalculations and misperceptions in causing war.

Chinese analysts often assert that signs of future trends appear in hidden in current events. For example, the Bosnia conflict is said to reveal a struggle between the United States and the European Union (EU) to dominate Europe and to re-divide the former Soviet sphere of influence.⁽⁴⁰⁾ The hidden intent behind U.S. policies of NATO enlargement and revision of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines is to challenge the spheres of Russia and China from both the east and west flanks.

Will another 25 years of Sino-American "strategic dialogue" and military-to-military exchanges eliminate the Chinese misperceptions identified in this study? American exchange programs have been effective and need to be increased in the future. However, China may not be willing to modify its most dearly held beliefs about traditional statecraft and the future.

To reduce the potential for misunderstanding or mirror imaging discussed in the preface, this prologue draws together examples from nine authors in five key research institutes who draw upon concepts from ancient statecraft. Their comments about the future security environment would be difficult to understand without extensive knowledge of the metaphors of Chinese ancient statecraft. The Chinese language is rich in idioms from ancient statecraft. Moreover, Chinese writing about the future security environment describes the future in terms of the Warring States era in Chinese history.⁽⁴¹⁾ The age in which the classics of Chinese statecraft were produced was a time when a multistate competition to become "hegemon" featured stratagems, small wars, interstate conferences, treaties, and what Western scholars of international relations would label "anarchy." One set of "lessons" (among many) was how to become a hegemon; another was how to survive destruction at the hands of a predatory hegemon.

One specific Chinese premise from the ancient statecraft of the Warring States era seems to influence Chinese authors who write about the United States today--the concept of how to diagnose and deal with a powerful "hegemon" (ba) that seeks to dominate several other less powerful states. The way hegemons conducted themselves during the Warring States period of ancient China forms one of the sources of the classic lessons of Chinese statecraft. Unfortunately, lessons from Chinese statecraft about dealing with a predatory hegemon are little known in the West, and there is no guide for Westerners to the famous stories in Chinese traditional statecraft so well known to all our authors.⁽⁴²⁾ According to interviews with Chinese military officers, these stories are embedded in Chinese culture just as the West has its own history, its own literature, and its own Bible stories. This prologue selects only one subject among many from the lessons of the Warring States--how China in the future should assess and deal with a powerful hegemon.

China's military authors have called the future multipolar world "amazingly" similar to the Warring States era and declare that China's future security environment resembles the Warring States era in several ways. A representative article by Colonel Liu Chungzi of the National Defense University Strategy Department states that Sun Zi's The Art of War was "the product of the multipolar world structure in China 2500 years ago," that "there are a surprising number of similarities between Sun Zi's time and the contemporary multipolar trend,"and that "in the 1990s, the world entered a multipolar era very similar to the time of Sun Zi."⁽⁴³⁾ General Gao Rui, former Vice President of the Academy of Military Science (AMS), writes that the era is "extremely distant from modern times, but still shines with the glory of truth" and "the splendid military legacy created through the bloody struggles of our ancient ancestors . . . [today] has a radiance even more resplendent."⁽⁴⁴⁾ Others claim that China should study "treasuries" of strategies from the Warring States. Many books have been published in the last 5 years as a revival of interest in ancient statecraft has been officially blessed by a large commission of China's generals. The director of research at the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army published six volumes of studies on ancient statecraft in 1996 that contained specific advice on how to comprehend the current and future security environment.⁽⁴⁵⁾

n essential aspect of assessing the security environment is said to be determining the rank order of the power held by the various warring states. Although today's Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) was invented in the early 1980s, it originally stemmed from Chinese traditional military philosophy. Authors who currently assess the CNP of different nations can find precedents in the ancient classics. For example, Sun Zi identified "five things" and "seven stratagems" that govern the outcome of war, and Wu Zi wrote about six conditions in which, if the other side's strength was greater, war should be avoided. Colonel Wu Chunqiu of AMS writes that these six points "are relatively complete, they simply are the epitome of [today's concept of] Comprehensive National Power."⁽⁴⁶⁾

However, much like current times, Chinese ancient strategists also attempted to help their country achieve dominance through nonwarfare methods. According to Wu Chunqiu, calculating CNP can aid a nation not just for war but also to "coordinate a political and diplomatic offensive, to psychologically disintegrate the enemy forces and subdue them." Assessing one's own CNP can also aid a country in promoting development and growth.

Two studies by the late Herbert Goldhamer of the RAND Corporation sought to outline some of the content of Chinese statecraft and China's unique perceptions.⁽⁴⁷⁾ One of Goldhamer's insights relevant to this study is his emphasis on how China's ancient statecraft demanded efforts to calculate the future. He points out that ancient China's first Minister was called "The Universal Calculator"; that the philosopher Han Feizi demanded that strategy be based on cost-benefit calculations; and that the philosopher Mozi persuaded an enemy general to surrender by showing he could calculate through a "seminar game" what the outcome of the battle would be.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The Warring States era had the equivalent of general staffs, which calculated the strengths and intentions of players in this multipolar world.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Sun Zi warned that victory depended on calculations and estimates of enemy strength and weaknesses made in advance by advisers in the temple council; Mozi taught his students the future could be known.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Two of ancient China's greatest advisers on statecraft, Lord Shang and Li Si, warned of the need for calculating the future in a multipolar strategic environment. Li Si wrote a famous memorandum to the ruler of Qin, the man who would unify China and become its first emperor, warning, "This is the one moment in ten thousand ages. If your Highness allows it to slip away . . . there will form an anti-Qin alliance."⁽⁵¹⁾

With regard to calculating the future, Goldhamer suggests that political writings from ancient China contained "principled predictions," not just intuition or guess work. For example, Lord Shang, a famous adviser in Qin, warned that the price for neglecting quantitative calculations would be that even a state with a large population and a favorable geographical position "will become weaker and weaker, until it is dismembered. . . .The early kings did not rely on their beliefs but on their figures."⁽⁵²⁾ The subject of Chinese statecraft in a multipolar world explored by Goldhamer remains important to China's process of strategic assessment, especially judging by the sharp increase of Chinese military publications about the relevance of ancient statecraft in the last few years.

Warring states that rose too fast suffered attack, dismemberment, and even complete extinction. In the final phase of the Warring States era, as every literate Chinese knows, a brilliant strategist formed a coalition that stood for several decades against the predatory hegemon Qin. Chinese authors today apparently believe the United States is this kind of hegemon, which, if provoked, will attack or "contain" China to preserve its hegemony.

The existence of a dangerous and predatory hegemon is the context of Deng Xiaoping's advice, which employs expressions from the Warring States and other ancient texts to guide future Chinese leaders on strategy. China must "tao guang yang hui," which, literally translated, means "Hide brightness, nourish obscurity," or, as the official Beijing interpretation translates the four-character idiom, "Bide our time and build up our capabilities." China at present is too poor and weak and must avoid being dragged into local wars, conflicts about spheres of influence, or struggles over natural resources. Deng's much-quoted advice also is to "yield on small issues with the long term in mind."

How is Deng's advice about dealing in the future with a dangerous hegemon actually applied? Dr. Yan Xuetong, Director of the Center for Foreign Policy at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), China's largest international research institute, warned in an article in 1997 that the probability of China's avoiding war for at least 10 more years will increase the more China avoids any confrontation not only with the current global hegemon but with at least two of the other major powers. Like his colleague at CASS, who warns about the dangerous decade from 2020 to 2030, when the U.S. leadership will finally realize that China's power is about to surpass America's, the CICIR center director warns that from ancient times, the hegemon will form a coalition to strangle to death (e mo) a rising power when he fears he is to be replaced. Deng Xiaoping's additional word of advice was bu chu tou--never be the leader or, literally translated, "Don't stick your head out."

President Jiang Zemin has issued traditional-style, poetic statements in sets of 16 Chinese characters that continue Deng's cautious advice about avoiding confrontation with the hegemon.⁽⁵³⁾ Under Jiang Zemin, an additional set of writings (five books in 1996) has advocated that China's military programs be focused on the potential RMA rather than improving current weapons. According to these books, the potential RMA will not "mature" until at least 2030, by which time Chinese military authors calculate that China (or possibly Japan) will score highest in the world in CNP and be well positioned, as General Mi Zhenyu has written, to "get ahead of all the others."⁽⁵⁴⁾

Deng Xiaoping's call for caution is not the only lesson based on ancient statecraft. Other Chinese authors (called hotheads by their critics) want to take the initiative to form a coalition against the United States, Warring States style. This is the opposite of not sticking your head out, or biding your time. China's ultranationalist and well-connected author He Xin advocates that China, "under the banner of opposing the hegemon" should align with every anti-American nation in the world, explicitly citing the powerful precedent of the Warring States coalition. Critics of He Xin, especially authors from his former employer CASS, point out that the Warring States era ended when a more brilliant statesman adroitly broke up the coalition and became the founding emperor of China, which may be just what He Xin fears. He predicts that the future ambition of the United States is to impose world domination.

He Xin's critics, however, project a sharp decline in the global role of the United States, asserting that in two decades or so:

From this viewpoint, dealing with the dangerous hegemon is only a temporary problem. Within two or three decades, or so, the problem will solve itself, as happened many times in the Warring States era.

Patience and caution are thus seen to be wiser than aggressive coalition building against the United States. Dr. Yan Xuetong, of CICIR, has cautioned that the ruling American hegemon can be kept from using force to contain China's rise as long as certain policy goals are maximized: annually increasing exports up to 9 percent and avoiding simultaneous confrontation with the United States and two other powerful nations. Using the following imaginative table of probabilities, Dr. Yan predicts that China can avoid war for at least 10 years by adopting these two policies. However, his table shows that as China's annual share of export markets declines and the number of powerful nations China confronts increases, the probability that China will become involved in war with the United States increases rather sharply.

Source: Yan Xuetong, "Zhongguo jueqi de guoji huanjing pinggu" (An Assessment of the international environment of China's rise), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 20, no. 1 (1997):18, 20, 23.

Not all authors are as optimistic as Dr. Yan. Indeed, his fellow author at CICIR, Zhang Wenmu, presents a more pessimistic diagnosis also based on Warring States premises. The hegemon needs resources, and such a hegemon presents a set of dangers China will face because of America's desperate need for access to new oil and gas resources, especially in Central Asia. According to Zhang's assessment of U.S. future strategy, the United States has begun to interfere in the Tibet issue as part of a larger scheme involving the enlargement of NATO and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. Zhang believes U.S. strategy is always to "follow the oil." In World War II, the United States did not intervene until Japan changed its strategy and moved toward oil supplies. Similarly, before the Gulf War, the United States ignored Iraqi expansion toward the North and West and even "pretended" not to notice, but when Saudi and Kuwait oil was threatened, the United States went to war. Zhang writes that in 1998 the United States had a "two arms" strategy to contain both Russia (with NATO enlargement) and China (with the new Japan Defense Guidelines and promoting the China Threat Theory).

In addition, Zhang predicts that the United States wants to screen off both Chinese and Russian access to Central Asian oil and gas. To accomplish this strategic goal, the United States will promote the future independence of Tibet from China. If there is internal turmoil in Tibet or farther north in Muslim Xinjiang, Zhang predicts that the United States will try to set up an international no-fly zone as it did after the Gulf War. In a disguised manner, this would amount to "dismembering" Tibet and Xinjiang, the hub or pivot of China's geopolitical position. This is particularly dangerous because the Soviet collapse started with the independence of the Baltic states. A chain reaction from Tibet and Xinjiang would affect China's industrial southwest and cause the loss of the high plateau, which provides natural protection to the west. Zhang therefore recommends that China take the lead in settling the Afghan civil war (which he says the United States is prolonging through covert aid to the Taliban fundamentalists). At the same time, Zhang advocates more caution. China must get the Central Asia oil market oriented to China. It is better to place high priority on land transport of oil and gas, which China's superiority in ground forces can protect, rather than depend in the future on sealanes for oil supplies that the United States and Japan will threaten with their powerful navies.⁽⁵⁵⁾ These recommendations had their counterparts in the Warring States era.

Zhang Wenmu and Dr. Yan Xuetong contrast sharply with the strategic diagnosis and recommendation based on the Warring States period offered by one of China's most colorful and controversial strategic authors, He Xin, who frequently uses analogies to the era.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Reformers despise him and orthodox analysts tend to distance themselves from his outspoken nationalistic writings, which run against Deng Xiaoping's advice to "bide our time" and "never take the lead." Nevertheless, there is no better example of how statecraft from the Warring States era can affect China's assessments of the future. Among many other articles, He Xin has written a call for a Chinese-led coalition against today's hegemon before it is too late. He Xin cites the precedent of the Warring States era, because "the past can help us understand the present" and outlines key points:⁽⁵⁷⁾

Somewhere between the cautionary advice of Deng Xiaoping, Dr. Yan, and Zhang Wenmu, and the bold demand of He Xin for anti-U.S. coalition building, lies the strategic advice offered by Liu Jinghua, of CASS. While less dramatic than He Xin's proposal for a global anti-U.S. coalition, his suggestion deals with the same problem of preventing the predatory, hegemonic United States from containing China's rise, or worse, and is also firmly in the tradition of Warring States statecraft. Liu warns that by 2020 to 2030, serious confrontations will begin among the major powers. At present, it is wise to tao guang yang hui (conceal abilities and bide time), in order to eliminate the China Threat Theory, but by 2020 that policy will not be sufficient. The United States (and Europe, too) will by then begin seriously to attempt to contain China. Then, "once the flood begins, we must have a 'Great Wall' that cannot collapse." One part of this "Great Wall" must be a partnership with Russia to defeat Western containment of China, which will be attempted by restricting access to capital markets and technology, promoting Western values and using military power "as the core" against China.⁽⁶²⁾ Implicit here, too, is that China has plenty of time and needs mainly not to provoke the hegemon in the intervening two decades until the Great Wall can be made ready.

Another diagnosis and recommendation project onto the United States the kind of knowledge from ancient statecraft that a true predatory hegemon ought to have. This is a kind of mirror image from the Warring States. According to General Li Jijun, one of China's most distinguished military authors and a former Vice President of AMS, the greater danger to a nation's survival is not warfare but zhanlue wudao--"strategic misdirection"--in the current multipolar world structure. General Li describes the United States as being particularly adept at this strategy, as powerful hegemons used to be.

According to Genera Li, the United States brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union with strategic misdirection. Washington deceptively stimulated the Soviets to increase their defense budget to great heights through various means, including the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), which the United States had no intention of deploying, Li writes. The United States also supported the opposition in Poland and Afghanistan, drove down the price of oil to cut off the main source of Soviet foreign exchange, and exacerbated the domestic Soviet political crisis. In 1990, Washington again used strategic misdirection against Saddam Hussein, in order to contain his rising power in the Gulf. As supposedly revealed by an American author, Washington deliberately lured Saddam into invading Kuwait, in part through deliberately deceptive comments to Saddam by the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad, to the effect that the United States did not care if he invaded Kuwait. General Li, comparing the strategic cultures of all the major powers, concludes that the preferred "strategic cultural" approach of the United States is strategic misdirection. Citing the lessons of history, General Li warns that "unconsciously accepting an opponent's strategic misdirection causes a nation to be defeated or collapse, and not know why."⁽⁶³⁾

General Li is not the only PLA officer to hold this view. Following the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in spring 1999, a Chinese journal interviewed several PLA generals about the attack; they stated that one reason for the United States to bomb the embassy was strategic misdirection. An article in the June issue of Zhongguo Pinglun concludes, "The Western forces are attempting to drag China into the mire of the arms race. The United States is planning to pursue a TMD [theatre missile defense] system . . . so that the Chinese will step into the shoes of the former Soviet Union. In an arms race with the United States, China will consume its national power, and collapse without a battle."⁽⁶⁴⁾ A key strategy of the Warring States was to attempt to do just this to an opponent.

Having made the point that these nine authors from five key research institutes use lessons and metaphors from the Warring States era and ancient statecraft, the first chapter presents several debates underway among many authors about the exact nature of the future "multipolar" security environment China will face in the decades ahead.

the visions of more than 30 authors are presented in this chapter about the geopolitical features of the future. They reveal debates between orthodox and reformist authors about which nations will be the most powerful by 2020, what kinds of international alignments will form, and the nature of the post-Cold War transitional pattern.

China's current assessment of the future security environment is based on the kind of calculations Sun Zi and the Warring States strategists would recognize. It was issued before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War and can be dated to early 1986. The assessment characterizes the present world as being in a "new era" of transition that will last several decades. During this period, great rivalries will emerge among the powers, and many local wars will be fought (as large as Korea in 1950 or the Gulf War in 1991), as a "re-division of spheres of influence" and a struggle for world leadership takes place. Bosnia is one example of the strife that typifies the era, because the Bosnia conflict is frequently called a "struggle between the United States and the European Union for domination of Europe." NATO enlargement, which China opposes, is another example of this "struggle to re-divide spheres of influence." The outcome of this transitional period of "turbulence" will have the following eight features:

Within the framework of this strategic assessment, China's analysts discuss a number of subjects in their journals and books.⁽⁷³⁾ For example, the question frequently arises about how current events fit into the framework. Some Chinese authors see the following examples of the "turbulent period of transition" as suggesting that former spheres of influence are being "re-divided." While not all Chinese authors included in this volume would agree with all these findings, the examples demonstrate how the framework of the assessment of the future is applied in practice:

Chinese analysts do not observe international scholarly standards by footnoting each other or providing bibliographical information. Most authors write as if they were the sole Chinese to ever deal with an issue, in sharp contrast to Western scholarly books and articles, where the author is expected to make clear his debt to earlier work and narrowly and modestly to describe his new contribution. Thus, no Chinese author writing in the 1990s refers to the origins of the current view of the future security environment. Interviews have established that it was Huan Xiang, Deng Xiaoping's national security adviser, who had both access to scholarly experts from Shanghai as well as experience as China's ambassador to Britain, who announced its features in early 1986, just after the U.S.-Soviet summit. Huan's speeches and articles in 1984 and 1985 described a world structure that was changing, but it was still unclear what actions the major players would take and its characteristics were not yet determined:

Beginning in January 1986, the uncertainty about the future world structure had disappeared, and its transformation and transition had definite traits and stages.⁽⁸²⁾ Huan explained, "Future international politics and economics are facing a new period."⁽⁸³⁾

China's national security analysts became very concerned about Bush administration proposals for a "new international order" and held a conference in 1991 to discuss their own views.⁽⁹⁰⁾ The phrase "New World Order" was first used by then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev at the November 1990 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in Paris and at the U.N. General Assembly speech on December 7, 1988, when he announced severe reductions in Soviet military forces, including Soviet forces stationed in the Warsaw Pact countries, which, according to a congressional research study, may have stimulated the unraveling of support for the Communist parties in Eastern Europe and "the demise of the Warsaw Pact."⁽⁹¹⁾ Multipolarity in the 21st century was forecast by a senior scholar in 1991.⁽⁹²⁾

As mentioned, Chinese authors rarely refer to each other and almost never criticize other authors by name, but in 1997, two unusual articles broke this apparent taboo in two national journals. The episode began when Yang Dazhou, a well-known senior analyst at the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), published a direct and detailed criticism of the orthodox assessment of the coming world of multipolarity.⁽⁹³⁾ It is difficult for any foreign observer to know whether the article remained within the bounds of scientifically "seeking truth from facts" that Deng Xiaoping demanded in 1978, or whether it was a "poisonous weed" that threatened Communist Party doctrine, because Central Party documents, which authoritatively set the range of debate, are never made public. Some of those interviewed said the article tested the outer limits of Party orthodoxy about the future world.

The article met with a vigorous response from a senior general in military intelligence. In a departure from the tradition of merely stating a view without debating anyone else, the PLA general actually quoted long passages from the reformer's article. The general then wrote that these views were ridiculous, without foundation, and unsupportable and, worst of all, played into the hands of the United States.⁽⁹⁴⁾

Several Chinese authors commented in interviews on both the style and the issues of this unusual "debate." They acknowledged that the two articles reflect a difference among the senior leadership of China about the pace of the decline of the United States and the rate of the rise of "multipolarity." At least a few influential civilian analysts are said to have written sensitive internal studies for the senior leadership of China, concluding that the United States may remain a superpower for as long as 50 more years. However, analysts stated that no one is willing yet to openly publish the view because of resistance by the military and some civilians who cling to the conventional assessment. This "debate" may have been addressed at the 1997 traditional annual month-long meeting of China's most senior leaders. If so, it highlights the importance of these contradictory two articles on the future security environment.

In his article, Yang Dazhou heretically argues against each of the key features of the orthodox view of the future security environment, putting forward a reformist scenario:

According to an interview the author of this volume conducted in Beijing in May 1998, the editor of the PLA journal International Strategic Studies decided that an unsolicited article by General Huang Zhengji merited publication even though it was very "sharp" (hostile in tone) and "out of the ordinary" in style. General Huang quoted passages from Yang's article without directly citing it and reasserted the orthodox view on each of these points:

Local wars are certain, even though "'peace and development' is the main trend" during the transitional period of uncertainty in the decades ahead.

According to interviews, the orthodox forecast of the future security environment continues to dominate in all Chinese international studies journals. It is as if the reformist views of Yang Dazhou's article had never appeared. Two methods reinforce the orthodox view. First, new developments are assembled to "prove" the orthodox view. For example, a typical review of 1997 supposedly provided clear evidence not only of the "acceleration" of the inevitable trend toward multipolarity, but also of America's declining international influence: the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) refusal of U.S. demands that Burma not be admitted as a member of ASEAN; Russian and European defiance of U.S. pressure not to trade with Iran; and Brazil's blocking of U.S. efforts for a free-trade zone in South America.⁽⁹⁷⁾

The second method to reinforce the orthodox and ignore the reform view is repetitive articles by senior officials. One novel example is the publication of a speech given at Harvard University in December 1997 by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, General Xiong Guangkai, that contained all the features of the orthodox view. According to interviews in Beijing, the use of Harvard as the location and a senior PLA policy maker as the "awesome" vehicle was an emphatic message to reformers. It is useful to quote at some length the words Xiong used to reinforce the orthodox view of the future:

As stated, the orthodox and reform views rarely confront each other. Therefore, the open "debate" between Yang Dazhou and Huang Zhengji was without precedent in dealing with such core issues as to whether:

This is not to say that there are no differences or variances in opinion about the above issues; merely, other authors do not mention anyone else's views, let alone criticize them. Sometimes a "neutral" author alludes to the existence of different points of view on an issue, or a journal will publish the comments of several scholars from a conference in a way that shows disagreements exist. For example, in 2000: Where is the World Going?, Yang Zheng sets forth six different scenarios for the future world structure, but he only provides a scholar's name in one scenario, does not distinguish between the views of Chinese and foreign analysts, and does not examine or give his own opinion on the feasibility of these possible scenarios.⁽⁹⁹⁾

In 1997, a very senior analyst at CICIR, Li Zhongcheng, outlined three different views of the future world structure by analysts at CICIR and CASS. Although they are not described as being part of a debate, their conflicting arguments fall into the opposing sides of the Yang Dazhou-Huang Zhengji dispute. The first scenario is depicted in the writings of Xi Runchang of CASS, who, like Yang Dazhou, refers to the world pattern following the collapse of the Soviet Union as "one super, four strong," and believes that this pattern constitutes a world structure: "Currently there has already basically formed a new embryonic structure supported by the five powers . . . in the 21st century, this new structure will further form and be perfected."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

The views of Yan Xuetong of CICIR are representative of the second scenario, "the theory on finalizing the basic design of multipolarity." He asserts, "The basic establishment of the great nations' strategic relations in 1996 caused the post-Cold War transition from a bipolar structure to a one super many strong structure to be completed."⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Finally, the writings of Song Baoxian and Yu Xiaoqiu of CICIR offer a third scenario, which is more similar to that of Huang Zhengji and the orthodox camp, that "multipolarity is forming" and that countries other than the five most powerful are growing in strength. They argue, "The development of the multipolarity trend is accelerating" and "A new group of powers will rise" that will have a "restricting role with regard to the five major powers, [and] will cause the multipolarity trend of the world structure to be even more attractive and varied."⁽¹⁰²⁾ Li does not directly criticize any of the authors whose concepts he presents, although his own views appear to be much closer to those represented in the third scenario.

Authors sometimes resort to citing respected foreign experts in order to dissent. For example, in 1997 in a book published by CICIR, the three authors, who are presumably aware of the orthodox position that there can only be five poles, hinted that Henry Kissinger holds a reform view: "Kissinger predicted that the future world will have six poles--America, Japan, China, Russia, Europe, and India. . . .[Today] India's military power is only fourth behind the United States, Russia and China, and India's Comprehensive National Power is continually increasing."⁽¹⁰³⁾

Another innovative technique to avoid debate of the orthodox view is to rise above it by inventing new definitions of orthodox terms. Yan Xuetong of CICIR writes, "The new international structure has some special characteristics, the most important of which is the replacement of 'poles'(ji) by 'units' (yuan). The nature of 'poles' is long-term stable confrontation, but the nature of 'units' is that the dominant position of key countries is determined by the nature of specific affairs."⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ These definitions elude the orthodox line. Much of Yang Dazhou's article challenged the orthodox view by employing this very tactic of establishing and clarifying definitions for key words and phrases, such as "pole," "transition era," "pluralization" (duoyuanhua) versus "multipolarization" (duojihua), and "major nation" (daguo) versus "a power" (qiangguo).

For example, Yang defined what constitutes a "pole" based on the standards of the Cold War era, when the United States and the Soviet Union were the only two poles. The "four strong," consequently, are not poles because "when compared to the Soviet Union, there still is a great distance."⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ Similarly, in his argument against those who claim that the world is in a transition era that will go on for an undetermined long period of time, Yang argues that by definition a transition is not indefinite. "Some people believe that the post-Cold War transition period could continue for 20, even 30 years. This type of argument is not appropriate; a 'transition period' always has an ending time. Suppose the 'transition period' goes on for 20 or 30 years, then this itself already constitutes a new structure different from that of the Cold War period."⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

Differences of opinion clearly exist between the reform and orthodox camps over whether or not a world structure has already been established, but even among scholars who adhere to the orthodox line and believe that the world is in a transition period, various views can be found on how long it will last. No real consensus appears to exist on the subject. Many authors simply make vague predictions without giving a time frame of when multipolarity might emerge, other than "in the early 21st century." For example, He Feng of the State Council International Studies Center writes, "Because the replacement of the old world structure by a new one is taking place under peaceful conditions, this transition era certainly will be comparatively long," and he believes that it will "continue into the early part of the next century."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

Chen Qimao, former president of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) breaks down the transition period into three stages, which the world will go through before a multipolar structure is established. The first stage was from 1989 to 1991, when the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union brought about the end of the Cold War. Currently, according to Chen, the world is in the second phase, from the Soviet collapse to "the basic formation of the new multipolar structure." He writes that during this stage, where "the old structure has already ended, but the new structure has not yet formed, . . . a situation of 'one super (the United States) many strong (the European Union, Japan, Russia, China),' or the so called 1-2-3-5 layered structure has emerged--1 (one superpower, the United States), 2 (two military powers, the United States and Russia), 3 (three economic powers, the United States, Japan, and Europe), 5 (five political powers, the United States, Europe, Japan, Russia, and China)." He foresees the world will be "complex and changeable, turbulent and unstable" until "the beginning of the next century," when "the period of major changes will come to an end, and a new balance will be established." The world will then begin the last phase of the transition, "the formation and finalization of the foundation of the multipolar structure, a stage where a new international political and economic order suited to the requirements of the new structure will be established and adjusted."⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ However, Chen does not predict when the final transition stage will end.

Some analysts have even revised their own estimates. In the early 1990s, Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science (AMS), wrote, "Because of the fast development and globalization of science, technology and economics, the dispersion of world power will speed up." Therefore, the creation of a " world structure of multipolar coexistence . . . might take 10 or 20 years to take shape."⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ However, a few years later, he extended the timetable for the transition period. "By the mid-21st century, I believe, the world will have gradually built a real multipolar structure and a mature security structure as well so that absolute hegemonism will have declined and this is likely to dictate a global trend in the second half of the 21st century."⁽¹¹⁰⁾

Other differences of opinion exist about who will be a pole once the world has gone through its transition period and finally formed a multipolar structure. For example there is the issue of a European pole. Some authors, such as Gao Heng of CASS, believe that Germany as an independent nation will be one of the world's five poles, not the EU. The First Secretary at the Chinese Embassy in Germany, Shang Jin, regards unified Germany as "the biggest winner of the Cold War" and the future overlord of Europe's economy.⁽¹¹¹⁾ Several authors assert that Germany is striving for domination of Europe in order to establish itself as a pole. However, it is running into opposition from Britain and France. According to Qi Deguang of CICIR, the struggles among the European powers are manifested through leadership conflicts, such as over how to proceed in the Bosnia crisis. He claims Germany supported the Bosnian Croats in order "seize the leadership of Europe," but France and Britain "would not bow out in favor of Germany." London and Paris therefore "invoked the provision in the German Constitution that forbids Germany from sending its troops abroad" and supported NATO instead. The French and British decision to send peace-keeping troops to Bosnia was also "meant to belittle Germany."⁽¹¹²⁾

Other analysts argue that while Germany may be the strongest of the Western European nations, it still is no match for the United States; only Europe has that potential. In a study conducted by SIIS, Wang Houkang asserts that none of the Western European nations individually has the power to constitute a pole, but the joint strength of the European Union not only provides it with "pole" qualifications, but once its integration process has progressed and solidified, it will then be able to contend with the United States for global influence:

While noting the difficulties in the integration process and predicting that it will be long in duration, Wang also believes that its eventual completion is inevitable: "The trend of European integration will not stop or reverse, this point is certain." Finally, Wang questions the potential for Europe to be the dominant world power in the future: "In the 18th and 19th centuries, Europe . . . was the acknowledged leader of the world for several hundred years. In the 20th century it declined and the U.S. moved ahead of it. In the 21st century can it rise again? People can not eliminate this possibility."⁽¹¹⁴⁾ His view is shared by a Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, Shen Guoliang, who writes, "Today not a single country in Europe, including such European powers as Germany, France and Britain, can possibly be independent of European integration and cope with the complex and fierce challenges independently. Europe can only become one of the poles in the world by way of integration and playing a role in the multipolar order."⁽¹¹⁵⁾

Whether or not Third World countries will play a significant role in the future multipolar world also is an issue where Chinese authors have differed. Like Yang Dazhou, Chen Qimao believes that the CNP of Third World countries will continue to grow in the early part of the next century but does not see their strength increasing fast enough to allow them to come close to the power of the five poles. Chen, however, predicts that they will rise somewhat more quickly than Yang, "The power of India, Brazil and ASEAN will greatly increase, but until the early 21st century (before 2010) there is no prospect for any of them to become one of the world's poles."⁽¹¹⁶⁾ In contrast, He Fang estimates that great changes involving Third World countries will have occurred in the world by the end of the next decade. He writes, "The rise of the developing countries shows even more so the irreversible trend of relative U.S. decline. . . . By 2010, seven of the world's ten economic powers will be developing countries. . . . Regional powers will be elevated to world powers and world powers will decline to regional ones."⁽¹¹⁷⁾

The NATO strikes on Yugoslavia and the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in the spring of 1999 have given prominence to the debate concerning the future world structure. One of the biggest outgrowths of the Kosovo crisis and the bombing is that they led to reevaluation of previous assessments of the pace of U.S. decline and the rate at which the world is moving toward multipolarization. It appears that the reformist view, represented by Yang Dazhou, gained support as a result of U.S. and NATO actions in Yugoslavia. A clear post-Kosovo trend has been the number of Chinese authors admitting that the transition to multipolarity has been delayed: "An analysis of the situation at the present stage shows that . . . the deeds of the United States have slowed down the multipolarization process and made it more difficult for the international community to build a new political and economic order in the next century."⁽¹¹⁸⁾ A key element in the new assessment is the corresponding issue of why the time frame for the transition to the new world structure has been greatly extended--the United States remains powerful. Not only are some authors no longer focusing on current U.S. decline, but rather, they are predicting that its strength may even continue to increase:

Chinese authors explain U.S. dominance as stemming from a number of factors. Current U.S. economic and technological superiority is at the top of their list. "The United States is at the peak of a financial monopoly of capital. Moreover, being propelled by a contemporary technological revolution, it is in the leading position in most high and new technological fields, in addition to enjoying relative superiority in the technological industry and economic strength."⁽¹²⁰⁾ According to Xiao Lian of the North American Institute at CASS, future U.S. economic domination may last many decades because of the success of U.S. strategy. He gives several reasons. First, "no matter how the European economy is reorganized or integrated, Europe will be unable to control the Japanese and the Asia-Pacific economies unless the United States participates in this process. By the same token, no matter how the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation zone is built, Europe will be unable to play a significant role in the Asia-Pacific economy unless the United States takes part in this process." The second reason Xiao lists is that "United States has all along controlled the WTO [World Trade Organization], the World Bank, and has had a bigger say in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] to date. . . . United States has time and again succeeded in consolidating and enhancing its control over the world economy." This success includes "controlling and manipulating the foreign exchange markets the world over" in order to get "huge profits by virtue of its economic and financial strength and the special position of the U.S. dollar."⁽¹²¹⁾

Another argument put forward by Chinese authors to explain the delay in multipolarization is that the other poles do not yet have the strength to independently stand up to the United States. For example, Shen Jiru, Director of the International Strategic Studies Office of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at CASS, describes the EU position in international activities rather negatively. He writes, "In world affairs, it has always remained a political shorty and a military dwarf. . . .So far, the EU has yet to develop any independent defense strength which can be of some real use; and the EU still has to largely depend on NATO for its defense."⁽¹²²⁾ Consequently, Chinese authors assert, the United States has taken advantage of the relative weakness of European countries and Japan to create some powerful alliances. These partnerships are an additional factor boosting current American dominance. One author stated, "Internationally, the United States has formed a collective hegemonist alliance, turning some international political, economic, and military organizations into U.S. tools for hegemony."⁽¹²³⁾ Shen Jiru agrees, claiming that it is an "ill omen that the unipolar world dominance of the United States takes the form of a U.S.-Europe and a U.S.-Japanese joint hegemony." According to Shen, because the U.S. share of the world economy will drop in the future, "this means that its economy will be unable to provide adequate backing for its hegemonist practices," so it must rely on its allies to maintain its superiority. "In order to establish a unipolar global dominance, the United States needs a group of helpers no matter whether it is viewed from the political, economic, or military angle." However, Shen cautions, while "this group of helpers"-- NATO and Japan--may "look like joint hegemony outwardly," it "is actually dominated by the United States in reality; in other words, a unipolar hegemony still dominated by the United States. Such a practice can considerably prolong the life of the U.S.-dominated unipolar hegemony and greatly put off the formation of a multipolar world setup."⁽¹²⁴⁾

Other Chinese analysts, while recognizing that the pace of the multipolarization process has decreased, and predicting further increases in U.S. power, also emphasize that the current trend does not mean that the U.S. will be able to establish a unipolar world. It is only a setback in the transition to a new world structure: "For the world to advance toward multipolarization is the inevitable trend of history. Although twists and turns and ups and downs may occur in the process of the development of this trend, no force can block the tide of development of multipolarization."⁽¹²⁵⁾ Another author writes:

The reason cited by most authors for the ultimate success of multipolarization is that the other poles will become more powerful and come into greater conflict with the United States: "The true essence and the vital point of the U.S. pursuit of hegemonism is to establish an international order under U.S. dominance, but the developing countries will not allow this, and even its allies will not allow it."⁽¹²⁷⁾ Another author writes, "Although cooperation and coordination between Europe and the United States are obviously growing, conflicts and differences remain," and asserts that the same situation also applies to the U.S. relationship with Japan.⁽¹²⁸⁾ Zhang Zhaozhong, Director of the Science and Technology Teaching and Research Section of NDU, concurs: "NATO is by no means totally united, and it is certain that splits will occur in the future, and multipolarization remains a trend. France will not follow the United States for ever, Germany has become stronger since reunification and it too is not willing to always follow the United States; since the Europeans have organized the euro, this will naturally match the dollar."⁽¹²⁹⁾

The "orthodox" features of the future security environment can be found in many books and articles of the 1990s, but those from Shanghai frequently are very thorough and elaborate. According to interviews conducted by the author in Beijing, open-source assessments are based on internal Chinese Government documents approved by Deng Xiaoping in the mid-1980s. Several officials pointed out that President Jiang Zemin has endorsed all the features of Deng's assessment. SIIS has a close relationship with Jiang, developed while he was mayor of Shanghai. Perhaps because of this personal relationship (and because Shanghai is far from the rigid, official climate of Beijing), SIIS publications often provide extensive details about the future security environment.⁽¹³⁰⁾ SIIS publications, particularly those by its President Chen Qimao, who has also written articles for Qiu Shi, the journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, are authoritative and add greater detail and background about the future security environment.⁽¹³¹⁾ It is possible that the view from Shanghai tends to be both orthodox and elaborate, because scholars there can draw more from Central Committee documents, or maybe because they helped draft these documents and therefore have been permitted leeway to present them.

An example of the extensive details of the future world structure provided by SIIS can be found in "The Roots of the Transitional Era," which focuses on turbulence and wars. Former SIIS President Chen Qimao states,

Chen then compares the decline of the Ottoman Empire to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Chen points out that the full process of the decline of the former Soviet Union is not complete. He notes that there are still 25 million Russians living in republics outside Russia and 20 million other nationalities in Russia. He forecasts, "Due to the rise of nationalism, this situation may lead to a great deal of explosive potential." The process of reform and the completion of the process of disintegration of the former Soviet Union, Chen argues, will "become one of the important causes of turbulence in the transitional era." He reminds us that the former Soviet Union was a superpower and in World War II it "utterly routed the imperial fascist Germany."

Chen draws on several episodes of Chinese history to illustrate how the process of the emergence of a new era can take many decades. He begins with the decline of the Eastern Han Dynasty (25 B.C.-220 A.D.) to the establishment of the Western Jin Dynasty (265-316 A.D.), a period of about 80 years during which the "war lords fought each other, the Three Kingdoms dominated their own territories, while the masses lived in dire poverty." China saw another long period of turbulence when the Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) collapsed.

Looking to the several decades that lie ahead for the emergence of a post-Cold War world strategic pattern, Chen points to Central Eurasia as a conflict zone where "religious frictions and national disputes are interlocking, leading to a lot of historic grievances." This is also where two world wars were fought. This whole zone in the past century or more has been dominated by tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian Empires. According to Chen, contradictions among these three empires produced several wars. He states, "Territorial issues were always so sensitive that a little disturbance could have resulted in enormous turbulence, thus leading to the danger of another world war." Chen adheres to the concept put forth by many Chinese analysts that the Vienna System built upon the Anti-Napoleon War, the Versailles System established after World War I, and the Yalta System built upon World War II created new political maps and divided spheres of influence among the great powers relatively rapidly, because of the international conference agreements that these great powers were able to work out after the wars.

Without such a war or international conference to mark the end of the Cold War, Chen states that a new world system cannot be created by way of victorious powers' conferences, "nor can spheres of influence be divided quickly." Thus, Chen believes violence is ahead, and the "re-division of spheres of influence will be a long-term and tortuous process . . . the struggle among big powers for spheres of influence is under way." Russia wants to maintain as its sphere all its former Soviet boundaries, while "there is little doubt that Western nations want to have East European countries joining NATO and to put them under the protection of the West." Besides the struggle for redividing spheres of influence in Europe, Chen states that "struggles between the United States and Japan for the dominating role in the Asia-Pacific as well as struggles among Germany, France, and Britain for the dominating role in Europe have not yet surfaced, but they do demonstrate themselves through a series of signs." Such struggles involve re-division of influence spheres and "will become significant roots for the emergence of turbulence in the transitional world."

In Europe, Chen agrees with many Chinese analysts that Germany was the major winner of the Cold War and has the best prospects to become a great power in the new era. He traces the origins of the Bosnia Conflict to "Germany's support for the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, without taking into account American objections and other European allies' reservations. Germany also went together with Austria to supply a great deal of weapons to Slovenia and Croatia, quickening the pace of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and aggravating the turbulence in the Balkan Peninsula." However, Chen goes on to use the Bosnia case study as an "indirect demonstration of the struggle between the United States and the European Union" over who will dominate the future of Europe.

Chen, like many Chinese analysts, directly attacks the concept that the United States is the sole superpower and that there is a unipolar strategic pattern. Will there be American hegemony? According to Chen, "Enormous facts emerging after the end of the Cold War have proved that kind of view wrong." He believes that many issues "demonstrate that America's ability to control its allies has decreased." However, "The Yalta System in the Asia-Pacific region was not so complete and solid as that in Europe." Chen argues that a looser, multipolar system has long existed in Asia because of the American failure in the Vietnam War and the Soviet failure in the Afghan War, which reduced the two superpowers' influence. He states, "Their capacity to control the region was already much less than that in Europe. Because of these developments, many contradictions and disputes in the Asia-Pacific region were not covered by the bipolar system." Of course, he acknowledges that the Asia-Pacific region has a number of uncertainties, such as territorial disputes, the Korean problem, the Taiwan issue, and the leadership succession in several countries. However, the region has actually become a place where "the centers not only are relatively independent but also in mutual check and balance" among the United States, Russia, Japan, China, and ASEAN.

Using the indicators of CNP (described in chapter 5), Chen believes that "the heyday when the United States dominated the Asia-Pacific region has gone forever." Thus, the multipolar structure has begun to take shape earlier in the Asia-Pacific than in other regions of the world, so that it's possible already to say that "no single power can have the final say in the Asia-Pacific region." This has been achieved without a Yalta, a Versailles, or a Vienna conference. The role of China has become a source of regional stability because of its rapid economic growth and its adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Chen believes China's role has been important in encouraging this transition to take shape in Asia first.

Chen's argument that the rise of China will bring peace and stability is strengthened by an article from another former SIIS President, Liang Yufan. Liang states that because China was the "prey of imperialist aggression for more than a century, the rivalry of great powers inside China was once a major cause of persistent instability and turmoil and wars in East Asia." The implication is that a strong, unified China eliminates the influence of foreign great powers (who caused wars), so Chinese stability will help to end the era of transition and bring the new era to East Asia first.⁽¹³³⁾

One of the important premises on which Chinese assessments about the future security environment are based is the concept of "world structures" (zhanlue shijie geju).⁽¹³⁴⁾ This term is used to refer to the design of the world pattern, which, according to Chinese, generally exists for several decades before undergoing a major transformation. Each "world structure" is based on the organization and state of relations among the great nations in the world. The process by which one world strategic pattern gives away to another usually is a major war. One author writes, "A world pattern is the relatively stable international structure formed by the interrelations and interaction between the main forces in the world during a certain historical period. . . . The changes in the world pattern are based on the changes in the relations of the world's main contradictions, and they accompany international and social phenomena such as turbulence, division, alignment and crises, that result in conflicts and war."⁽¹³⁵⁾ The basic Chinese catechism identifies four major "world strategic patterns" during the past 200 years. One scholar at CICIR has put together a grid (table 2) illustrating characteristics of the world order in the 20th century.

Source: Liu Jiangyong, "On the Establishment of Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Dialogue Mechanism," Contemporary International Relations 4, no. 2 (February 1994): 32. Liu is a Senior Fellow and Director of the East Asia Division at CICIR.

The first world structure, called the "Vienna System" by the Chinese, lasted 40 to 50 years and was set up by the victorious nations who defeated Napoleon. These four powers (Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Britain) established a world structure that was centered entirely on Europe and characterized by mutual bargaining and the use of "spheres of influence" to preserve stability. The second structure, which also lasted 40 to 50 years, was created by internal events in Japan, Italy, Germany, and the United States that destroyed "the original proportions and distributions of strength" and in so doing broke out of the strategic configuration confined to Europe.⁽¹³⁶⁾ Although still centered on Europe, this new pattern also expanded to North America and Asia. Briefly, the major developments were the rapid advancement of capitalism in the United States after the Civil War, the Meiji Restoration in Japan, and the political unification of Italy, as well as the unification of Germany in 1870 and its defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War in 1871.

The third world structure derived from the conduct of the powers that won World War I. In a manner similar to the creation of the Vienna System Pattern, the new Versailles System was established by the strong victorious powers (the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan). As had occurred with the Vienna Conference after the Napoleonic Wars, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 "redivided the world" and laid down the rules for the next "era." However, the October Revolution established the Soviet Union in this period and Moscow participated in the Versailles System, which "broke the pattern whereby imperialism ruled the whole world."⁽¹³⁷⁾ When discussing this era, several Chinese authors refer to it as the Versailles-Washington System, arguing that the three major treaties signed at the Washington Conference of 1921 played a major role in shaping the world structure of the time.⁽¹³⁸⁾

The fourth world structure is known in China as the Yalta System, a name derived from the Yalta Summit involving the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union in February 1945. Most Chinese claim this conference "carved out the spheres of influence in Europe and Asia for the United States and the Soviet Union." With respect to China, the Yalta Summit included Soviet recognition of "U.S. control over Japan," while the United States in turn "satisfied the Soviet Union's wishes to regain Sakhalin Island, enabled Outer Mongolia to become independent, and enlisted northeast China into the sphere of influence."⁽¹³⁹⁾ The Chinese state that the decline of British strength reduced its sphere of influence, so that the Yalta System actually established a world structure of two poles, Washington and Moscow, whose relationship largely determined world politics. The Yalta System endured until 1991, nearly 50 years. Because the core of the Yalta Agreement was the division of Europe and Germany into two parts, Chinese date the end of the Yalta System to the reunification of Germany in 1991. Although the Chinese say the Yalta System has "basically disintegrated," they recognize it continues in Northeast Asia in the division between North Korea and South Korea and in the unresolved territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo over the northern territories. There have been some Chinese references to the unresolved problem of Taiwan's sovereignty also being a part of the Yalta System because Taiwan's legal status was not resolved either at Yalta or the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference.

Within a world structure there is also what is known as a world order (shijie zhixu), or the ways and means by which nations interact and deal with each other:

The future world structure will depend on the outcomes of competitions in both military strength and CNP. The struggle for "peace and development" will shift the competitive rank orders of various nations according to their CNP, which is based on the economic and technology policies they pursue. At the same time, in the military domain there are different rules to the international competition, including the use of force and the competition for military superiority. This field has been addressed primarily by military authors in China, although a few civilian analysts have also written about the consequences of local war and the development of military technology.⁽¹⁴¹⁾

The rivalries and struggles to achieve CNP and military superiority will greatly contribute to the turbulence that characterizes the transition period, say Chinese analysts. As a consequence, the "new era" will feature destabilizing factors and inevitable local wars that will last for several decades. In fact, many Chinese articles mention the current trend of "relaxation," and then warn that there are prospects for more wars in the future. Three NDU analysts write, "The overall situation is one in which frequent regional conflicts are the outcome of the changing strategic pattern and international political disorder."⁽¹⁴²⁾

The certainty of future local wars does not seem to be debated. On the contrary, all Chinese analysts expect frequent local wars in the decades ahead. Liao Yonghe of CASS writes, "With the further reduction of the danger of a global world war, regional armed conflicts and limited wars will become the main field of military conflict."⁽¹⁴³⁾ In the available literature, the definition of local war includes the conflicts in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1964-69), and the Gulf War (1991). This is an important premise of Chinese views of the future security environment: international wars on at least the scale of Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War are virtually certain in the decades ahead. Furthermore, there are many explicit references to the level of destruction caused by each of these past local wars. Different measures of destructiveness have been used, including logistics. In 3 years of war in Korea, 600,000 bombs were used; Vietnam required twice that number; and the Gulf War consumed nearly 8 million tons of supplies. Chinese articles on the "revolution in science and technology" expect future wars to have still higher levels of destruction.

Not only have Chinese authors noted that the intensity and scope of local wars are escalating, but they cite another major trend in the accelerating frequency with which they have been occurring since the Cold War period. According to Li Zhongcheng of CICIR, "In the 40 years of the Cold War, there were 190 regional conflicts, an average of four per year. In the first 7 years after the end of the Cold War there were 193, an average of 28 per year, seven times that of the former year average."⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Other authors, in order to predict future trends, have tracked the specific number of conflicts per year, distinguishing between wars that are new and those that are continuations from the previous year. Li Qinggong, a Research Fellow at CIISS, writes,

In contrast to Western nations, there appear to be few Chinese articles or books on the international security situation that express optimism about the future role of arms control or the United Nations in building international trust or reducing the probability of the use of force. Since 1980, China has entered global economic institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund but has never accepted the jurisdiction of international security arrangements such as U.N. peacekeeping forces.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

Chinese authors appear to assume other nations share their views about the future role of military force. Chinese assessments about future military competition suggest they see other countries preparing themselves for the era of regional wars. For example, an article by two PLA analysts claims that the United States thinks "a new threat surpassing the confrontation between the East and the West in the past 45 years" is emerging. With regard to Russia, they argue, "The Russian military thinks that the process of easing up does not have an irreversible nature and that the danger of war still exists in the world." Japan, they assert, "faces military threats and serious competitors. Therefore, Japan will continue to beef up military strength and improve weapons and equipment." Concerning India, the PLA analysts claim that India thinks "India's security situation in the 1990s is still very grim, therefore it will continue to improve overall military strength and strategic deterrence strength." During the transition era some PLA analysts thus conclude that various countries "view the use of military strength as an important means to support their international status and safeguard their national interests."⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

After the U.S. accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, some authors seemed to question whether the main trend of the times still is peace and development. For example, Yang Chengxu, President of CIIS, writes, "Simply put, NATO will have the right to interfere anywhere in the world. As an ideological organization, it is laying down some hidden troubles for the outbreak of World War III. The world has become more turbulent."⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ An article in Zhongguo Pinglun, which interviewed generals from several military research institutes, brought up a similar issue, warning that "China must be ready to fight a world war." It said, "after NATO attacked the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Chinese strategists believe that before peacetime truly comes, world war could erupt at any moment. China must be fully prepared for it."⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ However, although the potential for a third world war was mentioned following U.S. and NATO actions in Yugoslavia, the majority of Chinese authors still claim that ultimately peace and development will prevail. Shen Jiru of CASS argues, "The military actions taken by NATO will hardly change the general trend of peace and development" for three reasons:

As before the Kosovo crisis, Chinese analysts maintain the seeming contradiction that regional wars will continue to exist even though peace and development are the main trend. "For the 21st century, peace and development will still be the theme of the times. We should not doubt or waver in this judgment. . . . However, limited war will be unavoidable since the roots of war will still be there."⁽¹⁵¹⁾

What will be the causes of the regional wars that will occur throughout the transition period as the new world structure is in the process of replacing the old one? Where will they take place? Who will be involved? Chinese analysts explain the outbreak of local wars in the 1990s as having two major reasons: first, the ethnic, religious, historical, and territorial disputes previously covered up and restricted by the U.S.-Soviet confrontation were free to emerge following the end of the Cold War; and second, as the new world structure is forming, there is competition and contention for power, influence, and economic resources. As the transition period progresses, the hot spots where local wars are focused will not be static but are expected to shift as some conflicts come to an end and new ones emerge, and as relations between the powers develop. Former SIIS president Chen Qimao explains:

Consequently, the local wars will occur for a variety of reasons, with the participants ranging from small groups to major powers, and at locations worldwide.

Several Chinese authors have suggested that the fault lines of future war in the multipolar security environment will not be the same as during the bipolar Soviet-American confrontation. Following the end of the Cold War, the main area where local wars were focused was in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. However, most Chinese analysts, while not predicting protracted peace and stability, consider the region's turmoil and armed conflicts to have subsided to some extent and see the main local war hot spot as shifting to Africa. A People's Daily article reported that for 1997, "According to statistics, nearly half of all the local wars that took place worldwide this year happened in Africa. . . . Though these conflicts were of the nature of civil wars and were local, they have nevertheless posed a certain threat to peace and stability and have caused the concern of the international community."⁽¹⁵³⁾ Chinese analysts do not foresee the problems in Africa disappearing any time in the near future and expect that there will continue to be frequent wars. For example, Li Zhongcheng of CICIR writes, "At the turn of the century, and the early part of next century, it is extremely possible that there will appear in the African Great Lake region a situation where as one racial or sectional conflict ends another begins."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ The Middle East is another area mentioned by Li and other authors as a current hot spot:

Many Chinese analysts point out that the proliferation of local ethnic, religious, and territorial wars has not meant that the major powers have not been involved in the conflicts. In fact, a number of analysts cite hegemonism and military interventionism as contributing to and exacerbating local wars. Wang Xuhe of the Strategy Department at AMS stated, "The factors threatening international security are pluralizing, becoming more complicated, and have more layers, but hegemonism and power politics will for a considerably long period still be the major threats to international security."⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ With regard to the two current hot spots, Africa and the Middle East, Chen Feng, a Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, writes,

Other examples of hegemonism and intervention on the part of the major powers are cited by another CIISS Research Fellow, Li Qinggong: the United States sending aircraft carriers to the Gulf when Iran crossed the "restricted airspace" to attack Iraq's Kurdish region; in Bosnia, "the U.S. peacekeeping forces clashing with local people and shooting a number of Serbian residents"; the United States "sending an 'expeditionary air force' to Bosnia to terrorize psychologically the Serbian people;" and France "continuously engaging in military intervention against the Republic of Central Africa."⁽¹⁵⁸⁾

Following NATO military strikes against Yugoslavia in spring 1999, there was a tremendous increase in criticism and alarm about U.S. hegemonism being a source of war. One author writes, "Hegemonism and power politics are still developing, and there will be no peace under heaven in the 21st century."⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ Wang Jincun, a senior researcher at CASS portrays the United States as "striving to build a single-polar world and to strengthen its hegemony." After the U.S. accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Wang wrote that the United States is employing military methods as one means for achieving its goal: "What deserves more attention is that the United States, not yet satisfied with its Cold War achievements, seeks to gain more advances through military means. Therefore, there has appeared an even closer growing link between the new Cold War and 'hot war.' The military interference by the United States in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bombing against Sudan and Afghanistan, and especially the ongoing air strikes against Yugoslavia, serve as prominent examples."⁽¹⁶⁰⁾

Chu Shulong of CICIR pointed out, "The number of times and the frequency with which the United States has used force in various parts of the world in just a few years have rarely been seen before in the history of U.S. foreign policy and in the history of international relations."⁽¹⁶¹⁾ An explanation offered by one author for the sudden increase in U.S. intervention is that it has a "Gulf War syndrome:" "The United States, the world's sole superpower, developed a 'Vietnam syndrome' on account of its defeat with heavy casualties in the Vietnam war, and became careful and cautious for a time about getting involved in overseas conflicts. Success in the 1991 Gulf War produced a 'Gulf War syndrome' in the United States and it became enthusiastic about military intervention activities."⁽¹⁶²⁾ One article noted that, "Since 1990, the United States has dispatched troops more than 40 times, and 10 of them were strong military interventions." It concludes, "Given the large amount of indisputable evidence, the United States has become the world's major source of war by its arms expansion and implementation of hegemonism and power politics, and it has become a major threat to the world's peace. It is predictable that more countries will become test spots for the high- and new-technology weapons of the United States and the victims of its war machine."⁽¹⁶³⁾

For Chinese analysts, the question is not whether the U.S. will once again interfere overseas, but where. In its pursuit of global hegemony and a unipolar world order, U.S. military intervention is expected to continue to occur throughout the transition period. According to Colonel Zhang Zhaozhong of NDU, "Gangster logic is now emerging ever more prominently. We should realize from this that at the turn of the century we are in an extremely unstable strategic pattern, and the United States is also testing the water. At present it is in midstream, not knowing if it can get to the opposite bank and whether there will be any dangerous rocks or reefs. I believe that this testing of the water will go on for several years, and we need to observe whether Chechnya or the Korean peninsula will be next."⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ An article in the Liberation Army Daily, after asserting that U.S. "gunboat policy will inevitably lead to endless wars and disorder all over the world," predicted that U.S. military interference may not be limited to smaller nations in the future. "The target today may be a small nation, but it could be a big country tomorrow! The target may be Kosovo today, but it could be any country that does not meet U.S. desires tomorrow. . . . War increasingly will become the major means adopted by the United States to establish a polarized pattern. Wars are not far away from us."⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

In addition to hegemonism and power politics and ethnic, religious, and territorial reasons, Chinese analysts see the struggle for economic resources as another major source contributing to local wars in the transition era. As Colonel Liu Mingde states, "The Marxists hold that the conflict of economic interests is the root of war." He explains that the Arab-Israeli dispute "has to do with Israel's heavy reliance on the Jordan River" and that the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf War were about petroleum. Similarly, the civil war in Yugoslavia is a war between the "poor" Serbs and the "rich" Slovaks and Croats. Liu concludes, "Competition in Comprehensive National Power has aggravated the scrambling for resources among nations."⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ An even bleaker forecast about the rivalry over economic resources is predicted by He Xin, who draws an analogy to the Warring States era of Chinese history:

It is this struggle for economic resources that could lead to direct conflicts between the major powers. While many Chinese authors imply that there will not be a war among the five major powers, that they very likely will participate in the regional wars but probably not against each other, there is another viewpoint that believes the potential for conflict exists.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ Three analysts at the Strategy Institute at NDU write, "The majority of regional conflicts in the world are civil wars, social turmoil, and civil coups. Although there are influence and interference from some other countries, these interventions do not develop into military confrontations between large countries." However, they warn that, "Potential conflict areas do exist that may possibly involve direct military confrontations between large countries or regional powers. If large-scale armed conflicts and local wars happen in these regions, it can result in drastic changes in the world situation and harm the global strategic situation."⁽¹⁶⁹⁾

A likely area for future conflict among the powers will be Central Asia where "abundant natural resources will become the target of a struggle" between the major powers. Yang Shuheng from the U.S. Institute at CASS writes that the United States wants the region's energy resources, but Russia is unwilling to "drop to the status of a second-rank country" and will resist the United States. However, pursuing economic interests is not the only U.S. goal in the region--another is "squeezing Russia out."⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ She explains, "The rivalry over the Caspian Sea region's oil and natural gas . . . is part of the U.S.-Russian rivalry over strategic interests and spheres of influence in the Eurasian hinterland." Yang predicts, "The number of countries involved will increase. The European Union also regards the Central Asian region as an energy resources base that can replace the Gulf in the future . . . . International forces covet the treasure chest that is Central Asia."⁽¹⁷¹⁾

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was seen by a number of Chinese authors as part of the organization's efforts to gain influence and control in the region. Li Yonggang, a scholar at the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management, says geopolitical, economic, and energy interests were the motivations for NATO actions, for once NATO controlled the Balkans it had a direct path to Central Asia. He writes,

"Viewed from the angle of economic interests, NATO European powers have been quietly, secretly enthusiastic about getting through the Balkan corridor in the south to extend their sphere of economic influence to Central Asia and even further. . . . Although the European powers are still in line with the United States on several important issues, the building of a united, powerful, and eventually independent Europe to contend with the United States is still the long-term strategy of these countries. . . . Once the Euro has reached the bank of the Caspian Sea, it can enter the hinterland of Russia and can also come into contact with the five countries in Central Asia. This will have an extremely far-reaching political, economic, and cultural significance. This is the general political, economic, and financial strategy of Europe."

An additional source of instability in Central Asia has been pointed out by Gao Heng of CASS, who believes that "the development of Islamic resurgence activities" could lead to conflict.⁽¹⁷³⁾ Moreover, Chen Feng of CIISS argues that the contention in Central Asia could be exacerbated by the military activities and exercises of foreign troops. For example, when the United States, "for the first time since the end of World War II, sent regular troops (more than 500 personnel of one battalion under the 82nd Airborne Division) to the region to take part in military maneuvers, it indicated that the struggle to control the region between the big powers has spread from economic and political fields to military and security fields."⁽¹⁷⁴⁾

Central Asia is one of two regions Chinese analysts predict will emerge as a new hot spot in the future; the other is the Asia-Pacific.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ There are, however, differing views concerning the potential for future wars in the latter region. While some authors are concerned about the possibility that major conflicts could erupt, others emphasize the recent greater stability in the Asia-Pacific as compared to other parts of the globe. Zhang Changtai, a Research Fellow at CIISS believes, "In a relatively stable security environment, the Asia-Pacific remains one of the regions in the world with fewer cases of armed conflicts and such a situation can still be maintained in the years to come." His views are backed up by the few number of local wars in the region. He writes:

However, many authors argue that despite the low number of local wars and greater stability in the 1990s, there still is serious potential for the Asia-Pacific to become a hot spot.

Chen Peiyao, president of SIIS has pointed out, "During the Cold War, East Asia was the region where military conflicts and local wars were constantly seen. The end of the Cold War did not bring an end to all the regional problems."⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ His argument is furthered by Shen Qurong of CICIR, who states, "The Cold War in the postwar Asia-Pacific was never 'cold' and peace in post-Cold War Asia-Pacific has been only lukewarm. The issue of regional peace awaits a fundamental solution. Beneath the surface of relative stability lie destabilizing factors. . . . In the 50 postwar years, the two largest local wars in the world both broke out in the Asia-Pacific region . . . the Asia-Pacific has now entered a stage of 'Cold Peace.' "⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ According to Li Zhongcheng, of CICIR, major issues such as the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, the Nansha Islands, and the Diaoyu islands "make it clear that in the East Asia-Pacific region there exists the kindling for regional conflicts."⁽¹⁷⁹⁾

The Japanese parliament's adoption of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines, in spring 1999, also is considered to be a source of future conflicts. Not only does it signify the rise of militarism in Japan, considered by some to be a serious potential factor for instability in the region, but it also "increased the capacity of the U.S. military to intervene in the Asia-Pacific . . . [for] without Japan as a forward base, U.S. military forces would have to retreat east to Hawaii and south to Australia." Lu Guangye, a fellow at the Chinese National Defense Strategic Institute, claims that together with NATO, the U.S.-Japanese military alliance has become one of "the two black hands helping the tyrant to do evil." He sees NATO military strikes in Yugoslavia and the bombing of the Chinese embassy as omens of future U.S. and Japanese actions. "Everything that NATO does can be regarded as the most direct and most realistic mirror of what we understand as the substance of the Japanese-US military alliance and of how Japan and the United States will act in the Asia-Pacific region. The 'experiment' carried out in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by US-led NATO also provides a vivid example for the Asia-Pacific countries."⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

Another potential cause of war in the Asia-Pacific has to do with China's rise as a global power. Several authors have written about U.S. efforts in the next decade or two to contain China's development and prevent its rise in international affairs. Colonel Zhang Zhaozhong of NDU was asked in an interview why he considered "the next 10 to 15 years will be the most difficult and most important period in China's development." His reply was, "The United States has already realized that this is the best period for containing China, and so it produces stuff like the theory of the Chinese threat to suppress China. If the United States is unable to curb the momentum of China's development in the next 10 to 20 years, it will have wasted a lot of effort. During this period, therefore, the United States may devise all kinds of ways to cause trouble." However, Colonel Zhang does not foresee China and the United States going to war in the near term. "Unless there are major changes over Taiwan or other issues, the United States at present does not have the gall to take the initiative in attacking China's territory. But we must be vigilant."⁽¹⁸¹⁾ Chu Shulong of CICIR also predicts that efforts to contain China could lead to problems, "Negative and extremist trends in U.S. domestic politics, external strategy, and diplomacy toward China are extremely dangerous for world peace and development and for the present and future of Sino-US relations."⁽¹⁸²⁾ These views are echoed in the yearly Study Reports on the International Situation--1997-1998, published by the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management, where Yan Xuetong of CICIR warns of potential conflicts between China and the United States, as China's power increases and the "desperate" United States struggles to maintain its leading position:

The predictions of Yan and others tend to modify Deng Xiaoping's earlier assertion, discussed below, that China will never be a "source" of war. Yan and many authors are worried that the United States could somehow force a war upon China in order to contain its rise or dismember its territory.

In the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping apparently described, in still-unreleased documents, four alternative scenarios, each of which was based on a different "basic contradiction" that would characterize the new era. He summarized a series of major conflicts in the world that might lead to war in four Chinese characters: "East, West, South, and North." The first set of conflicts, East-West, is posited as the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union--that is, between socialism and capitalism; the second scenario suggests West-West conflicts between developed capitalist countries; in the third scenario South-North conflicts are between the developing Third World countries and the developed capitalist countries; and the fourth alternative view sees South-South conflicts as differences between Third World countries that can lead to warfare. In 1989 Deng predicted that two of these sets of conflicts could result in new Cold Wars. "I hope the Cold War will end, but I am disappointed. Perhaps when one cold war ends, two more cold wars have already started. One is directed against the south and the third world, the other against socialism."⁽¹⁸⁴⁾

A crucial part of Deng's formulation of the sources of future warfare is that China will never be a source of war, nor does China aspire to become a superpower, even though Chinese officials since 1988 have explicitly accepted the Iklé-Wohlstetter Commission estimate that China will have the world's largest economy around 2020. The one exception to these comments on the sources of war appears to be Taiwan; many authors echo the long-standing question of Taiwan's status as a national threat. According to Gao Heng of the usually moderate CASS,

If Taiwan (no matter what name or form it uses) publicly or officially flies a "Taiwan independence" flag, it will lead to a major crisis in relations between the two shores. On that occasion, if the United States, Japan, or other countries publicly intervene, it will lead to a serious armed conflict, or escalate to a local war. Its influence will go beyond the Asia-Pacific region, and have global and historical impact.⁽¹⁸⁵⁾

Chinese analysts assert that China need not be purely passive but can assist the trend toward multipolarity and increase its pace. For example, it can help Europe move toward becoming a pole. One author argues that the EU wants to play a bigger international role as a "powerful independent pole" in an unfolding multipolar world, so it is "seeking at the same time to tighten its bond with the world's major powers," and issued an important policy document entitled, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, in March 1997. Feng Zhongping of CICIR calls this "a strategic partnership." According to Feng, this new relationship with China will "help the EU in its long cherished endeavor to assert itself on the world stage and become an independent 'pole' in world affairs." The reason the EU can become a "pole" is because of "China's status in the unfolding world power balance."⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ A similar argument is put forward by Shen Yihui, who states that "the EU needs to count on China for support," because "West Europe's building closer ties with China will enable itself to play a bigger part in international affairs. It is also conducive to quickening the process of world multipolarization as far as international politics is concerned." Shen adds that not only can China help the EU gain power in world affairs, but improved Sino-EU relations can also benefit the EU in other areas as well. He states that, economically, "The Chinese market is needed to catalyze Europe's economic growth." Even in the area of security, he claims, "China can be used to build a 'crescent' security zone around the EU."⁽¹⁸⁷⁾

The current assessment of the future security environment publicly emerged in 1986, following the U.S.-Soviet summit, and can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping's national security advisor, Huan Xiang. Its orthodox tenets about a future multipolar world are subject to muted revision and debate. Among the disagreements which this chapter has examined in some detail: who will form the poles of a coming multipolar world; how "pole" should be defined and on what basis classifications should be made; the transition to a multipolar world and how to characterize the turmoil and world structure of such a transition period; and finally, how Chinese analysts interpret and construe recent events as evidence for the prevailing orthodox view, or conversely for the reformist view.

The Chinese assessment of the current and future security environment depicts the present world as being in an era of transition to a new world structure. During this period, great rivalries will emerge among the powers, and many local wars will be fought, as a struggle for world leadership takes place. Chinese authorities assert that world politics since the 1800s always has had a "system" or a "strategic pattern" (the "Vienna System" of 1815-70; an intermediate system when Germany and Italy each unified and Japan launched the Meiji Reform; the "Versailles System" of 1920-45; the "Yalta System" of 1945-89; and the present "transition era.") Under those rules, there is a competition among powers that includes a global division of spheres of influence. Some examples of the current rivalries to carve out spheres include:

The decline of U.S. power and influence is a key feature of the current era, so that after the transition period is complete, there will no longer be any superpowers but instead a "multipolar world" in which five major nations--China, the United States, Japan, Europe and Russia--will each have roughly equal comprehensive national power. International affairs in the new multipolar "world system" will be governed by the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," and hegemons and power politics will no longer prevail.

Chinese authors rarely refer to each other, seldom provide footnote or bibliographical information, and hardly ever mention or admit to the existence of debates or differences of opinions, let alone criticize other authors by name. The precedent was broken however in 1997 when two national journals carried two articles, one reformist in nature, and the other orthodox, which openly challenged and criticized the other point of view about the current transition period and the coming world of multipolarity. Yang Dazhou, a senior analyst at the Institute of American Studies of CASS, initiated the debate, when he published a direct and detailed criticism of the orthodox assessment of the future security environment. The article met with a forceful response from a senior general in military intelligence, Huang Zhengji. Although he did not directly cite Yang's article, Huang refuted it by quoting long passages of it. The two articles reflect a debate among Chinese analysts about:

In his article, Yang Dazhou put forward a reformist scenario of the current and future security environment, which conflicted with the majority of the key features of the orthodox view. He argued:

In turn, General Huang reasserted the orthodox view by contesting each of Yang's points:

Other differences or variances in opinion also exist about the above issues, however, rather than engaging in a direct debate, some Chinese authors employ more subtle techniques for showing dissent, such as by citing foreign experts in order to show an opposing view, or rising above the debate by inventing new definitions of orthodox terms. Sometimes a "neutral" author might set forth conflicting scenarios or different points of view held by other authors, or a journal will publish the comments of several scholars from a conference in a way that shows disagreements exist.

The NATO strikes on Yugoslavia and the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in spring 1999 highlighted the debate concerning the future world structure, because they resulted in the reevaluation of previous assessments about the current transition period. The reformist view clearly gained support on the issues of the pace of U.S. decline and the rate of multipolarization. This new trend was manifested through a number of articles admitting that the transition to multipolarity has been postponed. The cause for the delay was largely attributed to the fact that the United States remains powerful. Not only were some authors no longer focusing on current U.S. decline, but rather they predicted that its strength may even continue to increase. However, other Chinese analysts, while recognizing that the pace of the multipolarization process has slowed, also emphasize that the current trend does not mean that the U.S. will be able to establish a unipolar world. It is only a temporary setback, the basic premise about the world moving toward a relatively equal multipolar structure has not been altered.

Chinese analysts are largely in agreement that before multipolarity and peaceful coexistence prevails, the current transition period will be characterized by turbulence and instability. Despite the mantra that "peace and development are the main trend" of the times, regional wars are expected to be frequent. In general, a major world war is not predicted, although after the Kosovo crisis and Chinese embassy bombing in spring 1999, warnings were expressed by a few authors about the possibility of a third global war.

The regional wars that will prevail throughout the current period are noted to be increasing in intensity, scope and frequency. According to Chinese authors, they stem from three major sources:

While a number of authors stress that the major powers will not be involved in wars against one another, other authors cite struggles over resources as conflicts that could lead to such types of confrontations.

New regional war "hot spots" are expected to emerge as the transition period progresses, and aside from the current problem areas such as the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East, Central Asia and the Asia Pacific are considered to be potential candidates. Whether or not the Asia-Pacific will remain stable is a subject for debate among Chinese analysts. The Korean peninsula, Taiwan, the Nansha Islands, and the Diaoyu islands, are cited as conceivable seeds for major conflicts, all of which could somehow involve China. Although Deng Xiaoping asserted that China would never be a source of war, China's rise as a global power is considered to be another possible cause of instability. Several authors have written about U.S. efforts, in the next decade or two, to contain China's development and prevent its rise in international affairs. They warn of potential conflicts between China and the United States, as China's power increases and the "desperate" United States struggles to maintain its leading position.

A number of analysts cite hegemonism and military interventionism as contributing to and exacerbating local wars. Following the NATO military strikes against Yugoslavia in spring 1999, for example, there was a tremendous increase in criticism and alarm about U.S. hegemonism being a source of war. Chinese analysts assert that in its pursuit of global hegemony and a unipolar world order, the United States will continue to intervene militarily throughout the transition period.

While many authors imply that there will be a war among the five major powers, there is another viewpoint that believes the potential for conflict exists among the major powers. A likely area for future conflict among the powers will be Central Asia, due to its strategic position and vast natural resources.

The current debates among Chinese security analysts all might be said to elaborate on the four alternative scenarios Deng Xiaoping described in the mid-1980s. Each was based on a different "basic contradiction" that would characterize the new era. Deng summarized a series of major conflicts in the world that might lead to war in four Chinese characters: "East, West, South, and North." The first set of conflicts, East-West, is posited as the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union--that is, between socialism and capitalism; West-West conflicts are characterized as being between developed capitalist countries; South-North conflicts are expected to be between the developing Third World countries and the developed capitalist countries; and South-South conflicts are defined as the differences between Third World countries that can lead to warfare. A crucial part of Deng's formulation of the sources of future warfare is that China will never be a source of war, nor does China aspire to become a superpower.

As noted, the formulation used by Chinese authors during the 1990s to forecast the future security environment is similar to the authoritative statements first made 15 years ago by Deng. Huan Xiang, his national security adviser, first announced the features of the current view of the future security environment in early 1986, just after the U.S.-Soviet summit:

china's security analysts have been predicting u.s. decline for a long time. In fact, the idea that U.S. strength is weakening and that its policies will no longer be effective throughout the world is not new in the 1990s. Using internal Chinese documents, Professor Robert S. Ross has shown it was alleged in the early 1980s. For example, U.S. concessions in what formed the August 17, 1982, Communique between the United States and China were explained as due to U.S. "power decline." Another analyst at that time argued that U.S. "position of strength is declining" and U.S. policy will "lead to failure everywhere."⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

According to official Chinese Marxism, a "capitalist" United States cannot avoid decline forever. Even in military strength and technology, including the development of the revolution in military affairs (RMA), areas where the United States currently is considered to hold the leading position, Chinese military experts claim that there are several reasons the United States is destined to fall behind other nations. This "inevitable" decline of the U.S. hegemon is a decisive feature of China's assessment of the future. Without U.S. decline, there will be no multipolar structure in which a rising power can seek protection. Without the fading away of U.S. military alliances with Europe and Japan, a rising power will have no new partners with which to align. Additionally, without U.S. decline, Chinese Marxism would be proven false.

Since 1991, some Chinese military authors have described specific U.S. military weaknesses and forecasted that after two decades the superpower status of the United States will end. This chapter, which cites the views of 70 authors, divides its survey of U.S. decline into three subjects:

This is the first of several chapters to deal with Chinese writings about the future implications of the RMA, which is also an important factor in the chapters about Comprehensive National Power (CNP), Japan, Russia, and future wars. PLA authors assert that the United States will do well in the RMA only in its initial period of a decade or so, then other nations like Russia and Japan will surpass America in developing future RMA-type forces.⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ Failure with the RMA will affect victory in future war, because "Non-RMA troops will not possess the qualifications for future high-technology warfare."⁽¹⁹⁰⁾

The assessment of U.S. military decline is reinforced by Chinese civilian authors. As mentioned in chapter one, authoritative civilian analysts forecast a decline in America's diplomatic role in the 21st century, as multipolarity opens up the potential for new alignments and "partnerships," and Japan and Europe seek to improve their relations with China. According to the ancient statecraft of the Warring States era, a too-powerful hegemon could easily destroy a rising rival. However, a coalition or a series of "strategic partnerships" could save a rising power from such destruction if the hegemon were declining. Chinese authors claim, "Today the trend toward multipolarization in the world is quickening, which prevents the United States from achieving world dominance. In fact the United States is declining relatively in the world. The gap between insufficient power and overly lofty goals fundamentally frustrates its scheme to create a single-pole world."⁽¹⁹¹⁾

Chinese authors define an RMA as they believe the United States does, emphasizing the potential invention of radical new forms of warfare, enhanced information warfare, networks of systems, and "digitized" combat forces.⁽¹⁹²⁾ However, while Chinese analysts acknowledge America's current leading position in the field, many also point to existing and future weaknesses, how they can be exploited, and why other countries will surpass the United States. For example, the scope of negative predictions about how the United States will implement an RMA varies little among five books published by PLA authors at the Academy of Military Science (AMS) in the last 4 years.⁽¹⁹³⁾ Their critiques of the United States range from technology issues to the ways in which U.S. military and government attitudes and philosophies will restrict and limit creativity, development, and implementation of the RMA. Several of the authors emphasize the greater potential of other countries, including China, in the area of innovation. Gao Chunxiang writes that U.S. weaknesses

Other authors point out how long it will take the United States to realize fully the RMA. General Wang Pufeng estimates it will take until 2050 for all U.S. forces to be "digitized" and part of a "system of systems," because of the slow pace to date and U.S. interservice rivalry.⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

According to Han Shengmin, the United States faces the following four major obstacles in "establishing a digitized battlefield:"⁽¹⁹⁶⁾

Another important example of Chinese beliefs is America, Russia, and the Revolution in Military Affairs, by two officers at the AMS, who argue that the United States will at first be successfully innovative during the initial decade of the RMA but later will be surpassed by one (or more) vigorous nations. They explain that the United States will ultimately lose its status as a military superpower because it will fail to exploit the RMA for several reasons, including:

Wang Zhenxi, a Senior Adviser at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), provides additional insight into why, despite its advanced technology, other countries may surpass the U.S. in exploiting the RMA. He argues that not only could other nations put forward new technologies or doctrines before the United States, but that military factors are not the only ones affecting the outcome of the RMA. Instead, a variety of components, such as the factors that make up a country's CNP, also contributes to a country's ability to develop the RMA:

Wang next employs the same definition of RMA used by Andrew W. Marshall and other American proponents:

To the surprise of Westerners, Wang differs from Americans and does not expect the United States to be the world's leader in the RMA:

Chinese analysts also use the most recent public review of United States defense strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as the basis to suggest increasing military challenges the United States may not be prepared to face. First, there is the issue of homeland defense. Lu Dehong from the CIISS writes, "It is the first time since the end of the Cold War that the United States emphasizes that the U.S. homeland is not free from external threats." Second, Lu points out that the United States is making only a modest effort to exploit the RMA: "How to balance investment in the present versus the future was the fundamental contradiction facing the U.S. Department of Defense." The QDR examined three different strategic paths to solve this tough problem: the QDR chose a third path--to strike a balance between the present and the future "that embraces the RMA in an evolutionary way. . . . Continuing to exploit the RMA has been adopted as the general principle of U.S. military development of the QDR."⁽²⁰²⁾

The Chinese criticize the U.S. Army for already "being trapped in the blind alley of technology." A Liberation Army Daily article states, "The Army which the U.S. Army is engaged in is no more than the use of a nation's technology to transform the existing units as well as the existing weaponry and equipment of the Army, and the U.S. Army is already trapped in the blind alley of technology." The article warns, "If the United States goes on with the present practice, the military revolution it is engaged in will not be a thorough going one," and predicts "The United States will not exploit the RMA very well."⁽²⁰³⁾

According to some Chinese military authors, the United States already knows China can defeat it in 2020. General Pan Junfeng states that the United States will not have formed a full information warfare force until the middle of the 21st century. He explains three ways that in future wars American computers can be very vulnerable. "We can make the enemy's command centers not work by changing their data system. We can cause the enemy's headquarters to make incorrect judgments by sending disinformation. We can dominate the enemy's banking system and even its entire social order." General Pan states that the United States already realizes these three points and that on January 30, 1994, Defense News reported that in war games between the Chinese military and the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, at the U.S. Naval War College, the Chinese forces defeated U.S. forces. General Pan puts forward five suggestions for ways in which China can strengthen its development and implementation of the RMA:

Some Chinese authors have treated the question of America's future extensively as they analyze the future security environment, so it is important to know the baseline of how China assesses the United States today. In general, Chinese authors assert the following points about current U.S. military weakness:

Chinese books on the U.S. military are plentiful and largely descriptive.⁽²⁰⁵⁾ Some Chinese military textbooks about the U.S. Armed Forces begin with a sentence that declares U.S. military technology is the best in the world,⁽²⁰⁶⁾ but this apparent praise is misleading. The main point of all writings about U.S. forces is to emphasize their weak points and their vulnerability to defeat by China. Not one of the more than 200 books reviewed for this study admitted that the United States could defeat China by force in any scenario--but many techniques can supposedly defeat U.S. forces.⁽²⁰⁷⁾ There are frequent references to China's "defeat" of U.S. forces in both Korea and Vietnam. The United States is said likely to fall behind others in the RMA. It is said that even Japan is developing better military technology than the United States in several areas and that the United States is "dependent" on Japan for military technology.⁽²⁰⁸⁾

The devaluing of U.S. military power is accompanied by frequent references in military books and the prestigious journal, China Military Science, to the importance of ancient Chinese statecraft, especially to the early centuries of Chinese history, when several warring states adroitly manipulated a balance of power until one state achieved primacy and assumed the name "China." Both the challenge of new military technology and the need to use traditional Chinese statecraft figure in this story of the founding of China; both are also often mentioned when Chinese authors address the 21st century.

In general, most Chinese analysts since 1991 have acknowledged that the United States is the "sole military superpower" and has the most technologically advanced army, navy and air force in the world. Somewhat humorously, one analyst writes, "In the last 20 years, people have turned pale at the mere mention of U.S. military strength."⁽²⁰⁹⁾ However, they suggest that this characterization of narrow technological superiority would mean very little in a U.S. conflict with China. Chinese authors repeatedly emphasize that major, fatal weaknesses characterize the American Armed Forces. Almost all universally cite Chairman Mao's requirement that the dialectical aspect of Chinese military science requires assessment of weakness as well as strength.

The Chinese view is that the United States suffers from fundamental logistics weaknesses and several operational weaknesses. Chinese authors believe Saddam Hussein, using Chinese-style strategy, could have exploited these weaknesses in order to defeat the United States.

In order to denigrate the image of the United States as a superpower colossus, a number of Chinese articles focus on American logistics limitations.⁽²¹⁰⁾ Many Chinese analysts cite statistics and examples from the Gulf War in order to point out the problems the United States would face in a potential war in Asia. Other authors examine the evolution of U.S. military strategy, arguing that it illustrates the gradual weakening of U.S. power since World War II.

The United States is described as a country that "must cross the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans and go to Europe or Asia" before any serious war starts. From 1961 to 1968, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson incorporated a flexible response strategy for fighting two-and-a-half wars simultaneously. Chinese military authors refer to these as a war with the Soviet Union and Europe, a war with China and Asia, and half a war with a regional power in an area such as the Middle East. As America's overall national strength declined, however, from 1969 to 1980, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter realized that "strength fell short of ambition" to fight two-and-a-half wars, so U.S. military strategy shifted to fighting one-and-a-half wars. Chinese called this "fighting the big war either in Europe or Asia, and at the same time a small war in some other region."⁽²¹¹⁾

The Chinese posit that American weakness can be seen from the U.S. definition that the Gulf War should have been a "half war," but in fact it required almost all America's conventional weapons, its reserves had to be called up, 6 months were needed for the United States to complete the deployment of troops in the Gulf, and it had to hire foreign ships to carry troops, equipment, and supplies. Chinese analysts point out that nearly 50 percent of the weapons and equipment for the Gulf War had to be carried by foreign ships and foreign aircraft because the United States lacked strategic airlift and sealift. After detailing the extent of U.S. dependency on foreign transportation, one author wrote, "Huge inputs were in order to guarantee one battlefield's requirements; if it had to simultaneously ensure the requirements of two battlefields, the current U.S. transportation capabilities clearly are insufficient."⁽²¹²⁾ More importantly, Chinese articles point out that in the Gulf War, oil, which accounts for 50 percent of the materials consumed by the U.S. Armed Forces, could basically be arranged in the region rather than having to rely on vulnerable lines of supply. One author asks, "If it were a long, drawnout war, with many casualties and losses, could the United States promptly replenish troops, equipment, and materials and maintain the troops' fighting ability?"⁽²¹³⁾

They cite other U.S. advantages in the Gulf War, not to be repeated again, such as the cooperation of the 28 countries in the coalition and the role of 120 countries in imposing a blockade against Iraq. Chinese analysts also note that America's "strong dependency on allies" is a potential vulnerability in future multination joint combat operations because of problems inherent in alliances. One author writes that during the Gulf War, "Due to differences among the various allied countries' troops, in the areas of war interests, combat ideology, weaponry, culture, and language, numerous difficulties inevitably existed in command coordination. This could provide the opponent with a few opportunities it could exploit, including dividing and disintegrating the alliance politically, and destroying the countries militarily one by one."⁽²¹⁴⁾ In addition, Chinese military specialists also point out that in spite of all the advantages provided by the alliance, it took Iraq only several hours to capture Kuwait, but the allied forces took more than 30 days to recover Kuwait.

One important assessment concludes that if it was so difficult for the United States to win a "half war" against Iraq with so many advantages from its coalition forces, the United States would not do well fighting alone against China and Asia. A PLA author asserts that it would be "hard to predict the result" of a United States war with China and Asia:

Even looking back on World War II, the Chinese assessment is that, although the United States was in a "whole" war, it fought only "half of it" because of its limited participation, which began with Pearl Harbor. According to the Chinese assessment, "The relentless pressure of the Russians was driving the Germans farther and farther back, and the defeat of Germany was almost a certainty" before the United States opened the second front in Normandy. Even in the European theater, the United States was joined by both the Soviet Union and Britain, while in the Asian theater the United States enjoyed the combat cooperation of "China, Britain, and the Soviet Union."⁽²¹⁶⁾

Chinese military authors also appear to devalue the effectiveness of U.S. forces in a future Korean scenario. According to a colonel at AMS, several factors ensure U.S. defeat "if in the next few years a Korean War erupted." His main points are:

The Chinese perception of American strategic weakness based on logistics is further compounded by the assertions of many Chinese military authors that American operational weaknesses could one day make U.S. forces extremely vulnerable to a Chinese-style strategy. An overall assessment of the war comes from the Vice President of AMS, Li Jijun, who writes that during the Gulf War,

Several books published in the mid-1990s purport to analyze U.S. military weaknesses in detail. One published in May 1996 by Major General Li Zhiyun, Foreign Military Studies Director at the National Defense University, contains articles by 75 PLA authors who describe in detail an extended list of joint warfare weaknesses of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force:⁽²¹⁹⁾

These represent a common theme in PLA views of future warfare--America is proclaimed to be a declining power with but two or three decades of primacy left. U.S. military forces, while dangerous at present, are vulnerable and can be defeated by China with the right strategy. That strategy is "defeating the superior with the inferior" (yiruo shengqiang). Part of the recommended approach in some of this PLA writing is the requirement for "the inferior" to pre-emptively strike the "superior" in order to paralyze his nerve centers and block his logistics. Chinese military books and articles on U.S. weaknesses date back at least to the Gulf War in 1991 and continue to appear, drawing on analysis of that conflict. Ten strategies that could have been employed to exploit U.S. operational weaknesses during the Gulf War were cited by Chinese military analysts.

Fortify positions. One representative analyst states, "Nothing can better reflect an Army's fighting ability than combat involving attacks on fortified positions." The Chinese explain American success in attacking Iraqi fortifications as due to the terrain in Kuwait and Southern Iraq, which is "a flat desert" where it is "difficult to build long-term solid fortifications" because the sand layer is so thin. Even with this advantage of Iraqi weakness, "The United States took a long time to tackle them . . . in 38 days they flew 10,000 sorties, and eliminated only 40 percent of the Iraqi forces." To the Chinese, the important point about American weakness is that U.S. forces could not overcome the following defenses: cities and mountains deep in the hinterland, the underground command post, garrisoned tunnels, underground warehouses, and aircraft and strategic missile bunkers that, according to the Chinese analysis, were "relatively safe." Only a few civilian bunkers and "some hangars which were not solid enough" were destroyed. U.S. conventional munitions cannot destroy fortifications with walls greater than 10 meters thick or deep underground facilities, especially in mountainous areas. The Chinese analyst concludes, "If the Iraqi forces could have relied on mountainous areas and built tunnels with layers more than 10 meters or even dozens of meters thick, then even if the U.S. forces could have cut several meters away from the peak, they could not have hurt the Iraqi forces one little bit."

Using this measure of effectiveness, Chinese analysts belittle American capabilities to "penetrate or blow up a protective layer several meters thick" or the battleship Wisconsin's 1-ton shells that can destroy "a reinforced concrete protective layer as thick as 4 meters."⁽²²⁰⁾ Chinese underground bunkers are portrayed as invulnerable to American attacks. If press reports are accurate, China has a series of underground tunnels in the mountainous area west of Beijing that protect a national underground command center. Chinese use of tunneling and mountainous areas for command centers and protection of army, navy, and air force equipment dates back to the Korean War and is often described with pride in Chinese historical accounts. It is therefore likely that Chinese military leaders take comfort in this American operational weakness.

Exploit weaknesses. Several Chinese articles criticized the Iraqi military commanders for not exploiting well-known American weaknesses.⁽²²¹⁾ The Vietcong and North Vietnamese knew how to play on American weaknesses, but the Iraqis did not learn from those lessons. For example, the Iraqis did not conduct harassment attacks behind American lines at bases in Saudi Arabia, unlike the Vietcong's extensive operations. The Iraqi officer corps was not sufficiently trained in technology to master the advanced equipment that it had purchased.⁽²²²⁾

One way to defeat U.S. Air Force and Naval air power is to strike at American-controlled airbases, according to former Chief of Staff of the PLA, General Su Yu: "However strong a combat capability, an Army unit does not have any combat capability before entering its position." According to past examples of local wars, the Israeli Air Force succeeded in launching surprise attacks in several wars because of its "strict training and meticulous planning and preparations" and because "the other party slackened their efforts, lowered their guard, had insufficient training, and issued inappropriate combat commands."⁽²²³⁾ Another crucial area where Chinese analysts criticized Iraq for not making surprise attacks was pointed out by Gao Chunxiang. When discussing the complexities of logistics safeguards, he stated, "If the Iraqi military had made a surprise attack on the rear of the U.S. military and multination troops, then the end of the war could have been rewritten."⁽²²⁴⁾

Prevent specialized training. According to the Chinese, the Iraqis allowed the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct special training for several months before the war and to remain on a high state of alert. "This undoubtedly helped to win superiority and take the initiative." According to Chinese analysts, "Air power's relative strength is complicated. It includes the quality and quantity of weapons, the training level and fighting will of personnel, the logistics support capabilities, and combat operational concepts." These are referred to as "a balance of static forces" which Chinese analysts do not believe is as useful a measure of effectiveness as the "balance of dynamic forces." The dynamic balance "has a great deal to do with how both parties actually employ their power."⁽²²⁵⁾

Use special measures. A particular example of how one side in combat can greatly strengthen its superiority in a "balance of dynamic strength" is to adopt "special measures." Although the U.S.-led coalition had static balance superiority in terms of air power, if the Iraqis had followed a North Vietnamese example, during the Gulf War they could have released "smoke screens supplemented by the spray of water." The Vietnamese used these "screens" to "make it impossible for the laser-guided bombs dropped by the U.S. Air Force to hit the Hanoi electric power station." Some Iraqi special measures were effective, however. Quoting a U.S. Government source, Chinese analysts state, "Only a dozen or so of the 700 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed in the first 2 days of air raids," because of the effectiveness of air defense self-protective measures, camouflage, and "air defense exercises in cities." In the long run, Chinese analysts trust the use of protracted and guerilla warfare to wear down the invader. Harassing attacks can create confusion, cause losses, and damage the morale of the political system.⁽²²⁶⁾

Study high-tech weapon vulnerability. A series of Chinese articles describes how individual U.S. high-tech weapons systems each have their own particular weaknesses and flaws that must be studied and exploited. Even the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile can be shot down by Chinese surface-to-air guided missiles. Chinese missiles have "on several occasions downed U.S.-made U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance planes, causing a great shock to the United States." The HQ-2 surface-to-air guided missile made by China is acclaimed to have a "killing probability" of "no less than 90 percent" when three missiles are launched simultaneously within the effective range of about 30 kilometers.⁽²²⁷⁾

Camouflage tanks. Another measure of effectiveness showing American military weakness involves Iraqi tanks and American efforts to destroy them. According to Zhai Zhigang, a military Research Fellow, in order to attack Iraqi troops successfully, U.S. troops would have had to achieve a three-to-one superiority in order to "insure a quick battle to force a quick decision." Zhai then listed the obstacles to American success. First, Iraqis had built antitank ditches filled with gasoline and with mines laid densely around them; thus, "even if the 2,200 U.S. tanks break through the many Iraqi tank positions and gallop to northern Kuwait, they will fight an engagement with nearly 1,000 T-72 tanks from five of the best Presidential Republican Guard divisions." According to Zhai, "A tank in a defilade can usually cope with two to three offensive tanks with similar capabilities." There were 4,000 Iraqi tanks in Kuwait that had been concealed in "solid defilades." Therefore, Zhai estimated, only 40 percent of a tank in a defilade was exposed, and camouflaging made it hard to discover or hit directly.⁽²²⁸⁾

What is the significance of these military calculations? Zhai's comments confirm the use of operations research by Chinese analysts. Trading off one tank vs. two to three tanks when the defending tank is in defilade is a good example. The suggestion that the 2,200 U.S. tanks that penetrated Northern Kuwait would not be able to successfully destroy 1,000 T-72 tanks contains a number of miscalculations, including the determination that a U.S.-crewed M-1 tank is roughly equivalent to an Iraqi-crewed, 20-year-old, Soviet-made T-72 tank and that even a 2.2-to-1 superiority is inadequate.

Destroy the nonlinear. U.S. combat theory for high-tech local wars was criticized by one Chinese analyst, who believes that the nonlinear form of combat, where "fairly large gaps can emerge between the flank and rear of one's own troops," means there is the potential for "annihilation." Li Qingshan writes, "During the Gulf War, the U.S. military frontal attack from the coast of the Persian Gulf . . . was approximately 300 kilometers. In this 150,000-square-kilometer combat area, the U.S. military deployed 17 divisions, and the average interval between each division was 94 kilometers. It is thus clear that the gaps exposed by the nonlinear form of combat can provide opportunities for the one side to be carved up, surrounded, and even destroyed by the other."⁽²²⁹⁾

Establish sound economic structure. A Chinese military Research Fellow, Han Ren, pointed out that Iraq had an important economic-based weakness. "Iraq's economic structure is irrational, and 80 percent of its food, 60 percent of its medicines, and the majority of its modern weapons are imported." Han described Iraq's overall military disadvantage by comparing the static totals. His comparisons are particularly interesting because Iraq's quantitative military indicators approach those of China. Han said that Iraq had 1.1 million troops, 5,500 tanks, 780 combat planes, and 40 to 50 naval vessels. U.S. and coalition forces counted 700,000 troops, 3,100 tanks, 2,200 planes, and some 200 naval vessels superior in quality and capability to Iraq.⁽²³⁰⁾

Establish a nuclear deterrent. The Chinese media (and interviews by the author) stress that Iraq did not have a nuclear deterrent and that the United States needed to make nuclear threats in order to achieve victory over Iraq. According to the Chinese, Saddam treated seriously a comment to the British Broadcasting Corporation by Vice President Dan Quayle, on February 1, 1991, that he "would not rule out using nuclear weapons in the war against Iraq." This assertion seems to suggest that the conventional forces alone of the U.S.-led coalition could not have defeated Iraq without a nuclear threat, which presumably would not be so successful in deterring China.

Assess air power. Chinese assessments of American air power also include specific measures of effectiveness and imply the use of operations research. U.S. airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) have "raised by more than 30 percent the probability of attacking aircraft hitting their targets." This would be effective even for old aircraft models. Chinese assessments of the Falklands War emphasized that "even though Argentina did not enjoy advanced air power, it achieved the glorious distinction of downing 18 British ships and won widespread notice in the international community."⁽²³¹⁾ Sun Hongwei points out that "even in the Gulf War, in which the largest amount of new weaponry was used, aircraft dating from the 1960s made up the biggest proportion of the total used by coalition forces." The point seems to be that by combining new and a majority of old fighter aircraft with the force multiplier of AWACS and others listed in the article (electronic jamming aircraft sometimes made up as much as 25 percent of each formation), superiority can be achieved.

This misperception allows an obsolete 30-year-old fighter aircraft (the majority of China's Air Force) to become effective by adding a few AWACS aircraft and electronic jamming aircraft, which China is in the process of acquiring. This is not a proper approach to assessing the balance of air power and could lead to a major miscalculation. If Chinese military leaders actually use such concepts, they would greatly underestimate the damage that advanced fighter aircraft can do to a nation defended by obsolete fighters.

The effect of U.S. military decline will reinforce the trend toward multipolarity and the end of America's superpower status, because, according to Chinese assessments, U.S. military weaknesses are just one part of the overall fall in U.S. CNP. In fact, Chinese analysts see U.S. decline in virtually any arena. For example, in a discussion about how the newest and highest skyscrapers in the world are all being built in Asia, and many in China, one author writes, "As the 20th century fades, the United States seems to be ceding skyscraper supremacy to the East. Does that imply that the coming century and the coming millennium will belong to the Orient?"⁽²³³⁾ However, as was true of the debates on the period of transition to a multipolar world, Chinese authors do differ in their views on the extent and rate of U.S. decline. Some analysts focus on the concrete, specific aspects of American weaknesses, while others examine overall U.S. power and compare it with that of other nations.⁽²³⁴⁾

One of the authors of a major study on the changing world structure by the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) asserts that U.S. decline is relative. He explains, "Position of strength is a relative concept; whether a country's position of strength is high or low, strong or weak, can be shown only through a comparison with other countries. In general, the relative decline of America's position of strength is the contrast between the power of the United States and that of other major nations." The author goes on to state that at present, no country will increase its strength quickly enough to surpass the United States before the early 21st century. The rise of Japan, Germany, and other major European and Asian countries "subjected America's position of strength to new challenges, but they still do not constitute a major threat to America's superpower status. This situation will be maintained at least until the beginning of the next century."⁽²³⁵⁾ The former president of SIIS, Chen Qimao, points out that U.S. power can be declining compared to other countries even though its economy and science and technology are strong. "Overall, the U.S. position of strength will continue its relative decline, but in recent years, the U.S. economy has picked up, its economic structure has been adjusted, and, in areas such as the science and technology revolution that takes information as its core, it is at the forefront of the Western nations; therefore, the process of its relative decline will be convoluted, not direct."

He goes on to claim that "Certain far-sighted intelligent U.S. personages have already clearly pointed out that in the new century the U.S. will be transformed from a superpower to a common power (putong daguo)."⁽²³⁶⁾ He Fang, at the State Council International Studies Center, also believes that the United States will be a common power in the future; however, he provides a possible exemption for U.S. military power. He writes, "The transition period will be America's evolution process from a superpower to a common power; its military force perhaps will not be included, but its military role is declining."⁽²³⁷⁾

Social issues are frequently cited by Chinese analysts as an area where the United States has serious troubles. Particularly when compared to other countries, the United States is depicted as leading the world in social problems.⁽²³⁸⁾ For example, one author referred to America as the "Drug Superpower."⁽²⁴⁰⁾ A book entitled American Social Diseases conveys the impression that pure economic decline would be the least of the problems Americans will face in the future. The author forecasts American weakness based on:

"Crisis of political confidence (lack of trust in the government and congress, disappointment and dissatisfaction with both parties, 'lost faith' in the current political mechanism)."⁽²⁴¹⁾

America's international position and influence continue to relatively weaken . . . due to the quickening development of the world's multipolar trend, so that internationally, the U.S. is subject to greater challenges and restrictions; on the other hand. . . . America's own deep social problems and crises are becoming more and more revealed to the world, so that U.S. international influence is naturally declining.⁽²⁴²⁾

What are the long-term consequences of the United States declining while others rise? Chinese authors assert that as Japan and Western European nations gain more and more power, they will seek influence in international affairs commensurate with their strength and demand equality in their relationships with the United States. In keeping with the world's transition toward multipolarity, the decreasing gap between the U.S. CNP and that of Japan and Europe means America's allies will be asserting themselves as poles, unwilling to remain the subordinate partners of the United States and submit to its "Unipolar World Strategy."⁽²⁴³⁾

An article by four analysts at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) states, "As a result of their economic growth, more and more countries now dare to say 'no' to the United States. Gone are the days when one or two powers could sit upon high and dominate."⁽²⁴⁴⁾ Yuan Peng, also of CICIR, agrees, "It is proved in practice that, although the absolute strength of the United States has almost peaked, its international influences and its capability of dominating global affairs have not synchronously increased. On the contrary, they are noticeably not as good as in the past. The multipolar system proposed by China, Russia, France, and other countries has posed a direct challenge to the unipolar strategy of the United States. . . . Of more concern to the United States is the fact that its traditional European allies, Japan, etc., are also gradually drifting away and are hardly of one heart and one mind with the United States on major issues."⁽²⁴⁵⁾

For its part, the United States, with its "global domination mentality," is expected to fight to hold on to its position of world leadership and supremacy, leading to direct conflicts and struggles with Japan and Europe.⁽²⁴⁶⁾ Although America will be able to maintain its alliances in the short term, Chinese analysts foresee that in the long run:

Jin Dexiang, a senior analyst at CICIR, believes, "Changes in the relative economic status of the United States, Japan, and Germany have exerted a far-reaching impact not only on their external and internal policies but also on world economics, world politics, and international relations."⁽²⁴⁷⁾ Jin argues that while the U.S. economic growth rate and share of world trade declined greatly from its post-World War II levels, in large part to its arms race with the Soviet Union, the economies of Japan and Germany grew. Subsequently, Japan and Germany were no longer satisfied with economic power but desired influence in other realms as well. "Bulging money bags have whetted the appetite of both Tokyo and Bonn for a larger global role in the political arena." According to Jin, Japan therefore is "beefing up its military muscle" and "filling up the vacuum left behind by U.S.-Soviet military retrenchment" in the Asia-Pacific region. Germany, too, is seeking a major political role through several tactics. It is striving for a Bonn-centered European Economic Zone while "trying its best to overtake Japan and catch up with the United States in the 21st century." Jin believes, "The scramble for the political leading role already exists among America, Europe, and Japan," concluding that "rivalry and contention among the three economic power centers of America, Europe, and Japan promise to replace U.S.-Soviet contention and the arms race as an all-important world issue."⁽²⁴⁸⁾

While Jin argues that simply the economic power of Germany has provided it with the foundation to assert itself on the world stage, other authors point to the fact that the joint economic strength of the EU is even greater than that of the United States according to some indicators. When discussing the economic contention and friction that exist between the EU and United States, for example, Yang Dazhou of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) writes, "Europe already possesses the economic strength to contend with the United States; the GNP of the European Union nations already exceeds America's."⁽²⁴⁹⁾

In addition to economic considerations, another major factor cited by many authors that has contributed to the increasing rivalry between the United States and Japan and Europe is the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. To quote Jin Dexiang, the end of the Cold War resulted in the "removal of the glue cementing Western unity."⁽²⁵⁰⁾ Sa Benwang, a Senior Researcher at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), agrees. He believes "the demise of the 'common threat' and 'common enemy,' and the subsequent demise of the 'common target' of the U.S.-European-Japanese 'Cold War alliance'," reduced the possibility of coordination and compromise, so that "'west-west' contradictions between the United States and Europe and Japan will be on the rise."⁽²⁵¹⁾ Three CICIR analysts claim that the combination of "eroded alliance cohesion" and the growth of the EU means

Several analysts at CICIR argue that the United States realizes its "leadership capacity and cohesive force" are weakening and therefore it has to "cotton up" to its allies by supporting Germany and Japan to become permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, allowing Europe to build a certain amount of self-defense strength and encouraging Japan to play a greater role in Asia. They explain that the United States does this "to achieve 'soft control' over these countries."⁽²⁵³⁾ Most authors, however, believe that the United States will be more active in its efforts to maintain power. For example, Yang Shuheng at the Center for Peace and Development, argues that the United States intends to establish its dominant position.⁽²⁵⁴⁾ According to Qi Deguang of CICIR, the United States "purposefully took an attitude of aloofness" toward the Bosnia crisis to "wait to see the fun when they failed."⁽²⁵⁵⁾ After the European effort to reduce the crisis failed, the United States started to proclaim that it must play the leading role and bombed the Bosnian-Serb position to show that the United States was seizing overall control.

Another analyst suggests that a key factor causing the United States to enlarge NATO is that "the United States finds its national power weakened, . . . [and] it seeks to rely on NATO to continue its leading role in the world."⁽²⁵⁶⁾ According to Chinese analysts, America's goal through the NATO eastward expansion is both to weaken and encircle Russia, and to provide itself with a means of consolidating and furthering its leadership position in Europe. Zhang Liangneng, an analyst at CICIR, states "NATO eastward expansion is a vital strategic step for the United States to control Europe and contain Russia." However, Zhang asserts that the United States may not be able to realize its aspirations where Europe is concerned, because

Zhang's argument is supported by another CICIR analyst, who believes that European nations not only intend to create a more unified military force independent of the United States, but also plan to utilize NATO to do so: "Although both the United States and Western Europe advocate NATO eastward expansion, they are not entirely the same in regard to the concrete objective, style and pace of the extension. While the United States attempts to make use of the NATO move to maintain its own leading position in European affairs, West Europe wants to build up its own 'defense pillar' through NATO expansion so as to get rid of American control."⁽²⁵⁸⁾ A Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, Wang Naicheng, expects that this "U.S.-European contradiction of control and counter-control" will become more and more acute, because each side will intensify its efforts to establish its position. "Europe is striving to change its role during the Cold War period as the little partner utterly controlled by and dependent upon America. It is demanding that power be shared in order to establish an equal, true partnership with the United States, but the United States refuses to concede and instead is becoming even more domineering, trying vigorously to consolidate its position as the overlord in NATO."⁽²⁵⁹⁾

Europe is not the only place where Chinese authors predict a U.S.-EU struggle for leadership; they also foresee conflicts between the two Cold War allies around the globe as Europe moves to expand its influence. Asia in particular is pointed to by Chinese as an area where European nations are striving to establish closer ties. An article by three CICIR analysts states,

The first Asia-Europe Summit Conference in Thailand (March 1996) was considered by the authors to be a symbol of greater closeness between the two regions, presaging further decline in U.S. global influence. They write that in addition to seeking "stability and equilibrium in world political and economic order," one of the main goals of the summit was to "further weaken U.S. dominance in the global economy and international relations and frustrate U.S. attempts to seek post-Cold War global hegemony."⁽²⁶¹⁾ Chen Feng, a Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, pointed out that the Asia-Europe summit meant that "for the first time the United States, as the only superpower in the world, was unable to take part in this significant international conference."⁽²⁶²⁾

As the desire to be independent poles grows among European nations and in Japan, Chinese analysts predict that they will work to improve their relations with China. Three CICIR analysts conclude that the result of the power struggles among the Cold War allies will be that America, Western Europe, and Japan will "attach more importance to the China factor in their foreign strategies" because of the "enhancement of China's Comprehensive National Power and the extension of China's international influence."⁽²⁶³⁾ Li Zhongcheng, also at CICIR, agrees that China will become a new focus in international relations because of its increased strength, but argues that China's growing importance may actually be one of the factors that comes between the allies. "With the improvement of its political big power status, Japan will gain more independence in dealing with regional and international affairs. Therefore, even though more stress has been laid on keeping vigilance over China within the U.S.-Japanese alliance, it will be very difficult for Japan and the United States to act synchronously and speak in one voice on their China policy. Worse still, they could even become major rivals to each other in vying for economic dominance in the Asia-Pacific."⁽²⁶⁴⁾ Gao Heng of CASS asserts that Japan is not only working on its relations with China, but is also focusing on Russia. "Under pressure from the United States, Japan accepted the new policy of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. However, for its own interests (to serve as a world level power), Japan could not but try its best to improve its relations with Russia and China."⁽²⁶⁵⁾

According to Gao, Germany is also focusing on improving its relations with Russia in order to expand its influence, even though it is "America's 'leading partner' in Europe."⁽²⁶⁶⁾ Gao, like other authors, mentions the developing closeness in German-French-Russian relations and the recent creation of a large triangular relationship among the three. Wu Guoqing of CASS explains that "political triangles" such as the German-French-Russian one "constitute new geopolitical centers" that alter Europe's geopolitical structure.⁽²⁶⁷⁾ Hu Ning of the Center for Peace and Development argues that Germany, France, and other Western European nations are seeking to improve relations with Russia at the same time that NATO is pursuing its eastward expansion, because Russia can serve as a counter to the United States. Europe "needs to draw support from Russia's power to oppose the U.S. domination of European security affairs, with the aim of building a U.S.-Russian-Western European 'multipolar restrict and balance' situation."⁽²⁶⁸⁾ Chinese authors quote Yeltsin as stating that if he had to choose, he would side with Europe over the United States: "President Yeltsin . . . said during the Denver Summit, 'If conflicts occur somewhere between Europe and the United States, Russia will favor the position of Europe, sharing weal and woe together.' "⁽²⁶⁹⁾

Despite the extensive writing by Chinese analysts about the trends of growing rivalries and conflicts between America and Japan and Europe, most expect the alliances to endure in the short term. Regarding the United States and Europe, for example, Wang Naicheng of CIISS writes that, although "their contradiction has intensified," he believes that "in the foreseeable future . . . coordination and cooperation will remain the central point in their relations." Because of Russia's existence as a common potential threat and Europe's continued, though decreasing, dependence on the United States in security affairs and economic interdependence, "it is difficult to change in a short time the feature of the relationship where the United States is the principal and Europe is the subordinate. . . . Nevertheless, the cohesive force linking America and Europe in NATO from the beginning of the post-Cold War era has weakened with each passing day, and the contradiction, quite intense at times, has been developing continuously." He believes that as EU integration continues, the pattern of the U.S.-EU relationship will change. "With the progress in EU political, economic and defense cooperation, certainly Western European countries will pose even graver challenges to U.S. hegemony."⁽²⁷⁰⁾

Wang's views are shared by Sa Benwang of CIIS, who sees the weakening of the alliances between America and Japan and Europe as inevitable but believes that they will not abruptly end: "The centrifugal trend of Europe and Japan away from the United States as head of the alliance will further increase, and the tendency of the alliance to weaken will be hard to stop. Of course, this will also be a tortuous and complex process; it is expected that alliance relations will be maintained up to 2015."⁽²⁷¹⁾ Views similar to those held by the above two analysts are presented more strongly by three CICIR analysts who predict that major U.S.-EU confrontations only await the growth of EU unified CNP:

Chinese analysts quote American authors out of context to suggest that distinguished Americans agree with China's assessment. It is true that American authors frequently predict drastic decline for their country, but these warnings are always linked to a set of recommendations that, if followed, will save the day and avert the fall. Chinese authors omit these linked recommendations, thereby giving their readers the impression that many sage Americans predict their nations's own inevitable weakening.⁽²⁷³⁾

Henry Kissinger has been quoted as stating that America will now be only a "beggar policeman," because the United States sought coalition funding for the Gulf War. A glowing review of a book by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control, in China's most prestigious military journal subtly distorted a key point of the book. Brzezinski suggests that the United States will risk losing its global leadership role if it does not improve its materialistic values and present a more attractive model civilization than it does at present. According to Colonel Pan Jiabin of the Academy of Military Science, the book "is certainly representative of Western thought, especially that of high-level U.S. Government views." Pan then misquotes Brzezinski: "The U.S. position as a global power is in imminent danger."⁽²⁷⁴⁾ Pan omits Brzezinski's recommendations, which, if followed, would assure America's superpower status. Colonel Zhang Zhaohong, of NDU, cites Samuel Huntington on American weaknesses. He writes, "This U.S. leadership group lacks the ability to sit in a tent and devise successful strategies. Huntington's latest book, The Lonely Superpower, includes some views with which I rather agree. The book points out that when the power of the sole superpower reaches a considerable degree, it has too much trust in its own strength, does not take a broad view of anything, and is prone to make many mistaken policy decisions."⁽²⁷⁵⁾

Paul Kennedy's book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, is another example of American writing frequently cited by Chinese analysts. Kennedy argues that high military spending leads to the weakening of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, while low military spending allowed Germany and Japan to rise. CICIR analyst Jin Dexiang, quotes Kennedy on the link between large defense budgets and the decline of a country's economy and overall national power. "If . . . too large a proportion of the state's resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer term. In the same way if a state overextends itself strategically . . . it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all--a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has entered a period of relative economic decline." Jin then puts forward his own belief that the United States is already entrapped in the danger zone predicted by Kennedy. "As a matter of fact," he writes, "Washington today does not merely 'run the risk' of weakening national power, it is actually bogged down in the quagmire of relative decline. Relentless expansion of war industry has entailed . . . disastrous consequences on the long-term development of the U.S. economy."⁽²⁷⁶⁾

Chinese authors have repeatedly pointed out that one important cause of America's future decline is its conscious choice of a mistaken foreign policy. After the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the depiction of America's foreign policy in the official Communist Party newspaper became particularly vivid. For example, the United States was likened to Nazi Germany in eight specific ways in a long article that concluded that the pursuit of such Nazi-like policies would end in "complete failure."⁽²⁷⁷⁾

In lieu of excerpting many other articles that also describe U.S. foreign policy as a search for world domination, this one will be quoted in sufficient detail to reveal the Chinese assessment of American goals clearly. It begins by responding to the rhetorical question of how the United States today and Nazi Germany are alike:

Although this article is harsher in tone and more intemperate than others, it does not deviate much in substance from Chinese authors who also condemn the "hegemonic" goals of the United States. Some authors seem to hold out hope that Washington will someday change its foreign policy goals, but this debate is muted at present.

Differing only in their views of exactly how fast and in what ways America's powers will decline, Chinese analysts agree in asserting that the U.S. is losing economic, political, and military influence around the world, and therein, its status as a superpower. As evidence, they cite its failure to invest fully in the RMA, as well as what they term weak strategies and logistics as military vulnerabilities; they note its intractable domestic problems; and they point to its frequent inability to prevail diplomatically. Their main criticisms of U.S. weaknesses are outlined below. Chinese authors emphasize several problem areas that America faces in implementing the RMA and maintaining its leading position:

In addition to Iraq's economic weakness and its lack of a nuclear deterrent, Chinese analysts criticize Iraq for:

It should be noted, however, that Chinese assessments do not treat the United States as "weak" in any absolute sense at the present time. They characterize the United States as a true hegemon in every way today. For example, a series of books on the U.S. Armed Forces asserts U.S. technological superiority in practically every field, despite U.S. reductions since 1991.⁽²⁷⁸⁾ Nevertheless, they assert that the United States will fall behind in military innovation after 2010.

U.S. military vulnerabilities are only one contributing factor in the overall process of U.S. decline depicted by Chinese analysts. While some authors focus on specific areas where America is weakening, such as in military affairs or domestic social problems, other analysts argue that the country's decline is relative, that it is only declining compared to other nations whose power is increasing. One predicted outgrowth of this trend of falling national strength is that the U.S. is expected to lose its allies. As the power of Europe and Japan increases, and they no longer must depend upon America either militarily or economically, they are expected to come into greater conflict with the U.S. Consequently, rivalries and struggles are expected to gradually cause the alliances to weaken and fade. Moreover, at the same time that their relationships are deteriorating with the U.S., Chinese analysts predict that Japan and Europe will be striving to improve their ties to China.

After the Kosovo conflict, a number of Chinese authors debated the length of time that the United States would be able to sustain its "unipolar" hegemonic domination and hold back the global trend toward multipolarity. However, agreement about the central trend was not reversed. The debate was only about the length of time it will take for these tendencies and trends to unfold.

Chinese national security specialists have been describing America's role in the future security environment in the same way for a decade: dangerous but declining. In the picturesque terms of ancient Chinese statecraft, America is a decaying hegemon whose leaders are as yet unaware that their fate is unavoidable, so the U.S. leadership is pursuing several dangerous but doomed strategies, such as:

China's authors propose a number of countermeasures to these alleged American maneuvers. Deng Xiaoping's public proclamations were to "remain coolheaded" and to "taoguang-yanghui"--bide our time and build our capability--to avoid conflict with the United States during the decades it suffers inevitable decline. Other authors sound more stringent warnings. The Vice President of AMS urges vigilance, because the declining United States will attempt "strategic deception" of other major powers, including China, as it did the Soviet Union with the phony "Star Wars" threat, and as it did when it tricked Iraq into invading Kuwait so the United States could dismantle Iraq's growing power. The Director of the Foreign Policy Center at China's largest security research institute warns that the United States may form a coalition to "strangle" China if the proponents of the China Threat Theory become strong in the United States.

Other proposals are more defensive. For example, China's forecasted energy needs will be enormous in 2020, which could make China vulnerable to the United States. Therefore, one author urges that China's energy must be sought through pipelines to Russia and Central Asia, because China's relative military superiority in ground forces can better protect these energy assets, rather than through oil purchases from the Persian Gulf, which rely on sea lanes that America (and Japan) could threaten in the future. Perhaps the most aggressive advice about how China should deal with the declining American hegemon has been couched in specific analogies to ancient statecraft. A well-connected scholar proposes China help to form a global anti-U.S. coalition with any and all nations opposed to the United States. His colleagues criticize him for such alarmist proposals. Several analysts have written that it is already "too late" for the United States to contain China.

In the short term, Chinese authors (and the Chinese Government) advocate good relations with both Japan and India, through "shelving" territorial disputes for later resolution. However, in the long term, Chinese analysts appear to hold exaggerated estimates of the prospects of future geopolitical threats to China from both Japan and India, to include support of "dismemberment" of China. India could join the United States in aiding Tibetan independence, and Japan might support an independent Taiwan.⁽²⁸⁰⁾ One reason for this wariness may be that Chinese Marxism counsels suspicion of the predatory motives of any capitalist power. Another may be that ancient Chinese statecraft recommends vigilance toward nearby rivals, especially those with whom one has disputed territory, as China does with Japan and India. Chinese authors themselves suggest that an additional cause for concern has to do with history and culture, particularly the still prevalent memories of past wars. For example, an extreme assessment comes from General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science (AMS), who writes that Japan's strategic culture is fundamentally ruthless, bloodthirsty, and a "self-made freak."⁽²⁸¹⁾ While not as bad as the Japanese, the Indians as a culture are also described as ambitious. A report written by the late Premier Zhou Enlai described India's "blood relationship" (interbreeding) with the British and explained that the Indian middle classes "took over from British imperialism this concept of India as the center of Asia," and want to have "a great Indian empire" that dominates Asia.⁽²⁸²⁾

CASS calculates that by 2010 Japan will become equal to the United States in Comprehensive National Power (CNP), at a growth rate that will allow it to surpass the United States by 2020. Prior to May 1998, Chinese military authors had been predicting that India would become a nuclear power; now they estimate that Japan will follow suit and that both countries will each maintain at least two aircraft carriers. They assert these two democracies will probably become nationalistic, aggressive military powers. In other words, the fact that Japan and India are democracies counts for little in the eyes of Chinese analysts assessing the future security environment. Instead, several Chinese authors use ancient statecraft and strategic culture arguments to portray Japan and India in derogatory terms usually reserved for totalitarian regimes. Japan's national goal is purportedly to replace the United States as world hegemon, while India is merely in pursuit of regional hegemony. No author says so, but it appears that few welcome Japan or India as a potential strategic partner for China. Instead, these two are "nearby" powers to be opposed rather than "distant" states with whom to seek partnerships.

India's CNP will remain inferior to China's, according to civilian analysts, but military analysts write that India is already ahead of China in naval power and defense spending. Japan's prospects with respect to the RMA are rated as high. Japan is expected to become a major nuclear and conventional military power, co-equal or superior to China, Russia, and the United States. Japan's future military equivalence to the United States can come through its superior CNP or through its implementation of the RMA, and "Japan's Self Defense Forces will strive to be on an equal footing with the United States in the area of conventional military forces."⁽²⁸³⁾ A more nationalistic Chinese author, He Xin, warned in 1989 about Japan's long-term goals in harsher terms: "Japan in the overall strategic arrangement will completely carve up and isolate China. Casting off the United States, nibbling at China, fostering cordial relations with the Soviet Union, and striving for world hegemony very likely will be Japan's basic strategic world policy."⁽²⁸⁴⁾ Such Chinese predictions about Japan's intentions and capabilities contrast sharply with orthodox American views of Japan.

A provocative article by Feng Zhaokui, a Japan specialist at CASS, appeared in 1997 alleging that Japan is seeking to engineer a severe conflict between China and the United States. Following a classic Warring States tactic of "Murder With a Borrowed Knife" (the third of the 36 Stratagems),⁽²⁸⁵⁾ Japan's long-term strategy for the future multipolar world is said to be devious efforts to turn the United States against China in the decades ahead so that Japan can "sneak" past the United States in CNP while the United States is distracted by the pseudo threat of China.⁽²⁸⁶⁾ Japan's motive is said to be to continue its historical ambition to dominate Asia, in pursuit of which it must weaken China's CNP and also break free of its dependency on the United States. Both these goals can be achieved if Japan (or India) succeeds in persuading the Americans that China is a threat and a challenge to American world leadership. Even the usually moderate Beijing Review asserted in 1997 that the sinister China Threat Theory was manufactured first in Japan in 1990 for just this purpose.⁽²⁸⁷⁾

India, too, is seen to have menacing designs for the future multipolar world and also is said to employ the tactic of playing the China Threat card. An article by Zhang Wenmu of the CICIR asserts that India's intention is to separate Tibet from China, because, "Tibetan independence will create a buffer zone between China and India and enable India to take bolder action on the South Asian continent, and subsequently, in the Indian Ocean region, without the fear of being attacked front and rear." Consequently it used the China Threat as its excuse for conducting nuclear tests in May 1998. Zhang argues India realized that "in order to ease pressure from the United States (regarding its nuclear tests), India must challenge China," because India and the West have similar strategic aims concerning containing China. Zhang writes,

According to Zhang, the mutual objective explains why the sanctions imposed on India by the West were not as harsh as those inflicted on Iraq for a similar problem.⁽²⁸⁸⁾

Chinese authors assess the future roles of Japan and India in the international security environment mainly as future rivals of China, based both on a belief in their sinister long-term hegemonic strategies and on the military power they will use to back up their plans. Although in overall CNP there are definite differences in the three countries' scores, in terms of military power, both Japan and India are today assessed as roughly equal to China; Japan is slightly superior while India slightly inferior. AMS estimates that:

These current "scores" comparing China to India and Japan are not static in Chinese assessments. Instead, many authors focus on the probability of ultranationalist, militarist takeovers of the governments of either Tokyo or New Delhi, or both. In such scenarios, China could find itself facing military giants to the east and south, two nations that might even form a coalition against China. A stream of articles in the 1990s by Chinese specialists on Japan and India tends to ignore the democratic and even pacifist sentiment on which Western analysts focus. Rather, the Chinese seem to be debating among themselves as to how soon current indicators of political, economic, and religious trends will result in nationalistic, militarist regimes in Japan and India.

Chinese authors do not lack knowledge of Japan; they cite Japanese language sources and interviews in Japan. They predict Japan's future based on its domestic development and other factors that will make Japan, like all capitalist nations, behave in a predatory imperialist fashion.⁽²⁹¹⁾

The Chinese have not always been so negative in their views of Japan's military development and actually encouraged it in the 1970s. Indeed, it was not until the mid-1980s that China reassessed its support (offered since 1972) for Japanese military modernization. Chinese military figures had encouraged Japan to increase its defense spending to meet the Soviet threat. At one point the Chinese deputy chief of the general staff encouraged Japan to increase its share of defense expenditures from 1 percent of the gross national product (GNP) up to 3 percent, nearly triple Japanese defense expenditures. If this advice had been followed by Tokyo, Japan's budget today would not be U.S. $40 billion but U.S. $150 billion, more than 20 times China's claimed military budget.

Deng Xiaoping told a Japanese delegation to Beijing in September 1978, "I am in favor of Japan's Self Defense Force buildup."⁽²⁹²⁾ At that time, China faced a threatening security environment, and its support for Japan's enlarged defense efforts may have been related in part to Beijing's interest in acquiring Japanese weapons and defense-related technology. China also was clearly interested in recruiting a new partner to their united anti-Soviet front.⁽²⁹³⁾ However, 10 years later, China's security environment had changed, and by the time Japan announced in January 1987 that it would actually increase its defense spending slightly above 1 percent of GNP, the Chinese reacted strongly, attributing it to Japan's larger military ambitions. One of the first strong criticisms of Japanese military goals that authoritatively reversed earlier encouragement of Japan came from Huan Xiang, who served as Deng's national security advisor.⁽²⁹⁴⁾

Today, Chinese security experts seem united in the view that in the future security environment, Japan will be primarily locked in a long-term competitive struggle with the other great capitalist power centers, Europe and America; this is a consistent Chinese Marxist-Leninist view of Japan. In 1986, Deng Xiaoping's national security adviser, Huan Xiang, declared that America's allies would all begin to free themselves from U.S. domination. Japan's future strategy toward China and Russia is seen in this larger global geopolitical framework of a powerful Japan now escaping from an ever-declining America, but also colliding with America's escaping European capitalist allies. The 1990s have seen no change since Huan Xiang's assessment in 1986. For example, Japan's present and future geopolitical goals are treated as being the same in five subsequent annual reviews of the international security environment conducted by CICIR, which, as part of its duties for the Ministry of State Security, publishes an annual "World Outlook" article. The authors are not the same each year, but their views on Japan's future role appear to be consistent:

An article in the foreign ministry journal World Knowledge also points to Japan's increasing power and confidence in the relationship. It forecasts that American-Japanese relations "have entered the most turbulent period in the postwar era, and Japan no longer plays the obedient lamb of the United States." However, like other analysts, the author claims that there is no urgency to this problem: "Although there are contradictions of sorts in U.S.-Japanese relations, no radical change in the basic pattern of relations between the two countries is on the horizon in the foreseeable future."⁽³⁰³⁾ According to some Chinese analysts, the reason that the relationship will not be greatly altered in the near term, despite the increasing discord and Japan's growing power and ambitions, is Japan's continued economic, political, and security dependency on the United States. One author explains that while "there are obvious economic conflicts between Japan and the United States," and "the United States is worried that it may lose out to Japan. . . . Due to mutual political and military needs, with Rightist forces in Japan wishing to rely on the United States to achieve their target of building Japan into a political and military power and the United States wishing to rely on Japan to consolidate its 'line of defense' in East Asia, the two countries have come closer together in recent years."⁽³⁰⁴⁾ A CICIR analyst elaborates further: "For a long time Japan will not part company with America, although it will change its policies toward the latter. This is because Japan's economy relies heavily on the United States. Its security and politics also need support from the United States. In the new times the Japanese-U.S. relationship is one of cooperation and competition, and of conflict and coordination."⁽³⁰⁵⁾

However, Japan's dependency on America will be greatly reduced and overcome, if the assessments of other Chinese analysts regarding Japan's current and future development are correct. For example, one of the major areas in which many Chinese believe Japan holds the world's most advanced position is high technology. Praising the progress it has made in research and innovation, one author writes, "This basic research will be in a leading position in the future science and technology competition, especially nuclear energy, space navigation, civil aviation, ocean development, bio-engineering, superconduction, the magnetic suspension train, fiber-optics communications, high-definition television, and fifth-generation computers, etc."⁽³⁰⁶⁾ Even in the area of military technology, Chinese authors write that Japan is encroaching on U.S. dominance. A 1996 article, "Japan: Leading the U.S. in Military Technology," stated, "Japan has had great progress in the area of military computer application . . . Without Japan's technology, the U.S. military's F-117A stealth fighter, which was tremendously intimidating in the Gulf War, essentially would not have been created."⁽³⁰⁷⁾

Not only do Chinese authors emphasize specific areas in which they believe Japan already is superior to America, but some perceive Japan to be catching up and even pulling ahead of the United States in overall national power. According to an article in World Knowledge, the major U.S. competitive adversary is shifting to Asia, specifically to Japan, because a number of indicators show "Japan is swiftly shrinking its gap with the United States in the fields of economics and science and technology, and engaging in sharp competition with the United States":

The United States has become the world's largest debtor nation, while Japan has become the world's largest creditor nation.

Japan provides more foreign aid than the United States and is the country that provides the most foreign aid in the world.

This article seems to "favorably" forecast Japan's catching up to the United States in the future. For example, it goes on to assert, "By 2010, Japanese direct overseas investment will account for about one-third of global transnational direct investment. Japan is going to exploit these advantages to catch up to the United States faster . . . by 2025 the Japanese economy will overtake the U.S. economy. Even in purchase price parity power, by 2045, the Japanese economy will overtake the U.S. economy."⁽³⁰⁸⁾ As will be discussed in chapter five, Chinese analysts who quantitatively measure CNP also have predicted that Japan will surpass the United States in the future.

However, it must be pointed out that in the past year negative assessments of Japan's short-term development have been appearing in Chinese journals, particularly when comparing its economic situation with that of its leading rivals, the United States and Europe. As an example, Chen Feng, a senior Research Fellow at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), suggests, "Japan's performance is rather bad among the developed nations. Suffering from the aftermath of the collapse of the bubble economy, the Japanese economy has been weak in recovery with repeated fluctuations and is estimated to barely maintain growth by 1 percent."⁽³⁰⁹⁾ Another author, Jian Yuechun of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), forecasts, "The Japanese economy will be weak for a long time. The period of real recovery for the Japanese economy will not come for some time."⁽³¹⁰⁾ The Deputy Director of the Division of East Asian Studies at CICIR has even written that the country's economic problems are having a negative impact on its rivalry with the United States and Europe for global dominance: "The unstable political situation and weak economy shook the pillars supporting Japanese diplomacy, and the 'Japan can say no' position that used to be seen in its relations with big powers vanished."⁽³¹¹⁾ However, the former president of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), Chen Qimao, predicts that the diminishing of Japan's diplomatic capabilities is not permanent, and that in the long term its strong overall CNP will allow it to overcome its current problems:

Before going into a discussion of Chinese views on Japanese militarism, it is useful to contrast a carefully selected "mainstream" American view of Japanese strategic policies with the Chinese "mainstream" view.⁽³¹³⁾ There is no more respected American specialist on Japan than the late Edwin Reischauer, who served as President John F. Kennedy's Ambassador to Japan after more than two decades at Harvard University, where he trained a generation of American scholars in Japanese studies. He is the co-author with John K. Fairbank of a college textbook on East Asia used for three decades. In addition to his scholarly writings, Reischauer frequently wrote essays on Japan, including the centerpiece for a Life cover story.⁽³¹⁴⁾ Reischauer saw the American occupation of Japan (1945-50) as "restoring" democracy to a Japan that had already been operating well as a democracy in the 1920s. He wrote that the Japanese are a "populace devoted to the concepts of individual human rights, democracy, and world peace," concluding by stating, "Most important, we have come to share much the same ideals. With such shared ideals, we are inevitable partners."⁽³¹⁵⁾ Reischauer's emphasis on the 1920s is important. In that period, Japan's military spending was low compared to later years, it seemed to have active political parties and a lively parliament, and the role of the military in politics was extremely limited. Japan agreed at the Washington Conference (1921-22) to limit its naval development for a decade. In Reischauer's view, the American occupation purged Japan of the Fascist and military leaders of the 1930s and returned Japan to its roots in democracy and responsible diplomacy of the 1920s. However, this is not the Chinese assessment.

There is a range of debate among China's leading Japan specialists about the direction of Japan's future development.⁽³¹⁶⁾ Almost all see it as inevitable that Japan will seek and assume a greater international political role commensurate with its global economic influence, and that an increase in its military power will accompany this new position. What is debated, however, is the extent to which the country's drive to be a world power and its growing military force will affect its democracy and foreign policy. Will the conservative rightists in Japanese society and politics gain the ascendency and Japan once again head down the "road to militarism?" Chinese analysts question whether Japanese democracy is enduring and stable. One author writes, "Objectively speaking, Japan's becoming a major political nation is the general trend of the times, and no individual's will can change that. The question is, what kind of major political nation will it become? What kind of role will it play?"⁽³¹⁷⁾

In 1995, Liu Jiangyong, chief of Japan studies at CICIR, published a lengthy criticism of Japanese democracy and called into question the extent to which the American occupation influenced the Japanese political system. Its implications for Japanese future policy is as pessimistic as Reischauer's is optimistic.⁽³¹⁸⁾ According to Liu Jiangyong, "Japan's militarism has never been thoroughly exposed and criticized." He acknowledges that the American occupation took "some measures for Japan's demilitarization and democratization, such as disbanding its armed forces, arresting the war criminals, as well as supervising the formulation and adoption of Japan's postwar constitution of peace." However, in Liu's view, the American occupation failed to terminate the century-old force of Japanese militarism. A class-A war criminal was released and became Japan's prime minister in 1957. Troop 731, which had engaged in biological warfare experiments, was exempted from trial. In March 1950, all remaining class-A Japanese war criminals in custody were released, thus "preserving the remnants of Japanese militarism."⁽³¹⁹⁾ More recently, in 1995 "Japan's right-wing forces have collected and published a series of materials in preparation for reversing the verdict." Liu was particularly concerned that Japan's prewar imperial perception of history still has considerable influence. This theory first appeared in a message of the Meiji emperor, when the government claimed, "The emperor is the supreme deity who has been Japan's ruler ever since the birth of the universe." Liu writes that the myth was "derived from Japan's earliest fairy tale, Kojiki." Today, Japanese "right wingers" are still "deeply immersed in the imperial perception of history and now want to amend Japan's constitution to restore the old imperial system." One year in the nineties, nine out of twenty members of the Japanese cabinet then in power payed homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, which was established in 1979 and used for "spiritual mobilization for further aggressive expansion in China."⁽³²⁰⁾

Liu writes that because Japan has become "an economic power, it is now moving toward becoming a great military power." He sees "a contempt for Asia" in past and present Japanese policies. The scholar who originated many of these Japanese concepts, Yukichi Fukuzawa, even defined the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894-95 as a "war between civilization and barbarism," in which Japan found itself with a sense of superiority against a "barbarian" China. Liu argues that Japan's "sense of superiority" has again "gained ground" and is "daily expanding." Liu lays emphasis on the 1995 effort by the Japanese prime minister to pass a resolution in parliament in symbolic opposition to war and aggression. Nearly 40 percent of the membership of the parliament opposed passage of the resolution, and two associations collected more than five million signatures, 4 percent of Japan's population, to oppose it. Liu notes the significance of the Diet members who voted against the resolution, including a number of "second-generation heredity Diet members" who are "influenced by their fathers in their perception of war."

Liu is also concerned that Japanese right-wing organizations, 237 of which were disbanded in 1945, have made a comeback since the mid-1990s and now number 1,900. Some have "propaganda vans on the streets of Tokyo shouting slogans to sing praises of the holy war for greater East Asia." Some of these organizations have collectively published the book, Listen! Japan's Innocent Cry, which is aimed at blocking any further investigation into the Emperor's responsibility for the war. Liu contrasts Japan's attitude with the anti-Nazi legislation of Germany, a law passed in 1994 that sentences to 5 years in prison anyone who denies the truth of the Holocaust. He writes, "People cannot help thinking that Japan has legally retained the freedom for the right-wing forces to reverse the verdict on Japan's history of aggression."⁽³²¹⁾

Liu is not alone in his analysis of Japan; other scholars point to similar issues in their assessments. For example, a Research Fellow at CIISS, also is alarmed by the Japanese cabinet members who visited the Yasukuni Shrine and "have been increasingly spreading fallacies denying Japan's history of militarist aggression." The author goes on to state,

The release in Japan in May 1998 of "Pride, The Fatal Moment," a movie eulogizing one of the great advocates of the Co-prosperity Sphere and a Japanese class-A war criminal, Hideko Tojo, drew numerous attacks in China for "boisterously glorifying" Tojo and the "Japanese evil war of aggression" and was cited as an example of the continued existence and pervasiveness of militarism. "The making of this reactionary movie is not something accidental. It reflects the continuing existence of militarist thinking in Japan. The ideas expressed in it are not anything new, but belong to the same category promoted by Japan's postwar ultrarightist force. What is worrying after all is that the ultra-rightist force does still have some following in Japan. Otherwise, this reactionary movie would not have been screened for the public."⁽³²³⁾

The adoption of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines by the Japanese parliament and the passage of relevant bills in spring 1999 also raised concerns about the growing strength of the right-wing and militarism. An article in the Liberation Army Daily warns:

Some Chinese authors temper their discussions of Japanese militarism by pointing out that it is only one segment of Japanese society and politics that advocates extreme nationalism, not the general public. For example, Gao Heng of CASS believes that the American occupation did not eradicate militarism in Japan, and worse, because the United States wanted to use Japan to counter the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China during the occupation, "It preserved Japan's entire national machinery and war machinery (although the names were changed)." Today, he writes, "In the Northeast Asian region, the greatest undetermined factor is Japan. Facts make clear that the people who advocate that Japan should restore the militarist line are continuously getting more power." However, Gao believes the general Japanese public does not support the militarists, although he warns, "If Japan's domestic society and the international society lose vigilance, and lack a restricting mechanism, then the possibility that Japan will follow the same disastrous road to militarism still exists."⁽³²⁵⁾ The Deputy Director of the Division for East Asian Studies at CICIR, Yang Bojiang, even believes that currently the political trend of militarism is on the decline in Japan. "Generally speaking, the influence of the conservative hard liners, who are pursuing a domestic policy of cooperating with conservatives and a foreign policy of carrying out extreme nationalism toward the Japanese politics is decreasing." However, he also cautions, "Taking the Japanese diplomatic environment into account, in the next 5 to 7 years, if the political and economic development is not smooth, the nationalism is likely to continuously rise. For example, some Japanese will possibly spread extreme views regarding its historical act of aggression, some will even raise the question of revising the Constitution."⁽³²⁶⁾

Lu Guangye, a fellow at the Chinese National Defense Strategic Institute, argues that a revival of militarism is not inevitable in Japan, because not only are the Japanese people opposed to it, but it runs counter to the main trend of peace and development in the world today: "The main current in the world today . . . is peace and development, and the cries of the people of the whole world in demanding justice and equality and the establishment of a new international political and economic order cannot be blocked. The Japanese people dearly love peace and will absolutely not permit the country to again march into the abyss of war."⁽³²⁷⁾

The prospects of future Japanese militarism are worrisome for the Chinese because of the role Japan may try to play in the Asia-Pacific. Japan is viewed as breaking free of its links to the West and shifting its focus to Asia. One author writes, "A historical issue that has confronted Japan ever since the Meiji Restoration is this: should Japan exist as part of Asia or part of the United States and Europe?" He suggests that for the "third time Japan has changed its national direction." The author continues to say that recently Japan has decided to become more involved with Asian economic affairs, and "this strategic shift naturally has attracted profound concern in nations around the world, particularly its neighbors in Asia."⁽³²⁸⁾ Therefore, the issue for Chinese analysts becomes how will Japan act with regard to its new focus. An article by four CICIR analysts states, "Japan is now on the third historical turning point since the Meiji Restoration. A debate is well under way in the country on whether Japan should grow into a 'peaceful country which emphasizes making contributions to the world' or 'a mini superpower with a military role to play.' "⁽³²⁹⁾

Of even greater concern to the Chinese is how Japan may view China and Chinese national interests as it strives to become a major political and military power and, particularly, how will it react to the rise of China. The Vice President of CICIR, Lu Zhongwei, points out, "In Asia's diplomatic history, there has never been such a precedent as the coexistence of a strong China and a strong Japan."⁽³³⁰⁾ Cooperation between the two powers is not considered to be a likely option, he argues, because of the "two T's (Taiwan and the security treaty between the U.S. and Japan)," and because China considers itself to be in an unfavorable position in the Sino-U.S.-Japan trilateral relationship. Several Chinese authors mention that in recent years Japanese politicians have stated that Sino-Japanese relations are equally as important to Japan as U.S.-Japanese relations. However, Lu writes that despite these assurances, "It would be very hard for Japan to manage deftly to put the two relationships on an equal footing when it has to make a strategic decision."⁽³³¹⁾ Other authors argue that Japan sees the relationships as being of equal importance, only because, in its efforts to become a power, it intends to take advantage of China's strength and international standing, while at the same time working to contain China and intervene in its development and affairs:

Additionally, there are the dual concerns that "some elements in Japan also intend to utilize the United States to restrain China" and that the United States wants to use Japan for the same end.⁽³³³⁾ At AMS, the director of the foreign military studies department, a Japan specialist, has described the history of Japanese militarism and its consequences for Japan's future military role in Asia. He and others worry that "Attempts by the United States to restore its hegemony by playing China and Japan against each other will be dangerous. The United States may try to encourage differences among the Western Pacific countries."⁽³³⁴⁾

When asked by outsiders about the prospects for Chinese cooperation with Japan on security issues in the future, the typical Chinese answer generally includes a discussion of the problem of Japanese latent militarism and the growing strength of the "right wing" in Japan. In balance of power terms, it would be in China's interest to avoid a rivalry with Japan that could be exploited by other powers. As East Asia's two great powers, China and Japan could reap benefits from cooperation to prevent Asian instability; it is thus interesting that Chinese perceptions of several Japanese initiatives in the 1990s have been negative. The Chinese believe the initiative of Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1992-93 brought to an end the postwar doctrine of Prime Minister Yoshida, who advocated that Japan concentrate on economic development at home and investment in Asia, while relying on the U.S. security umbrella, with Japan's own defense concentrating solely on the home islands. The so-called Miyazawa doctrine to form a regional forum to discuss Asian security issues modeled on the Conference On Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was criticized by Chinese authors as a thinly veiled effort to contain China. When Japan then supported American efforts in Iraq and passed the Peace Keeping Operations Law, which authorized Japanese forces in U.N. missions for 1 year, Chinese analysts described this as yet another step in the return to militarism in Japan.

When Japan's Self-Defense Forces participated in the U.N. mission in Cambodia, Beijing objected even though Japan sent only unarmed engineers. Beijing seems divided between those who wished to discourage Japan's military buildup and believe it may be underway, and the more pessimistic view that Japan's militarization is inevitable and can only be postponed at best.⁽³³⁵⁾

China's national security research organizations seem united in the view that in the future Japan will play an independent role as a major military power.⁽³³⁶⁾ This is in sharp contrast with most American views of Japan. Richard Nixon, for example, raised the prospect of a Chinese-Japanese quasi-alliance that could dominate East Asia economically and militarily.⁽³³⁷⁾ According to some calculations, the arithmetic combination of the Japanese and Chinese gross national products in the year 2020 would surpass the GNP of the United States. In China, this concept of a China-Japan alliance seems absurd.

One Chinese journal claimed that the United States had itself begun to become wary about Japan's longer term military ambitions, including the possible event of "Japan taking the road of a military power."⁽³³⁸⁾ The article stressed that the United States had tried but perhaps failed "to control Japan (and to make) Japan its important strategic partner forever." A kind of Marxist economic concept was used to explain that "the present Japan-United States economic frictions have not reached the stage of endangering the strategic cooperation between both sides." In other words, an increase in Japanese-American economic friction beyond a certain threshold may well lead to Japan becoming an independent military power. Nevertheless, The New York Times reported that a Chinese official revealed that the Chinese military has asked for additional defense spending in the 5-year plan to deal with Japanese military capabilities.⁽³³⁹⁾ In November 1995, China called for the closing of American bases in Okinawa and called into question the need for a U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty in the post-Cold War environment.

Against this backdrop, the recent revisions of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines have proved especially worrisome for China, because the scope of the alliance was expanded in ways that China felt directly threatened its national interests. One author writes, "Last April, the United States and Japan signed a joint declaration on security guarantees to strengthen their military cooperation. This was aimed at preventing China from rising, getting stronger, and positing a challenge to the United States."⁽³⁴⁰⁾ In the Study Reports on the International Situation-1997-1998, a yearly compilation of the views of authors from a variety of institutes published by the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management, Liu Jiangyong of CICIR points out that the Defense Institute of the Japanese Defense Agency has issued a report, "Long-Term Forecast for Japan's Security at the End of 1996." This report asserts, "By 2015 it is almost certain that China will become a great power economically, militarily, and politically. At any time it will constitute a threat to Japanese navigation passage from the Malacca Strait to the Bashi Channel. The South China Sea will become a Chinese sea." According to Liu, "obviously in revising the defense guidelines with the United States the purpose of Japan and America is to strengthen the strategic deterrence against China . . . China becomes a so-called imaginary enemy under the Japanese-American Security Treaty."⁽³⁴¹⁾

One of the chief causes for Chinese concern is that the new agreement indicates, both in terms of geographic coverage and time of action, that the United States and Japan plan to involve themselves in China's affairs. First, the wording referring to the geographic area encompassed by the guidelines changed from the "Far East" to "Japan's surrounding areas," which means that not only is Taiwan included, but the Nansha Islands as well. Second, the time of joint Japan-U.S. military operations is no longer limited to an attack on Japan, but now includes both peacetime and contingencies in the "surrounding areas." Many Chinese analysts were particularly angered by the comments of Japanese officials on the subject. Zhang Changtai of CIISS stated, "Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Siroku Kajiyama openly declared that 'Japan's surrounding areas should naturally include the Taiwan Strait' and that 'Japan will not sit idle if the U.S. troops set out for the Taiwan issue,' thus exposing clearly their intents of interfering in China's internal affairs by means of the new guidelines."⁽³⁴²⁾

At present, China is most concerned about a possible Japanese manipulative role in Taiwan politics, possibly encouraging Taiwan to move toward independence and a close relationship with Japan. Zbigniew Brzezinski has revealed in his memoirs that China insisted on a promise from the United States that it would prevent Japan from forming a defense relationship with Taiwan.

Another extremely troublesome aspect of the new U.S.-Japan security guidelines for the Chinese is that Japan's military functions in the alliance have been broadened. Its activities are no longer solely confined to defending its own territories, but include providing the United States with logistic support. According to the Deputy Director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at CASS, "During the Cold War, . . . Japan played the role of a 'shield' and America that of a 'spear.' The new strategic assignment the Joint Declaration has allotted to Japan is through providing logistic support, to play a corresponding military role in preventing disputes in the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, the role of Japan has changed from a 'shield' in the past to one of an auxiliary 'spear.' "⁽³⁴³⁾ The Chinese fear is that Japan's expanded role and functions will further fuel the development of militarism and the growth of the Right. A Research Fellow at CIISS writes that there is a direct connection between U.S.-Japan security cooperation and the efforts of some Japanese to put their country back on the road to militarism:

Similarly, CICIR's Liu Jiangyong writes that if America and Japan actually implement the Security Treaty, "it will lead to political turmoil in Japan." ⁽³⁴⁵⁾

Following NATO military strikes in Yugoslavia and the Japanese parliament's adoption of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines in the spring of 1999, Chinese authors expressed even graver concerns about the U.S.-Japanese military relationship. "This NATO of the Asian version has brazenly included the 'emergencies in areas surrounding Japan,' including China, into the sphere of its military intervention and attempted to include China's Taiwan into its 'theater missile defense system,' thus sowing the seed of trouble for the future peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region."⁽³⁴⁶⁾ Lu Guangye, a fellow at the Chinese National Defense Strategic Institute, went so far as to warn:

At the "high end" of alarm about Japan's future intentions and capabilities toward China, one must count He Xin, perhaps China's best known hypernationalist author and an advisor to then Premier Li Peng. In a article written at the end of 1988, He Xin predicted that Japan's predatory need for resources would cause it try to "colonize" China. The only hope for China's survival would be comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union.⁽³⁴⁸⁾ He Xin forecast the following:

The discussion of future Japanese militarism sets the foundation for Chinese authors to analyze the country's military planning. Several authors point to Japan's growing defense budget as being indicative of efforts to become a military power: "It is . . . still increasing its military budget, which is already the second largest in the world."⁽³⁴⁹⁾ Further, "Japan's defense expenditure has been increasing since 1991, though its economic growth is constantly declining."⁽³⁵⁰⁾ Chinese analysts argue that the level and extent of Japan's military development reveal that it is moving beyond self-defense, to overseas operations and potential military expansionism. Liu Jiangyong of CICIR writes,

An immediate problem for China is the Japanese development of an antiballistic missile defense system in cooperation with the United States. Detailed Chinese commentary has also emphasized Japanese plans to acquire additional military airlift, aerial refueling, long-range antishipping fighter aircraft (the FSX), and other military acquisition plans as clear evidence of Japan's gradual transition over the coming decade into a major military power, including the Japanese goal of acquiring nuclear weapons and two aircraft carriers within two decades.⁽³⁵²⁾ Chinese analysts claim that Japan already has transport ships that "have the functions of an air-craft carrier" and are able to carry helicopters and vertical-flight jet fighters.⁽³⁵³⁾

Chinese authors also point out how being "militarily strong in technology" will put Japan in a beneficial position in developing the RMA.⁽³⁵⁴⁾ For example, a Research Fellow at CIISS, which is sponsored by military intelligence, writes, "Japan is unwilling to lag behind the tide of the new military revolution. Using every opportunity, Japan has not only changed its practice of 'building the country through scientific and technological copying' to 'building the country through scientific and technological creativity,' but also put the emphasis of military reform on enhancing the five capabilities, i.e., the capabilities of intelligence, sea lane defense, island defense, theater missile defense, and long-distance transportation."⁽³⁵⁵⁾ Even on the issue of nuclear weapons, some analysts predict that in the future, Japan will, like India, become a nuclear power:

Chinese assessments of India's future development and international role frequently stress its dangerous military potential and the instability of Indian democracy. For many years, Chinese analysts have been attuned to the prospects of intense rivalry with India, another great ancient empire. In spite of a well-publicized agreement in September 1993 on confidence-building measures regarding their disputed territory, they recently have become concerned that there are countervailing manifestations of Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry. They include Chinese M-11 missile component sales to Pakistan in response to concern about Indian nuclear and missile development; Chinese irritation about India's tacit support for Tibetan independence; Indian allegations about a disruptive Chinese role in the Kashmir dispute; and China's efforts to sell weapons to India's neighbors.⁽³⁵⁷⁾ After May 1999, PLA authors such as Peng Guangqian of AMS warned that the United States will exploit India to contain China, adding another kind of "danger" from India. Writings from 25 Chinese authors are reviewed in the following section.

There is some debate among Chinese analysts about the position and role of India in the 21st century. As discussed in chapter one, orthodox and reform views differ over whether or not Third World nations will rise in strength to occupy a significant position in the future multipolar world. Orthodox authors predict that today's developing nations will be crucial in transforming world politics, while reformists do not foresee that they will develop enough power to exert a major influence and compete with the five poles. India, as one of the major Third World nations, is at the center of this debate. At one end of the spectrum, Zhang Changtai, a Research Fellow at CIISS, writes, "Besides the five major powers, India is also a major power with great potential for development so far as population and territorial size and regional influence are concerned. It is expected that India will become a newly rising force not to be neglected in the upcoming structure of the Asia-Pacific."⁽³⁵⁸⁾ Chen Qimao, former president of SIIS, believes that India's power "will greatly increase, but until the early 21st century (before 2010) there is no prospect for . . . [it] to become one of the world's poles."⁽³⁵⁹⁾ On the other side of the debate is the view that India is too weak to contend in the future world structure. "After 50 years of development . . . India has not extricated itself from its status as a poor country, and its average output per capita is far down in world rankings. India has been demanding for a long time to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and to achieve an international status commensurate with having the second highest population in the world. In fact, however, India's international status has been continually declining in recent years."⁽³⁶⁰⁾ This debate about India will be echoed in chapter five, where orthodox and reform quantitative assessments of India's CNP predict very different placements for India in the hierarchy of the world's future major powers.

In general, when assessing India and its power, Chinese analysts emphasize that the country's development has both positive and negative factors. Ye Zhengjia of CIIS writes, "India is a very complex developing major nation, it has a dual nature in multiple areas. India has tremendous potential, and faces numerous grim challenges."⁽³⁶¹⁾ For example, in terms of India's economic development, Chinese assessments tend to discuss both that India has made great strides and that it still has a long way to go. Hua Biyun of CICIR, while noting that India's reforms "have attained spectacular results," and predicting continued accomplishments, also lists numerous "restricting factors" that will hinder rapid success:⁽³⁶²⁾

When discussing the influence of India's economic development on China, Hua predicts that although "as a parallel rising market, India becomes China's main competitor in international funds, technology and commodity markets," theirs is "not a life or death relationship," because China's economy is stronger. "India's influence in Asia and the Indian Ocean will expand. From now until 2010, its economic development speed is predicted to be 6 to 8 percent, while China's will be above 8 percent. The two countries' development levels will grow further apart . . . therefore, India cannot become 'China's replacement market,' although its influence is rising."⁽³⁶⁴⁾

China's research on India's future also focuses on the range of divergent factors affecting stability in Indian politics and government. One Chinese concern has been the role played in Indian politics by religious extremist organizations, and the extent to which they will influence the orientation of Indian domestic and foreign policies.⁽³⁶⁵⁾ One important article stresses that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) may take over India and turn it toward intense, Hindu chauvinistic policies.⁽³⁶⁶⁾ The rise of nationalism is another point of concern for Chinese analysts, because the BJP drew on Indian nationalism to gain support for the nuclear tests, and the government may draw on it again to boost its efforts to attain regional hegemony. One analyst asserts, "Great power ambitions form a strong contrast with the decline of real international status, and this is an important reason for the continual rise of nationalism in India in recent years. . . . The BJP, which rode this whirlwind of nationalism to take power, has seized the opportunity brought by the nuclear tests to play the 'people's will' card to the outside world and the 'interests of national security card' for domestic consumption, and has used international pressure to further fan nationalist emotions."⁽³⁶⁷⁾

Political instability in general is predicted for India. "In the future a multi-party alliance government is very possible, representing different classes and interests, but India's historical experiences have proved that this type of government often is short lived. A turbulent situation could once again emerge in India. In addition, religious, ethnic, and sex contradictions are very complex, making it difficult for the country to maintain long term stability."⁽³⁶⁸⁾

One area where Chinese authors assess India as having significant power is in military affairs. For example, Hua Biyun asserts, "India's military strength is number four in the world."⁽³⁶⁹⁾ Two CICIR analysts write, "During the past few decades, India has enhanced its military strength and rapidly developed its national defense industry." They explain that India's stress on the development of science and technology has been a key factor in developing its military power. "India currently has 3 million scientists and technicians, following only the United States and Russia, to be third in the world. These science and technology troops are India's precious 'intelligence resource,' and play a decisive role in national defense studies and war production." They predict that India's military power will continue to grow in the future:

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean has caused India to focus on naval development, and many analysts stress India's powerful Navy in their discussions of the country's military capabilities. "In order to attain its strategic objective of seeking regional hegemony and exercising control over the Indian Ocean, India has focused attention on strengthening its navy. India's Navy now ranks 7th in the world and it is one of a small number of countries in the world, and the only one in South Asia, to possess aircraft carriers." ⁽³⁷¹⁾ An article written following India's nuclear tests in 1998, stated, "The Indian Navy is the strongest one in the South Asian subcontinent, being charged with the missions of 'countering' the Pakistan Navy and controlling the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea on the east and west wings of the Indian peninsula, and, when conditions permit, deterring the superpowers within Indian sea space." It details India's future development plan as forming:

As the Chinese see it, India's prospects seem to depend on the chances for resolution of its conflicts with Pakistan and its ultimate ambitions. Chinese authors urge caution, specifically recommending against China becoming a mediator between India and Pakistan. For example, Sheng Huipeng, a professor at Beijing University, argues that two of the "important purposes of India's nuclear policy are . . . to counter what it considered a possible nuclear threat from China; and . . . to use its status as a nuclear power to become a permanent member state of the U.N. Security Council."⁽³⁷³⁾ Sheng is more generous toward Pakistan, which he says maintains its nuclear program because

A new assessment of the Indian-Pakistan dispute in Kashmir comes from an article in the Liberation Army Daily, which "sees a U.S. conspiracy" in the conflict, and believes, "Fighting between India and Pakistan over Kashmir would benefit the United States regardless of the outcome." The editorial by Ding Zengyi depicted "the United States as 'sitting on a hill watching the tigers fight,' waiting to reap the benefits of their conflict." The current U.S. "South Asia strategy is to control India and Pakistan, maintain the balance of power in South Asia and use India to contain China." The article concluded that "In the present India-Pakistan armed clash over Kashmir, it would be hard to avoid a scenario where both parties are losers again. . . . This would result in a weakened Pakistan and a limited India for the United States. . . . As long as the exchange of fire between India and Pakistan does not turn into a nuclear war, it would benefit the United States' South Asia strategic scheme."⁽³⁷⁶⁾

China's analysts are clearly worried about either India or Japan becoming part of a future balance of power system in Asia that may emerge in response to a common perceived threat from China. They would have sufficient economic and military strength to join the United States to form a balance of power system. Forming such an anti-China coalition seems an unlikely possibility to Western analysts. At present, some idea of the pressure threshold required to drive together Asian nations can be observed in the failure of the ASEAN member nations to achieve any multinational security cooperation. In the decades ahead, an Asian multinational security coalition to deter China would have to include several larger powers, roughly equivalent to Chinese economic and military capacity. Using the CNP scores of Chinese analysts, for example, it could be calculated that Japan, Russia, and India would be needed to balance China. Rapid growth rates for Russia and India, however, may bring these two Asian nations into the same league as China and Japan. They would then be available as strong partners in a coalition in Asia, rather than weak states that would tend to ally themselves with the threatening power or seek isolation and neutrality. Because of their potential to affect the Asia balance of power, the quality of economic decisionmaking in New Delhi and Moscow in the near term will determine whether these powers will have the capability to form coalitions, let alone the intention to do so. Some Chinese authors have considered this possibility.

Chinese authors debate whether the historical origins of India's rivalry with China can ever be resolved, or must inevitably remain a source of military conflict. On the optimistic side of this debate, some authors imply that this historical issue can be overcome and no longer be a barrier to improving future Sino-Indian relations. On the pessimistic side, however, far more authors emphasize the depth of Indian hostility. Even the optimists use the word "dangerous" to warn of the consequences if India does not revisit the past and see it the "right" way. For example, Ye Zhengjia, a Senior Research Fellow at CIIS, stated in an interview with the Indian magazine Frontline, "My personal view is that it is a precondition [for the development of Sino-Indian relations] to see the right situation in 1962," that the two sides "can not go forward smoothly without clarifying all the facts." He explains, "Because the Indian side did not see the facts right in 1962, from a wrong notion, India and China came to conflict. The BJP government wants to force a boundary settlement on China on its terms. As a scholar, I would like to warn that if we do not take this boundary question on the right track, it could turn out to be dangerous." Another problem with historical roots discussed by Ye involves Tibet. He criticizes Prime Minister Nehru's reluctance "to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet," and states that today,

At the height of the polemics in 1962, after China had attacked Indian frontier posts (claiming self-defense), the Chinese Government provided its opinion of why India had expansionist ambitions. The Chinese view of Indian motives was that Indian leaders had interbred with their British colonial occupiers, thereby absorbing "British imperialism" and leading to "a blood relationship" with the British.⁽³⁷⁸⁾ China also implied that India's reliance on Western aid meant that India had been "bought" by the West. Finally, China quoted this sentence from Prime Minister Nehru's Autobiography to show his imperialist expansionist ambitions: "Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there."

China claimed that this statement shows that the "goal pursued by this ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India's history." A small national state "can only be a vassal in Nehru's great empire." Nehru was not alone in his ambition, China stated, for the Indian middle classes "took over from British imperialism this concept of India as the center of Asia" and "this has led to Nehru's idea of a great Indian empire. . . . India is the only country in Asia that has a protectorate."⁽³⁷⁹⁾

It might be imagined that China's rivalry with India may also be based on other historical factors, like the challenge of Buddhism to Chinese core beliefs, jealousy about the achievements of India's ancient empire, or India's large population and territory. There were also more immediate issues in 1962. Premier Zhou Enlai's public letter to Nehru said, "The Indian Government has stepped up its persecution of Chinese nationals in India . . . publicly spread seeds of hatred for the Chinese people."⁽³⁸⁰⁾

Another cause for China's hostility was the claim that India "instigated treason" in Tibet in 1950. While China's security was "seriously threatened by the U.S. aggression in Korea," India "brazenly did what the British imperialists had not dared to do. They forcibly occupied more than 90,000 square kilometers of China's territory." In 1959, "the fourth day after" Tibet started its rebellion in March, Nehru wrote to Zhou Enlai repeating the demand for 90,000 square kilometers and adding a claim for another 33,000 in the west, making the total area claimed three times as large as Holland.

China responded testily to Indian charges that China is an expansionist power, stating, "It is true that historically China had been powerful and had invaded other countries, but that occurred under the rule of the feudal landlord class."⁽³⁸¹⁾ Nehru's statements were "utterly outrageous" and "preposterous" and formed a slander campaign from 1959 to 1962, when Nehru made more than 300 speeches using "the most malicious language vilifying China," such as saying that China is "trying to flaunt her strength in a crude and violent way . . . to keep a foot on our chest." Nehru is "slandering China noisily" on the boundary question and "he has also tried in the most despicable sinister way to sow dissension between China and other countries."⁽³⁸²⁾

Particularly galling for China was this statement by Nehru: "A strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout history this has been the case. . . . Even if we were 100 percent friendly with them, the fact remains that here is a mighty power sitting on our borders. That in itself changes the whole context, the whole picture. . . . The continuous failure of harvest has created an explosive situation." China replied that Chinese population pressure is less than in India, China's per square kilometer population being 67 and India's 148. China asked Nehru, "According to your logic, do you or do you not think that India's huge population is also a menace to other countries?"

A final motive for the activation of the rivalry was India's effort to protect Tibet from China's suppression of the Buddhist monks in the name of social progress. India's actions seemed closely related to the road to Tibet China had built secretly across the disputed territory prior to the 1959 Tibet uprising. India's effort in Tibet to protect Buddhism from a society that had rejected Buddhism was a source of hostile comments by China, especially because India seemed to be cooperating with the American CIA in this supposedly "religious" effort.⁽³⁸³⁾

China and India also had military skirmishes again in 1987. Despite the appearance of improved diplomatic relations, India and China cannot find common ground to settle their border dispute. Behind that dispute, an enduring rivalry exists that has been intensified by India's development of both nuclear weapons and a ballistic missile, which put much of China within range of Indian nuclear warheads.

Following its nuclear tests in May 1998, the Indian Government alleged a China threat--a clear manifestation of the continued influence of the historical rivalries in Sino-Indian relations. A China Daily article stated that Indian leaders "thought spreading the theory of a China threat was very useful. However, since they could not find any factual basis, they wracked their brains to come up with some age-old events in an attempt to confuse public opinion. In a letter to the U.S. President, the [Indian] Prime Minister slung mud at China, saying that China 'launched an armed invasion against India in 1962,' and that India's security environment has 'continued to worsen' for several years. That is to say, India was developing its nuclear weapons because of a China threat."⁽³⁸⁴⁾

Chinese authors reacted strongly to India's new China Threat Theory, blasting the government for creating the theory as an excuse for their nuclear tests, and to keep the BJP in power.⁽³⁸⁵⁾ They were particularly disgusted because it "wrecked in a single day the results of improving relations between these two countries over the past 10 years and more."⁽³⁸⁶⁾ A Liberation Army Daily article stated, "Unexpectedly, just as Sino-Indian relations are improving continually, the Indian authorities have insolently jumped out and raised a hue and cry about the China Threat Theory, openly regarding China as an obstacle to India seeking regional hegemony in an attempt to land China in a difficult position and boost its own morale. If this is not regional hegemonism, what is it then?"⁽³⁸⁷⁾

Yan Xuetong of CICIR expressed concern that India may try to turn the China Threat Theory into reality. "What merits attention is that India's vigorous spread of the China Threat Theory may betoken a new regional danger. For a long time India has repeatedly pushed forward its expansionist policy, threatening its neighboring countries in various ways. In 1962 it even started a large-scale border war against China; it also provided bases in Indian territory for the Dalai clique and encouraged them to engage in activities splitting China. People should wait and see whether the current Indian Government will create new trouble that may lead to a regional danger, to prove to the world a 'China Threat' really exists."⁽³⁸⁸⁾

At the same time India was using the China threat and the 1962 war as its excuse for conducting nuclear tests, Chinese analysts were employing arguments and phrases from the same era to respond to and criticize the tests. They frequently referred to Nehru's ambitions and India's British legacy as the sources of Indian aspirations of hegemony and its related goal of possessing nuclear weapons. For example, an article in the Liberation Army Daily stated, "The desire among some Indians to seek regional hegemony has swollen and they are bent on intimidating others and forcing neighboring countries to "respect" India. . . . Prior to India's independence, Indian Congress Party leader Nehru pointed out in his book, India's Discovery: 'With its current position, India simply cannot play a secondary role in the world. India should either be vigorous or disappear from the scene.' "⁽³⁸⁹⁾

Far from disappearing from the scene, Chinese authors argue that "Through 50 years of efforts, India now boasts a mighty army," and its "military strategic targets" are "to seek hegemony in South Asia, contain China, control the Indian Ocean, and strive to become a military power in the contemporary world." One reason for India's "ambition of scrambling for military hegemony in the region" is that "it believes that since the Indian Ocean was formerly the 'lake of Britain,' it should now be included in the sphere of influence of India."⁽³⁹⁰⁾

Another article also mentions the British legacy in Indian aspirations, but argues that India lacks the real strength to achieve its goals. "In the contemporary era, India has always considered itself to be the 'natural successor to the great British empire.' It is dreaming of becoming a regional big nation and a world power as well. However, it is also a developing country. Of its over 900 million population (1993-1994), 169 million are impoverished, accounting for 19 percent of the total number." Therefore, the article argues, "It can only place its hope on wantonly engaging in military ventures and making a show of force. . . . Its fond dream of regional hegemony is a nightmare to the world!"⁽³⁹¹⁾ According to Chinese analysts, India believed the way to achieve its dreams of regional hegemony was to possess nuclear weapons. A Liberation Army Daily article states, "For a long time, succeeding Indian Governments have viewed nuclear weapons development as an important means to seek great-power status and to dominate South Asia and the Indian Ocean."⁽³⁹²⁾ Wang Chiming of NDU agrees, although he argues that Pakistan's strong foreign ties, rather than India's domestic situation, are the factor hindering hegemony.

China's assessments of Japan and India are similar because both "fit" the analytic premises the Chinese use about nations that have territorial disputes with China, that are capitalist, and that are democratic. India is assessed as a sort of half-scale version of Japan. Chinese authors surveyed in this chapter suggest that Japan:

China's analysts write that India, as a smaller scale version of Japan, also has a militaristic, religion-based strategic culture, seeks to dominate its neighbors, has had covert nuclear ambitions for two decades prior to its nuclear tests in 1998, attempts to foment conflict between China and other nations, and has some areas of military superiority over China, such as its current navy. However, India's economic reforms are judged insufficient to catch up with China and enter the multipolar world as the sixth pole. India's CNP scores for 2010 place it no higher than number nine (AMS) or thirteen (CASS), only about half of China's CNP score in 2010.

china has made highly optimistic forecasts about Russia's prospects for recovery and return to the ranks of the top five powers in the future security environment. Few analysts in the United States share this optimism about Russia's future, nor would Americans agree with the proposal of some nationalistic Chinese authors, like He Xin, that China must form a long-term strategic partnership with Russia in order to balance the rise of a militaristic Japan. One orthodox senior analyst explains that the geopolitical thinking is, "Russia needs to rely on China. Because both the United States and Japan regard Russia as a potential force to reduce their influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and Japan has territorial disputes with Russia, Chinese-Russian cooperation can, to a great extent, resist U.S. and Japanese forces, as well as maintain the power balance in Asia."⁽³⁹⁴⁾

Chinese military estimates of Russian national power by 2010 to 2020 place Russia as the second- or at least the third-ranking country in terms of overall military power. Applying the ancient statecraft of the Warring States, Chinese authors refer to the geopolitical nightmare of a powerful predatory Japan joining with a declining but still powerful America to isolate and contain China. A strong Chinese partnership with a recovering Russia is the preferred countermeasure. This chapter, which introduces the views of 55 Chinese authors on Russia, lists the factors they foresee Russia will face in its future dangerous security environment. In spite of these dangers, they believe Russia also has advantages, such as its potential partnership with China and advanced military concepts and technology, which cause China to assess the Russians as far more likely to exploit successfully the revolution in military affairs (RMA) than the United States. One military author argues that "Russia will use the RMA to maintain its military superiority . . . and is taking aim at America's commanding position in the RMA."⁽³⁹⁵⁾ Another military author states that the Russian General Staff Academy is focusing on the RMA.⁽³⁹⁶⁾ Ancient Chinese statecraft warns that a state needs powerful "partners" to survive in a multipolar environment. China's authors seem to see a rewarding Russian "partnership" in the decades ahead. This chapter also describes Chinese sympathy for the dangers that a weak Russia will face from Japan, Europe, and the United States as these three powers attempt to carve out part of the former Soviet sphere of influence in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

According to interviews with civilian experts, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it took 2 years for Chinese analysts to reach a consensus on the causes and future significance of the Soviet collapse (addressed at the end of this chapter). It is apparent from Chinese articles written since the consensus was reached that China has decided Russia's decline will end and that it will be able to play its assigned role as one of the five poles in the multipolar world foreseen by Deng Xiaoping and Huan Xian in 1986. Indeed, Russia may be aligned with China in the future multipolar world, now that Moscow is somewhat weakened from its Soviet days and has a smaller gross national product (GNP) than China. According to one author, Russia's GNP is fifth in Europe, or "the level of a medium country."⁽³⁹⁷⁾ Additionally, because Russia has forsaken Marxism, Marxist ideology cannot be a source of conflict between the two countries, nor can Russia realistically ever again seek to dominate China.

The new consensus on Russia's promising future contrasts with past debates.⁽³⁹⁸⁾ Since the early days of the Chinese Communist Party, even before Mao was Chairman, party leaders have debated the nature of the Soviet Union. The subject of Soviet communism and the Russian nation may be the most controversial among Chinese strategists. From alliance with the Soviets in the 1950s, to estrangement and then border clashes in the 1960s, Moscow has proved "hard to understand," in the words of one People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer interviewed for this study.

In spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese analysts "officially" continue to portray the future role of Russia as one of the five equal "poles" (along with China, Japan, Europe, and the United States) that will shape the future world balance of power. Nevertheless, a few years ago, China's analysts saw Russia's immediate future as uncertain.⁽³⁹⁹⁾ At least four scenarios were mentioned, although none of them would upset the "inevitable" trend toward a five-power multipolar structure laid down by Deng Xiaoping:

By 1995, Chinese writings about Russia became more optimistic.⁽⁴⁰¹⁾ Chinese military authors envisioned Russia increasing its military power in future decades by exploiting the RMA ahead of other nations. In any event, Chinese authors deny that the collapse of the Soviet Union caused future trends in world politics to "break" or be "transformed."⁽⁴⁰²⁾ They asserted China had anticipated the end of the bipolar world as early as 1986, 5 years before the Soviet collapse.

Although there is a general consensus among Chinese authors about Russia's position as a pole in the future multipolar world, Chinese analysts suggest there are dangers to Russia in the decades ahead:

Chinese authors recognize that Russia will continue to have economic, political, and social turbulence in the short term but do not foresee these problems preventing Russia from assuming its position as a pole in the future multipolar world. Although its influence has weakened and it no longer is a superpower, Chinese analysts emphasize that Russia remains a major nation with extensive military strength. While today's crises have contributed to a decline in Russia's CNP, in the long run they forecast that its domestic difficulties will gradually be overcome.

At present, however, the Chinese view Russia as a factor of instability during the period of transition to a multipolar world. When assessing the overall situation in the Asia-Pacific, Zhang Changtai, a Research Fellow at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), writes:

Chinese analysts also see economic problems precluding stability in Russia's current development and do not believe the economy will recover quickly.⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾ A Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) analyst estimates, "In the short term it will be difficult for the Russian Federation's economic situation to take a turn for the better, economic recovery will necessitate a very long period of time . . . by the year 2005 it will be able to break even with the economy in 1990. The necessary time for Russia to build a comparatively complete and developed market economy will probably be even longer."⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾

A study of Russia's current and future development by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) provides a representative orthodox view of Russia's overall near-term prospects. It both acknowledges serious problems and predicts a trend of inevitable gradual recovery and restoration. Stating that "for many years Russian society has accumulated a huge number of complex contradictions and problems," the study lists some of the most critical issues it is currently facing:

According to the study, the combination of the above problems "makes it very difficult for people to make an optimistic appraisal of Russia's political situation and the entire country's situation at the end of the century."⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾ However, at least with regard to Russia's economic prospects, CICIR is more positive and puts forward a timetable predicting future development and reconstruction. It forecasts that 1997-98 will be "the true turning point for Russia's economy," 1999-2005 will bring "stable recovery," and after 2005, Russia will see "sustained growth."⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾ This growth will permit gradual progress in attaining strategic goals to "restore its position as a great nation," to "contain regional separatism," and to prevent "external forces" from penetrating Russia's sphere of influence.⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾

What Chinese analysts emphasize is that despite Russia's current and short-term difficulties, the "framework" of its former power and status still exists, and the country has definite potential for future development. The CICIR study concludes, "Currently, Russia's domestic political and economic relations still are not smooth and the restoration of its Comprehensive National Power still requires time. However, the framework of Russia as a major nation and the factors of its actual strength have not disappeared; in particular, Russia possesses a huge nuclear weapons arsenal and armed forces that can not be belittled."⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ Similarly, Chen Qimao, former president of SIIS, writes, "In the short term it will be difficult for Russia to revive, but its potential cannot be underestimated. . . . From the long-term view, Russia will gradually recover and develop, and although it can not again become a superpower, it still will be a global power."⁽⁴¹¹⁾ Yu Sui, of the Central Committee International Liaison Department, sums up Chinese analysts greater optimism about Russia's mid- to long-term prospects, saying, "We would rather assess that Russia will rejuvenate at an earlier date and at a quicker pace."⁽⁴¹²⁾

Not only do Chinese analysts predict continued domestic problems during Russia's path to establishing its position as one of the five poles of the future multipolar world, but they also examine the numerous threats to its external security environment. One author writes,

In general, most Chinese analysts focus on the United States and NATO as being the biggest challenges currently endangering Russia's security environment. In fact, some have blamed the West for contributing to Russia's continued domestic problems. For example, several authors assert that one of the reasons that Russia has not recovered more rapidly is "the stingy financial assistance provided by the Western powers."⁽⁴¹⁴⁾ The insufficient aid is explained by Chinese authors as the West's desire to keep Russia weak, so that it will not grow and once again be a challenge to America and NATO. "The United States and other Western countries . . . (have) continued their Cold War mentality, trying to take advantage of Russia's current political, economic and military weakness to pursue a policy of containment in order to weaken, westernize and split Russia and prevent it from restoring its position as a big power."⁽⁴¹⁵⁾

However, Chinese analysts note that the West wants Russia to be "weak but not chaotic," and therefore must temper its efforts to inhibit the country's power.⁽⁴¹⁶⁾ Xue Gang, a Research Fellow at CIISS, explains, "The present U.S. attitude toward Russia is like this: on the one hand it continues to assist and support the present government in Moscow in order to stabilize the situation in Russia, but on the other, it attempts to prevent Russia from becoming truly powerful so that Russia will not become a threat to it again in the future."⁽⁴¹⁷⁾

The main thrust of the West's "policy of precaution, containment, and enfeeblement" toward Russia is through the NATO eastward expansion.⁽⁴¹⁸⁾ Feng Yujun of CICIR writes, "There are three objectives for the West to extend eastward: to fill up the security vacancy in Eastern and Central Europe so as to consolidate its victory won in the Cold War; to give an impetus to Westernization of the former Warsaw Pact nations so as to 'enlarge the community of democratic countries' and to complete strategic encirclement of Russia so as to prevent Russia from staging a comeback."⁽⁴¹⁹⁾ Consequently, Chinese analysts assert, "It is not a simple policy regression for the Russians to redefine NATO as its chief threat. It is an inevitable result of the fierce strategic collision between Russia and the Western powers to protect their respective strategic interests. . . . Containing NATO expansion naturally becomes a major goal of Russian military strategy."⁽⁴²⁰⁾ However, the Chinese forecast that the prospects for Russia's ability to prevent the eastward expansion are dim. A CICIR analyst, discussing how Russia was already forced to accept that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will join NATO, writes, "Confronted with such a powerful offensive, Moscow has evidently soft-pedaled its resistance. Acutely aware of the latent threats to its security, yet unable to reverse the trends, Moscow had no alternative other than swallowing the bitter pill."⁽⁴²¹⁾ Some analysts do not foresee that Russia will do much better at thwarting new Western aggression in the near term either: "Short of an evident increase in economic and military strength in the near future, Russia will still be in a passive position before the NATO eastward expansion."⁽⁴²²⁾

Chinese authors often seem genuinely worried and even sympathetic to the hostile security environment in which a weakened Russia will find itself for decades ahead until its comprehensive power is rebuilt. For example, Russia's current weakness in the face of NATO seems exaggerated in this statement:

Chinese analysts suggest that the real threat to Russia's security would occur if NATO decided to infiltrate the nations of the former Soviet Union, incorporating the Baltic states and Central Asian nations into its sphere of influence. They assert that such a move is part of the final NATO aim to completely encircle Russia and that the United States and Western European nations have already begun to lay the foundation for the ultimate stages of the eastward expansion. At present, they claim the West is penetrating the region through economic and military means. "The United States has decided to play a more active role in the ethnic and local conflicts in the region, and has refused to let Russia have special peacekeeping privileges in the region."⁽⁴²⁴⁾

A Senior Research Fellow at CIISS, Wang Naicheng, even argues that if NATO did eventually incorporate this area, such a development could mean the end of Russia's hope to becoming a pole in the future multipolar world. "Further NATO expansion to the Baltic nations, Ukraine, and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries will make Russia's space for strategic survival contract to the maximum. This would be no less than to strike at the root of Russia, for she might finally lose the important base upon which she could be an independent pole in the world." However, Wang asserts that Russia is doing its utmost to prevent this worst case scenario. "With the first line of defense in Central-Eastern Europe broken through, Russia is exerting every effort to build and entrench on the second line, tolerating no entry into the 'forbidden zone.' "⁽⁴²⁵⁾

Two articles written in 1998 foresee the three Baltic Nations--Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia-- becoming the next in line to fall into NATO clutches, citing the signing of the "U.S.-Baltic Charter of Partnership" in January and the first meeting of the Partnership Committee in July as preliminary steps. A People's Daily article asserts, "The formal launching of NATO eastward expansion shows that East Europe is being drawn into the west European sphere of influence and will not longer be under Russian control. Against this background, the United States has decided to push on in the flush of victory and regards the countries of the former Soviet Union as the next targets in expanding its influence." According to the article, the three Baltic states are the natural choices of NATO because they "were the first to break away from the Soviet Union and have never joined the CIS." Additionally, they have already tried to "fuse into Europe" in an effort to maintain their independence from Russian control.⁽⁴²⁶⁾

Other analysts see the Central Asian nations as the main countries targeted by the West. A CICIR study holds that "Western nations, with the United States at the head, have stood in the way of the CIS integration process, particularly toward Ukraine, and have actively carried out efforts to divide and disintegrate." U.S. invitations to Ukraine and Uzbekistan to join NATO are extremely dangerous to Russia's security interests, for Uzbekistan is considered to be an "important strategic partner" by the West, and in 1996, the Ukrainian Minister of National Defense expressed that at a necessary time, Ukraine "would not eliminate the possibility of entering NATO."⁽⁴²⁷⁾ Additionally, Ukraine and a few Central Asian countries have signed "Peace Partnership Relationship" documents with NATO. One article asserts that it is through these Peace Partnerships that the United States will be able to increase its infiltration of the region, "on the pretext of 'mediating' regional conflicts, and, in the name of 'maintaining peace', dispatching U.S. and Western military forces to weaken and push out Russia's forces in this region." It concludes, "In essence it is a repeat of the 19th century 'fierce rivalry' among the great powers for Central Asia, and a way to turn Central Asian countries into the United States 'chess pieces.' "⁽⁴²⁸⁾

The future U.S. challenge to Russia is even more serious than efforts to contain Russia's power. In addition to luring former Soviet republics to join NATO, the United States has targeted Central Asian oil and natural gas and is already "squeezing Russia out."⁽⁴²⁹⁾ Yang Shuheng, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), asserts, "The rivalry over the Caspian Sea region's oil and natural gas is . . . part of the U.S.-Russian rivalry over strategic interests and spheres of influence in the Eurasian hinterland. . . . The number of countries involved (in the struggle) will increase. . . . International forces covet the treasure chest that is Central Asia."⁽⁴³⁰⁾

While some Chinese authors regard Russia as passive and weak in the face of these threats, others see Russia as taking a stand and adopting countermeasures against U.S. and NATO policies. For example, Li Qinggong, a Research Fellow at CIISS, states, "The plan of 'NATO eastward expansion' pursued by the United States and other Western countries has entered the stage of implementation, but Russia has not weakened its opposition; it has taken new countering actions in an attempt to build the Russia-France-Germany axis to oppose the control of the United States over European security affairs and offset the impact of 'NATO eastward expansion.' "⁽⁴³¹⁾ Liu Guilin, an Associate Research Professor in the Division for Russian and East Europe Studies at CICIR writes, "Clearly, Moscow intends to rely on the CIS as both the basis for its great power strategy and the bulwark against NATO eastern expansion." He believes that despite drawbacks and problems that exist in inter-CIS relations, such as worries about "Moscow's possible domineering intention," Russia will not lose out to the West in the struggle for influence over the nations of the former Soviet Union.⁽⁴³²⁾ "Shared interests will sustain the CIS in the face of difficulties . . . (and) cooperation will remain the mainstream due to economic and security interdependence. . . . Russia still retains strong deep-seated influence in the CIS in the forms of geographical proximity, traditional economic ties, and a Russian community of some 25 million scattered all over the region. All this cannot possibly be replaced by the West."⁽⁴³³⁾ He writes that even the "strongly independence-minded Ukraine will still depend on Russia for a long time to come," citing the fact that 40 percent of its foreign trade is with Russia, and that Russia supplies much of its oil and gas.⁽⁴³⁴⁾ Therefore, Liu predicts that CIS integration will proceed, although it will be gradual. Finally, he concludes,

Looking beyond the current Russian financial crisis, it can safely be estimated that along with further improvement in overall conditions, the stronger Russia's urge to make bigger strides in winning back its original big power status in international life, the greater CIS cohesion and the higher the organization's profile in a multipolar world of the 21st century.⁽⁴³⁵⁾

Chinese analysts recognize that on international issues other than NATO eastward expansion, Russia also has strategic interests that conflict with those of the West. In the Iraqi weapons inspection crises, they assert that Russia came out ahead in its dispute with the United States over how to handle the problem:

The two different views regarding Russia's position and power in the world structure--that it is passive and relatively powerless against the current onslaught from the NATO eastward expansion, versus it is actively asserting itself and taking steps to counter the threat--are reflected in the divergent views put forward by Chinese analysts regarding Russia's response to NATO military strikes against Yugoslavia in spring 1999. Some authors focus on the dangers posed by NATO actions in the Kosovo crisis and Russia's weak response, while others emphasize Russia's eventual return to power and the ways this was manifested during the crisis.

Chinese analysts regarded NATO strikes against Yugoslavia as part of the plan of eastward expansion, an effort "to bring the strategic areas in the Balkans under control, in order to further contain and weaken Russia and prevent Russia from rising up again."⁽⁴³⁷⁾ While one CICIR analyst merely stated that NATO "wanted to issue a warning to Russia, and further weaken its international standing," other authors were much more explicit.⁽⁴³⁸⁾ An article in the Liberation Army Daily, claimed:

Li Yonggang, a scholar at the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management, holds a similar view, "By dismembering the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or forcing Milosevic to surrender, the external front of Russia will be brushed away, therefore, Russia will be further oppressed, which is the key step to finally annihilating Russia." He writes, "In addition to sharing the advantages of militarily and politically squeezing out Russia," one of the reasons "NATO European powers have been so enthusiastic" about their actions in Yugoslavia is that it is an "attempt to get through the Balkan corridor in the south and extend their sphere of economic influence to Central Asia and even further to a wider scope."⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾

Wang Naicheng, of CIISS, also considers power in Central Asia to be one of the goals of NATO: "If NATO succeeds in stationing its troops in Kosovo and taking up strategically important places to the east, it can make direct threats against Central Asia, thus weakening the control of Russia over the CIS and undermining its foundation." Wang even warned that NATO incursions could harm Russia's efforts to return to power. "If the strength and influence of NATO can drive straight into the scope of influence of the former Soviet Union through the Balkans, Russia is bound to be further weakened and will encounter more difficulties in realizing its overall state strategy of becoming a pole in the future multipolar world."⁽⁴⁴¹⁾

Chinese analysts note how the United States exploited Russia's economic weakness during the Kosovo crisis, counting on Russia's dependency on loans to keep it from taking a stand against NATO actions. Zhang Zhaozhong, of NDU, writes, "The United States has already accurately gauged Russia's weak disposition. When it started bombing the FRY, it was feeling for Russia's cards and did not know what Russia would do." However, "they know that in dealing with Russia they only need to use economic methods and give them a bit of money, and everything will be fine. In addition, the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also declared that they were willing to help Russia resolve its economic crisis and provide loans totaling over $4 billion. They also knew that Russia would just murmur without really doing anything."⁽⁴⁴²⁾ Colonel Liu Gang of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) similarly commented on Russia's weak response due to economic concerns, stating, "The fact that Russia has continually changed its role during the Kosovo crisis shows that when U.S.-led NATO encroached on Russian interests in Kosovo and affronted its dignity. . . . Russia showed that, for economic reasons, 'the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak,' and it had no alternative but to retreat." However, Colonel Liu points out that the United States was forced to make "certain concessions to Russia . . . because Russia is still a military power that cannot be lightly 'stirred up.' "⁽⁴⁴³⁾

Dr. Shen Jiru, a Research Fellow and Director of the International Strategic Research Section of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at CASS, argues that despite its weakened power, Russia will not be passive in the face of the NATO threat:

Other authors considered Russia's function as a mediator in the Kosovo crisis to be evidence of Russia's continued influence in international affairs. One explained, "In the political settlement of the Kosovo issue, Russia played a unique, important role. Regarding this, the United States expressed its 'thanks' to Russia superficially. In fact, it had a sour feeling. For a considerable period of time, the United States has adopted the policy of pressuring and intimidating Russia, weakening its role in international affairs. However, when the United States was in a dilemma over the Kosovo issue, it had to seek Russia's assistance. As a consequence, the latter played the role of mediator and increased its international status."⁽⁴⁴⁵⁾ The fact that Russian troops entered Kosovo before NATO troops was viewed by the Chinese as even further evidence of Russian power and a sign of potential growth and influence in the future.

Some Chinese analysts argue that one way for Russia to counterbalance the dangers to its security environment from the West would be to improve its relations with China. Chinese authors have noted a shift in Russia's foreign policy toward this direction, in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initially, in the early 1990s, they were critical of Russia for focusing too much on the West, for "leaning to one side."⁽⁴⁴⁷⁾ In keeping with the Chinese foreign policy theory that only weak nations have alliances, Russia at that time was regarded negatively, "Because of dependency on the West, Russia's foreign affairs policy lacked independence, causing its international position to suffer a disastrous decline and incurring domestic criticism and opposition."⁽⁴⁴⁸⁾ However, in the mid-1990s, the focus of Russia's foreign policy began to widen, with greater attention being given to other parts of the world.⁽⁴⁴⁹⁾ Li Zhongcheng, a Research Professor in the China and World Studies Division at CICIR, writes, "Russia, bent on recovering its former status as a global power, will intensify its efforts in pursuing an omni-directional diplomacy so as to regain and expand its influence in the international community."⁽⁴⁵⁰⁾

Chinese analysts assert that it was the threats to Russia's security environment from the West that caused it turn to the East, making Asia in general and China in particular the new targets of its diplomacy. Li states, "While NATO was busy preparing its eastward expansion and the United States and Japan redefined the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which broadened the field of cooperative defense, China and Russia announced a plan to develop a '21st-century-oriented strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence, and mutual coordination.' "⁽⁴⁵¹⁾ Shi Ze, the Vice President of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), holds a similar view, emphasizing the benefits to Russia from improving its relations with China:

Chinese authors see the Sino-Russian partnership as benefiting both sides.⁽⁴⁵³⁾ Not only does Russia gain by having a counterweight to NATO eastward expansion, but several studies also point to the economic advantages that can be derived through improved relations, because "the two sides are specially complementary in terms of resources, industrial structure, and development levels."⁽⁴⁵⁴⁾ From China's point of view, it also intends to use Russia as a counterbalance to the West. Liu Jinghua of CASS writes,

Study Reports on the International Situation-1997-1998, a yearly compilation of the views of authors from a variety of institutes published by the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management, contained an article that argues why Russia and China are very natural strategic partners. The author, Zheng Yu, writes, "Even if the next Russian President takes office with pro-Western influence in the year 2000, Russia's unique diplomatic and cultural tradition, its consciousness as a great power, and the natural characteristics formed by the Orthodox Eastern Church will make it difficult" for Russia to be part of the West. The process of catching up for Russia has lasted "several hundred years, since Peter the Great, [and] has not made Russia entirely Westernized." He further points out, "Since 1992 pro-Western radicals in Russia have gradually lost power on the Russian political stage." This is a strategic cultural argument. According to Zheng, a good reason for Russia to help China is that "Russia has considerable influence in the continents of Europe and Asia and will undoubtedly promote the setting up of China's position of a political great power in the world."⁽⁴⁵⁶⁾

Additionally, Zheng advocates that in the 21st century China should increase its cooperation with Russia and Northeast Asia "with a view to disintegrating American manipulation to improve Japanese-Russian relations and draw Russia closer to the American-Japanese position on the question of security in the Northeast Asian region."⁽⁴⁵⁷⁾ Concerning economic factors, creating closer ties to Russia would also benefit China.

Zheng also points out that "China's participation in the development of Russia Far East oil and gas fields will have an important strategic significance in the next century."⁽⁴⁵⁸⁾ Military affairs is a final area where China could profit from improved relations. Zheng argues, "In Chinese-Russian military cooperation, China should absorb and use Russian achievements for long-term research on American weapons and combat methods in order to serve China in its struggle in Taiwan and to exercise Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea.⁽⁴⁵⁹⁾

Chinese analysts do point out troubles that exist in Sino-Russian relations, which could become hindrances to continued improvement, and a few authors have warned Moscow not to interfere in Taiwan or take other steps to harm China's interests. The Vice President of CIIS put forward three main problem areas in the bilateral ties:

Other authors cite similar issues, but argue that the current trend of improving relations will outweigh the problems. Feng Yujun, an Assistant Research Professor in the Division for Russian and East Europe Studies at CICIR writes,

In general, Chinese analysts put forward very positive assessments of the current and future development of the two countries' relationship. For example, the settlement and removal of problems that existed between China and the Soviet Union, such as ideology and border disputes, have contributed to the improvement of Sino-Russian relations, as Shi Ze asserts: "Compared with the relations between China and the Soviet Union, which experienced ups and downs and even military confrontations . . . the relations between China and Russia have been showing positive momentum of stable development and full dynamic."⁽⁴⁶²⁾

Other authors write about how Sino-Russian relations will contribute to regional stability and the world's multipolar development: "The expansion of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation has given an impetus to adjustments in major power relations and a strong stimulus to the tendency toward a multipolar world."⁽⁴⁶³⁾ Li Zhongcheng of CICIR even predicts that these improved relations will be better than those China has with the United States:

Chinese analysts often point to Russian military power as one of the key factors contributing to its continued existence as a major nation in the world and believe that in international affairs it will rely on its military strength while it copes with its domestic economic and political problems. However, the Russian military, while strong, still can not compare to that of the Soviet Union. One author writes about Russia's current force: "Its military power has declined and its defense capability has seriously weakened. . . . Russia inherited most of the former Soviet army's weapons and equipment, but less than 20 percent of those meet the requirements of modernization; its military power has seriously weakened."⁽⁴⁶⁵⁾

A CICIR study stated, "Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall in Russia's Comprehensive National Power, Russia's armed forces sank into a severe decline." It went on to sum up several problems Russia will have to deal with in its efforts to modernize and develop its military:

However, according to the study, Russia's military reforms may speed up because of its problems in Chechnya, which "critically influenced Russia's military reform process," even though Russia still "lacks a clear military reform strategy." Failures during the war in Chechnya resulted in much attention from Russia's highest decisionmaking levels, so that the entire plan for military reforms is also being "tensely deliberated and drafted."⁽⁴⁶⁷⁾

One area of Russia's military force that Chinese analysts assess as balancing these inadequacies is its arsenal of nuclear weapons. "On the one hand, Russia is still a major nuclear power and the second largest military power in the world; on the other hand, the shortage of military funds, the slow renewal of equipment and the irregular training have greatly lowered the Russian army's effectiveness."⁽⁴⁶⁸⁾ Chinese authors point out that, "given the fact that Russian national power has dramatically declined and its conventional forces have been reduced on a large scale," Russia has no choice but to "stress the deterrent role played by the nuclear force in safeguarding its national security."⁽⁴⁶⁹⁾ A People's Daily article stated,

The article predicts that Russia will invest heavily in the development of nuclear technology so that it will retain its military power:

Despite Russia's weakened military force, Chinese analysts emphasize that it still is quite powerful when compared to that of other countries. According to Chinese assessments, Russia currently has the second most powerful military in the world after the United States, and in the short term no other country will be able to surpass it. For example, Yan Xuetong of CICIR writes, "Russia's superiority over China, Japan, and Germany in the areas of nuclear and conventional weaponry . . . can be preserved until early next century."⁽⁴⁷²⁾ A comparison of the military power of six countries, done by Colonel Huang Shuofeng of AMS in 1996 as part of a study on CNP, found that Russia's military power was 67 percent of the U.S. score, a major decline from the assessment of the Soviet Union's military power by Huang in 1990, when it was 99.6 percent of the U.S. score.⁽⁴⁷³⁾ However, Huang points out, "Although Russia currently has numerous economic difficulties, the progress of its armed forces reforms is uneven, its national defense expenditures have actually decreased by around 45 percent, and it has suffered a disastrous decline from its position as a military superpower to a very large extent; it can be said that Russia is a military power that is second only to the United States, and it is second only to the United States in terms of the highest military expenditures." China accordingly, still falls behind Russia in military power. Based on Huang's calculations, in 1996, China's military power score was 77.7 percent of the Russian score. In strategic weaponry, China's score was only 0.4 percent of Russia's; in national defense expenditures, China scored 8.7 percent; and in average national defense expenditures per person and annual per capita defense expenditures, China's scores were 4.7 percent and 1.0 percent, respectively.⁽⁴⁷⁴⁾

As Russia assumes its place as one of the five poles in the multipolar structure, Chinese military analysts believe Russia will also be exploiting the RMA, probably ahead of the declining United States. Two officers at AMS, authors of America, Russia, and the Revolution in Military Affairs, describe Russia's fall from its "superpower pinnacle" as the reason Moscow "temporarily will be unable to compete with the United States in this new RMA." They add: "In the new RMA tide that is currently rising in the world, the United States without a doubt is in the central position that is the focus of attention." However, they contend that several factors favor a surprise, and Russia may do better at the RMA than the United States: "Because military power has today become practically the only pillar supporting Russia's position as a major nation, its strategists will place top priority on using the new RMA to maintain its military superiority in a position of top priority in its national strategy. Currently it is secretly taking aim at America's commanding position in the new RMA and actively planning, preparing, and carrying out the new RMA."⁽⁴⁷⁵⁾ The orthodox view seems to be that Russia will achieve sustained growth after 2005, and recovery suggests to PLA authors that Moscow will be able to exploit the RMA rapidly, which would enhance Russian military power.

Russian military specialists invited to AMS find their works quoted favorably in Chinese journals.⁽⁴⁷⁶⁾ Even though "up to now [Moscow] still has not completely implemented a new RMA plan . . . this does not indicate that the figures in Russia's military and political leadership and military doctrinal circles lack a full understanding and urgent desire regarding the RMA; also, it does not mean that Russia is willingly allowing its former opponent to get far ahead in the spring tide of this new RMA . . . they are trying to prepare for the future when Russia will enter the period when it completely carries out the new RMA."⁽⁴⁷⁷⁾ Despite its current economic weakness, Chinese analysts such as Gao Chunxiang of AMS see that, "Russia's high-level military and political leadership continually make speeches on issues related to the RMA . . . [and] draw lessons from the new technology the United States needs to develop the RMA." The place in Russia where this is done is "the General Staff Military Academy and other military learning organizations." The Chinese are aware that Russian doctrine "points out that national defense research and development must first focus on developing new deep-strike weapons, information weapons, and electronic warfare equipment." Moreover, they know the Russian military is "putting forward concepts about 21st century Russian military structure and has already made public 'The Russian Military's Ten-Year Weaponry Development Long-Term Plan' and 'Twenty-First Century Soldier Equipment Plan.' "⁽⁴⁷⁸⁾ Li Qinggong, a Research Fellow at CIISS, writes,

As noted in the Preface, Chinese "debates" about the security environment are quite different in style and content from the debates of Western scholars and public commentators. Debates about Russia have been particularly sensitive and secretive in the two decades since the death of Chairman Mao.

According to interviews in China, these past debates remain relevant and not all issues in them have been fully resolved. A secretive debate on the character of the USSR was carried out in the mid-1970s through allegorical references to Chinese ancient history by authors using pseudonyms for the individuals or groups involved. The authors pretended to hold "harmless" historical debates. Only after the deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four did China reveal that the allegorical debates had directly involved Politburo members. Apparently they instigated the scholars' attack on the policies of their political opponents using ancient historical figures in allegory.⁽⁴⁸⁰⁾

From 1978 to 1982, a second debate on the USSR was also largely concealed. The result of the second debate was a sharp reduction in China's assessment of a Soviet military threat.⁽⁴⁸¹⁾

The collapse of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union jolted China. China's leaders had difficulty maintaining their claim that socialism was a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Consequently, in the early nineties, a debate ensued over the causes of the collapse and the implications for China. In the first phase of the debate, from 1991-92, the United States was assessed to be completely responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union through a process of containment and ideological subversion called "peaceful evolution." ⁽⁴⁸²⁾ However, this view was overturned in the second stage of "scholarly" debate in 1992-93.⁽⁴⁸³⁾

Close examination of Chinese commentary from 1990 to 1992 indicates a veiled debate took place among various institutes and individuals about the causes of the Soviet disintegration and its consequences for Chinese communism. The debates were initially restricted to internally circulated journals. Using an old Mao quotation, an initial explanation was attributed to an American strategy, dating back to John Foster Dulles, known by the characters for "peaceful evolution." An early assertion of this cause of the Soviet collapse appeared in Hong Kong in December 1991 in a newspaper affiliated with the People's Republic of China (PRC):

Its author provides an explicit warning for China when he adds, "It is fair to say that without overt or covert support from the United States, the disintegration of the Soviet Union could not have been realized, nor could it have been achieved so successfully and so precipitously."

According to the "peaceful evolution" strategy, the levers the United States used against the former Soviet Union (and which would apply to China) were trade, economic cooperation, technology transfer, diplomacy, cultural and educational exchanges, religious freedom, and so on. Another scholar estimates that the West enjoyed a superiority in these "weapons." By the mid-1980s, the estimated advantage that the Western countries enjoyed over the socialist countries in material terms was calculated by the Chinese to be 3:1. However, in terms of mass media, the advantage was calculated to exceed 20:1. The analyst argued that Western countries have employed electronic media as a weapon to infiltrate socialist countries and disintegrate them.⁽⁴⁸⁵⁾ One internal speech by a Chinese leader warns,

According to interviews conducted by the author, a book entitled Western Politicians on Peaceful Evolution contains articles warning about the American subversive strategy for dealing with China after the June 1989 Tiananmen breakdown.

The second thesis about the collapse of the Soviet Union was argued by Liu Keming, the former chief of the Liaison Department of China's Central Committee. Liu, a leading Soviet expert, criticized Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" and his personality.⁽⁴⁸⁷⁾ In Liu's view, when Gorbachev introduced a multiparty system and separation of powers, he completely negated 70 years of Soviet political structure and brought an end to the Communist Party in power. Gorbachev was a negative example for China; thus Liu asserts that China should avoid:

Liu's thesis holds that the neglect of politics and ideology by the Soviet leadership, together with Gorbachev's political errors and widespread corruption (including the bribery case of Leonid Brezhnev's son-in-law), all caused the downfall.

By mid-1992, however, a new analysis emerged. Scholars presenting this analysis challenged the idea of Western imperialists pushing peaceful evolution in the Soviet Union. If they had been at it since the 1940s, why did it not succeed until the late 1980s? They asked how hostile international forces could peacefully subvert a 20-million-member Soviet Communist Party without encountering any resistance. Professor Luo Zhaohong, of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at CASS, directly criticizes the effort to blame Gorbachev alone for the Soviet disintegration. He also attacks the notion of peaceful evolution, arguing that foreign involvement could never play a significant role in the Soviet collapse. Professor Luo puts forward the view that it was an excess of Stalinism and poor budgetary management and errors in economic policy that caused the Soviet collapse.⁽⁴⁸⁸⁾ According to Chinese analysts, the logic of the "peaceful evolution" thesis began to be attacked by many analysts in the second phase of the 1990-1992 debate.⁽⁴⁸⁹⁾ For one thing, not a single American soldier had entered the Soviet Union. Chinese analysts instead suggest that problems such as agriculture were ignored; the ethnic issue was mishandled; and the Soviets were overcommitted, especially with the invasion of Afghanistan and generous aid to Cuba. In general, they said, economic factors were key to the collapse.

In an interesting twist, the new argument held that stagnation and isolation had caused the Soviet system to fall behind, along with its highly centralized planning and an excessive military budget. The implication of this diagnosis was that if China could avoid highly centralized planning, excess defense spending, and isolation, then China could also avoid the fate of the Soviet Union. Professor Luo Zhaohong also criticizes the economic theory of the Soviet Union because it left out of its theoretical foundation notions of value, profit, and competition and it overemphasized state-owned enterprises, which had no autonomy and had their production geared to an arbitrary state plan rather than market commands. This, he concludes, destroyed the vitality of enterprises and hampered the quantity and quality of production. There were no incentives to innovate. Technological progress and competition with the West were impossible.⁽⁴⁹⁰⁾

Professor Luo estimates the Soviet defense budget to have been at 20 to 25 percent of the GNP at the time of the USSR collapse, and almost all the research efforts of the Soviet industrial base served the military. He quotes former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov in saying that 75 percent of the government research and development budget had been appropriated for alternate use, and that the military share of electronics was as much as 50 percent. Thus Luo concludes that because the Soviet GNP was one-third that of the U.S. GNP, maintaining strategic parity with strategic weapons and surpassing the United States in conventional forces put an unbearable burden on the Soviet economy. The Chinese quote Gorbachev's admission in a speech in February 1981: "This is the most militarized economy in the world."⁽⁴⁹¹⁾

Gorbachev's personality and policies may have accelerated the economic collapse, but in the Chinese view, decades of overly centralized planning and excessive military expenditures were the root causes of the collapse. The gap between American and Soviet living standards was 10 to 1, according to Chinese calculations, with the per capita GNP in the Soviet Union as low as about $2,000.

The conclusions for China of this new thesis were not that "peaceful evolution" should be cut off by seclusion and isolation from Western cultural influences; rather, the issues would be successful management of the economy to maintain ever higher living standards, further devolution of planning toward a market economy, and efforts to continue technological progress. After nearly 2 years of debate, in what seems to be a tradition in this policy process, a major conference was held in Beijing in May 1992. The record was published in the journal World Economics and Politics. An important element in this policy process was a statement made by Deng Xiaoping during his tour of Southern China in early 1992. In remarks conveyed through intermediaries, Deng supposedly said, "A planned economy does not equal socialism." Whether something is socialist or capitalist, Deng pointed out, depends on whether it will benefit the living standards of the people. He criticized anyone who opposed foreign capital investment in China or joint ventures with foreigners as "ignorant" and "lacking common sense."⁽⁴⁹²⁾

Russia and the Soviet Union have always been a subject of debate in China. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s there were disagreements about the extent of the Soviet threat, while in the early 1990s a major debate ensued over the causes of the collapse of the USSR and its implications for China. Today, Chinese analysts see the Soviet decline as a cautionary tale but generally speaking they regard Russia with sympathy. In spite of its current extensive problems, Chinese analysts "officially" continue to portray the future role of Russia as one of the five equal poles that will shape the coming world balance of power. They forecast that its decline will eventually end, and that Russia will increase its military power by exploiting the RMA in advance of other nations. Although Russia's inevitable recovery and position as a pole are commonly accepted by Chinese analysts, what will happen to the country during the transition to a multipolar world is the subject of conflicting points of view. Authors recognize that Russia will continue to have economic, political, and social instability. What they disagree upon is how long the turmoil will prevail. Additionally, most analysts discuss the numerous threats to Russia's future security environment, but they differ in how they view its response to these dangers.

Chinese authors do not foresee Russia's severe crises and decline in CNP preventing it from assuming its position as a pole, because they emphasize that the framework of its former power and status still exists, and it has potential for future development. Some authors argue that promoting relations with China would be a way for Russia to improve its current circumstances. Not only would it be helped by strengthened economic ties to China, but a strategic partnership would also be a means for counterbalancing the dangers to its security environment, particularly by providing a counterweight to NATO eastward expansion.

It is Russia's past efforts and its future abilities to deal with serious threats from the U.S. and NATO that are the main subjects of debate about Russia. Some analysts see Russia as passive and relatively powerless against NATO efforts to infringe upon the former Soviet sphere of influence. They point out that Russia has already lost Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to NATO and do not foresee that Russia will do much better at thwarting new Western aggression in the near term. The real threat to Russia's security would occur if NATO decided to infiltrate the Baltic states and particularly Central Asia, where the goal of the West is not only to contain Russia's power but also to obtain oil and gas. There have even been warnings that if Russia does not prevent these incursions, it could lose its foundation for becoming a pole. However, other analysts see Russia adopting countermeasures against U.S. and NATO policies that are commensurate with its current power and indicative of future influence.

Chinese discussions of Russian military strength tend to fall into two categories--those that focus on the negative aspects of its current status, and those that make positive predictions about the future. When assessing the Russian military today, many authors examine its numerous weaknesses, although its arsenal of nuclear weapons is often considered to balance some of its inadequacies. More optimistic assessments are made about Russian military affairs, when analysts examine the country's development potential. In particular, some authors assert that as Russia assumes its place as a pole, it will be developing the RMA, probably ahead of the declining United States. Analysts argue that its current military power is the key factor contributing to its continued existence as a major nation in the world, consequently the country will give priority to promoting the RMA. The belief is that once Russia inevitably overcomes its problems, gradual sustained growth will allow it to be able to rapidly exploit the RMA, enhancing both its military strength, as well as its overall CNP.

a unique aspect of china's strategic assessments of the future security environment is the "scientific" method used to predict power relations among the major nations. Chinese ancient statecraft from the Warring States era focused on how a wise leader made strategy according to the power of his state. Sun Zi warned that the outcome of war depends on the correct assessment of power through calculations and estimates of enemy strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, more so than most Western futurists, Chinese authors want to forecast the future international status hierarchy. The means by which they make such strategic assessments is through the measurement and comparison of Comprehensive National Power (CNP).

CNP (zonghe guoli) refers to the combined overall conditions and strengths of a country in numerous areas. During the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, a nation's power was largely determined by military force, but in the current transition period, as the world moves toward multipolarity, military might is no longer the main defining factor of strength. Instead, elements such as economics and science and technology have become increasingly important in the competition for power and influence in the world. An evaluation of current and future strength requires the inclusion of a variety of factors, such as territory, natural resources, military force, economic power, social conditions, domestic government, foreign policy, and international influence. CNP is the aggregate of all these factors, as Deng Xiaoping stated: "In measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides."⁽⁴⁹³⁾

Chinese assessments of CNP are done both qualitatively, in general discussions of country strengths and weaknesses, as well as quantitatively, through the use of formulas to calculate numerical values of CNP. China's forecasts of CNP reject using gross national product (GNP) indexes or the measurement methods of national power used in the United States. Instead, Chinese analysts have developed their own extensive index systems and equations for assessing CNP. It will be seen that their analytical methods are not traditional Marxist-Leninist dogma or Western social science but something unique to China.

Several assessments of the current and future CNP of a number of nations are provided in this chapter, including estimations of the rank order in the future security environment of 2010 and 2020. The conflicting findings reflect the differences seen in chapters 1 and 2 about both the rate at which the world is moving toward multipolarity and the rate of decline of U.S. national power. For example, of the 20 authors introduced in this section, some authors write, "It is certain that the five major powers will be the focus of the world, but the relative strengths of the various poles will be unbalanced,"⁽⁴⁹⁴⁾ while others emphasize, "The strength and political gaps among the five powers are gradually getting closer."⁽⁴⁹⁵⁾ This "debate" about CNP is also important to analysts of the RMA, because knowing a nation's CNP can determine which side will win a war and which side will better implement an RMA.⁽⁴⁹⁶⁾ To sum up, the future CNP scores for major powers can help identify:

Although numerous authors make predictions about future CNP, few provide detailed accounts about the measurement and evaluation process. This chapter focuses on two studies that contain elaborate descriptions of how their assessments were conducted, and which represent the orthodox and reform views. After the following overview of the two abovementioned studies, the chapter is divided into four main sections:

To illustrate how China assesses CNP, the findings of two books published by the Academy of Military Science (AMS) are contrasted with those of a book by the civilian Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The publications of both institutes use premises established by Deng Xiaoping 15 years ago, and some of the authors were apparently directly involved with Deng's estimates. From AMS, this chapter draws on interviews with and the published work of Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng. His orthodox findings differ from those presented in the reform assessment published by a team of CASS researchers. The reformers had as senior advisor noted author Gao Heng. According to interviews, Gao helped to invent the key Chinese concept of structural multipolarity, which he published in 1986, at the same time Deng Xiaoping's national security adviser announced the concept.⁽⁴⁹⁷⁾

The AMS books and the CASS book are similar in that they see America declining and an evolution toward a multipolar world, as the quantitative power gap between the United States and other major powers closes rapidly between 2000 and 2020. Additionally, they avoid describing the rise of China to superpower status. A decade ago, senior Chinese analysts pondered in public the implications of China's surpassing the United States; however, this is not mentioned by AMS or CASS authors. The publications of both institutes agree that China will, at most, become merely one pole among five equals, in spite of its much faster growth rate and much larger population and territory. Where the AMS and CASS books differ is mainly in how to assess the rate of China's rise and America's decline. They also differ in how they assess military power. By examining this "debate" about the future security environment, foreign observers can better understand how issues about the future are "argued" among both civilian and military analysts.

According to interviews in Beijing, the assessments of future power ratios by CASS and AMS are not projected beyond 2010 because to do so might aid the China Threat Theory. However, for this study, the AMS and CASS estimated growth rates and their baseline power scores for 2010 are used to project 2020 findings. It is apparent that CASS and AMS use very different rates--AMS growth estimates have China's CNP increasing seven times faster than the CASS pace; the CASS rate for Japan is also much slower. The CASS assessment has U.S. CNP decreasing 1 percent a year, to be overtaken by Japan, which is growing by 1 percent a year.

The estimates of the orthodox authors support the assertions of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng that the multipolar world is approaching. By 2020, based on projected AMS scores, the United States and China will have roughly equal national power. However, the reform view published by the team from CASS predicts different results. Its CNP scores for the present suggest American unipolar superpower, not multipolarity. Projected CASS scores show that by 2020 Japan will be number one, followed closely by the United States, whereas China will still be only number eight in the world, not even one of the top major powers. China and Russia will be "half poles" because they will each have only about half the national power of Japan and America. These differences in CNP affect the debates discussed in other chapters of this study about which nations will be first to exploit the potential of an RMA.

Although the phrase "Comprehensive National Power" did not itself come into existence until the 1980s, the concept has ancient cultural roots and "evolved from the concepts of 'power,' 'actual strength', and 'national power.' "⁽⁴⁹⁸⁾ Although a number of authors cite Marxist-Leninist theory as a foundation for CNP studies, even earlier discussions of the need to compare the *overall power of different countries can be found in several Chinese ancient military classics. The studies of Herbert Goldhamer provide numerous examples of ancient Chinese strategists who emphasized the need to conduct calculations about the future.⁽⁴⁹⁹⁾

In his book Grand Strategy, Wu Chunqiu, a distinguished author at AMS, gives examples from Sun Zi's The Art of War, Wu Zi's The Art of War, and Guan Zhong's Guan Zi, to show how, "to a certain extent, the discussion of warfare in Chinese ancient literature embodies primitive, simple, and unsophisticated national power thought."⁽⁵⁰⁰⁾ He explains, "In general, national power theories frequently (or above all) are closely related to issues of war." Therefore, measurements must include not only military strength but also other forces that have to do with carrying out a war. "China's wise ancient strategists," Wu writes, "never advocated relying only on military power to conquer the enemy, but emphasized combining military power with the nonmilitary power related to war in order to get the upper hand." Sun Zi advanced that there were "five things" and "seven stratagems" that governed the outcome of war. Weighing these components, which include politics, military affairs, economics, geography, and "subjective guidance," could forecast the results of a war in advance. Wu Zi writes about six conditions under which, if the other side's strength was greater, war should be avoided. Wu Chunqiu writes, "These six points include the factors of national territory, population, domestic embodiment power, the legal system, servants, the quantity and quality of troops, as well as international aid. Even in an assessment based on modern views, these factors are relatively complete and are the epitome of Comprehensive National Power." Finally, the "eight views" discussed in Guan Zi are areas that, when assessed, show the size, strength, and development of a country's national power.

One of the largest and most famous geopolitical coalitions in ancient Chinese history was based on power calculations similar to assessments of CNP. The director of the military research division of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Colonel Chai Yuqiu, recounts that in 334 B.C., during the Warring States era, the strategist Su Qin proposed that the six states of the vertical pillar of the strategic rectangle that made up the Warring States geopolitical game board unite against the hegemonic state of Qin. Su Qin explained that together, the land of the six nations was five times greater than the territory of Qin, and their combined military power was ten times greater than that of Qin. If the six nations united together to attack Qin, it would be destroyed. Su Qin successfully persuaded all six to "unite vertically" (he zong) to prevent their destruction, one by one, by Qin's hegemony. It was not until the next century that Qin's leading strategist was able to break up this coalition, which had been based on quantitative calculations of comparative power.⁽⁵⁰¹⁾

According to Wu Chunqiu, the ancient Chinese stratagem of "victory without war" also has great relevance to the concept of CNP. The origin of the stratagem is a famous quotation from Sun Zi's The Art of War: "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill"--means, according to Wu, "Under certain military pressures, one can coordinate a political and diplomatic offensive, to psychologically disintegrate the enemy forces and subdue them."⁽⁵⁰²⁾ Later, in Xun Zi and the works of other strategists, the concept is discussed further and condensed into "victory without war." Wu believes this strategy to achieve foreign policy goals without going to battle is even more applicable to the future security environment. He writes: "Victory without war does not mean that there is no war at all. The wars one must fight are political wars, economic wars, science and technology wars, diplomatic wars, etc. To sum up in a word, it is a war of Comprehensive National Power. Although military power is an important factor, in peacetime it usually acts as a backup force, and plays the role of invisible might."

Compared to China, American studies of the future neglect geopolitical hierarchy and the rank order of the great powers. One reason may be the noble hope that war and geopolitics have become obsolete. Western studies have warned that errors in assessing power may explain why wars occur and that it is extremely difficult to assess geopolitical power accurately.⁽⁵⁰³⁾ An almost poetic account is from the remark by the great English statesman, Lord Bolingbroke:

The Chinese focus on geopolitical calculation makes it crucial to them to have good estimates of the future. The idea of measuring and comparing CNP developed during the early 1980s, as Deng Xiaoping modified Chairman Mao's party line that "world war was unavoidable," by instead predicting that "world war probably can be avoided."⁽⁵⁰⁵⁾ The Marxist-Leninist "foundation" of Deng's new assessment of the security environment was that "the growth of the world's forces of peace exceed the growth of the forces of war." Not only were the United States and the Soviet Union at a stalemate in their military struggle, but the strength of countries that were opposed to war was increasing. The international environment was changing, and the importance of economic issues and conflicts was growing. Military force was no longer the main index for judging a country's strength. Numerous other factors contributed to a country's power and were playing a greater role in warfare, such as economics, science and technology, and popular will. There needed to be a means for measuring the sum of the "forces restricting war," which included China. Deng wrote:

In order to make more accurate assessments about the future balance of power, country strength had to be evaluated in a variety of areas.

Zhu Liangyin and Meng Renzhong of AMS write, "Deng Xiaoping used keen foresight and . . . established the theoretical basis for the emergence and formation of his Comprehensive National Power theory."⁽⁵⁰⁷⁾ While Zhu and Meng never once quote Deng using the specific phrase "Comprehensive National Power," they set forth his "thought" on the subject, through analysis of his statements on the priorities of China's national construction and the significance of this development to the growth of China's strategic power. Deng's views that economic strength can be a force for peace and can counter military strength are used to show that "economic power is the most important and most essential factor in Comprehensive National Power." They go on to state that "Deng Xiaoping believes that military power is the basic means for ensuring that economic power will rise, protecting the nation's general interests, and carrying out global strategic goals. Therefore, while we on the one hand emphasize economic power as being the base of Comprehensive National Power, we must on the other hand devote ourselves to the development of military power, the element with the most direct role in Comprehensive National Power."

Zhu and Meng write that science and technology are considered to be "the guiding force in raising Comprehensive National Power."⁽⁵⁰⁸⁾ This is established through Deng's emphasis on the need for scientific and technological research and advancement in the military and economic arenas. They claim Deng further developed the sacred classics of Marxist-Leninism by adding his unique idea of the "primary" productive role of science and technology. "Marx talked about science and technology being a productive force and this is very accurate, but perhaps today saying it that way is not sufficient, I think that they are the primary productive force."

Deng Xiaoping's new assessment of the security environment required a means to compare China to other countries. According to a book by Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng of AMS, the specific phrase "Comprehensive National Power" was put forward by Colonel Huang himself as he worked with Deng. In On Comprehensive National Power, Huang describes how, in 1984, as part of a study on China's national defense strategy in the year 2000, Chinese scholars looked at the "national power equations" of Ray Cline and the West German professor William Fuchs as possible ways in which to analyze the international balance of power. After rejecting them based on their use of the concept of "power politics," the absence in their equations of a way to evaluate the role of science and technology, and other issues, Chinese scholars began to create their own models and formulas for weighing and contrasting different countries' overall power. Colonel Huang writes that in 1984 he "put forward the concept of 'Comprehensive National Power,' and established a 'Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation' model aimed at comprehensively assessing the comprehensive power of different countries in the world, and conducted comparative analysis of the major countries Comprehensive National Power."⁽⁵⁰⁹⁾

In observing the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party, a clue about how important something is can come from the strained efforts to justify its creation with appeals to precedents from the sacred Marxist classics. It appears that Comprehensive National Power is sufficiently important to merit such claims. Colonel Huang Shuofeng cites Marx, Engels, and Mao as precedents for "guiding thoughts on studying Comprehensive National Power" and its relationship to warfare,⁽⁵¹⁰⁾ emphasizing Engels' discussion in Anti-Duhring on the important role of economics and other factors in military force. Huang also mentions Lenin's statement, "War is a test of every nation's complete economic and organizational power," and writes that Lenin's theory, "using the language of today," would be that war "is a test of every country's Comprehensive National Power."⁽⁵¹¹⁾

According to Colonel Huang, Chairman Mao Zedong also contributed to the development of the concept of CNP through his "strategy of grasping the situation as a whole," which applied Marxist-Leninist theory to China's military strategy. In his writings, Mao not only emphasized the role of concrete material components, such as military and economic power, in affecting the balance of power, but also the function of spiritual components, in particular the influence of leaders and popular will. In "Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War," he wrote, "Victory or defeat in war is mainly determined by both side's various military, political, economic and natural conditions; this is not an issue. However, it is not simply just that, it is also determined by the subjective leadership capabilities of both sides in combat."⁽⁵¹²⁾ Both Huang and Wu Chunqiu laud Mao's On Protracted Warfare for its comprehensive comparison of China's and Japan's strengths during World War II and praised Mao's 1956 speech, "On the Ten Relationships," which was "a complete guide to strengthening Comprehensive National Power."⁽⁵¹³⁾

The close connection between warfare and national power, which formed the basis of earlier Chinese strategic theory on the subject, of course remains a prominent issue today. However, because the foundation and means for exerting one's power and influence have diversified, because conflicts between countries are more focused on nonmilitary issues, and because they can be resolved through diplomatic and economic channels, Chinese scholars in a number of disciplines, both military and nonmilitary, today use the concept of CNP to make assessments in their particular areas. CNP scores can aid "warfare" today in general terms in an "all directional economic war,"⁽⁵¹⁴⁾ and more specifically in future warfare to predict "who is capable of winning a victory in a new RMA war."⁽⁵¹⁵⁾

The basis of a discussion on employing the framework of CNP to analyze the outcome of future wars in The New Revolution in Military Affairs and High-technology Warfare, by Li Qingshan, a People's Liberation Army (PLA) colonel, is highly similar to the arguments put forward by China's ancient strategists. Sun Zi and Wu Zi both discussed how victory or defeat in war can be known in advance if a comparison is done of certain factors that contribute to a country's strengths. Li Qingshan agrees: "Through the analysis of belligerent countries' Comprehensive National Power, even before a war has begun, people can frequently know the results in advance."⁽⁵¹⁶⁾ However, Li adds that power changes during a war, because "Comprehensive National Power is a relatively dynamic concept." As a war develops, fluctuations and transformations will inevitably occur in the strengths and functions of the various component factors. Li states, "The outcome of war to a very large extent is determined by the contrast of the actual strength and potential of the two sides before the war begins, but what plays a direct role in the outcome of the war are the changes that take place in this comparison of forces during the process of military operations, as well as the results of diplomatic struggles, ideological struggles, and economic struggles."

Li's book asserts that the RMA will not override previously existing premises for making strategic assessments. Li claims that high-technology weaponry "can change the appearance of warfare, but it cannot change the laws of victory in warfare. Victory or defeat in war is, of course, related to the technological means used by the belligerents, but it is not the sole relationship. Historically, in numerous wars the victors have been both those who have technically inferior weaponry and those who have technically superior weaponry. Technology is not the only factor determining victory or defeat in war."⁽⁵¹⁷⁾ Li links the RMA to CNP. Lenin wrote, "War is a test of every nation's complete economic and organizational power," which Li asserts means that new RMA warfare "is still a comprehensive test of the level of countries' strength."

During development of the RMA, Li believes that CNP will continue to be composed of a country's strength in five major areas--politics, economics, military affairs, science and technology, and foreign affairs--each of which he discusses with regard to its influence and role in war. Beginning with political affairs, he states, "Warfare is the continuation of politics and reflects a country's strategic intentions, the desires of the people, organizational ability, and decision making ability."⁽⁵¹⁸⁾ According to Li, if a country's decisionmaking, organizational capability, or strategy is weak, unfocused, or defective, these factors will outweigh "actual" strength in determining the outcome of a war. Popular will expressed in opposition to a war can also reduce "actual" power. Pure military power "is warfare's most direct material force, it includes people, weaponry, strategy and tactics, organization and command, as well as various safeguards, etc. It is the most basic factor determining victory or defeat in war, and strength or weakness in any area will have a major role in war." Of course, in future RMA warfare, where "the entire process of war is permeated by the contest and match of technology," the extent of a country's scientific and technological development will be of major importance in attaining victory.⁽⁵¹⁹⁾

While Li Qingshan views the component factors of CNP from the perspective of their relevance to warfare, authors Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang analyze them with more economic issues in mind. Tong and Liu's interest in evaluating and comparing countries' CNP stems from the role it plays in world conflicts and rivalries over "science and technology, industrialization, foreign trade, finance, and natural resources."⁽⁵²⁰⁾ They divide CNP into four major parts--economics, politics, science and technology, and military affairs--placing economics in the most crucial position. "Actual economic strength," they write, "is, of course, the major component part of Comprehensive National Power, and to a certain extent, a country's actual economic strength represents its Comprehensive National Power." The other three areas are not discussed as independent factors but with regard to their relationship to economics.

Concerning politics, Tong and Liu write, "In general, political power and actual economic strength are linked together."⁽⁵²¹⁾ They believe a country with strong economic power will have powerful political influence, and a nation with unsubstantial economic strength will not have major political influence. However, they do grant an exception for Japan, whose great economic strength does not translate into a strong role in international political affairs. A similar relationship exists between the extent of a country's economic strength and the level of its scientific and technological development. While the authors recognize the importance of military power, they assess it based on its connection to the other factors:

Sun Zi's emphasis on the importance of knowing and then attacking an opponent's strategy has also found its way into the study of CNP. "Prospects for the New World Structure," by Xi Runchang of AMS, is an effort to predict the future world structure based on each area that contributes to Comprehensive National Power--strategy, population and national territory, military affairs, economics, and international influence. However, in his discussion on evaluating and comparing CNP, Xi does emphasize an area of definite significance to his discipline--the less concrete component factors, especially strategy. Xi explains that his particular stress on the importance of strategy does not ignore the position of the other components, but is "done in order to give prominence to this important area that people often overlook."⁽⁵²³⁾ According to Xi, national strategies need to be evaluated in three aspects:

Today, the United States, Europe, and Japan, because of their "overwhelmingly ambitious" goals and because they have moved quickly to implement their strategies, are ahead of other countries. "By comparison, Russia and China, particularly Russia, are especially slow in the area of action. In a certain sense, this is an important reason why, in today's international competition, Russia and China are in defensive positions, or are said to have been late to enter the ranks of the major competing nations."⁽⁵²⁷⁾

In Grand Strategy, Wu Chunqiu, of AMS, views the relationship between a country's strategy and CNP somewhat differently than Xi. He argues that CNP and grand strategy have an "unbreakable internal connection" of a "dual nature."⁽⁵²⁸⁾ On the one hand, CNP is wielded to attain the goals of grand strategy, but on the other, because this requires strong CNP, its development becomes one of the aims of grand strategy. Wu therefore does not consider strategy to be a component of CNP. Rather, he breaks the main factors and their functions down in the following manner: "In the current age when peace and development have become the main trends in the world, numerous countries, to different degrees, recognize that economics are the foundation; science and technology, especially high technology, are the guide; education is the guide of the guide; national defense is the backup force; and national policies are the key factor playing a unifying and coordinating role."

Not only can studies of CNP aid a country in making strategic assessments of the international situation, but they also are an important tool for analyzing a country's own strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, Wu explains that countries can learn from mistakes made by other countries by analyzing the development of both their national strategy and Comprehensive National Power. Like many Chinese authors, Wu cites the collapse of the Soviet Union as an example of a policy failure in the CNP competition.

What exactly are the specific components of CNP? Some Chinese authors discuss CNP only in a qualitative sense, dividing it into a few broad areas. Others, however, engage in quantitative analysis with detailed definitions of the contents of CNP. Authors share certain factors, but there are also discrepancies. Wu Chunqiu writes, "Because different countries' national conditions are not the same and researcher's personal goals are different, interpretations of the concept of national power vary. In the broadest sense, a country's power includes natural factors and social (manmade) factors; it includes material factors (hard national power) and spirit factors (soft national power); it includes actual strength, as well as potential and the mechanism for turning potential into actual strength. It is all encompassing."⁽⁵²⁹⁾ Two books propose quantitative approaches: Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive National Power of the World's Major Nations, by a team of analysts coordinated by Wang Songfen, of CASS, and On Comprehensive National Power, by Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng, of AMS.

The current Foreign Minister of Russia once headed the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IMEMO), an influential Russian research institution. Since the 1950s, China has had its own IMEMO, the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), within CASS. Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive National Power of the World's Major Nations is the product of a group of researchers in the Office of Statistics and Analysis at IWEP. Published in December 1996, the book puts forward a detailed dissection of the characteristics and roles of the CNP component factors; describes measurement methods to evaluate them; and provides extensive data tables from the results of examining the CNP of 18 countries. The authors define their subject matter carefully:

The book divides CNP into eight major areas: natural resources, domestic and foreign economics, science and technology, military affairs, government and foreign affairs capability, and social development. Three of the basic principles on which the authors relied to determine the above eight general factors include the following:

In order to objectively assess the CNP of different countries, CASS needed measurable, unified standards. To this end, they sought (for each of the eight component factors) a set of specific indexes. The creation of an index system capable of evaluating countries at different development levels and with varying social, political, and economic systems meant that the indexes selected had to be general enough to be applicable to the diverse nations of the world; be representative of all the factors that constitute Comprehensive National Power; and have data sources that were systematic and feasible. The authors wanted to include "both indexes for total amount, and indexes for amount per person; both quantity indexes and quality indexes; both efficiency indexes and consumption indexes."⁽⁵³²⁾ Additionally, structural indexes were necessary in order to demonstrate the interrelations and inter-reliance of the different factors. Consequently, the authors divided the eight major areas into 64 indexes (table 3).

On Comprehensive National Power, by Colonel Huang Shuofeng, provides a detailed analysis of the major component factors of CNP and their numerous indexes. Huang writes, "Comprehensive National Power research is done in order to accurately analyze the international strategic situation and evaluate the comprehensive power of enemy states, allies, and one's own country for the purpose of scientifically planning one's own national strategic decision making."⁽⁵³³⁾ Only relying on theoretical research is therefore inadequate for making this sort of assessment, and instead systems theory and mathematical methods must be utilized to develop qualitative and quantitative analysis. Consequently, Huang's objective in creating an index system is to "completely and systematically" describe the characteristics and development conditions of a country's CNP "in order to carry out scientific quantitative analysis."

Huang describes CNP as a large, complex system composed of many levels or subsystems, within which there are numerous interlinked component factors. He divides the CNP index system into four major index subsystems--the material power (hard) index subsystem, the spirit power (soft) index subsystem, the coordinated power index subsystem, and the environmental index subsystem:

Material power is made up of the hard factors, natural resources, economics, science and technology, and national defense. However, Huang explains, even the hard factors contain some aspects that are soft in nature, but for the purpose of analysis they are designated to a subsystem based on their dominant characteristic. For example, when viewed overall, national defense is a hard factor, but a few of its components, such as national defense ideology and military theory, are not. The "spiritual (including psychological) and intellect power soft factors" that "determine the effectiveness of the material form (hard) national power" include politics, foreign affairs, and culture and education.⁽⁵³⁵⁾

The coordinated power index subsystem is important because, in order for CNP to develop effectively, the factors that constitute material and spirit power "require macro adjustment and control, and coordinated develop-ment."⁽⁵³⁶⁾ These functions are important both at the national level as well as at the lower levels of the specific areas. Although some of the soft power factors are contained both in their own system as well as in the coordinated power index, they operate differently in the capacity of the latter. As "spiritual" factors they influence the material form factors, but within the coordinated power index they regulate the relationship between the hard and soft factors. Finally, the environment index subsystem comprises three parts, the international environment (the world structure and the different balances of power), the natural environment (a country's natural resources, as well as its geographic and ecological conditions), and social environment (the political, economic and social systems and their stability). These three areas greatly influence, both negatively and positively, the development of all the other factors.

Each of the components of the major subindexes is itself a sub-subindex, and together they all form what Huang refers to as a CNP appraisal index system. For each of these sub-subindexes, he provides detailed lists of their contents, but only four of Huang's lists are seen here for comparison, two from the soft factor side, and two from the hard factor side:

After listing the above specific indexes, Huang writes, "The Comprehensive National Power index system is the concrete embodiment of the concept of Comprehensive National Power; it also is the qualitative basis for appraising Comprehensive National Power," and therefore is the foundation for his "Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation," which will be discussed later.⁽⁵³⁸⁾ Before setting forth this equation, Huang first arranges his index system into a network structure so that it can be more easily quantified. However, in this diagram, "The Structural Network of the Comprehensive National Power System," Huang outlines national defense power differently. He breaks it down into direct military power and indirect military power. Direct military power includes measures of nuclear forces and conventional forces. The components of the latter are: total armed manpower; soldier quality; weapons effectiveness; military installations and logistics support; organizational quality; strategic reserve capability; and the extent of weapons acquisitions.

Chinese authors explicitly criticize foreign quantitative analysis methods. Three foreign formulas for assessing CNP frequently mentioned, both negatively and positively, are those created by Ray Cline, William Fuchs, and the Japan Economic Planning Department, Comprehensive Planning Office, in a study entitled Japan's Comprehensive National Power.

As noted earlier, according to Huang Shuofeng, Deng Xiaoping asked Chinese scholars in 1984 to analyze the future security environment, as part of a study on China's national defense strategy for the year 2000. They first examined existing Western formulas, but Huang rejected Cline's "national power equation" because it does not include a way to evaluate science and technology power; it is a static equation and therefore does not assess the variations in and development of a country's CNP over time; and Cline's means for judging the soft, intangible factors are not objective or unified. Huang finds fault with William Fuchs' formula because it measures only the hard material factors and completely ignores the soft ones. The Japanese study, done in 1987, is criticized by the authors of The World's All Directional Economic War, Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, because its index system and calculation methods are narrow and unscientific. They write that the research of the Japanese group was "done in order to serve the Japanese Government's established guiding principles and policy."⁽⁵³⁹⁾

As is common in China's assessment techniques, part of the foreigners' concepts may be borrowed. For example, in "Prospects for the New World Structure," in order to make "an objective and unassuming assessment" of Comprehensive National Power, Xi Runchang used Ray Cline's national power equation, P = (C+E+M) × (S+W). In the formula,

In great contrast to General Huang's comments, Xi believe's Cline's standards to be "relatively objective," including the standards for the soft factors, such as strategy, which is one of Xi's main areas of focus. CASS, for one of their measurement techniques (which will be explained in greater detail later), not only adapts aspects of Cline's method but combines it with features of the Japanese study.

One foreign study on the analysis and measurement of national power that is not criticized by Chinese analysts is the International Competitive Power Report, a yearly study conducted by the World Economic Forum and the Swiss Lausanne Management Institute. (A few Chinese institutes and university departments even contribute to it.) The Chinese periodical Strategy and Management praises the report, saying that it is "an important foundation which different countries' government circles and business circles refer to when making policy decisions, and has extensive authoritativeness."⁽⁵⁴¹⁾ Beginning in 1996, the magazine stated that each year it would publish the portion of the report showing the rank order of China's international competitive standing according to the various power indexes.⁽⁵⁴²⁾

The researchers in the CASS Office of Statistics and Analysis at IWEP divide their measurement of CNP into two stages, the basic plan and the weighted plan.

The Basic Plan. The 64 indexes the researchers set forth as standards for evaluating CNP vary in size and character, so the basic plan is composed of several calculation methods, in order to cover and suit all of them. First, the data from the hard indexes are standardized through index calculation methods, which "combine R. S. Cline's comprehensive calculation method of assigning values and the comprehensive index calculation method used in Japan's Comprehensive National Power."⁽⁵⁴³⁾ Afterwards, it is separated into calculated unit values. The hard indexes are divided into two groups, direct indexes (those directly related to GDP growth per person) and indirect indexes (those inversely related to GDP growth per person). The former set take the biggest value as 100, the latter set takes the lowest value as 100 to "successively calculate the deserved value of the different countries for those indexes." An investigation method of posing questions to specialists is utilized in the case of some of the intangible soft factors not easily measured. For example, in order to assess government regulation and control, the researchers asked some of the participants at the 1994 China World Economic Institute annual meeting questions about 9 aspects of government regulation and control in 18 countries.

The answers from 59 specialists, scholars, and professors then underwent a computerized analysis. For foreign affairs, another soft factor, the group "designed a nerve network model with ten factors related to capability in foreign affairs activities--population, territory, natural resources, military affairs, economics, science and technology, politics, ideology, system of organization, and image--to make assessments and obtained vague data of the different countries' foreign affairs capabilities; afterwards the data were standardized." For all the standardized data, "a standardized, differentiated levels collection method was adopted to obtain the basic plan data model." Based on these different methods, the researchers calculated the numerical value of the 64 indexes, the eight major areas, and the CNP for 18 countries in the years 1970, 1980, and 1990. Looked at statically, the results can be used to compare the CNP of different countries; viewed dynamically, the results show the changes in a country's CNP over time.

The Weighted Plan. Certain problems and distortions arise, however, when calculations are made under the basic plan; this necessitates "appropriate revision [of the calculation techniques] through weighted methods."⁽⁵⁴⁴⁾ First, those countries with extensive natural resources and comparatively small populations, such as Canada and Australia, receive high values of CNP that do not correspond to their actual economic strength and role in world affairs. Such results arise because in those countries per-person rates of a variety of economic and social factors are fairly high. Second, when assessing CNP, the authors assert it must be recognized that the importance and role of the various factors change over time. For example, during war, even during the Cold War, military strength and the various factors that contribute to it are the most crucial components of CNP. However, during peacetime, economic development, foreign trade, and social development rise in prominence. "Therefore, based on different time periods and different missions, revisions need to be made and weights need to be assigned to ensure the research conclusions are scientific and objective." Last, not only is the number of indexes in each of the eight major areas not equal--natural resources has fourteen, while foreign economic capability has only two--but each index, regardless of its value or importance, is allotted the same weight. Consequently, in the second stage of CNP measurement, the quantitative results of the basic plan are revised through qualitative analysis, by assigning weights to both the eight major component factors and their specific indexes.

In general, the researchers determined the weighted coefficients (table 4) for the different indexes based on the following principles:

National Power Factor		Weighted Coefficient
Total CNP Natural resources Economic activities capability Foreign economic activities capability Scientific and technological capability Social development level Military capability Government regulation and control capability Foreign affairs capability		1.00 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08

Source: Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative studies of the comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 169.

Additionally, the different indexes within each of the major factors are also assigned weights. As examples, within the science and technology factor, the index for proportion of research and development in the GDP and the index for technology personnel both have weighted coefficients of 0.30; the index for the proportion of machinery and transportation equipment exports in total exports and the index for the proportion of high-technology intensive exports in total exports are both 0.20. All four indexes constituting the military factor--the number of military personnel, military expenditures, weapons exports, and nuclear weapons--are assigned equal weights of 0.25.

Index	4	3	2	1	Unit
Anticipated time of being drawn into a war	>10	>5 <10	>0 <5	0	Year
Unity with the strategic interests of other powers	Be in unity with the United States and one power	Be opposed to the United States and in unity with three powers	Be opposed to the United States and one power	Be opposed to the United States and two powers	Country
The increasing share of export markets	>0.3	>0.1 <0.3	>0 <0.1	<0	%

Systems and Models	Period
Systems and Models	Between World War I & II	Post World War II	1970s-80s	1990s
International relations systems	Multipolar system	Bipolar system	Bipolar, pluralist system	Pluralist coexistence system
Types of war or disputes	World War	Cold War and local war	Cold War, local war, and economic war	Economic disputes, national and religious wars
International security models	Military alliance and balance of power	Military blocs and nuclear deterrence	Alliance, nuclear deterrence, and balance of power	U.N. and multilateral security dialogue
Goals	Domain and colony	Orbit and global hegemony	Comprehensive strength of state	Comprehensive strength and social stability
Decisive factors of forces	Military and diverse empires	Military and two superpowers	Military, economic and pluralist powers	Economic, pluralist harmony and military force
World economic systems	Plantation system and discriminatory economic blocs	Two large closed markets of socialism and capitalism	Transitional global market economy	Harmony of globalism and regionalism in world economy
Nature of international relations	Struggle for hegemony	Power politics	Power politics and interdependence	Interdependence and power politics

Country	National Power Factors
Country	Natural Resources	Economic Activities	Foreign Economic Activities	Science & Technology
United States	4.3	24.3	12.8	8.8
Japan	1.2	14.3	7.3	11.9
Germany	1.3	11.1	9.3	8.0
France	1.3	10.6	5.7	6.4
Italy	1.1	9.8	5.9	4.9
England	1.4	8.5	4.6	7.2
Canada	2.6	9.3	2.7	5.1
Australia	2.6	8.0	1.3	2.4
S. Africa	0.9	3.6	0.3	1.3
USSR	5.7	9.4	1.9	10.3
Russia	4.2	6.7	1.3	9.4