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Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition
Douglas B. Rider Combat aircrews at the wing level requested a steady flow of target materials, especially imagery. At one end of the spectrum were systems such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile and the F-117 that had prodigious requirements for specialized information. But even in the case of fighter-bombers with less exacting requirements for mission planning, the appetite for target imagery and threat information in the units proved well-nigh insatiable. --Gulf War Air Power Survey The expanded use of precision-guided munitions and the need for near-real-time targeting during and since the Gulf War have created an ever-increasing demand for high-resolution imagery for military planning.1 Unfortunately, intelligence assets have always fallen into the category of low density/high demand (LD/HD) resources. In particular, satellite imagery systems are constrained by orbital mechanics to the number of images they can take over a specific area in one day. In the future, it is highly likely that demands on existing national assets will outstrip supply, particularly during a regional crisis.2 Thus the need for a way to augment national systems becomes evident. This paper investigates the development of a Commercial Reserve Imagery Fleet (CRIF) to augment national imagery systems during crises. The CRIF concept is explored in detail by comparing it with the successful Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) model that supplies surge airlift capacity. A new era in space started with the launch of the first truly commercial high-resolution imagery satellite on September 24, 1999. The Ikonos spacecraft by Space Imaging, Inc., is the first privately owned, high-resolution imaging satellite to be successfully launched and operated.3 It is also the most capable imaging satellite currently available on the open market, providing unprecedented resolution and timely access to any spot on the Earth to anyone with a credit card. Two other companies, EarthWatch, Inc., and Orbital Imaging Corporation plan to launch competing pairs of satellites starting this year, resulting in a potential "constellation" of five, 1-meter resolution satellites on orbit by 2002.4 This development builds on recent history that points toward a powerful force multiplier. The Gulf War was called "the first space war" because of the integrated role space assets played, many for the first time.5 The fact that the coalition controlled all imagery satellites provided a strategic advantage that fueled the new commercial market. Based on increased attention given to satellite remote sensing systems after the Gulf War, many countries started pursuing development of their own capabilities. At the same time, American satellite builders put pressure on Congress to update the Land Remote Sensing Act in 1992 to allow U.S. companies to compete in the expanding global market for commercial satellite imagery. This move was meant to support and expand the U.S. industrial base in this key technology area and protect our current technological advantage.6 Additionally, it appears that congressional intent is ultimately to reduce the cost of acquiring imagery for national security purposes by relying on more commercial imagery in the future.7 This situation is highly analogous to the one that existed in the early 1900s with the development of military and commercial aviation. Although a robust commercial aviation industry was not envisioned early on, it ultimately developed into a national resource, able to supplement military airlift when needed. Similarly, several sources suggest that commercial space assets could be used to augment national space systems during times of crisis based on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet model for commercial airlift.8 This paper investigates the development of the Commercial Reserve Imagery Fleet. Scope This paper attempts to answer three questions on the concept of a CRIF: First, do we need such a fleet? Second, if a CRIF is needed, what are the necessary conditions for establishing it? Third, once the conditions have been established, how should a CRIF be designed? To answer these questions, the history of the CRAF is explored to find useful lessons learned from its establishment and operation. Then the history and unique aspects of commercial satellite imagery are explored and to see where the CRAF model fits and where it doesn't and to suggest a model that is appropriate for a CRIF. Why a CRIF? Given a requirement for surge imagery capacity during a crisis, it is not obvious that a CRIF would be the proper solution. This section addresses three reasons why a CRIF is needed. First, Congress appears intent on reducing the cost of providing satellite reconnaissance capability for the United States. Members of Congress are hoping that commercial remote sensing satellites will eventually perform a significant portion of routine imaging requirements, enabling a leaner and less costly government reconnaissance system. Second, looking at the historical development of aviation provides a lesson that is difficult to ignore. The parallels between the development of commercial aviation and commercial remote sensing offer CRAF as a strong precedent for a CRIF. Third, future imagery requirements, as documented in the Community Imagery Needs Forecast (CINF),9 point to a CRIF-type system as an effective way to augment national capability, especially for surge capacity. Each of these three points will be discussed in detail in the following three sections. Congressional Support The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 most vividly portrays the mood of the current Congress to move toward increased reliance on commercial imagery. Title VII of the Act calls for a National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The duties of the commission include "review(ing) the current organization, practices, and authorities of the NRO, in particular with respect to...use of commercial imagery." The notes to the Act provide further explanation: [T]he managers determined that an independent review of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) must be conducted to ensure that the Intelligence Community will acquire the most efficient, technologically capable, and economical satellite collection systems...the changing threat environment and emerging technologies have altered both what information satellites can collect and how they collect it. Additionally, Congress wants to ensure that future generations of intelligence collection satellites both perform to their requirements and are purchased at a fair cost to the taxpayer.10 Additionally, the directors of National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the NRO have proposed a nearly $1 billion program over the next 6 years to increase the involvement of commercial providers in the U.S. Imagery and Geospatial Information Service (USIGS)--the system that provides imagery services to the government. While it is still too early to tell if this program will be fully implemented, it appears to have support on Capitol Hill.11 This support, along with congressional drive to reduce the cost of reconnaissance services, is reason enough to develop a CRIF. There also is strong historical precedent. Historical Precedent Early History of Commercial Aviation The military directed and funded a large portion of the initial development of aviation before, during, and after World War I (WWI).12 During WWI, the Army was not able to handle its wartime requirements and continue delivering mail for the Post Office, so the Post Office won permission to start its own air mail delivery service. The contract airlines that sprung up in the 1920s as a result of this eventually became parts of United, American, and Trans World Airways.13 Additionally, America's late entry into WWI caused aircraft manufacturing to gear up just as the war was ending. This left a robust postwar aircraft manufacturing capability with no immediate customer. Aircraft were therefore available at bargain prices, further fueling the initial development of air commerce.14 Several important government actions during this time helped establish commercial aviation. In 1925, Congress passed the Kelly Act. This was the first national policy to promote commercial aviation, providing "for commercial contracts for small connecting routes to supplement the Post Office's own transcontinental service."15 After many smaller studies, Congress appointed the Baker Board in 1934 to study the relationship between government and military aviation. This board recommended that the government form a close relationship with civil aviation, but that the two entities should remain separate. The board also recommended that commercial airlines be used as a reserve for national defense purposes. This was the first recorded recommendation of a civil air reserve, but it was not acted upon until after the WWII and Berlin Airlift experiences proved the value of commercial airlift to the nation.16 At the same time, commercial airline companies repeatedly argued that the military airlift system provided unfair competition with civil airlines and that commercial companies should get most, if not all government business.17 This pattern of developments appears to be repeated in the commercial satellite imagery business. History of Commercial Imagery Satellites The government initially developed imagery satellites for official purposes, much as it had done with aviation. The Corona program launched the first successful, albeit classified, high-resolution system (nominally 11 meters) in 1960.18 Around the same time, several countries launched unclassified, civil satellite remote sensing systems. The United States launched the 1-kilometer resolution Tiros system starting in 1960, followed by the 80-meter resolution Landsat I in 1972; the Landsat series eventually achieved 30-meter resolution.19 The Persian Gulf War saw the first public showcasing of imagery and other services from space providing increased combat effectiveness.20 Just as WWI advanced the role of aviation, this crisis highlighted the use of space imagery and was a catalyst to increased development of this technology. Coalition forces made substantial use of unclassified imagery from the French civil imagery satellite system, Spot, which had been launched in 1986 and delivered 10-meter resolution panchromatic and 20-meter resolution multispectral imagery to the open market. In the 1990s, SPOT was followed by systems built by the European Union, India, Japan, and Canada, while many other countries were developing similar systems.21 Under pressure from U.S. satellite builders, the Congress updated the Land Remote Sensing Act in 1992 to allow U.S. companies to compete in the expanding global market for commercial satellite imagery. This move was meant to ensure and expand the U.S. industrial base in this key technology area and protect our current technological advantage.22 This act was similar to the Kelly Act of 1925 for commercial aviation, which established the first national policy for a new technology in response to growing commercial concern. The commercial remote sensing community is currently discussing the role of commercial imagery satellites in the government architecture and competition between commercial and government systems in the marketplace with Congress and the Intelligence Community (IC).23 It is possible that the congressional NRO review dictated in this year's Intelligence Authorization Act could produce a congressional commercial imagery declaration similar to the Baker Board's civil aviation declaration in 1934; however, this remains to be seen. If such a declaration were made, the only item missing to complete the analogy between aviation and imagery satellites is a major crisis (or crises) that required surge imagery to parallel the use of commercial aviation during WWII and the Berlin Airlift. Summary of Historical Parallels There are three important parallels between the development of civil aviation and of the commercial satellite imagery industry. First, early development of both technologies was driven by the military for exclusively military requirements. Second, as the technology became more accepted, refined, and cost-effective, commercial applications developed. Third, the initial commercial applications were heavily government subsidized, with truly private applications developing later. Referring to figure 1, it is clear that the commercial satellite imagery industry is in a state of development similar to that of commercial aviation between 1925 and 1934. It was during this time that commercial aviation blossomed, became economically viable, and developed into a national resource that was first tested during World War II. The CRAF was established in 1951, shortly after the Berlin Airlift demonstrated the utility of a massive airlift capability. From this perspective, discussions of a CRIF are clearly the ground floor of an effort that will need to mature and evolve as the satellite imagery industry develops and becomes commercially viable. However, these changes may occur more rapidly as the current pace of technology and business development is much greater than in the 1930s. It is also possible that a near-term crisis could accelerate this process. Requirement for Surge Imagery The most important reason to develop a CRIF is that there is a real surge requirement for imagery that cannot be met by current or programmed government systems. There is much debate on this issue. Some argue a surge requirement is self-evident. During crises, limited assets like airlift and reconnaissance systems are always overtasked and requirements far exceed capacity.24 Others argue that the proposed NRO Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), the programmed next-generation of national imagery satellites and ground stations, will provide more than enough capacity to meet all future requirements.25 A detailed treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this study. However, the recent NIMA/NRO Commercial Imagery Strategy (CIS) study provides the most detailed effort to date investigating the use of commercial imagery. The CIS conducted several analyses using the CINF that studied different combinations of national and commercial constellations. The CIS study confirmed that commercial imagery systems could meet surge requirements.26 Mr. Keith Hall, Director of the NRO, amplified this point during a media roundtable discussion:
What we have found in our imagery architecture and one of the main things of FIA is not how many pictures you can take in a day, but how many pictures can you take over Kosovo in a day. It is a lot less what you can take over Kosovo than what you can take over the world. And in those type of situations, I would anticipate that a combination of airborne, commercial and FIA in a region like Kosovo or North Korea or something like that, we still will be stressed to get all the information to support what people can properly use to make wise decisions.27
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One other assumption that is critical to a CRIF is that commercial satellite imagery is able to fill valid imagery requirements in peacetime (non-surge requirements). In order for the CRIF to work, commercial imagery must fill valid requirements that will provide a sustainable level of government business that can be used as monetary incentive for vendor participation in the CRIF. The CIS and two other studies validated this assumption that commercial imagery of with resolution of 1-10 meters can accomplish many militarily significant tasks.28 Conditions for CRIF Implementation Although the preceding evidence supports a CRIF concept to meet national imagery surge requirements, it is not clear that current government and industry conditions are sufficient to support the establishment of a CRIF. This section briefly reviews the status of the aviation industry preceding and during the CRAF formation to examine the conditions that precipitated CRAF formation. Using this analysis, the conditions necessary for the implementation of the CRIF are then explored. First, the legal basis for providing incentives to the industry for participation is examined, then the exact requirement for surge capacity. Legal Basis and Incentives to Vendors for Participation Based on the successes of civil aviation in WWII and the Berlin Airlift, President Truman signed Executive Order 10219 in March 1951 to create the CRAF. By this time, commercial air service had truly become a national asset.29 A major bolstering of the CRAF came several years later, when the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 established the Federal Aviation Agency and required any carrier wishing to do business with the Department of Defense to offer aircraft to the CRAF. This Act gave the Secretary of the Air Force the legal basis for giving preferential treatment to CRAF participants for normal, peacetime, airlift requirements.30 The main incentive for commercial airline participation in the CRAF, besides patriotism and utilization of excess airline capacity, is the lure of a sustained base of regular, peacetime airlift from the DOD. In the early 1960s, the DOD commercial airlift budget was approximately $150 million to $250 million per year.31 By 1989, the airlift budget had grown to $618 million.32 However, the drawdown of the military in the 1990s caused this budget to shrink, and the incentive for commercial participation diminished accordingly. Likewise, commercial satellite imagery vendors are interested in a steady, baseline DOD business. However, the government has not yet developed a commercial satellite imagery budget. The NIMA FY2000 budget for commercial imagery purchases is only $6.4 million. In addition, there is $75 million in the FY2000 budget for contractual production of geospatial data, products, and services, some of which will be derived from commercial imagery. The jointly developed NIMA and NRO Commercial Imagery Strategy proposed a 6-year (FY2000-2005) $1 billion budget, with approximately $320 million designated for commercial imagery purchases, $580 million for contracted geospatial data products and services, and $100 million for infrastructure improvements.33 Until this proposed budget becomes a reality, there is no financial incentive for the vendors to participate in a CRIF. One possible solution is to aggregate the entire U.S. Government requirement for commercial imagery into a single incentive pool. Currently at least two other government agencies--the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)--purchase commercial imagery for their purposes.34 If the money dedicated for these purchases could be pooled it would create a larger incentive for CRIF participation. Pooling could be accomplished by legislative action, similar to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 that mandated airline participation in the CRAF prior to receiving any peacetime DOD airlift contracts. In the same manner, legislation could be put in place to require CRIF participation for any company providing imagery, or even imagery services to the U.S. Government. Two other issues may affect the incentive pool for commercial imagery. The first is the NRO Future Imagery Architecture (FIA). FIA will produce a government imagery system that is more capable than today's imagery constellation, potentially leading to a decreased need for commercial imagery, even though commercial imagery will be integrated into FIA.35 The commercial remote sensing companies argue that this is the wrong causal relationship. They argue that FIA should be modified by the success of the commercial ventures--the government should not develop a system that directly competes with commercial enterprise.36 However, the FIA development train has already left the station and will not likely be impacted by commercial imagery, at least in the near-term. This trend toward decreased need for commercial imagery based on FIA capability may be countered by the second issue, the military's increasing reliance on information and information systems driving an exponentially increasing need for imagery and imagery products.37 It remains to be seen which of these trends will dominate. Requirement for Surge Capacity The second condition that must be met before forming a CRIF is to understand the requirement for surge capacity. For the CRAF this was an ongoing argument between the commercial carriers and the military that was finally settled in 1960, when the Defense Department published The Role of Military Air Transport Service in Peace and War. This report essentially established the size of the military airlift component by mandating that the military build indigenous airlift sufficient to meet "hard-core" military requirements: outsize and oversize cargo, hazardous materials, and short take-offs and landings from unimproved runways. The military could operate this airlift in peacetime to perform routine airlift, but all other airlift requirements would be reserved for U.S. commercial carriers.38 This eventually led to the situation prior to the Gulf War where commercial carriers dedicated the capability to lift 17 million ton miles (MTM) per day of cargo to augment military airlift capability for a major theater war.39 Likewise, the U.S. Government needs to define more clearly the surge imagery requirements for crisis. This is necessary so that the incentive system can be set up to balance supply and demand. The actual surge requirements need to be explored in detail so the vendors offer what is needed. For example, in CRAF the main requirement is for long-range cargo capacity. Accordingly, the CRAF was set up to give more credit to those companies contributing long-range cargo aircraft and less credit for short-range cargo or passenger aircraft.40 Similarly, the exact surge requirements for a CRIF need to be defined so participation can be measured. In the CRIF, some requirement categories might be time-dominant versus non-time-dominant, highest resolution versus lower resolution, broad area versus point targets, and panchromatic versus multispectral, to name just a few. This could also be where services other than collection capacity might be considered. During a crisis, there may be a requirement for surge exploitation or value-added product production capabilities. With some creative thinking, the CRIF might be used to help augment all phases of the imagery intelligence cycle including tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. Further refinement of these requirements is a prerequisite to the successful creation of a CRIF. However, the detailed exploration of these requirements is beyond the scope of this study. Developing a Working Commercial Reserve Imagery Fleet
Having established the need for a CRIF and the necessary conditions for implementing it, this section concentrates on outlining the details of setting up a CRIF. An analysis of the CRAF provides a useful baseline from which to start. The details of the commercial satellite imagery industry are compared to the airline industry to identify significant differences. A CRIF structure is then proposed based on this analysis. This section discusses three major areas for implementing a CRIF: the contractual model, CRIF organization, and risk issues.
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A similar system of segments and stages is proposed for the CRIF. A notional stage, segment, and category breakdown for the CRIF is given in table 2. The same three stages of emergency call-up are adopted from the CRAF. Three different imagery segments are proposed: high-resolution points, high-resolution area, and broad area coverage. The exact definition of each segment will need to be specified through a detailed study, but these terms are generally accepted in the intelligence community. Finally, imagery types are further divided into panchromatic and multispectral categories. A radar category could also be added if a U.S. radar satellite was developed or the CRIF was expanded to include foreign satellites. Third, a review of the CRAF call-up during the Gulf War reveals logistical problems that lead to a parallel discussion of improving commercial imagery delivery to the end user before the surge requirement is fulfilled. For example, there was a lack of loading and unloading equipment for the commercial aircraft that caused longer ramp times for the aircraft than planned. Also, commercial carriers were not well prepared to handle or transport hazardous materials.42 These examples indicate a thorough examination of the details of getting the product to the end user must be made in order to have a successful surge capacity. The user's need is not met until the product is in hand. In the intelligence community, this is referred to as completing the intelligence cycle. Thus, in order to have a successful surge imagery capacity, the entire tasking, production, exploitation, and dissemination cycle must be enhanced to avoid any bottlenecks to getting the final product to the end user. A detailed discussion of all of the contractual model elements may be found in appendix A. CRIF Organizational Structure After many changes and organizational evolutions, the current CRAF organizational structure is relatively solid. It provides a good baseline for administration and operation of a CRIF. In fact, a similar organizational construct is already in place. At the top level, the functional control of CRAF is split between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. After years of evolution, in May 1981 a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the DOD and DOT redefined the relationship between the two departments with CRAF allocation assigned to DOT and CRAF operation assigned to DOD.43 A similar structure exists today for commercial satellite imagery. Licensing authority and regulation of the commercial remote sensing industry is given to the Department of Commerce (DOC) by the Land Remote Sensing Act of 1992.44 Thus, if a CRIF is implemented, it will likely entail a similar MOU between the Department of Commerce (for allocation authority) and the intelligence community and DOD (for operation). For the day-to-day and emergency operation of the CRIF within the intelligence community, the CRAF model is also highly instructive. The DOD organization that controls the CRAF is the Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC). The portion of the organizational structure relevant to the CRAF is shown in figure 2. Day-to-day administration of the contracts and operational control flows from AMC headquarters through the Director of Operations to the Contract Airlift Division.45 During a crisis, an AMC crisis action team (CAT) is formed with representatives from all the necessary AMC staff agencies. Within the CAT is a CRAF Cell composed of military members directly responsible for the operational management of the CRAF. The last barrier to overcome is the interface with the commercial carriers. Each commercial carrier uses its own method of scheduling and its own cargo tracking system, and all systems are different from those used by the military. To handle this diverse industry and ensure interface with military operations, the CRAF cell has a Technical Advisory Group (TAG). The TAG is made up of "qualified airline representatives designated and provided by CRAF carriers that will furnish technical advice and information designed to provide maximum coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness in the use of the CRAF." The TAG may operate during peacetime and during CRAF activation.46 A similar organizational structure for commercial imagery also exists within the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. DOD Directive 5105.60 gives NIMA the authority to contract for, order, and purchase commercial imagery for the DOD, the intelligence community, and other organizations, as appropriate.47 Figure 3 shows the NIMA organizational structure for this function. The NIMA Commercial Imagery Program (CIP) is part of the Central Imagery Tasking Office (CITO) within the Operations Directorate of NIMA.48 The CIP negotiates and manages the day-to-day contract operations for commercial satellite imagery and would be the logical place to negotiate and manage CRIF contracts. CITO also is establishing a Commercial Imagery Staff Office (CISO) to interface commercial requirements with the national Requirements Management System (RMS). Thus CISO will be the office responsible for deconflicting national and commercial imagery collection on a routine basis.49 A crisis action team or CRIF cell could be attached to the CISO or be formed at a higher level within the NIMA operations chain to handle surge imagery requirements during crisis. Additionally, an imagery vendor TAG within this cell may be useful to smooth any interface issues. Vendor Issues for CRIF Participation
Finally, several other CRAF issues are instructional in the development of a CRIF. The issues fall into financial and physical risk categories.
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Financial Risks
Two issues related to financial impacts of CRAF participation are relevant to the development of the CRIF. The first is the current business environment. Under deregulation, the airlines are constantly striving for increased efficiency and less overhead.50 Correspondingly, they have lost the ability to absorb a CRAF call-up and are thus reluctant to participate for fear of losing market share. Long-term losses outweigh short-term gains. In contrast, imagery vendors are not worried about deregulation, but the current business environment does affect their ability to participate in a CRIF. The three vendors have each established different business models regarding the rights and responsibilities of their investment partners. Thus, a particular vendor will find it easier or harder to participate in a CRIF depending on the contractual details. The details of the various business models are proprietary information and may not be specifically discussed. At this point, it must suffice to say that this concern must be taken into consideration during CRIF development.51 Second, the aviation industry has worked its way through a period of concern about competition from military airlift for the lucrative business of moving military equipment and personnel. As the airlines developed, they constantly complained about the competition from the military airlift system and made political moves to obtain the bulk of military airlift for themselves.52 This issue was studied extensively. Eventually the military agreed to develop airlift systems specifically designed to meet military "hard-core" requirements that could not be met by civilian aviation. The maintenance of this capability would necessarily mean that some peacetime airlift would be done by the military, but the rest was to be given to commercial companies.53 In 1956, DOD Directive 5160.2 required military airlift to be re-established on an "industrial-fund basis," that is, military airlift had to be operated like a business, with users paying for the airlift they need. The airlines, however, continued to complain that the competition was not fair because the amount charged by the military did not account for the costs of the equipment or the salaries of the operators as these items came out of a different pot of money.54 In the CRIF arena, one method for improving competition between government and commercial collection systems might be to reestablish the government imagery business on an industrial-fund basis as was done for airlift in the 1960s. This would entail the government establishing a practice whereby the imagery customer pays for imagery and imagery services from the government imaging system, just as they pay for commercial imagery and services. However, this may be difficult to accomplish based on the current National Space Policy. This policy states that the price charged for government facilities, equipment, or service "will not seek to recover the design and development costs of investments associated with any existing or new facilities required to meet U.S. government needs and to which the U.S. government retains title."55 Physical Risks The threat of SCUD missile attacks with chemical weapons made protection of assets and people a key issue for the CRAF during the Gulf War. The government issued chemical gear to the aircrews, but a lack of training and unwillingness to use the equipment caused those precautions to be of little use.56 Additionally, commercial insurers cancelled insurance on aircraft called into the CRAF.57 Congress had previously addressed this issue in 1951 by adding a Title XIII to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, allowing the DOC to provide aviation war risk insurance during crises.58 If U.S. commercial imagery vendors were to be activated under a CRIF, it could increase the likelihood of attack on their assets, both terrestrial and space-based. Due consideration must be given to this possibility to include protection and training against possible attacks, conducting vulnerability assessments, and setting up passive and active defense measures. Further research investigating the implications of CRIF activation on the ability of the vendors to insure their assets must be completed. It may be necessary to legislate a government insurance program for times of crisis, similar to the Title XIII insurance for aircraft. Summary and Conclusions The inclusion of advanced technology in our military doctrine to improve our ability to find, fix, and target anything with greater speed and accuracy is driving an ever-increasing requirement for imagery during crises. In response, the evidence presented in this paper supports the formation of a CRIF. The intent of Congress to support commercial imagery and control the cost for national imagery sources is clear.59 Tough congressional budget decisions will eventually refocus national imagery systems on the "hard core" requirements and commercial imagery will be relied upon to fill routine collection and supplement national systems for surge capacity during crisis. The historical parallel between commercial aviation and commercial satellite imagery illustrates a successful CRIF is likely and supportable. Additionally, preliminary studies validated the ability of commercial systems to fill baseline peacetime and surge imagery requirements.60 The only remaining question is when a CRIF will become a viable option. This study identified the two major conditions that must be met prior to the implementation of a CRIF. The first is the development of a viable incentive system. Commercial companies will not volunteer to participate in a CRIF if the incentives are lacking. Development of this incentive system will likely take some time and be somewhat dependent on the viability of the commercial remote sensing industry. The government is making progress on establishing a workable incentive program through the development of a $1 billion peacetime program over six years. If this comes to fruition it would provide the necessary funding basis and a sufficient incentive. The second condition is for the government to examine in detail the surge requirement for commercial imagery. The government needs to have an understanding of the quantity, quality, and timeliness of imagery necessary to meet surge crisis requirements. A good understanding of the requirements is necessary to balance the supply and demand equation of a CRIF.
Finally, the details of how a CRIF could be implemented were proposed. While the CRAF provides an excellent model to jump-start the CRIF development process, there are significant differences between the two industries that must be considered. The contractual model, organizational lessons, and risks that arose during CRAF activation serve to refine CRIF implementation. Table 3 presents a summary of the similarities and differences between the two industries and the effects on CRIF formation. The biggest difference between the two industries is in stage of maturity. By the time the CRAF was implemented in 1951, commercial air service was a robust industry that had proven itself in WWII and the Berlin Airlift. AMC is now struggling with maintaining the CRAF in the current environment of deregulation. Conversely, the satellite imagery business is working to establish its market position. This condition demands that the government fully understand its requirements before implementing a CRIF and work even harder to shape the incentive program appropriately.
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The other primary difference is the basic unit of measure for participation. The CRAF uses number of aircraft. This analysis shows that the equivalent unit of participation for satellite imagery is seconds of imaging time. Using this measure, the CRAF model of stages, segments, and categories can then be adopted for CRIF with the appropriate elements redefined to meet the satellite imagery industry. From an organizational standpoint, control of the CRAF and control of satellite imagery have similar structures. If the CRAF serves as a good organizational example, a cell needs to be created in the NIMA operations chain to coordinate and deconflict commercial imagery requirements during crises. The requirement for a surge imagery capacity is valid. The Gulf War, recent conflicts, and the increasing need for information and speed in modern wars confirm this requirement. Plotting the recent actions of Congress against the historical example for airlift makes it equally clear that a CRIF is in the future. The only question is when. The government needs to work with industry to establish the conditions that will support the national interest through the development of a robust commercial satellite imagery industry that will blossom into a national resource. Recommendations It would not be possible to negotiate a CRIF today. As this study has pointed out, there are at least two necessary conditions that need to be met prior to implementing a CRIF. These are development of the incentive for participation and refinement of the surge requirements. Additionally, there are several interim steps that can be taken to enhance the utility of commercial imagery and accelerate the development of the CRIF. Each of these items will be discussed briefly below. The first step is to develop the incentive for participation. The industry has indicated that a commitment on the order of $50 million per year would be adequate to assure the vendors of sufficient business enabling them to invest in infrastructure and future system developments that meet an expanded set of government requirements.61 Government budgets that would adequately meet the needs of industry have been proposed. The Commercial Imagery Strategy Study, approved by the Directors of NRO and NIMA, has put forward a budget that includes direct imagery purchases averaging over $50 million per year over the FY00-05 budget cycle. Additionally, there is more money budgeted for infrastructure improvements and value added products and services.62 The government needs to follow through with these budgets and establish firm commitments to the industry. Without an established incentive of this magnitude, there is no reason a vendor would volunteer to participate in a CRIF.63 Second, one of the major assumptions for this study was that a surge requirement for imagery existed that could be fulfilled by commercial imagery. This assumption has been validated by a previous study,64 but the detailed requirement has not been established. This must occur before a CRIF can be implemented. In the CRAF example, the military figured out how much of an airlift deficit existed to support a major theater war.65 The CRAF, although voluntary, could then be sized appropriately. Likewise the government needs to establish the quantity, quality, and timeliness of its surge imagery requirements in some detail. Establishing the requirement will be the first step in developing the weighting system used to measure participation in the CRIF. More value will be given to participation that meets the most critical needs. Finally, the government can take several steps now to speed and smooth the integration of commercial imagery into USIGS and improve the implementation of a CRIF when the time is right. The government needs to act now to influence the Future Imagery Architecture development so that commercial imagery providers are integrated seamlessly. Additionally, the government needs to firm up the organizational structure within NIMA that will be responsible for all commercial imagery activities.66 Appendix A Contractual Model Measuring Vendor Participation In the CRAF model, airlines voluntarily designate a certain number of aircraft for participation. Some aircraft are more valuable than others because of characteristics such as longer range or more cargo capacity. The vendor is given more "credit" for allocating aircraft with these desirable characteristics by calculation of the aircraft's mobilization value (MV). A MV is calculated for each aircraft allocated to the CRAF based on its payload capacity, volume, speed, and range. The sum of all the MV of a carrier is computed and the airlines with the largest sums get the greatest percentage of DOD peacetime airlift contracts.67 (For a detailed look at how MV is calculated, see appendix B.) While a concept similar to MV might be developed for imaging spacecraft, space assets are sufficiently different from aircraft that a different unit of measure is necessary. The primary difference is in the concept of exclusive use. Aircraft are mobile and can be moved to where they are needed. But an aircraft being used on a CRAF mission is not available to the commercial carrier. However, a satellite taking images in support of the CRIF remains available to the vendor and the image itself could be re-used by the vendor, if allowed.68 So an imagery satellite clearly cannot be the equivalent unit to an aircraft in the CRAF. The satellite imagery business does not have such a clearly defined and easily fungible unit of measure. The three current vendors generally speak in terms of images, equivalent images,69 or seconds of imaging time. They sometimes talk in larger terms about percentage of collection capacity. Additionally, these terms all are tied to the satellite location at the time. Capacity, images, or seconds of imagery time in one geographic region have very little or no impact for a different region.70 Compounding this issue, crises tend to be geographically confined, although the exact location is difficult to predict in advance. For CRAF activation, this is not a particularly difficult issue, since aircraft have the flexibility to move to the location. For imagery vendors, this is more difficult for two reasons. First, each vendor has a different business model. All the companies have signed up partners around the world; however, the relationship between the vendor and the partners and the rights of the partners varies significantly from vendor to vendor. Thus the ability of individual vendors to commit capacity to a CRIF may vary.71 Second, even within a single vendor, the geographic distribution of partners and the amount of total capacity over specific regions committed to these partners vary dramatically.72 This increases the difficulty in developing a general scheme that allows vendors to "participate" in a globally applicable CRIF, at least initially. Over time, this situation may resolve itself as a standard business practice emerges. Based on these concerns and information provided by the vendors, the best unit of measure for the CRIF is seconds of imagery time per day, based on its universality and ease of measurement. The value of these seconds may be determined by the following attributes: swath width, equivalent image size, and delivery time. Additionally, a quality measure (that will be discussed under Segments below) should contribute to the value, as well as the priority of tasking and the geographic concentration allowed. Geographic concentration refers to how densely the seconds may be tasked. For example, if a vendor offers 100 imaging seconds per day, the government may place a higher value on this time if all 100 seconds can be collected over a single region. Alternatively, the vendor may offer 100 seconds per day with no more than 50 seconds collected in one pass. This may be of lower value to the government. The exact weighting system will need further study, based on government requirements. Segments The CRAF model breaks up participation into segments to maximize flexibility in activation and to better define the specific needs of the government for various levels of crisis. The CRAF has five segments, each with specific requirements: long-range international, short-range international, domestic, Alaskan, and aeromedical evacuation. Each of these segments is designed to address a specific airlift shortfall that may occur during a crisis.73 For example, long-range international aircraft must have extended overwater capability with the necessary navigation, communication, and survival equipment to fly at least 2,350 nautical miles with a productive load. Additionally, the segments are further subdivided into two subcategories--cargo aircraft and passenger aircraft--since the two types of airlift capabilities address separate needs and cannot be easily interchanged.74 Similarly, the CRIF may benefit from having pre-defined segments. The proposed segments are high-resolution point collection, high-resolution area collection, and broad area coverage. These terms have generally accepted meaning within the intelligence community and divide the requirement set into recognizable areas. The exact resolution limits and coverage capabilities of these segments still need to be determined. For example, the high-resolution point collection segment will have a minimum quality (lowest acceptable resolution), image size, and timeliness requirement associated with it that will correspond with being able to complete certain intelligence tasks. These segments can be further categorized by sensor type. In this case the categories will be Panchromatic and Multispectral. If the CRIF were expanded to foreign systems or a U.S. radar satellite was developed, a Radar category might also be useful. The exact requirements for each segment need to be resolved by a thorough study. Continuing with the example from the vendor participation section above, a vendor might participate in the CRIF by offering 100 imaging seconds per day in the High-Resolution Point Collection Segment and 200 seconds per day in the Broad Area Coverage Segment. Orbital mechanics may preclude a vendor from having any imaging seconds that meet high-resolution standards on a given day, but this is a known fact-of-life in the satellite imagery business. This construct allows the government some level of predictability of access required during a crisis, yet acknowledges access limitations inherent in the satellite business. Stages The CRAF model has three call-up stages to provide maximum responsiveness and flexibility: Stage 1--Committed Expansion, Stage 2--Defense Airlift Emergency, and Stage 3--National Emergency. The commander of Air Mobility Command can activate Stage 1, while Stages 2 and 3 require the National Command Authority (President or Secretary of Defense) for activation. In addition, each call-up stage is comprised of different segments of the CRAF to meet the requirements of that level of crisis. As seen in table 1, Stage 1 is comprised only of long-range international segment aircraft, while the other two stages include all the other segments except aeromedical, which is only in Stage 3.75 The number of stages required for a CRIF will probably mirror this three-level approach. However, the number of stages needed and the exact composition of the segments within each stage are subjects for further investigation, based on the requirements of the government. A notional stage, segment, and category breakdown for the CRIF is given in table 2. Logistics: Processing, Production and Dissemination
During the CRAF call-up for Desert Storm, several logistics and planning problems were unexpectedly encountered. First, there was a lack of loading and unloading equipment for the commercial aircraft that caused longer ramp times for the aircraft than planned. Additionally, wide-body passenger aircraft modified to carry cargo under the CRAF Enhancement Program76
had no provision for using loading equipment and had to be loaded and unloaded by hand. So even though they could carry more cargo, the long delays made them less useful. Also, commercial carriers were not well prepared to handle or transport hazardous materials.77
These examples indicate a thorough examination of the details of getting the product to the end user must be made in order to have a successful surge capacity. The user's need is not met until the product is in his hand. In the intelligence community, this is referred to as completing the intelligence cycle. As shown in figure 4, collection is only one part of the cycle. Increasing collection to meet surge requirements must be accompanied by improvements in all portions of the cycle to be successful. The planning and direction portion of the CRIF will be discussed later in the section on organization. This section will briefly discuss the processing, production, and dissemination portion of the intelligence cycle.
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Processing commercial imagery is a normal function of the commercial vendors, who turn raw data from the satellite into useable information: images. Vendor systems are sized to process all of the data from their satellites, so surge processing capacity is not an issue. However, one scheme for improving the delivery of image data to the user is to downlink the imagery directly to the theater. In fact, the three vendor systems are all designed to operate primarily in a direct downlink mode. In this case, the government needs to develop an in-theater, direct, downlink processing system, similar to the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army Eagle Vision systems.79 Once processing is complete, production entails the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information, in this case commercial imagery, to produce finished intelligence.80 This implies that in order to generate a true surge capacity, not just for imagery collection, but also intelligence production, surge analysis and exploitation capability must be developed as well. Just like the CRAF concept, which has a separate contract for logistics to support surge commercial airlift capacity, the CRIF should have a separate contract for exploitation and value-added product support for surge commercial imagery collection capacity. This may take one of two forms. The contract could be set up as a logistic-type contract as a separate part of the CRIF. Or the concept may be to add an additional segment to the existing CRIF contract, to "back-fill" domestic exploitation and value-added production requirements as government analysts and production resources are switched over to work on the crisis. This "back-fill" concept would then work similarly to the CRAF domestic segment to augment the domestic requirements that are not being met as military airlift aircraft are called into service to support the crisis. Finally, the image or finished intelligence must be transmitted to the user. This is the dissemination phase. Dissemination of surge commercial imagery as part of CRIF will likely be over the same dissemination paths for normal, nonsurge imagery.81 The design of the dissemination system only needs to take into account the surge rates expected. These rates will come from the detailed requirements analysis that still needs to be conducted. At the appropriate time, all these logistics considerations need to be folded into the government imagery system architecture, known as the U.S. Imagery and Geospatial Information Service (USIGS).82 Ideally, commercial imagery providers would integrate seamlessly into the system so that they look and feel like government imagery providers (the NRO and other tactical imagery systems). Without a comparable level of integration, the commercial systems will not be able to fulfill their full capability to meet established requirements. Several infrastructure improvements could be looked at to meet near-term and future needs. These include, but are not limited to, improved electronic delivery, improved visibility into tasking and collection status, common countdown of requirements, direct downlink of imagery to theater, and near real-time downlink of imagery.83 Appendix B CRAF Mobilization Value (MV) Calculation The mobilization value (MV) is a relative measure of the value DOD places on commercial aircraft for meeting wartime requirements. Basic MV Computation Factors The aircraft MV computation is based on aircraft payload, volume, block speed, and range. Computation data is derived from the standard equipment and configuration of each aircraft. * Payload is based on aircraft weight capability at a specified range. * Volume is provided by the number of 463L pallets on the main deck and LD-3 containers in the lower lobe carried on board cargo aircraft. * Block speed is computed in accordance with Air Force airlift planning directives using the average speed with 25 minutes added for taxi, takeoff, approach, landing, and block-in. * Standard range for MV computations for each segment: * Long-Range International and aeromedical-3,500 nautical miles * Short-Range International-1,500 nautical miles * Domestic-400 nautical miles * Alaskan-400 nautical miles Long-Range International and Aeromedical Evacuation CRAF Computation/Factors and Procedures Computations are based on the relative capability of long-range international CRAF aircraft. The aircraft chosen as the base aircraft will be given payload and speed factors of "1". * All MV calculations are based on data submitted by carriers on AMC HQ Form 82, CRAF Aircraft Basic Data Sheet, and AMC HQ Form 83, CRAF Aircraft Performance. These forms are part of the * solicitation for airlift services and must be on file in HQ AMC/XOC in order to receive MV points. * Cargo aircraft MV formula: MV = Payload Factor x Speed Factor x Daily Utilization Rate (10.0) * Payload Factor--the square root of the product of the weight factor and the cube factor: * Cube Factor--the cubic feet of cargo space available on military 463L pallets on the main deck and in LD-3 containers in the lower lobe, divided by 4,680 (the cubic feet of cargo space available on the base aircraft). * Weight factor--The payload, in tons, of an aircraft over 3,500 nautical miles divided by 36.0 (the payload of the base aircraft). * Speed Factor--based on the aircraft's block speed over the standard range divided by 440 (the block speed of the base aircraft). * Daily utilization rate--the minimum number of hours of daily aircraft utilization for acceptance into the CRAF. * Passenger/aeromedical aircraft MV (PMV/AMV) Formula: PMV/AMV = Payload Factor x Speed Factor x Daily Utilization Rate (10.0) * The passenger payload factor is based on the smaller of either the company standard seating of the number of passengers; at 400 pounds each, the aircraft can carry the standard range (3,500 nautical miles). The smaller of these two numbers is then divided by 165 (number of passengers on the base aircraft). * After computing the MVs, each cargo and aeromedical evacuation aircraft receive full MV credit. Passenger aircraft receive prorated MV credit. The prorated MV credit for passenger aircraft is determined by multiplying the raw MV by a passenger MV multiplier. * The passenger MV multiplier is determined by dividing the total raw cargo MV points by the predetermined cargo percentage share of the AMC peacetime fixed buy airlift business. From the answer, subtract the total raw cargo MV points. Then divide the answer, which is the total allowed passenger MV points, by the total raw passenger MV points. The final answer is the MV multiplier. Short-Range International, Domestic, and Alaskan CRAF Computations MV computations are based on maximum payload, in short tons, multiplied by the block speed, multiplied by the utilization rate, and then divided by 10,000 (a constant used to simplify the final number). Time Period for Computing and Recomputing MV MV will be initially computed after the carriers submit their AMC HQ Forms 82 and 83, then it may be recomputed once every six months, with the resulting MV points applying only to expansion business.84 Glossary
AMC-Air Mobility Command Notes 1. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, "Summary Report," in Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1993), 135. [Back] 2. Keith Hall, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, "Media Roundtable Transcript," July 8, 1999. [Back] 3. Joseph C. Anselmo, "Commercial Space's Sharp New Image," Aviation Week and Space Technology 152 (January 31, 2000): 52-7. See also Orbital Imaging Corporation (ORBIMAGE), "OrbView-1: Low-Cost, High-Value Weather Information," n.p.; on-line, Internet, March 20, 2000, available from http://www.orbimage.com/satellite/orbview1/orbview1.html. ORBIMAGE launched the first truly commercial imaging satellite, OrbView-1, in April 1995. This satellite provides weather and lightning data for atmospheric monitoring and research. The imaging instrument has a resolution of 10 kilometers. Ikonos is the first "high-resolution" commercial imaging satellite. [Back] 4. Anselmo, "Commercial Space's Sharp New Image," 52-7. [Back] 5. James Oberg, "Spying for Dummies," IEEE Spectrum 36 (November 1999): 62. [Back] 6. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "Foreign Access to Remote Sensing Capabilities," Fact Sheet, PDD-23 (March 10, 1994). [Back] 7. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-120, 106th Cong., (2000), section 703 and comments on section 701. See also NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report (DRAFT) (U), July 15, 1999, 4. (SECRET/SCI/PROPIN) Information extracted is unclassified. [Back] 8. Researching this topic revealed three nominally independent sources for the CRIF idea. See Commercial Imagery Program, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Frequently Asked Questions, NIMA Use of Commercial Imagery (October 15, 1999). See also Chris Allen, "Civil Reserve Imaging Fleet Proposal," Proposal viewgraph slides (Bethesda, MD: NIMA/PAS). See also Institute for National Security Studies, "Space Policy--Topic 14, Propose New Business Practices Whereby the U.S. Military Can Obtain Needed Surge Capacity on Commercial Systems During Times of Crisis," Air University Research Topics, August 9, 1999, on-line, Internet, 6 October 1999, available from http://research.maxwell.af.mil/Topics_Database/display_topic.asp?topicNbr=326. [Back] 9. NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report (DRAFT) (U), 15 July 1999, 22. (SECRET/SCI/PROPIN) Information extracted is unclassified. NIMA's CINF is the intelligence community's projection of future imagery requirements. It is the most complete database available to study future imagery needs. However, the study stated explicitly one of its analysis assumptions: "NIMA's CINF database of requirements is a real reflection of government requirements in the future; although, a variety of non-CINF specified requirements are addressed." [Back] 10. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-120, 106th Cong., (2000), comments on Section 701. [Back] 11. Frequently Asked Questions, NIMA Use of Commercial Imagery. [Back] 12. Ronald N. Priddy, A History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet In Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sortie (Washington, D.C.: DOD Policy Board on Federal Aviation, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 1994),1. [Back] 13. Carl R. Behrens, "The Civil Reserve Air Fleet: The Past, First Use, and the Future," Air War College Student Report (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Library, April 1994), 6. [Back] 14. Priddy, A History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 1. [Back] 15. Ibid., 3. [Back] 16. Ibid., 4. [Back] 17. Kirk L. Brown, "History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (1952-1986)," Air Command and Staff College Student Report (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Library, April 1987), 3-28. [Back] 18. Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., CORONA: America's First Satellite Program, CIA Cold War Series (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), 37. [Back] 19. George J. Tahu, John C. Baker, and Kevin M. O'Connel, "Expanding Global Access to Civilian and Commercial Remote Sensing Data: Implications and Policy Issues," Space Policy 14 (August 1998): 180. See also Anselmo, "Commercial Space's Sharp New Image," 56. [Back] 20. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 135. [Back]
21. Tahu et al., "Expanding Global Access to Civilian and Commercial Remote Sensing 22. National Science and Technology Council, The White House, "National Space Policy," Fact Sheet (September 19, 1996), 9. [Back] 23. NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report (DRAFT) (U), 15 July 1999, 6-7 and 18-9. (SECRET/SCI/PROPIN) Information extracted is unclassified. [Back] 24. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 135. See also Hall, "Media Roundtable Transcript." [Back] 25. Keith R. Hall, "The National Reconnaissance Office: Revolutionizing Global Reconnaissance," Defense Intelligence Journal 8 (Summer 1999): 11. See also Keith R. Hall, "The National Reconnaissance Office--Freedom's Sentinel in Space," to be published in American Intelligence Journal (1999): 23-4. [Back] 26. Commercial Imagery Program, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Frequently Asked Questions, NIMA Use of Commercial Imagery. See also NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report (DRAFT) (U), 15 July 1999, 43. (SECRET/SCI/PROPIN) Information extracted is unclassified. [Back] 27. Hall, "Media Roundtable Transcript." [Back] 28. NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report (DRAFT) (U), 15 July 1999, 43. (SECRET/SCI/PROPIN) Information extracted is unclassified. See also Larry K. Grundhauser, "Sentinels Rising," Airpower Journal 12 (Winter 1998): 63-6. This reference talks about two studies performed by U.S. Space Command and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that validate that commercial imagery of one- to ten-meter resolution can be used for many militarily significant tasks. Many of these tasks are not time-sensitive and the potentially slower delivery time of commercial satellite imagery is not an issue. [Back] 29. Behrens, "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 4. [Back] 30. Priddy, History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 23. [Back] 31. Ibid., 29. [Back] 32. Behrens, "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 12. All figures are in then-year dollars. [Back] 33. Commercial Imagery Program, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Frequently Asked Questions, NIMA Use of Commercial Imagery (October 15, 1999). [Back] 34. Laura Robinson, Chief, NIMA Commercial Imagery Program, Interview by author, March 16, 2000, Bethesda, MD. [Back] 35. National Reconnaissance Office, "NRO Announces FIA Contract Winner," Press Release, September 3, 1999; on-line, Internet, February 12, 2000, available from http://www.nro.mil/PressReleases/prs_rel32.html. See also Raytheon Media Relations, "Raytheon Awarded Subcontract on National Reconnaissance Office Future Imagery Architecture Program," August 31, 1999; on-line, Internet, March 20, 2000, available from http://www.raytheonsemi.com/press/1999/sep/fia.html. [Back] 36. Jeff Kerridge, Vice President, Sales, EarthWatch, interview by author, January 31, 2000, Longmont, CO. [Back] 37. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 135. [Back] 38. Priddy, History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 25. [Back] 39. Ibid., 34. [Back] 40. Air Mobility Command Regulation (AMCR) 55-8, Operations, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) (Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, August 15, 1992), 11-12. [Back] 41. Priddy, History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, D-1 through D-4. The number of aircraft in each stage are cumulative (e.g., the 250 long-range international passenger aircraft in Stage 3 include the 75 aircraft from Stage 2 which includes the 17 aircraft from Stage 1). [Back] 42. Behrens, "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 17. [Back] 43. Ibid., 30. [Back] 44. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Public Law 102-555, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., (28 October 1992). [Back] 45. Air Mobility Command, "Welcome to Headquarters Air Mobility Command Contract Airlift Division," November 9, 1999; on-line, Internet, March 13, 2000, available from http://www.amc.af.mil/do/DOY.htm. [Back] 46. AMCR 55-8, 11. [Back] 47. Commercial Imagery Program, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, USIGS Commercial Satellite Imagery Concept of Operations (July 1999) (For Official Use Only), 4. [Back] 48. National Imagery and Mapping Agency, "WWW Organizational Chart," June 1999; on-line, Internet, March 13, 2000, available from http://164.214.2.59/org/ orgchart.html. [Back] 49. USIGS Commercial Satellite Imagery Concept of Operations, 4. [Back] 50. Behrens, "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 20. [Back] 51. Synthesis of information from three vendor interviews. [Back] 52. Brown, "History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 26. [Back] 53. Priddy, History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 25. [Back] 54. Ibid., 19-20. [Back] 55. National Science and Technology Council, "National Space Policy." [Back] 56. Behrens, "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 16. [Back] 57. Ibid., 18. [Back] 58. Priddy, History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 202. [Back] 59. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-120, 106th Cong., (2000), section 703 and notes on section 701. [Back] 60. NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report, 43. [Back] 61. Joseph Dodd, "Alternatives for Integrating Commercial High Resolution Imaging Satellites in the Future Architecture," (unpublished white paper, ORBIMAGE, Dulles, Virginia). Also discussed in vendor interviews: Joseph Dodd, Vice President, Government Programs, ORBIMAGE, interview by author, Dulles, VA, January 24, 2000; Gary Fuller, Director, Development Programs, Space Imaging, interview by author, Tysons Corner, VA, January 24, 2000; and Jeff Kerridge, Vice President, Sales, EarthWatch, interview by author, January 31, 2000, Longmont, CO. [Back] 62. National Imagery and Mapping Agency and National Reconnaissance Office, "Commercial Imagery Strategy," Unpublished briefing slides (Chantilly, VA: July 1999) (FOUO). [Back] 63. Joseph Dodd, "Alternatives for Integrating Commercial High Resolution Imaging Satellites in the Future Architecture," (unpublished white paper, ORBIMAGE, Dulles, VA). [Back] 64. NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report (DRAFT) (U), July 15, 1999, 43. (SECRET/SCI/PROPIN) Information extracted is unclassified. [Back] 65. William G. Palmby, Enhancement of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: An Alternative for Bridging the Airlift Gap ( Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 1995), 1. [Back] 66. EarthWatch, Orbital Imaging Corporation, and Space Imaging, Inc., "Point Paper for Commercial Imagery Industry Meeting with Congressional Staff," Joint Industry Point Paper (January 7, 2000). [Back] 67. Priddy, History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 26. [Back] 68. Synthesis of information from three vendor interviews: Joseph Dodd, Vice President, Government Programs, ORBIMAGE, interview by author, January 24, 2000, Dulles, VA; Gary Fuller, Director, Development Programs, Space Imaging, interview by author, January 24, 2000, Tysons Corner, VA; and Jeff Kerridge, Vice President, Sales, Earth Watch, interview by author, January 31, 2000, Longmont, CO. [Back] 69. An equivalent image is usually the smallest image the system can take. The amount of system resources consumed is sometimes measured by comparing the actual image size as it is taken to the number of equivalent images that could have been taken in the same time. As a simplified example, if the smallest image size a particular system produces is 10x10 kilometers, an image that is 10x30 kilometers in size is three equivalent images in size and is priced at three times the equivalent image rate. [Back] 70. Synthesis of information from three vendor interviews. See also NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report (DRAFT) (U), July 15, 1999, 37-8. (SECRET/SCI/PROPIN) Information extracted is unclassified. "Global collection capability is difficult to quantify as the distribution of targets globally can have a significant effect on collection performance...regionally, commercial architectures are limited by access and slow imaging times." [Back] 71. Ibid. [Back] 72. Ibid. [Back] 73. Brown, "History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 28-9. [Back] 74. Air Mobility Command Regulation (AMCR) 55-8, Operations, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) (Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Department of the Air Force, August 15, 1992), 11-12. Detailed minimum requirements for each segment and aircraft type--cargo and passenger--are contained in this regulation in Chapter 2, Sections E and F. [Back] 75. Brown, "History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 28-9. [Back] 76. William G. Palmby, Enhancement of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: An Alternative for Bridging the Airlift Gap, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 1995), 25. The CRAF Enhancement program started in 1979 to modify existing or new aircraft to better carry cargo. Aircraft committed to the CRAF by the airlines are primarily passenger aircraft with limited cargo capacity, especially for oversized or outsized cargo. DOD's primary surge need is for cargo capacity, not moving troops. To overcome this problem, Air Mobility Command (AMC) proposed to modify existing or new aircraft in production to add a cargo door and beef-up the flooring system so that a passenger aircraft can be quickly converted to a cargo aircraft. This issue was studied extensively and was found to be the most cost-effective way to increase the surge cargo capacity for the nation, better than a similar amount of organic capability either through new military systems or buying new commercial aircraft for dedicated military use. [Back] 77. Behrens, "Civil Reserve Air Fleet," 17. [Back] 78. Joint Pub 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995), II-3. [Back] 79. Pat Riggs, "EVII System Description," U.S. Army Topographic Engineering Center, 26 January 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, March 20, 2000, available from http://www.tec.army.mil/Ev_II/sysover.htm. [Back] 80. Joint Pub 2-0, II-5. [Back] 81. Commercial Imagery Program, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Interim Demonstration Test Report FY99: CONUS/Hawaii Commands and Organizations (November 30, 1999), 5. [Back] 82. EarthWatch, ORBIMAGE, Space Imaging, "Point Paper for Commercial Imagery Industry Meeting with Congressional Staff," (joint industry unpublished point paper, January 7, 2000). [Back] 83. NIMA and NRO, Commercial Imagery Strategy, Development Team Recommendation, Final Report (DRAFT) (U), July 15, 1999, 48. (SECRET/SCI/PROPIN) Information extracted is unclassified. The report's recommended "Cooperative Engagement Strategy" is based on a "pay as you go" integration of current commercial imagery, imagery products, and services. The potential elements for government industry interaction include several options. First, spin-offs of unique government imaging or communications technologies for commercial use (e.g. government high-fidelity geo-location accuracy used on commercial multispectral products). Second, defense related procurement "pull" (e.g. near-real-time downlink). Third, concurrent development (hyperspectral technology). Fourth, shared infrastructure for tasking and requirements management. Fifth, dual-use technology (government "hardening" of critical satellite components). Last, spin-on of commercial standards for direct government purchase and use. This strategy looks at high near-term costs producing even larger savings in the future. [Back]
84. Air Mobility Command Regulation (AMCR) 55-8, Operations, Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 12-3.
[Back]
Major Douglas B. Rider, USAF, shared second place with this essay, written while attending the Air Command and Staff College. Currently, he is serving in the Central Imagery Tasking Office of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Previous assignments include duty with the joint-service commercial imagery ground station.
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