The Navy before and after September 11

Henry H. Gaffney

Before September 11, the Navy was facing hard choices between maintaining force structure and transforming its forces, especially given resource constraints imposed by the Bush administration. After September 11, the Navy rose splendidly to support the campaign in Afghanistan. Two carriers were available in the Indian Ocean immediately, with two more joining within days. The Navy was also available for homeland defense of the United States, with carrier battlegroups deploying off the two coasts, and the USNS Comfort hospital ship and USNS Denebola supply ship deploying to New York.

Meanwhile, the United States has girded for more terrorist attacks at home. The intensive bombing campaign in Afghanistan to root out Osama bin Laden, demolish the al Qaeda training facilities, and bring down Taliban rule lasted 73 days, from October 7 to December 18.¹ Reportedly, 70 percent of the strikes in Afghanistan were by naval aircraft. Naval air continues to support the campaign. As of April 1, 2002, it was still necessary to strike al Qaeda regrouping facilities, and Omar and Osama still had not been captured.

Beyond the campaign in Afghanistan, the possibilities exist of similar follow-up campaigns to root out al Qaeda in Somalia, Yemen, and Indonesia (special forces are providing assistance in the Philippines and Yemen). Beyond these campaigns, it will take mostly police work and banking investigations to roll up al Qaeda. The Navy may be able to return to its normal operations by summer 2002, but for the foreseeable future, two carriers may be stationed in the Indian Ocean.

The attacks on the United States came at a moment when the U.S. economy was entering recession. The attacks have reinforced that recession, although recent statistics indicate recovery may be sooner than expected. Yet the combination of budget increases and supplementals for the war have improved the Navy’s budget. However, the combination of recession and extra expenses for rebuilding, homeland defense, the war, and stimuli for the economy is leading to a return to a deficit in the Federal budget. This in turn will eventually put a squeeze on the level of the defense budget, even though it is being increased in the near term. With only a vaguely defined role in homeland security, the Navy would then be back to making hard choices about its forces, operations, and modernization, subject to guidance from the administration—choices that may well lead to reductions in the number of ships. The Navy will then have to choose between several options—for example, shrinking the combat elements proportionately, emphasizing one over the other, or taking new paths that are not necessarily dependent on the number of ships to increase capabilities. Naval aviation, including the carriers, has made such a crucial contribution to the campaign in Afghanistan that cutting the number of carriers below 12 is hard to imagine, despite rumors to that effect.

The Navy before September 11

Programs and Force Structure. In its programs and budgets, the Navy and Marine Corps were slated for approximately $99 billion per annum of the overall Department of Defense funding profile of nearly $332 billion. Even at that level, the Congressional defense appropriation categories of Ship Construction and Conversion, Navy (SCN) and Aviation Procurement, Navy (APN) were underfunded. As a result, the Navy was finding it hard to sustain enough shipbuilding to maintain a force structure level of 312 ships. Indeed, both the guided missile destroyer (DDG–51) and amphibious transport dock (LPD–17) programs were experiencing cost overruns, taking even more funds than originally planned. One alternative that had been floated was to reduce the overall fleet to 11 carriers and 11 amphibious ready groups (ARGs) to fund the ship construction shortfall. However, the Defense Planning Guidance (issued before September 11) directed the services to maintain their current manpower and, by implication, total force structure. On the other hand, compensation and medical care had both been improved, and recruitment and retention were up.

Readiness was improving, especially for deploying ships. The F/A–18E/F Strike Hornet aircraft was in full production, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program source selection was drawing near. But production of MV–22 Osprey was set back by 2 more years for further development. The DD 21 Zumwalt-class land attack destroyer program source selection had been deferred since the last days of the Clinton administration, and it was in trouble with both the Bush administration and Congress. The submarine force used the conclusion of a recent Joint Chiefs of Staff study that 68 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) were required to sustain a level of at least 55 in an operational status. A decision had not yet been made to proceed with the conversion of Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarines (SSGNs). The Navy was shifting from specialized mine warfare forces to organic mine countermeasures throughout the fleet. Given that the Bush administration was directing that the services keep force structure, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy were looking for efficiencies instead, including a targetting goal of up to $10 billion in savings a year for the Navy. As planned, these efficiencies would include base closures, but Congress has deferred their consideration to 2005.

Operations. In its forward deployments, the Navy was maintaining the deployment of 2.5 carrier battlegroups and ARGs. With readiness improvements, the deploying ships were adequately supplied, although the problems with Vieques were threatening predeployment training. The Navy was continuing its role in Operation Southern Watch, which necessitated a 1.0 carrier presence in the Gulf, and had thus reduced its Mediterranean carrier presence to 0.5 (while the western Pacific carrier presence was around 1.4, counting USS Kitty Hawk in Japan). However, it no longer had a role in the Adriatic. Operations Southern and Northern Watch and drug patrols were keeping EA–6Bs and E–2Cs busy. The multinational interception operation (MIO) was maintained in the Gulf to prevent Iraq from smuggling oil. Turn-around ratios for vessel and deploying units had been growing somewhat longer—up toward 4.0 in the Atlantic Fleet—especially given the increasing number of nuclear carriers in the fleet and their longer maintenance needs. The interdeployment training cycle (IDTC) was thus being more carefully managed, and naval personnel were not as stressed during the IDTC as they had been earlier. After the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, force protection measures had been stepped up, leading to even fewer in-port days in the Gulf. SSBNs continued their routine patrols. Goals for personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO), the amount of time personnel spent deployed as compared to time in homeport or training, had not been broken since Operation Desert Storm.

Future planning. In the defense debates about the future, the Navy continued to stress its unique contributions to forward presence, to engagement with countries, and to navy-to-navy contacts—altogether referred to as combat credible forward presence. The submarine force emphasized its value in gathering intelligence. The Navy continued to be concerned with antiaccess—the threats from mines, diesel submarines, shore-based cruise missiles, and swarming small boats (but not particularly with combat aircraft flying out to sea; Aegis provides good protection, and few if any hostile countries train that way). For future capabilities, the Navy advocated netcentric warfare, although it was not clear what it consisted of beyond the ongoing Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program. The Navy had gained enormous amounts of dedicated communication frequency bandwidth throughout the 1990s, which permitted it to install the IT–21 Internet system on ships, communicate better with airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and receive joint air tasking orders electronically (which had been a problem during Desert Storm).

Together the Navy and Marine Corps had begun the Navy-Marine Corps Common Internet (NMCI) program to connect all Navy and Marine units at sea and ashore.² The Navy was acquiring more precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Tomahawk had already gained the surface combatant force an independent role. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski—from his position as president of the Naval War College and immediate supervisor of the new Naval Warfare Development Command—pushed for the small littoral combatant concept called Streetfighter, although it had not yet received funding in the overall program.³ CVNX and DD 21 represented the epitome of research and development (R&D) for ships—R&D directed at reducing manning, developing electric drive motors, and so forth. The prospect of a short take-off and landing version of the JSF meant that air-capable ship platforms might be multiplied.⁴ The Navy was more timid about acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), though. The possibility of a near-amphibious family of maritime prepositioning force forward positioned (MPF[F]) ships was discussed, but it was not yet funded in the program. The last of 20 large roll-on/roll-off sealift ships had been launched. Discussion about stretching presence through the rotation of crews, double-crewing, or overseas homeporting (especially in Guam) kept coming up, but such programs have not been executed.

Upon September 11

The Navy responded quickly. For homeland defense, an aircraft carrier and several Aegis ships were deployed toward New York, and similar measures were taken on the West Coast. The hospital ship USNS Comfort was manned and got under way to help in New York in 24 hours rather than the 5 days planned for it. Some of the Navy’s Cyclone-class patrol craft, originally built for special forces, augmented the Coast Guard. The aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson and the USS Enterprise were already in the Indian Ocean, and the USS Theodore Roosevelt was deployed 6 weeks earlier than planned and eventually relieved the Enterprise. The USS Kitty Hawk was stripped of most of its air wing and sent from Japan to the Indian Ocean to serve as a staging base for Army Special Forces. Tomahawks were on station on surface combatants and SSNs. The carrier aircraft carrying out strike missions into Afghanistan were refueled by Navy carrier-based S–3s and Air Force land-based (and long-range) KC–10s and were directed in their attacks by AWACS as well as through tracking on laser guidance provided by special forces on the ground. Numerous surface combatants were in the area, including those involved in the ongoing MIO in the Gulf. Naval presence in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific was reduced.⁵ The political pressure on the controversy over the live-fire range at Vieques had receded into the background and the referendum in Puerto Rico postponed. Altogether, the Navy was in the vicinity of Afghanistan, highly ready and responsive, for any joint action to be executed. PERSTEMPO was (and is) being substantially broken for the first time since Desert Storm, but it may turn out to be necessary only for the crews of the carriers, not those of surface combatants and ARGs. The Marines were directed to set up a base south of Kandahar and later moved to Kandahar airport. Force protection measures that had been set in train after the Cole bombing were intensified.

Defense has been authorized $345 billion for fiscal year (FY) 2002, including the $332 billion originally planned plus the supplemental. The supplemental provides minimal additions for the Navy, however. Two Trident SSGN conversions have been funded (two more were added in the FY03 budget submission). PGM inventories are funded. The budget does not, however, solve the SCN and APN deficits, and the Navy planned to finance only five new ships with FY02 funds.

The new requirements for homeland defense were being studied intensively, but there remains considerable uncertainty as to what the role of the Navy may be. The Coast Guard is already taking much of the action to patrol harbors—witness their careful escorting of a natural gas tanker into Boston Harbor in October 2001.⁶ The Coast Guard has had to give up other missions, such as drug patrols.⁷ It is not clear whether the Coast Guard will be adequately funded for its new missions with the mere $203 million it has received in supplemental funding. Its Deepwater program may well be subject to new review.⁸ The Navy is concerned with international airliner attacks, attacks on cruise ships à la the USS Cole, and rogue merchant ships. Better intelligence and intelligence coordination is the first need, for the problem of rogue merchant ships must be identified at the port of embarkation.

The Changed Long-Term Outlook for the Navy

Operations. For Navy deployments, the long-term outlook for the Navy will initially be driven by the intensity and length of the campaign in Afghanistan. The Navy would be under great strain if it were required to keep four (or even three) carriers on station in the Indian Ocean.⁹ In Desert Storm, 6 carriers were present (and 2 more were being readied), but the war lasted only 45 days. If the Navy were to maintain four carriers on station, the IDTC would be greatly shrunk after a year, with consequent problems in training and maintenance. But the pace of strikes in Afghanistan hardly compares to Desert Storm or Kosovo, and two carriers in the Indian Ocean seem sufficient. A total of 2 can be sustained indefinitely with the current force of 12 carriers, although the carrier presence in the Mediterranean would go to near-zero, and in the Western Pacific the presence would be around 1.0 (the aircraft carrier homeported in Japan.) If the United States were to establish substantial airbases and a fighter aircraft presence in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgyzstan, the carriers might not be needed at all, and one of them could return to a resumed Southern Watch over Iraq (Southern Watch has been maintained minimally by the Air Force during the Afghanistan conflict).

It is of note that only a minimal number of Tomahawks were fired into Afghanistan so far, and few escort ships are accompanying the carriers, perhaps because of the absence of any retaliatory threat. It may be that surface combatants can maintain their regular schedules and not even break PERSTEMPO. The same would apply to submarines. The Marine expeditionary unit special operations capable (MEU[SOC]) was deployed in December 2001 from the USS Pelileu ARG to Afghanistan, where it set up Camp Rhino southwest of Kandahar, later moved to Kandahar airport, and was replaced by units of the Army’s 101st Airmobile Division in January 2002. Another ARG/MEU(SOC) remains in the Indian Ocean. It was not so much Marine amphibious capability but rather its inherent expeditionary ability to sustain itself on the ground for 30 days with minimal resupply that counted on this occasion, though they were readily available to move from the sea to shore staging points.

If the war were extended to Iraq (while continuing in Afghanistan), the demands on the Navy would be huge. The consumption of munitions could be enormous, and the United States might have to go on some kind of wartime footing to produce the required ordnance and call up reservists. So far, Saddam Husayn has not provided the excuse for such a war, even though—according to the former two major theater war doctrine—opportunistic adversaries are expected to take advantage of U.S. distraction to attack their neighbors.

In March 2002, the campaign in Afghanistan renewed its intensity with the battles near Gardez. However, the Taliban was out of power, and the previous operating and training bases of al Qaeda had been demolished. But Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Laden had escaped, along with much of the al Qaeda leadership. Some of the al Qaeda operatives in the 60 cells in countries around the world were in custody, but many were still at large, and the question remained open as to how loosely (versus centrally) directed al Qaeda really was, and how dependent on both the charisma and decisions of bin Laden. Some U.S. military attention was shifting to Somalia and the Philippines. Yemen was being watched, and U.S. Special Forces were sent to train its troops. The new homeland defense agency under former Governor Thomas Ridge was doing much in the way of planning for contingencies and for the reorganization of domestic security agencies. Warnings were frequent, but no new terrorist incidents had taken place.

Aside from the continuing campaign to round up al Qaeda operatives and break the organization, the world of conflicts and confrontations would probably revert to what it had been before September 11, but with some changed attitudes and perspectives about what had previously been considered the threats to U.S. and world security. The United States is already developing better relations with Russia, following President Vladimir Putin’s initiatives to “join the West.” The China-Taiwan confrontation had been softening, with complicated politics in Taiwan and a recession in the Taiwanese economy. China is entering the World Trade Organization. North Korea and Iraq are still hostile, but the slow evolution of Iranian politics continues. Their minimal cooperation on Afghanistan, however minimal, lay in contrast to their shipping of arms to the Palestinians. The Israeli-Palestinian war continues. In Europe, the only current action is in the Balkans, where peacekeeping forces are still present in Bosnia and Kosovo, and a truce has been arranged in Macedonia. Naval forces are not needed in the Adriatic Sea for now. The Mediterranean region is otherwise quiet: Libya seems restrained of late; the Algerian civil war is quiet for the moment; and Greek-Turkish enmities, including those over Cyprus, are being handled by diplomatic means.

Thus, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area remain the priority for both joint forces and U.S. naval forces for the foreseeable future. The shift to an East Asian strategy with accompanying shifts of forces, which the administration indicated earlier might happen, seems to have been put aside for the duration. The future of an Asian strategy depends on whether the war on terror changes the otherwise confrontational relations between the United States and China.

The possibility exists for more Navy assets—for example, ships and patrol/early warning aircraft such as P–3s, E–2Cs—to be devoted to patrolling home waters. As noted, the Coast Guard has had to give priority to homeland defense measures over patrolling for drug traffic. The Navy may be affected as well. There is also a question of the extent to which budget resources will be devoted to force protection; the amounts might seem marginal, but all current programs operate on a tight margin in any case. Force protection is yet another burden on the Department of the Navy’s budget. As for the need for coastal patrols, it appears that gathering intelligence and tips would be more important to the interception of the great threats—rogue merchant ships—with the consequent need to be able to vector an intercepting ship or aircraft out quickly. In the longer term, homeland defense might involve having surface combatants contribute to national missile defense and thus not be available for overseas deployments. The decisions on the naval contribution to missile defense depend on the success of R&D and thus lie years in the future.

Future planning. As for future naval programs, the United States and the world are in an economic slump approaching a recession. The time and path of economic recovery is uncertain. Together with tax cuts, the U.S. economic slowdown will lead to a renewed Federal Government deficit. The deficit, combined with measures for homeland defense, will put a new squeeze on the defense budget. Initially for the FY03 program and budget submission, the Navy proposed to retire the rest of the Spruance-class destroyers, thus going down to 98 surface combatants, and to reduce to 286 total ships. New guidance for the preparation of the FY03 budget, with the possibility of a 15 percent budget increase, may allow the Navy to increase SCN and keep anywhere from 305 to 325 ships. It is hard to believe that such an increase will in fact be realized before the economy shows growth again, but the FY03 budget deliberations in Congress will provide the answer.

Since September 11, Lockheed-Martin was chosen in the JSF source selection, so a program that some thought to be a candidate for cancellation proceeds (toward an initial operational capability of 2008, presumably for the Air Force version). In the meantime, production of F/A–18E/F is to proceed at a full 48 aircraft a year. The DD 21 program is to be restructured to be the DD(X), a multipurpose platform rather than one mostly dedicated to shore bombardment. Smaller and more modular versions were under discussion. In addition, a new air defense cruiser class built on the same hull as the DD(X) has been proposed. In the meanwhile, service life extension of the 22 CG–47 class ships with the vertical launch system (VLS) has been initially funded. They would eventually be missile defense ships; however, the Navy Area Defense program has been cancelled and the Navy Theater Wide missile defense lies well into the future. The Navy’s programmed budget for FY03 (PR03) proposes to slip CVNX funding one year, from FY06 to FY07. Although it looked like four Tridents would be converted to SSGNs, the submarine construction program still did not have room to ramp up to funding of two SSN–774s a year. Not included in the PR03 submission was funding for a proposed littoral combat ship (LCS) as a spin-off of the DD(X) program. LCS would be essentially a mission-limited version of Cebrowski’s Streetfighter concept.

Otherwise, replacements for amphibious assault ships (LHA follow-ons, including funding for LHD–8), P–3 maritime patrol aircraft (the proposed multipurpose maritime aircraft), new maritime prepositioning ships, LCC command ships (the JCC(X) joint command ship program), and EA–6B (possibly replaced by the F/A–18G ¹⁰) were still in the analysis-of-alternatives stage, with no places yet in the actual program of record.

So far, we see an emerging Navy that generally looks like the pre-September 11 Navy of the 1990s. A struggle has been occurring between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which wants transformation, and the services, which seek to keep force structure in the numbers and shapes they have had. But much transformation takes place on the platforms rather than through creating new platforms—such as all the PGMs entering the force (including Tactical Tomahawk), the interconnections (IT–21, NMCI, and CEC), and the upgrading and evolution of Aegis and Standard missiles for missile defense. The Navy still struggles with mine warfare and cruise missile defenses—the main (and old) instruments of antiaccess. And it worries about diesel submarines in the littoral warfare context.

Alternatives for a Future Navy

There is a lot of discussion about futuristic concepts: Streetfighter (will the LCS version of DD[X] suffice?); space warfare; netcentric warfare; big shifts to UAVs; fast transport with Jervis Bay-type ships, etc.¹¹ None of these have acquired a place in prospective force structures as yet. More important for the allocation of resources would be progress on missile defense, both for homeland defense and tactical and theater defense in combat zones overseas.

Uncertainty about the duration of the war in Afghanistan would tend to postpone any radical thinking or changes in Navy deployments or training. The aircraft carriers are in the limelight and are likely to be tied down in the Indian Ocean for the foreseeable future. The Navy can sustain two carriers on station in the Indian Ocean indefinitely with its current force structure and deployment schedules. The operational need is less for surface combatants, submarines, and amphibious ships, so they can presumably stick more closely to normal rotations. In any case, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area is pegged as the cockpit of the world for the foreseeable future, and a “carrier-centric” Navy has proven its worth.

If indeed carriers and naval aviation are the wave of the future (and noting how dependent they are in functioning within a joint structure, for target selection, refueling, and target direction on the scene), one might well imagine an even greater shift to carriers—but the ability to ramp up carrier construction is severely constrained, as is aircraft production. But that would be only one model of the possible future Navy.

The big questions affecting future overall U.S. defense efforts would be the shape of the world, the incidence of conflict in that world, and how U.S. foreign policy reacts to and engages in the world—in other words, the particulars of globalization. Since the other chapters have discussed these topics and they are too complex to detail here, I will confine this discussion to variations of the current Navy. In any case, it is my view that the triad of world evolution/globalization, U.S. foreign policy, and the evolution of U.S. forces is only loosely connected. But in that series of loose connections lie flexibility and adaptability for the appropriate evolution of the forces and their uses by U.S. political authorities.

Persistent constraints on the configuration of naval forces will continue to exist. These constraints will include tighter budgets, which lead to the inevitable long-term trend of the decline of numbers as the capabilities get more sophisticated. Fortunately, no country is exempt from such trends—unlike during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union defied economics for 45 years and paid the price with its total collapse. The second constraint is the legacy forces—past investments that are still useful—such as aircraft carriers and supposedly range-limited F/A–18s. Third is the fact that there are no competing global navies out there. The Navy is more worried about opposition from the shore, a situation that is effectively a “constraint” that shapes the sort of Navy to be built.¹²

A final constraint is the fact that every future campaign the United States commits its military forces to will be joint, with only trivial exceptions. The United States likes to use as many tools in the tool box as it can lay its hands on; however, arguably, the Navy is most likely to be used when it provides unique rather than simply complementary capabilities.

How the Navy stands now. The Navy had the capabilities on hand that were appropriate for the campaign in Afghanistan. The carriers were quickly on hand, and F–14s and F/A–18s conducted strikes with PGMs. Some Tomahawks were also fired. The strikes were conducted in a joint operation: they were generally directed from the air headquarters at Prince Sultan Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia. They were responsive to special forces spotters on the ground. They were refueled by U.S. Air Force and Royal Air Force tankers as well as their own S–3 Viking aircraft. The USS Kitty Hawk provided a mobile staging base for special forces helicopters. The Marines were offshore, ready to be moved into Afghanistan. These same forces would be appropriate to similar operations in Somalia or Yemen (which are even more accessible from the ocean), or to strike Iraq. The Navy’s homeland defense roles remain to be determined. It is likely to be used more as a response force than a routine patrol force. The indefiniteness of the operations off Afghanistan may eventually strain the forces.

Beyond these operations, the Navy will look again to the future. The future will remain constrained by the defense budget, which is not likely to be generous if the economy continues to have difficulties, the Federal budget is in deficit, and tax cuts maintain their priority.

However, the Navy has realized numerous improvements in its programs, even despite the constant use of the Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) and Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) accounts as bill-payers. The platforms themselves are slowly evolving. There is a strong emphasis on littoral warfare. The force is becoming more joint. Missile defense, however, is likely to continue in development for some years to come.

Alternative evolutions. Several major directions can be postulated for the future Navy. These alternatives revolve around the five major combatant platforms: aircraft carriers and naval aviation, surface combatants, amphibious ships, attack submarines (SSNs and SSGNs), and SSBNs. Whatever the talk about netcentric warfare, the Navy will remain platform-centric if it is to continue to be a navy, that is, if it is to be at sea and afloat. Any network must have nodes, and ships are the maritime nodes. What is done off these platforms, and how they are connected, especially in joint operations, is nonetheless important and most improvements are directed to these ends. Four alternatives for the composition of the Navy can be set forth:

In light of the sunk costs of legacy forces—and because even these legacy forces are better than those of any other country in the world—and given that carriers have proven so valuable in Desert Storm, Southern Watch, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, an evolutionary force dominated by carriers and naval aviation is most likely.¹³ This force would probably remain at 12 carriers, despite competing arguments about why it should be 10 or 15. However, keeping 12 carriers and equipping them with new aircraft in the future almost inevitably would squeeze the numbers of surface combatants and submarines. The Navy had already planned to reduce the amphibious force to 36 ships with the introduction of the LPD–17 San Antonio-class. But the LPD–17 construction program is taking longer than expected, and the Navy could decide to retire aging amphibious dock land ships and LPDs earlier than planned. If this evolutionary process to maintain some balance among the platforms continues, the future MPF(F) program as currently conceived is unlikely to find a place in the budget. F/A–18E/F aircraft constitute a successful program, and their production would continue until JSF became available—providing JSF is actually brought to completion (remembering the experience with prototypes of the F–22). Decisions on the replacement of P–3s may drag on for some time. SH–60s would continue as mainstay helicopters, but the fate of the MV–22 becomes uncertain at this juncture. The Trident SSBNs would likely remain at 14 for the indefinite future. Whatever the minor changes in the balances among the five platforms, this evolutionary process would nonetheless provide a versatile toolbox.

The other alternatives are unlikely to be chosen for political and industrial base reasons, but they illustrate choices that might have to be made. Some of the more likely arguments include:

Retention of current warfare communities. There are thresholds below which any of the Navy communities might not survive. The greatest flexibility lies in the number of surface combatants. Submarines could be reduced—but to what level? One Navy study of force alternatives thought the lowest number of submarines was 38, but the British sustain a community with 16 SSBNs and SSNs. The issue of what force levels are required to justify the existence of a specialized warfare community is contentious.¹⁴

Survival of the Marine Corps. If all major operations are to be joint, as has been increasingly the case over the past 3 decades, it is unlikely the future Navy would be reconfigured solely to support Marine Corps amphibious landings. The MV–22 is now in trouble, and the Marines were transported into Afghanistan without it. As noted, MPF(F) may not find a place in the budget—though how to extend the capability represented by the present “black hulls” of the Maritime Prepositioning Squadron to the Army would have to be examined. And the precision aviation drops demonstrated in Afghanistan would seem to reduce the necessity of long-range guns.

Diversion of resources to homeland defense. Homeland defense could conceivably pose serious constraints on the numbers of naval ships that could deploy overseas. Before September 11, the dilemma of diverting a major part of the cruiser force to missile defense was being contemplated. Surface combatants could be placed in a new version of the distant early warning line extension of the 1950s, but that is unlikely.¹⁵ The patrol craft (PCs) have taken on a new utility in homeland waters and might not be retired.¹⁶ An increase in the Coast Guard might come at the cost of the Navy (but is highly unlikely to, given the committee structure in Congress). A new emphasis on SSBNs might even come into play down the road, depending on intercontinental ballistic missile threats to the United States.

What Will Future Evolutions of the Navy Have to Do with Globalization?

How appropriate are these evolutionary naval forces for the foreseeable future? It is very important that such issues are addressed in the context of globalization.

Globalization, a dynamic process, is a current characterization of the world system that is expressed in economic, social, and cultural terms, with governments and politics in mediating roles. It is not a system expressed in military terms—unlike the Cold War, the military balance of power thinking of the 19th century, or the theoretical bipolarity or multipolarity concepts in international relations. Basing our conception of the international system on an exclusively military focus leads to zero-sum arms races, confrontations, and posturing. Basing the system on the economic focus of globalization is non-zero-sum—everybody gains—with governments in mediating, rule-setting roles rather than in directing roles. Since military establishments are in turn instruments of governments, they do not have (despite the arguments of many chapters in this volume) any obvious direct roles in economic matters.

Looking at the U.S. military establishment in this globalization context, we can note—consistent with the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001—that its effects on economic development lie in deep historical background to the globalizing world that evolved out of the Cold War world (and before that, World War II). As the sole surviving superforce (following the collapse of the Soviet military), the U.S. military establishment saves most other countries of the world from having to build their own superforces, or even much of any kind of forces at all. That in itself is worth our military investment during this current era of globalization.

Continuing technological improvements in our military forces—as demonstrated in the chain from Desert Storm through Kosovo to Afghanistan—dissuade other countries from making investments in the technological improvements heralded by the revolution in military affairs.¹⁷ Beyond that, our high-technology military specifically deters what were previously referred to as the four rogue states (Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea)—and now the axis of evil (plus Libya)—from aggression against their neighbors. And beyond that, our extensive forces have been available to intervene along the fringes of the functioning globalized economy in those mostly internal conflicts that arise but are not necessarily threatening to the overall economics of the globalization process. In other words, they are sometimes the enabler of our humanitarian instincts in a chaotic Third World. In deep background to all this is the general deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

What roles do U.S. naval forces play in this? In sustaining the largest and most capable blue-water navy in the world, the U.S. Navy is part of the global historical background to the current general peace that has permitted globalization to proceed. The United States has discouraged and dissuaded other navies from building up, especially with carriers (not counting vertical or short take-off and land [V/STOL] aircraft carriers). They are a major deterrent to three of the four rogues (Iraq and Iran—especially, and also Libya; the major deterrent to North Korea is South Korean forces, backed by U.S. nuclear weapons). They are a deterrent to Chinese threats (if not attacks) on Taiwan. In interventions, they are a crucial part of U.S. joint forces, providing offshore bases—such as during operations in Afghanistan (they were less essential for the Kosovo war where land bases were available). Despite the concerns expressed in chapter 8, they do not need to patrol the sea lines of communication and straits (with the exception of the Strait of Hormuz) because the ocean threats are practically nonexistent—unless an actual rogue terrorist merchant ship threat to the U.S. homeland were to materialize. U.S. Navy SSBNs will soon be providing 73 percent of U.S. strategic nuclear missile warheads in that deep background role.

These roles within the globalization context do not in themselves provide very specific guidance on how to configure U.S. naval forces. It is not clear how numbers of ships count in this context, given the lack of threats at sea and the fact that in the global economy, every other country operates under the same kind of budget constraints as the United States, although more so. The U.S. Navy is conducting far more innovation in platforms, technology, communications, and weapons than any other navy, so this dissuasion function can continue to be served. The U.S. Navy practice of deployments and associated readiness means that it can continue to sustain a substantial presence in the most distant waters, that is, the Persian Gulf. As noted in chapter 6, this in turn provides a major stabilization of the oil market.

In a globalizing world, it may be that the worse threat to the U.S. Navy is the fact that it is taken for granted. Evolutionary developments conducted in the background are easily ignored, or worse yet, put off or underfunded. There will always be a persuasive advocate of the latest strategic buzzword or hottest weapon system who will be able to attract public attention away from the dissuasive function, even though dissuasion may be the most important way that U.S. military forces can assist globalization. If you want effective dissuasion in a globalizing world, you need an effective, overwhelming, global navy.

Henry H. Gaffney is a research manager at the CNA Corporation, serving as team leader for globalization research and as director of the Strategy and Concepts Group of the Center for Strategic Studies. He has conducted research for senior defense leaders and served in the U.S. Mission to NATO. He has authored numerous research studies, reports, and professional articles, particularly in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. His latest article, “Globalization Gets a Bodyguard” (co-authored with Thomas P.M. Barnett), appeared in the November 2001 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

Notes

¹ Coincidentally, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and Serbia lasted 78 days, but it was toward a definite end (Milosevic’s capitulation). The end in Afghanistan is not in sight. [BACK]

²A good summary of Navy-Marine Corps Common Internet implementation is Bill Murray, “Joining Forces,” Government Executive, December 2000, 42–46. [BACK]

³ See, for example, Greg Jaffe, “Debate Surrounding Small Ship Poses Fundamental Questions For U.S. Navy,” The Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2001, 1. [BACK]

⁴ For a discussion of Navy views on vertical short take-off and landing and short take-off and vertical landing, see Charles H. Brown, “Up, Up and Away,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 8 (August 2001), 36–40. [BACK]

⁵ In 1999, during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and Serbia, the USS Kitty Hawk was sent to the Gulf to cover for the USS Theodore Roosevelt, which had been diverted to the Adriatic. There was then a public controversy in the United States concerning the fact that the Western Pacific had been left uncovered. No such hue and cry was raised in 2001 when the Kitty Hawk was deployed to the Indian Ocean. [BACK]

⁶ Pressure by Boston officials to stop or escort liquid natural gas (LNG) tankers had been intense. See “Coast Guard Revokes Ban on Natural-Gas Shipments,” The Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2001, B6B; William B. Cassidy, “USCG lifts Boston LNG blockade,” Traffic World, November 5, 2001, 31. [BACK]

⁷ See, for example, Robert S. Boyd, “ Coast Guard’s Focus Has Shifted Since 9/11,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 18, 2002, 1; Matthew Weinstock, “Changing Course,” Government Executive, December 2001, 55–57. [BACK]

⁸ See discussion in Vago Muradian, “Deepwater More Important Ever For Coast Guard, Requirements Unchanged,” Defense Daily, December 7, 2001, 1. [BACK]

⁹ In the event, four carriers were present together for only about a week. USS Theodore Roosevelt relieved Enterprise, and Kitty Hawk returned to Japan in December once special forces had bases on land adjacent to Afghanistan. [BACK]

¹⁰ See Allan J. Assel, “Airborne Electronic Attack: What’s Next,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 2 (February 2001), 52–55. [BACK]

¹¹ The original articles on Streetfighter include: Arthur K. Cebrowski and Wayne P. Hughes, “Rebalancing the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 11 (November 1999), 31–34; Wayne P. Hughes, “22 Questions for Streetfighter,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 2 (February 2000), 46–49. On naval space warfare, see Randall G. Bowdish and Bruce Woodyard, “A Naval Concepts-Based Vision for Space,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 1 (January 1999), 50–53; Sam J. Tangredi, “Space is an Ocean,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 1 (January 1999), 52–53; Rand H. Fisher, and Kent B. Pelot, “The Navy Has a Stake in Space,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 10 (October 2001), 58–62. The definitive article on netcentric warfare remains Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 123, no. 1 (January 1998), 28–35. On developments in naval UAVs, see Kevin P. Miller, “UAVs Hold Promise for No-Fly Zone Enforcement,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 9 (September 2001), 38–41. On Jervis Bay-type high-speed vessels, see Robert Morrison, Vaughn Rixon, and John Dudley, “Chartering and HMAS Jervis Bay,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 9 (September 2000), 75–77. [BACK]

¹² The editor makes this case forcefully in (amoung other sources) Sam J. Tangredi, “Beyond the Sea and Jointness,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 9 (September 2001), 60–63. [BACK]

¹³ One of the best arguments for the value of carriers is David A. Perin, “Are Big Decks Still the Answer?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 6 (June 2001), 30–33. [BACK]

¹⁴ An interesting discussion on the reorganization of the Navy helicopter community in light of its reduction in platforms is Frederick Latrash, “Reorganizing the Navy Helo Force,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 1 (January 2001), 46–51. [BACK]

¹⁵ For a discussion of how the U.S. Navy conducted that mission in the 1950s and 1960s, see Joseph F. Bouchard, “Guarding the Cold War Ramparts: The U.S. Navy’s Role in Continental Air Defense,” Naval War College Review 52, no. 3 (Summer 1999), 111–135. [BACK]

¹⁶ See, for example, Jack Dorsey and Dale Eisman, “Navy May Help Bail Out Mission-Swamped Coast Guard,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 17, 2001, 1; Thomas B. Hunter, “The Need for Speed,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 1 (January 2001), 76–79. [BACK]

¹⁷ Among the first to discuss this dissuasion function was then-Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Threats and How to Address Them (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999). [BACK]