PLA Conservative Nationalism and
Chinese Politics and Society

Nan Li 

        As China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew earlier from the class struggle-based societal politics of the Cultural Revolution and more recently from its extensive commercial activities, its policy attention should become more concentrated on two new dimensions: first, irredentist claims-based and geostrategic concerns-driven nationalist agendas that stress security issues on the peripheries of China;

and second, technology-driven force modernization to resolve these issues. This essay examines the first dimension, with particular emphasis on its conceptual basis: the PLA conservative nationalism, and its implications for Chinese politics and society before the 16th CCP (Chinese Communist Party) Congress. Specifically, it addresses the following research questions: What is PLA conservative nationalism? How does such an ideology influence Chinese politics and society before the 16th CCP Congress? What major factors may aggravate or constrain the impact of PLA nationalism on Chinese politics and policy?

        Several caveats are in order. First, this essay is not intended to develop a theoretical argument about China’s civil-military relations, but rather to delineate the basic patterns of the new PLA ideology’s influence on politics and society. Because exploring the specific ways and areas where the new ideology influences politics and society may contribute to the general goal of  theory building, this is a worthwhile effort. Second, this is not a study of the origins of PLA conservative nationalism, but rather an analysis of the implications of the new ideology for politics and society. To the extent examination of the origins has been done else where,^[1] and analyzing implications is more pertinent to designing policy to mitigate the new ideology, this study is justified. Finally, this study focuses on the dominant ideology, but not alternative voices. Such a focus is reasonable largely because dominant ideology has more influence on policy, which may have more important implications for formulating coping strategies.

        The essay is divided into four sections. The first defines the concept of PLA conservative nationalism. The second and third address the major influence of  this new PLA ideology on politics and society. The final section examines the major factors that may mitigate the impact of PLA  nationalism on policy. 

What Is PLA Conservative Nationalism? 

        As I argued elsewhere,^[2] conservative nationalism has become the dominant cognitive paradigm that defines the thinking of China’s security and military planners in the post-Mao era. PLA conservative nationalism has two major components: nationalism and conservatism. The central premise of nationalism is that in the post-ideology, post-Cold War era, nation-state has become the central category that defines internal organization and hierarchy, and external uncertainty and vulnerability. To the extent China exists in a competitive international environment where uncertainty and fluidity reign and relative gains matter, the survival and security of the Chinese nation have become of paramount importance. In order to achieve the goal of survival and security, it is first of all necessary to build up the Chinese economy and technology to reduce China’s disadvantages relative to the advanced countries. But in order for the development of economy and technology to proceed smoothly, it is also necessary for China to become externally secure. The external security of China defines the central role of the PLA.

        To enhance China’s external security, the PLA is supposed to fulfill several specific missions. First, it is to make significant contribution to China’s territorial consolidation through reunification between the mainland and  Taiwan. This reunification allegedly is essential to the survival of the Chinese nation because without such consolidation, China would have remained divided and faced the possible prospect of further fragmentation. Second, the PLA would strive to preserve the integrity of the territories and the security of the borders that are currently under the Chinese control. Finally, the PLA is to enhance the security of the economic resources such as raw materials supplies, manufacturing platforms, infrastructure, and trading routes, to ensure the sustained development of the economic and technology. For the last two missions, it is not sufficient to maintain the status quo, but rather to create a “buffer zone” through expanding the “depth of defense” moderately beyond the status quo. This expanded security zone is both desirable and necessary largely because without it, China would have become much more vulnerable and insecure under the condition of modern military technology, which renders military strikes longer range, more precise, and therefore more lethal. While diplomatic negotiations and promoting economic and cultural interactions may all serve to enhance China’s security goal, the role of military force is indispensable and central. To the extent major challenges to China’s territorial consolidation, border security, and economic resources security are military in nature, it is imperative for the PLA to develop the sufficient and appropriate military capabilities to deter such challenges, and to fight and win wars if deterrence fails.

        Besides nationalism, conservatism is another central feature that defines the role and missions of the PLA. Conservatism here first of all concerns the scope of the nationalist agendas. China’s security goal through the prism of the PLA, for instance, stays relatively local and limited, and therefore manageable. Such a goal deals mainly with the territorial and geostrategic issues on the margins of China, such as Taiwan, the dispute over the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea, the border dispute with India, the Korean Peninsula, and the ethnic and religious tension in western China, but not with ambitious superpower competition in places far away from China. Moreover, with the exception of Taiwan, the PLA has largely taken a conservative and defensive posture in handling these issues, with strong emphasis on conserving and consolidating what it has under its control, rather than on acquiring what it has claimed. Even on the issue of Taiwan, arms buildup and military maneuvers seemingly are designed to achieve the immediate goal of deterring Taiwan from declaring independence, a rather limited and conservative step in the pursuit of the more ambitious goal of achieving the complete reunification.

        Moreover, conservatism concerns the ways of realizing the nationalist agendas. Rather than overstretch of resources stemming from revolutionary, radical changes, for instance, the PLA favors the gradual buildup of the national economy and technology, which should contribute significantly to national consolidation based on the enhanced “comprehensive national power.” It also favors national unity and internal social stability, the prerequisites for steady economic growth and technological development, and for more effective competition in the highly vulnerable environment of external uncertainty. Finally, the PLA is highly skeptical of formal, tight alliance with foreign countries,  largely because large partners in the alliance may engage in “buck passing” behavior (such as the Soviet Union with regard to the Korean War) and small partners in “free-riding” behavior (Such as North Vietnam and North Korea), thus depleting Chinese resources.

        One way to illustrate PLA conservative nationalism is to show what it is not. First of all, the new PLA ideology represents a significant departure from Maoism, and therefore it is not Maoism. The central premise of Maoism is that social-economic class, but not nation-state, defines internal organization and solidarity and external uncertainty and antagonism. Based on such a premise, the Maoist domestic policy would stress the formulation of rigid class categories, and a class struggle-based “continuous revolution” to weed out “hidden class enemies” in the party and state bureaucracy, the PLA, and throughout the Chinese society. Because Maoism assumes that social-economic classes and class struggle transcend national boundaries, it also justifies a proactive foreign policy of “world revolution” by providing doctrinal, manpower, and material support to the class-based  radical, revolutionary movements in foreign countries. To the extent the PLA had withdrawn from its extensive involvement in the fierce domestic “class struggle” of the Cultural Revolution (because such struggle undermines national unity), and terminated its active support of the radical revolutionary movements in foreign countries (because such endeavor would cause overstretch of resources and undermine national economic development), it is apparent that Maoism is no longer the guiding ideology that dictates the PLA policy.

        Another alternative voice in the current PLA discourse is the quasi-liberal voice, which places emphasis on international institutions, diplomatic negotiations, and multilaterally agreed-upon confidence-building measures for managing and alleviate the interstate disputes. Such a voice, however, has not become the dominant PLA ideology for two major reasons. The first is that the quasi-liberal voice represents a small minority among the PLA thinkers and tends to be marginalized. Second, even among those who argue for policy along the quasi-liberal line, some are apparently under the influence of the conservative-nationalist voice. Participation in international institutions and diplomatic negotiations, for instance, are usually treated by some quasi-liberals as opportunities to enhance the relative gains of nation-states: such involvement is either regarded as delaying tactics to gain preparation time for war, as a way to evade responsibility and to enjoy benefits, or as a stratagem to acquire technology and intelligence. This shows that conservative nationalism, but not quasi-liberalism, is the dominant ideology that shapes the current PLA thought and practice. 

How Does PLA Conservative Nationalism Influence Chinese Politics? 

        The PLA conservative nationalism influences Chinese politics in three major areas: ideology, personnel, and policy.

         Ideology. In Party-state ideology, the most dramatic change is the recent official endorsement of CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s theory of “three representations” (the CCP representing the advanced productive forces, the advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of China’s  broad masses), and his July 1 declaration that private businessmen would be allowed to join the CCP. Although sketchy, there are some evidence to show that the PLA has had input into the processes leading to such a change. First of all, Jiang’s theory is consistent with the PLA’s nationalist agenda of promoting national strength and unity, in that it opens up the powerful domestic institutions to the highly productive segment of the Chinese society, which contributes significantly to the tax revenue, the material basis of “comprehensive national power.” Such a measure also means that the CCP, by becoming more representative of the increasingly diverse interests, would gain a new lease on life, which is good for stability. Without such opening up, the newly gained energy and resources released by decades of economic reforms within this segment would be channeled to other organizations, which may create new “class struggle,” undermine the Party-state rule, and fragment the nation.

        Second, Jiang’s theory is the result of years of  discussion on political reform, which began as early as the time before the 15th CCP Congress of 1997. Such a discussion has been primarily sponsored and coordinated by the CCP Central Policy Research Office (zhonggong zhongyang zhengce yanjiu shi), and involved major bureaucracies and think tanks at the central level, including PLA institutions such as the Academy of Military Science (AMS). The discussion explored various options of political reform, including genuine democratization such as introducing multiparty competition for political offices. The multiparty competition option, however, was considered too radical and too costly, and was abandoned for two major reasons: it may trigger ethnic, religious, and provincial separatism, leading to China’s disintegration (largely based on a reading of the collapse of the Soviet Union due to democratization); and it may cause the collapse of the family planning policy, which would abort the central objective of increasing per capita income by controlling population growth on the one hand, and promote economic growth on the other. While the second reason reflects the view of the State Family Planning

Commission, the first reason clearly represents the perspective of the PLA.^[3] Rather than the radically liberal direction of multiparty competition at the expense of current political institutions, which may allegedly cause national disintegration, it now seems political reform has moved toward a more conservative and nationalist direction: opening up current political institutions to accommodate and alleviate the pent-up aspirations and frustrations associated with the rapid economic changes, which may avoid a new “class struggle” and enhance national unity and cohesiveness. To the extent Jiang’s theory reportedly was extensively discussed by the CCP Politburo before its release, and the idea originated from two well known reform scholars from the CCP Central Policy Research Office, Teng Wensheng (Office director) and Wang Hu’ning (deputy director and a professor from the Shanghai Fudan University), it is logical to assume that the theory is a collective product based on the aggregated input from major central bureaucracies, including the PLA.

        Finally, the extensive interpretation of Jiang’s theory in the Liberation Army Daily, not just in terms of its narrower implications for defense modernization,^[4] but also its implications for the  broader nationalist agenda of national integration and unity,^[5] shows a strong association between the PLA and Jiang’s theory. Such association implies that the PLA is an active participant in formulating the theory as much as it is a subordinate institution in operationalizing and implementing the theory in its narrower functional specialties, or it just attempts to convert the skeptics in the PLA into true believers.

        Personnel. Similar to ideology, PLA conservative nationalism also has a role to play in personnel changes of the top Party-state leadership in the upcoming 16th CCP Congress . On the one hand, such a role may remain moderate, and there are several major reasons why this is so. First of all, there is no imminent CCP leadership crisis in the scale of the Cultural Revolution (causing collapse of the Party-state bureaucracy) or the 1989 Tian Anmen Incident (causing severe division among the CCP leadership on how to handle student demonstrations, which made it difficult to take preemptive measures). Unless a crisis of similar scale occurs and creates a political vacuum for the PLA leaders to exploit, it is not likely for the PLA to play the blatant kingmaking role in Party-state politics.^[6] Some may argue that accelerated PLA professionalization may lead to a sharp divergence in values and interests between the PLA and the CCP, to the point the PLA may develop the incentive to advance its own values and interests by launching a coup against the Party-state rule. But military professionalization may also mean that the PLA is gradually losing skills and interests in Party-state politics, to the point it would rather concentrate on the narrower pursuit of functional and technical skills of the military profession, but not on civilian politics.^[7] This does not suggest that the PLA would be totally detached from civilian politics. But the PLA involvement in civilian politics may be  narrowly focused on PLA institutional issues such as the defense budget, manpower policy and so forth, but not on the broader and more ambitious issue of seizing the state power. In this sense, a more professionalized PLA may increasingly resemble a lobbying group engaging in mundane bureaucratic politics in the arena of Party-state, but not the palace guard unit which is more interested in usurping the supreme power. Furthermore, to the extent the upcoming 16th CCP Congress leadership transition takes place not just to the CCP Politburo, but also to the Central Military Commission (CMC), the influence of the PLA leadership in civilian leadership transition may be weakened. As the senior uniformed CMC members retire, for instance, those who are promoted to fill their positions may remain politically weak and less capable of influencing the Party-state leadership politics, because their positions and influence have yet to be consolidated. Finally, the 70-year retirement age rule for both the Politburo and the CMC members, if followed well, may reduce the incentive for individuals to exert influence over personnel changes through irregular, abnormal channels.^[8]

        On the other hand, it is just as wrong to argue that the PLA leadership has an insignificant role to play in the upcoming Party-state leadership transition. Such a role, however, would be subtle and implicit, but not blatant and explicit, and it would be influenced by PLA conservative nationalism. The PLA leadership, for instance, does have a profile of the new Party-state leadership that it prefers. Such a profile connotes conservative nationalism and has three major components that the PLA leadership hopes the new Party-state leadership would be well prepared to strengthen: 1) national economic and technological development to enhance the “comprehensive national power;” 2) internal stability and national unity; and 3) national defense-based PLA institutional interests.

        First on economic and technological development, it is very likely that the PLA leadership would prefer the new Party-state leadership to be dominated by technocrats, i.e., those who are technical experts by training (engineers, specialists in science and technology, and so forth) but have also gained administrative experience by spending a number of years of their career managing a major bureaucracy, a major enterprise, or a province. This is because technocrats understand the nuts and bolts of economics, technology and management. They also tend to be pragmatists who prefer the incremental, cautious, and technical approaches to solving problems, and therefore are more likely to produce concrete results in economic and technological development. On the other hand, the PLA leadership may be highly skeptical and critical if the new leadership is dominated by the ideologues or the idealists of either the neo-leftist (Maoist) or the neo-rightist (liberal) persuasion, or those who advocate radical, revolutionary changes through mobilizational methods or inciting propaganda. To the PLA, such leadership would do more harm than good to national economic and technological development.

        Second on stability and unity, it is likely that the PLA leadership would want to see that the new Party-state leadership is capable of promoting leadership unity, a prerequisite for national stability and unity. This means that the new leadership should possess the skills in building consensus on major policy issues by regularly consulting major bureaucracies, by negotiations, and by sharing power. This also means the new Party-state leadership should apply the established rules and norms, and follow a policy of promoting to important positions people from the “five lakes and four seas” (“wuhu sihai,” meaning all corners of the country) based on merits, but not engage too much in factional politics based on highly parochial, personalized ties. This is because unmitigated factional politics would trigger intensive intra-leadership rivalry, cause policy paralysis, and undermine leadership unity.

        Finally on national defense-based institutional interests of the PLA, the PLA leadership apparently would like to see that the military is well taken care of. This means that the new Party-state leadership should place equal emphasis on both economic development and national defense , but not stress the former while neglect the latter. It is also desirable that this leadership would make an effort to increase defense budget, to improve the living conditions of the military personnel (by raising wages, improving housing conditions, and creating employment opportunities for military dependents and the discharged), to consult the PLA on major national defense and foreign policy issues, and to take a hands-on approach to PLA high-level personnel changes (by reviewing the list of candidates for high-level positions, soliciting opinion from the units of the candidates, and conducting interviews). For the PLA, a good Party-state leadership is one that is benevolent, considerate, and prudent, and one that makes good judgment on taking care of the PLA. This, however, does not mean that the PLA leadership would like the new Party-state leadership to micromanage the PLA. On the contrary, for the most part, it prefers that the new civilian leadership provides the general policy guidelines, but leaves the PLA to flesh out the details, which also means more flexibility and space for the PLA to advance its own interests. By similar logic, the PLA clearly favors the collective and technocratic style of the current Party-state leadership, but not the charismatic and one-person dominance style of Mao and Deng. This is because the relatively diffused nature of power in collective leadership means more leeway for the PLA to exploit in order to promote its institutional interests. This also translates into a higher level of institutional cohesiveness. In contrast, a highly interventionist, “divide and rule” tactic employed by Mao and Deng from a strong center tended to divide the PLA leadership.

        The consultation between the CCP Politburo and the PLA leadership concerning the upcoming leadership transition would dwell largely on these three issues. How well and how poorly the Party-state leadership matches this PLA profile may provide a clue why some Party-state leaders fare better politically than others. One of the central reasons why Deng had never had the confidence to relinquish the CMC chair position to Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, for instance, is that both had been quite controversial among the PLA leaders. Hu had historically been a propagandist who had a flamboyant style. Both Hu and Zhao also mobilized political support from outside the Party (among the liberal intellectuals and the students) in the intra-Party power struggle, rendering them politically vulnerable for violating the newly restored Party rules and norms and undermining leadership unity. Both also were considered too liberal. But most importantly, both (particularly Zhao) paid too much attention to economic issues but too little to the national defense-related PLA institutional interests.

        In contrast, Jiang matches this profile much better than Hu and Zhao, and therefore has been able to consolidate his influence in the PLA. On the other hand, some PLA leaders may feel quite uneasy if Jiang retains his CMC chair position after giving up his CCP general secretary position at the 16th Congress. This is because holding CMC chair position without being the CCP general secretary is generally perceived as abnormal and irregular, except in extreme circumstances.  But since there is no imminent political crisis in sight, such practice may undermine Party norms such as the mandatory retirement age, revive the personality-driven politics of “attending to state affairs behind the curtain,” weaken the legitimacy of the CMC, and trigger intra-leadership rivalry.

        Hu Jintao fits the profile fairly well, and should receive the support of the PLA leaders. Compared to peer competitors such as Zeng Qinghong, Hu has a few other comparative advantages. Hu has served as the CMC vice chair since 1999, and can use the opportunity to cultivate relationships and authority among the PLA leaders. The PLA leaders also appreciate Hu’s service as the first Party secretary of Tibet, a frontier province, and his credential of cracking down on the religious and ethnic “separatism” there. Zeng, on the other hand, has not had the opportunity or the credential to cultivate more specific political favors from the PLA. Hu’s responsibilities in handling the PLA’s divestiture from businesses and managing the popular demonstrations against the US bombing of Chinese embassy, however, may displease some PLA officers, particularly at the lower-levels. But to the extent most PLA high-level leaders agree that the divestiture from businesses would enhance PLA combat effectiveness, and that popular demonstrations need to be managed so that they don’t run out of hand and undermine social stability, such credentials should work favorable for Hu, but not undermine his chances in the upcoming succession.

        What can the PLA leaders do if the new Party-state Leadership does not meet the desire and needs of the PLA leaders? First of all, the current and the upcoming crops of the Party-state leaders seemingly fit the profile well, and operate within the broad, centrist paradigm of conservative nationalism. This should reduce the probability of a major political-military crisis. Also, the new Party-state leadership does not have to cater to all the needs of the PLA, but can take steps to take care of the more immediate issue such as the PLA’s institutional interests, in order to consolidate influence in the PLA. Moreover, if the PLA is unhappy with the new civilian leadership, it may send subtle messages through passive and tacit obstruction of the policy programs handed down from the CCP Central, which should allow for the Party-state leadership to respond and to adjust. Finally, to the extent the current PRC leadership has a much higher level of political flexibility and sophistication than the dying old guards generation, both civilian and the PLA leaders have ample time and opportunities to learn from each other and about each other’s needs, and to make necessary accommodations. Indeed, unless the top Party-state position was hijacked by a hidden Maoist radical or a Chinese Gorbachev, routinized bureaucratic consultation and mediation among people who share a similar mindset should lower the odds of an imminent, major political-military crisis.

        Policy. The influence of PLA conservative nationalism on policy has become narrowly confined to the national defense and security component of both foreign and domestic policy. In foreign policy, the PLA largely takes a more hawkish position if compared to the civilian bureaucracies, whether the policy is about Taiwan, the South China Sea, the proliferation issue, the US missile defense, or the current US fight against terrorism. Such a position usually reflects a  paranoid mentality of zero-sum game associated with an obsessive concern about relative gains. Earlier this year, for instance, the PLA leaders were able to successfully persuade the skeptical and reluctant Jiang and Zhu Rongji that a large-scale, months-long military exercise at Dongshan Island is necessary in order to prevent Taiwan independence. Without military deterrence, they argued, Chen Suibian’s pro-independence DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) would gain more legislative seats in the fall election in Taiwan, and Taiwan independence would gain new grounds, particularly at a time when the Sino-US relations deteriorated due to the plane collision incident, and as the US government increased arms sales to Taiwan and allowed Chen to make a transit in the US in his Latin America trip. Similarly, the constraints attached to the current Chinese cautious support for the US fight against terrorism, such as providing concrete proof, acting within the UN framework, and avoiding civilian casualties also reflect the PLA concern. The concern is that prolonged and expansive US military operations in central Asia, if not constrained, would undermine Chinese influence in the region, which in the long run would render China’s western frontier unstable and vulnerable.

        In domestic policy, evidence of influence of PLA nationalism is also apparent and abundant. The PLA endorses any policy program that would enhance national integration and unity. The plan to shift capital investment to western provinces gained the full support from the PLA, because it would reduce wealth disparity between regions, thus enhancing national integration. An element of this plan is to build a railway line from Qinghai to Tibet. This project was proven to be too costly and unfeasible in engineering terms. But because the PLA insisted that the proposed line would achieve the strategic goal of integrating and consolidating Tibet, it was endorsed by the CCP Central and the State Council and would proceed.

        One key policy area where PLA influence is getting stronger is mobilizing civilian resources for national defense purposes, or integrating national defense into the national economic and social development plans under the new rubric of stressing both the “marketplace” (“shichang”) and the “battlefield” (“zhanchang”). The recent decision jointly endorsed by the State Council and the CMC to train PLA officers in civilian schools, for instance, led to the development of a contractual system where the PLA scholarship-supported students from China’s key universities, upon graduation, would be directly recruited as active service officers by major PLA institutions. As a result, reserve officer training programs have also been established in China’s major universities and selected high schools. Furthermore, the PLA has been developing systematic programs in mobilizing the civilian infrastructure for military purposes. These programs include integrating military design and requirements into construction or modification of highways, air ports, sea ports, railroads, and telecommunications; modifying commercial planes and merchant ships for military purposes; and exploring the organization, methods, management, and logistics of utilizing these resources through mobilizational exercises. The PLA has also been dispatching teams of technical specialists to identity and acquire dual-use technologies in the fast-growing technology-intensive joint ventures. Finally, the PLA has been developing technology-intensive reserve units in cities and regions where technology-intensive firms concentrate, and recruiting technical experts in science, technology, and engineering to fill positions in these units.

        Through what channels and institutions does the PLA exercise influence over civilian policy? At the very top on the Party side, two uniformed PLA members (who are also the only two uniformed CMC vice chairs) serve in the 21-member CCP Politburo, but neither sits at its powerful seven-member Standing Committee. One of the two is also a member of the CCP Secretariat, which supervises the CCP central bureaucracies and operationalize the Politburo decisions. Moreover, about 18% of the CCP Central Committee members are from the PLA. One uniformed CMC vice chair is also a member of the Foreign Affairs Leadership Small Group, an informal Party grouping, which includes the heads of all the Party and state bureaucracies involved in foreign affairs, discusses foreign affairs, formulate foreign policy guidelines, and coordinate policy implementation. One PLA deputy chief of Staff also serves as a  member of  the Taiwan Affairs Leadership Small Group, which fulfills similar functions, but on Taiwan affairs.

        On the government side, a substantial number of PLA personnel serve as delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s legislature. One uniformed CMC vice chair also serves as the defense minister of the State Council, China’s cabinet. This person is also a state councilor, and the highest PLA representative at the regular State Council-CMC coordination conference, which mediates between the two institutions and coordinates policy. Finally, This CMC vice chair, together with a vice premier of the State Council, chair the State National Defense Mobilization Commission (NDMC, which was established in 1994), a joint State Council-CMC policy discussion and coordination institution. The NDMC has four major offices (people’s arms mobilization, economic mobilization, people’s air defense, and transportation and war preparation) under it, which are staffed by personnel from both the related State Council ministries and commissions, and the PLA four general (staff, political, logistics, and armament) departments. A PLA deputy chief of staff serves as the secretary general of the NDMC.

        Some reports suggest that the PLA members in the CCP Politburo and Central Committee would be substantially increased at the 16th Congress, because the PLA leaders demand more seats in order to have more say on policy. Such a forecast may be premature for several reasons. First of all, the current level of PLA membership in the Politburo (9%) and the Central Committee (18%) has stayed constant and stable since the early 1990s. Unless there is a major political crisis, drastic changes to this level may cause questions and criticism from the civilian side, trigger intra-Party rivalry, and undermine unity. Moreover, having more military members in these institutions does not necessarily translate into more effective PLA influence on policy. During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA membership in the Politburo and the Central Committee reached as high as 50% respectively. This led only to the expanded participation of the PLA leaders in the fierce intra-Party leadership factional struggle, which blew back  into the PLA and caused severe division among the PLA leaders. This in turn translated into policy stalemate and paralysis, but not policy effectiveness. Finally, these Party Central institutions, together with the CCP Secretariat, the leadership small groups, and the NPC, focus mainly on formulating general policy guidelines, but not on daily running of things, or going out and getting things done. Some of them don’t even meet regularly, and some others serve merely as forums for discussion, or as mechanisms of automatic approval of decisions made elsewhere. In comparison, the regular State Council-CMC coordinating conference and the NDMC are becoming very substantial and meaningful institutions in expanding the PLA’s influence on policy. To the extent the NDMC has been replicated at the provincial, prefecture, and county levels, and with the mandate of the State Council and the CMC it goes out to commandeer civilian manpower, infrastructure, technology, and properties in the name of national security, it definitely deserves more careful analysis. 

How Does PLA Conservative Nationalism Influence Chinese Society?        

        Like politics, the influence of PLA conservative nationalism on society has become narrowly focused on propagating and socializing the nationalism-based security and military values associated with national defense. For the past few years, for instance, there has been a steady increase of security and military literature in the popular media. they address issues ranging from China’s territorial and geostrategic vulnerability; its economic, energy, ecological, and information insecurity; to ways to reduce such vulnerability and insecurity. There has also been a remarkable increase in technical literature that concentrates on issues concerning military strategies and tactics, expenditures, technology, and organization. The other literary area that witnesses the substantial growth concerns the Chinese military history, both premodern and modern. Such literature involves the interpretation of major historical military campaigns and battles; of the strategies and tactics, organization, and technology employed; of the performance of major military units and personalities involved; and of the implications for China’s historical destiny. Another subject area that attracts extensive attention and interpretation of the media pundits concerns major current foreign security and military events and issues, and their security implications for China.

        The PLA’s substantial political and propaganda apparatus has also been systematically explicating the instruments and means of propagating nationalist values. These include “literary products such as novels and reportage, movies and TV shows, and operas and plays, that feature war themes.” “Organizing the public to visit war memorials and museums, and ‘holy places,’ and observing memorial days and military holidays” can also inculcate national defense values. Another way is to propagate war heroes. “The names of war heroes and those who have made outstanding contributions to national defense construction can be used to entitle cities and towns, streets , city squares, and working units, as well as planes, military vehicles, and warships that are in active service.” National defense model personalities can also “be organized for speech tours throughout the country, and enjoy generous government allowances and benefits.” Organizing military sports events such as “the cross-country and armed marathon competitions, and shooting competitions” should contribute to the cultivation of national defense values as well. During the conscription seasons, “regularly and repeatedly distributing the printed, audio and video materials that feature the historical evolution of military units, major military campaigns and victories, the lives of famous commanders and war heroes” should also achieve the effect. Finally,  “funds can be raised either through the government’s yearly allocation or society contribution” to construct “national defense education bases, and to improve the facilities, content, and means of such education.”^[9]

        To facilitate the social diffusion of national defense values, Liberation Army Daily, the mouthpiece of the PLA, has created  a new newspaper: China National Defense Daily (zhongguo guofang bao), which has gained wide circulation. The PLA propaganda apparatus has also been producing a daily half-hour military news program, aired by the CCTV (China Central Television, China’s national TV network). This program serves primarily the civilian audience, but not the PLA. Moreover, this apparatus has been producing TV movies and plays for the CCTV, which feature military themes. One report gleefully claims that in the current year, military themes-based TV movies and plays have occupied more than 50% of the prime time of the CCTV.^[10] Finally, with the increasing popularity of personal computers, Internet, and worldwide web, the number of Internet forums and chat rooms devoted to military subjects has been growing, and many are sponsored by the PLA institutions.

        The PLA has also been providing regular military commentators for TV news programs and forums on the Internet, which has created a few PLA celebrities. One such celebrity is Zhang Zhaozhong, a navy captain who heads the science and technology teaching and research Section of the National Defense University. For the past few years, Zhang has published a few nonfiction bestsellers, with titles such as Who Can Fight and Win the Next War? How Far Is the War from Us? and Who is the Next Target?, creating a sensation known as the “Zhang Zhaozhong phenomenon” among China’s book readers. The topics that Zhang comments on range from Taiwan, war in Kosovo and US bombing of Chinese embassy, information warfare, naval modernization, to the US missile defense.^[11] Other PLA media celebrities include two air force senior colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, who published the bestseller Unrestricted Warfare. Qiao and Wang are particularly fond of opining on asymmetrical warfare and its implications for a hypothetical Taiwan conquest scenario; and the recent terrorist attacks on the US.

        What conceptual rationale does the PLA provide to justify the socialization of national security and military values? This rationale has largely been driven by the new notion of propaganda warfare. Besides propaganda offensive such as media disinformation to mislead or demoralize the adversary, the PLA theorists particularly stress the importance of propaganda defense. The general goal of propaganda defense is to “enhance national cohesiveness ... and defeat the infiltration of the adversary's ideological and cultural values through patriotism education.” Under this general goal, there are three specific objectives to accomplish. The first is to “arouse and foster the consciousness of the broad masses to love the nation and the army; and to construct the spiritual great wall through cultivating the national spirit of self-respect, self-confidence, and self-strengthening.” The second is to “enhance the psychological quality of the Chinese nationals, particularly in developing the psychological ability to adapt to the high-tech war, which tends to be unprecedentedly brutal and may generate tremendous psychological pressure.” The psychological preparation through patriotism education in turn can translate into “the confident, optimistic, unifying and stable state of mind among citizens and soldiers in face of powerful enemy psychological deterrence.” Finally, propaganda warfare should not be just treated as a component of the political and diplomatic struggles, but also integrated into specific military operations. This means that “more systematic analysis should be done regarding the methods of propaganda warfare at the campaign and battle levels, with an eye toward the primary operational adversary.”^[12]

        How effective are the PLA programs in socializing the national defense and military values? When there is no systematic public opinion survey on the effectiveness of these programs, there are a few reasons to believe that they may achieve some level of success. The first reason is the difference in the popular appeal between the old Maoist subnational and transnational values of “class struggle” and “world revolution,” and the current  nationalist values. The Maoist values have been discredited largely because “class struggle” is too narrow, and it excludes many people (those with “bad” class backgrounds) from identifying with the Chinese nation; and “world revolution” is too broad and illusive for an average person to grasp. In comparison, the nationalist values, with the goal of defending and securing the land and the nation where one’s ancestors lived for centuries, can be much more appealing to an ordinary Chinese. Moreover, the government-imposed restrictions on the diffusion of liberal values in the mass media may also have helped to channel the public consciousness toward the nationalist direction. Finally, security and military values-based propaganda may be attractive because it may help to ease a prevailing sense of insecurity and vulnerability among the populace, a sense somewhat associated with rapid social-economic changes.         

What Aggravate and Constrain PLA Nationalism? 

        What aggravate PLA nationalism? There are several major internal and external factors that may aggravate PLA nationalism. Internally,  the continued economic growth, coupled with an effective mechanism to transfer more money from that growth to defense modernization, should contribute to the heightened PLA nationalism. The absence of a major domestic social-economic crisis that would fully absorb the energy and resources of the PLA, can lend a freer hand to the PLA in pursuing its nationalist goal. The almost absence of  routine legislative oversight and executive control of the PLA,^[13] together with the marginalization of liberal voices and challenges, may also expand the PLA’s influence on policy. But one major factor, which has not be carefully explored before, has to do with the style of the PLA strategic analyses. Over the decades, the PLA has developed a highly positivist strategic style, which places strong emphasis a) on a sharp dichotomy that defines friends and enemy; and b) on identifying the positive and strong points of the PLA, and the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the enemy.^[14] Such a style has the potential to aggravate PLA nationalism, leading to reckless policy choices based on gross miscalculations, which may in turn cause major policy blunders.^[15]

        What then account for such a strategic style? Among other things, two cultural-psychological variables may be central to an understanding of such a style. The first is the Chinese concern about “face,” which relates to the traditional Chinese culture and originates from the Confucian teaching on the need to maintain “ritual” (the appearance of righteousness) to sustain moral authority. To save “face” or not to lose it, for instance, the incentive is to show self-righteousness, or all the good, positive and strong points of the self; and the evil, negative, and weak points of the other, to the point such a dichotomy no longer reflects the more complex reality, because it is based on an exaggeration of the strength of the self, and the weakness of the enemy. The second is the residual of Maoism. Even though the PLA is moving away from Maoism in policy substance, the Maoist influence on the PLA style is still apparent and can not be quickly eradicated. A central element of Maoism, for instance, is voluntarism. Voluntarism stresses the power of  the mind and the consciousness, which can overcome the obstacles of the material conditions. Such an ideology would continue to influence the thinking of the PLA strategists, to the point some PLA strategic analyses may not reflect the balance of forces in the real world, but rather an overestimation of the PLA’s strength, and an underestimation of the adversary’s.

        Externally, to the extent PLA nationalism has largely focused on the  issue of Taiwan and the US commitment to the defense of Taiwan such as arms sales, what the US does about Taiwan may either aggravate or constrain PLA nationalism. The immediate goal of the PLA is to deter Taiwan from going independent, to the point it would accept China’s principle of “one country, two systems.” The PLA strategists are confident that  if the US is not committed to the defense of Taiwan, the PLA can accomplish this goal, which also means the PLA has a low regard for Taiwan and a much higher regard for the US commitment. Therefore, any sign of the US weakening of its commitment to the defense of Taiwan (not necessarily in terms of scaling down arms sales, but just in terms of being distracted by other issues) means an opportunity for the PLA to exploit. In this sense, the “911” tragedy may both constrain and aggravate PLA nationalism. It constrains PLA nationalism because from the PLA perspective, the need to use military means, such as conducting highly visible military maneuvers to deter US intervention and to intimidate Taiwan voters from voting for the DPP candidates in the fall legislative election, declines. This is because the distraction of the US from the Taiwan issue and its need for China’s cooperation in fighting terrorism, together with China’s imminent membership in the World Trade Organization and Taiwan’s economic difficulties, may reduce Taiwan’s leverage and produce the subtle deterrence effect on Taiwan independence, particularly with regard to whom the people in Taiwan would vote in the upcoming election. On the other hand, the “911” incident may also aggravate PLA nationalism, not in terms of the means but in terms of the substance. This is because from the PLA perspective, the PLA’s nationalist goal of preventing Taiwan independence is more likely to be realized now by the “continuation of war by other means,” such as the enhanced Chinese political, diplomatic and economic leverages.

        What constrain PLA nationalism? Besides those that may aggravate PLA nationalism, a few major internal and external factors also exist that may constrain or weaken PLA nationalism. Internally, an economic recession, or a weak mechanism incapable of transferring the necessary portion of the new civilian wealth to military modernization, would constrain PLA nationalism. Moreover, democratization may constrain PLA nationalism in two major ways. First, if it goes badly, China may fragment, which means the PLA would either fragment along the liberal and hard lines, or along the provincial, local and ethnic lines (as had happened to the Soviet Army during Russia’s democratization). Or the PLA may choose to stay together and launch a coup, to take over the weakened national government to prevent disintegration. Either way, the PLA would be fully absorbed into an acute domestic crisis, which should weaken PLA nationalism. Second, if democratization goes well to the point genuine liberal and democratic institutions such as the rule of law, a system of multiparty competition, and a free press take hold, PLA nationalism should also be substantially constrained. The PLA, for instance, would switch its allegiance from a communist party to the Constitution, and become nonpartisan. With the removal of the CCP from the PLA, the NPC, and the State Council, more effective legislative oversight and executive control of the PLA would be established, thus curtailing the policy influence of the PLA. Similarly, the debate on security and military policy would become more civilianized and less dominated by the PLA, which should also translate into the reduced influence of the PLA. This also means that it would be much easier for the liberal voices and values to challenge and contain the nationalist values of the PLA, to the point the PLA would gradually withdraw from the policy arena, into the narrower domain of the functional and technical specialties of the military profession. All these would substantially constrain PLA nationalism.

        Externally, a US policy that combines a balance-of-threat strategy and an engagement strategy should also constrain PLA nationalism. Currently, the PLA pursues a deterrence strategy of arms buildup and military exercises with regard to Taiwan. In the arsenal of the PLA, the most potent and threatening are the theater ballistic missiles. Therefore, a balance-of-threat strategy may focus on how to diffuse this missile threat, for instance, by developing a missile defense system. Some may argue that such a strategy may play into the hands of China’s hard-liners (such as the PLA) by militarizing the Taiwan issue and exacerbating an arms race, thus aggravating PLA nationalism. Such an argument is flawed for several reasons. First, it is the PLA who has militarized the Taiwan issue through its arms buildup and exercises. Second, to the extent the goal of the PLA deterrence strategy is to force the adversary yield without the actual use of force, not doing anything to defend oneself amounts to yielding, which clearly plays into the hands of China’s hard-liners such as the PLA. Third, a balance-of-threat strategy may actually strengthen the hands of China’s moderates and quasi-liberals, but not the hard-liners, because this strategy may enable the moderates and the quasi-liberals to argue that the PLA’s deterrence strategy is too costly and traps China into an arms race, and therefore it does not work. This may constrain PLA nationalism, because it may cause the Chinese switch from the militarized means to the political and diplomatic means in handling the Taiwan issue.

        The balance-of-threat strategy should also be accompanied by an engagement strategy.  The engagement strategy does not have to be a policy of appeasement as long as a) it is backed up by a balance-of-threat strategy which can incur high cost for cheating behavior; and b) it is designed in a way it does not provide an easy conduit for the PLA to acquire technology and intelligence. The track two diplomacy-based engagement strategy may serve to increase the transparency of each other’s military intentions and capabilities, and to work out ways to prevent accidents. Equally important, such a strategy may include educational programs that aim to modify Chinese domestic norms by inculcating the liberal values among China’s policy elite, including values concerning the role and functions of the military in a rule-of-law-based environment. To the extent a small but expanding group of moderates and quasi-liberals do exist in China’s policy circle ( including the PLA) who are more receptive to new ideas and norms, an engagement strategy apparently can work to constrain and undermine PLA nationalism.