

Chapter 14

Africa

The Seven Africas

Africa's challenges and opportunities are as diverse as the continent itself. Africa is perhaps better considered as a series of subregions, including the following seven: North Africa, the Sahel, West Africa, Central Africa, the Great Lakes region, East Africa, and Southern Africa. Africa's many conflicts tend to be local and entrenched, but the Horn of Africa and Sudan pose particular security challenges in the next 5 to 10 years. For the United States, a clear understanding of history may help to overcome the temptation to react to superficial events rather than to deal with underlying problems and long-term solutions. Enduring challenges such as fragile institutions and poverty have rich but different histories, geography, and identities. Both conflict and

opportunities abound, but the United States is only one of the external actors and not equally active or welcome in all areas.

North Africa

North Africa's five countries have similarities, but each is also distinct. The three countries classically referred to as the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia)¹ retain a French orientation. In this region, the United States is mostly seen as a potential market (or, in the case of Algeria, a real market) for raw materials and primary industries and, in the case of Morocco, as an ally.² The governments of all three Francophone Maghrebi states—but particularly Algeria—are challenged by radical Islamist movements of differing intensity; the so-called al Qaeda Orga-

AP Images (Ronald Zak)



Djiboutians gather for opening of new well

nization in the Land of the Berbers (established in 2005 by the now-deceased Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi) attempts to address them all, working through and with a variety of front or allied extremist groups. Nonetheless, there is a range of homegrown Islamist movements, some political and nonviolent, and some radical, that challenge the countries' leaders.

Algeria has promoted the removal of Western Sahara from Moroccan sovereignty since the Spanish colonial occupiers ceded it back to Morocco in February 1976. Algeria's sponsorship of the armed movement known as POLISARIO (*Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia El-Hamra y Río de Oro*, or Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro), which has claimed the right to self-determination of the territory, continues to be a flashpoint between Algeria and Morocco. Despite the size difference between Algeria and Morocco, the latter has historically fared well in military engagements with Algeria. As a result, an ongoing military buildup by Algeria must be viewed with concern.

Libya is closer than ever to change. Its leader, Muammar Qadhafi, is aging and Libyan institutions remain frail. The country's export wealth from oil has risen, and foreign investment in new oilfields has been offset to some degree by failure to sufficiently maintain older infrastructure. In recent years, Libya has opened up considerably, especially as the international isolation that followed the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 is coming to an end. But the urgent reality is the growing immobility of Qadhafi and the belief that his reign may be drawing to a close, without adequate provision for succession. Qadhafi has said that one of his sons, Saif al-Islam, would succeed him. However, neither Qadhafi nor his immediate entourage will give Saif al-Islam visible support, leading to speculation that the immediate post-Qadhafi era could be marked by a strenuous power struggle.

Several groups oppose Qadhafi, including the moderate Senussi Muslim movement—the *Sanussiyah*—centered on the Cyrenaica region of Eastern Libya, and generally supportive of a restoration of the Senussi monarchy. The Senussi movement is the diametric opposite of the Wahhabist movement in that the Senussi is tolerant, liberal, and modernizing. However, there are also radical Islamists in the Wahhabist or Salafist mold functioning as an active opposition in Libya. Stability in Libya will be a key element in ensuring the modernization of North Africa and its incorporation into the Mediterranean trading basin.

Egypt, Libya's neighbor, also faces the question of leadership succession. President Hosni Mubarak turned 80 in May 2008. One of the President's sons, Gamal, appears to be in line for succession, as suggested by his movement through the ranks of the National Democratic Party. But it is not clear whether such a succession would be challenged and, indeed, whether Gamal Mubarak would have the public, military, and political support necessary to address the challenges that could come from a presently constrained opposition movement. Certainly, there is a vibrant opposition, much of it radical and religious.

Egypt's political and cultural dominance of much of the Middle East, North Africa, and to a lesser degree of Africa as a whole means that the Egyptian succession process is of strategic importance, especially with the added weight given by Egypt's control of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Egypt, so dependent on U.S. military and civil support since the Camp David Accords of 1978, has been under a formal state of emergency since the assassination of President Mubarak's predecessor, Anwar Sadat, in 1981. In recent years, however, Egypt has become less politically involved with the United States, and it is possible that the next generation of Egyptian leadership may decide to move still further from a tacit alliance unless the United States undertakes initiatives that prepare for, and preempt, such a shift in Egyptian attitudes.

Sahelian Africa

Extending from Mauritania to Chad (but encroaching culturally on the eastern parts of West Africa and the northern part of Central Africa), the Sahel is an area of transition. Its very name, Sahel, in Arabic means *the shore*, reached after crossing the Sahara. The main foreign influences on the Sahelian states remain France and Morocco, even if the Sahel's most troubled areas (Darfur in western Sudan and northern Nigeria) are now increasingly Muslim in outlook, albeit of African Islamic moderation.

There is a growing concern about potential radicalization in this area because this part of the continent is home to some of the poorest people, institutions are brittle, and the United States has a low profile. The Sahara plays an overriding role, not least because of the southern drift of the Algerian radical Islamist movement and the growing interest of the Wahhabist al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Berbers movement. Stemming radical Islamist movements is delicate but feasible because they are culturally heterogeneous and generally not

welcomed by the African populations to the south. Significantly, Wahhabist and Salafist Islamic groups have contended for influence in this area along with groups sponsored (until 2003) by Saddam Hussein and Qadhafi. Iraqi-sponsored Ba'athists, for example, were behind coup attempts in Mauritania, culminating with the defeat of Ba'athists in the Mauritanian army in 2003, the same year that the prime minister moved to suppress al Qaeda elements that had been trying to establish a base of operation.

U.S. Navy (Jesse B. Awalt)



Muammar Qadhafi was elected chairman of the 12th African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, February 2009

West Africa

West Africa is an area of extreme cultural diversity, where European—specifically, French, Portuguese, and British—influences overlap. It is also an area of extreme economic disparity, where the various economies range from poor (Burkina Faso) to nationally wealthy (Nigeria) with a number of countries (Cam-

eroon, Ghana) aspiring to middle-income status. Nigeria is the natural regional power, but it is a dangerously splintered one, with its northern Sahelian region aspiring to retain the national domination inherited from colonial times and the Biafra War, while the Niger Delta states have been torn apart by a mounting low-intensity conflict. The conflict has its roots in a growing distortion of state-federal relations that have seen the central government take what the Delta states feel is a disproportionately large share of oil and gas export revenues, while neglecting infrastructural and human needs.

The Niger Delta crisis emerged through 2008 as perhaps the single greatest threat to the supply of foreign energy to the United States, Europe, and China. Nigeria's federal government was constrained in dealing effectively with the crisis because legal challenges to the legitimacy of the presidential elections of April 2007 were still being considered by the nation's supreme court. Some analysts estimated that the disruptions and threats to Niger Delta oil and gas production contributed at least 20 percent to the significant rise in oil prices in mid-2008.

Nigeria's leadership in creating the Gulf of Guinea Commission in recent years has attempted to weld some cohesion among the countries along the Western African coast, almost all of which were, or potentially were, energy-producing states. This organization and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are key to building effective indigenous institutions that can address the rich diversity represented by the region's states and populations. At the same time, a growing network of energy pipelines is extending through the region, with the vision of ultimately linking South African west coast energy resources with other energy production up the entire Western African coast, and ultimately by undersea pipeline across the Mediterranean to southwestern Europe. In the meantime, the pipeline network is a building block for regional modernization and economic growth.

Central Africa

The heart of the continent, Central Africa, hinges on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a country still rebuilding from more than three decades of rule by President Mobutu Sese Seko. This was followed by "Africa's First World War" (1998–2003), the deadliest conflict in the world since World War II that left almost 4 million dead. Beyond the DRC, the region includes parts of West Africa (the Gabon, most of the Republic of

Congo–Brazzaville), as well as northern Angola and western Zambia.

This is a totally underdeveloped area of immense potential wealth. Blessed with a low population-to-resources ratio, Central Africa is perhaps the richest part of the whole continent and, if well governed, could aspire to middle-income status. The DRC, which was once approaching this level of development, has today the lowest per capita income on the continent.

Significantly, the linkage between the DRC with the neighboring Great Lakes state, Rwanda, is largely through ethnic and clan relationships, which is why substantial numbers of Hutu Rwandans—and much of the Hutu *Interahamwe* militia—fled to the DRC following the Rwandan civil war of 1994. This linkage also accounts for the profound influence that Rwandan President Paul Kagame has over the DRC government—and much of the territory of the DRC. It is not coincidental that both the DRC and Rwanda were controlled as a colony (the Belgian Congo) and League of Nations mandate protectorate (Rwanda) by Belgium. Both territories shared not only some ethnic and cultural overlap, but also a common, and searing, experience under Belgian control until less than a half-century ago.

The Great Lakes

The Great Lakes region is made up of only two full-fledged countries—Rwanda and Burundi—but also comprises regions of others (eastern DRC, western Uganda, and western Tanzania). This is a densely populated mountainous region (approximate to those of the Netherlands or the Asian great river deltas), and overpopulation is perhaps the main problem. The genocidal cycles that the region has periodically suffered since 1959 have been attributed in many ways to an intensive but traditional agriculture, which finds it difficult to support a rapidly expanding population. This theory, however, has been strongly contested, with other theorists pointing to the Belgian occupiers' predilection for favoring the promotion of the Hutu people over the traditionally ruling Tutsi. Although sharing a common language (Kinyarwanda), religion (Roman Catholicism), and culture, the Tutsi have Nilotic ethnic origins (from the Hamitic regions around southern Ethiopia) while the Hutu have Bantu origins (from southern Africa). The whole region remains extremely explosive, and the war provoked by the flight of Hutu militia from Rwanda into the DRC is still simmering in the Eastern Congo, with or without Rwandan involvement.

The “peace agreement” that began to take effect in

Burundi with elections in 2005 remains extremely fragile because it rests on the capacity of a stagnant agricultural economy to integrate thousands of disenfranchised Hutu who expect miracles from the new dispensation. Rwanda itself remains delicately balanced, despite recent economic growth, given the Tutsi-led government of President Kagame's successful presentation of itself to the international community as inclusive, balanced, and democratic. Kagame, however, retains a strong grip on the internal security



U.S. Air Force (Nathan Lipscomb)

Nigerian air force brigadier general, chairman of Africa Endeavor 2008 planning committee, explains objectives of U.S. European Command–sponsored exercise to U.S. Embassy Nigeria Chief of Mission

situation, especially in light of the 1994 genocide that failed to stop the Tutsi from seizing back the power the Belgians had taken from them and given to the Hutu. The spillover potential of the as-yet-unresolved conflict—particularly the eastern DRC component of it—remains significant. In spite of its small area, the Great Lakes region has roughly 40 million inhabitants, vastly more than the 14 million affected by the Chad/Darfur conflict in North Africa. The United States has barely begun to understand and address the Great Lakes region, although the appointment of an experienced Africa-oriented U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda in late 2008 upgraded Washington's focus on the region.

East Africa

East Africa is one the most culturally coherent areas of the continent, both because of the relative

closeness of the precolonial cultures and because the whole region received a strong British imprint during the colonial period. The core area is constituted by the three countries of the former British East Africa—Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania—but the socioeconomic coherence of the region extends to Malawi and to large parts of Zambia. This is an area of relative political equilibrium since Uganda grew out of civil war 20 years ago. The residual violence in northern Uganda is now more Sudan-related than homegrown.

The whole region is slowly moving toward a middle-income position, provided it can avoid political backsliding (as in Kenya recently, or in Uganda potentially the day President Yoweri Museveni departs). But there are no structural causes making political strife probable, other than the ethnic differences, such as those that rose to the surface during the 2008 Kenyan elections. Ethnic and religious differences remain the subtext for politics in Kenya, in particular.

This is an area of relative democratic governance, with a strong potential for more given the importance of the civil society. This is also the part of the continent that has perhaps the most positive view of the United States.

Southern Africa

Southern Africa comprises two former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, along with the former British colonies—Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Lesotho, and the Republic of South Africa—and the former British Protectorate, the Kingdom of Swaziland.

Southern Africa is in many respects the most economically developed part of the continent, with additional vital geographic significance, given its domination of the Cape of Good Hope. South Africa's gross national product equals that of the whole of the other sub-Saharan Africa states. In South Africa, the key may be managing economic growth among the black population without disenfranchising the whites. This will require sustaining relative stability and strong economic discipline—and therefore foreign investor confidence—following the country's second leadership transition since the end of apartheid rule in 1994.

In Angola, the challenge is how to distribute nationally the growing oil wealth presently concentrated in the hands of a culturally marginal minority of coastal white, half-caste, and black *assimilados*, whose victory in 2002 over the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola—after three decades of civil war—gave unchecked power to the

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola government of President José Eduardo dos Santos.

The political, economic, and social outlook for Zimbabwe remained unpredictable at the end of 2008, given the reluctance of Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front leader and President Robert Mugabe to relinquish real power in the face of national elections. As of late 2008, Mugabe was continuing to flout a power-sharing agreement that kept him in the presidency, but which brought Morgan Tsvangarai to the Prime Ministership; Mugabe's unilateral appointments, including of a second vice president, met no immediate, effective opposition.

Quite apart from poor governance and human misery, the problems of Zimbabwe are not restricted to that country alone. The country's prevalence of HIV/AIDS, unchecked through years of national isolation, has spawned a virulent and (as yet) incurable form of tuberculosis that has the potential for broad international transmission. With some 2 million Zimbabwean refugees already living in difficult conditions in South Africa, many just outside Cape Town, the trouble has already begun to spread and can only get worse if stability in Zimbabwe is not created to avert further outflows of refugees.

Unaddressed, and pointedly ignored by the great power of the region, South Africa, has been the protracted issue of the restoration of Swaziland's stolen territories. A significant part of Swaziland's territories were apportioned out to Mozambique (then a Portuguese colony) and South Africa (then a British colony) by the United Kingdom, acting in its capacity as the invited Protector of the Kingdom of Swaziland.

America's Security Role: The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa, stretching from North to East Africa, is arguably the area of greatest security engagement for the United States. There are at least three broad, interlocking sets of problems in the Horn:

- security and economic growth in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, and Kenya
- political, ethnic, and religious developments, which are critical for stability and moderation in the greater Middle East
- maritime security in the Red Sea and Suez sealanes, which increasingly link the affairs of Horn states with those of the Middle East (Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran) and Indian Ocean area (India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Australia).

While U.S. engagement in the complex affairs of the Horn of Africa has deepened in recent years, it is far from new. During the 1970s, authoritarian socialist governments with close links to the Soviet Union ruled Ethiopia and Somalia. Previously close relations with the West, including the United States, had largely dissipated. Human rights abuses were flagrant, and the economies, plagued by Soviet-state socialism and civil war, fell into disarray. Both countries concluded military cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union, including hundreds of Soviet and Soviet bloc advisors and massive amounts of Soviet weapons. Particularly in Somalia, as did the United States before, Soviet aircraft and naval vessels had virtual sovereign use of vital airfields and port facilities. Operating out of Somalia, the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to U.S. alliances—and shipping—in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea, including the southern approach to the Suez Canal. The Horn of Africa thus had become a significant zone of East-West confrontation.

Somalia

Suddenly, in October 1977, Somalia leader Siad Barre sent his army to “liberate” the large ethnic Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Moscow swiftly stopped all military assistance to Somalia, withdrew its advisors, and poured weapons and advisors into Ethiopia. What became a major Soviet presence in Ethiopia began when the Carter administration withdrew its support for Emperor Haile Selassie I, who was overthrown by army major Mengistu Haile Mariam; when denied U.S. support, Mengistu allied himself with the Soviet Union. Soviet help for Mengistu included several well-trained, heavily armed brigades of the Cuban army. The Somalis were quickly routed by the Soviet-backed Ethiopian forces, and Siad Barre turned to America for help. Only too happy to counter growing Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean region, the United States provided considerable military and economic assistance. The U.S. Navy began using Somali airfields and ports, particularly at Berbera in the former area of British Somaliland, which, with the collapse of the Siad Barre government, withdrew from the Somalia union of 1960 and later reasserted its independence as the Republic of Somaliland in 1991. Despite U.S. assistance, Siad Barre’s autocratic rule had led by 1990 to widespread dissatisfaction and civil war, resulting in his ouster in 1991. A prolonged drought in the late 1980s plus the depredation of the continuing war resulted in famine. Some 500,000 people had died by

mid-1991, generating pressure for outside intervention when the feuding Somali warlords disrupted food deliveries by the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Civil war among Somali-based militants was accompanied by a drought that caused some 400,000 deaths by the summer of 1992. UN efforts to end the civil war so that humanitarian assistance could be delivered had failed. President George H.W. Bush, with the approval of the UN Security Council, organized an international coalition of some 30,000 troops in a unified task force under the command and control of the United States. It began operations in December 1992. By March 1993, humanitarian assistance was flowing freely, and the country was stable enough for a new force (United Nations Operation in Somalia II or UNOSOM II) to replace the unified task force. But, once again, the UN effort failed. It became embroiled in a renewed Somali civil war and suffered serious casualties. In an effort to support UNOSOM II—and the prestige of the United Nations—President Bill Clinton dispatched Task Force Ranger, a unit of special operations forces, to neutralize the most powerful of the militias involved in the conflict led by Mohamed Farrah Aidid. However, U.S. forces were taken by surprise and lost 18 men in the first Battle of Mogadishu. Pakistani and Nigerian units lost substantially more troops in the engagement, and the Pakistani forces were vital in helping recover U.S. personnel. Under pressure from an enraged Congress, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces. Without U.S. support on the ground, an attempt by UNOSOM II to continue operations came to an end by March of 1994. The Somali civil war continued and, over time, an Islamist movement emerged as the most probable actor for ending the violence.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States feared that al Qaeda and Taliban remnants could find sanctuary in Somalia following their defeat in Afghanistan. It established multinational naval and air patrols to prevent such an incursion and created Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA). Based in Djibouti, CJTF–HOA was designed to carry out political, military, and economic activities—particularly in Ethiopia and Kenya—aimed at combating terrorism and strengthening the capacity of regional governments and the well-being of their populations.

In Somalia, by late 2005, the United States had become afraid that an indigenous politico-religious movement—the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)—was

gaining strength and could pose a serious terrorist threat, collaborating with al Qaeda. Like the Taliban in Afghanistan, its initial apparent success in ending widespread clan-based violence and crime, buttressed by its religious zeal, garnered substantial popular support. By the fall of 2006, ICU militias were threatening to overrun the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Although recognized by the UN, the TFG was too weak to enter Mogadishu. The ICU was also threatening to move into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia where ethnic Somali guerrillas were already active. This caused the Ethiopian army—supported with considerable U.S. assistance including two airstrikes—to move into Somalia. Once it had done so, it quickly routed the ICU militias whose remnants were pushed into the region near the Kenyan border. The TFG was reestablished in Mogadishu but had almost no authority and was dependent on the Ethiopian army, which was itself under almost daily harassment by ICU remnants and other disgruntled Somalis.

Attempts by the international community to resolve the serious problems of Somalia came to naught. Following a United Nations-brokered peace, Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia in January 2009. In the same month a moderate Islamist, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, was installed as President. As of June 2009, fierce fighting continued between the government and Islamist groups opposed to it, which has resulted in a significant number of casualties and displaced persons especially in and around Mogadishu.

In late 2008, towns outside the capital were still falling to the ICU. Significantly, the ICU has received significant financial and weapons support from the Eritrean government in a bid to weaken Ethiopia, and various Somali officials, particularly the president, have benefited financially and in other terms from support from Yemen. Given the president's background as the former warlord of Puntland, this has boosted armed attacks on the pro-Western Republic of Somaliland, which has worked closely with the United States and United Kingdom on counter-terrorism issues.



U.S. Air Force (Stan Parker)

General William Ward, USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command, speaks at change of command ceremony for Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, February 2009

Although weakened by the actions of some 40,000 Ethiopian military forces, Somali Islamist radicals, strengthened by a growing upsurge of an anti-Ethiopian insurgency, retained a capability to regroup and rearm should Ethiopian forces withdraw, or should they be able to circumvent efforts to prevent them from receiving external assistance.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia has been wracked by civil war. In 1990, two allied secessionist movements rapidly gained strength, one band in Eritrea, and one in the Tigray Province of Ethiopia. By May 1991, Ethiopia leader Mengistu Haile Mariam had fled the country, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front leader, Meles Zenawi, found himself, with significant Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) military support, in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The United States, at this time preoccupied with the collapse of the Soviet Union, essentially sanctioned Meles' seizing control of Ethiopia, even though his secessionist war had been fought to wrest Tigray away from Amhara-dominated Ethiopia. Meles, however, had been allied with the EPLF leader, Isaias Afwerki, and, with the support of the former, as a result of a 1993 UN-monitored referendum, Eritrea split from Ethiopia to become an independent state.

Following Eritrea's independence, the two countries, led by erstwhile allies, enjoyed an amicable relationship. However, relations began to sour, bilateral attempts at policy coordination and economic cooperation faltered, and border incidents recurred in 1997. The failure of the two governments to bridge their policy differences, defuse their simmering tensions, and resolve the underlying causes of their deteriorating bilateral relations led to full-scale war by June 1998. Demanding a return to the status quo ante, Ethiopia declared war on May 13, 1998, and

abandoned its use of Eritrea's ports. A joint U.S.-Rwandan initiative and an Organization of African Unity (OAU) attempt failed to prevent further escalation. The war was joined and unfolded in three intermittent rounds: June-July 1998, February 1999, and May-June 2000.

Persistent efforts by the United States, the OAU, and the United Nations succeeded in brokering the Algiers Agreements, namely the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of June 18, 2000, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of December 12, 2000. The war ended. The peace accord provided, among other things, the establishment of a neutral body, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), with the mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on the pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicable international law.

The two governments agreed that the decision was to be final and binding. The peace agreement was guaranteed by the United Nations and the OAU. The Boundary Commission issued its delimitation decision on April 13, 2002. Contravening the terms of the agreement, Ethiopia refused to unconditionally accept the boundary commission's decision and withdraw its forces from territories awarded to Eritrea. Ethiopia obstructed the physical demarcation of the boundary, thereby impeding the full implementation of the Algiers Agreements and causing the long impasse of neither peace nor war between the two countries.

After 4 years of fruitless effort (from April 2002 to November 2006, during which attempts to demarcate a land boundary floundered over Ethiopia's refusal to cooperate and scant support from the UN Security Council), the Boundary Commission issued a deadline. In November 2006, the EEBC gave the parties 1 year in which to erect or allow it to erect the pillars on the boundary, failing which it would demarcate by coordinates. At the end of the deadline, November 26, 2007, the EEBC declared that the boundary stood demarcated in accordance with the coordinates and reaffirmed that the delimitation decision of April 2002 and the demarcation by coordinates were legally binding on the parties per the Algiers treaty.

Subsequently, the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea was terminated July 31, 2008, and the Boundary Commission has ended its operations, as stated in its 27th and final report submitted by the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council on October 2, 2008. It remains for the Security Council to endorse the EEBC's virtual

demarcation, catalyze physical demarcation, and facilitate reconciliation between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

The war caused enormous destruction of property, huge loss of human life, and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people, and entailed a significant lost opportunity for development on both sides. The Eritrean and Ethiopian economies and peoples have suffered as their governments pursue the politics of a zero-sum game in futile efforts to undo each other, prolong their authoritarian rules, and postpone a durable solution. Furthermore, the unresolved Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict has a pervasive spillover effect; it exerts a negative impact on the internal stability of both countries as well as on regional peace and security in the strategic Horn of Africa, in general, and on the Somali and Sudanese crises, in particular, as both governments operate to undermine each other by supporting each other's domestic and regional opponents.

The resolution of the conflict and the ensuing normalization of bilateral relations and restoration of political and economic cooperation between Eritrea and Ethiopia would not only serve the interests of the two countries and their peoples but also contribute to regional peace and security in the volatile Horn of Africa. The United States must thus consider the benefits of a nuanced regional stance and a balanced policy in the Horn that promotes conflict resolution and peacemaking in accordance with international law; enables it to use its considerable assets to influence events; and promotes democracy, rule of law, and good governance conducive to sustainable development in the region. If stability can be maintained, then there is reason to believe that Ethiopia can increase its role as the great heartland power of the Horn, with some 70 million people, and capacity to increasingly influence the security of the Red Sea and Suez sea lines of communication.

Sudan

In 1989, General Omar Bashir seized power in Khartoum in partnership with radical Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi. They opened Sudan's doors to Islamist radicals from other countries: Hamas, Abu Nidal, Black September, Hizballah, and the Egyptian organizations, the Islamic Group and Al Jihad (led by Ayman al-Zawahri). In 1992, the Sudanese government gave safe haven with freedom to train, equip, and operate to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization, which had been expelled from Saudi Arabia. The government also provided large tracts of the best farmland and major construction contracts. In the early

1990s, Al Jihad conducted suicide attacks on senior Egyptian officials in Egypt and other countries. This culminated in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Mubarak during his 1994 visit to Ethiopia (Al Jihad later became part of al Qaeda). In December 1992, an al Qaeda *fatwa* was issued in Khartoum calling for worldwide Islamist terrorist activities directed against the United States as well as Saudi Arabia. In January 1993, al Qaeda blew up a hotel in Yemen, which was being used by U.S. forces en route to Somalia. In October 1993, bin Laden claimed responsibility for the “Black Hawk Down” attacks upon U.S. forces in Mogadishu. This was a false claim but it greatly enhanced al Qaeda’s stature in some Muslim communities.

In the early years of the 21st century, Ethiopia was no longer supporting oppositionists to the government in Khartoum. However, Eritrea was harboring ethnic separatists from eastern Sudan and a northern Sudanese political organization at odds with President Bashir’s Islamist administration in Khartoum. U.S.-backed peace talks between John Garang’s Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Bashir government got under way in 2002, in which the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) played an important role. Its members included both Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan was completed in January 2005.

The continued confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea has had a deleterious impact on developments in Darfur. As a means of pressure to prevent the Khartoum government from establishing closer relations with Ethiopia, Eritrea has provided financial support and weapons to some of the Darfur rebel groups fighting the Sudanese army in collaboration with Libya (and the government of Chad). This is another example of the interlinked web of issues confronting countries in the Horn. At the same time, however, Sudan and Eritrea have worked together on anti-Ethiopian issues, while currently Ethiopia and Sudan are working harmoniously on defining their collective border, which had been unresolved since the British/Egyptian occupation of Sudan ended in the 20th century.

Djibouti

Despite a small, ethnically divided population and threatening neighbors, Djibouti has made surprising progress over the past decade. The longstanding military presence of the French, and more recently of the United States, has provided security and political stability. Other countries have also provided economic

assistance. More importantly, Djibouti’s strategic location near the oil-rich countries of the Gulf has provided an economic boom for investors from the Gulf and other countries. The Djibouti government wishes to expand shipping and other facilities connecting the Gulf and the rest of the world. The huge economic benefits have been such that the entire population has benefited, further enhancing stability and attracting more investment.

The presence of CJTF-HOA in Djibouti has succeeded in preventing al Qaeda and other terrorist networks from gaining a major foothold in the Horn as had been feared. Civic action programs and other assistance from the United States, and assistance from other countries such as the United Kingdom and France, has effectively neutralized them. However, all the countries of the Horn—not only the worst case of Somalia—have major internal problems that provide ready kindling for Islamist radicals to start future fires. Obviously, the negative view of the United States in some Islamic communities creates problems, as does the sizeable U.S. assistance to and support for the authoritarian government in Ethiopia, which is all too widely misperceived as a junior partner to a putative anti-Islamist war.

Underlying Trends and Concerns

The United States has historically looked at the Horn of Africa primarily through a strategic lens (for example, the Cold War and the global fight against extremism), with periodic responses to humanitarian crises. Underlying long-term problems of ethnic and religious tensions, tribal and clan differences, governance, and poverty have not been given the same priority. When they have, no nostrums have been discovered. This is also the case for other outside actors that are more concerned with economic and social issues (such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank), as well as regional political organizations such as the African Union and IGAD.

There are also immense and growing problems associated with demography, climate, and water. This is especially true for Ethiopia, because of its large and rapidly growing population, as well as Somalia. The climate is prone to periods of drought and famine. This has combined with efforts—largely ineffectual despite foreign assistance—to modernize agricultural development and with internal conflict to keep domestic food production far below the minimum needs of the population. International food prices have been rising speedily. The United States and

other traditional suppliers are no longer able to supply the large amounts of subsidized food needed for the Horn. The major long-term political impact of this situation is self-evident.

In light of the recent past, close attention should be paid to several potentially serious security problems in the Horn of Africa:

- a renewal of major conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, nominally over unresolved territorial issues
- the continued upsurge of Islamist radicalism in Somalia and potential sanctuary for terrorist networks such as al Qaeda
- the collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in Sudan (see the essay on Sudan in this chapter), which would have far-reaching consequences on economic development, energy, migratory flows and refugees, and external interference.

Persistent Conflicts

The media perception of Africa is as a continent in conflict, and yet most of Africa is at peace. Where there is insecurity, it is often related to poverty-driven crime, but it is important to note that most external perceptions of Africa are stereotypes that, if they were ever accurate for even parts of the continent, are usually years or even decades out of date.

The reality of Africa is that it has many areas of calm and many areas of real economic and social promise.

This does not mean that the legacies of colonialism, tribalism and ethnicity, language barriers, and the like have been entirely overcome, but African states are moving at different rates toward national identities beyond the postcolonial era. Even so, substantial intrastate and interstate conflicts continue. But there are also mechanisms and institutions for conflict resolution that may support greater stability and peace in the years ahead.

Active or simmering armed conflicts in Africa include the following:

- the unresolved conflict over the future of the former Spanish Western Sahara, which is now legally part of Morocco
- the Touareg rebellion on the Algeria/Mali Sahara confines
- the rebellion in Chad
- the northern Central African Republic rebellion
- the Sudanese civil war in Darfur
- various low-intensity regional guerrilla conflicts in Eritrea, with some directed toward Djibouti
- the ongoing Eritrean-supported Oromo Liberation Front rebellion in Ethiopia and a number of other ethnic-based insurrections in Ethiopia, including the simmering Ogaden rebellion



U.S. Air Force (Joe Zuccaro)

Villagers wait to see U.S. medical personnel from Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in Milo, Ethiopia

- the unresolved border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which has substantial potential for resurgence into a major conventional war

- clan warfare in Somalia (the former Italian Somaliland) internally, and the separate confrontations between Somalia and Somaliland, particularly originating from Puntland

- the Lord's Resistance Army remnants hovering between southeastern Central African Republic, northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, southern Sudan, and northern Uganda

- the Nkunda rebellion in North Kivu (DRC)

- *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda) remnants in the Cabinda enclave (Angola)

- a presently dormant conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, where part of the national territory escapes government control

- the escalating armed conflict between various groups and the Nigerian federal government in the country's oil- and gas-producing Niger Delta over states' rights and revenue-sharing.

There are of course many other regions where social, cultural, or ethnic unrest lies semi-dormant and could reignite under appropriate conditions. Within this context, at the intersection of the Uganda/Ethiopia/Sudan/Kenya quadri-borders, a cluster of pastoral tribes (mainly the Karimojong, Dessanech, Nyangatom, Toposa, and Turkana) are engaged in recurrent cross-border cattle raiding. In the Lower Congo, the Bundu dia Kongo ethno-religious sect lives in a state of semipermanent political secession from the DRC. And in the Caprivi Strip, the Lozi tribe hopes to (re) create a country (Barotseland) out of various pieces of Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana. All of this unrest matters, but none of it seriously threatens the security of any established state, however weak.

Other areas of political tension exist, but in most of these cases—including, for example, the refusal of the people of the Bakassi Peninsula to allow themselves to be recategorized as Cameroonian citizens while claiming to remain part of Nigeria—armed conflict may well be avoided. In addition, Swaziland's claims to recover territories expropriated during the British Protectorate era and placed under South African and Mozambican control could generate military reactions from the states now controlling former Swazi lands and people.

In some African states, issues of leadership succession remain areas of security concern, although Africa has moved strongly toward democratic

processes which have, as their principal value, the orderly transition from one government or leader to the next without causing major disruptions to the processes of building national institutions and economic progress. If it continues, this significant move toward orderly succession of governments—with the support of armed forces, which are becoming increasingly committed to civilian control—will move much of Africa toward greater stability. There remain areas, even beyond North Africa, however, where this process has not yet taken root, and those countries where no plan for constitutional succession processes are in place are states that run the risk of both instability and economic dislocation.

Quite apart from outdated external perceptions of stability and security in Africa, the challenges and conflicts that do arise there are not, in general terms, the same. Each situation has distinct characteristics that require external assistance to be carefully tailored to the local historical and cultural context.

Even so, the overriding problem is that of how modern African states were created and how they have developed. In many instances, African states are both too strong (*vis-à-vis* their civil society) and too weak (when considering the developmental needs they should tackle). Even Somalia, where the state, having disappeared, cannot be said to be at the heart of the present anarchy, fits within this theory: one of the reasons the state disappeared in Somalia was that the excesses of the Siad Barre administration (1969–1991) contributed not only to its own demise but also to discrediting the very notion of the state in a nomadic, ultra-democratic society that was highly suspicious of the state concept from the outset. There are few African states in which the economy has the significant degree of independence from the state that is evident in most highly developed industrial societies, but a number of African societies are diversifying, becoming more complex and less state-centric.

Weak civil societies, where they continue to exist in Africa, cannot stand up to delinquent and often rogue states. Countries such as Rwanda or Angola had no civil society worth the name, and the state (or the rebels) was enabled to create significant levels of disorder. However, the December 2007 Kenya election resulted in the killing of about 1,500 people, but a powerful civil society was one of the factors that then brought under control a potentially deadly civil conflict. Similarly, whether the situation resulting from the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections in Zimbabwe will end up in civil

war largely depends on the confrontation between the fairly developed Zimbabwean civil society and the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front political structures and leaders that continue to retain significant authority, despite the powersharing agreement achieved on September 15, 2008, with Morgan Tsvangirai (as prime minister) of the Movement for Democratic Change. Any dislocation within Zimbabwe is likely to exacerbate the flow of refugees from the country, and particularly into neighboring South Africa.

Borders and Interstate Conflict in Africa

Porous artificial borders, stemming from colonial occupation, are a source of criminal activity and other security challenges. At its creation in 1962, the OAU, seeking to avoid a series of territorial wars in postcolonial Africa, laid down, as a principle, that national borders set by colonial powers should become fixed and agreed upon among the independent states of Africa. This minimized interstate conflict—certainly over borders—for the next half century, but did not eliminate all problems. The AU, which succeeded the OAU as the collective forum for African states in 2002, continued its predecessor's stricture on the maintenance of the former colonial boundaries, but this did not eliminate a series of attempts to redraw the African map.³

Conflict Resolution and Stabilization Mechanisms

Although the African Union lacks adequate resources, it has helped to foster a gradual transformation of acceptable norms and good governance in Africa.

Other regional bodies include ECOWAS, founded in 1975, and headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria. ECOWAS functions through a commission, in some respects similar to the European Union (EU).⁴ Also like the EU, ECOWAS has a parliament, in which the 15 member states are represented, and which gives the body some executive authority over the region.

There are a range of other regional bodies, such as the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), the world's oldest customs union (created in 1889). Since 2002, SACU has had an independent secretariat and a headquarters established in Windhoek, Namibia. Other regional governance bodies include the Gulf of Guinea Commission, which brings together the energy-producing states of the gulf on Africa's west coast. Others include the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CSSS), formed in 1998; the IGAD in eastern

Africa, created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, founded in 1986; the Southern African Development Community, established in 1980; the East African Community, originally founded in 1967 and revived in 2000; the Arab Maghreb Union, formally joined in 1989; the Economic Community of Central African States, established in 1983; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, formed in 1994; and a range of other specialist cooperative organizations, including one dealing with the interstate sharing of criminal intelligence, for example, and others, such as the West African Monetary Union, which was created in 1994 to promote a common currency.

There are, then, a significant array of mechanisms that enable interstate dialogue and cooperation, and these have led to an effective pattern of cooperation minimizing major conflict on the continent in recent decades.

The growing move by the United States to focus attention on Africa, which gained momentum with the end of the Cold War in 1990, has led to the creation of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), which effectively stood up as an independent military command in October 2008 and is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. USAFRICOM clearly supports the projection and protection of U.S. interests in Africa, but it is unique as a military command in that it works closely with nonmilitary elements of the U.S. Government to project “soft power” approaches⁵ designed to help stabilize and build Africa, on which the United States is becoming increasingly dependent for energy.

By 2005, Africa—particularly the Gulf of Guinea states, such as Nigeria—was providing more oil to the United States than the Middle East.⁶ America was expected to import as much as 25 percent of its oil and gas from the Gulf of Guinea states by 2015, not only making U.S. interest in the stability of the region of paramount importance, but also adding wealth to the region. What has been significant has been the low percentage of the gross domestic product, which African states, on average, commit to defense spending. In 2007, when global military spending reached an estimated \$1.34 trillion, the entire African continent spent only \$18.5 billion on defense, with South Africa having the highest defense budget in sub-Saharan Africa.

The role of USAFRICOM is to assist in conflict resolution in Africa, in concert with local governments, and to assist in humanitarian actions, while at the same time helping to improve the professional development of African armed forces. Aside

from direct security benefits for the region, this also contributes to continuing the process whereby African militaries gain an increasingly respected place in supporting the framework of democratic governance.

African states have turned more to legal mechanisms than to conflict to resolve interstate differences. A major example was the case in the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which in October 2002 decided the ownership of the disputed 700-square-kilometer oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula between Nigeria, which had run the area historically, and Cameroon. The court decided, after a 10-year court case, in favor of Cameroon. The area was reincorporated into Cameroon on August 14, 2008.

The Bakassi Peninsula example may be one that is followed by Swaziland in pursuing its claims against South Africa for the restoration of Swazi territory occupied by South Africa since that country was a British colony. But there is a difference, in terms of conflict resolution, between African states deciding themselves to pursue internationally binding arbitration and external powers forcing international legal settlements. A case in point was the distortion of the African solution to resolving the Liberian civil war.

Nigeria had lost many of its youth fighting to bring an end to the Liberian civil war and there-

fore had no love for Liberian leader Charles Taylor, whose forces had opposed them. Nonetheless, as a means of resolving the conflict, Nigeria offered asylum to Taylor as a means of letting him voluntarily depart Liberia. Taylor accepted, but the United States—having initially urged the asylum option on Nigeria—had now begun to press Nigeria to extradite the infamous Taylor to face International Criminal Court charges. In forcing Nigeria to accept extradition, the option of providing asylum as a means of removing embattled leaders was discredited. It is possible that this affected the decision by Mugabe to fight to retain power in that country, despite having lost the 2008 elections. An African solution had worked in several other cases, including removing the Ethiopian Dergue leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, in order to minimize the damage caused by civil war. From the vantage point of some in Africa, external interference in a successful mechanism for conflict reduction was unhelpful.

Global Attention to Africa at a Critical Time

Africa's mineral and energy resources have become a major focus for foreign investors during the first decade of the 21st century, a trend likely to continue to expand in importance. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has turned to Africa to meet its rap-

U.S. Navy (Chad R. Erdmann)



USS *Iwo Jima* passes under Mubarak Peace Bridge transiting the Suez Canal, March 2009

idly growing energy needs, and this has contributed significantly to competition for Africa's products. There is little doubt, then, that this competition will place increased pressure on U.S. and European administrations to commit more political, diplomatic, and other resources to ensure the stability—and the friendship—of African states.

High resources prices, not only for oil and gas but also for iron ore and a range of other minerals, gems, and gold, mean that some African states will prosper. Of special importance, however, is the question of whether this will help or hinder balanced national growth, bearing in mind that the oil boom of the 1960s and later in Nigeria effectively took the workforce away from agriculture to seek some of the energy wealth in the cities. This caused the rapid and unplanned growth of cities—with commensurate increases in poverty and violence—while at the same time reducing Nigeria from a net food exporter to an import-dependent nation. A number of African leaders have begun stressing the need for a return to agriculture as a core of national economic success and have begun moves to encourage investment and political and infrastructural support for the primary sector.

The United Nations in 2000 adopted the Millennium Development Goals as a means of creating a focus for reducing poverty by 2015. Critics of this approach, however, have said that these goals risk labeling some African states as “failures,” even though they have made strides in achieving, for example, improvements in education in a timeframe that was far shorter than one in which the United States made comparable progress.

Nonetheless, Africa's new centrality as an energy and mineral resource for the world has concentrated a growing level of policy interest in the continent from the industrialized world, which has seen the merit in fighting HIV/AIDS. This attention is likely to increase, with benefits for African economies, particularly as competition for resources grows among the United States, Europe, and China. The PRC has already displaced a number of Western companies for priority in minerals development and in energy projects in Africa, and this competition will become politically significant, both in Africa and in the industrial societies, over the coming decade.

This, in turn, will factor into the costs of energy and raw materials to U.S. and global consumers. The sharp spike in world oil prices in 2008 was partially attributable to unrest in the Niger Delta region, suggesting an urgent need for international support for

conflict resolution and good governance in Africa.

USAFRICOM could well become a critical element in helping to galvanize U.S.-African relations, given that the command is more an instrument for military-led diplomacy than one for power projection. USAFRICOM, in fact, represents a milestone in the American employment of soft power and gives the United States a range of tools between pure diplomacy and force projection, especially given the reality that USAFRICOM can be used to assist African nations in resolving security, emergency response, and national development projects.

Toward Possible Incremental Solutions

The impatience of the international community with Africa has been a major impediment toward progress. Three more long-term approaches that the United States and other countries could take to advance progress would focus on education and diplomacy.

A first step toward a long-term investment in Africa would be to revitalize Africa Studies in universities. The level of knowledge about Africa in the Western world is much lower than it was during colonial times.

A second step toward advancing African development would reverse the current “brain drain” by providing more economic opportunities for African students to work in Africa. Building further African capacity in higher education, including through international partnerships with universities throughout the world, could contribute to this effort.

Thirdly, expanding diplomatic interaction with Africa would upgrade the level of attention paid to Africa and Africa's many problems and opportunities. Clearly diplomacy must avoid reducing Africa to single issues, whether terrorism or energy, and instead help to deal with Africa with all of its diversity.

Sudan and the Threat of Civil War

The forces pulling Sudan apart since its independence from Great Britain in 1956 accelerated over a 3-year period from 2006 to 2008. These trends combined with the growing weakness of central authority have significantly increased the potential for the disintegration of the Sudanese state, which would cause a humanitarian, human rights, political, and security crisis for the Horn of Africa greater than any it has witnessed in the past. Of key importance in this are the Darfur conflict and the deteriorating North-South relationship that are driving the current crisis.

The Darfur Crisis

Three ethnically African Darfur tribes—the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit—launched a rebellion against the Sudanese government in early 2003. These tribes rebelled over their brutal treatment by the Arabs who have long dominated the regional government in the province and the poor conditions caused by the underdevelopment of the region by successive central governments. In 2003–2004, the Sudanese government engaged in an “ethnic cleansing” campaign designed to eliminate the base of support for the rebellious tribes, in which they destroyed 2,700 villages, systematically executed any young men who might be potential recruits to the rebellion, and engaged in a campaign of intimidation that degenerated, either deliberately or accidentally, into the systematic mass rape of women and girls.

The ethnic cleansing campaign was carried out by the Sudanese air force (with the help of the Syrian air force) and the Janjaweed militia, a decades-old Arab supremacist movement (known previously as the Arab Gathering) whose aim has been the reclaiming of nomadic grazing areas encroached on by farmers from African tribes. The Arab Gathering was reorganized by the Sudanese government in 2003 after its regular military forces were repeatedly defeated in battles with the rebels. It was the third tribal war Darfur was to suffer in 20 years.

An estimated 250,000 people, most civilian, have died in the civil war that has driven more than 2 million people into internally displaced camps now supported by a massive international humanitarian aid effort run by UN aid agencies and international nongovernmental organizations. Sixty percent of the cost is funded by the U.S. Government. The vast majority of deaths—about 96 percent—occurred during the first 2 years of the rebellion. In 2007 and the first half of 2008, the death rate fell to an average of 100 per month, with the huge drop associated with the influx of international assistance to provide relatively secure camps for the internally displaced.

The Darfur peace agreement signed by one of the two main rebel factions in April 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria, has not brought peace to Darfur as it has not been implemented by the Sudanese government and has not had broad public support. One of the major rebel leaders—Abdul Wahid Nur—did not sign the agreement, has continued to mobilize public opposition to it, and has threatened to kill his own followers who support the agreement or participate in any negotiated peace settlement with the Sudanese govern-

ment. The peace talks sponsored by the UN and AU in Sirte, Libya, in October 2007 failed because Abdul Wahid Nur, along with other minor rebel leaders, refused to attend, arguing that there needed to be peace and security on the ground before negotiating any peace settlement.

The two original Darfur rebel factions have now atomized into, by some counts, as many as 50 smaller groups with no central command and control, a very tenuous connection between the armed rebel groups and the rebel political leaders, no supply system for provisioning the troops (which means they live off what they steal), and no clear political agenda. Negotiating a political settlement with 50 armed groups with no clear leader would be virtually impossible.

Four neighboring countries—Libya, Chad, Eritrea, and Egypt—along with some others have interests in Darfur, many of which are in conflict with each other. Egypt wishes peace and stability at nearly any price, as they fear the breakup of the Sudanese state or its takeover by radical Islamist forces. Chad is locked in an undeclared war with the Sudanese government driven by internal Zaghawa tribal politics, as President Idriss Deby of Chad is a Zaghawa and is a blood relation of one of the rebel leaders. The Zaghawa provide most of the strongest and most effective rebel military commanders and are most feared by the Sudanese government. Eritrea and Libya have both attempted unsuccessfully to broker (each separately outside the UN or AU negotiations) unification efforts among the rebels and a peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the rebels, as they see their regional prestige and political influence affected by their ability to bring peace. Both have more influence on the ground among the rebel factions than any Western country, the AU, or UN.

Unless the interests of the four regional powers are aligned with each other and with the contestants in the conflict, and the rebel groups have been unified into one chain of command bringing the military and political leadership together, no peace agreement will be possible. It is unlikely the Darfur crisis will be settled in the near or medium term; the best that can be hoped for is to prevent further deaths, stabilize the economic and social systems, and get UN/AU troops approved by the Security Council to increase security.

The authorized strength of the hybrid UN/AU force in Sudan, as set out by the Security Council

▼ *Continued on p. 322*

Counterterrorism in Africa

Combating terrorism in Africa did not begin on September 11, 2001. It began in the 1990s in Sudan, where Osama bin Laden operated and where an attack against Egyptian President Mubarak was organized.¹ Three years later, in 1998, al Qaeda cells blew up the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. In retaliation for these attacks, the United States, in addition to an attack in Afghanistan, bombed a chemical plant in Sudan, claiming that it was producing elements for chemical weapons for al Qaeda. From the time of these attacks, moreover, U.S. policy in Somalia became preoccupied with searching out, capturing, and killing the perpetrators of those attacks who were believed to have taken refuge there. More recently, terrorist acts in Europe, particularly the train attack in Spain, have been linked to cells in Morocco, Bosnia, and Algeria, which interact with North African residents in Europe, and both Morocco and Algeria have been victims of recent terrorist bombing attacks. Jihadists returning to these and other African countries from Iraq are considered a serious threat.

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. focus on terrorism in Africa has become much more pronounced. For the first time since 1993, the United States has deployed a sizeable contingent of U.S. troops on the continent, with the establishment in late 2002 of CJTF-HOA. In addition, President Bush announced a \$100 million counterterrorism initiative for East Africa and the Horn in 2003. Counterterrorism efforts became even more pronounced in U.S. Africa policy after the Islamic Courts Union took power in Mogadishu in 2006, leading to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, with tacit U.S. support, and the current fighting that now consumes that country.

At the same time, U.S. European Command spearheaded a series of training and military support operations in the Sahel, aimed at the Algeria-based Great Lakes Policy Forum; the program later blossomed into the much larger Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative that now involves both North African and Sahelian states. Most importantly, the Pentagon established USAFRICOM to bring together its varied programs on the continent, a sign of increasing U.S. focus on security in Africa. USAFRICOM will focus on two threats: terrorism and the security of energy supplies primarily from West Africa. As noted below, it also may well have to focus on the drug cartels gaining headway in Africa.

It is clear that Africa is no more immune to the threats from terrorism than any other continent. Its

combination of relatively weak states, ethnic and religious diversity and sometimes discrimination, its poverty, and in many places its “ungoverned spaces” all lend Africa a significant susceptibility to the growth of radical and sometimes internationally connected movements that employ terrorism. Some of these are aimed specifically at African governments (for example, the radical Islamic Maitatsine and “Taliban” in Nigeria, or the pseudo-Christian Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda); others clearly have a more international agenda (for example, the al Qaeda cells along the east coast of Africa and presumably the North Africans and Sudanese who have returned to their home countries from training and participating in the insurgency in Iraq).

However, while the war on terror usually relates to internationally linked terrorists, Africans face other security threats of equal or greater significance, posing a question of focus for U.S. as well as African counterterrorism efforts. There are several organized rebellions or insurgencies in Africa, while not always classified as terrorists, which wreak terrible havoc on African people and threaten national stability. These include various militias in eastern Congo, who have been the target of the International Criminal Court for their crimes against humanity, the insurgents in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, who have shut down more than 10 percent of Nigeria’s oil production, and the Janjaweed militia in the Darfur region of Sudan. It is notable that USAFRICOM lists the Lord’s Resistance Army, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, and the obscure Afrikaner Boeremag in South Africa along with a host of Islamic groups as among the “Terror Groups in Africa.”² Another problem is the growing use of African countries for transit of drugs to Europe. Guinea-Bissau, a severely poor country in that region, has become a major operational site for Colombian cartels. The link of narcotics and terrorism has been demonstrated in Latin America and could easily take hold in Africa.

African states have responded to this threat in different ways. In West Africa, Sahelian states have welcomed U.S. help in gaining control over their ungoverned spaces but still face unrest from within those territories. Counterterrorism programs in these countries in fact often run counter to efforts to pacify historically restive groups, such as the Taureg, who trade across boundaries and resent increased government security presence. Other countries, such as Kenya and South Africa, facing the growth of Islamic terrorist groups,

have struggled to balance the need for new security legislation with the preservation of newly gained civil rights. Some, like Chad and the previous government of Mauritania, have used the terrorist threat to solidify policies of suppression and antidemocratic practices, while solidifying U.S. support for their antiterrorist policies. And at least one, Zimbabwe, has turned the issue on its head, countering U.S. and other international criticism of its antidemocratic practices by labeling its domestic opponents as “terrorists.” At the same time, operating in isolation, Zimbabwe has become a major host to terrorist-related Islamist organizations, laundering funds and narcotics.


Two major challenges now loom in the African and U.S. responses to terrorism. Many Africans and some U.S. critics are concerned that USAFRICOM and other U.S. antiterrorism programs signal an increased militarization of U.S. policy in Africa. These critics argue that only a continual intensive attack on the root causes of terrorism and violence—that is, poverty, authoritarianism, discrimination, weak states, and similar conditions—will effectively combat such threats. They contend that a focus that relies too heavily on security will encourage authoritarian practices and undermine Africa’s move toward more democratic governance.

A second challenge relates to the continued ability of the Africa Union to provide leadership in conflict resolution and the timely provision of peacekeepers as it has done in recent years in Burundi, Darfur, and Côte d’Ivoire. Following the difficulties that the AU force in Darfur has encountered, the current security crisis in Somalia may have dragged the AU into an untenable situation that could fundamentally undermine the promise of that organization as a force for peacemaking. After promising a force of 8,000 to replace the Ethiopians in Somalia, the AU has mobilized only 2,000 from Uganda and Burundi, a force which has become caught up in the violence. This occurred at the same time that the AU may experience diminishing support from Nigeria—which has historically provided the bulk of African peacekeeping forces—and perhaps South Africa (both distracted by domestic security

▲ *Continued from p. 320*

in July 2007, is 19,555 military personnel and 6,432 police. The difficulties faced by the force in providing security are underscored by the fact that even by the end of March 2009 the total strength of the force numbered only 15,351 uniformed personnel.

DOD (Chad J. McNeelley)



U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey and Admiral Mullen meet with Egyptian minister of defense, Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, in Cairo, April 2009

and political issues), the most influential countries in Africa, as leaders change in those countries.

Fortunately for the United States, most African states share the concern over terrorism and are prepared to cooperate in fighting it for their own safety and security. They are also beset, however, with other priorities and limitations. The United States has the tools to respond broadly, with recent initiatives such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Millennium Challenge Account, and generally rising aid levels. It has skillful diplomats and the ability to call on the United Nations and others to advance complex political solutions, as will surely be needed in the Horn. Keeping these fully engaged along with direct security programs, the partnership with Africa in this area can be advanced and deepened.

NOTES

¹ Arguably, it began much earlier with such incidents as the terrorist assassination—asccribed to Islamists—of Sadat in October 1981, and the uprising of Islamist *Maitatsine* movement from Northern Nigeria, in Lagos in the early 1980s.

² Brigadier General Jeffrey Marshall, ARNG, “EUCOM Engagement in Africa,” briefing presented to the Conference on AFRICOM at Airlie House, VA, September 23, 2007, 16.

The Current Crisis

The carnage in Darfur has diverted international attention from the revived crisis between the north and the south, which could result in the dissolution of the Sudanese state, bringing with it much worse bloodshed than what Darfur has experienced. Sudan is no longer simply a humanitarian and

human rights crisis. Any disintegration of Sudan would open its neighbors to instability, prompt mass population movements across borders, and would likely draw destabilizing forces, which feed off state weakness, or worse, chaos, to the region. At one point in 2007, al Qaeda added Darfur to one of its usual web sites, portraying it as its new battleground with the West, and threatened that if Western troops disguised as UN peacekeeping troops were sent to Darfur, their holy warriors would follow them to do battle.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The United States played a central role in initiating the peace process that ended the civil war in 2002, facilitating the negotiations and acting as a guarantor of the agreement along with other countries. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 ended, albeit temporarily, 22 years of civil war between the north and the south, which claimed the lives of 2.5 million southerners. Many of the easiest provisions of the agreement have been implemented: new governments have been formed in the south and north, nearly \$4 billion in oil revenues have been transferred to the southern government's treasury, the northern army has been withdrawn from the south, the economy of the south is beginning to boom, and most importantly, there is no war, and millions of displaced people are beginning to return to their homes in the south.

The north and south came close to war in October and November 2007 over the failure of the north to implement the more transformational provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which would threaten the National Congress Party's (NCP's) hold on power. In July 2007, the north essentially rejected several generous compromises proposed by the south, which went beyond the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to resolve the status of Abyei, the disputed oil-rich area between the north and the south and ancestral seat for centuries of the Ngok Dinka kings (the most powerful southern tribe). These events, particularly the Abyei dispute, led to the south's withdrawal in September from the Government of National Unity, established under the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Command and control in both the Sudanese armed forces (SAF) and the SPLA are weak, and the potential for a local commander to initiate hostilities without any higher approval remains a grave risk. Omar Bashir and Salva Kiir, the northern and southern leaders, pulled back their sides from

war by mid-December 2007, just in time to avoid a further escalation of the crisis. In late December, the south rejoined the government, after eight of nine Comprehensive Peace Agreement issues were resolved, at least on paper.

An unavoidable flaw in the design of the agreement is that the northern and southern parties to the agreement charged with its implementation are preparing to unseat each other from power in the elections required by the agreement. Originally scheduled to take place in 2009, the elections have been delayed until at least 2010; the stated reason being that more time is required to conclude census work and establish election committees. Those elections could either reduce the pressure building up in the political system and force leaders to address many of the grievances of the people who live on the periphery of the country, or they could cause the dissolution of the country if the NCP attempts to steal the elections or refuses to leave office if they lose, or if the campaigns generate widespread ethnic violence. A political deal between the Nile River Arabs and Southern Sudanese to run in a coalition offers some chance of reducing the risk that the elections will destabilize the country.

Strategy of the National Congress Party

The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) had its roots in the National Islamic Front, the historic Salafist political party in Sudan, which unseated the last democratically elected government of Sudan in a coup in July 1989, in part to stop that government from signing a peace agreement between the north and south. Although the NCP remains an Islamist party, its driving motivation at this point is simply staying in power.

Successive governments of the Nile River Arabs have pursued a policy for 25 years to maintain themselves in power, which has exacerbated the ethnic, racial, and religious divisions in the country. This policy involved four tactics:

- arming destitute and poorly educated Arab tribes from the rural areas of the west to do the killing, unleashing them first against the south in the 1980s and then more recently against the Darfuris
- turning one rebel tribe against another by paying it off, arming one against another, promising land and jobs, and spreading disinformation
- causing massive population displacement of rebel tribes to destroy their way of life, culture, and value system, undermine their traditional tribal

leadership, weaken traditional family life, destroy the structure of their economy, and make them more vulnerable to conversion to radical Salafist teaching

■ keeping the fighting away from Khartoum at all costs, and developing the center (where the Nile River Arabs live) of the country at the expense of the periphery (where the rest of the population lives in poverty and underdevelopment).

This strategy worked for 25 years, but it is now rapidly unraveling. Arab tribes allied with the NCP in Khordofan and Darfur have switched sides or stayed neutral. Southern populations displaced by the war are now returning home angry about what the Nile River Arabs have visited on them. Twice now—once upon southern leader John Garang's death in 2005 and again when a large force of well-armed Darfuri rebels (with 200 vehicles) attacked Omdurman, a suburb of Khartoum, in May 2008—Khartoum has seen widespread violence. The war is now moving to the center. And finally, the south itself has been united, however fitfully and incompletely, and its diverse ethnic groups are now directing frustration and anger on the Arabs in the north. The Nile River Arabs know that they are at risk and that the war threatens to consume them as it approaches their center of power.

The NCP has clearly identified its vital interests and is driven by a nearly obsessive survival instinct. It is strongly believed that the leaders of the ruling party would not endanger their own survival or compromise their essential interests no matter how much international pressure is placed on them, unless that pressure itself posed a greater threat to the survival of the administration.

NCP leaders believe there is a conspiracy in the West in general, and in the United States in particular, to destabilize the country, remove them from power, and ultimately facilitate Sudan's breakup as a nation-state. They see—with some logic—the UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping force as a disguised attempt to carry out this strategy. The more aggressively the international community pursues war crime trials and the Western advocacy movement demands justice in Darfur, the greater and more aggressive the NCP resistance will be to the UN/AU peacekeeping force in Darfur.

The Nile River Arabs are growing more paranoid, defensive, and fearful that they will be unable to resist much longer their adversaries in the west and the south. As a result, they are more obstructionist, difficult to deal with, and insecure.

Economic growth in Sudan, driven by rising oil revenues, has in the past provided the NCP and the Nile River Arabs who run it with the revenue to insulate themselves from outside pressure, allowed them to buy off groups within the country that oppose them, ensured the Arabs in the center of the country are prosperous and unemployment low, guaranteed a growth rate of 12 to 14 percent per year, and allowed them to arm themselves and support a massive internal security apparatus that has kept them in power. Despite this revenue, the forces of dissolution are growing more powerful and are causing unease among the prosperous business community in the center. The U.S. economic sanctions regime put in place during the Clinton administration and then increased, expanded, and extended by President Bush in his Executive order of April 2007 makes it illegal for the United States to do business with or use dollars in trade with dozens of commercial enterprises associated with the Sudanese military and security apparatus, which provides their funding outside the regular budgetary processes. This new sanction has caused enough havoc in the banking and financial system of the country that the Sudanese business community has begun pressing the government for a resolution of the crisis and a normalization of relations with the outside world.

Military Balance of Power

Unlike most authoritarian governments, the Sudanese state does not have a monopoly on the use of violence. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was formed by John Garang when he began his revolt against the Nile River Arabs in 1983, and now has 22 years of combat experience. It has a larger infantry than the Sudanese government's army does. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement specifically allows international assistance in transforming the southern military, which the U.S. Government has been supporting, though this does not include weapons systems.

Two major factors have led to a serious reduction in the combat readiness of the SAF between 2003 and 2006. The first was a major purge of officers and enlisted men in 2005 and 2006. More than a thousand officers and tens of thousands of enlisted men who had been trained in the west or who displayed strong leadership skills were forced into early retirement because these two groups were seen as those most likely to lead a potential coup.

Secondly, in August 2006, the Bashir government embarked on a major military offensive in Darfur

that was a major embarrassment. The SAF were roundly defeated in every battle, as they have been since, demoralizing the military even more. The SAF do maintain a monopoly of airpower, though the air force is modest, and its armored units are much stronger than those of the south. The military power of the Sudanese army, particularly their infantry forces, is now substantially diminished.

Fragility of the State

Military vulnerability is not the north's only weakness at this moment. The Nile River Arabs fear that they are losing control of the country. Khartoum in 2007 and 2008 was pervaded by fear of what might happen if war were to break out between the north and south, or the Darfuri rebels were to take Khartoum. When John Garang died in a helicopter crash—under questionable circumstances—in July 2005, many of the several million southern migrants in Khartoum rioted, burning Arabs and looting their businesses, because they believed the accident was a disguised assassination. Some displaced Darfuri men raped Arab women in Khartoum, telling them this was in retaliation for the rape of their wives, sisters, and daughters.

Some northerners now refer to southerners as a cancer on the country and welcome their potential separation, a sentiment that would have been inconceivable in 2005 or 2006 when the unrelenting refrain of NCP leaders was that Western powers

were not doing enough to encourage the unity of the country and to discourage southern secession. The risk of widespread retributive violence in the greater Khartoum area is high if the war in the periphery were brought to the center of the country, a risk that should be the focus of any international or bilateral initiatives trying to resolve the crisis.

The NCP has become more repressive when it has sensed internal or outside threats to its survival. The Western strategy of confrontation has not succeeded in producing a solution to the Darfur crisis. The alternative U.S. approach in dealing with Sudan has been a policy of engagement. That policy produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the one forward-looking accomplishment of the Bashir government, and while it has been erratically implemented, it ended the war between the north and south and stabilized the country.

The United States could now consider a renewed push to resolve the tensions and pull Sudan back from the brink of dissolution. Elements of that “grand bargain” could include:

- a step-by-step normalization of relations between the United States and Sudan in exchange for full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the NCP, free and fair elections, proper execution of the referendum on southern independence in 2011, and full cooperation in the introduction of the remaining UN/AU troops in Darfur



UN (Fred Noy)

UN and AU leaders meet with rebel leaders before Darfur peace talks, October 2007

- resolution of the Abyei dispute through a land-for-oil bargain in which the north would agree to the Abyei Commission boundary sought by the south and the north would get a fixed percentage of the revenues of the oil fields there until they are depleted

- some way of resolving the International Criminal Court insistence on war crimes trials through some internal judicial process controlled by the Sudanese (which, under court protocols, would obviate the authority of the court)

- a political agreement of the SPLM (the southern political party) to run in a coalition with one or more of the Nile River Arab parties, which would also include some participation by the NCP in the new government without its control over the security apparatus of the country

- a broadened and accelerated U.S. Government reconstruction program in southern Sudan, which will increase the chances for southern success.

the 48 countries comprising sub-Saharan Africa have an average life expectancy of 50 years. It trails all other regions of the world in terms of virtually all poverty indicators. Twenty-seven percent of children under 5 are malnourished and about 41 percent of the population lives on less than a dollar a day. The primary school enrollment rate is 68 percent.

However, in the past few years, annual economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa has exceeded 5 percent. Since 1996, 25 countries have sustained relatively high growth—at least 4 percent annually—and are making some progress in reducing poverty. More than half have reduced child malnutrition and mortality and increased access to clean water, and a few are reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Background

Underlying the region's underdevelopment is anemic long-term economic growth. Between 1960 and 2005, income per capita grew at about one-fifth the average rate for other developing countries (0.5 versus 2.5 percent). Many factors explain this, starting with the colonial legacy. Borders drawn by European colonial powers resulted in a highly fragmented region: 48 generally very small states, including 15 landlocked and 6 island ones. This resulted in small markets and higher intraregional transportation costs than any other region in the world. The colonial powers left little by way of capable institutions and trained Africans.

However, 40 to 50 years after the African nations gained independence, their disappointing performance should not be laid only at the feet of the colonial powers. With numerous coups, conflicts, and poor policies, many governments have struggled to establish stability and legitimate, effective governance. Donors share responsibility, as foreign aid often promoted Cold War or other foreign policy priorities more than development. In the 1980s, for example, Zaire and Somalia were among the U.S. Government's largest aid recipients. Furthermore, donor efforts have not always been well designed or executed, and some approaches, such as support for import substitution, have been discredited. At the same time, external powers have often exerted overwhelming pressures to shape African governance and actions in the postcolonial era.

Key Issues

Low Economic Growth. Without self-sustaining growth, nations will depend on receiving foreign aid or exploiting their natural resources to reduce



UN (Stuart Price)

Chinese engineers unload equipment kits upon arrival at Nyala, Sudan, as part of UN–African Union Mission in Darfur

Challenge of African Development

Helping Africa reduce poverty and achieve self-sustaining development is the greatest humanitarian challenge facing the international community and the United States. It is also an important security challenge. Africa's underdevelopment breeds extremism, crime, and disease, which can spread rapidly with globalization.

Excluding the relatively advanced countries of North Africa, where life expectancy exceeds 71 years,

poverty. While 13 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have achieved middle-income status, 9 others have regressed since 1960. Growth was especially weak during 1974–1995 but has improved. The two countries with the most remarkable turnarounds were Mozambique and Rwanda, which averaged 8.3 and 7.6 percent annual growth rates respectively, during 1996–2005. Their success is attributable to both stability and improved economic policies.

Low levels and productivity of investment—driven by geography, demography, and government policy—have constrained regional economies. Geographic drawbacks include the region's fragmentation, landlocked and island economies, and disease-prone tropical location. High fertility rates have resulted in a larger and younger population. AIDS has decimated the most productive part of the region's population, especially in southern Africa. Bad policy has helped make the cost of doing business higher than in any other region.

While African governments and donors are working in these areas, regional integration, infrastructure, and higher education require more attention. Redrawing borders to reduce fragmentation is off the table, but regional investment should be promoted to gain cross-border economies of scale, such as the West African gas pipeline network. There should also be increased support to subregional intergovernmental organizations, whose institutional capacity is—with some exceptions, such as ECOWAS—weak, for reducing tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and for research in agriculture and other areas of common interest.

Landlocked countries such as Uganda suffer greatly when coastal countries such as Kenya allow their ports, roads, and rail networks to deteriorate. Greater investment is needed in rural and trunk roads, energy, communications, and ports. Except in a few countries supported by the Millennium Challenge Account, U.S. foreign aid for infrastructure has been insignificant in recent years.


To reduce poverty, investing in primary education, especially for girls, is vital. Here, there has been significant support by African governments and donors, including the United States. With the growing youth bulge, more effort is needed for vocational training to increase productive youth employment and lessen susceptibility to recruitment by extremist or criminal elements. More investment is also needed in higher education to build a larger workforce that can take advantage of new technologies to enhance business productivity. The United States has provided little

foreign aid for higher education in the past decade.

Poor Governance. The World Bank assesses governance according to six indicators:

- voice and accountability
- political stability
- government effectiveness
- regulatory quality
- rule of law
- control of corruption.

Judged against these, performance has generally been dismal; only the former Soviet Union scores worse in a majority of indicators. While half of sub-Saharan African countries are oil or mineral exporters, for most this has been a curse. Resource revenues have reduced incentives to promote other areas of the economy (most particularly agriculture), increased volatility of revenues, and enabled leaders



UN (Stuart Price)

UN–African Union Mission in Darfur officials meet with Arab nomads as part of ongoing efforts to consult with all parties and groups affected by the 5-year conflict


to rely less on taxation from their citizens, and consequently, to be less accountable to them.

Lack of accountability has resulted in inappropriate public expenditure; fewer and less effective government services, such as for education and health; and policies favoring narrow interests. It has also led to legendary corruption, which erodes public trust in government. In Transparency International's


▼ *Continued on p. 330*

Countries with the Largest Numbers of Refugees and Internally Displaced


Internally displaced
 Refugees
 (total in millions)




Uganda, 1.86



Sudan, 1.52



Cote d'Ivoire, 0.74



Democratic Republic of Congo, 0.70



Somalia, 0.40



Chad, 0.40



Central African Republic, 0.16



Zambia, 0.12

China's Growing Interest In Africa

The United States and the Western European countries have long possessed significant strategic interests in Africa, stemming from its geographic location, valuable resources, historic links, and, since September 11, 2001, its role in the Global War on Terror. But now China, too, perceives a strategic interest in Africa, both as a source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods. The Chinese have acquired part or majority ownership of oil ventures in Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, and Sudan, and have mining interests in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To promote their objectives, the Chinese have provided favored trading partners with arms, military gear, and military services, causing concern in the United States. Although denying any connection to these Chinese initiatives, the United States is also increasing its military-support activities in Africa, giving the impression of a U.S.-Chinese arms rivalry.


► **Recipients of U.S. military aid to Africa include:** *Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, *Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, *Mali, *Mauritania, Mauritius, *Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, *Niger, *Nigeria, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Sao Tome e Principe, *Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, *Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia.


*Member, Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership

► **Recipients of Chinese arms sales and military aid to Africa include:** Burkina Faso, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Sources: U.S. aid: U.S. Dept. of State, *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations*, Fiscal Year 2009 (Washington, D.C., 2008). Chinese data: Amnesty International, *People's Republic of China: Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses: The Flow of Arms Continues* (London, 2006).

Leading Oil Producers in Africa





▲ *Continued from p. 327*

2007 Corruption Perceptions Index covering 179 countries, Botswana was the only African country among the 40 least corrupt. Through elections, a free press, and parliamentary scrutiny, democracy improves accountability. Africa's 8 countries ranked among the 80 least corrupt are all electoral democracies judged free or partly free (in terms of individual political rights and civil liberties) by Freedom House. Yet among sub-Saharan Africa's 16 most corrupt countries, only 5 are electoral democracies and 4 judged free or partly free.

Most regional countries have faltered in building capable government institutions and transparent processes. Brain drain and HIV/AIDS have decimated government ranks in some countries, which have made the economic growth rates in recent years significant and remarkable. Many governments have built complex regulatory systems beyond their capacity to administer and the private sector's ability to comply. Simplification, such as eliminating steps required to start a new business, reduces demands on government, enables more consistent enforcement, and lessens opportunities for corruption.

Botswana demonstrates that good governance is possible in a resource-rich economy. Key to its success has been prudent leadership and concern for accountability and rule of law. Its government has imposed self-discipline in spending mineral revenues, requires minimum rates of return for public investments, and sets standards for service delivery. While the United States and other donors should invest in capacity-building of government institutions, they should focus more on helping governments learn from the experience of Botswana and other good regional performers.

Conflict. If making productive investment in Africa is difficult during stable times, it is nearly impossible in times of conflict. Although the number of conflicts in Africa has fallen in recent years, many remain and others loom. The costs of a civil war worldwide are huge, reducing economic growth by an estimated 2.3 percent per year over the typical 7-year duration. Moreover, conflict spills over to neighboring countries with refugees and loss of transport routes, export proceeds, and remittances. When ethnic violence in Kenya erupted after the elections in December 2007, processing of credit card transactions in Tanzania nearly ground to a halt because they were cleared in Nairobi. In human terms, conflict has been devastating, causing millions

of deaths, even more people displaced, destruction of livelihoods, and breakdown in social services.

The largest ongoing conflicts are in Sudan, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. The first two have each already resulted in 2 to 4 million lives lost, while all three have resulted in millions more refugees and internally displaced, often leading to conflict being carried into neighboring states, such as (in the case of the Sudanese fighting) Chad. Several neighboring countries have supported or been directly engaged in the fighting. Many other countries have more localized conflicts occurring in regions often distant from their capitals, such as in northern Uganda, Ethiopia's Ogaden, and Nigeria's Niger Delta. Still others, once in conflict but now peaceful such as Sierra Leone, are fragile and could revert to conflict; recidivism within 10 years is about 50 percent.

The causes of conflict are many and complex, and deep understanding of local contexts is imperative if there is to be success in preventing or mitigating them. Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa has become a growth industry for governments and academia. At times, African mediation of conflicts has been superb, but unfortunately, resources available to African leaders to resolve conflicts in their region has too often been lacking. A major case was the inability of African governments to field operational transport aircraft to insert peacekeepers into the Darfur conflict region, a problem which could have been resolved by the provision of C-130 spare parts to the Nigerian air force. The quiet diplomacy of South African President Thabo Mbeki in Zimbabwe has been perceived as ineffective in stemming the plunge of a regional economic powerhouse into abject poverty and chaos, although a significant goal of South Africa in mediating the Zimbabwe dispute was to constrain—rather than inflame—the flow of Zimbabwean refugees to South Africa. In this respect, Mbeki was relatively successful, and conscious of the fact that HIV-initiated diseases, such as new forms of tuberculosis, were being carried into South Africa from Zimbabwe, and potentially could be carried to the world community.

Significantly, African peacekeepers have proven invaluable in resolving regional conflicts, at high casualty costs to the donor forces, such as the high loss of Nigerian personnel in support of U.S. efforts in Somalia, or in taking the lead in Liberian and Sierra Leonean peacekeeping.

Given that it is unlikely that either the United States or European Union wishes to field substantial forces to resolve African conflicts, more needs to be

done to support the capabilities of African forces so that they can be easily and efficiently transported in to peacekeeping areas, and then adequately supported there.

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the most important arm of the preeminent regional organization on the continent, has a secretariat of just four professional staff. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the only subregional organization focusing on conflict in the violence-prone Horn of Africa, is still ineffective 20 years after its creation because of limited funding and staffing as well as interstate conflict. Donors have made efforts to build the capacity of such organizations, and they should do more, but the need for strong African leadership and staffing is paramount.

Seizing the Challenge

Promoting economic growth, improving governance, and reducing conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are long-term challenges that will face the international community and future U.S. administrations. For the United States, effective engagement and progress might focus on four areas: actively engaging in helping resolve conflicts, promoting African leadership in addressing these challenges, building unity of effort among international and U.S. Government agencies engaged in the region, and reestablishing a leading intellectual role for the United States.

Engage in Conflict Resolution. U.S. engagement and leadership in leveraging implementation of agreed obligations under international law, such as in the case of the Eritrea-Ethiopia impasse, could contribute to securing the peace and help reduce or eliminate the regional spillover impact of such seemingly intractable conflicts. Peace, stability, and security would lay a solid foundation for Africa's rapid and sustainable development and allow African states to focus their resources and efforts on addressing their domestic problems.

Promote African Leadership. While some foreign assistance from the United States and other donors has been useful, much has actually undermined African development by fostering dependency and lack of African leadership. For example, programs to fight HIV/AIDS have proven most effective in countries such as Uganda, which have shown strong political leadership from the top. Other African leaders need to do much better, even though, for example, HIV/AIDS had been less of a problem for Nigeria until that country was asked to insert peacekeeping forces into Liberia to resolve the civil war there; this

resulted in homecoming Nigerian troops suffering a 15 percent contagion rate, with consequent impact on Nigerian society, as a penalty for having undertaken the onerous and protracted humanitarian task on behalf of the international community.

The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief should rebalance its efforts to focus less on one-off grants and more on promoting leadership and building capacity of governments to address the HIV/AIDS scourge over the long term and to deal with linked, consequent diseases, such as the new strain of tuberculosis that evolved from the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Zimbabwe. With smart diplomacy and a dose of humility, the U.S. Government should promote African leadership in identifying and resolving African problems. Significantly, Africans responded to the program of "African solutions to African problems," sponsored by Nigeria's leadership under then-President Ibrahim Babangida. The United States should also help strengthen African government institutions and enhance their partnership with private business and civil society. Furthermore, it should promote regional approaches, encouraging Africans to work with each other in attacking common problems, to pressure each other to do better, and to learn from each other what works best and what does not.

Achieve U.S. Unity of Effort. It is not only Africa that is fragmented. So is U.S. Government foreign assistance to the continent, which is now provided by more than 20 governmental agencies and departments. While the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) used to provide the majority of U.S. foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa, its share has declined markedly in favor of the Millennium Challenge Account, President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and other agencies. Coordination among them is often lacking. At times, policies and assistance programs work at cross purposes, such as subsidies for American cotton growers undermining several African economies, assisted by USAID, that rely on cotton exports. The 2007 creation of the Bureau of Foreign Assistance in the State Department was a positive step in integrating aid provided by State and USAID. It helped make aid more supportive of U.S. strategy, but it does not govern aid channeled through other agencies and its implementation has been flawed. Moreover, it has not reduced congressional earmarks and directives, which result in micromanagement of the aid budget in Africa and a loss of focus. Aid reform needs to encompass all U.S. foreign aid, tie it better to other tools of statecraft, and get the administration and Congress focusing together

on fewer priorities. Several commissions and scholars have recently proposed how to accomplish this.

Regain Intellectual Leadership. While the U.S. Government is still the largest donor in Africa, it has ceded intellectual leadership to other donors in many areas. Still strong in health, it lacks capacity in key areas for Africa's development, such as infrastructure and higher education. More broadly, our ability to provide leadership through knowledge and partnerships on the ground has suffered through acute staff shortages, caused by a USAID reduction in force in the late 1990s, insufficient recruitment by State and USAID, and redeployment to Afghanistan and Iraq. Good ideas are often more powerful than funding, but they depend on staff with world-class expertise and local knowledge. They do not all have to be American. Local recruitment of qualified African professionals is highly cost effective and should be expanded. With added expertise, the United States will be better positioned to listen to and work with partners on the ground, monitor developments, and lead in areas of greatest concern. [gsa](#)

NOTES

¹ By modern definition, the Maghreb as a geopolitical grouping is now taken to include Algeria, Ceuta (a Spanish exclave), Libya, Mauritania, Melilla (a Spanish exclave), Morocco (including Western Sahara), and Tunisia.

² Morocco and the United States in 2004 signed a Free Trade Agreement, which was regarded an important step toward President Bush's vision of a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. The treaty was ratified by Congress on July 22, 2004.

³ The revolutionary group, Tigray People's Liberation Front, when it led the coalition that took power in Addis Ababa with the collapse of the Ethiopian Dergue in 1991, agreed voluntarily to cede the Ethiopian territory of Eritrea to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, which had been an ally in fighting the Dergue government of Ethiopia. Despite the voluntary nature of that redrawing of the national borders, disputes developed between Eritrea and Ethiopia, leading to conventional war between the two. Significantly, however, Ethiopia was not a nation that came into being as a result of European colonization, and therefore could be said to be exempt from the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) ruling. Similarly, the Kingdom of Swaziland was not a colonial creation, but had voluntarily ceded management of the state to the United Kingdom as a Protectorate, and thus could be said to be exempt from the OAU/AU stricture, and could therefore—as the United Kingdom in fact recommended when it departed in 1960—demand the return of Swazi territory, which had been administratively handed by Britain to South Africa

and Mozambique, without legal authority. Also, the creation of Somalia in 1960 was a voluntary union between two already independent states (the former British Somaliland and former Italian Somaliland), and therefore outside the OAU/AU stricture, which means that when the former British Somaliland withdrew in 1991 from the Somalia union, following the collapse of the Siad Barre administration, Somaliland's legal sovereignty was theoretically intact, although no AU states have yet formally recognized Somaliland's sovereignty. There have been other moves to redraw African boundaries in areas that were covered by the OAU/AU stricture, such as the attempt to create the state of Biafra out of Nigeria's energy-producing region in 1967; the Bakongo ethnic split between Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), and Angola remains unresolved since 1975; the contentious Kinyarwanda diaspora from 1959 to the present; and others.

⁴ In 2005, the combined gross domestic product for the Economic Community of West African States was estimated at \$139 billion.

⁵ For example, on January 1, 2006, Bush approved 37 sub-Saharan African countries as eligible for tariff preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This annual determination signifies which countries are making continued progress toward a market-based economy, rule of law, free trade, economic policies that would reduce poverty, and protection of workers' rights. Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Togo were the only countries in the region not approved for the AGOA.

⁶ A Bank of America report of April 2006 noted that U.S. imports of African oil reached 921 million barrels, or 18.7 percent of the U.S. total, in 2005. That surpassed imports from the Middle East, which supplied 839 million barrels, or 17 percent. Imports from Africa had increased by 51 percent since 2000 at the same time supplies from the Middle East fell from more than 900 million barrels to 839 million, or from 22 percent to 17 percent of total U.S. imports.

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