



Research Highlights

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About

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Post-Revolutionary Transitions: A Conference Report

On 14 March the Institute for National Strategic Studies in conjunction with the United States Institute of Peace held a conference to examine the process of transition from authoritarian rule using theoretical and historical examples and applying the common patterns to the dramatic changes in many Arab states. The goal was to extract those factors that drive the process of political and social change and assess if they can be altered to reach a positive end state.

The outcomes of transition from authoritarian rule can result in at least three different end states: 1) a drift to extremist or totalitarian rule, 2) a transition to various forms of democracy, and 3) some middle ground with a reformist version of the previous regime. **The six nations discussed at the conference seem to be headed in all three directions:**

1) In the drift towards totalitarian rule, moderates first acquire power but extremist elements soon seize power. The radicals succeed because they are driven by a clear and simple vision of the end state and are not afraid to use all means necessary to achieve that end. There are no guarantees of a positive outcome or that democracy will prevail in the short-term. This would seem to apply to Yemen, Libya and Iran.

2) Other revolutions have followed a less violent course and achieved democratic results. In the past 4 decades, revolutions in Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Balkans were, for the most part, peaceful, the opposition was not dominated by anti-democratic elements, the military was part of the process, the new government was able to deliver services, and there was agreement on a process for national reconciliation. Tunisia and Egypt appear to be examples of this.

3) Some protestors in the Middle East region seek a middle ground. Violence by military and security forces occurs, but efforts are made to negotiate compromises which would leave the ruling family in place with concessions on power sharing to elected parliaments. In this uncertain environment, radical clerics and political hard-liners vie for public space, foreign intervention is a reality, and moderates may find themselves marginalized. Bahrain is the primary example.

In general, historic evidence indicates that the second, desired end-state is more likely to occur if: 1) the revolution is relatively peaceful, 2) the opposition is well organized and not dominated by radical or anti-democratic forces,

3) the military agrees to establish civilian rule, remains intact, and has the support of the population, 4) the new government distances itself from the old regime, can deliver basic services and stabilize the economy, 5) civil society forms political parties and associations to sustain the new government, 6) a process for peaceful and democratic transitions of government is put in place, and 7) an independent and credible judiciary and a reconciliation process bind old wounds.

History also shows that constructive external involvement can have an impact. While most transitions are shaped by internal factors, the U.S. can influence the process during the transition by supporting peaceful efforts at transition on the part on non-extreme members of the opposition, seeking to avoid fragmentation of the military during the transition process, providing economic support to fledgling moderate governments, promoting the development of a democratic constitution and of viable political parties, and supporting rule of law and reconciliation processes.

Iraq: Captured Insights for Current Problems

At the annual conference of the International Studies Association, the Conflict Records Research Center's Mr. David Palkki presented a paper entitled "Coercive Disarmament: Lessons from Iraq." Mr. Palkki found that Iraq's disarmament refutes the notion that the factors leading to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) reversal are the inverse of those causing proliferation. In particular, he argues that the international economic sanctions were the most important factor driving Iraq's disarmament behavior.

A general consensus exists among scholars that in order to stem WMD proliferation and foster rollback, motivations must be satisfied that have driven proliferation. If states proliferate because leaders seek security or prestige, or because powerful bureaucracies stand to gain, the U.S. must improve the regime's security or its prestige, or provide offsets to those bureaucracies that would benefit from proliferation. The U.S. approach, on the other hand, often seeks to exacerbate the target country's sense of insecurity, humiliate its leadership, and further divide its government.

In short, the U.S. frequently pursues disarmament in exactly the ways that scholars suggest are bound to fail.

In the case of Saddam's Iraq, coercive disarmament succeeded. This paper focuses on why Iraq disarmed at a time when Iraqi security was plummeting in the face of increasing U.S. enmity and Iranian power, all while Iraqi prestige suffered from humiliating UN inspections.

The 1991 Gulf War: Perspectives from Baghdad

In conjunction with the Scowcroft Institute's "20th Anniversary Commemoration of the Beginning of Military Operations to Liberate Kuwait," the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) released transcripts of three meetings between Saddam Hussein and his inner circle during the onset of the Coalition's ground campaign to liberate Kuwait. The records reveal that as late as 24 February 1991, Saddam continued to hope that Soviet mediation efforts would succeed and believed that conflict on the ground could be avoided. When it became clear that the mediation efforts had failed, Saddam blamed the Soviet Union for intentionally misleading Iraq. Additionally, the tapes reveal that perceptions in Baghdad differed markedly from those in Washington. For instance, while President Bush described Iraq's burning of Kuwaiti oil wells as a scorched earth policy, Saddam told his advisors it was a necessary measure to create smoke to hinder Coalition bombings.

In addition to the Scowcroft Institute event, CRRC conducted a roundtable discussion on the findings of "The Mother of all Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War," which drew on part of the collection of over 800 captured documents and audio tapes from Saddam Hussein's regime. Kevin M. Woods, author of the study, noted that his extensive research in the Iraqi archive yielded no evidence that Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was influenced by statements of American diplomats. Dr. Thomas A. Keaney from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies/Johns Hopkins University discussed how Saddam viewed the US refusal to accept his initial proposal for

a withdrawal from Kuwait as evidence that American intentions were to depose him, rather than to ensure Kuwaiti sovereignty.

The captured records exemplify how Iraqi actions and decision-making during the 1991 conflict were based on Saddam's perceptions of the war, no matter how unreal. Conversations between Saddam and his top military advisors reveal that the Iraqis were often unaware of the facts on the ground or that they were largely ignored. Scholars and policymakers can learn how to better understand their own nations and adversaries through historical insights and lessons learned from the captured record collections at the CRRC.

The Biggest Myths about Saddam's Iraq

The Conflict Records Research Center's David Palkki presented research as a Dole Archive Visiting Fellow at the Dole Institute of Politics in which he challenged what he considers to be the biggest misunderstandings about Saddam's Iraq. He found that Saddam never trusted the U.S., despite limited U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and did not believe he had received a "green light" from U.S. officials (including U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie) to invade Kuwait. He argued that Saddam's conspiratorial and anti-Semitic public speech, reflected in his private discourse, was not merely insincere rhetoric for public consumption. Desire to deter Iranian aggression or for Saddam to appear strong before his lieutenants, he argued, did not significantly contribute to Iraq's resistance to allowing UN inspectors to verify Iraq's lack of WMD.

While many scholars have bemoaned that with Saddam's death the world lost key insights into his thinking and behavior, Mr. Palkki argued that Saddam's claims from captivity offered far fewer insights than the captured Iraqi records. He said that Saddam grandstanded and lied repeatedly in his trial as well as in meetings with his FBI interrogator, and suggested that scholars will benefit far more from analyzing the thousands of hours of audio files and millions of pages of captured records

than from anything Saddam might have revealed had he been allowed to live.

Actionable Foresight Workshop

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy, in partnership with the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, has been examining ways to strengthen the linkage between longer-term analysis and national security decision-making through a series of workshops. "Actionable foresight" is defined as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures that provides decision makers with the understanding needed to better influence the future environment. The key question is how to incorporate foresight into the national security process so that it is considered seriously—and acted upon—in planning and decision-making?

A series of three workshops over the past nine months, involving some 200 individuals from over 50 different US government agencies, the private sector, academia and 10 countries, considered ways in which to bridge the "consumer/producer" divide in foresight production and delivery. Notable participants included Peter Schwartz, Leon Fuerth, David Walker and Anne-Marie Slaughter. Key findings highlight the need for foresight to identify alternative possibilities in an increasingly complex, interconnected global security environment. Consumers and producers of foresight should recognize the speculative nature of foresight as opposed to evidence based recommendations. The interface between foresight and policy should occur regularly and be linked to ongoing decision making processes. Informal, persistent and diverse networks of foresight should include the whole of government and society. Foresight should be linked to current events in order to gain the attention of the policy maker. There is a need to create a central hub for facilitating and coordinating foresight. Foresight should be used to identify opportunities (preventive and responsive) to inform policy makers of actions that would help achieve specific goals. Project participants are seeking to build an

informal U.S. government Community of Interest on Actionable Foresight to exchange best practices in periodic meetings and virtual discussions.

Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation

The Center for Strategic Research's *Strategic Perspectives* No. 4 makes the case that organizational innovations were a major catalyst for the dramatic reversal of U.S. fortunes in Iraq. Dr. Lamb and his coauthor, Evan Munsing, explain how interagency high-value target teams put insurgent clandestine organizations on the defensive and gave population security measures a chance to take effect. The interagency teams pioneered by Special Operations Forces (SOF), along with other interagency constructs used by several Army brigade commanders, produced three innovations: networked-based targeting, fusion of intelligence and operations, and counterterrorist-counterinsurgency integration. These innovations required unprecedented collaboration between diverse departments and agencies and between SOF and conventional forces. The authors use ten variables from organizational literature to explain how these teams worked, and how they explain the United States' ability to reverse the deteriorating security situation in Iraq in 2007 better than just the popular explanations proffered to date (e.g. new U.S. leadership and strategy; the five brigade surge in U.S. forces; and U.S. financial support to Sunni tribal leaders).

This research leads to several important observations. 1) Organization matters in national security, and particularly interagency organization since the success of so many national security missions is utterly dependent upon better multi-agency collaboration. Moreover, as this study convincingly demonstrates, effective interagency collaboration requires much more than just good leadership. 2) Interagency teams are not well understood or respected in national security circles. This is ironic since, as this study demonstrates, our nation's best warriors thoroughly understand the importance of interagency collaboration. 3) Interagency teams cost little to nothing and deliver great performance improvements,

yet no effort is being made to gather data and study this phenomenon. This lack of attention increases the likelihood that the U.S. will fail to institutionalize this new capability, and that it will disappear from America's arsenal as quickly as it appeared (as have other organizational reforms in the past).

Military Professionalism: Introspection and Reflection on Basic Tenets and the Way Ahead

The Center for Strategic Conferences, in conjunction with the Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership, hosted a conference entitled "Military Professionalism: Introspection and Reflection on Basic Tenets and the Way Ahead." The conference was the first major activity in a continuing project on military professionalism requested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Key subjects discussed in the conference will inform future project conferences and activities and included: military professionalism and military ethos; who is a member of the military profession; challenges in providing military advice to political leaders; and professional disagreements on policy and when, if ever, is it appropriate to disagree with declared policy or strategy. Project products include a paper (<http://www.ndu.edu/INSEL/docUploaded/obligations%20of%20military%20professionalism.pdf>) on military professionalism that offers both conclusions about professional values to which most can subscribe, and judgments on application of the principles offered, based on those values, and finally thoughts on where and how to draw lines between acceptable and unacceptable conduct, both public and private. In addition to the paper, an annotated bibliography of relevant literature (<http://www.ndu.edu/INSEL/docUploaded/MilitaryProfessionalismBibliography.pdf>) was produced.

Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability

In the Center for Strategic Research's *Strategic Forum* No. 263, Elaine Bunn and Vincent Manzo conclude

that a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability would be a valuable strategic asset for some fleeting, denied, and difficult-to-reach targets. It would fill a gap in the U.S. conventional strike capability in some plausible high risk scenarios, contribute to a more versatile and credible U.S. strategic posture, and potentially enhance deterrence across a diverse spectrum of threats.

They also argue that a small number of CPGS weapons would not significantly affect the size of the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal or substitute for the ability of nuclear weapons to hold large sets of hard, deeply buried, or mobile targets at risk. Bunn and Manzo also address the nuclear ambiguity issue: the risk that either Russia or China might launch its nuclear forces due to uncertainty about the target of an ambiguous U.S. CPGS strike. Assuming functioning early warning systems, the totally-ballistic Convention Trident Modification (CTM) mitigates this risk better than the boost-glide Conventional Strike Missile, because Russia and Chinese officials would be better able to assess quickly whether a CTM would land on their territory.

Bunn and Manzo further suggest that the U.S. should make efforts to persuade Russia and China that a niche CPGS capability would not threaten the credibility of their nuclear deterrent forces. A logical starting point would be to engage Russia on implementing a joint data exchange for early warning information. China may be unwilling to discuss its early warning system plans and capabilities with the U.S. CPGS launch notification could be a useful starting point for a U.S.-Chinese discussion of CPGS.

Russia's Revival: Ambitions, Limitations, and Opportunities for the United States

In the Center for Strategic Research's *Strategic Perspectives* No. 3, Dr. John W. Parker examines the prospects for Russia's return to great power status in the decades ahead and the consequences for the U.S. Dr. Parker finds that if Russia wants to remain a mediocre power, it can do so without effort by not changing its current behavior patterns. But with growing corruption,

business stifling political controls, and dependency on raw materials exports retarding the full potential of Russia's growth, the country is facing the prospect of decades of decline relative to other more dynamic regional and world powers.

As a result, Moscow is already seeking to strengthen Russia's ties with Europe and the United States. The West is seen as crucial to Russia's modernization as well as a hedge against what may develop to Russia's east and south in coming decades. This process will bring consequences and opportunities for U.S. diplomacy and strategic development, some of which the Obama administration's policy of "reset" is already reaping. But Russian policy toward the U.S. is conditional on a U.S. approach that engages Russia in positive ways. If that policy were to change, it could push Russia and China closer together on some issues in an effort to constrain the U.S.

The PLA after Taiwan Rapprochement

Since 2008, economic and political rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait has been a welcome development, reducing the likelihood of war between the U.S. and China. In *Strategic Forum* No. 261, Michael A. Glosny from the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs analyzes the implications of deeper cross-strait rapprochement for China's relations with Asia and the U.S., and for People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization. Asian countries would be relieved by the removal of one of the major sources of potential regional conflict, but many countries would also worry that a rising China no longer constrained by a focus on Taiwan would use its increased power to challenge their interests. The U.S. would have similar concerns about an unconstrained China challenging its interests and would face demands for enhanced, credible defense commitments from regional countries.

Deeper rapprochement would free up resources currently devoted to military preparations for Taiwan contingencies and give the PLA new options. China's potential choices for PLA modernization include: relaxed modernization, domestic and continental concerns, anti-access

focus, assertive pursuit of regional maritime claims, and extra-regional activities. China's integration into the world economy and expanding interests are already leading to new pressures to take on additional missions, but deeper rapprochement will likely lead to a more thorough evaluation of the proper mix of roles and missions for the PLA. The direction of PLA modernization and how China uses its military can help alleviate or further exacerbate international concerns about a rising China that will become more powerful, but also less constrained by Taiwan.

Toward a Theory of Spacepower

The Center for Strategic Research's volume of commissioned papers entitled "Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays" serves as a starting point for continued discourse on ways to extend, modify, refine and integrate a broad range of viewpoints about human-initiated space activity; its relationship to our globalized society; and its economic, political, and security interactions. The book was written as a means to equip practitioners in the military, executive agencies, and Congress, as well as scholars and students at professional military institutions and universities, with the historical background and conceptual framework to navigate through and assess the challenges and opportunities of an increasingly complex space environment.

The book opens with a review of the building blocks for a theoretical study of spacepower, defining theory, explaining the possible goals of a theory and the role of theory in the formulation of strategy and policy, examining the relationship between international relations theory and social interactions in outer space, and identifying the physical constraints and technological obstacles facing space-faring actors. The second section highlights the connection between space and national security with a focus on the unique contribution of space capabilities to U.S. national security. It provides three perspectives on the difficult issues of space weapons, arms control, and U.S. national security strategy, and examines the relationship between spacepower, airpower, and cyberpower. The third section discusses the economic, civil, and commercial dimensions of spacepower,

examining the relationship between U.S. civil and national security space programs, commercial space, technological innovation, and globalization from both a historical and contemporary perspective. The final section of the book contemplates the future of spacepower, examining how the President has and should organize the U.S. government to exercise spacepower, offering suggestions for refining the international space law regime to facilitate sustainable security and economic opportunities in space, and exploring potential visions for U.S. space strategy.

Maximizing the Returns of Government Venture Capital Programs

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy's *Defense Horizons* No. 71, by Andrew S. Mara, examines how Government Venture Capital (GVC) initiatives can provide four key benefits to the government: a wider "window" on new technology development, an increased potential government supplier base, more leverage of private investment, and more rapid acquisition of new technologies.

In the paper, In-Q-Tel, OnPoint Technologies, and DeVenCI are used to illustrate the successes of the system, as well as areas that need improvement. Despite the fact that the Federal Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense have made substantial commitments in the venture capital community, knowledge of these programs throughout the government is limited. GVC programs have insight into many small technology companies and company information should be shared among government agencies to maximize the value of GVC investments. Challenges to transferring new technologies to the government include classification, timing, culture and incentive issues. GVC programs should rely on technology champions to increase the transfer rate of promising technologies.

Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement

In the Center for Strategic Research's *Strategic Forum* No. 266, Ambassador Luigi Einaudi observes that

Brazil's economic performance, political stability, and cultural vitality ensure that Brasilia's foreign and defense policies will help shape global as well as regional politics in the decades ahead. More than a Latin American or even Third World leader, Brazil has become an autonomous global power. Ambassador Einaudi argues U.S. relations with Brazil have evolved from an alliance during and immediately after World War II to skeptical distance today. Distrust is exacerbated by outmoded stereotypes and hubris on both sides. In light of President Obama's recent trip to Brazil, this essay provides an insightful look at potential ways to strengthen the U.S.-Brazil bilateral relationship and examines what both governments need to do in order to get there.

Mutually beneficial engagement requires Washington to welcome Brazil's emergence as a global power that is culturally and politically close to the U.S.; and for Brasilia, in turn, to realize that the U.S. accepts its rise and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it. Ambassador Einaudi concludes by suggesting three practical approaches that would have a substantial, positive impact: both countries should consult widely on global issues, strengthen personal and institutional ties, and learn to cooperate more effectively on conflict resolution, energy, and trade.

Assessing Military Benefits of S&T Investments in Micro Autonomous Systems Utilizing a "Gedanken" Experiment

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy's (CTNSP) *Defense & Technology Paper (DTP)* No. 80 by Albert Sciarretta, Joseph Mait, Richard Chait, Elizabeth Redden, and Jordan Willcox reports on the results of a "Gedanken" experiment (thought experiment), used to explore the potential military tactical benefits of micro-autonomous robotic systems. In a previous DTP, the CTNSP presented a variety of approaches for deriving the return on investment – in terms of warfighting capabilities – for Army science and technology (S&T) efforts. CTNSP sought to demonstrate parts of the methodology in the evaluation of an actual Army S&T

effort. The Army Research Laboratory's Micro-Autonomous Systems and Technology (MAST) Collaborative Technology Alliance (CTA) program was chosen to demonstrate the utility of the methodology because it offered significant future capabilities for the Army, provided a set of very robust present-day technical challenges, and offered a significant assessment challenge since it is focused on basic research.

A three-day event was conducted at Fort Benning, GA, with warfighters who had experience in small unit operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom; as well as with technical performers within the MAST CTA. The output provided the MAST CTA Cooperative Agreement Manager (CAM) with warfighter insights which proved to be useful for design considerations and future trade-off analyses. As hoped for in a cost-benefit analysis effort, it aided the MAST CTA CAM in developing his investment strategy.

Technical topics detailed in the paper of most interest to the warfighters were information fidelity, mobility, stealth, and scalable levels of autonomy; while the operational emphasis was on deployment, command and control, and lethal/non-lethal capabilities. The most important benefit for the MAST CTA CAM was his use of the warfighters' perspectives to assess the benefits of design approaches.

Exercise Northern Nexus

The Center for Applied Strategic Learning's (CASL) *Northern Nexus* exercise, conducted in support of NDU's CAPSTONE and International Student Management Office, examined the contours of the changing Arctic environment. The U.S. and international General and Flag Officer participants were asked to grapple with what might occur should the current ice melt trend continue, therefore allowing more non-traditional actors to access the Arctic.

One of the major exercise conclusions was that if boundary line disputes are not solved, some littoral nations may become incentivized to place restrictions (transit tariffs or regulations) on shipping companies

transiting the disputed waters. This may force shipping companies to take more dangerous routes where restrictions have not been put in place. The economic and environmental impact of a disaster occurring due to this type of scenario could pose severe challenges not only for shippers and the littoral states, but other nations who are seeking transit through the opening Arctic.

Another key discussion was centered on the need for the U.S. to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The participants noted that the U.S. follows the Convention as a matter of course, but the lack of ratification puts the U.S. at a disadvantage at the bargaining table. Overall, the U.S. and international participants walked away with a better understanding of the importance of the Arctic region as well as an increased comfort level in dealing with non-traditional crises in a multi-lateral environment.

Exercise Pivotal Crossroads

The Center for Applied Strategic Learning inaugural National Security Policy Analysis Forum (NSPAF) exercise, *Pivotal Crossroads*, focused on identifying the key economic and security challenges the Caspian Sea region faces and the potential impact on U.S. national interests. Building on the success of the Strategic Policy Forum (SPF) program, NSPAF is designed to bring Executive Branch senior officials and representatives from Capitol Hill together in order to discuss crises in the medium- to long-term.

Throughout the discussion, the interagency participants continued to stress the need to define our national interests in the region not only for Congress, the White House, and the American people, but to ensure that the goals the U.S. sets in the region are in line with the realities of the region. Perceptions of U.S. roles in the region vary between the Caspian Sea states, and as such, the U.S. Government must be sensitive to those realities.

Exercise Gulf Gambol

The Center for Applied Strategic Learning's (CASL) strategic policy exercise *Gulf Gambol* was conducted in support of the Reserve Component National Security

Course for the Joint Reserve Affairs Center (JRAC) and was designed to challenge participants to evaluate a scenario depicting a deteriorating security situation in Nigeria while applying the "DIME" analytic framework. It offered a hands-on introduction to national security policy and strategy formulation. Working through the DIME framework, JRAC seminar leaders guided student discussions and assessed security challenges to U.S. national interests posed by the scenario; identified and evaluated the interplay between U.S. domestic and third country actors, and the competing interests which inform and influence U.S. policy formulation; and developed a policy mindful of the aforementioned actors and interests. Students articulated several challenges of policy development during the post-exercise debrief. The difficulty of identifying and recognizing assumptions, the need for more time and information, and the challenge of thinking at the strategic level were some of the key post-exercise comments.

USDA Lessons Learned Report

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) provided field support in Afghanistan to facilitate the U.S. government's Agriculture Conference. The effort was designed to capture best practices and lessons learned from the experiences of actively serving U.S. Department of Agriculture advisors. In the project report, CCO's Sara Thannhauser and Bernie Carreau highlight the need to identify, and provide adequate authority to, one office to oversee all agriculture development projects in Afghanistan. The position of Agriculture Czar is a step in this direction, but without budget authority the office will be limited in its ability to control, prioritize and effectively coordinate all efforts in the field. Along with this, a need to increase the visibility of the Agriculture Czar was identified. Most advisors rarely, if ever, communicated with the Agriculture Policy Working Group. Finally, the research noted the importance of developing a list of all agriculture development programs underway in Afghanistan that detail how much money is being directed toward each project, all actors involved, and how the project furthers the overall strategy.

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